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== Add India Partition to See Also ==

I currently don't have >500 edits, so I cannot edit this article due to it being locked with ]. Instead, can someone with >500 edits please add the ] to the "See Also" section? India/Pakistan was partitioned the year before this was voted-on, and this article states that both India and Pakistan voted against the Partition Plan for Palestine. I think the reader may want to read about what happened in India/Pakistan from their recent partition after reading this article. ''-- 03:21, 16 December 2022 Maltfield''

== Edit request: ''Ad hoc'' Committee, last section ==

* '''What I think should be changed (format using {{tl|textdiff}})''':
{{TextDiff|Arab states requested representation on the UN ad hoc subcommittees of October 1947, but were excluded from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition. <ref>Baylis Thomas, Lexington Books 1999 p.57 n.6.</ref>|The chairman ] excluded the Arab states from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition. Initially, only this majority proposal was to be drafted, but an unnamed US politician maneuvered to also draft the minority proposal, thereby excluding the Arab states from the majority proposal's drafting. Instead, all Arab states were placed in Subcommittee 2 to draft the minority recommendation. <ref>Cf. Daniel Mandel (2004): . Frank Cass. p. 128.</ref> Evatt also rejected a motion from Subcommittee 2 to balance this subcommittees' composition. <ref>UN, Department of Public Information: . p. 240.</ref> He was later criticized for thereby preventing a compromise and a fairer partition proposal by creating these "unbalanced" subcommittees. <ref>E.g. ] (1968): . ''Law and Contemporary Problems'' '''33 (1)'''. p. 101: „It seems anomalous that the procedure adopted for the consideration of the report was delegated to two subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee, one composed of pro-partition delegates and the other of Arab delegates plus Colombia and Pakistan, which were sympathetic to the Arab cause. It was obvious that those two sub-committees were so unbalanced as to be unable to achieve anything constructive. As was later evident, the task of reconciling their conflicting recommendations was impossible. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that no serious attention was given to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.“</ref><ref> E.g. John B. Judis (2014): Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Section 13: "Months later, Hagglof told Lionel Gelber from the Jewish Agency that a majority of nations felt that the United States and the chairman of the ad hoc committee, the Australian Herbert Evatt, had manipulated the issue so that the countries were forced to choose between 'partition and some pro-Arab scheme.' They would have preferred an 'attempt at conciliation,' but that was not among the choices they were given."</ref><ref>Similarly, Victor Kattan (2009): . Pluto Press. p. 149: "In this regard, two of the Arab states let it be known that they were anxious to step down from Subcommittee 2 so that it might be reconstituted on a fairer basis with countries both for and against partition working together. But the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee rejected the proposal. In the words of Khan: 'It was either partition or nothing.' There was no middle way."</ref>
}}

* '''Why it should be changed''':<br />This was in fact one of the major irregularities in the drafting of the partition resolution. The matter is referenced in the UN Yearbook 1947/1948. Cohen reports on it, cited by Thomas, who is cited by the Wikitext. Each source presents it slightly differently from the previous one, so the Wikitext is not accurate in the end. I mark the crucial point with a "".
** UN, Department of Public Information: . p. 240: "On a preliminary review of the task assigned to it - the drafting of a detailed plan for the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the establishment of Palestine as an independent unitary state - the Sub-Committee felt that it was somewhat unfortunate that both Sub-Committee 1 and Sub-Committee 2 were so constituted as to include in each of them representatives of only one school of thought, respectively, and that there was insufficient representation of neutral countries. Accordingly, it was proposed that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee should be requested to reconstitute Sub-Committee 2 (irrespective of what might be done with regard to Sub-Committee 1) by replacing two of the Arab States in the Sub-Committee (which were prepared to withdraw) by neutrals or countries which had not definitely committed themselves to any particular solution of the Palestine question. The Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, being approached in this connection, explained to the Sub-Committee that he could not see his way to accepting this recommendation. In the circumstances, the representative of Colombia resigned from the Sub-Committee on October 28, and Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) was elected as Chairman in his stead, at the same time retaining his position as Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee."
** Michael J. Cohen (2016): Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. Princeton Legacy Library. p. 284: "On October 22, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, chaired by Dr. Herbert E. Evatt of Australia, set up two subcommittees, to study the majority and minority reports and to bring forward detailed proposals to the full assembly. Subcommittee One, with nine members, all supporters of partition, was deputed to work on the majority report; Subcommittee Two, composed of six Arab delegates and three supporters of the minority plan, was to work out the details of the unitary state scheme. Subcommittee Two was not really taken seriously, and the unitary state scheme was never considered at any length by the assembly. Evatt found his freedom of choice severely limited by the right of delegates to opt out of subcommittees , but nevertheless he was criticized severely for composing them exclusively of delegates who already supported the schemes they were called upon to consider. The mutual exclusivity of the two reports was underlined by the fact that the Jewish Agency exploited to the full the opportunity afforded it to give evidence to Subcommittee One, while the HAC, which boycotted the first committee, was continually consulted by Subcommittee Two."
** Thomas (see text): "The Arabs had boycotted the June 1947 UNSCOP inquiry but wished to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine's ''subcommittees'' of October 1947. They were excluded from Subcommittee One, responsible for studying and modifying the boundaries and other specifics of partition. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine placed only pro-partition, pro-Jewish countries (including the United States and U.S.S.R.) on this subcommittee. The chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, though limited in his freedom of choice concerning the assignment of delegates to various committees , 'was criticized severely for composing them exclusively of delegates who already supported the schemes that were called upon to consider.' The Arabs were included only in Subcommittee Two, dealing with the minority report (unitary Arab plan), which was not taken seriously. Cohen, ''Palestine'', 284."

<references /> ] (]) 18:50, 7 June 2024 (UTC)

== Edit request: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), First Section ==

* '''What I think should be changed (format using {{tl|textdiff}})''':
{{TextDiff|The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court, and refused to collaborate with UNSCOP, which had extended an invitation for liaison also to the ]. <ref name="Baylis Thomas p.47"/> <ref>Mandel, </ref>|The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court. The ] even officially refused to cooperate with UNSCOP. <ref>Haim Levenberg: Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945-1948. Frank Cass 1993. .</ref>
}}

* '''Why it should be changed''': The information in Thomas is wrong. I have actually found even more books where a boycott by 'the Arabs' is mentioned. However, the matter is thoroughly discussed by Levenberg: It was only some members of the Arab Higher Committee who wanted to boycott UNSCOP. The other Arab states were against it, did of course work together with UNSCOP, and even within the AHC, several individuals (e.g., Khalidi and Alami ) unofficially collaborated with UNSCOP.<br /><br />
<references />
] (]) 09:19, 8 June 2024 (UTC)


== Edit request: Proposed partition == == Edit request: Proposed partition ==
Line 65: Line 38:


:: You are right. The population statistics are from the UNSCOP report, the land statistics refer to the final partition (55,5% Jewish state, 43,8% Arab State, 0,7% Jerusalem. See ). I've done a very rough measurement: the area along the border with Egypt (the largest change) is just ~7-8% of Palestine. According to the UNSCOP plan, therefore, roughly 62-63% would have been allocated to the Jewish state. But this would need a source. I can't find any calculations on how the areas of the Jewish and Arab states compared to each other before the adjustments. ] (]) 08:17, 11 June 2024 (UTC) :: You are right. The population statistics are from the UNSCOP report, the land statistics refer to the final partition (55,5% Jewish state, 43,8% Arab State, 0,7% Jerusalem. See ). I've done a very rough measurement: the area along the border with Egypt (the largest change) is just ~7-8% of Palestine. According to the UNSCOP plan, therefore, roughly 62-63% would have been allocated to the Jewish state. But this would need a source. I can't find any calculations on how the areas of the Jewish and Arab states compared to each other before the adjustments. ] (]) 08:17, 11 June 2024 (UTC)

::: God, I'm such an airhead. On the page itself, there are two quotes that mention 62%: Morris: 1948, p. 47; Ben-Dror: Arab Struggle, p. 259 f. Tom Segev: ''1949. The First Israelis''. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-8050-5896-6. p. 21 has also the Arab figure:<br />
::: ", which had prepared the Partition Resolution of 1947, had allotted 62 percent of the territory of Palestine to the Jewish state and 38 percent to the Arab one. The November 29 Resolution itself altered this ratio in favor of the Arabs, giving them 45 percent as opposed to 55 percent to the Jews. Following the conclusion of hte armistice agreements, Israel retained nearly 80 percent of the territory and the Arabs about 20 percent." ] (]) 13:19, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
::::In that case we need to fix the article in a few places
::::# Proposed partition - your proposed changes (removing Jaffa) and also probably it would make sense to rename it to "Initial partition plan" to make it clear that it was *proposed* but the UN voted on a different plan
::::# Proposed partition - the table and the percentages should be removed and replaced by the numbers that you've found (62% and 38%).
::::# Boundary changes - the tables and percentages describing the finalised partition plan should be moved here. Again, I'd suggest renaming it to something like "Final partition plan"
::::WDYT? ]<sub>]</sub> 20:39, 11 June 2024 (UTC)

::::: Sounds good to me. I would also move
:::::: State Department advice critical of the controversial UNSCOP recommendation to give the overwhelmingly Arab town of Jaffa, and the Negev, to the Jews was overturned by an urgent and secret late meeting organized for Chaim Weizman with Truman, which immediately countermanded the recommendation.
::::: to "Boundary changes". The background is this:
:::::: The dominant USA had already planned to reallocate Jaffa and the Negev to the Arab state to gain favor with Arab states and secure their support for the partition plan. However, when the Zionists learned of these plans, ] advisor ] arranged a meeting with ], who persuaded the President with the vision of a canal running through Jewish territory from the ] to ]. Following Truman’s direct orders, the Americans abandoned their earlier tactic<ref>Cf. Chaim Weizmann: . Schocken Books, 1966. p. 457–459.</ref><ref>]: . Random House, 1977. p. 94.</ref><ref>T. G. Fraser: The USA and the Middle East Since World War 2. Palgrave Macmillan, 1989. p. 30 f.</ref><ref>Robert J. Donovan: Conflict and Crisis. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948. W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. p. 327 f.</ref><ref>John W. Mulhall: America and the Founding of Israel. An Investigation of the Morality of America's Role. Deshon Press, 1995. p. 140–142.</ref><ref>Allis Radosh / Ronald Radosh: . Harper Collins Publishers, 2009. p. 261–265.</ref><ref>John B. Judis: Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014. Epub edition, section 13: "The most controversial of these amendments was giving most of the Negev to the Arabs. With the Negev included, an Arab state would be larger than the Jewish state, and it would have a direct link to the sea and a contiguous border with Egypt and Jordan. Such a plan might have at least brought the Arab League into negotiations. And it would have been a far fairer distribution of Palestine's assets. Truman approved the State Department's amendments, which fit his own sense of fairness. But the Jewish Agency was determined to defeat the proposal."</ref> and only introduced a modification proposal (which was accepted) to slightly enlarge the Palestinian area with the city of Beersheba and a section on the border with Egypt.<ref>{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=53|isbn=978-0-300-12696-9}}</ref> ] (]) 17:30, 12 June 2024 (UTC)
{{reftalk}}

== Background ==

* '''What I think should be changed (format using {{tl|textdiff}})''':
{{TextDiff|To address any economic problems, the Plan proposed avoiding interfering with Jewish immigration, since any interference would be liable to produce an "economic crisis", most of Palestine's wealth coming from the Jewish community.| -
}}

* '''Why it should be changed''': This is completely incorrect.
** The phrase "economic crisis" does not appear anywhere in the Peel Commission Report.
** Regarding Jewish immigration, it is rather recommended to limit it to a maximum of 12,000 per year:<br />
::: , p. 306 s. 97: "In view of the foregoing considerations we advise that there should now be a definite limit to the annual volume of Jewish immigration. We recommend that Your Majesty's Government should lay down a 'political high level' of Jewish immigration to cover Jewish immigration of all categories. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum, and in no circumstances during that period should more than that number be allowed into the country in any one year."
** Footnotes following this sentence seem to have been misplaced as well. The Peel Report on pages 389-391 and Morris's "Righteous Victims" on page 139 only discuss the idea of "transfer" and are therefore already cited before this sentence. "Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine 1929–1948" is an entire book; it's unclear what is meant to be substantiated with it.
** Most importantly, in the report, it is not stated that Palestine's wealth "came from the Jewish community." This also does not at all correspond to the reality, which was quite outrageous: Instead, the report notes
*** that "the Jews contribute more ''per capita'' to the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs" (p. 386 s. 23), accounting for 37% in absolute terms (p. 320 s. 8). This is against a backdrop where Palestinian farmers had been "so over-taxed that they find great difficulty in paying the tithe" (, p. 65) and many had lost their fields to creditors (Peel Report, p. 239), rendering them unable to be taxed further. This excessive taxation occurred because the nascent Jewish industry was unprofitable and therefore required "protection" by the British through tax cuts and export subsidies (Peel Report, p. 209 s. 8). For example, Nesher Cement, highlighted as a "notable exception" as regards profitability (ibid.), was able to import raw materials duty-free, negotiated with the British an increase of tariffs on imported cement, because otherwise "the company risked collapse," and thanks to export subsidies, was able to sell its cement in Syria at a lower price than in Palestine, despite transportation costs (Cf. , p. 44-46). So, there wasn't any "wealth of Palestine," and most definitely no wealth "coming" from the Zionists "to Palestine."
*** (almost comically) that the "Jewish area" possessed "taxable capacity," as the revenue-generating ports, most Arab and all Zionist industries, and the majority of the citrus fruit plantations — the leading export commodity at the time, comprising 84% of total exports (p. 213 s. 18) with about 40-45% Arab ownership — were located there. The underlying and outrageous rationale was that, after nearly 20 years of redistributing "wealth," the British were prepared to implement another massive redistribution with their transfer idea. This plan would decimate the Palestinians' primary economic sector (citrus fruit export) and the bulk of their industry in one fell swoop, making these assets available to the Zionists. As the British faced the loss of the Jewish state, they aimed to create a mechanism that would redistribute this wealth back to the part that would remain under their influence as part of Transjordan. This is the reality which is obliquely stated as:
::: p. 386 s. 23: "Partition would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (1) the Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty in the Jewish Area: (2) that Area, as we have defined it, would be larger than the existing area of Jewish land and settlement: (3) the Jews would be free from their present liability for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that Area . It seems to us, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that the Jewish State should pay a subvention ot the Arab State when Partition comes into effect."
] (]) 08:37, 20 June 2024 (UTC)

== More precise figures on the proposed division of land. ==
I found this article (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2307/2535720) by Fawzi Asadi (1976). The first page is free. It states that the size of the territories under the 1947 UN-approved partition plan was as follows:
Jewish state: 5893 sq mi and 56.47% of the total area.
Arab state: 4,476 sq mi and 42.88% of the total area.

Page 52 of http://132.248.9.195/ptd2019/junio/0789747/0789747.pdf, which quotes from the above paper, gives a figure of 68 'millas cuadradas' (Spanish for square miles), for the Jerusalem District. The article gives a figure of 0.68% for the Jerusalem District, but it needs to be 0.65% for the three districts to add up to 100%.

The Fawzi Asadi article quoted above is the earliest reference I could find to the figure of 42.88% for the area of the Palestinian territory as a proportion of the area of Palestine. The same figure has been used by several other authors, including:
https://www.persee.fr/doc/geoas_1266-4618_2004_num_28_1_2294;
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/the-economic-costs-of-the-israeli-occupation-for-the-palestinian-people-the-unrealized-oil-and-natural-gas-potential-unctad-report/; and
https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/1555.pdf

The Misplaced Pages article figure of 2% for the internationally administered zone around Jerusalem is much higher than I've seen elsewhere, and so I've decided to alter the figures in the article which were Jewish State 56%, Arab State 42%, Jerusalem District 2%.

Adding up the areas in sq mi given in the Fawzi Asadi article gives 10,437 sq mi.

Due to rounding in the Fawzi Asadi article, the square kilometres of the states based on the figures given are in the following range (rounded to 0dp):
Jewish State: 15,263 to 15,266 sq km
Arab State: 11,591 to 11,594 sq km
Jerusalem District: 175 to 177 sq km

The midpoint of the range of possible values for the territory area in sq km, rounded to 0dp is as follows:
Jewish State: 15,264 sq km
Arab State: 11,592 sq km
Jerusalem District: 176 sq km

] (]) 23:27, 27 September 2024 (UTC)

:I'm still not entirely convinced about the figures, if I tot up the sq miles, it's 10437 total but I can see different figures for mandate Palestine area and actually no consistency among those either. It could be we are achieving a false accuracy with %'s to two dp. just gives approx 57% for the Jewish state (cited to V Kattan) and says nothing about the rest. I would really like to see the original data. ] (]) 13:29, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

: The large difference between 2% and 0.68% for the Jerusalem enclave provides an opportunity to sanity-check these sources. I measured the area of the Jerusalem enclave on the ] using the scale on the map. I obtained 183 sq.km., which is a few percent larger than 68 sq.miles. The total area of Palestine was 27,024 sq.km. (10,434 sq.miles) according to the 1944 Survey of Palestine (v1, p103). This gives a percentage 0.68%, precisely as claimed. Thus, there is no doubt that "2%" is about 3 times too high. I suspect it was obtained by subtracting two rounded percentages from 100%. I see no reason to doubt Asadi's numbers, but precision to several decimal places is too much to expect. When I get over covid I'll look at Asadi's source. There surely must be official figures somewhere. ]<sup><small>]</small></sup> 13:32, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
::I think the Beeb did the subtract two rounded %'s thing and got 0%, lol. I looked at Kattan and he does say approx 57% and then he has a note saying that Khan claimed it was 60% (speech by Khan UN Doc. A/PV.126, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/734602/files/A_PV-126-EN.pdf?ln=en and that's it. I don't think I have the Palestine Diary. ] (]) 14:08, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
::: My library has it, but I'm isolating... I could not find a precise figure in UN docs. ]<sup><small>]</small></sup> 14:41, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
::::68 square miles is 0.65% of 10,434 sq. miles, not 0.68%. I don't have access to the second page of the Asadi article. I got the 68 sq. miles figure from a secondary reference to the Asadi article (linked above), and it does fit well with the percentages given for the Jewish & Arab territories, and the remaining percentage belonging to the Jerusalem District. I believe the secondary reference erroneously quoted 0.68% for the Jerusalem District for two reasons: because of the remainder percentage (100% -56.47% -42.88% = 0.65%); and because 68/10,434 rounds to 0.65%. I agreed that it's quite possible that Asadi's figures may not be accurate to four significant figures, but seeing as they gave the area in square miles to four significant figures, it's reasonable to also give the percentages to the same number of significant figures, and you've got to change 0.65% significantly to round it, but in theory, you could round to 56.5%, 42.9% and 0.6%, and it would conveniently still add up to 100%. The range of square kilometres of the territories I worked out based on Asadi's figures are consistent with both the square miles and the percentages given by Assadi. To keep the Misplaced Pages article concise, I just gave the midpoint of the possible range of square kilometres without elaboration. It could be argued that there's more of a case for rounding the square kilometres to the nearest 10km than there is for rounding the percentages to 1dp, because there's 2.589988110336 square kilometres in a square mile, so I've kind of implied an accuracy inflated by the same factor. But I would just leave it as it is, because I've done the best that anyone could do without redoing the land survey to give the fairest possible estimate of the area in square kilometres based on all the information we have from Asadi.
::] (]) 15:30, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
:::Thanks for noticing the wrong number! ]<sub>]</sub> 20:34, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Measuring areas on the usual map of the partition plan, I obtain Jewish state 56.3%, Arab state 42.9%, Jerusalem enclave 0.7%. The last digit is uncertain since the boundaries on the map are thick lines. However, these values are very close to Asali's values, adding further confidence. Incidentally, the figure of 27,024 sq.km. for the total includes inland water, of which the part of the Dead Sea in Palestine is the largest portion. This can be one source of variant numbers. The boundary between the two proposed states in the Dead Sea is not shown on the map but is defined in Res 181 to be directly east-west so that's what I used. ]<sup><small>]</small></sup> 06:27, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

:Seems right, I guess the total is a separate thing, if you go by ] and add Israel and Palestine together plus inland water, that's 21497 + 6025 + 440 = 27962. Really must have a proper look at that one of these days. ] (]) 10:02, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

{{reflist-talk}}

== New content in the lede ==

The has a few issues. Issa Nakhle is not a historian. Since he was a representative of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine his work can be valuable as a primary source but it requires interpretation by secondary ones. Secondary sources are also needed to establish the importance of this fact (assuming it's true) for the topic of this article. ]<sub>]</sub> 20:53, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

:I am aware of Jewish attacks by Lehi, Irgun and so on against the British in 47, that's well documented, I have not seen much material covering Jewish attacks on Arabs in the same time period, not until after the partition resolution. I would like to see some additional sourcing on that. ] (]) 09:28, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
::Even if sourced it does not summarize the body. I think the fourth lede paragraph should be rewritten fully to narrate the regional (which might briefly mention these terrorist attacks) and international repercussions of the partition plan as well as its legacy. But that requires an improvement of these aspects to the body. ] (]) 11:59, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
:Regardless of Zionist criticism of Issa Nakhle, author of the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, chapters 6 and 7, which quote hundreds of reports of terrorist attacks on Palestinian civilians by Zionist terrorists are not in dispute. You have no right to bury that information. The information and the source should stand. The intro of the Wiki article, particularly the last paragraph, before that material was included was terribly biased - a whole paragraph on Arab opposition to the partition of Palestine, followed by the sentence 'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' - as if it was all the Arabs' fault, with no mention of the escalating, almost daily Zionist terrorist attacks. ] (]) 22:40, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
::{{tq|Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented}} My phrase iirc, it is true, is it not? Nor does it imply anything about fault.
::Can you provide the page number(s) in the source supporting the statement in the article as just glancing I can only see a lot of material about attacks on the British. ] (]) 09:05, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' - why do I have a problem with that phrase being tacked onto the last paragraph of the introduction that was all about Arab hostility to the partition plan, in an introduction that didn't even mention the rising, eventually near daily Zionist terrorist attacks?
:::I think Chat GPT answered this well:
:::Prompt: 'Can the word 'subsequently' imply blame or causation when used in propaganda?'
:::Chat GPT reply: 'Yes, the word "subsequently" can imply blame or causation, particularly when used in propaganda. While "subsequently" typically means "afterward" or "following in time," in certain contexts, especially in propaganda or biased communication, it can be strategically used to create a subtle link between events, implying that one caused the other.
:::In propaganda, this type of wording can be used to influence perception by:
:::   Implying causality: By placing one event before another and linking them with "subsequently," a writer or speaker can suggest that the earlier event led to the latter, even if there's no direct evidence for that causal relationship.
:::   Shifting blame: When used in discussing negative outcomes, it can imply that the earlier event was the reason for the negative consequence, thus assigning blame indirectly.
:::For example:
:::   "The country enacted new policies, and the economy subsequently collapsed."
:::   Here, "subsequently" subtly suggests that the policies caused the economic collapse, even though it may not explicitly state that causation.
:::In propaganda, this technique manipulates the reader or listener's perception by creating a sequence of events that seem logically connected, even if the connection is questionable or false.'
:::The sentence 'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' is fine, but it belongs after a description of the increasing Zionist terrorist attacks, not after a paragraph about Arab proclamations of opposition to the partitioning of Palestine.
:::___________
:::As for not being able to find many references to attacks on Palestinians in the British military reports quoted in chapters 6 and 7 of the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, you must not have looked for very long. If the Internet Archive copy isn't available, try this site, it has the whole pdf of the first volume available for free download: https://web.archive.org/web/20191121134610/http://aaargh.vho.org/fran/livres5/palproblem.pdf. You might like to skip to printed page 149, pdf page 146:
:::'2 DECEMBER 1947
:::Khisas village. 1 Arab civilian shot dead by Jewish Gaffir from Beit Hillel approximately 1200 hours. TJFF Huleh patrols increased. WO 275146 Public Record Office, London'
:::3 DECEMBER 1947
:::Jewish retaliation incidents are reported as follows:-
:::Morning 3 December. Several Arab shops in Harcarmel Street Mashiya Quarter of Jaffa set on fire by Jews.
:::031500B 14 year old Arab boy shot from passing Jewish taxi in Yazur village MR 131 169 on main road Jaffa�Jerusalem.
:::03 1630B Arab boy seriously injured by shot fired from Jewish bus passing through A1 Qubab village MR 145 15 1 on main road Jaffa-Jerusalem.
:::Afternoon 3 December. JSPs passing through Yazur vil�lage MR 13 1169 in a taxi and pick-up fired at British Police who returned fire. No casualty. JSPs were traced to Rehovoth and alleged they had been stoned in village.
:::WO 275146'
:::The following is summary of the British military reports from the first half of December 1947 quoted by Issa Nakhle in the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, only counting the incidents in which Jews/Hebrew speakers/Jewish terrorists were held responsible, and the victims were not Brits or Jews, and you can reasonably presume they were Arabs. The figures I've given are the total for the day, which was sometimes from multiple reports. In cases were the report is ambiguous, I've erred on the side of conservatism, for example, where the report said there were an unknown number of injuries, I've counted that as zero. And these reports almost certainly understate the number of less severe injuries. In addition to this, there was also a lot of arson and bombs targeting Arab homes and businesses that I haven't included in the summary below.
:::2-Dec: 1-killed; 3-Dec: 4-injured; 4-Dec: 1-injured; 5-Dec: 2-injured; 6-Dec: 6-killed, 10-injured; 11-Dec: 43-killed, 33-injured (3 youth victim's ethnicity not specified, but presumably the Jews who did it weren't throwing bombs at their own kind); 12-Dec: 3-injured; 13-Dec: 18-killed, 104-injured; 14-Dec: 7-injured; 15-Dec: 1-killed, 8-injured, ethnicity of attacker not specified, but presumably Arabs weren't firing randomly at Arab buses.
:::There were even more reports in the second half of December. And there were far fewer in the months before the Jews won the UN partition vote. ] (]) 11:27, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
::::I don't care what ChatGPT says and neither should you. So none of that says "hundreds" unless I missed it? And the figures you give above do not support hundreds before the resolution or the frequency increasing "several fold" after the resolution. Also none of this is in the article body so I have removed it for now. ] (]) 11:36, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::::I did however remove the word subsequently, which does not substantively alter things and which you could have done yourself if that was the concern. ] (]) 11:40, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::::I said hundreds throughout 1947, ie 1 Jan - 31 Dec. And there were. I'll do a count of them now, but it will probably take several hours. If it turns out more than 100 but less than 200, I'll change it from 'hundreds' to 'more than a hundred', even though it's grammatically fine to use the plural of something whenever there's more than one of it, for example, '1.1 apples'. Just counting the stats posted above, in the first half of December, there were 69 Arabs reported killed by Jews. The subsequent "civil war" (which was really just an escalation of the Zionist terrorist ethnic cleansing that was already underway) had more to do with the pre-existing and escalating Zionist terrorist attacks than any Arab proclamations of determination to not permit the partitioning of Palestine. ] (]) 11:52, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
::::::It's my understanding that there were quite a number of Arab attacks after the resolution, perhaps in response to Jewish attacks (and vice versa?). See ], there are quite a few 1947 mentioned there. ] (]) 11:57, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::::::That's certainly something to look at, as it provides the other half of the story that is largely omitted from the account by Issa Nakhle, but it also barely scratches the surface of the Jewish violence in 1947 and 1948. ] (]) 12:33, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
::::::ChatGPT prompt: 'I'm trying to count the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Jews, Hebrew speakers, and Zionist terrorist organisations such as Irgun and Stern in Palestine in 1947. I have a list of reports from British military reports from the time, and it includes things like buses and cinemas being shot-up by Jews, and that's obviously a terrorist attack, but I'm unsure whether I should count what were likely ethnically-motivated incidents of arson, robbery, and gang-bashings of Palestinians by Jews? Please restrict your reply to just one paragraph if possible.'
::::::ChatGPT reply: 'When counting terrorist attacks by groups like Irgun, Stern, or individuals during 1947 in Palestine, it’s essential to consider the broader definition of terrorism, which includes acts of violence intended to instill fear, coerce, or intimidate a population for political or ideological reasons. Ethnically-motivated incidents of arson, robbery, and gang violence against Palestinians by Jews could be included if these actions were systematic and aimed at spreading fear or advancing a political or ideological agenda, rather than being isolated or purely criminal acts. Therefore, if such incidents were organized or had political motives, they could reasonably be counted as part of the broader campaign of terror.' ] (]) 12:29, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::::::Please stop with the ChatGPT, it's not reliable. ] (]) 12:46, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
:::::::Misplaced Pages works by adding secondary sources to body, which are summarized concisely afterwards in the lede; and in cases of dispute, the talk page is used to discuss and present personal arguments. ChatGPT plays a role in neither and no one cares about what it has to say about anything. Please refrain from re-inserting disputed material. ] (]) 12:47, 1 October 2024 (UTC)

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Edit request: Proposed partition

  • What I think should be changed and added (format using {{textdiff}}):
−The proposed Arab State would include the central and part of western ], with the town of ], the hill country of ] and ], an enclave at ], and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now ]) and encompassing what is now the ], with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. +The proposed Arab State would include the central and part of western ], with the town of ], the hill country of ] and ], and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now ]) and encompassing what is now the ].
  • Why it should be changed: This is not accurate. The Jaffa section was only added later, following the comments of later members of Sub-committee 2. The same is true for the desert section, which was added at the request of the USA. This is already stated in the Misplaced Pages article further below. UNSCOP instead proposed:
    • About Jaffa: "Jaffa, which has an Arab population of about 70,000, is entirely Arab except for two Jewish quarters. It is contiguous with Tel Aviv and would either have to be treated as an enclave or else be included in the Jewish State. On balance, and having in mind the difficulties which an enclave involves, not least from the economic point at view, it was thought better to suggest that Jaffa be included in the Jewish State, on the assumption that it would have a large measure of local autonomy and that the port would be under the administration of the Economic Union."
    • About the southern coastal plain and the Negev: "The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, the hill country of Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the City of Jerusalem, and the coastal plain from Isdud to the Egyptian frontier. The proposed Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon plain, most of the coastal plain, and the whole of the Beersheba subdistrict, which includes the Negeb."

  1. Cf. e.g. Ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question of the 2nd UN General Assembly 1947 (10 November 1947). "Tenth meeting, held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 10 October 1947". p. 59. Retrieved 10 June 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link): "With regard to the population of the future States as a whole, the Pakistan representative had said that there would be as many Arabs as Jews in the proposed Jewish State. The delegation of Guatemala was ready to reconsider the position of Jaffa and to support any proposal which would give the Arab State possession of that city, to which it had an undeniable right. In that case, there would not be more than 337,000 Arabs in the Jewish State, according to the estimates ."

DaWalda (talk) 09:19, 9 June 2024 (UTC)

Hi, you're right, thanks for noticing the error. I was about to make the change but then I wondered whether the statistics in the last paragraphs of the Proposed partition section refer to the initial plan or to the amended one (the part starting from The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945) and ending with The Jewish State allocated to the Jews, who constituted a third of the population and owned about 7% of the land, was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there.) Alaexis¿question? 20:56, 10 June 2024 (UTC)
You are right. The population statistics are from the UNSCOP report, the land statistics refer to the final partition (55,5% Jewish state, 43,8% Arab State, 0,7% Jerusalem. See Abu-Sitta 2010, p. 7). I've done a very rough measurement: the area along the border with Egypt (the largest change) is just ~7-8% of Palestine. According to the UNSCOP plan, therefore, roughly 62-63% would have been allocated to the Jewish state. But this would need a source. I can't find any calculations on how the areas of the Jewish and Arab states compared to each other before the adjustments. DaWalda (talk) 08:17, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
God, I'm such an airhead. On the page itself, there are two quotes that mention 62%: Morris: 1948, p. 47; Ben-Dror: Arab Struggle, p. 259 f. Tom Segev: 1949. The First Israelis. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-8050-5896-6. p. 21 has also the Arab figure:
", which had prepared the Partition Resolution of 1947, had allotted 62 percent of the territory of Palestine to the Jewish state and 38 percent to the Arab one. The November 29 Resolution itself altered this ratio in favor of the Arabs, giving them 45 percent as opposed to 55 percent to the Jews. Following the conclusion of hte armistice agreements, Israel retained nearly 80 percent of the territory and the Arabs about 20 percent." DaWalda (talk) 13:19, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
In that case we need to fix the article in a few places
  1. Proposed partition - your proposed changes (removing Jaffa) and also probably it would make sense to rename it to "Initial partition plan" to make it clear that it was *proposed* but the UN voted on a different plan
  2. Proposed partition - the table and the percentages should be removed and replaced by the numbers that you've found (62% and 38%).
  3. Boundary changes - the tables and percentages describing the finalised partition plan should be moved here. Again, I'd suggest renaming it to something like "Final partition plan"
WDYT? Alaexis¿question? 20:39, 11 June 2024 (UTC)
Sounds good to me. I would also move
State Department advice critical of the controversial UNSCOP recommendation to give the overwhelmingly Arab town of Jaffa, and the Negev, to the Jews was overturned by an urgent and secret late meeting organized for Chaim Weizman with Truman, which immediately countermanded the recommendation.
to "Boundary changes". The background is this:
The dominant USA had already planned to reallocate Jaffa and the Negev to the Arab state to gain favor with Arab states and secure their support for the partition plan. However, when the Zionists learned of these plans, President Truman's advisor David Niles arranged a meeting with Chaim Weizmann, who persuaded the President with the vision of a canal running through Jewish territory from the Gulf of Aqaba to Tel Aviv. Following Truman’s direct orders, the Americans abandoned their earlier tactic and only introduced a modification proposal (which was accepted) to slightly enlarge the Palestinian area with the city of Beersheba and a section on the border with Egypt. DaWalda (talk) 17:30, 12 June 2024 (UTC)

References

  1. Cf. Chaim Weizmann: Trial and Error. Schocken Books, 1966. p. 457–459.
  2. Abba Eban: An Autobiography. Random House, 1977. p. 94.
  3. T. G. Fraser: The USA and the Middle East Since World War 2. Palgrave Macmillan, 1989. p. 30 f.
  4. Robert J. Donovan: Conflict and Crisis. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948. W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. p. 327 f.
  5. John W. Mulhall: America and the Founding of Israel. An Investigation of the Morality of America's Role. Deshon Press, 1995. p. 140–142.
  6. Allis Radosh / Ronald Radosh: A Safe Haven. Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel. Harper Collins Publishers, 2009. p. 261–265.
  7. John B. Judis: Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014. Epub edition, section 13: "The most controversial of these amendments was giving most of the Negev to the Arabs. With the Negev included, an Arab state would be larger than the Jewish state, and it would have a direct link to the sea and a contiguous border with Egypt and Jordan. Such a plan might have at least brought the Arab League into negotiations. And it would have been a far fairer distribution of Palestine's assets. Truman approved the State Department's amendments, which fit his own sense of fairness. But the Jewish Agency was determined to defeat the proposal."
  8. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9.

Background

  • What I think should be changed (format using {{textdiff}}):
−To address any economic problems, the Plan proposed avoiding interfering with Jewish immigration, since any interference would be liable to produce an "economic crisis", most of Palestine's wealth coming from the Jewish community.+ -
  • Why it should be changed: This is completely incorrect.
    • The phrase "economic crisis" does not appear anywhere in the Peel Commission Report.
    • Regarding Jewish immigration, it is rather recommended to limit it to a maximum of 12,000 per year:
Peel Commission Report, 1937, p. 306 s. 97: "In view of the foregoing considerations we advise that there should now be a definite limit to the annual volume of Jewish immigration. We recommend that Your Majesty's Government should lay down a 'political high level' of Jewish immigration to cover Jewish immigration of all categories. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum, and in no circumstances during that period should more than that number be allowed into the country in any one year."
    • Footnotes following this sentence seem to have been misplaced as well. The Peel Report on pages 389-391 and Morris's "Righteous Victims" on page 139 only discuss the idea of "transfer" and are therefore already cited before this sentence. "Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine 1929–1948" is an entire book; it's unclear what is meant to be substantiated with it.
    • Most importantly, in the report, it is not stated that Palestine's wealth "came from the Jewish community." This also does not at all correspond to the reality, which was quite outrageous: Instead, the report notes
      • that "the Jews contribute more per capita to the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs" (p. 386 s. 23), accounting for 37% in absolute terms (p. 320 s. 8). This is against a backdrop where Palestinian farmers had been "so over-taxed that they find great difficulty in paying the tithe" (Simpson Report, 1930, p. 65) and many had lost their fields to creditors (Peel Report, p. 239), rendering them unable to be taxed further. This excessive taxation occurred because the nascent Jewish industry was unprofitable and therefore required "protection" by the British through tax cuts and export subsidies (Peel Report, p. 209 s. 8). For example, Nesher Cement, highlighted as a "notable exception" as regards profitability (ibid.), was able to import raw materials duty-free, negotiated with the British an increase of tariffs on imported cement, because otherwise "the company risked collapse," and thanks to export subsidies, was able to sell its cement in Syria at a lower price than in Palestine, despite transportation costs (Cf. Ben Zeev 2019, p. 44-46). So, there wasn't any "wealth of Palestine," and most definitely no wealth "coming" from the Zionists "to Palestine."
      • (almost comically) that the "Jewish area" possessed "taxable capacity," as the revenue-generating ports, most Arab and all Zionist industries, and the majority of the citrus fruit plantations — the leading export commodity at the time, comprising 84% of total exports (p. 213 s. 18) with about 40-45% Arab ownership — were located there. The underlying and outrageous rationale was that, after nearly 20 years of redistributing "wealth," the British were prepared to implement another massive redistribution with their transfer idea. This plan would decimate the Palestinians' primary economic sector (citrus fruit export) and the bulk of their industry in one fell swoop, making these assets available to the Zionists. As the British faced the loss of the Jewish state, they aimed to create a mechanism that would redistribute this wealth back to the part that would remain under their influence as part of Transjordan. This is the reality which is obliquely stated as:
p. 386 s. 23: "Partition would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (1) the Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty in the Jewish Area: (2) that Area, as we have defined it, would be larger than the existing area of Jewish land and settlement: (3) the Jews would be free from their present liability for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that Area . It seems to us, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that the Jewish State should pay a subvention ot the Arab State when Partition comes into effect."

DaWalda (talk) 08:37, 20 June 2024 (UTC)

More precise figures on the proposed division of land.

I found this article (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2307/2535720) by Fawzi Asadi (1976). The first page is free. It states that the size of the territories under the 1947 UN-approved partition plan was as follows: Jewish state: 5893 sq mi and 56.47% of the total area. Arab state: 4,476 sq mi and 42.88% of the total area.

Page 52 of http://132.248.9.195/ptd2019/junio/0789747/0789747.pdf, which quotes from the above paper, gives a figure of 68 'millas cuadradas' (Spanish for square miles), for the Jerusalem District. The article gives a figure of 0.68% for the Jerusalem District, but it needs to be 0.65% for the three districts to add up to 100%.

The Fawzi Asadi article quoted above is the earliest reference I could find to the figure of 42.88% for the area of the Palestinian territory as a proportion of the area of Palestine. The same figure has been used by several other authors, including: https://www.persee.fr/doc/geoas_1266-4618_2004_num_28_1_2294; https://www.un.org/unispal/document/the-economic-costs-of-the-israeli-occupation-for-the-palestinian-people-the-unrealized-oil-and-natural-gas-potential-unctad-report/; and https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/1555.pdf

The Misplaced Pages article figure of 2% for the internationally administered zone around Jerusalem is much higher than I've seen elsewhere, and so I've decided to alter the figures in the article which were Jewish State 56%, Arab State 42%, Jerusalem District 2%.

Adding up the areas in sq mi given in the Fawzi Asadi article gives 10,437 sq mi.

Due to rounding in the Fawzi Asadi article, the square kilometres of the states based on the figures given are in the following range (rounded to 0dp): Jewish State: 15,263 to 15,266 sq km Arab State: 11,591 to 11,594 sq km Jerusalem District: 175 to 177 sq km

The midpoint of the range of possible values for the territory area in sq km, rounded to 0dp is as follows: Jewish State: 15,264 sq km Arab State: 11,592 sq km Jerusalem District: 176 sq km

MathewMunro (talk) 23:27, 27 September 2024 (UTC)

I'm still not entirely convinced about the figures, if I tot up the sq miles, it's 10437 total but I can see different figures for mandate Palestine area and actually no consistency among those either. It could be we are achieving a false accuracy with  %'s to two dp. Ardi Imseis' just gives approx 57% for the Jewish state (cited to V Kattan) and says nothing about the rest. I would really like to see the original data. Selfstudier (talk) 13:29, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
The large difference between 2% and 0.68% for the Jerusalem enclave provides an opportunity to sanity-check these sources. I measured the area of the Jerusalem enclave on the official map using the scale on the map. I obtained 183 sq.km., which is a few percent larger than 68 sq.miles. The total area of Palestine was 27,024 sq.km. (10,434 sq.miles) according to the 1944 Survey of Palestine (v1, p103). This gives a percentage 0.68%, precisely as claimed. Thus, there is no doubt that "2%" is about 3 times too high. I suspect it was obtained by subtracting two rounded percentages from 100%. I see no reason to doubt Asadi's numbers, but precision to several decimal places is too much to expect. When I get over covid I'll look at Asadi's source. There surely must be official figures somewhere. Zero 13:32, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
I think the Beeb did the subtract two rounded %'s thing and got 0%, lol. I looked at Kattan and he does say approx 57% and then he has a note saying that Khan claimed it was 60% (speech by Khan UN Doc. A/PV.126, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/734602/files/A_PV-126-EN.pdf?ln=en and that's it. I don't think I have the Palestine Diary. Selfstudier (talk) 14:08, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
My library has it, but I'm isolating... I could not find a precise figure in UN docs. Zero 14:41, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
68 square miles is 0.65% of 10,434 sq. miles, not 0.68%. I don't have access to the second page of the Asadi article. I got the 68 sq. miles figure from a secondary reference to the Asadi article (linked above), and it does fit well with the percentages given for the Jewish & Arab territories, and the remaining percentage belonging to the Jerusalem District. I believe the secondary reference erroneously quoted 0.68% for the Jerusalem District for two reasons: because of the remainder percentage (100% -56.47% -42.88% = 0.65%); and because 68/10,434 rounds to 0.65%. I agreed that it's quite possible that Asadi's figures may not be accurate to four significant figures, but seeing as they gave the area in square miles to four significant figures, it's reasonable to also give the percentages to the same number of significant figures, and you've got to change 0.65% significantly to round it, but in theory, you could round to 56.5%, 42.9% and 0.6%, and it would conveniently still add up to 100%. The range of square kilometres of the territories I worked out based on Asadi's figures are consistent with both the square miles and the percentages given by Assadi. To keep the Misplaced Pages article concise, I just gave the midpoint of the possible range of square kilometres without elaboration. It could be argued that there's more of a case for rounding the square kilometres to the nearest 10km than there is for rounding the percentages to 1dp, because there's 2.589988110336 square kilometres in a square mile, so I've kind of implied an accuracy inflated by the same factor. But I would just leave it as it is, because I've done the best that anyone could do without redoing the land survey to give the fairest possible estimate of the area in square kilometres based on all the information we have from Asadi.
MathewMunro (talk) 15:30, 29 September 2024 (UTC)
Thanks for noticing the wrong number! Alaexis¿question? 20:34, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Measuring areas on the usual map of the partition plan, I obtain Jewish state 56.3%, Arab state 42.9%, Jerusalem enclave 0.7%. The last digit is uncertain since the boundaries on the map are thick lines. However, these values are very close to Asali's values, adding further confidence. Incidentally, the figure of 27,024 sq.km. for the total includes inland water, of which the part of the Dead Sea in Palestine is the largest portion. This can be one source of variant numbers. The boundary between the two proposed states in the Dead Sea is not shown on the map but is defined in Res 181 to be directly east-west so that's what I used. Zero 06:27, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Seems right, I guess the total is a separate thing, if you go by List of countries and dependencies by area and add Israel and Palestine together plus inland water, that's 21497 + 6025 + 440 = 27962. Really must have a proper look at that one of these days. Selfstudier (talk) 10:02, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

References

New content in the lede

The newly added content has a few issues. Issa Nakhle is not a historian. Since he was a representative of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine his work can be valuable as a primary source but it requires interpretation by secondary ones. Secondary sources are also needed to establish the importance of this fact (assuming it's true) for the topic of this article. Alaexis¿question? 20:53, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

I am aware of Jewish attacks by Lehi, Irgun and so on against the British in 47, that's well documented, I have not seen much material covering Jewish attacks on Arabs in the same time period, not until after the partition resolution. I would like to see some additional sourcing on that. Selfstudier (talk) 09:28, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
Even if sourced it does not summarize the body. I think the fourth lede paragraph should be rewritten fully to narrate the regional (which might briefly mention these terrorist attacks) and international repercussions of the partition plan as well as its legacy. But that requires an improvement of these aspects to the body. Makeandtoss (talk) 11:59, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
Regardless of Zionist criticism of Issa Nakhle, author of the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, chapters 6 and 7, which quote hundreds of reports of terrorist attacks on Palestinian civilians by Zionist terrorists are not in dispute. You have no right to bury that information. The information and the source should stand. The intro of the Wiki article, particularly the last paragraph, before that material was included was terribly biased - a whole paragraph on Arab opposition to the partition of Palestine, followed by the sentence 'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' - as if it was all the Arabs' fault, with no mention of the escalating, almost daily Zionist terrorist attacks. MathewMunro (talk) 22:40, 30 September 2024 (UTC)
Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented My phrase iirc, it is true, is it not? Nor does it imply anything about fault.
Can you provide the page number(s) in the source supporting the statement in the article as just glancing I can only see a lot of material about attacks on the British. Selfstudier (talk) 09:05, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' - why do I have a problem with that phrase being tacked onto the last paragraph of the introduction that was all about Arab hostility to the partition plan, in an introduction that didn't even mention the rising, eventually near daily Zionist terrorist attacks?
I think Chat GPT answered this well:
Prompt: 'Can the word 'subsequently' imply blame or causation when used in propaganda?'
Chat GPT reply: 'Yes, the word "subsequently" can imply blame or causation, particularly when used in propaganda. While "subsequently" typically means "afterward" or "following in time," in certain contexts, especially in propaganda or biased communication, it can be strategically used to create a subtle link between events, implying that one caused the other.
In propaganda, this type of wording can be used to influence perception by:
   Implying causality: By placing one event before another and linking them with "subsequently," a writer or speaker can suggest that the earlier event led to the latter, even if there's no direct evidence for that causal relationship.
   Shifting blame: When used in discussing negative outcomes, it can imply that the earlier event was the reason for the negative consequence, thus assigning blame indirectly.
For example:
   "The country enacted new policies, and the economy subsequently collapsed."
   Here, "subsequently" subtly suggests that the policies caused the economic collapse, even though it may not explicitly state that causation.
In propaganda, this technique manipulates the reader or listener's perception by creating a sequence of events that seem logically connected, even if the connection is questionable or false.'
The sentence 'Subsequently a civil war broke out in Palestine, and the plan was not implemented' is fine, but it belongs after a description of the increasing Zionist terrorist attacks, not after a paragraph about Arab proclamations of opposition to the partitioning of Palestine.
___________
As for not being able to find many references to attacks on Palestinians in the British military reports quoted in chapters 6 and 7 of the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, you must not have looked for very long. If the Internet Archive copy isn't available, try this site, it has the whole pdf of the first volume available for free download: https://web.archive.org/web/20191121134610/http://aaargh.vho.org/fran/livres5/palproblem.pdf. You might like to skip to printed page 149, pdf page 146:
'2 DECEMBER 1947
Khisas village. 1 Arab civilian shot dead by Jewish Gaffir from Beit Hillel approximately 1200 hours. TJFF Huleh patrols increased. WO 275146 Public Record Office, London'
3 DECEMBER 1947
Jewish retaliation incidents are reported as follows:-
Morning 3 December. Several Arab shops in Harcarmel Street Mashiya Quarter of Jaffa set on fire by Jews.
031500B 14 year old Arab boy shot from passing Jewish taxi in Yazur village MR 131 169 on main road Jaffa�Jerusalem.
03 1630B Arab boy seriously injured by shot fired from Jewish bus passing through A1 Qubab village MR 145 15 1 on main road Jaffa-Jerusalem.
Afternoon 3 December. JSPs passing through Yazur vil�lage MR 13 1169 in a taxi and pick-up fired at British Police who returned fire. No casualty. JSPs were traced to Rehovoth and alleged they had been stoned in village.
WO 275146'
The following is summary of the British military reports from the first half of December 1947 quoted by Issa Nakhle in the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, only counting the incidents in which Jews/Hebrew speakers/Jewish terrorists were held responsible, and the victims were not Brits or Jews, and you can reasonably presume they were Arabs. The figures I've given are the total for the day, which was sometimes from multiple reports. In cases were the report is ambiguous, I've erred on the side of conservatism, for example, where the report said there were an unknown number of injuries, I've counted that as zero. And these reports almost certainly understate the number of less severe injuries. In addition to this, there was also a lot of arson and bombs targeting Arab homes and businesses that I haven't included in the summary below.
2-Dec: 1-killed; 3-Dec: 4-injured; 4-Dec: 1-injured; 5-Dec: 2-injured; 6-Dec: 6-killed, 10-injured; 11-Dec: 43-killed, 33-injured (3 youth victim's ethnicity not specified, but presumably the Jews who did it weren't throwing bombs at their own kind); 12-Dec: 3-injured; 13-Dec: 18-killed, 104-injured; 14-Dec: 7-injured; 15-Dec: 1-killed, 8-injured, ethnicity of attacker not specified, but presumably Arabs weren't firing randomly at Arab buses.
There were even more reports in the second half of December. And there were far fewer in the months before the Jews won the UN partition vote. MathewMunro (talk) 11:27, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
I don't care what ChatGPT says and neither should you. So none of that says "hundreds" unless I missed it? And the figures you give above do not support hundreds before the resolution or the frequency increasing "several fold" after the resolution. Also none of this is in the article body so I have removed it for now. Selfstudier (talk) 11:36, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
I did however remove the word subsequently, which does not substantively alter things and which you could have done yourself if that was the concern. Selfstudier (talk) 11:40, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
I said hundreds throughout 1947, ie 1 Jan - 31 Dec. And there were. I'll do a count of them now, but it will probably take several hours. If it turns out more than 100 but less than 200, I'll change it from 'hundreds' to 'more than a hundred', even though it's grammatically fine to use the plural of something whenever there's more than one of it, for example, '1.1 apples'. Just counting the stats posted above, in the first half of December, there were 69 Arabs reported killed by Jews. The subsequent "civil war" (which was really just an escalation of the Zionist terrorist ethnic cleansing that was already underway) had more to do with the pre-existing and escalating Zionist terrorist attacks than any Arab proclamations of determination to not permit the partitioning of Palestine. MathewMunro (talk) 11:52, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
It's my understanding that there were quite a number of Arab attacks after the resolution, perhaps in response to Jewish attacks (and vice versa?). See List of killings and massacres in Mandatory Palestine, there are quite a few 1947 mentioned there. Selfstudier (talk) 11:57, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
That's certainly something to look at, as it provides the other half of the story that is largely omitted from the account by Issa Nakhle, but it also barely scratches the surface of the Jewish violence in 1947 and 1948. MathewMunro (talk) 12:33, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
ChatGPT prompt: 'I'm trying to count the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Jews, Hebrew speakers, and Zionist terrorist organisations such as Irgun and Stern in Palestine in 1947. I have a list of reports from British military reports from the time, and it includes things like buses and cinemas being shot-up by Jews, and that's obviously a terrorist attack, but I'm unsure whether I should count what were likely ethnically-motivated incidents of arson, robbery, and gang-bashings of Palestinians by Jews? Please restrict your reply to just one paragraph if possible.'
ChatGPT reply: 'When counting terrorist attacks by groups like Irgun, Stern, or individuals during 1947 in Palestine, it’s essential to consider the broader definition of terrorism, which includes acts of violence intended to instill fear, coerce, or intimidate a population for political or ideological reasons. Ethnically-motivated incidents of arson, robbery, and gang violence against Palestinians by Jews could be included if these actions were systematic and aimed at spreading fear or advancing a political or ideological agenda, rather than being isolated or purely criminal acts. Therefore, if such incidents were organized or had political motives, they could reasonably be counted as part of the broader campaign of terror.' MathewMunro (talk) 12:29, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
Please stop with the ChatGPT, it's not reliable. Selfstudier (talk) 12:46, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
Misplaced Pages works by adding secondary sources to body, which are summarized concisely afterwards in the lede; and in cases of dispute, the talk page is used to discuss and present personal arguments. ChatGPT plays a role in neither and no one cares about what it has to say about anything. Please refrain from re-inserting disputed material. Makeandtoss (talk) 12:47, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
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