Zarqawi PSYOP program: Difference between revisions

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	The '''Zarqawi PSYOP program''' refers to a US ] program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of ] in ] and the ].

	The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."<ref name="WaPo"> By Thomas E. Ricks, The ], April 10, 2006</ref><ref name="Salon"> by ], ], June 15, 2006</ref><ref name="CounterPunch1"> by Jennifer van Bergen, ], June 12, 2006</ref><ref name="Global_Research"> by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,</ref><ref name="CounterPunch2"> by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006</ref><ref name="GRca"> by Michel Chossudovsky, ], April 18, 2006</ref><ref name="RollingStone"> by Tim Dickinson, ], April 11, 2006</ref>

	One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency.<ref name="WaPo"/> However, ] reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons."<ref name="Salon"/>

	Terrorism expert stated that the US created a myth and then these fabrications became a ].<ref name="Schultz"> By Jennifer Schultz, UPI, November 10, 2005</ref><ref name="Napoleoni"> By Loretta Napoleoni, Foreign affairs</ref><ref name="Napoleoni_2"> by Loretta Napoleoni, November 11, 2005 </ref>


	==Program==
	]

	On October 4, 2004, The ] reported that, according to a US military intelligence agent, the US was paying $10,000 to individuals in order to pass for fact the fiction and supposition regarding Zarqawi.<ref name="TG"> By Adrian Blomfield, Telegraph, October 4, 2004</ref>

	The ] reported on ], ], that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the ] in a ] campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:
	<blockquote>''For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.''<ref name="WaPo"/></blockquote>

	The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,
	<blockquote>''describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.''</blockquote>
	Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefing did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

	Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to reporter ], about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. He used that information for an article<ref> By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times, February 9, 2004</ref> in the ].<ref name="RollingStone"/> Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.<ref name="WaPo"/>

	According to Sidney Blumenthal, in an article for ], a military source told him that, for ultimately "domestic political reasons," ] and the ] resisted degrading the dramatically inflated image of Zarqawi.<ref name="Salon"/>

	Responding to the in the Post reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq, but no longer present as the program was started, said that the US doesn't do that. Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably influenced the view of the ] raising his profile. The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the ].<ref name="WaPo"/><ref> by Mark Mazzetti, ], January 27th, 2006</ref>

	By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him.<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="CounterPunch1"/> Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:
	<blockquote>''"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>

	Regarding the influence of this program on Al Qaeda ]
	reports the comments by terrorism expert ]:
	<blockquote>The myth of al-Zarqawi, Napoleoni believes, helped usher in al-Qaida's "transformation from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement."</blockquote>ref name="Napoleoni"/>

	==Rise to power==
	{{main\|Abu Musab al-Zarqawi}}

	According to articles in ], ], and ] Online several incidents turned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in ].<ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="Newsweek"> By ], ], June 30, 2006</ref> The Asia Times contends that in February 2003 he was practically unknown outside Jordan.<ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="ATO"/> By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times Online, October 15, 2005</ref> Both Newsweek and the Asia Times continue by commenting that initially he was largely unconnected to Saddam Hussein, and not part of ]'s group. ], terrorism expert, concurs that he never was part of al Qaeda.<ref name="Margolis"> by Sarah Challands, CTV.ca, June 12, 2006</ref> Following the allegation he was a link between ] and ] (used as ]<ref name="Salon"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="ATO"/><ref name="GRca2"> by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006</ref>), by ] before the ] in ], he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the ] by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity, which ] in Newsweek describes as:
	<blockquote>''the Iraq invasion gave Zarqawi a chance to blossom on his own as a jihadi.''<ref name="Newsweek"/></blockquote>
	After the capture of ] the ] accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as ] commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:
	<blockquote>''"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."''<ref name="CounterPunch2"/></blockquote>

	Articles in the ], ], ], Counterpunch Newsletter and ] suggest his increased notoriety, as illustrated above, was the result of an orchestrated effort involving ].<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/><ref name="Newsweek"/><ref name="CounterPunch2"/><ref name="CJR"> By Daniel Schulman, ] at ]'s Graduate ]</ref>

	], CNN’s former Baghdad bureau chief, observed that their are discrepancies between what journalist encounter in Iraq “and a lot of the comments we see coming out of the administration and the Pentagon.” Commenting on this Daniel Schulman for Columbia Journalism Review said:
	<blockquote>''... it has become, in part, a contest over the framing of reality, and thus a hall of mirrors for the press.''<ref name="CJR"/></blockquote>

	In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the U.S. military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the ] previously advocated him to be.

	==Effect of US PSYOP on domestic audiences==
	{{see\| Psychological operations (United States)\| Psychological warfare}}

	The US military defines psychological operations, or PSYOP, as:
	<blockquote>"planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."<ref name="Definition"></ref> Joint Publication 3-53, 5 September 2003 ]</blockquote>

	The ], adopted in ], explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public.<ref name="NSA"> by ], January 26, 2006</ref><ref name="Lamb"> by ], senior fellow in the ] at the ] and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.</ref><ref name="CJR"/> Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:
	<blockquote>''There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.''<ref name="WaPo"/></blockquote>
	] reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:
	<blockquote>''The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.'' <ref name="AP"> by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006</ref></blockquote>
	US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "]." <ref name="CJR"/><ref name="AP"/> The document acknowledges the ], but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.<ref name="NSA"/><ref name="Lamb"/><ref name="BBC"> By Adam Brookes, ], January 27, 2006 </ref>

	Several incidents in 2003 were documented by ], a sixty-four-year-old retired Air Force colonel, which he saw as information-warfare campaigns that were intended for "foreign populations and the American public." “],”<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/Info%20Operations%20Roadmap%20Truth%20from%20These%20Podia.pdf Truth from These Podia
	Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception Management,
	Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations
	in Gulf II] by ], Colonel, ] (Retired),October 8, 2003, </ref> as the treatise was called, reported that the way the ] was fought resembled a ], stressing the message instead of the truth.<ref name="CJR"/> The ] reported that Zarqawi’s group, and three other groups of in Iraq, were disseminating propaganda in a sophisticated manner.<ref name="CJR"/>

	Nevertheless, the Information Operations Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program, but it does show the general dilemma psychological operations pose regarding the effect they potentially have on the US home audience.<ref name="AP"/>

	==Quotes==
	The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in ]:
	<blockquote>''"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."''<ref name="WaPo"/><ref name="RollingStone"/></blockquote>


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	{{War on Terrorism}}

	==References==
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Latest revision as of 17:37, 11 March 2007

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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi