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Exactly, apologists for American Hegemony. I added the following (expanded):

Quote:

In a December 26, 1979 declassified memo to President Jimmy Carter Brzezinski stated:

We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels.

In a 1998 Brzezinski Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, he stated:

"According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention."

Tulsipres (talk) 05:34, 23 September 2022 (UTC)

See Wikiquote on this apparently mistranslated/apocryphal, if not downright fabricated, statement. No such note to President Carter has ever been found. In fact, Brzezinski's December 26, 1979 memo to the president says nearly the opposite of what is claimed above: "Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. ... we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam ... "TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:16, 24 September 2022 (UTC)

Here is an older conversation:

https://en.wikipedia.org/Talk:Zbigniew_Brzezinski/Archive_1#Policy_on_Afghanistan

Tulsipres (talk) 04:04, 28 September 2022 (UTC)

WIKIQUOTE
https://en.wikiquote.org/Zbigniew_Brzezinski#Disputed

"According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention."

Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris (15-21 January 1998) : Brzezinski has http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04252012-175722/unrestricted/WHITE_THESIS.pdf repeatedly

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM denied] having said this, and

https://books.google.com/books?id=ToYxFL5wmBIC&q=deep+skepticism#v=snippet&q=deep%20skepticism&f=false no such memo exists.

According to Tobin, Conor (April 2020). "The Myth of the 'Afghan Trap': Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979". Diplomatic History. 44 (2). Oxford University Press: 238–239. doi:10.1093/dh/dhz065.:

"The French interview has had a major impact on the historiography, being used as the almost sole basis to prove the existence of a concerted effort to lure Moscow into the 'Afghan trap.'

Title

First, the title is deceptive. It reads (in translation): 'The revelations of a former adviser to Carter: "Yes, the CIA came into Afghanistan before the Russians ..."' Quotation marks and ellipsis indicate that this is a direct quote from Brzezinski and implies CIA operations inside Afghanistan before December 1979, which does not fit with the historical record.

Although insisting on the accuracy of the interview, the journalist has since conceded that the quote in the title was not actually from Brzezinski but was 'invented' by the editors, which casts doubt on the subsequent text.

published remarks were heavily edited

Secondly, the published remarks were heavily edited and Brzezinski has denied the article's accuracy on numerous occasions, asserting that it was 'not an interview, but excerpts from an interview that was originally supposed to be published in full but which they never checked with me for approval in the form that it did appear.'

Wikiquote editors own opinion

There are, however, significant problems with it as an historical source.

It is also likely a casualty of translation—being conducted in English, translated and printed in French, and reconverted to English—with the original statements becoming skewed and distorted in their edited and translated form.

Additionally, many of the interview's claims are unsupported by documentary evidence. For example, Brzezinski has denied he ever sent a note claiming the covert aid would 'lead to a Soviet military intervention,' and no such note, nor references to it, has ever been found. Nowhere else has Brzezinski ever referred to a systematic plan for the 'Afghan trap' and neither in his subsequent actions, writings, interviews, or public remarks on the topic has he shown any satisfaction that his strategy had worked. It is highly questionable that Brzezinski would attempt to bolster his reputation and disclose information on a secret plan to ensnare Moscow in an Afghan quagmire in just one foreign interview and then subsequently and repeatedly deny it.

THE MEMO 

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/docs/1979-12-26%20Brzezinski%20to%20Carter%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf December 26, 1979

OCR:

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

I will be sending you separately a proposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday, and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran. In the meantime, you are receiving today's SCC minutes on both subjects. This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject.

As I mentioned to you a week or so ago, we are now facing a regional crisis. Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.

Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs.

Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us for the follow ing dotnestip, and international reasons:

Domestic

A. Ther'SR^^' intervention is likely to stimulate calls for more inapVEKli': Military action in Iran. Soviet "decisiveness* will be contrasted with our restraint, which will no longer be labeled as prudent but increasingly as timid;

B. At the same time, regional instability may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us, and it could bring us into a head to head confrontation with the Soviets;

C. SALT is likely to be damaged, perhaps irreparably, because Soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked;

D. More generally, our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the Right and the Left.

International

A. Pakistan, unless we somehow manage to project both confidence and power into the region, is likely to be intimidated, and it could eventually even acquiesce to seme form of external Soviet domination.

B. With Iran destabilized, there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean;

C. The Chinese will certainly note that Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States.

Compensating Factors

There will be, to be sure, some compensating factors:

A. World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, Moslem countries will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.

B. There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. That figure will certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well.

C. There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense.

A Soviet Vietnam?

to be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming badly organized and poorly led;

B. They have'hd~TOhc‘tuary, no organized army, and no central government — all of which North Vietnam had;

C. They have limited foreign support, in contrast to the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China;

D. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a policy of "inoculating" the enemy.

As a consequence, the Soviets might be able to assert themselves effectively, and in world politics nothing succeeds like success, whatever the moral aspects.

What is to be Done?

What follows are some preliminary thoughts, which need to be discussed more fully:

A. It is essential that Afghanistan resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice;

B. To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy;

C. We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also;

D. We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels;

E. We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placing SALT in jeopardy and that will also influence the substance of the Brown visit to China, since the Chinese are doubtless going to be most concerned about implications for themselves of such Soviet assertiveness so close to their border. Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer, I fear the Soviets will not take our "expressions of concern" very seriously, with the effect that our relations will suffer, without the Soviets ever having been confronted with the need to ask the question whether such loaal adventurism is worth the long-term daj^ge, to the U.S.-Soviet relationship;

F. FinaHra£ve should consider taking Soviet actions in Afghanistan t■ uas..ai.threat to peace.

Daclassified

/Released on 7 /^l/ijj under provisions of E C '2958 by R. Soubers, National Security Council

FINISH

THE REAL NEWS NETWORK INTERVIEW  - rewrote the entire section - added Adghanistan can become USSRs South Vietnam, removed puff lanaguge 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM

In July 1979 Jimmy Carter signed a presidential finding permitting the CIA to spend $695,000 on non-military assistance. This assistance included "cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters" to Afghan mujahideen insurgents, and a propaganda campaign targeting the Soviet-backed leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). This was in response to the March 1979 Herat uprising in Afghanistan.

In a December 26, 1979 declassified memo to President Jimmy Carter Brzezinski stated:

...the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam...We should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels.

In a 1998 Brzezinski Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, he stated:

"According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention."

Brzezinski later denied he said this in an interview decades later:

Robert Gates revealed in his memoirs accurately that before the Soviets staged the formal invasion of Afghanistan but they were already in Afghanistan with Special Forces and so forth we increased military we increase financial assistance to the Mujahideen

it was mostly for the acquisition presumably of weapons and then after they came in when the Soviets came in I did send a personal memo saying yes their entry into Afghanistan at a time of turmoil in Iran and in the whole Persian region in Gulf region as a consequence potentially we have a chance to give the Soviets their Vietnam.

The Real News Network: The (Le Nouvel Observateur) interview says this was before...

Brzezinski: well that's not that's not right.

An April 2020 review of declassified U.S. documents by Conor Tobin in the journal Diplomatic History states that "The (Le Nouvel Observateur) interview has had a major impact on the historiography, being used as the almost sole basis to prove the existence of a concerted effort to lure Moscow into the 'Afghan trap'". Tobin contends that this "Afghan Trap" theory, is a misrepresentation of the historical record based almost entirely on a "caricature" of Brzezinski as an anti-communist fanatic, an "unreliable" statement attributed to Brzezinski by a French journalist in 1998 (which was "subsequently and repeatedly den" by Brzezinski himself), "and the circumstantial fact that U.S. support antedated the invasion."

The July 1979 money to the CIA was for a desire to rebuild strained U.S. relations with Pakistani leader Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in light of the Iranian Revolution. Internal deliberations show that "U.S. policies were almost wholly reactive...to the Soviets' escalating military presence" with policymakers rejecting "a substantial covert aid program" (including lethal provisions) "to avoid provoking Moscow." (The Soviet military and political presence in Afghanistan steadily increased throughout 1979 before any U.S. aid was distributed, while the U.S. funding paled in comparison "to the tens of millions of dollars in military aid provided by Moscow to the DRA.")

Brzezinski tried to dissuade the Soviets from invading Afghanistan in 1979 by urging the Carter administration to publicize information regarding the growing Soviet military role in Afghanistan's civil war. He explicitly warned the Soviets of severe sanctions in the event of an invasion; when his warnings were watered-down by the State Department under the leadership of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Brzezinski leaked information to a journalist, resulting in an August 1979 article in The New York Times headlined "U.S. Is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention." Ironically, Soviet general Valentin Varennikov complained in 1995 that American officials had never made Afghanistan's strategic significance clear to their Soviet counterparts prior to December 1979, speculating—in line with the "Afghan Trap", that this omission may have been deliberate as the U.S, "had an interest in us getting stuck in Afghanistan, and paying the greatest possible price for that." Furthermore, Brzezinski discretely attempted to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin during 1980, privately conceding that the country would likely remain within the Soviet sphere of influence following a diplomatic settlement, as he had little confidence in the mujahideen's ability to inflict a military defeat on the Red Army (these talks stalled for several reasons, including a Soviet desire to wait until after the 1980 United States presidential election was decided).

Carter administration officials Robert Gates and Vice President Walter Mondale criticized the "Afghan Trap" as inaccurate between 2010 and 2012. Gates said "there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily," while Mondale dismissed the theory as "a huge, unwarranted leap". Echoing Steve Coll, Tobin concludes: "The small-scale covert program that developed in response to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan if the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention;... The very idea that Carter would actively endorse a policy that would risk SALT and détente, and jeopardize his reelection campaign, while simultaneously threatening Iran, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf to future Soviet infiltration, is largely inconceivable." Coll had previously stated that "Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail. ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism." Elisabeth Leake agrees that "the original provision was certainly inadequate to force a Soviet armed intervention. Instead it adhered to broader US practices of providing limited covert support to anti-communist forces worldwide." Tulsipres (talk) 05:15, 27 September 2022 (UTC)

The primary sources that you cite (most of which I provided) are important, but we do not copy/paste whole paragraphs from primary sources into articles verbatim on Misplaced Pages. Rather, we rely on secondary sources, such as Coll 2004, Tobin 2020, and Leake 2022. Relying exclusively on primary sources can lead to introducing original research into articles, which is a serious violation of Misplaced Pages's content policies.

For example, in this edit you quote Brzezinski saying that " could become a Soviet Vietnam," but this is arguably a cherrypicked snippet from a primary source document. A fuller excerpt suggests that Brzezinski was highly skeptical of this possibility: "Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us for the following domestic and international reasons:  ... However, we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam: A. The guerillas are badly organized and poorly led; B. They have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government—all of which North Vietnam had; C. They have limited foreign support, in contrast to the enormous amount of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China; D. The Soviets are likely to act decisively, unlike the U.S., which pursued in Vietnam a policy of 'inoculating' the enemy."

Summarizing the preceding analysis as " could become a Soviet Vietnam" and using that to "rebut" secondary sources like Coll 2004, Tobin 2020, and Leake 2022 is a textbook example of the kind of content that WP:OR forbids and seeks to keep out of our encyclopedia.

Of course, it is ultimately immaterial that you or I might draw different conclusions from the same archival document, because we are both just Misplaced Pages editors without specialist training or expertise, but that is precisely why we need to defer to high-quality secondary sources, as the previous long-standing text does.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:40, 28 September 2022 (UTC)