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On 31 December 2024, at 19:50 EET (17:50 UTC), Moldova's unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria stopped receiving natural gas supplies from Russia. Historically, Transnistria had covered most of Moldova's electricity needs through the Cuciurgan power station, which functioned with Russian gas supplied to Transnistria for free. However, with the termination of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria and the end of Moldovan purchases of Transnistrian electricity, the possibility of a humanitarian crisis in Transnistria has arisen, which could even lead to the collapse of the breakaway state and its reintegration into Moldova.

Background

Transnistria is an unrecognized breakaway state internationally recognized as part of Moldova. It is located mainly on the Moldovan left bank of the Dniester river. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Transnistria War of 1992 sparked between Moldova and the separatists in Transnistria. The latter won with the help of the Russian army present in the region, which is today organized into the Operational Group of Russian Forces, comprising about 1,500 troops. A majority of Transnistrians speak Russian as their first language, around half of them have Russian citizenship along with the Moldovan one and an internationally unrecognized referendum held in 2006 showed that over 95% of Transnistrians wanted to be annexed into Russia; allegations on irregularities and infringements in the referendum exist.

Ever since Moldova's independence, Moldova relied on the Cuciurgan power station, running on Russian natural gas supplied via Transnistria, to satisfy most of its electricity needs. The Cuciurgan power station is located in Transnistrian-held territory, and Moldova paid millions of euros to Transnistria every year in exchange for electricity at below-the-market prices, effectively financing separatism in its own territory. However, following Maia Sandu's victory in the 2020 Moldovan presidential election, Moldova has approached the European Union (EU), which has helped Moldova reduce its dependence on the Cuciurgan power station. Thus, Moldova planned to satisfy 53% of its electicity needs with power from the station in November 2024, a number that fell to 37% in December 2024. This figure had historically been at 90%.

Prelude

Negotiations with Gazprom and sackings in Moldova

On 5 December 2024, the Prime Minister of Moldova, Dorin Recean, announced that he had requested the resignation of the Minister of Energy, Victor Parlicov, as he was the person responsible for managing the energy sector and "he made mistakes that led us to this situation of crisis". Recean also requested the resignation of two other figures: Victor Bînzari, the general director of Energocom (the national electricity supplier company), as the company "did not manage to secure the gas needs for the winter period at the most advantageous prices"; and Sergiu Tofilat, a member of the supervisory board of Moldovagaz (the national gas supplier company), as he "blocked the procurement of gas by the responsible institutions when the prices were the most affordable". Recean also announced that he would directly assume the role that the energy minister had and that he called for the establishment of a state of emergency in energy starting from 16 December.

On the same day, 26 members of the Parliament of Moldova for the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS), the main opposition party, presented a motion of no confidence against the Recean Cabinet over the energy situation, also calling for early parliamentary elections. Ion Ceban, the Mayor of Chișinău and president of the National Alternative Movement (MAN), called for the resignation of the cabinet and the organisation of early parliamentary elections following Recean's sackings, and so did the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The Moldovan parliament rejected the motion on 13 December, with 55 votes against, 18 votes in favor and one abstention, well short of the 55 votes in favor required for a successful motion.

Declarations of states of emergency

On 11 December, Transnistria's legislature, the Supreme Council, approved a state of economic emergency for a period of 30 days as ordered by the President of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, in the face of the possible end of gas supplies to Transnistria. This measure foresaw the rationalization of gas consumption, the creation of a reserve of energy resources, the end of the export of energy resources with the exception of electricity and the preservation of human life and health.

The Moldovan parliament approved two days later the establishment of a nation-wide state of emergency for a period of 60 days, which would come into effect on 16 December. 56 of the 101 parliament members voted for its approval. Recean added that this was a necessary measure "so that this winter will be the last in which the Kremlin can threaten our energy security" and that "energy blackmail" would end with the completion of a high-voltage line between Chișinău and Romania, at the time under construction. Following this, the Romanian energy minister, Sebastian Burduja, announced that Romania would help Moldova overcome the energy crisis and that the Romanian energy companies Nuclearelectrica and Hidroelectrica were already in talks with Energocom to explore options to supply additional electricity to Moldova.

Gazprom's confirmation of the end of gas supplies

On 23 December, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR RF) alleged that President of Moldova Sandu had asked for a plan to take the Cuciurgan power station and Transnistria as a whole by force, that was no guarantee that she would not start a war in the region and that she "is out of her mind". Gazprom formally notified Moldovagaz on 28 December that gas supplies to Moldova would be completely stopped on 1 January 2025 at 08:00 MSK (07:00 in Moldova, 05:00 UTC). Gazprom cited Moldovagaz's alleged failure to fulfill its payment obligations under the contract as the reason, and it stated that it retained the right to completely terminate the agreement between the two and to demand compensations from Moldovagaz. In response, Recean announced that Moldova would not accept any debt invalidated by the international audit and that Russia was using energy as a political weapon. On the same day, Tiraspoltransgaz, Transnistria's largest gas supplier company, cut off the gas supply to several buildings of the Moldovan authorities in the Security Zone and in the city of Bender (Tighina).

Also on the same day, the opposition Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by former president Igor Dodon, called on the government, which it blamed for the crisis, to try to find solutions regarding the problem of the debt demanded by Gazprom and to re-establish dialogue with Russia to continue the supply of gas and prevent a humanitarian crisis. Recean condemned this call, denied the existence of Gazprom's demanded debt and referred to the Socialists as "political speculators of the Kremlin". Parliament member Radu Marian, of the incumbent Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), referred to the Socialists' behavior as traitorous for Moldova.

On 30 December, Sandu announced that the Moldovan government and its partners had developed a plan to provide humanitarian aid to the citizens in Transnistria. She later stated that the Transnistrian authorities had rejected help from Moldova. The Moldovan government increased compensation payments for the increase in energy prices for the period between December 2024 and March 2025. Thus, in December, 500 million Moldovan lei would be used to compensate about 670,000 beneficiaries. The Moldovan authorities accused Russia of trying to destabilise the country through energy blackmail in order to influence the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election and undermine Moldova's path towards Europe. Recean asked the Minister of Justice, Veronica Mihailov-Moraru, to prepare the legislative changes that would allow for the nationalization of Moldovagaz, of which at that time Gazprom owned half of all shares, Transnistria 13% and the Moldovan government 35.6%.

On 31 December, Bulgaria's energy minister, Vladimir Malinov [pl], declared that Bulgaria would help Moldova by providing the country with access to liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as through the public supplier company Bulgargaz, if Moldova requested it. Furthermore, Moldova's energy ministry announced that Energocom planned to cover 38% of Moldova's electricity needs for January 2025 from local production (over 127,000 megawatt-hours or 28% from the thermal power stations in Chișinău and Bălți, 46,000 MWh or 10% from renewable energy) and that the remaining 62% would be imported from Romania (over 178,000 MWh or 39% from OPCOM [el; ro]'s electricity market, 105,000 MWh or 23% from bilateral contracts).

Crisis

On 1 January 2025, at 07:00 EET (05:00 UTC), Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas to Europe through its territory. The supply of gas to Transnistria through Ukraine stopped earlier, on 31 December at 19:50 EET (17:50 UTC). As a result, heating and hot water were cut off in Transnistria. An exception was made for healthcare and residential care facilities. The Republican Clinical Hospital switched to diesel heating. 131 schools, 147 kindergartens and 130 administrative buildings were disconnected from heating. 40 kindergartens were kept heated, which would accommodate children whose parents were involved in mitigating the energy crisis. After the New Year holidays, schools switched to distance learning, similar to during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gas supplies were suspended for the private sector and rural areas, and the use of gas for cooking was permitted until the pressure of the network dropped to a critical level. Production facilities and hundreds of businesses put their operations on hold, leaving thousands of people unemployed. The energy company Tirasteploenergo urged residents to dress warmly, gather family members together in a single room, hang blankets or thick curtains over windows and balcony doors and use electric heaters, stating that it was forbidden to use gas or electric stoves to heat the apartment, as "this can lead to tragedy".

The Cuciurgan power station switched from gas to coal for power generation exactly at midnight on 1 January. Coal reserves would allow for 50 to 52 days of supply, during which Transnistria would have guaranteed electricity. The station produced that day 105 megawatts (out of a maximum of 157), while the Dubăsari Dam produced 8 MW (out of a maximum of 24). Transnistrian gas reserves amounted to 13 million cubic metres (460 million cubic feet), enough for 10 days in the north of the region and 20 days in the south, only to be used for cooking and not for heating. Three dozen heating and temporary accommodation points were equipped across Transnistria, ready to accommodate 1,325 people. The temperature at the Transnistrian capital of Tiraspol was set to drop to 1 °C (34 °F) on the night of 1 January. Commenting on the energy crisis, Transnistrian president Krasnoselsky stated that "we knew about this possibility , prepared for it and were not caught off guard".

Regarding the rest of Moldova, electricity supplies from the Cuciurgan power station stopped completely. Moldova's Termoelectrica company put the CET-1 power station [ro; ru; uk] in operation. It produced 6 MW, while the CET-2 power station [ro; ru; uk] produced 174–175 MW. Energocom stated that the deficit of the electricity system in government-held Moldova was about 600 MW, to be covered not only from the Romanian electricity market and bilateral contracts, but also from Ukraine's Energoatom state-owned energy company. Electricity imported from Romania arrived via the Isaccea–Vulcănești line. Consumption on both banks of the Dniester for 1 January was lower than the forecasted 825 MW, at 756 MW at the time of writing of an article by Moldovan news website NewsMaker. Moldovan foreign policy presidential adviser Olga Roșca declared to the BBC that "we're treating this not as an energy crisis but a security crisis", which would have been instigated by Russia to destabilize the country socially and economically and "create demand for a return of pro-Russian forces to power" ahead of the 2025 parliamentary election in Moldova.

On 2 January, Transnistria's Minister of Economic Development, Sergey Obolonik [ru], stated that all industrial enterprises in Transnistria had stopped their activities, with the exception of those necessary to maintain food security in the breakaway state. He warned of "irreversible changes" as "enterprises will lose the ability to start up" if the gas problem was not resolved soon. He also stated that almost 75,000 households had already been disconnected from the supply of gas, while 116,000 would receive a limited amount of gas for the moment. Moldovagaz and Energocom offered Tiraspoltransgaz assistance, including technical and commercial support, to organise the purchase of gas from any European gas platform at market price. Tiraspoltransgaz rejected this offer, with the Transnistrian authorities stating that this would entail buying gas at a higher price and that a resumption of gas supplies by Gazprom was expected in virtue of the contract expiring in 2026. A Moldovan government source declared the next day to the American digital newspaper Politico that they believed this decision had come from Russia rather than from the Transnistrian authorities. Regarding the export of energy from Romania to Moldova, Romanian energy minister Burduja declared "I consider that we have a moral duty to stand by our brothers across the Prut with everything possible".

On 3 January, Moldova's National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) increased electricity tariffs for Premier Energy consumers in the centre and south of the country by 75% (from 2.34 to 4.10 lei per kilowatt-hour) and ​​for FEE-Nord consumers in the north by 65% (from 2.84 to 4.68 lei per kWh). Heating tariffs were also increased by 38% in Chișinău, 17% in Bălți and 12% in Comrat. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection announced it would compensate the increase in energy tariffs to those who had already submitted compensation requests. The volume of gas exports from Romania to Moldova, carried out primarily through the Iași–Chișinău pipeline, reached a record level of 5 million m (180 million cu ft) of gas. In Transnistria, power cuts were introduced from 18:00 to 22:00, lasting one hour and rotating between different parts of the republic, as the energy system would not be producing enough electricity to meet the population's consumption level. Recean described the end of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria as a security crisis for Moldova with the aim of allowing a pro-Russian victory in the upcoming parliamentary election and "transforming our territory into a weapon against Ukraine", adding that Russia had "betrayed" and "isolated" Transnistria. Furthermore, the Moldovan government announced it had alternative energy sources (biomass systems, generators), humanitarian aid and essential medical supplies ready to be sent to Transnistria if the separatist authorities accepted the help. This offer was also rejected.

On 4 January, Constantin Borosan, secretary of state of the Ministry of Energy, announced that Moldova was registering an energy consumption level lower than expected due to the population's receptivity of the authorities' calls to save energy. Alexandr Petkov, the Mayor of Bălți, called on the Moldovan government to compensate for the damages caused to Bălți by its "incompetent policies" regarding energy security in the face of increased electricity and heating tariffs. In Transnistria, Moldova Steel Works director Serghei Kornev stated that the steel plant in Rîbnița had ceased operations and could not be reactivated in the near future, leaving over 2,000 workers unemployed and creating risks for the Transnistrian economy.

Analysis

Potential humanitarian crisis in Transnistria

According to Oleg Serebrian, Moldova's Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, the energy crisis caused by the end of Russian gas exports to Transnistria could cause a "much more complicated" situation than that caused by the 2022–2023 Moldovan energy crisis. As he stated, Transnistria's population could face a humanitarian crisis, as it could be left without gas, coal, and electricity. On his part, Recean stated that Transnistrians could remain without heat and electricity, which could turn into a humanitarian catastrophe. Some 300,000 people lived in Transnistria at the time according to him; over 90% of them had Moldovan citizenship according to Serebrian.

Ukrainian journalist Serhii Sydorenko argued in an article for European Pravda that the end of free Russian gas supplies to Transnistria would cause the disappearance of most of Transnistria's revenues and the collapse of its public budget. This would jeopardize the continuation of below-the-market prices for gas, electricity and heating for the Transnistrian population. The strong reduction of revenue and the new costs that would appear as a result of the energy crisis would not allow it to be mitigated through austerity measures. Furthermore, a shortage of energy resources would aggravate the humanitarian crisis; problems with fuel needed for heating could generate a severe social and economic disaster in the region according to Sydorenko. One of the first consequences of this, he argued, could be a rapid outflow of people, especially young and working-age people, from Transnistria, further exacerbating the region's administrative and budgetary crisis. He considered the prospect of Transnistria closing its "borders" to stop this outflow impossible.

Geopolitical implications

According to Sydorenko, the humanitarian crisis that could arise from the end of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria would lead to a rapid collapse of the separatist regime. Transnistria would be forced to negotiate a reintegration back into Moldova, which could happen quickly if the Moldovan authorities showed flexibility. Parlicov expressed similar hopes; in a TV8 programme on 27 November 2024, he stated that the region could be reintegrated by 2026 if Moldova established a good interaction with the Transnistrian authorities.

Sydorenko argued that Moldova would not lack financial and expert assistance from Western partners to tackle the crisis. For the West, the costs would be moderate given the region's small size and population. Furthermore, the West could regard this project as a chance to generate a model of reintegration for the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine. Ukraine's case in particular would pose significantly larger and more complex problems than Transnistria's reintegration, and the West could be interested in using Transnistria as a "testing ground" for its approaches and theories before treating Ukraine's more complex case.

In an article for the Harvard International Review, Lizzie Place noted that the Moldovan government could theoretically cut off all energy payments to Transnistria to put pressure on the region to reintegrate. However, the economic collapse and humanitarian crisis this would pose for its own citizens would make it hesitant to implement such a scenario, she considered. Moldovan scholar Ion Marandici regarded a gradual decrease in energy payments to Transnistria coupled with humanitarian assistance for residents as a more realistic scenario for reintegration.

Russian disinformation

In the face of the possible crisis in Transnistria, Russian propagandists and influence agents stepped up accusations against Moldova's leadership. These accusations included narratives that Sandu had ordered and prepared a military takeover of Transnistria, that she had refused to discuss with Ukraine the continuation of the transit of gas, that Moldova would take "revenge" on Transnistria if Russia refused to continue supplying gas to Moldova and that the EU would be passive or even tacitly supportive of a new crisis in Russia's sphere of influence.

Following the SVR RF's 23 December 2024 intelligence report, Russian state-owned news agency TASS stated on Telegram that the EU did not know how to calm "emotionally unstable" Sandu, who was preparing a military intervention into Transnistria. Russian state-owned news agencies RT and RIA Novosti also shared on Telegram the information in the SVR RF's report; as of 25 December, TASS' publication garnered nearly 62,000 views on the platform, RT's gained over 222,000 and RIA Novosti's gained over 633,000. Moldovan fugitive oligarch and politician Ilan Shor made use of the SVR RF's report, stating that he had already warned multiple times that Moldova was getting into the same "scheme" that had been "implemented" in Ukraine, that "Sandu will flee, and ordinary people will suffer" and that "we have to stop her before it is too late". For his part, Russian State Duma member Aleksey Zhuravlyov declared that Sandu was "emotionally unstable", "completely incapable of negotiating", "incapable of independent thought" and that she "only follows the orders of her Western puppeteers", threatening that Russia would defend Transnistria from a Moldovan attack, for which both should be prepared.

The report, the news agencies' publications and Shor's post were reposted by dozens of pro-Russian Telegram channels, gaining tens of thousands of views. These included Молдавский Vагон (Moldavskiy Vagon, "Moldovan Wagon"), belonging to Moldovan politologist and PSRM parliament member Bogdan Țîrdea [ro; ru]; he later also published the Moldovan authorities' denial of the accusations. Russian Telegram channel Политджойстик / Politjoystic threatened "Does Sandu want us to launch missile strikes against decision-making centres in Moldova?", and stated that "military diplomacy" was more convincing than peaceful diplomacy; the post gained 48,000 views as of 25 December. 154,000 views were gained as of the same day by a post of the channel Lomovka, which accused Sandu of "taking the gas from the people" and wanting to form a military coalition with Western support to "capture" Transnistria. Гражданин (Grazhdanin, "Citizen") alleged that Romania would help Sandu attack Transnistria, while Военная хроника (Voyennaya khronika, "War Chronicle") reported that an attack on Transnistria could seek to disrupt or delay peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia and accuse Russia of a new aggression. Russian analyst Yuri Baranchik declared in his Telegram channel that it would be necessary to take Mykolaiv and Odesa from Ukraine to form a land corridor with Transnistria and "restore justice and legality" in Transnistria and Moldova, and that an attack against Transnistria guaranteed a Russian invasion and "deprivation of the statehood" of Moldova.

Adrian Băluțel, the chief of staff of Sandu's presidency, denied accusations that Moldova was preparing an attack against Transnistria, calling them a dangerous hoax meant to spread panic. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the accusations could represent an attempt to set the ground for a Russian false flag operation in Transnistria. They could also have been aimed at disrupting Moldova's accession to the EU by destabilising it, the ISW stated. Moldovan analyst Andrei Curăraru stated that the accusations were part of a destabilization plan and that they could be preceding several possible scenarios: an incident fabricated by Russia at the Cuciurgan power station to justify an intervention in Transnistria; extra accusations blaming Moldova of sabotaging Transnistria's energy to cause further hostility between the two and divert attention from Russia's failures; and an intensification of anti-Moldovan propaganda to radicalize the Transnistrian population and hinder any dialogue process.

See also

• 2022–2023 Moldovan energy crisis
• Blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh

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v t e Maia Sandu
6th President of Moldova Born (1972-05-24)24 May 1972
Positions	Minister of Education (2012–2015) Member of the Moldovan Parliament (2014–2015, 2019) President of the Party of Action and Solidarity (2016–2020) Prime Minister of Moldova (2019) President of Moldova (2020–present)
Elections	2016 presidential election 2020 presidential election 2024 presidential election
Premiership	International trips 2019 Moldovan constitutional crisis Sandu Cabinet
Presidency	International trips COVID-19 pandemic in Moldova vaccination Moldovan–Romanian collaboration Council of Europe Action Plan for the Republic of Moldova 2021–2024 Association Trio 2022 Transnistria attacks Moldovan protests (2022–2023) 2022–2023 Moldovan energy crisis European Moldova National Assembly 2nd European Political Community Summit Chișinău International Airport shooting 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum
← Igor Dodon

v t e Transnistria conflict
Background	First Partition of Poland and Treaty of Iași Union of Bessarabia with Romania Moldavian ASSR Moldovenism World War II Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Moldavian SSR Transnistria Governorate The Holocaust in Romania Dissolution of the Soviet Union Controversy over ethnic and linguistic identity in Moldova Moldovan language Unification of Moldova and Romania
Transnistria War	Timeline Battle of Bender Ceasefire agreement
Post-war developments	Human rights in Transnistria Romanian-language schools in Transnistria Russian military presence in Transnistria Joint Control Commission 2006 Transnistrian independence referendum 2006 Transnistrian customs crisis 2012 Moldova security zone incident 2022 Transnistria attacks
Resolution attempts	1997 Moscow memorandum 1999 Istanbul summit 2003 Kozak memorandum 2005 Yushchenko Plan Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of the Dniester 5+2 format (2005–present; see also Berlin Plus package, 2016–present) Potential solutions Reintegration into Moldova Bureau for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova Annexation by Russia
Participants and figures	Pro-Moldova Moldova Mircea Snegur Petru Lucinschi Vladimir Voronin Nicolae Timofti Igor Dodon Maia Sandu European Union Romania United States Ukraine Pro-Transnistria Transnistria Igor Smirnov Yevgeny Shevchuk Vadim Krasnoselsky Russia 14th Guards Army Operational Group of Russian Forces Neutral Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
See also	Gagauzia conflict Gagauz Republic Cobasna ammunition depot Moldova–Ukraine border

• 2025 in Moldova
• 2025 in Transnistria
• Energy crises
• Natural gas in Moldova
• Electric power in Moldova
• Economic history of Moldova
• Economy of Transnistria
• Transnistria conflict
• Events affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Moldova–Romania relations
• Moldova–Russia relations
• Russia–Transnistria relations