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{{Infobox Military Conflict | {{Infobox Military Conflict | ||
|conflict=Battle of |
|conflict=Battle of Huế | ||
|partof=the ] | |partof=the ] | ||
|image= ] | |image= ] | ||
|caption=ARVN soldiers after the battle |
|caption=ARVN soldiers after the battle | ||
|date=], ] - ], ] | |date=], ] - ], ] | ||
|place=], ] | |place=], ] | ||
|result=South Vietnamese and |
|result=South Vietnamese and U.S. victory | ||
|combatant1=] ]<br>] ] | |combatant1=] ]<br>] ] | ||
|combatant2=] ]<br>] ] | |combatant2=] ]<br>] ] | ||
|commander1=] | |commander1=]<br>] | ||
|commander2= | |commander2=] | ||
|strength1=30,000 |
|strength1=Over 30,000 {{cn}} | ||
|strength2= |
|strength2=8,000 to 12,000 | ||
|casualties1=ARVN:452 KIA; 2,123 WIA<br>US:216 KIA; 1,584 WIA<ref |
|casualties1='''ARVN''':452 KIA; 2,123 WIA<br>'''US''':216 KIA; 1,584 WIA<ref>http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1965.html</ref><br>'''Total''': 668 KIA; 3,707 WIA | ||
|casualties2=Est. over 5,000 killed (combined Allied claim ), 98 POW | |||
|casualties2=1,500 KIA (according to American sources)<br> 3,000 KIA (according to South Vietnamese sources)<ref name="bbcrecapturehue">{{cite news| title =South Vietnamese recapture Hue| publisher =BBC| date =1968-02-24| url =http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/24/newsid_4249000/4249381.stm| accessdate = 2007-04-06 }}</ref> |}} | |||
|}} | |||
{{Campaignbox Vietnam War}} | {{Campaignbox Vietnam War}} | ||
The '''Battle of Huế''' was one the bloodiest and longest battles of the ]. | |||
The '''Battle of Hue''' was perhaps the bloodiest and the longest battle of the ]. With the beginning of the ] on ], ], the Vietnamese lunar New Year, American forces had been committed to endless combat upon South Vietnamese soil for almost three years. The Communist offensive was carried out through main-force and guerrilla tactics upon more than forty province capitals, cities, and military installations throughout ]. ] (NVA) General ], who was the chief architect of the ] victory over the French at ] in 1954, planned it. The ] and three understrength U.S. Marine battalions, consisting of fewer than 2,500 men, attacked and soundly defeated more than 10,000 entrenched enemy troops, liberating Hue for South Vietnam. | |||
The ] and three understrength ] battalions, consisting of fewer than 2,500 men, attacked and soundly defeated more than 10,000 entrenched enemy troops, liberating the city of ] (pop. 140,000) for ]. | |||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
With the beginning of the ] on ], ], the Vietnamese lunar New Year, American forces had been committed to endless combat upon South Vietnamese soil for almost three years. Highway One passed through Hué and over the ] (the river ran through the city dividing it into both northern and southern areas) creating an important supply line from the coastal city of ] to the ] for the Allied forces. Hué was also a base for ] supply boats. The city, considering its value and its distance from the DMZ (only 50 miles), should have therefore been well-defended, fortified, and prepared for the Communist offensive. But it was actually poorly defended and unprepared for the twenty-six-day battle that was fought throughout its buildings and streets because the Allied forces expected that the NVA and VC would respect the Tet truce and, since Hué had never suffered any major attack before, they thought the city was safe. | |||
During the |
During the ], which is an important holiday celebrated in Vietnam, the ] and the ] launched a massive assault on South Vietnam, attacking hundreds of military targets and population centers across the country, among them the city of Hué. The Tet Offensive began on ], ]. | ||
==The |
==The battle== | ||
In the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, a division-sized force of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers launched a well coordinated multi-pronged attack on the city of Hué. | In the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, a division-sized force of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers launched a well coordinated multi-pronged attack on the city of Hué. | ||
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===Initial attack on the city=== | ===Initial attack on the city=== | ||
At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky above |
At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky above Hué. The battle began with the attack of two battalions from the NVA Sixth Regiment upon the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel located on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang Cu Compound, the Tac Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. A simultaneous attack by the NVA Forth Regiment was also launched on Hué's headquarters of the U.S. MACV Compound in the southern part of Hué. At the Western Gate of the Citadel, a four-man North Vietnamese sapper team, dressed in South Vietnamese Army uniforms, killed the guards and opened the gate. Upon their flashlight signals, lead elements of the 6th NVA entered the old city. In similar scenes throughout the Citadel, the North Vietnamese regulars poured into the old imperial capital.' The 800th and 802d Battalions pushed through the Western Gate and then drove north. On the Tay Loc airfield, the 'Black Panther' Company, reinforced by the division's 1st Ordnance Company, stopped the 800th Battalion. Although the enemy battle account stated that the South Vietnamese 'offered no strong resistance,' the NVA report acknowledged 'the heavy enemy ARVN fire enveloped the entire airfield. By dawn, our troops were still unable to advance.' | ||
While the fighting for the airfield continued to seesaw with first the ARVN having the upper hand and then the Communists, the 802d Battalion struck the 1st Division headquarters at Along Ca. Although the enemy battalion penetrated the division compound, an ad hoc 200-man defensive force consisting of staff officers, clerks, and other headquarters personnel managed to stave off the enemy assaults. General Truong called back most of his Black Panther Company from the airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses. With the reinforcements, the division headquarters remained secure. Nevertheless, by daylight, at the southern gate to the Citadel, with its flagpole, is where the North Vietnamese raised their flag. | While the fighting for the airfield continued to seesaw with first the ARVN having the upper hand and then the Communists, the 802d Battalion struck the 1st Division headquarters at Along Ca. Although the enemy battalion penetrated the division compound, an ad hoc 200-man defensive force consisting of staff officers, clerks, and other headquarters personnel managed to stave off the enemy assaults. General Truong called back most of his Black Panther Company from the airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses. With the reinforcements, the division headquarters remained secure. Nevertheless, by daylight, at the southern gate to the Citadel, with its flagpole, is where the North Vietnamese raised their flag. | ||
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60 percent of the Citadel, including the imperial palace, was in the hands of the NVA. At 0800, North Vietnamese troops raised the red and blue Viet Cong banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower. | 60 percent of the Citadel, including the imperial palace, was in the hands of the NVA. At 0800, North Vietnamese troops raised the red and blue Viet Cong banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower. | ||
In the moment of the attack there were three ] battalions protecting the air base at ] (approximately ten miles southeast of |
In the moment of the attack there were three ] battalions protecting the air base at ] (approximately ten miles southeast of Hué), Highway One and all western entrances to Hué, when there should have been two complete regiments. The Commanding General of the Marines in Hué was the General ], a veteran of ] and the ]. | ||
===Attack on the MACV compound=== | ===Attack on the MACV compound=== | ||
Across the river in southern |
Across the river in southern Hué, much the same situation existed. U.S. advisors to the 1st ARVN Division in the MACV compound, a complex of several two- to three-story buildings, including a former hotel, awoke in the early morning hours to the sound of bursting mortar and rocket rounds. The Americans grabbed any weapons that were at hand and manned their defenses. Like the 1st Division staff, the advisors successfully repulsed the initial enemy ground attack. While not mounting any further ground assaults, the NVA maintained a virtual siege of the compound with mortars, rockets, and automatic weapons fire." | ||
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Advisory Team 3 had the mission of providing support (mostly fire support and logistics) to the 1st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) headquartered in Hué as well as Thua Thien province forces. The province headquarters were just north of the MACV compound. | Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Advisory Team 3 had the mission of providing support (mostly fire support and logistics) to the 1st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) headquartered in Hué as well as Thua Thien province forces. The province headquarters were just north of the MACV compound. | ||
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==Aftermath== | ==Aftermath== | ||
The communist forces paid heavily too. The South Vietnamese claimed to have killed nearly 3,000 in the battle for Hue, while the Americans said they have killed 1,500. |
The communist forces paid heavily too. The South Vietnamese claimed to have killed nearly 3,000 in the battle for Hue (probably overstimate), while the Americans said they have killed 1,500. About 3,000 more were estimated to be killed outside of the city. | ||
There were also massive civilian casualties due to ] by North Vietnamese forces of the civilian population of the city during their one month control of the city. In the battle's aftermath, South Vietnamese and American soldiers unearthed numerous shallow mass graves inside the city and on its outskirts containing the bodies of approximately 2,800 people killed by the NVA and VC and their systematic way of eliminating those who were considered as a threat to Communist victory, |
There were also massive civilian casualties due to ] by North Vietnamese forces of the civilian population of the city during their one month control of the city. In the battle's aftermath, South Vietnamese and American soldiers unearthed numerous shallow mass graves inside the city and on its outskirts containing the bodies of approximately 2,800 people killed by the NVA and VC and their systematic way of eliminating those who were considered as a threat to Communist victory, although it has been stated that a South Vietnamese intelligence unit may have killed some of these victims who were said to have aided the enemy. But, perhaps Hue’s aftermath can best be described by a Marine Captain Myron Harrington who commanded a one-hundred-man company during the battle: "''Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it''"?<ref>http://navysite.de/cg/cg66hist.htm</ref> | ||
Militarily, Hue was considered an Allied victory, for the NVA and VC forces (ultimately numbering over 10,000, more than a full division) were driven from the city, but from the opinion of the American public, Hue was the beginning of the end. From this time forward the American people became disgusted with sending their teenage boys and men off to die in Vietnam, and during the next five years American involvement slowly but steadily decreased until 1973 when the last American troops left Vietnam only to see their sacrifices end in utter disaster two years later. | Militarily, Hue was considered an Allied victory, for the NVA and VC forces (ultimately numbering over 10,000, more than a full division) were driven from the city, but from the opinion of the American public, Hue was the beginning of the end. From this time forward the American people became disgusted with sending their teenage boys and men off to die in Vietnam, and during the next five years American involvement slowly but steadily decreased until 1973 when the last American troops left Vietnam only to see their sacrifices end in utter disaster two years later. | ||
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<references /></div> | <references /></div> | ||
] | |||
{{DEFAULTSORT:Hue}} | |||
] | ] | ||
] | ] |
Revision as of 21:06, 17 April 2007
Battle of Huế | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
File:Hue ARVN victory.jpg ARVN soldiers after the battle | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
South Viet Nam United States |
North Viet Nam Viet Cong | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Ngo Quang Truong Foster C. LaHue | Tran Van Quang | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Over 30,000 | 8,000 to 12,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
ARVN:452 KIA; 2,123 WIA US:216 KIA; 1,584 WIA Total: 668 KIA; 3,707 WIA | Est. over 5,000 killed (combined Allied claim ), 98 POW |
The Battle of Huế was one the bloodiest and longest battles of the Vietnam War.
The South Vietnamese Army and three understrength U.S. Marine battalions, consisting of fewer than 2,500 men, attacked and soundly defeated more than 10,000 entrenched enemy troops, liberating the city of Huế (pop. 140,000) for South Vietnam.
Background
With the beginning of the Tet Offensive on January 30, 1968, the Vietnamese lunar New Year, American forces had been committed to endless combat upon South Vietnamese soil for almost three years. Highway One passed through Hué and over the Perfume River (the river ran through the city dividing it into both northern and southern areas) creating an important supply line from the coastal city of Da Nang to the DMZ for the Allied forces. Hué was also a base for United States Navy supply boats. The city, considering its value and its distance from the DMZ (only 50 miles), should have therefore been well-defended, fortified, and prepared for the Communist offensive. But it was actually poorly defended and unprepared for the twenty-six-day battle that was fought throughout its buildings and streets because the Allied forces expected that the NVA and VC would respect the Tet truce and, since Hué had never suffered any major attack before, they thought the city was safe.
During the Tet, which is an important holiday celebrated in Vietnam, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army launched a massive assault on South Vietnam, attacking hundreds of military targets and population centers across the country, among them the city of Hué. The Tet Offensive began on January 31, 1968.
The battle
In the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, a division-sized force of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers launched a well coordinated multi-pronged attack on the city of Hué.
Their targets were the Tay Loc airfield and the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Citadel, and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the New City on the south side of the river. Their strategic objective, however, was to "liberate" the entire city as part of a country-wide popular uprising to sweep the Communist insurgents into power.
Initial attack on the city
At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky above Hué. The battle began with the attack of two battalions from the NVA Sixth Regiment upon the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel located on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang Cu Compound, the Tac Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. A simultaneous attack by the NVA Forth Regiment was also launched on Hué's headquarters of the U.S. MACV Compound in the southern part of Hué. At the Western Gate of the Citadel, a four-man North Vietnamese sapper team, dressed in South Vietnamese Army uniforms, killed the guards and opened the gate. Upon their flashlight signals, lead elements of the 6th NVA entered the old city. In similar scenes throughout the Citadel, the North Vietnamese regulars poured into the old imperial capital.' The 800th and 802d Battalions pushed through the Western Gate and then drove north. On the Tay Loc airfield, the 'Black Panther' Company, reinforced by the division's 1st Ordnance Company, stopped the 800th Battalion. Although the enemy battle account stated that the South Vietnamese 'offered no strong resistance,' the NVA report acknowledged 'the heavy enemy ARVN fire enveloped the entire airfield. By dawn, our troops were still unable to advance.'
While the fighting for the airfield continued to seesaw with first the ARVN having the upper hand and then the Communists, the 802d Battalion struck the 1st Division headquarters at Along Ca. Although the enemy battalion penetrated the division compound, an ad hoc 200-man defensive force consisting of staff officers, clerks, and other headquarters personnel managed to stave off the enemy assaults. General Truong called back most of his Black Panther Company from the airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses. With the reinforcements, the division headquarters remained secure. Nevertheless, by daylight, at the southern gate to the Citadel, with its flagpole, is where the North Vietnamese raised their flag.
60 percent of the Citadel, including the imperial palace, was in the hands of the NVA. At 0800, North Vietnamese troops raised the red and blue Viet Cong banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower.
In the moment of the attack there were three United States Marine Corps battalions protecting the air base at Phu Bai (approximately ten miles southeast of Hué), Highway One and all western entrances to Hué, when there should have been two complete regiments. The Commanding General of the Marines in Hué was the General Foster C. LaHue, a veteran of World War II and the Korea War.
Attack on the MACV compound
Across the river in southern Hué, much the same situation existed. U.S. advisors to the 1st ARVN Division in the MACV compound, a complex of several two- to three-story buildings, including a former hotel, awoke in the early morning hours to the sound of bursting mortar and rocket rounds. The Americans grabbed any weapons that were at hand and manned their defenses. Like the 1st Division staff, the advisors successfully repulsed the initial enemy ground attack. While not mounting any further ground assaults, the NVA maintained a virtual siege of the compound with mortars, rockets, and automatic weapons fire."
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Advisory Team 3 had the mission of providing support (mostly fire support and logistics) to the 1st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) headquartered in Hué as well as Thua Thien province forces. The province headquarters were just north of the MACV compound.
The team was quartered in an area approximately one city block square on the south side of the Perfume River in the New City of Hué. This area was called the Frank Doezema Compound in honor of U.S. Army Specialist Frank Doezema who was killed while manning a key defensive position there on the first morning of the Battle of Hué. Doezema was credited by many with saving the compound during the initial onslaught and was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his valor.
The city is in NVA hands
The 4th NVA Regiment with the 804th NVA Battalion, supported by local force companies and elements of the Hue City Sapper Battalion, had launched its offensive against the modern city. Divided into several attack groups, the enemy sought out key civil and military facilities. Even according to the North Vietnamese official account, the enemy actions and preparations in the new city lacked the cohesion and timing of those in the Citadel. The North Vietnamese author wrote: "The attacks on southern Hue were carried out by many forces which employed many very different forms of tactics." One unit lost its way in the darkness and did not arrive in the city until 0600. Despite confusion and some reverses, that morning, the NVA had control of most of southern Hue except for the prison, the MACV compound, and the Hue LCU (landing craft, utility) ramp on the waterfront to the northeast of the compound.
Call for ARVN reinforcements
In the Citadel, on February 1, the embattled General Truong called in reinforcements. He ordered his 3d Regiment; the 3d Troop, 7th ARVN Cavalry; and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force to relieve the pressure on his Mang Ca headquarters. Responding to the call at PK 17, the ARVN base located near a road marker on Route l, 17 kilometers north of Hue, the 3d Troop and the 7th Battalion of the Airborne task force rolled out of their base area in an armored convoy onto Route l. A North Vietnamese blocking force stopped the ARVN relief force about 400 meters short of the Citadel wall. Unable to force their way through the enemy positions, the South Vietnamese paratroopers asked for assistance. The 2d ARVN Airborne Battalion reinforced the convoy and the South Vietnamese finally penetrated the lines and entered the Citadel in the early morning hours of the next day. The cost had been heavy: the ARVN suffered 131 casualties including 40 dead, and lost 4 of the 12 armored personnel carriers in the convoy. According to the South Vietnamese, the enemy also paid a steep price in men and equipment. The ARVN claimed to have killed 250 of the NVA, captured 5 prisoners, and recovered 71 individual and 25 crew-served weapons.
The 3d ARVN Regiment had an even more difficult time. On the 31st, two of its battalions, the 2d and 3d, advanced east from encampments southwest of the city along the northern bank of the Perfume River, but North Vietnamese defensive fires forced them to fall back. Unable to enter the Citadel, the two battalions established their night positions outside the southeast wall of the old City. Enemy forces surrounded the 1st and 4th Battalions of the regiment, operating to the southeast, as they attempted to reinforce the units in Hue. Captain Phan Ngoc Luong, the commander of the 1st Battalion, retreated with his unit to the coastal Ba Long outpost, arriving there with only three clips per man for their World War II vintage Ml rifles.* At Ba Long, the battalion then embarked upon motorized junks and reached the Citadel the following day. The 4th Battalion, however, remained unable to break its encirclement for several days.
South of the city, on 31 January, Lieutenant Colonel Phan Huu Chi, the commander of the ARVN 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron attempted to break the enemy stranglehold. He led an armored column toward Hue, but like the other South Vietnamese units, found it impossible to break through. With the promise of U.S. Marine reinforcements, Chi's column, with three tanks in the lead, tried once more. This time they crossed the An Cuu Bridge into the new city. Coming upon the central police headquarters in southern Hue, the tanks attempted to relieve the police defenders. When an enemy B-40 rocket made a direct hit upon Lieutenant Colonel Chi's tank, killing him instantly, the South Vietnamese armor then pulled back.
After this the Marines at Phu Bai were called and the first U.S. Marines to bolster the South Vietnamese in the city were on their way. They were from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, part of Task Force X-Ray.
The Marines are called
On the night of 30-31 January, the same time the North Vietnamese struck Hue, the Marines had their hands full throughout the Phu Bai area of operations. Enemy rockets and mortars struck the Phu Bai airstrip and Communist infantry units hit Marine Combined Action Platoons and local PF and RF units in the region including the Truoi River and Phu Loc sectors. At the key Truoi River Bridge, about 0400 a North Vietnamese company attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment and the nearby Combined Action Platoon H-8. Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham ordered Captain G. Ronald Christmas, the Company H commander to relieve the embattled CAP unit. The Marines caught the enemy force beginning to withdraw from the CAP enclave and took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the North Vietnamese, Cheatham reinforced Company H with his Command Group and Company F.
With his other companies in blocking positions, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River. While inflicting casualties, the events in Hue were to interfere with his plans. At 1030, 31 January, Company G departed for Phu Bai as the Task Force reserve. Later that afternoon, the battalion lost operational control of Company F. Captain Downs years later remembered the company "disengaged . .. where we had them pinned up against a river, moved to the river and trucked into Phu Bai." With the departure of Company F about 1630, the NVA successfully disengaged and Companies H and E took up night defensive positions. According to the Marines, 2nd Battalion 5th Marines (2/5) killed 18 enemy troops, took 1 prisoner, and recovered sundry equipment and weapons including 6 AK-47s, at a cost of 3 Marines killed and 13 wounded.
While the fighting continued in the Truoi River and the Phu Loc sectors, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had begun to move into Hue city. In the early morning hours of 31 January after the rocket bombardment of the airfield and the initial attack on the Truoi River Bridge, Task Force X-Ray received reports of enemy strikes all along Route l between the Hai Van Pass and Hue. All told, the enemy hit some 18 targets from bridges, Combined Action units, and company defensive positions. With Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines as the Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Lieutenant Colonel Gravel to stage the company for any contingency. At 0630, Colonel Hughes ordered the company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge. All Captain Batcheller recalled several years later was that "we were rousted up about 0400 on the 31st and launched south on trucks to rendezvous with and reinforce ARVN forces about a map sheet and a half south of Phu Bai."
Up to this point the fighting for Hue had been entirely a South Vietnamese affair. General LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray commander, actually had very little reliable intelligence on the situation. All he knew was that Truong's headquarters had been under attack, as was the MACV compound. Because of enemy mortaring of the LCU ramp in southern Hue, the allies had stopped all river traffic to the city. As LaHue later wrote: "Initial deployment of forces was made with limited information."
The Marines go into battle
As the Marines approached the southern suburbs of the city, they began to come under increased sniper fire. In one village, the troops dismounted and cleared the houses on either side of the main street before proceeding. The Marine convoy stopped several times to eliminate resistance in heavy house-to-house and street fighting before proceeding again.
At about 1515 after bloody fighting the Marines managed to make their way toward the MACV compound. By this time, the enemy attackers had pulled back their forces from the immediate vicinity of the compound. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel met with Army Colonel George O. Adkisson, the U.S. senior advisor to the 1 st ARVN Division.
Leaving Company A behind to secure the MACV compound, the Marine battalion commander took Company G, reinforced by the three tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion and a few South Vietnamese tanks from the ARVN 7th Armored Squadron, and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Gravel left the armor behind on the southern bank to provide direct fire support. As he remembered, the American M48s were too heavy for the bridge and the South Vietnamese tankers in light M24 tanks "refused to go." As the Marine infantry started across, an enemy machine gun on the other end of the bridge opened up, killing and wounding several Marines. One Marine, Lance Corporal Lester A. Tully, later awarded the Silver Star for his action, ran forward, threw a grenade, and silenced the gun. Two platoons successfully made their way to the other side. They turned left and immediately came under automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire from the Citadel wall. The Marines decided to withdraw.
This was easier said then done. The enemy was well dug-in and firing from virtually every building in Hue city north of the river. The number of wounded was rising, the Marines commandeered some abandoned Vietnamese civilian vehicles and used them as makeshift ambulances to carry out the wounded. Among the casualties on the bridge was Major Walter M. Murphy, the 1st Battalion S-3 or operations officer, who later died of his wounds.
By 2000, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had established defensive positions near the MACV compound and a helicopter landing zone in a field just west of the Navy LCU Ramp in southern Hue. On that first day, the two Marine companies in Hue had sustained casualties of 10 Marines killed and 56 wounded. During the night, the battalion called in a helicopter into the landing zone to take out the worst of the wounded. The American command still had little realization of the situation in Hue.
Counter-attack
The next morning at 0700, Gravel launched a two-company assault supported by tanks towards the jail and provincial building. The Marines didn't get a block away before they started getting sniper fire. A tank was knocked out by a 57mm recoilless rifle. After that the attack was stopped cold and the battalion returned to the MACV compound.
North of the Perfume River, on the 1st, the 1st ARVN Division enjoyed some limited success. Although the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 3d ARVN Regiment remained outside of the Citadel walls unable to penetrate the NVA defenses, the 2d and 7th Airborne Battalions, supported by armored personnel carriers and the Black Panther Company, recaptured the Tay Loc airfield. About 1500, the 1st Battalion, 3d ARVN reached the 1st ARVN command post at the Mang Ca compound. Later that day, U.S. Marine helicopters from HMM-165 brought part of the 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment from Dong Ha into the Citadel. One of the pilots, Captain Denis M. Duna-gan, remembered that the call for an emergency trooplift came in about 1400. Eight CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters made the flight in marginal weather with a 200-500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility, arriving in an improvised landing zone under enemy mortar fire. The deteriorating weather forced the squadron to cancel the remaining lifts with about one-half of the battalion in the Citadel.
Shortly after 1500 Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines made a helicopter landing into southern Hue. They were to relieve a MACV communications facility surrounded by a VC force. The company spent the better part of the afternoon trying to reach the isolated United States Army Signal Corps troops and never made it. The company sustained casualties of 3 dead and 13 wounded.
Breakout over the river
On 1 February, General Cushman alerted the 1st Air Cavalry commander, Major General John J.Tolson, to be ready to deploy his 3d Brigade into a sector west of Hue. By 2215 that night, Tolson's command had asked III MAF to coordinate with I Corps and Task Force X-Ray its designated area of operations in the Hue sector.
Tolson's plan called for the insertion of two battalions of the 3d Brigade northwest of Hue. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was to arrive in the landing zone first, followed by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 3d Brigade headquarters. Attacking in a southeasterly direction, the two battalions would then attempt to close the enemy supply line into Hue.
Under difficult circumstances, the 'First Team' began its movement into the Hue area. In mid-afternoon on the 2d, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry arrived in a landing zone about K) miles northwest of Hue and then pushed towards the city.'
In southern Hue, on 2 February, the Marines made some minor headway and brought in further reinforcements. The 1st Battalion finally relieved the MACV radio facility that morning and later, after a three-hour fire fight, reached the Hue University campus.' Although the NVA, during the night, had dropped the railroad bridge across the Perfume River west of the city, they left untouched the bridge across the Phu Cam Canal. About 1100, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Captain G. Ronald Christmas, crossed the An Cuu Bridge over the canal in a 'Rough Rider' armed convoy.
As the convoy, accompanied by Army trucks equipped with quad .50-caliber machine guns and two Ontos, entered the city, enemy snipers opened up on the Marine reinforcements. Near the MACV compound, the Marines came under heavy enemy machine gun and rocket fire. The Army gunners with their 'quad .50s' and the Marine Ontos, each with six 106mm recoilless rifles, quickly responded. In the resulting confusion, the convoy exchanged fire with a Marine unit already in the city.
About mid-day, the NVA, continued to block any advance to the south. An enemy 75mm recoilless rifle knocked out one of the supporting tanks. By the end ot the day, the Marines had sustained 2 dead and 34 wounded and claimed to have killed nearly 140 of the enemy. The battalion consolidated its night defensive positions and waited to renew its attack on the following day.
Battle for the Citadel
Heavy street fighting followed the Marines all the way through the city for more than three weeks. Marines of the 1st and 5th Regiments, fighting alongside the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s 1st Division, and also supported by U.S. Army 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments drove the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces out of Hue little by little and retook the city one block at a time.
Many of the Marines had little or no urban combat experience, and the US troops were not trained for urban close-quarters combat, so this battle was especially tough for them. Due to Hue's religious and cultural status, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city, for fear of destroying the historic structures. Also, since it was monsoon season, it was virtually impossible for the US forces to use air support. But as the intensity of the battle increased, the policy was eliminated. The communist forces were constantly using snipers, hidden inside buildings or in small holes, and prepared makeshift machine gun bunkers. They organised local counterattacks and, during the night, they prepared explosive booby traps.
Finally it was only down to the Citadel and the Imperial Palace which was in the center of it. American A-4 Skyhawks dropped bombs and napalm on the Citadel.
The Marines raised an American flag but shortly thereafter were ordered to lower it flag, for in accordance with South Vietnamese law, no U.S. flag was permitted to be flown without an accompanying South Vietnamese flag. The Marines objected to this law and threatened to shoot a few American Army officers who were instructed to take down the flag, but eventually took it down themselves under an order from their superior officer.
On February 24, 1968 the Imperial Palace in the center of the Citadel was secured and the elite Black Panther Company of the First South Vietnamese Division tore down the NVA's flag, which had flown since the battle's start on January 31. A few days later the NVA withdrew from the city completely.
Aftermath
The communist forces paid heavily too. The South Vietnamese claimed to have killed nearly 3,000 in the battle for Hue (probably overstimate), while the Americans said they have killed 1,500. About 3,000 more were estimated to be killed outside of the city.
There were also massive civilian casualties due to large massacres by North Vietnamese forces of the civilian population of the city during their one month control of the city. In the battle's aftermath, South Vietnamese and American soldiers unearthed numerous shallow mass graves inside the city and on its outskirts containing the bodies of approximately 2,800 people killed by the NVA and VC and their systematic way of eliminating those who were considered as a threat to Communist victory, although it has been stated that a South Vietnamese intelligence unit may have killed some of these victims who were said to have aided the enemy. But, perhaps Hue’s aftermath can best be described by a Marine Captain Myron Harrington who commanded a one-hundred-man company during the battle: "Did we have to destroy the town in order to save it"?
Militarily, Hue was considered an Allied victory, for the NVA and VC forces (ultimately numbering over 10,000, more than a full division) were driven from the city, but from the opinion of the American public, Hue was the beginning of the end. From this time forward the American people became disgusted with sending their teenage boys and men off to die in Vietnam, and during the next five years American involvement slowly but steadily decreased until 1973 when the last American troops left Vietnam only to see their sacrifices end in utter disaster two years later.
See also
References
- http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1965.html
- http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/books/1968/0172.cfm
- http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/books/1968/0176.cfm
- http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/books/1968/0177.cfm
- "Fight for a Citadel". Time. 1968-03-01. Retrieved 2007-04-06.
- http://navysite.de/cg/cg66hist.htm