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A Chinese Indonesian (Mandarin: Yin du ni xi ya Huaren (Traditional: 印度尼西亞華人, Simplified: 印度尼西亚华人） Hakka: Thong ngin, Min: Teng lang, Indonesian: Tionghoa Indonesia, or (derisively) China totok) is a citizen or resident of Indonesia of Chinese birth or descent, as a result of centuries of overseas Chinese migration.

Chinese Indonesian people are diverse in their origins, timing and circumstances of immigration to Indonesia, and level of ties to China. Many trace their origins to the southern parts of China, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan provinces.

Broadly speaking, there were three waves of immigration of ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. The first wave was spurred by trading activities dating back to the time of Zheng He's voyage in the early 15th century, the second wave around the time of the Opium War, and the third wave around the first half of the 20th century.

Chinese Indonesians whose ancestors immigrated in the first and second waves, and have thus become creolised or huan-na (in Hokkien) by marriage and assimilation, are called Keturunan Chinese. The more recent Chinese immigrants and those who are still culturally Chinese are called Orang Tiong Hoa.

Although there used to be a sizable number of Chinese Indonesians in the rural areas, the largest populations of Chinese Indonesians today are in the cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Pekan Baru, Semarang, Pontianak, Makassar, Palembang, and Bandung, partially due to anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia.

Demographics

The economic activities and wealth of the Chinese community in Indonesia is very diverse; many are farmers and small-scale merchants, and others are businessmen. Most are identified as ethnic Chinese in official documents, but many are not, for a variety of reasons. In many parts of Indonesia, however, they are represented among the wealthier classes out of proportion with their small numbers.

According to a survey of corporations listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the Chinese Indonesian community was thought to own or operate a large fraction of major Indonesian corporations. This is a result of a long government restriction for Chinese Indonesians from going into academia, public service, and other governmental occupations.

Some, however, believe that this overestimates the influence of Chinese Indonesians on the economy: for example, despite being considered to be under control of Chinese Indonesians in research, the Salim Group is actually controlled by Liem Sioe Liong, two pribumi relatives of then President Suharto, and Ibrahim Risaid, an Acehnese associate of one of Suharto's cousins.

Such simplifications fuel the stereotype that Chinese Indonesian people are extremely wealthy, a common perception in Indonesian society. In part, as a result of this perceived dominance of the economy, the Chinese Indonesian community has frequently been viewed with suspicion by indigenous (Pribumi) Indonesians.

Origins

Most Chinese Indonesian are descended from ethnic groups originally from the south-eastern part of China. These ethnic groups include:

• Hakka
• Hainan
• Hokkien
• Cantonese
• Hokchia
• Teochew

Ethnic concentrations

• Peranakan - Jakarta, Java, Makassar
• Hakka - Aceh, North Sumatra, Batam, South Sumatra, Bangka-Belitung, Lampung, Java, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Ambon and Jayapura.
• Hainan - Riau (Pekanbaru and Batam), and Manado.
• Hokkien - North Sumatra, Bagansiapiapi,Pekanbaru, Padang, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Java, Bali (especially in Denpasar and Singaraja), Banjarmasin, Kutai, Sumbawa, Manggarai, Kupang, Makassar, Kendari, Central Sulawesi, Manado, and Ambon.
• Cantonese - Jakarta, Makassar and Manado.
• Hokchia - Java (especially in Bandung, Cirebon, and Surabaya), Banjarmasin
• Teochew - North Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan (especially in Pontianak and Ketapang).

History

Pre-colonial era

There is little known about Chinese involvement in what is now Indonesia before the Fifteenth Century, other than the record of a few emissaries, such as Fa Hien (Faxian, 法顯) the Buddhist monk who passed the region in the 5th Century on his way to India. Kingdoms of Indonesia and China had some relationships that thrived during the Tang dynasty.

Ironically, though most of the present Chinese Indonesians are not Muslims, some of the earliest Muslim evangelists in Java (who were called the Wali Songo or 'The Nine Ambassadors') might have been of Chinese ancestry. A historical theory even suggests that the first people who brought Islamic faith to Indonesia were the Chinese traders, especially those who came to Semarang under the leadership of Sam Po Kong or Admiral Zheng He(郑和) in the 15th century. Zheng He himself was not a Han, but a Muslim from a minority ethnic group in China.

Starting from the voyage of Zheng He, many Chinese considered the territory of what is now Indonesia as an attractive trading partner.

See: Zheng He#Zheng He and Islam in Southeast Asia.

Early Colonial Era (1500s-1800s)

Favored position under the Dutch

The largest waves of Chinese migration happened during early to middle Dutch colonial era, from about the 16th to the 19th Centuries, seeking to find new opportunities of trade.

Race relations between the Chinese Indonesians and native Indonesians (pribumis)have always been problematic, and remain so up to the present. Some commentators trace this to the Dutch era when colonial policy favored the ethnic Chinese, and in so doing established their economic dominance over the region.

The caste system established by the Dutch also made it disadvantageous for ethnic Chinese—as for members of other ethnic groups—to assimilate into the native population: this would mean being put in the third estate, the lowest one, together with the natives. Ethnic Chinese, on the other hand, together with Arabs and other "Foreign Orientals" were put in the second estate - just a notch beneath the first estate, a category reserved for Europeans and, ironically, Japanese and Siamese nationals as well.

In this the Dutch were among the early practitioners of a classic colonial strategy pracitced in many other times and places as well - namely, favoring specific ethnic or religious minorities and making of them a prop of the colonial rule and a buffer between it and the majority of the indigenous population. (In later times, the French and British were to use the local Christian and Jewish communities in the Arab World in the same way.)

Having the favor of the Dutch and being considered by them "intelligent, diligent, and capable of overseeing Dutch plantations", many ethnic Chinese were supporters of colonial rule. Indeed, in the early years of the Netherlands East Indies, ethnic Chinese actively helped strengthen Dutch domination in the region. Souw Ben Kong, the Kapitan Cina (i.e. "Captain of the Chinese") of Banten, for example, organized a large-scale immigration of Chinese under his rule to Batavia in the seventeenth century. This significantly destabilized the Bantenese economy, thus facilitating Dutch conquest of the Sultanate.

As a reward, Souw was made the first Kapitein der Chinezen of Batavia. His successors, the Kapiteins and later, the "Majors" (Majoors der Chinezen) of Batavia, were given landed fiefdoms and the hereditary title of "Sia" by the colonial government.

Between them, these aristocratic "Peranakan" families controlled a great deal of Java's land and wealth. Through the officership system, moreover, they governed the Peranakan and ethnic Chinese population of Batavia. The system was later extended to other centers of Dutch power in Java and parts of the rest of the archipelago.

Massacre of 1740

In spite of the above, Dutch attitudes towards the Chinese were not invariably friendly, and in the early decades of the Eighteenth Century tensions started building up, in some ways resulting from the very fact of the Chinese having settled in and around Batavia, ever since its foundation, and came to be a major element in its economic life.

Chinese workers were greatly involved in building Batavia and cultivating the adjacent agricultural areas. And Chinese traders, who were arriving in growing numbers, made the East India Company (VOC) increasingly dependent on them. The VOC's came to make most of its profits from trade among different Asian destinations rather than back to the Netherlands themselves - and it was naturally the Chinese traders resident in Batavia who had the best contacts in China.

Dutch and Chinese needed each other - which in theory should have ensured a good relatioinship. But an element among the Dutch colonists came to increasingly resent the situation of the Chinese being their effective social equals and economic rivals. The Chinese traders, like the Dutch ones, were tax-payers - which was an economic burden but also conferred considereable privileges (a phenomenon compareable to the later resentment of French settlers in Algeria to local Christians and Jews being legally their equals).

What set off a cataclysm of hatred and bloodshed was not the Chinese trading but the other major branch of their economic activity on Java: agricultural work carried out by poor Chinese coolies who were imported and employed by rich Chinese entrepreneurs. Such coolies were, for example, the dominant part of the labor force employed in the sugar plantations at the Ommelanden of Batavia, a major field of economic activity.

The importation of ever more coolies caused an enormous increase in the Chinese population in the VOC-ruled area of Batavia and its environs, and they came to constitute nearly half of the total population just before 1740. Already in 1690, the colonial authorities had imposed severe limitations on further immigration from China. This did not have, however, the effect of stopping the importation of more coolies. Rather, they continued to be imported through the payment of bribes to the authorities, and were all the more dependent on their employers (usually Chinese themselves) and susceptible to lucrative exploitation.

From about 1720 the sugar market went through a deepening crisis, with the markets in Europe becoming saturated, and the plantations of Java facing sharp competition from cheaper Brazilian sugar. Many of the sugar planters went bankrupt, and the authorities took no step to alleviate the situation of the workers thrown out of their jobs - with the result being bands of unemployed, hungry and desperate collies turning to bringandage.

Belatedly, at July, 1740 the colonial authorities decreed that all the coolies of the Ommelanden were to be transferred to Dutch-run plantations at Galle in Southern Ceylon. That might or might not have been the true intention, but rumors rife among the coolies were that the Dutch actually intended to throw them overboard once out of sight of the shore. Instead of boarding the ships, the coolies burst into an all-out revolt, with roaming bands robbing and killing in the coutryside and some even attempting to attack Batavia itself.

There is no evidence that the better off Chinese living inside the walled area of Batavia, some five thousand in number, were planning to join the rebellious coolies outside. However, many of the Dutch inhabitants did have such suspicions. On October 9, 1740, the order was issued to search the houses of all the Chinese resident in Batavia. This soon degenerated into an all-out, three-day long massacre - with Chinese being massacred in their homes, and earlier captured Chinese being killed out of hand in prisons and hospitals.

A preacher fanned the flames from the pulpit, declaring that the killing of Chinese was "God's Will", and the colonial government itself reportedly posted a bounty for decapitated Chinese heads. The number of victims in these three days is variously estimated at between five thousands and ten thousands. The name Kali Angke ("Red River" in Indonesian) is said to date from that time, recalling the blood flowing into the river.

Afterwards, the "resotoration of order" was proclaimed, with surviving Chinese hencheforward restricted to specific quarters of Batavia and other Dutch-ruled cities. The Chinese area of Batavia was designated Glodok, where many Chinese still live in present-day Jakarta.

Following the massacre, the Dutch Governor-General Valckenier was arrested and required to account for himself to the Heeren XVII ("Seventeen Lords", the VOC directors in Amsterdam). He died in prison, however, and the charges against him were declared "annulled by death".

The affair continued to crop up in later periods, especially in times of tension

Continued Immigration and division into three sub-communities

Even such bloody events did not put an end to the continued Chinese emigaration to the Indies, where economic opportunities not availalbe in China itself outweighed the dangers of discrimination or persecution.

Earlier Chinese immigrants had much closer ties toward mainland China. This was manifested in their strong desire to return home and consideration of the Indies as yet another temporary settlement.

Attitudes started changing from the middle 18th century, when the Qing Emperor of the time, Qian Long, considered these expatriates to be "turncoats" and thereby a threat to China. Still, while Emperor Qian Long adopted a general "closed-door policy", there was no evidence that Chinese expatriates were banned from returning to their original homeland.

Many of them, however, found the Indies an increasingly attractive abode. The hostile and oppressive Manchu government of the Qing dynasty brought even more migrants from China. Lulled by comfortable lives, some of them no longer associated themselves with mainland China. They were called Cina Babas or Peranakans. Cina Babas often intermarried with indigenous Indonesian (pribumis).

Some of them, however, identified themselves as Dutchmen, embraced Christianity, generally enjoyed higher education and social status, and thereby considered themselves as more culturally refined. They got to be called Qiao Sheng (literally, "foreign-born"). Beginning in the late Nineteenth Century, most of the aristocratic "Sia" families underwent rapid westernization. By the early decades of the twentieth century, many of them—especially those domiciled around Batavia—had become "more Dutch" than the Dutch themselves". The Sias were consequently some of the strongest proponents of colonial rule.

Those who still maintained ties toward China, whose main belief was Confucianism, considered Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs unfilial, all the more so because Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs typically shunned Chinese tradition. The ones who still maintained "purity" were called Cina Totoks.

These three groups of Chinese Indonesians had starkly different nationalistic views and tendencies. At the time

• Qiao Shengs were more inclined toward the Dutch;
• Cina Totoks were more inclined toward mainland China;

and

• Cina Babas were more toward the indigenous population of the Indies.

Late Colonial period (end of the 1800s to 1945)

Changing Dutch policies and decline of the Sia aristocracy

By the 1920s and 1930s, the long standing hold over the economy of the old Sia families, Qiao Sheng par excellence, was systematically destroyed by the very Dutch colonial government they supported . Following Queen Wilhelmina's speech to the Estates General (the Dutch Parliament) in which she insisted that a "moral debt" was owed to the people of the East Indies, the colonial government implemented its so-called "social policy". This was aimed at ending feudalism in Java and breaking up the large estates of the Peranakan aristocracy.

It was the Chinese Sias, more than the native aristocracy, who suffered from this measure. The native aristocracy did not own much land, due to their belief that popular influence, rather than ownership of land, was the base of their power. The native aristocracy owes to the Dutch their employment in the civil service. To the contrary, the Dutch compulsory acquisition of Peranakan fiefdoms destroyed many of the older Chinese landowning families. While some successfully managed to get into business, most former Sias—their title becaming obsolete by the 1940s—were swamped in economic power by Totok Chinese. This latter group remains, even today, the most powerful economic group in Indonesia.

Concomittant with the decline of the feudal-type Sias, Chinese Indonesians underwent a process of modernization and of building up Western-type political and social institutions. Chinese Indonesians built the first of their schools in Surabaya in the 1920s—one of the first non-Western schools in Java—and by the 1960s, many Chinese schools had been established in the major cities. The first Chinese newspapers were also printed during this era, and several Chinese political parties were established. These parties ranged from those who saw themselves as part of the Indonesian nationalist movement, and those who felt that Chinese Indonesians were still Chinese citizens - a question that was left unresolved for many decades.

Reflections of Chinese mainland politics

Later waves of migrants still maintained ties to China, mainly by supporting Chinese nationalistic movements to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Although the support was mainly monetary, some Chinese Indonesians were actively involved in the inside politics, especially so during the Sun Yat Sen era. Cina Totoks were particularly active.

Although the Chinese Communists were largely unsupported at first, from the 1930s on the Communists' effort to drive the Japanese occupants out of China gained the support of many Cina Totoks and even some Qiao Shengs. Thus, Indonesian Chinese manifestations of support towards mainland China became divided into two camps, parallel with the civil war sides in China itself: Nationalistic (Guomindang) and Communistic (Gong Chan Dang).

Sympathy for Indonesian nationalism

At the turn of the 20th century, however, Cina Totoks were increasingly assimilated into Indonesian culture. Younger generations still tried to maintain ties with China, but considered themselves as Indonesians and, therefore, adopted more Indonesian-Chinese nationalistic views.

Although the Dutch had given the Chinese Indonesians a special status, they were becoming increasingly oppressive and discriminative against all Chinese Indonesians. So, all three groups - Qiao Shengs, Cina Babas, and Cina Totoks - were more and more cooperative toward the Indonesian national movement, especially in providing monetary support.

More and more Chinese Indonesians were involved in Indonesian politics. Cina Totoks typically set up specific Chinese political parties which aimed at an Indonesia-China alliance and established newspapers. Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs typically joined nationalist parties jointly with pribumis. Some of them, serving as officers in the Dutch Army and later the Japanese one, used their positions to help the national movement.

All three groups were pioneers in the use of the Indonesian languague, actually eclipsing the pribumis in terms of quantity of publication. They were also among the pioneers of Indonesian newspapers. In their fledgling publishing companies, they published their own political ideas along with contributions from other Indonesian writers. In November 1928, the Chinese weekly Sin Po was the first paper to openly publish the text of the national anthem Indonesia Raya. On occasion, those involved in such activities ran a concrete risk of imprisonment or even of their lives, as the Dutch colonial authorities banned nationalistic publications and activities.

Chinese Indonesians were very active in supporting the independence movement during the 1940s Japanese occupation, when the all but one Chinese Indonesian political party - Huaqiao Zhonghui (华侨中会) - were banned by the Japanese military authorities. Some notable pro-independence activists were Siauw Giok Tjhan and Liem Koen Hian. Some of them, such as Yap Tjwan Bing, became officers in the Japanese forces, along with other Indonesians. Their aim was not to perpetuate Japanese rule but to help create the forces which they hoped would eventually gain Indonesian independence (which did indeed happen in 1945).

Indonesian National Revolution

"BPUPKI" ("Body for Investigating Preparation Attempts of Indonesia's Independence", Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) — had been originally set up under the Japanese and with their backing - but it outlived their rule and had a central role in proclaiming the Indonesian Declaration of Independence at 17 August 1945 - making clear that the return of Dutch colonial rule was unacceptable.

During the Indonesian National Revolution, many Chinese Indonesians supported the Independence movement. BPUPKI's membership included six ethnic Chinese members who contributed to the drafting of the Indonesian Constitution in 1945.

There was discussion on the formation of all-Chinese Indonesian units in the Revolution , similar to the formation of the all-Japanese American Nisei units in World War II. This suggestion was ultimately rejected, and the ethnic Chinese were urged instead to join their local pro-Independence groups.

Due to the lack of such clearly-defined ethnic unit, the precise number of Chinese Indonesians who took part in the Indonesian National Revolution, and their percentage of the Chinese Indonesian community as a whole, remains disputed. It is a sensitive issue due to it sometimes being linked to the post-war status of Chinese Indonesians and their equal status (or lack of one) in the Indonesia created by that war.

In 1946, the Consul General of the Republic of China, Chiang Chia Tung, expressed in Malang the ROC's support for Indonesia's independence.

Post-independence and New Order Era

During the 1945–1950 National Revolution to defend the independence from Dutch, surprisingly few Chinese Indonesians were involved in the liberation army. At that time, the economy plummeted and the taxes went sky high. Even everyday goods, such as soaps and spoons, were very rare as Dutch and Japanese confiscated many of them for their own army. Chinese Indonesian contribution in this era was in the smuggling of these goods. However, smuggling became increasingly difficult as Japan continued to affirm their foothold in Indonesia. Armed conflicts were inevitable. Nevertheless, Chinese Indonesians risked their lives for it.

After independence, the Japanese and Dutch were routed. Their companies were vacant or sold at very cheap prices. As Chinese Indonesians were apt at trades, they quickly assimilated these companies. However, many pribumis were dissatisfied with the outcome and sought to curb this effort. They were successful in accusing that Chinese Indonesian were rarely involved in armed conflicts and thereby the fledgling Indonesian government forced Chinese Indonesians to relinquish some of them. This upset many Chinese Indonesians. Some reduced their activities in politics, but some were still active and even served as ministers to the newly established republic.

The pribumis still felt left out and discriminated as the economy was increasingly dominated by Chinese Indonesians. The pribumis decried the government's lackluster effort to provide a level playing field and sought even more aggressive predicaments. This further escalated the tension of the already uneasy relationship between pribumis and Chinese Indonesian. Pribumis always considered Chinese Indonesians as the agents of the colonials. The tendency of Chinese Indonesians flocking together in Pecinan or Chinatowns, segregated from the pribumis, exacerbated it.

They succeeded. In 1959, President Soekarno approved PP 10/1959 that forced Chinese Indonesians to close their businesses in rural areas and relocate into urban areas in the hope of giving a competitive advantage for the pribumis to open their businesses in rural areas as the economy was agriculturally driven. This upset many Chinese Indonesians. They felt betrayed that their nationalism and heroism were not recognized at all. Moreover, the enforcement was brutal; many of them were slaughtered in the effort.

Many Cina Totoks "returned home" in protest to either mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, only to find that they were not as welcomed there either. Ironically, they were not regarded as "pure Chinese" regardless of their effort of maintaining a "pure Chinese breed". The unfortunate news of the early migrants was widespread among the ones in Indonesia. They soon found themselves as neither Indonesian nor Chinese and thus were in deep identity crisis. Some decided to move to some other places, like Singapore or Malaysia, but some uneasily decided to stay in Indonesia.

In the 1960s, many government regulations, such as PP 10/1959, restricted the Chinese Indonesians from the rural areas and forced many to relocate to the big cities. Moreover, political pressures in the 1970s and 1980s restricted the role of the Chinese Indonesian in politics, academics, and the military. As a result, they were thereafter constrained professionally to becoming entrepreneurs and professional managers in trade, manufacturing, and banking. In the 1970s, following the failed alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965, there was a strong sentiment against the Chinese Indonesians who were accused of being Communist collaborators.

Most Chinese Indonesian are not Muslim, further generating negative sentiments from the mostly Muslim native Indonesians. This is ironic in light of the fact that some of the earliest Muslim evangelists in Java (who were called the Wali Songo or 'The Nine Ambassadors') were of Chinese ancestry. A historical theory even suggests that the first people who brought Islamic faith to Indonesia were the Chinese traders, especially those who came to Semarang under the leadership of Sam Po Kong or Admiral Zheng He—Zheng. He himself was not a Han, but a Muslim from a minority ethnic group in China.

Various government policies banned Chinese language teaching, speaking, and publication. Established schools and colleges run by Chinese-Indonesian foundations were nationalized and their facilities seized without compensation and converted to state or pribumi-run schools such as Universitas Res Publica, which became Universitas Trisakti. A presidential directive forced Chinese Indonesian to abandon their Chinese names and adopt Indonesian names. Anti-Chinese sentiments increased among the pribumi Indonesians and anti-Chinese pogroms were frequent. In identity cards, all Chinese Indonesians were designated as "WNI" (Warga Negara Indonesia = Citizen of Indonesia), a euphemism for "ethnic Chinese" as opposed to just "Indonesian" for the pribumi Indonesians. This made it easy for government officials to extract bribes and side payments, and has been compared to Jews under Hitler being required to wear the Star of David badge on their chests. Ethnic Chinese must hold certificates of having rejected Chinese citizenship, despite being native-born and their family having lived in Indonesia for generations.

These highly discriminatory laws are believed by some as a concerted government effort at cultural genocide. Those Chinese Indonesians who could not stand the discrimination fled. The Totoks returned to mainland China—only to catch themselves trapped in Cultural Revolution—and the Peranakans, to the old masters' country, the Netherlands.

In 1998, preceding the fall of Suharto's 32-year presidency, big riots targeted the Chinese Indonesians, pogrom style. It is verified and confirmed that Chinese homes were looted and burned, and many Chinese people were raped or killed. The events in 1998 were significant because unlike earlier pogroms against Chinese Indonesians, due to the Internet, this incident spread world wide in real-time, and aroused the interest and feelings of the ethnic Chinese in China and other countries, which led to demonstrations against Indonesia in many countries with significant Chinese populations and protests to the government of Indonesia. After the tragedy, a large number of Chinese Indonesians fled to other countries, such as the USA, Australia, Singapore, and the Netherlands. Adding insult to injury, Habibie, the unpopular president after Suharto, ridiculed the fleeing Chinese as being unpatriotic. Ironically, Habibie himself left Indonesia to live in Germany after his performance report (pidato pertanggungjawaban) was rejected by the new, democratically-elected parliament in 1999.

Because of discrimination, most Chinese Indonesians were not politically active and could not lobby for legislation to protect their own interests despite their economical affluence. The situation is different in neighboring Malaysia where the overseas Chinese have been both politically and economically active despite being a minority in a similar environment—better off economically in a Muslim majority country.

Despite laws and sentiments against the Chinese Indonesians, many have succeeded in fields other than business, most notably in the sport of badminton, the most popular competitive sport in Indonesia. Indonesian athletes dominated the sport from the 1960s to the 1990s. Many of the beloved players and coaches are Chinese Indonesians, such as Tan Joe Hok, Rudy Hartono, Christian Hadinata, Tjun Tjun, Johan Wahjudi, Ade Chandra, Liem Swie King, Ivana Lie, Verawaty, Susi Susanti, Alan Budikusuma, Ardy Wiranata, and Heryanto Arbi.

New Order to Early Reform (1965-2000)

When Suharto came to power, Chinese Indonesians were increasingly discriminated against. With the justification of denouncing Chinese communism, Suharto not only closed communist-leaning parties, but also extended his reach toward all Chinese Indonesian parties and all aspects of Chinese Indonesian socio-culture. Soeharto effectively stripped Chinese Indonesians of power, banning them from politics and the military. He championed forced assimilation policy against Chinese Indonesians so that they would forget their ties to China. This policy brought forth many anti Chinese legislations. Soeharto passed and enacted very discriminatory citizenship laws, such as forcing Chinese Indonesians to re-register themselves as Indonesian citizens by renouncing their alleged Chinese citizenship regardless of the validity of the Indonesian citizenship they may already have. He denounced Chinese cultures and banned Chinese characters and literature. Allegedly, Soeharto was also the mastermind of the 1965 slaughter of millions of Chinese Indonesians, purportedly to eradicate the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

Group divisions among Cina Babas, Qiao Shengs, and Cina Totoks were blurred because Soeharto treated them alike. They were all forced to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones. This law is considered as one of the most humiliating ones to those in the Chinese community in Indonesia since by doing so, they are forced to lose their family name. Between 1965 and 1975, army and police officers were rampant in abusing Chinese Indonesians, such as openly robbing and raping their families. During this time, police could abuse any people using Chinese language. The only way to survive during this harsh period was by using bribes.

In addition, those who were considered as heroes of Indonesian independence, such as Siauw Giok Tjhan and Liem Koen Hian, were either brutally executed, exiled, or jailed. Those who protested were silently murdered. None of them were bestowed national hero status. It effectively discouraged any Chinese Indonesian of the time to dedicate their lives for Indonesia.

Since Chinese Indonesians were banned from all aspects of life except from the economy and industry, they concentrated their effort in those areas and became remarkably successful. It opened opportunities for government and military officers to levy bribes from Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Bribes and corruption soon became a norm. This widened the gap between them and pribumis. The pribumsi accused Chinese Indonesians with colluding with the government and thereby poisoning the entire political system. On the other hand, Chinese Indonesians felt that they were treated unfairly and the government was much more lenient toward the pribumis.

As more and more discrimination and enmity accumulated, Chinese Indonesians increasingly identified themselves as a separate group and did not like to be referred to as "Indonesians". Although younger generations did not as strictly follow traditions as the older ones did, they still felt they were different from Indonesians.

During this era, younger generations adopted western culture more and more as they perceived it as being more superior. They were more aligned toward western countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom. The westernization became popular as many parents sent their children abroad to western countries.

The Jakarta riot of 1998 targeted many Chinese Indonesians. The riot itself drew condemnations from Chinese speaking countries. Soeharto was allegedly the mastermind of this riot, but it misfired. Suffering from lootings and arsons, many Chinese Indonesians fled from Indonesia. Ironically, they found western countries were more accepting than Indonesia, their country of birth. Even after the riot subsided, many of them did not want to return.

Those who decided to stay in Indonesia found relief when Soeharto stepped down as president. The memory of the two genocidal riots associated with him, in 1965 and 1998, was not going to fade. They hoped that the new president would restore their status and end the enmity of centuries long.

Early in the reformation era, the government focused on stabilizing the economy and security. Discrimination was still rampant. However, Chinese Indonesians gained courage to express themselves in limited ways, which were otherwise impossible in the Soeharto era for fear of his heavy-handed tactics. Unfortunately, there were still many officers loyal to Soeharto who enforced the discriminatory laws. It was not for the sake of ideology, but rather for their own benefits.

Recent history, post-Reformasi Era

Soon after Abdurrahman Wahid came into power, he quickly abolished some of the discriminatory laws in efforts to improve race relationships. He encouraged Chinese Indonesian literature and culture. He also designated the Chinese lunar new year as a national holiday.

Chinese Indonesians are now in the era of rediscovery. Many younger generations, who cannot speak Mandarin due to the ban decades earlier, choose to learn Mandarin, as many learning centers open throughout the country. Stores now can openly show Chinese characters. Dragon dances and Lion dances are shown in public in many places without special permits or supervision.

The Chinese culture is starting to be embraced by even the popular media, who widely covers Chinese New Year celebrations and even broadcasts TV shows on Feng Shui and news in Chinese language in Indonesian television and radio, like Metro TV and Cakrawala broadscast radio.

A small number of Chinese Indonesians also regained the courage to get involved in politics and created new political parties, from one, (Kwik Kian Gie) was appointed minister in 1999. Chinese Indonesians adopted the term Tionghoa (Zhong Hua, 中华) to identify themselves. The term Cina is deemed derogatory today due to its unfortunate derogatory use in the past. Many Chinese Indonesians believe that they are now one distinct part of Indonesia.

See also

• Famous Chinese Indonesians
• Anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia
• Jakarta Riots of May 1998
• Demographics of Indonesia
• Malaysian Chinese
• Peranakan
• Overseas Chinese
• Indonesian-sounding names adopted by Chinese Indonesians
• Zheng He#Zheng He and Islam in Southeast Asia

Note

1. This definition and Chinese Indonesian is the same; URL accessed April 15, 2007.
2. http://www.greenleft.org.au/2000/406/23611
3. http://nanyang.xmu.edu.cn/printpage.asp?ArticleID=1369
6. Activist Arcengel quotes an anti-colonial pamphlet of 1902, the time of the bloody "Pacification of Aceh", stating: "The murder of 10,000 harmless Chinese was never punished!">.
7. http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_244_p.html

References

• Mark Landler, "Indonesia's Ethnic Chinese Feel Their Neighbors' Wrath," New York Times, May 16, 1998
• Ong Hok Ham. "Riwayat Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Story of Chinese Descendant in Java): A Collection of Ong Hok Ham's Articles in Star Weekly 1958-1960". Komunitas Bambu. 2005
• "Correcting the myth about the dominance of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian business," Business World (Philippines), 8 January 1999
• Tim Johnson, "Chinese diaspora: Indonesia," BBC News
• The Myth of Chinese Domination, By George J. Adijondro ()
• Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 by the U.S. Department of State .
• INDONESIA: Five years after May 1998
• Interview of Jusuf Kalla: Businessmen will be Treated Differently (In Indonesian).
• Protests of some Indonesian Chinese Organizations in the US towards racist remark of VP Kalla.
• Khoon Choy, Lee; A Fragile Nation: The Indonesian Crisis (Chapter 9).
• Khoon Choy, Lee; Indonesia, between myth and reality.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, Minority participation and democratization, The Jakarta Post - September 3, 2004.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, More Chinese Indonesians become actively engaged in politics, The Jakarta Post - March 29, 2004.
• Graaf, H. J. de (Hermanus Johannes), 1899-(?), "Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th centuries : the Malay Annals of Semarang and Cerbon / translated and provided with comments by H.J. de Graaf and Th. G.Th. Pigeaud; edited by M.C. Ricklefs. Publisher:  : Monash University, 1984. Description: xiii, 221 p. : folded map ; 21 cm. ISBN 0867464194 : Series: Monash papers on Southeast Asia ; no. 12
• "Landmark Legal Decision May Open U.S. Border to Chinese from Indonesia" by Jemma Purdey, Ph.D. - 2/1/2005

• Ethnic groups in Indonesia
• Overseas Chinese groups
• Chinese Indonesians