Apparentment - Misplaced Pages

(Redirected from Apparentement) Party-list addition system in elections

You can help expand this article with text translated from the corresponding article in German. (December 2010) Click for important translation instructions.

View a machine-translated version of the German article.
Machine translation, like DeepL or Google Translate, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Misplaced Pages.
Consider adding a topic to this template: there are already 2,137 articles in the main category, and specifying|topic= will aid in categorization.
Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.
You must provide copyright attribution in the edit summary accompanying your translation by providing an interlanguage link to the source of your translation. A model attribution edit summary is Content in this edit is translated from the existing German Misplaced Pages article at ]; see its history for attribution.
You may also add the template {{Translated|de|Listenverbindung}} to the talk page.
For more guidance, see Misplaced Pages:Translation.

This article is missing information about Fourth French Republic, Israel, Italy and other countries. Please expand the article to include this information. Further details may exist on the talk page. (February 2024)

Social choice and electoral systems
A joint Politics and Economics series

Social choice Mechanism design Comparative politics Comparison List (By country)
Single-winner methodsSingle vote - plurality methods First preference plurality (FPP) Two-round (US: Jungle primary) Partisan primary Instant-runoff UK: Alternative vote (AV) US: Ranked-choice (RCV) Condorcet methods Condorcet-IRV Round-robin voting Minimax Schulze Ranked pairs Maximal lottery Positional voting Plurality (el. IRV) Borda count (el. Baldwin) Antiplurality (el. Coombs) Cardinal voting Score voting Approval voting Majority judgment STAR voting
Proportional representationParty-list Apportionment Highest averages Largest remainders National remnant Biproportional List type Closed list Open list Panachage List-free PR Localized list Quota-remainder methods Hare STV Schulze STV CPO-STV Quota Borda Approval-based committees Thiele's method Phragmen's method Expanding approvals rule Method of equal shares Fractional social choice Direct representation Interactive representation Liquid democracy Fractional approval voting Maximal lottery Random ballot Semi-proportional representation Cumulative SNTV Limited voting
Mixed systemsBy results of combination Mixed-member majoritarian Mixed-member proportional By mechanism of combination Non-compensatory Parallel (superposition) Coexistence Conditional Fusion (majority bonus) Compensatory Seat linkage system UK: 'AMS' NZ: 'MMP' Vote linkage system Negative vote transfer Mixed ballot Supermixed systems Dual-member proportional Rural–urban proportional Majority jackpot By ballot type Single vote Double simultaneous vote Dual-vote
Paradoxes and pathologiesSpoiler effects Spoiler effect Cloning paradox Frustrated majorities paradox Center squeeze Pathological response Perverse response Best-is-worst paradox No-show paradox Multiple districts paradox Strategic voting Lesser evil voting Exaggeration Truncation Turkey-raising Paradoxes of majority rule Tyranny of the majority Discursive dilemma Conflicting majorities paradox
Social and collective choiceImpossibility theorems Arrow's theorem Majority impossibility Moulin's impossibility theorem McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem Gibbard's theorem Positive results Median voter theorem Condorcet's jury theorem May's theorem Condorcet dominance theorems Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
Politics portal Economics portal Mathematics portal
v t e

Apparentment is the name given to the system, sometimes provided for in elections conducted according to the party-list proportional representation system, which allows parties to specify electoral alliances. The system has been used in Switzerland since 1919, and is also used in Israel and Denmark (local and European Parliament elections only).

Under list proportional representation, seats are awarded for each quota of votes obtained. Any votes excess to the quota are lost. Under apparentment, parties combine their vote excess, which may yield an additional full quota and candidate elected. For example, if there are 100 seats in the legislature, the quota per seat will be around 1%. If two parties poll 1.4 and 1.3 quotas respectively, they will probably only win one seat each if their votes are counted separately (assuming there is no further threshold, such as Germany's 5% barrier) but if they can combine their votes, they will have 2.7 quotas in total and a good chance of winning 3 seats overall. Usually the third seat would go to the party with 1.4% as it has more votes within the alliance.

There are two possible types of apparentment: different parties within a single electoral district combining their results, or the same party competing in different electoral districts combining these results. In the election of the German Constituent Assembly in the 1920s, an unused vote could be used outside the original district to help a party get an additional seat.

The system introduces an element of ordinality - a vote is first applied to elect a candidate or a party, then a group list. It is akin to a prespecified ranking in a preferential voting system like alternative vote or single transferable vote, as is used with the above-the-line system in Australian elections.

References

Lijphart, Arend (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Comparative European Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-828054-8.
Bochsler, Daniel (December 2010). "Who gains from apparentments under D'Hondt?" (PDF). Electoral Studies. 29 (4): 617–627. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.06.001.
Hoag and Hallett (1926). Proportional Representation. p. 427.

This election-related article is a stub. You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it.

Categories:

See also

References