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{{Short description|1761 battle between the Durrani empire and Marathas}}
{{lead too long|date=November 2014}}
{{pp|reason=Persistent ] despite multiple temporary protections. Enough.; requested at ]|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=March 2022}}
{{Infobox military conflict {{Infobox military conflict
|conflict=Third Battle of Panipat | conflict = Third Battle of Panipat
| partof = ] and the ]
|partof=
|image=] | image = The Third battle of Panipat 13 January 1761.jpg
|caption=The Third Battle of Panipat, 14 January 1761, '''Hafiz Rahmat Khan''', standing right of ], who is shown sitting on a brown horse. | caption = {{circa|1770}} ]-style painting of the Third Battle of Panipat; the centre of the image is dominated by the twin arcs of the lines of guns firing at each other with smoke and destruction in between.
|date= 14 January 1761 | date = 14 January 1761
|place=], modern-day ], ] | place = ] (present-day ], ])
| coordinates={{Coord|29.39|N|76.97|E}} | coordinates = {{Coord|29.39|N|76.97|E}}
| territory =
|cause= Afghan raids in Punjab and Delhi.
| result = ] victory<ref name="KaushikRoy">Kaushik Roy, ''India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil'', (Orient Longman, 2004), 90.</ref>{{blist|] exiled to Awadh|] loses control over all territory north of the ] in the ] to the ]}}
|territory=Marathas lost suzerainty over Punjab and Delhi to the Afghans. Ahmad Shah Durrani vacates Delhi soon after the battle, appoints Mughal emperor as nominal head and returns to ].
| combatant1 = ] ]<br>'''Supported by:'''<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|FlagofKalat.svg|border=}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of Awadh.svg|border=}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of the State of Amb.svg|border=}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Black flag.svg|border=}} ]<br>]
|result=] victory
| combatant2 = {{tree list}}
|combatant1=<center>] <center>]
*{{flag|Maratha Confederacy}}
**] ]
**{{flagicon image|Indore Flag.svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{Cite book|author1=Robinson, Howard |author2=James Thomson Shotwell |title=Mogul Empire. The Development of the British Empire|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1922|page=91}}</ref>
**{{flagicon image|Flag of Gwalior (State).svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{Cite book|author1=Robinson, Howard |author2=James Thomson Shotwell |title=Mogul Empire. The Development of the British Empire|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1922|page=91}}</ref>
**{{flagicon|Maratha Confederacy|border=}} ]<ref>{{Cite book|author1=Robinson, Howard |author2=James Thomson Shotwell |title=Mogul Empire. The Development of the British Empire|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1922|page=91}}</ref>
{{tree list/end}}
| commander1 = ] ''']'''<br />(])<br>{{Collapsible list
| title = Afghan officers:
| ]
| ]{{KIA}}
| ]
| Wazir Shah Wali Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
| Atai Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy" />{{KIA}}
| Shah Pasand Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
| Barkhurdar Khan<ref name="Sharma">{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6n7vV0eiS3YC&q=barkhurdar&pg=PA191 |title = Haryana: Past and Present|isbn = 9788183240468|last1 = Sharma|first1 = Suresh K.|year= 2006| publisher=Mittal Publications }}</ref><br />| Abdus Samad Khan{{KIA}}
| Jahan Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
| Wazirullah Khan<ref name="Sharma" />
| Zaman Khan Niazi<ref>''"History of the Pathans" by Haroon Rashid, Volume III, page 365''</ref>
}}
----
{{Collapsible list {{Collapsible list
| title = Rohilla, Kalat, Awadh, Amb, Sindh and Mughal officers:
| bullets = no
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{cite book| last = Rai| first = Raghunath| title = History| publisher = FK Publications| isbn = 9788187139690 }}</ref><br />
| title = Supported by
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
|] <center> ]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{cite book |last1=Solomon |first1=Arnold |last2=Playne |first2=Somerset |title=Indian States |date=2006 |publisher=Asian Educational Services |isbn=81-206-1965-X |pages=362 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=47sfj8DUwNgC |access-date=7 January 2023}}</ref>
|]<center>]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} ]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the Rampur State.svg|border=}} Dunde Khan Barech<ref name="KaushikRoy"/>
| {{flagicon image|FlagofKalat.svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{cite book |last1=George |first1=Bruce Malleson |title=History of Afghanistan, From the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878 |date=1878 |publisher=W.H. Allen & Company |location=Afghanistan |isbn=9781163302446 |pages=287 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0ec2AQAAMAAJ |access-date=8 September 2021 |archive-date=2 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221002100539/https://www.google.ca/books/edition/History_of_Afghanistan/0ec2AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="UOB">{{cite journal |last1=Farooq Baloch |first1=Ghulam |title=TREATY OF KALAT 1758 BETWEEN QANDHAR AND KALAT AND ITS IMPACTS |journal=EduPK |date=1984 |volume=1 |issue=PK |page=6 |url=http://www.uob.edu.pk/journals/TREATY%20OF%20KALAT%201758%20BETWEEN%20QANDHAR%20AND%20KALAT%20AND%20ITS%20IMPACTS.pdf |access-date=8 September 2021 |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304032403/http://www.uob.edu.pk/journals/TREATY%20OF%20KALAT%201758%20BETWEEN%20QANDHAR%20AND%20KALAT%20AND%20ITS%20IMPACTS.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>
| {{flagicon image|FlagofKalat.svg|border=}} Mahmud Khan Ahmadzai
| {{flagicon image|Flag of Awadh.svg|border=}} ]<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TPVq3ykHyH4C&pg=PA234 | title=A History of India| isbn=9780415329194| last1=Kulke| first1=Hermann| last2=Rothermund| first2=Dietmar| year=2004| publisher=Psychology Press}}</ref>
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the State of Amb.svg|border=}} ]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of the State of Amb.svg|border=}} ]
| {{flagicon image|Black flag.svg|border=}} ]
| ]
| ]
| ]
| ]<ref name="Sharma" />
| Amir Beg<ref name="Sharma" />
| Murad Khan<ref name="Sharma" />
| Shuja Quli Khan
| Banghas Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
}}
| commander2 = ] ''']'''{{KIA}}<br>(])<br />{{Collapsible list
| title = Maratha officers:
| ] ]{{KIA}}
| ] ]{{KIA}}
| {{flagicon image|Indore Flag.svg|border=}} ]
| ] ]{{WIA}}
| ] ]{{POW}}
| ] ]{{DOW}}
| ] ]
| ] ]{{WIA}}
| {{nowrap|] ]{{Executed}}}}
| ] ]{{KIA}}
| ] ]
| ] Antaji Manakeshwar{{KIA}}
| ] Yeshwant Rao Pawar{{KIA}}
| ] Shri. Arvandekar {{KIA}}
| ] Sidhojiraje Gharge-Desai-Deshmukh {{KIA}}
| ] Balwant Rao Mehendele{{KIA}}
| ] Ambaji Ingle
}} }}
| strength1 = 42,000 Afghan ], of which 28,000 was regular cavalry<ref name="Roy">{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA84|title = India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil|pages=84–85–93|last1 = Roy|first1 = Kaushik|year= 2004| publisher=Orient Blackswan |isbn = 9788178241098}}</ref><br />32,000 Rohilla ]<ref name="Roy" /> 2,000 ] (camel gun)<ref>{{Cite book |author=Iqtidar Alam Khan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=s4PfAAAAMAAJ |title=Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India |date=2004|publisher=Oxford University Press|page=109|quote=At the Third Battle of Panipat (1761), Ahmed Shah Abdali had 2000 shaturnals which indicates that the popularity of these particular type of firearm was growing in the subcontinent down to the middle of the eighteenth century|isbn=978-0-19-566526-0 |language=en}}</ref>
|combatant2=<center>] <center>]
| strength2 = 55,000 Maratha cavalry, of which 11,000 was regular cavalry<ref name="Roy1">{{Cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA85|title = India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil|pages = 84–85–93|last1 = Roy|first1 = Kaushik|year = 2004|publisher = Orient Blackswan|isbn = 9788178241098|access-date = 8 February 2022|archive-date = 8 February 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220208200005/https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA85|url-status = live}}</ref><br />9,000 ] infantry<ref name="Roy1" /><br />200,000 non-combatants (pilgrims and camp-followers)<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://panipat.gov.in/third-battle/ | title=Third Battle of Panipat (1761) &#124; Panipat, Haryana | access-date=20 May 2018 | archive-date=27 October 2021 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211027181825/https://panipat.gov.in/third-battle/ | url-status=live }}</ref>
|commander1=]''']''' (Shah of Durrani Empire)<br/>]]<br/>]Wazir Wali Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"></ref><br/>]Shah Pasand Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"/><br />]Jahan Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"/><br />]]<br />]]<br /><br />]Hafiz Rahmat Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"/><br />]Dundi Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"/><br />]Banghas Khan<ref name="KaushikRoy"/>
| casualties1 = 15,000 Rohillas killed and wounded<ref name="Roy2">{{Cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA93|title = India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil|pages = 84–85–93|last1 = Roy|first1 = Kaushik|year = 2004|publisher = Orient Blackswan|isbn = 9788178241098|access-date = 8 February 2022|archive-date = 8 February 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220208195457/https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA93|url-status = live}}</ref><br />5,000 Afghans killed and wounded<ref name="Roy2" />
|commander2=]''']''' (commander-in-chief of Maratha Army) <br/>]]<br/>]]<br/>]]<br/>]]<br />]Jankoji Shinde<br />]Bhivrao Panse<br/>]]<br/>]Purandare<br/>]Vinchurkar (Infantry & Cavalry)<br/>]Sidoji Gharge
| casualties2 = 30,000 killed in battle<ref name="Roy2" /><br />10,000 killed while retreating<ref name="Roy2" /><br />10,000 missing<ref name="Roy2" />
|strength1=42,000 cavalry<br>38,000 infantry<br>10,000 reserves<br>4,000 personal guards<br>5,000 ]<br>120–130 pieces of cannon<br>large numbers of irregulars<br>totally an army of 100,000.
| cause = Maratha raids in Punjab and growing Maratha raids in Afghan territory
|strength2=40,000 cavalry<br>15,000 infantry(divided to 9 battalyons of Gardi rifle infantry)<ref></ref><br>15,000 ]s<br>200 pieces of artillery. The force was accompanied by 300,000 non-combatants (pilgrims and camp-followers)<br>totally an army of 70,000.
| notes = 50,000 non-combatants executed following the battle<ref name="Roy2" /><ref name="jgd">James Grant Duff "History of the Mahrattas, Vol II (Ch. 5), Printed for Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1826"</ref><ref name="tss" /><br />9,000 in ] killings following the battle<ref name="the University of Michigan">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=EfEdAAAAMAAJ&q=Qutb+Shah%27s+sons+slaughtered+4,000 |title= The Indian Journal of International Law:Official Organ of the Indian Society of International Law · Volume 3 |date= 1963 |publisher= the University of Michigan |access-date= 19 March 2023 |archive-date= 4 April 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230404115859/https://books.google.com/books?id=EfEdAAAAMAAJ&q=Qutb+Shah%27s+sons+slaughtered+4%2C000 |url-status= live }}</ref><br />Estimated 22,000 enslaved<ref name="jgd"/>
|casualties1= Estimates between 20,000 and 40,000 combatants killed.<ref name="jgd"/><ref name="tss"/>
|casualties2= Estimates between 30,000 and 40,000 combatants killed in the battle. Another 40,000-70,000 non-combatants massacred following the battle.<ref name="jgd">James Grant Duff "History of the Mahrattas, Vol II (Ch. 5), Printed for Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1826"</ref><ref name="tss">T. S. Shejwalkar, "Panipat 1761" (in Marathi and English) Deccan College Monograph Series. I., Pune (1946)</ref>
}} }}
{{Indian Campaign of Ahmad Shah Durrani}}
{{Campaigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani}}The '''Third Battle of Panipat'''{{efn|]: د پاني پت درېيمه جګړه<br>]: पानिपतची तिसरी लढाई<br>]: سومین نبرد پانی پت<br>]: पाणिपेतस्य तृतीयं युद्धम्}} took place on 14 January 1761 between the ] and the invading army of the ]. The battle took place in and around the city of ], approximately {{Convert|97|km|mi}} north of ]. The ] were supported by three key allies in ]: ] who persuaded the support of the ] chiefs, elements of the declining ], and most prized the ] under ].<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iHK-BhVXOU4C&dq=shuja+ud+dawlah+abdali&pg=PA152 |title=The Marathas 1600-1818:Volume 4 |page=154 |author=Stewart Gordon |date=1993 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521033169 |access-date=11 July 2023 |archive-date=30 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230730030532/https://books.google.com/books?id=iHK-BhVXOU4C&dq=shuja+ud+dawlah+abdali&pg=PA152 |url-status=live }}</ref> The Maratha army was led by ], who was third-highest authority of the Maratha Confederacy after the ] and the ]. The bulk of the Maratha army was stationed in the ] with the ].


The '''Third Battle of Panipat''' took place on 14 January 1761, at ], about {{convert|60|mi|km}} north of ] between a northern expeditionary force of the ] and the forces of the ], ], supported by two Indian Muslim allies—the ] of the ], and ], the Nawab of ]. Militarily, the battle pitted the French origin artillery<ref>{{cite web| url=http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9050745/Maratha-confederacy|title=Maratha Confederacy |publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica |accessdate=11 August 2007| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20070823111031/http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9050745/Maratha-confederacy| archivedate= 23 August 2007 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> and cavalry of the ]s against the heavy cavalry and mounted artillery (zamburak and jizail) of the Afghans and Rohillas led by ] and ], both ethnic ] (the former is also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali). The battle is considered one of the largest fought in the 18th century,<ref>Black, Jeremy (2002) ''Warfare In The Eighteenth Century'' (Cassell'S History Of Warfare) (Paperback&nbsp;– 25 July 2002)ISBN 0304362123</ref> and has perhaps the largest number of fatalities in a single day reported in a classic formation battle between two armies. Militarily, the battle pitted the artillery, musketry, and cavalry of the Marathas against the heavy cavalry, musketry ('']'') and mounted artillery ('']'') of the Afghans and the Rohillas led by ] and ]. The battle is considered to have been one of the largest and most eventful fought in the 18th century,<ref>{{cite book |last=Black |first=Jeremy |title=Warfare In The Eighteenth Century |publisher=Cassell |year=2002 |isbn=978-0304362127}}</ref> and it had perhaps the largest number of fatalities in a single day reported in a classic formation battle between two armies.


The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 troops; protracted skirmishes occurred, with losses and gains on both sides. The Afghan army ultimately emerged victorious from the battle after successfully destroying several Maratha flanks. The extent of the losses on both sides is heavily disputed by historians, but it is believed that between 60,000 and 70,000 troops were killed in the fighting, while the numbers of injured and prisoners taken vary considerably. According to the single-best eyewitness chronicle—the '']'' by Shuja-ud-Daula's ''Diwan Kashi Raja''—about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were collectively slaughtered on the day after the battle.<ref name="tss" /> ] historian ] includes an interview of a survivor of these massacres in his ''History of the Marathas'' and generally corroborates this number. Shejwalkar, whose monograph ''Panipat 1761'' is often regarded as the single-best secondary source on the battle, says that "not less than 100,000 Marathas (soldiers and non-combatants) perished during and after the battle".<ref name="jgd" />
The decline of the ] following the ] (1680–1707) had led to rapid territorial gains for the ]. Under Peshwa Baji Rao, Gujarat, Malwa and Rajputana came under Maratha control. Finally, in 1737, Baji Rao defeated the Mughals on the outskirts of Delhi, and brought much of the former Mughal territories south of Delhi under Maratha control. Baji Rao's son, ] (popularly known as Nana Saheb), further increased the territory under Maratha control by invading Punjab in 1758. This brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the Durrani empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali. In 1759 he raised an army from the ] and ] <ref name="thebaluch.com">http://thebaluch.com/documents/Nasir%20Khan%20Noori.pdf</ref> and made several gains against the smaller Maratha garrisons in Punjab. He then joined with his Indian allies—the Rohilla Afghans of the Gangetic Doab—forming a broad coalition against the Marathas. The Marathas, under the command of ], responded by gathering an army of between 45,000–60,000, which was accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants, a number of whom were pilgrims desirous of making pilgrimages to Hindu holy sites in northern India. The Marathas started their northward journey from Patdur on the 14 March 1760. Both sides tried to get the Nawad of Awadh, Shuja-ud-Daulah, into their camp. By late July, Shuja-ud-Daulah made the decision to join the Afghan-Rohilla coalition, preferring to join what was perceived as the 'army of Islam'. This was strategically a major loss for the Marathas, since Shuja provided much needed finances for the long Afghan stay in North India. It is doubtful whether the Afghan-Rohilla coalition would have the means to continue their conflict with the Marathas without Shuja's support.


== Background ==
The slow-moving Maratha camp finally reached Delhi on 1 August 1760, and took the city the next day. There followed a series of skirmishes along the banks of the river ], and a battle at ], which the Marathas won against an Afghan garrison of about 15,000 (at this time, Abdali and the other Afghan forces were on the eastern side of the Yamuna river). However, Abdali daringly crossed the river Yamuna on the 25 October at Baghpat, cutting off the Maratha camp from their base in Delhi. This eventually turned into a two-month-long siege led by Abdali against the Marathas in the town of Panipat. During the siege both sides tried to cut off the other's supplies. At this the Afghans were considerably more effective, so that by the end of November 1760 they had cut off almost all food supplies into the besieged Maratha camp (which had about 250,000 to 300,000, most of whom were non-combatants). According to all the chronicles of the time, food in the Maratha camp ran out by late December or early January and cattle died by the thousands. Reports of soldiers dying of starvation began to be heard in early January. On 13 January the Maratha chiefs begged their commander, Sadashiv Rao Bhau, to be allowed to die in battle than perish by starvation. The next day the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00&nbsp;a.m., and the battle raged until evening.
=== Decline of the Mughal Empire ===
{{main|Decline of the Mughal Empire}}
], 1760]]
The ] (1680–1707) led to rapid territorial loss of the ] to the ]. However, after his death in 1707, this process reversed following the Mughal succession war between the sons of Aurangzeb. By 1712, Marathas quickly started retaking their lost lands. Under ], ], ] and ] came under Maratha control. Finally, in 1737, Baji Rao defeated the Mughals on the outskirts of ] and brought much of the former ] territories in the south of ] under ] control. Baji Rao's son ] further increased the territory under Maratha control by invading ] in 1758.


] letter to the Peshwa, 4 May 1758.
The specific site of the battle itself is disputed by historians, but most consider it to have occurred somewhere near modern-day Kaalaa Aamb and Sanauli Road. The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 troops. Protracted skirmishes occurred, with losses and gains on both sides. The forces led by ] came out victorious after destroying several Maratha flanks. The extent of the losses on both sides is heavily disputed by historians, but it is believed that between 60,000–70,000 were killed in fighting, while the numbers of injured and prisoners taken vary considerably. According to the single best eye-witness chronicle- the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daulah's Diwan Kashi Raj, about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle.<ref name="tss"/> Grant Duff includes an interview of a survivor of these massacres in his ''History of the Marathas'' and generally corroborates this number. Shejwalkar, whose monograph ''Panipat 1761'' is often regarded as the single best secondary source on the battle, says that "not less than 100,000 Marathas (soldiers and non-combatants) perished during and after the battle."<ref name="jgd"/>


{{cquote|Lahore, Multan and other subahs on eastern side of Attock are under our rule for the most part, and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Shah Durrani's son Timur Shah Durrani and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops... So Ahmad Shah Durrani has returned to Kandahar with some 12–14 thousand broken troops.. Thus all have risen against Ahmad who has lost control over the region. We have decided to extend our rule up to Kandahar.}}
The result of the battle was the halting of further Maratha advances in the north, and a destabilization of their territories, for roughly 10 years. This period of 10 years is marked by the rule of ], who is credited with the revival of Maratha domination following the defeat at Panipat. In 1771, 10 years after Panipat, he sent a large Maratha army into North India in an expedition that was meant to re-establish Maratha domination in North India and punish refractory powers that had either sided with the Afghans, such as the Rohillas, or had shaken off Maratha domination after Panipat. The success of this campaign can be seen as the last saga of the long story of Panipat.


This brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the ] of ] (also known as Ahmad Shah Durrani). In 1759, he raised an army the core of which was from the ], and recruited other troops such as the Pashtun tribes, Kurds, and Uzbeks.<ref>{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=HkpnDwAAQBAJ&dq=qizilbashes+india+cavalry&pg=PT133 |title= The Indian Frontier: Horse and Warband in the Making of Empires |author= Jos Gommans |author-link=Jos Gommans|date= 2017 |publisher= Routledge |isbn= 978-1-351-36356-3 |access-date= 11 July 2023 |archive-date= 30 July 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230730030531/https://books.google.com/books?id=HkpnDwAAQBAJ&dq=qizilbashes+india+cavalry&pg=PT133 |url-status= live }}</ref><ref name="Jadunath Sarkar 67">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GxMhAAAAMAAJ&q=abdali+qizilbash+panipat |title=Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. 2 |author=Jadunath Sarkar |date=27 April 1966 |page=67 |access-date=24 March 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404094849/https://books.google.com/books?id=GxMhAAAAMAAJ&q=abdali+qizilbash+panipat |url-status=live }}</ref> and made several gains against the smaller Maratha garrisons in Punjab. He then joined his Indian allies—the ] of the Gangetic Doab, the Muslims of Northern India, and ]—forming a broad coalition against the Marathas.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofsikhs1401khus/page/150/mode/2up?q=Rohillas |title=A History Of The Sikhs, Vol. 1, 1469-1839 |author=Khushwant Singh |page=150 }}</ref>
==Background==
{{Main|Maratha conquest of North-west India}}
{{cquote|], ], ] and other subahs on this side of ] are under our rule for the most part, and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. ]'s son ] and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached ] with a few broken troops... So Ahmad Shah Durrani has returned to Kandahar with some 12-14 thousand broken troops.. Thus all have risen against Ahmad who has lost control over the region. We have decided to extend our rule up to ].<br/>
– ]'s letter to the Peshwa, 4 May 1758<ref name=K.RoyIHB/>
}}


To counter this, ] was supposed to go north to handle the situation. Raghunathrao asked for large number of an army soldiers, which was denied by ], his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa. Therefore, he declined to go. Sadashivrao Bhau was instead made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought.<ref name="Raghunathrao">]</ref>
===Decline of Mughal Empire===
{{Main|Mughal Empire}}
], 1758<br/>''(shown here in orange)''.]]
The Mughal Empire had been in decline since the death of the Mughal Emperor ] in 1707 due to rise of ].
The decline was accelerated by the invasion of India by ] in 1739 during the rule of Muhammad Shah who ruled from 1719-1748. Nadir Shah also took away Takht-i-Taus (the peacock throne) and the Kohinoor Diamond. Continued rebellions by the ] in the south, and the de facto separation of a number of states (including ] and ]), weakened the state further. Within a few years of Aurangzeb's death, the Marathas had reversed all his territorial gains in the Deccan and had conquered almost all Mughal territory in central and northern India. Mughals had thus become just the titular heads of Delhi. At the same time ] saw frequent invasions by Ahmad Shah Abdali, the great Punjabi poet ] said of the situation, ''"khada peeta wahy da, baqi Ahmad Shahy da"''--"we have nothing with us except what we eat and wear, all other things are for ]". Abdali appointed his son, ], as his governor in Punjab and Kashmir. In 1758 the ]'s Gen. ] marched onwards, attacked and conquered ] and ] and drove out ]. ], ], ] and other subahs on the south and eastern side of ] were under the Maratha rule for the most part. In Punjab and Kashmir the Marathas were now major players.<ref name="K.RoyIHB">{{cite book | last=Roy |first=Kaushik |title=India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil |publisher=Permanent Black, India |pages=80–1 |isbn=978-8178241098}}</ref><ref>{{cite book| first=Mountstuart |last=Elphinstone |title=History of India |publisher=John Murray, Albermarle Street |year=1841 |page=276}}</ref>


The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of between 45,000 and 60,000, which was accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants, a number of whom were pilgrims desirous of making pilgrimages to Hindu holy sites in northern India. The Marathas started their northward journey from Patdur on 14 March 1760. Both sides tried to get the ], ]h, into their camp. By late July Shuja-ud-Daulah made the decision to join the Afghan-Rohilla coalition, preferring to join what was perceived as the "army of ]". This was strategically a major loss for the Marathas, since Shuja provided much-needed finances for the long Afghan stay in ]. It is doubtful whether the Afghan-Rohilla coalition would have the means to continue their conflict with the Marathas without Shuja's support.{{citation needed|date=April 2017}}
===Rise of the Marathas===
{{Main|Maratha Empire}}
The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of India in the intervening period (1707–1757). In 1758 they occupied Delhi, captured ] and drove out ],<ref name="K.RoyIHB" /> the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of the Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended in the north to the Indus and the Himalayas, and in the south nearly to the extremity of the peninsula. This territory was ruled through the ], who talked of placing his son ] on the Mughal throne.<ref>{{cite book| first=Mountstuart |last=Elphinstone |title=History of India |publisher=John Murray, Albermarle Street |year=1841 |pages=276}}</ref> However, Delhi still remained under the nominal control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergy in India who were alarmed at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://storyofpakistan.com/person.asp?perid=P064 |title=Shah Wali Ullah (1703–1762) |publisher=Storyofpakistan.com |accessdate=11 August 2007}}</ref>


=== Rise of the Marathas ===
==Prelude==
Grant Duff, describing the Maratha army:<ref name="Keene">{{cite book |first=H. G. |last=Keene |title=The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan |volume= VI |pages=80–81}}</ref>
{{Main|Durrani Empire}}


{{cquote|The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broadcloths, were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a distance... Vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses, magnificently caparisoned ... seemed to be collected from every quarter ... it was an imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the Mughuls in the zenith of their glory.}}
{{cquote|
"The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broadcloths,
were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a distance...
Vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses,
magnificently caparisoned ... seemed to be collected from every
quarter ... it was an imitation of the more becoming and
tasteful array of the Mughuls in the zenith of their glory."
– ], describing the Maratha army.<ref name="Keene"/>}}
] (''Ahmad Shah Abdali''), angered by the news from his son and his allies, was unwilling to allow the Marathas' spread go unchecked. By the end of 1759 Abdali with his Afghan tribes and his ] ally ] had reached ] as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons. Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to Anupshahr, on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the ] ] to join his alliance against the Marathas—in spite of the Marathas time and again helping and showing sympathy towards Shuja-ud-daula. The Nawab’s mother was of the opinion that he should join the Marathas. The Marathas had helped Safdarjung (father of Shuja) in defeating Rohillas in Farrukhabad. However, Shuja was very much ill-treated in the Abdali camp. Abdali was an Afghan Sunni Muslim and Shuja was a Persian Shia Muslim.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>


The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of ] in the intervening period (1712–1757). In 1758 they nominally occupied ], captured ] and drove out ],<ref name="KaushikRoy" /> the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, ]. This was the high-water mark of Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended north of the ] river all the way down south to northern ]. This territory was ruled through the ], who talked of placing his son ] on the Mughal throne. However, ] still remained under the control of ], key Muslim intellectuals including ] and other Muslim clergies in India were frightened at these developments. In desperation they appealed to ], the ruler of ], to halt the threat.<ref>{{cite book |title=Studies in Mughal History |last=Agrawal |first=Ashvini |year=1983 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |chapter=Events leading to the Battle of Panipat |isbn=978-8120823266 |page=26}}</ref> The Marathas attempted to turn over the support of the Gujarati Muslim Babis, the Indian Rohillas, Nizam brothers of the Deccan, and Shuja-ud-Dawlah.<ref>{{cite book |title=textsPanipat:1761 |author=Shejwalkar, Tryambak Shankar |date=1946 |page=XV }}</ref>
The Marathas under ] (referred to as the Bhau or Bhao in sources) responded to the news of the Afghans' return to North India by raising a big army, and they marched North. Bhau's force was bolstered by some Maratha forces under ], ], ] and ]. ], the ] ruler of Bharatpur, also had joined Bhausaheb but left midway. This combined army of over 100,000 regular troops captured the Mughal capital, Delhi, from an Afghan garrison in December 1759.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Development of the British Empire |last=Robinson|first= Howard|authorlink= |author2=James Thomson Shotwell|year=1922 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin |chapter=Mogul Empire|location= |isbn= |page=91 |pages= |url= |accessdate= }}</ref> Delhi had been reduced to ashes many times due to previous invasions, and in addition there being acute shortage of supplies in the Maratha camp. Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city.<ref>{{cite book|title=Studies in Mughal History|last=Agrawal|first=Ashvini|year=1983|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|chapter=Events leading to the Battle of Panipat|location= |isbn=8120823265 |page=26}}</ref> He is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, on the Mughal throne. The Jats did not support the Marathas. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in its result. Abdali drew first blood by attacking a small Maratha army led by Dattaji Shinde at Murari Ghat. Dattaji fought with characteristic Maratha valour but was soon defeated and killed by Abdali’s troops.


]]]
===Initial skirmishes===
].]]
With both sides poised for battle, there followed much maneuvering, with skirmishes between the two armies fought at ] and ]. ], on the banks of the ] River 60 miles to the north of Delhi, was stormed by the Marathas and the whole Afghan garrison was killed or enslaved.<ref>Also see Syed Altaf Ali Brelvi, ''Life of Hafiz Rahmat Khan,'' pp. 108–9.</ref> Marathas achieved a rather easy victory at Kunjpura, although there was a substantial army posted there. Some of Abadali's best generals were killed. Ahmad Shah was encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains, and was powerless to aid the garrison. The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated him to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.<ref name="Lateef">{{cite book |title="History of the Punjab", p. 235,|first=S M |last=Lateef |publisher=}}</ref> Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from Shahdara, marching south. Taking a calculated risk, Abdali plunged into the river, followed by his bodyguards and troops. Between 23 and 25 October they were able to cross at ](a small town about 24 miles up the river), as a man from the village, in exchange for money, showed Abdali a way through Yamuna, from where the river could be crossed,<ref name="Vishwas Patil">{{cite book |title=Panipat |first=Vishwas |last=Patil}}</ref> unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura.


== Prelude ==
After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces from crossing the Yamuna River, they set up defensive works in the ground near ], thereby blocking his access back to Afghanistan, just as his forces blocked theirs to the south. However, on the afternoon of 26 October Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Sambalka, about halfway between ] and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Marathas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost 1000 men killed and wounded but drove the Marathas back to their main body, which kept retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, ], with 10,000 light cavalry who weren’t formally trained soldiers, was on a foraging mission with about 500 men. They were surprised by an Afghan force near Meerut, and in the ensuing fight Bundele was killed.<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite book |title=Panipat |first=Vishwas |last=Patil|publisher=Navbharat Sahitya Mandir|year=2005}}</ref> This was followed by the loss of another 2,000 Maratha soldiers who were delivering the army's payroll from Delhi. This completed the encirclement, as Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha army's supply lines.<ref name="Rawlinson">{{cite book |title=An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat |first=H. G. |last=Rawlinson |year=1926 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>
] (''Ahmad Shah Abdali''), angered by the news from his son and his allies, was unwilling to allow the Marathas' spread go unchecked. By the end of 1759 Abdali with his ] and the Afghan tribes,<ref name="Jadunath Sarkar 67"/> had reached ] as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons, and was joined by the Muslims of Northern India, the ], and ].<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofsikhs1401khus/page/150/mode/2up?q=Rohillas |title=A History Of The Sikhs, Vol. 1, 1469-1839 |author=Khushwant Singh |page=150 }}</ref> Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to ], on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the ] ] to join his alliance against the Marathas. The Marathas had earlier helped ] (father of Shuja) in defeating Rohillas in ].<ref name="tss"/>


The Marathas under ] responded to the news of the Afghans' return to North India by raising an army, and they marched North. Bhau's force was bolstered by some Maratha forces under ], ], ] and ]. ] (the ] ruler of ]) also had joined Bhausaheb initially. This combined army captured the Mughal capital, Delhi, from an Afghan garrison in December 1759.<ref>{{Cite book|author1=Robinson, Howard |author2=James Thomson Shotwell |title=Mogul Empire. The Development of the British Empire|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1922|page=91}}</ref> Delhi had been reduced to ashes many times due to previous invasions, and in addition there being acute shortage of supplies in the Maratha camp. Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city.<ref>Agrawal, Ashvini (1983). "Events leading to the Battle of Panipat". Studies in Mughal History. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 26. {{ISBN|8120823265}}.</ref> He is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, on the Delhi throne. The Jats withdrew their support from the Marathas. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in its result. The first blood was drawn when the leader of the Rohillas, an Indian Muslim named Qutb Khan, attacked a small Maratha army led by Dattaji Shinde at Burari Ghat. Dattaji camped at the Buradi Fort, south of Panipat, deciding to only engage with Abdali with the aid of Malharao Holkar.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-2TH8UYeAaoC&dq=qutb+khan+gupta&pg=PA119 |title=The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, C.1710-1780 |page=119 |publisher=Brill |date=1995 |author=Jos J. L. Gommans |isbn=9004101098 |access-date=24 March 2023 |archive-date=5 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405042141/https://books.google.com/books?id=-2TH8UYeAaoC&dq=qutb+khan+gupta&pg=PA119 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=4_SB95ZA-_cC&dq=dattaji+buradi&pg=PA85 |title= Decisive Battles India Lost (326 B. C. to 1803 A. D.) |page= 85 |author= Jaywant Joglekar |date= 2006 |publisher= Lulu.com |isbn= 9781847283023 |access-date= 19 March 2023 |archive-date= 4 April 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230404115900/https://books.google.com/books?id=4_SB95ZA-_cC&dq=dattaji+buradi&pg=PA85 |url-status= live }}</ref> He was beheaded and killed in an attack by ].<ref name="tss"/><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Mo-GvHjoH-cC&q=His+head+was+cut+off+by+Mian+Qutb+Shah+,+who+took+it+as+a+trophy+to+the+Afghan+king |title=A History of the Freedom Movement: 1707-1831 |page=282 |publisher=Pakistan Historical Society |date=1957 |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=5 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405042143/https://books.google.com/books?id=Mo-GvHjoH-cC&q=His+head+was+cut+off+by+Mian+Qutb+Shah+,+who+took+it+as+a+trophy+to+the+Afghan+king |url-status=live }}</ref>
With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions rose in the Maratha camp as the mercenaries in their army were complaining about not being paid. Initially the Marathas moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range, French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the time. The Marathas' plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.<ref name="Rawlinson"/>


===Suraj Mal's advice to Sadashiv Rao Bhau===
===Preliminary moves===
Before Battle of Panipat a war council was formed by Maratha commander-in-chief Sadashiv Rao Bhau in which Maharaja Suraj Mal was invited to give advice for war strategy against Abdali.
During the next two months of the ] constant skirmishes and duels took place between units and individual champions from either side. In one of these ] lost 3,000 of his Rohillas and was very nearly killed but ran away. Facing a potential stalemate, Abdali decided to seek terms, which Bhau was willing to consider. However, Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on religious grounds and sowed doubt about whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.<ref name="Keene">{{cite book |title=Part I, Chapter VI: The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan |first=H. G. |last=Keene |authorlink=Henry George Keene (1826–1915) |year=1887 |url=http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/hst/asian/TheFalloftheMoghulEmpireofHindustan/chap6.html}}</ref>


Jat chief Surajmal provided following advice :
After the Marathas moved from Kunjpura to Panipat, Diler Khan Marwat, with his father Alam Khan Marwat and a force of 2500 Pashtuns, attacked and took control of Kunjpura, where there was a Maratha garrison of 700–800 soldiers. At that time Atai Khan Baluch, son of the Wazir of Abdali, came from Afghanistan with 10,000 cavalry and cut off the supplies to the Marathas.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/> The Marathas at Panipat were surrounded by Abdali in the south, Pashtun Tribes (Yousuf Zai, Afridi, Khattak) in the east, Shuja, Atai Khan and others in the north and other Pashtun tribes (Gandapur, Marwat, Durranis and Kakars) in the west. Abdali had also ordered Wazir Shaha Wali Khan Afridi and others to keep a watch in the thorny jungles surrounding Panipat. Thus, all supplies lines were cut.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>


* Women, children, old people, families of soldier and non combatants should either be left on the other side of Chambal in Maratha's stronghold of Jhansi and Gwalior or in protection of Suraj Mal’s one of 4 forts in Jat strongholds.<ref name="books.google.co.in">{{Cite book |last=Roy |first=Kaushik |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&q=Suraj+Mal+&pg=PA82 |title=India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil |date=2004 |publisher=Orient Blackswan |isbn=978-81-7824-109-8 |pages=82 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="archive.org">{{cite web | url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.505305/page/n132/mode/1up?view=theater | title=History of Jats | date=1925 }}</ref>
The Marathas’ difficulty in obtaining supplies worsened as the local population became hostile to them, since in the Marathas' desperation to secure provisions they had pillaged the surrounding areas.
* Large baggage and heavy artillery should not be taken as they will slow down Maratha movement in the battlefield against Durrani’s forces.<ref name="books.google.co.in"/><ref name="archive.org"/>
* If Marathas find themselves on losing ground then a quick moving force will be able to move backwards in friendly country easily and Abdali will not be keen on crossing Chambal.<ref name="books.google.co.in"/><ref name="archive.org"/>
* Road for supply lines should be kept open so that Maratha army will not face problems in getting supplies during war <ref name="books.google.co.in"/><ref name="archive.org"/>
* One division of the Maratha army should be sent to Lahore and other to the east to destroy the supply lines so that Abdali will not be able to secure supplies from his allies for his army.<ref name="books.google.co.in"/><ref name="archive.org"/>
* A light cavalry guerrilla warfare will be suggested instead of conventional face-to-face warfare as Durrani will not be able to sustain a long warfare and when Monsoon will come both sides will find forces moving much slower, Durrani will be in much more disadvantage without supplies compared to Marathas and this will force Abdali to move back to his country.<ref name="books.google.co.in"/><ref name="archive.org"/>


Many of the Maratha generals found it good strategy as they themselves prefer guerrilla warfare but Sadashiv Rao Bhau found it dishonourable for a king and took this as result of Maratha general's old age and Suraj Mal's foolishness.
While Sadashivrao Bhau was still eager to make terms, a message was received from the Peshawa insisting on going to war and promising that reinforcements were under way. Unable to continue without supplies or wait for reinforcements any longer, Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.<ref name="Keene"/>


]]]
==Battle==
]


== Skirmishes before the battle ==
===Formations===
The Maratha lines began a little to the north of ]. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time were blocked from heading south—in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies—by those same troops. Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the household troops, was in the centre. The left wing consisted of the ''gardis'' under ]. Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.<ref name="Rawlinson"/>


=== Afghan defeat at Kunjpura ===
The Maratha line was to be formed up some 12&nbsp;km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained.<ref name="Rawlinson"/> Many were middle-class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young, inexperienced soldiers.
{{Main|Battle of Kunjpura}}
With both sides poised for battle, maneuvering followed, with skirmishes between the two armies fought around ] and ]. Abdus Samad Khan, the ] of ], had come to Kunjpura, on the banks of the ] river 60 miles to the north of Delhi with a force of more than ten thousand and supplies for the Afghan force. Kunjpura was stormed by the Marathas who was running short of supplies. Aided by the musketeers under Ibrahim Gardi, the Marathas achieved a rather easy victory at ] against an army of around 15,000 Afghans posted there.<ref name="tss" /> Some of Abdali's best generals like ] were killed.<ref name="Verma">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sOnKoAEACAAJ |title = Third Battle of Panipat|isbn = 9788180903328|last1 = Verma|first1 = Abhas|year= 2013| publisher=Bharatiya Kala Prakashan }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Imperial gazetteer of India: provincial series|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-AO2AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA314|access-date=29 June 2013|year=1908|publisher=Supt. of Govt. Print.|pages=314–}}</ref> Abdus Samad Khan the faujdar of Sirhind was also killed during the battle.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Singh |first1=Ganda |title=Ahmad Shah Durrani, father of modern Afghanistan |date=1959 |publisher=Asia Publishing house |pages=247 |url=https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.5426/page/n267/mode/1up |access-date=19 November 2022}}</ref> ] who was responsible for beheading ] at the battle of Barari ghat was executed by the Marathas after their capture of Kunjpura.<ref name="Ahmad Shah durrani">{{cite book |last1=Singh |first1=Ganda |title=Ahmad Shah Durrani, father of modern Afghanistan |date=1959 |page=247 |publisher=Asia Publishing House, Bombay |url=https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.5426/page/n267/mode/1up}}</ref> Ahmad Shah was encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains, and was powerless to aid the garrison. The whole Afghan garrison was killed or enslaved.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Also see Syed Altaf Ali Brelvi, Life of Hafiz Rahmat Khan|pages=108–09}}</ref> The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated Abdali to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Lateef, S M. "History of the Punjab"|page=235}}</ref>


=== Afghans cross Yamuna and the Battles of Samalkha and Meerut ===
On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, probably a few metres to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib and their right by two brigades of Persian troops. Their left centre was led by two Viziers, ] with 3,000 soldiers and 50–60 cannons and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen.<ref name="Rawlinson"/> The right centre consisted of 15,000 ] under ] and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry with the choicest Persian horses. Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.


Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from ], marching south. Taking a calculated risk, Abdali plunged into the river, followed by his bodyguards and troops. Between 23 and 25 October they were able to cross at ](a small town about 24 miles up the river), unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura and visit to nearby ]; an important Hindu pilgrimage destination.<ref name="tss" />
===Early phases===
Before dawn on 14 January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with the last remaining grain in camp and prepared for combat, coming from their lines with turbans disheveled and turmeric-smeared faces. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2&nbsp;km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the Afghan weapons and the static nature of the Maratha artillery, the Afghan cannons proved ineffectual.


After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces from crossing the Yamuna River, they set up defensive works in the ground near ], thereby blocking his access back to Afghanistan, just as Abdali's forces blocked theirs to the south. However, on the afternoon of 26 October, Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached ], about halfway between ] and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Marathas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost 1000 men but drove the Marathas back to their main body, which kept retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, ], with 10,000 light cavalry who weren't formally trained soldiers, was on a foraging mission with about 500 men. They were surprised by an Afghan force near ], and in the ensuing fight, Bundele was killed. This was followed by the loss of a contingent of 2,000 Maratha soldiers who had left ] to deliver money and rations to ]. This completed the encirclement, as Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha army's supply lines.<ref name = "csp">{{Cite book|title= An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat |last1= Pundit|first1= Casi Raja|author-link1= |translator-last1= Brown|translator-first1= James| editor-last1 = Rawlinson| editor-first1 = Hugh George |url= https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.6002/ |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1926 |isbn= 9789385509544 }}</ref>
The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who in his eagerness to prove his worth advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack was broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>


With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions started rising in the Maratha camp. Initially the Marathas had moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range, French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the time. The Marathas' plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.<ref name = "csp"/>
In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success, the overenthusiasm of the charge and a phenomenon called "Dakshinayan" on that fateful day, the attack itself failed because the sunlight shone directly into the eyes of the attackers' horses, many of them half-starved Maratha mounts who were exhausted long before they had traveled the two kilometers to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed.


===Final phase=== === Preliminary moves ===
During the next two months of the ], constant skirmishes and duels took place between units from the two sides. In one of these ] lost 3,000 of his Rohillas and was nearly killed himself. Facing a potential stalemate, Abdali decided to seek terms, which Bhau was willing to consider. However, Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on religious grounds and sowed doubt about whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Keene, H. G. (1887). Part I, Chapter VI: The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan.}}</ref>
In the final phase the Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib. Najib successfully fought a defensive action, however, keeping Scindia's forces at bay. By noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the centre was cut in two and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (]) and 2,000 swivel-mounted ''shutarnaals'' or Ushtranaal—cannons—on the backs of camels.<ref>War Elephants Written by Konstantin Nossov, Illustrated by Peter Dennis Format: Trade Paperback ISBN 9781846032684</ref> The shaturnals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. He therefore sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to any those front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhao in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizir in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.


After the Marathas moved from Kunjpura to Panipat, Diler Khan Marwat, with his father Alam Khan Marwat and a force of 2500 ], attacked and took control of Kunjpura, where there was a Maratha garrison of 700–800 soldiers. At that time Atai Khan Baluch, son of the Shah Wali Khan, the Wazir of Abdali, came from Afghanistan with 10,000 cavalry and cut off the supplies to the Marathas.<ref name="tss"/> The Marathas at Panipat were surrounded by Abdali in the south, Pashtun tribes (], ], ]) in the east, Shuja, Atai Khan and others in the north and other Pashtun tribes (], ], ]s and ]s) in the west.<ref name="tss"/>
With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00. By 16:00 the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.
Unable to continue without supplies or wait for reinforcements from Pune any longer, Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.<ref name="tss"/>


===Outflanked=== === Formations ===
]
], seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, had not kept any reserves, and upon seeing Vishwasrao disappear in the midst of the fighting, he felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle.<ref name="K.RoyIHB"/> Taking advantage of this, some Afghan soldiers who had been captured by the Marathas earlier during the siege of Kunjpura revolted. The slaves deliberately spread rumours about the defeat of the Marathas. This brought confusion and great consternation to loyal Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from their rear. Some Maratha troops, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee.
With the Maratha chiefs pressurizing Sadashivrao Bhau, to go to battle rather than perish by starvation, on 13 January, the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00&nbsp;a.m.<ref name="tss"/>


The Maratha lines began a little to the north of ]. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time were blocked from heading south—in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies—by those same troops. Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the royal guard (Huzurat), was in the centre. The left wing consisted of the ''Gardis'' under ]. Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.<ref name = "csp"/>
Abdali had given a part of his army the task of surrounding and killing the Gardis under ], who were at the leftmost part of the Maratha army. Bhausaheb had ordered Vitthal Vinchurkar (with 1500 cavalry) and Damaji Gaikwad (with 2500 cavalry) to protect the Gardis. However, after seeing the Gardis fight, they lost their patience, became overenthusiastic and decided to fight the Rohillas themselves. Thus they broke the round—they didn’t follow the idea of round battle and went all out on the Rohillas, and the Rohilla riflemen started accurately firing at the Maratha cavalry, which was equipped only with swords. This gave the Rohillas the opportunity to encircle the Gardis and outflank the Maratha centre while Shah Wali pressed on attacking the front. Thus the Gardis were left defenceless and started falling one by one.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>


The Maratha line was formed up some 12&nbsp;km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the civilians. Many were ordinary men, women and children on their pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young, inexperienced soldiers.<ref name="tss"/>
Vishwasrao had already been killed by a shot to the head. Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. At this stage Holkar, realising the battle was lost, broke from the Maratha left flank and retreated.<ref name="K.RoyIHB"/> The Maratha army was routed and fled under the devastating attack. While 15,000 soldiers managed to reach ], the rest of the Maratha forces—including large numbers of non-combatants—were either killed or captured.<ref name="K.RoyIHB"/>


On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, a few metres to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib and their right by two brigades of troops. Their left centre was led by two Viziers, ] with 3,000 soldiers and 50–60 cannons and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen.<ref name = "csp"/> The right centre consisted of 15,000 ] under ] and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry. Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.<ref name="tss">{{Cite book|title=Panipat 1761 |author= Shejwalkar, Trimbak S. |author-link= Tryambak Shankar Shejwalkar |url= https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.126833 |publisher= Deccan College |location= Pune|language= mr, en |date= 1946 |isbn= 9788174346421}}</ref>
===Rout===
The Afghans pursued the fleeing Maratha army and civilians. The Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sunset. Choosing not to launch a night attack, many Maratha troops escaped that night. Bhau's wife ], who was assisting in the administration of the Maratha camp, escaped to Pune with her bodyguard (Janu Bhintada).


== Battle ==
==Reasons for the outcome==
=== Early phases ===
Durrani had both numeric as well as qualitative superiority over Marathas. The combined Muslim army was much larger than that of Marathas. Though the infantry of Marathas was organized along European lines and their army had some of the best French-made guns of the time, their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast-moving Afghan forces. The heavy mounted artillery of Afghans proved much better in the battlefield than the light artillery of Marathas.<ref>{{cite book |title=Medieval India: From Sultanate to the Mughals Part&nbsp;– II|last=Chandra|first=Satish|authorlink= |year=2004 |publisher=Har-Anand|chapter=Later Mughals|location= |isbn=81-241-1066-2 |page= |pages= }}</ref>
] fighting at ]]]
Before dawn on 14 January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with sugared water in the camp and prepared for combat. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2&nbsp;km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire.<ref name="tss" />


The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack by Najib Khan's Rohillas was broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas.<ref name="tss"/>
The main reason for the failure of the ] was that they went to war without good allies. They were expecting support from their allies- ], ] and ], but none of them supported Marathas in the battle. The Marathas had interfered in the internal affairs of the ] (present-day Rajasthan) and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made large territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the ] territory had resulted in the loss of trust of Jat chiefs like ]. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone. Marathas treated Sikhs, who assisted them in their ] as a non-entity in Punjab affairs. According to an assessment, the Sikhs were ever ready to co-operate with the Marathas, but it goes to the discredit of the Marathas that they did not make a proper confederacy with Sikhs. Kirpal Singh writes:<ref></ref>
{{quote|"Unlike Ahmad Shah Abdali who subsequently raised a cry of ], the Marathas couldn't mobilize their resources and make a common cause with the Sikhs in order to pay the Afghan Emperor in his own coin."}}


In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and the Afghan soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success and the ferocity of the charge, the attack did not attain complete success as many of the half-starved Maratha mounts were exhausted. Also, there were no heavy armoured cavalry units for the Marathas to maintain these openings. In order to turn about the deserting Afghan troopers, Abdali deployed his Nascibchi musketeers to gun down the deserters who finally stopped and returned to the field.<ref name="tss"/>
Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Cambridge History of India: The Mughul period, planned by W. Haig|volume=4 |last=James Rapson|first=Edward |authorlink= |author2=Wolseley Haig |author3=Richard Burn |author4=Henry Dodwell |author5=Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler |year=1937|publisher=Cambridge University Press|chapter=|isbn=|page=448}}</ref> Some of them didn't support the idea of a ''round battle'' and wanted to fight using guerilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/> The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was 1000 miles away from their capital ].<ref name="rediff">{{cite web|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/column/250-years-on-battle-of-panipat-revisited/20110113.htm |title=250 years on, Battle of Panipat revisited - Rediff.com India News |publisher=Rediff.com |date=13 January 2011 |accessdate=26 March 2012}}</ref>


=== Final phase ===
The Maratha army was also burdened with over 300,000 pilgrims who wished to worship at Hindu places of worship like Mathura, Prayag, Kashi, etc. The pilgrims wanted to accompany the army, as they would be secure with them.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/> Apart from just fighting the battle, the Maratha troops had the responsibility to protect the non-combatants from Afghans. That was the reason why Marathas suffered heavy losses even after the battle. They could not retreat quickly as they were to protect the non-combatants who were accompanying them.
] in battle ]]
The Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib. Najib successfully fought a defensive action, however, keeping Scindia's forces at bay. By noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the centre was cut in two and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (]) and 2,000 swivel-mounted ''shutarnaals'' or Ushtranaal—cannons—on the backs of camels.<ref>War Elephants Written by Konstantin Nossov, Illustrated by Peter Dennis Format: Trade Paperback {{ISBN|978-1-84603-268-4}}</ref>{{page needed|date=April 2017}}


The shutarnaals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry, at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. Abdali therefore, sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to punish the front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhau in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizier in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.<ref name="tss"/>
Peshwa's decision to appoint ] as the Supreme Commander instead of ] or ] proved to be an unfortunate one, as Sadashivrao was totally ignorant of the political and military situation in North India.<ref>Claude Markovits, A history of modern India, 1480–1950. Pg. 207.</ref>


With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00 hrs. By 16:00 hrs, the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.<ref name="tss"/>
If Holkar had remained in the battlefield, the Maratha defeat would have been delayed but not averted. Ahmad Shah’s superiority in pitched battle could have been negated if the Marathas had conducted their traditional ganimi kava, or guerrilla warfare, as advised by ], in Punjab and in north India. Abdali was in no position to maintain his field army in India indefinitely.<ref>India's historic battles: from Alexander the great to Kargil, Kaushik Roy, pg 91.</ref> Marathas had used guerrilla warfare in North India. The Turki horses could not have handled the plundering and cutting of supply lines by the Marathas.


=== Outflanked ===
Najib, Shuja and the Rohillas knew North India very well and that most of North India had allied with Abdali. Abdali used shaturnals, camels with mobile artillery pieces at his disposal. He was also diplomatic, striking agreements with Hindu leaders, especially the Jats and Rajputs, and former rivals like the Nawab of Awadh, appealing to him in the name of religion.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>
] wounded in battle ]]
He also had better intelligence on the movements of his enemy, which played a crucial role in his encirclement of the enemy army.
Sadashiv Rao Bhau who had not kept any reserves, seeing his forward lines dwindling, civilians behind and upon seeing Vishwasrao disappear in the midst of the fighting, felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle.<ref name="KaushikRoy" />


Taking advantage of this, the Afghan soldiers who had been captured by the Marathas earlier during the Siege of Kunjpura revolted. The prisoners unwrapped their green belts and wore them as turbans to impersonate the troops of the ] and began attacking from within. This brought confusion and great consternation to the Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from the rear. Some Maratha troops in the vanguard, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant and the chaos ensuing in the rear, panicked and scattered in disarray towards the rear.<ref name="tss"/>
==Massacres after the battle==
Mass of surrendered Maratha soldiers were handcuffed and then murdered, their heads chopped off by Afghans. The Afghan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing tens of thousands of Maratha soldiers and civilians.<ref name="jgd"/><ref name="tss"/> The women and children seeking refuge in streets of Panipat were hounded back in Afghan camps as slaves. Children over 14 were beheaded before their own mothers and sisters. Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of 'infidel' ] the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area.<ref name="Bombay Gazette"/><ref name="Rlson"/> They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eye-witness chronicle- the bakhar by ]'s Diwan Kashi Raj, about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle.<ref name="jgd"/><ref name="tss"/><ref name="Bombay Gazette"/> According to Mr. Hamilton of Bombay Gazette about half a million ] were present there in Panipat town and he gives a figure of 70,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans.<ref name="Bombay Gazette"> A short story of genocide</ref>
Many of the fleeing Maratha women jumped into the Panipat wells rather than risk rape and dishonour.<ref name="Rlson"/>


Abdali had given a part of his army the task of surrounding and killing the Gardis, who were at the leftmost part of the Maratha army. Bhausaheb had ordered Vitthal Vinchurkar (with 1500 cavalry) and Damaji Gaikwad (with 2500 cavalry) to protect the Gardis. However, after seeing the Gardis having no clearing for directing their cannon fire at the enemy troops, they lost their patience and decided to fight the Rohillas themselves. Thus, they broke their position and went all out on the Rohillas. The Rohilla riflemen started accurately firing at the Maratha cavalry, which was equipped only with swords. This gave the Rohillas the opportunity to encircle the Gardis and outflank the Maratha centre while Shah Wali pressed on attacking the front. Thus the Gardis were left defenseless and started falling one by one.<ref name="tss"/>
All of the prisoners were transported on bullock carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.<ref name="Rlson"/><ref name="voi-book"/>


Vishwasrao had already been killed by a shot to the head. Bhau and the Huzurati royal forces fought till the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. At this stage, the Holkar and Scindia contingents, realising the battle was lost, merged their forces with one contingent breaking from the Maratha right flank and escaped from the opening in the Durrani lines southwards as ] lead the other contingent to reinforce the thinning lines of Marathas.<ref name="KaushikRoy" /> The Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sunset. Choosing not to launch a night attack, many Maratha troops escaped that night. Bhau's wife ], who was assisting in the administration of the Maratha camp, escaped to Pune with her bodyguard, Janu Bhintada along with ] under the protection of Malhar Rao Holkar's contingent. Some 15,000 soldiers managed to reach ].<ref name="KaushikRoy" />
Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin says:<ref name="Rlson">H. G. Rawlinson in C.H.I., IV, 424 and n.</ref><ref name="voi-book"> Women prisoners of the Panipat battle</ref>


== Reasons for the outcome ==
{{cquote|The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded... and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves - twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land.}}
Durrani had both numeric as well as qualitative superiority over Marathas. The combined Afghan army was much larger than that of Marathas. Though the infantry of Marathas was organized along European lines and their army had some of the best French-made guns of the time, their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast-moving Afghan forces. The heavy mounted artillery of Afghans proved much better in the battlefield than the light artillery of Marathas.<ref>{{cite book |title=Medieval India: From Sultanate to the Mughals Part II |last=Chandra |first=Satish |year=2004 |publisher=Har-Anand |chapter=Later Mughals |isbn=978-81-241-1066-9 }}</ref>{{Page needed|date=April 2017}} None of the other ]s joined forces to fight Abdali. Allies of Abdali, namely, Najib, Shuja and the Rohillas knew North India very well. He was also diplomatic, striking agreements with Hindu leaders, especially the Jats and ]s, and former rivals like the Nawab of Awadh, appealing to him in the name of religion.<ref name="tss"/>


Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Cambridge History of India: The Mughul period, planned by W. Haig |volume=4 |last=James Rapson |first=Edward |author2=Wolseley Haig |author3=Richard Burn |author4=Henry Dodwell |author5=Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler |year=1937 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=448}}</ref> Some of them did not support the idea of a ''pitched battle'' and wanted to fight using guerrilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on.<ref name="Roy 2004 91">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jpXijlqeRpIC&pg=PA80 |title=India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil |first=Kaushik |last=Roy |publisher=Orient Blackswan |year=2004 |isbn=978-8-17824-109-8 |page=91}}</ref> The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was 1000 miles away from their capital ].<ref name="rediff">{{cite web |url=http://www.rediff.com/news/column/250-years-on-battle-of-panipat-revisited/20110113.htm |title=250 years on, Battle of Panipat revisited |work=Rediff.com |date=13 January 2011 |access-date=26 March 2012 |archive-date=21 January 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120121101430/http://www.rediff.com/news/column/250-years-on-battle-of-panipat-revisited/20110113.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Aftermath==
] was used in the Third Battle of Panipat]]
The bodies of ] and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to Hindu custom.<ref name="Pradeep Barua"/> Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to ].


Raghunathrao was supposed to go north to reinforce the army. Raghunathrao asked for large amount of wealth and troops, which was denied by Sadashivrao Bhau, his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa, so he declined to go.<ref name="Raghunathrao"/> Sadashivrao Bhau was there upon made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought. Some historians have opined, that Peshwa's decision to appoint ] as the Supreme Commander instead of ] or ] proved to be an unfortunate one, as Sadashivrao was totally ignorant of the political and military situation in North India.<ref>Claude Markovits, A history of modern India, 1480–1950. p. 207.</ref>
], uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with reinforcements when a tired charkara arrived with a cryptic message: "Two pearls have been dissolved, 27 gold coins have been lost and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up". The Peshwa never recovered from the shock of the total debacle at Panipat. He returned to Pune and died a broken man in a temple on Paravati Hill.<ref name="K.RoyIHB"/>


If Holkar had remained in the battlefield, the Maratha defeat would have been delayed but not averted. Ahmad Shah's superiority in pitched battle could've been averted by guerrilla warfare, as advised by ] and ].<ref name="books.google.co.in"/> However it is described as impossible to implement due to the camp followers of Bhau's army, and the general quality of his men. It is also believed that the Afghans would not be susceptible to such tactics, due to the Afghan horses being able to outmaneuver the Marathas in battle. Abdali was in no position to maintain his field army in India indefinitely due to external threats.<ref name="Roy 2004 91"/>
Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. ] was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers, when they caught him performing the last rites of his master Sadashivraobhau and ].<ref name="Pradeep Barua">Pradeep Barua, "Military Developments in India, 1750–1850" Vol. 58, No. 4 (1994), p. 616</ref> The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the predominant military power in India and managed to retake Delhi 10 years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three ], almost 50 years after Panipat.<ref>Jadunath Sarkar ''Fall of the Mughal Empire'' Sangam Books 1992 P 235 ISBN 0861317491</ref>


== Massacres after the battle ==
The Jats under ] benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting. Suraj Mal himself was killed in battle against ] in 1763.<ref>K.R. Qunungo, History of the Jats, Ed. ], Delhi, 2003, pp. 202–205</ref><ref>G.C.Dwivedi, The Jats, Their role in the Mughal Empire, Ed Dr Vir Singh, Delhi, 2003, p. 253</ref> Ahmad Shah's victory left him, in the short term, the undisputed master of North India. However, his alliance quickly unravelled amidst squabbles between his generals and other princes, the increasing restlessness of his soldiers over pay, the increasing Indian heat and arrival of the news that Marathas had organised another 100,000 men in the south to avenge their loss and rescue captured prisoners. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognise ] as Emperor.<ref name=mohsiniInvasions>{{cite web | url=http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/ahmadshah.html| title=Invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali |publisher=afghan-network.net |first=Haroon |last=Mohsini |accessdate=13 August 2007| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20070813210837/http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/ahmadshah.html| archivedate= 13 August 2007 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref>
After the defeat the Marathas fled in all directions, and the Afghans, Mughals, Rohillas and Awadh troops fell upon them and were busy in plundering and slaying soldiers and civilians.<ref>{{cite book |url= https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.149767/page/n115/mode/2up |page=97 |author= Ghosh, D. K. Ed. digitallibraryindia; JaiGyan |title=A Comprehensive History Of India Vol. 9 }}</ref><ref name="jgd" /><ref name="tss" /> Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of ] the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area.<ref name="Rlson" /> They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eyewitness chronicle – the bakhar by ]'s Diwan Casi Raja(Kashi Raja) – about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle.<ref name="jgd" /><ref name="tss" /> According to Hamilton, a reporter of the ], about half a million ] were present there in Panipat town and he gives a figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans.<ref name="jgd" /><ref name="tss" /> ]'s son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat and Abdus Samad Khan's son killed 5,000 near Bahadurgad, to avenge their fathers deaths.<ref name="the University of Michigan"/> Some 22,000 women and children were driven off as slaves.<ref name="Rlson" />


All of the prisoners were transported on ]s, ]s and elephants in bamboo cages.<ref name="Rlson" />
Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal king, an annual tribute of four million rupees.<ref name=mohsiniInvasions/> This was to be Ahmad Shah's final major expedition to North India, as he became increasingly preoccupied with the increasingly successful rebellions by the Sikhs.<ref>MacLeod, John, The History of India, 2002, Greenwood Press</ref>


Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin says:<ref name="Rlson">{{cite book |first=H. G. |last=Rawlinson |title=Cambridge History of India |url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgehistory04raps |volume=IV |page= + note|publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1937 }}</ref>
Shah Shuja was to regret his decision to join the Afghan forces. In time his forces became embroiled in clashes between the orthodox ] Afghans and his own ] followers. He is alleged to have later secretly sent letters to Bhausaheb through his spies regretting his decision to join Abdali.<ref name="Vishwas Patil"/>


{{cquote|The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded... and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves – twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land.}}
After the Battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and ] to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler. However, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the ].<ref>{{cite book |title=Hastings and the Rohilla War |last=Strachey |first=John |authorlink= |coauthors=Sidney James Owen Vol. 8, No. 30|year=1893 |publisher= BR Publishing|location=|isbn=8170480051|page=374 }}</ref><ref>Strachey, p. 380</ref>


== Aftermath ==
Marathas re-captured Delhi and restored their power in North India after ten years of the battle by 1771 under ].
] restored Maratha domination over northern India, within a decade after the war.]]
The bodies of ] and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to their custom.<ref name="Pradeep Barua" /> Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to ].


], uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with a relief force and supplies when he heard of the defeat. He returned to Pune and never recovered from the shock of the debacle at Panipat.<ref name="KaushikRoy" /> According to Kashi Raja Pundit, "It was Balaji Bajirao's love of pleasure which was responsible for Panipat. He delayed at ] celebrating his second marriage until December 27, when it was too late."<ref name = "csp"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Sharma |first1=Suresh K. |title=Haryana: Past and Present |date=2006 |publisher=Mittal Publications |isbn=9788183240468 |page=173 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6n7vV0eiS3YC&q=Balaji+Baji+Rao+married++1760%7C1761&pg=PA173 |access-date=7 March 2019 |language=en}}</ref>
==Legacy==
{{Further|Anglo-Maratha Wars}}
The Third Battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of deaths and injuries in a single day of battle. It was the last major battle between indigenous South Asian military powers until the creation of ] in 1947.


Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. ] was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers.<ref name="Pradeep Barua">{{cite journal |first=Pradeep |last=Barua |title=Military Developments in India, 1750–1850 |volume=58 |issue=4 |pages=599–616 |year=1994 |journal=Journal of Military History |jstor=2944270 |doi=10.2307/2944270 }}</ref> The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the largest empire in the Indian subcontinent and managed to retake Delhi ten years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three ], in the early 19th century.<ref>{{cite book |first=Jadunath |last=Sarkar |author-link=Jadunath Sarkar |title=Fall of the Mughal Empire |publisher=Longmans |year=1950 |page=235}}</ref>
To save their kingdom, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India, but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, ], was accused of being involved in the ] and exiled.


The Jats under ] benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting.<ref>K.R. Qanungo, History of the Jats, Ed Dr Vir Singh, Delhi, 2003, p. 83</ref>
The Marathas' expansion was stopped in the battle, and infighting soon broke out within the empire. They never regained any unity. They recovered their position under the next Peshwa ] and by 1771 were back in control of the north, finally occupying Delhi. However, after the death of Madhavrao, due to infighting and increasing pressure from the British, their claims to empire only officially ended in 1818 after three wars with the British.


These circumstances made Abdali leave India at the earliest. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including ]), to recognise ] as Emperor.<ref name=mohsiniInvasions>{{cite web |url=http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/ahmadshah.html |title=Invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali |publisher=afghan-network.net |first=Haroon |last=Mohsini |access-date=13 August 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070813210837/http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/ahmadshah.html |archive-date=13 August 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Meanwhile the Sikhs—whose rebellion was the original reason Ahmad invaded—were left largely untouched by the battle. They soon retook Lahore. When Ahmad Shah returned in March 1764 he was forced to break off his siege after only two weeks due to a rebellion in ]. He returned again in 1767, but was unable to win any decisive battle. With his own troops complaining about not being paid, he eventually abandoned the district to the ]s, who remained in control until 1849.


]
The Marathi term "Sankrant Kosalali" (सक्रांत कोसळली), meaning "] has befallen us", is said to have originated from the events of the battle.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.geocities.com/lavlesh/landmaratha.html | title = Land Maratha|archiveurl=http://web.archive.org/web/20091027100804/http://www.geocities.com/lavlesh/landmaratha.html|archivedate=27 October 2009}}</ref> There are some verbs in the Marathi language related to this loss as "Panipat zale" (पानिपत झाले) . This verb is even today used in ] language. A common pun is "''Aamchaa Vishwaas Panipataat gela''" (आमचा विश्वास पानीपतात गेला) . Just before death of brave Dattaji Shinde, when asked whether he would still fight, lionheart Dattaji replied "''Bachenge to Aur Bhi Ladenge''" (बचेंगे तो औरभी लडेंगे।) . Many historians, including British historians of the time, have argued that had it not been for the weakening of Maratha power at Panipat, the British might never have gotten a strong foothold in India.{{citation needed|date=March 2014}}

Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal emperor, an annual tribute of four million rupees, which was never actually paid.<ref name=mohsiniInvasions /> This was to be Ahmad Shah's final major expedition to North India, as the losses in the battle left him without the capacity to wage any further war against the Marathas, and as he became increasingly preoccupied with the rise of the Sikhs. Thus, he retreated and never invaded Delhi after that.<ref>{{cite book |last=MacLeod |first=John |title=The History of India |year=2002 |publisher=Greenwood Press}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=April 2017}}

Shah Shuja's forces (including Persian advisers) played a decisive role in collecting intelligence against the Maratha forces and was notorious in ambushing the leading in hundreds of casualties.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220626125059/https://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gazetteer/pager.html?objectid=DS405.1.I34_V02_446.gif |date=26 June 2022 }} ], 1909, v. 2, p.&nbsp;411.</ref>

After the Battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of ] to Nawab ] and of ] and ] to Nawab ]. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler, who restored Delhi to a large extent. However, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the ] of the ].{{citation needed|date=April 2017}} Najib died on 30 October 1770.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220626125059/https://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gazetteer/pager.html?objectid=DS405.1.I34_V02_446.gif |date=26 June 2022 }} ], 1909, v. 2, p. 411.</ref>

To save their kingdom, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, ], was accused of being involved in the ] and exiled.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wYW5J-jQn8QC|title = The Last Mughal: The Fall of Delhi, 1857|isbn = 9781408806883|last1 = Dalrymple|first1 = William|date = 17 August 2009| publisher=A&C Black }}</ref>

The result of the battle was the temporary halting of further Maratha advances in the north and destabilisation of their territories for roughly ten years. This period is marked by the rule of ], who is credited with the revival of Maratha domination following the defeat at Panipat. In 1771, ten years after Panipat, ] led a large Maratha army into northern India in a counter offensive in which he along with others re-established the fallen Maratha supremacy in the area and punished refractory powers that had either sided with the Afghans, such as the Rohillas, or had shaken off Maratha domination after ].<ref name="tss"/> But their success was short-lived. Crippled by Madhavrao's untimely death at the age of 28, infighting ensued among Maratha chiefs soon after, and they were ultimately defeated and annexed by the ] in 1819.<ref>{{cite news| url = https://www.thehindu.com/features/kids/Peshwa-defeated/article14380314.ece| title = The third Maratha War gave the British control of almost all of the country - The Hindu| website = ]| date = 2 June 2016| access-date = 13 June 2019| archive-date = 18 October 2020| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201018013846/https://www.thehindu.com/features/kids/Peshwa-defeated/article14380314.ece| url-status = live}}</ref>

== Legacy ==
{{Further|First Anglo-Maratha War|Second Anglo-Maratha War|Third Anglo-Maratha War}}
The valour displayed by the Marathas was extolled by Ahmad Shah Abdali in his letter to his ally, ], the king of ].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/uday-mahurkar-on-lost-marathas-of-third-battle-of-panipat-and-rod-community/1/168513.html |title=The lost Marathas of third battle of Panipat |work=India Today |date=12 January 2012 |access-date=5 April 2017 |archive-date=11 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170511123702/http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/uday-mahurkar-on-lost-marathas-of-third-battle-of-panipat-and-rod-community/1/168513.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Sardesai|first=Govind Sakharam|url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57070|title=New History Of The Marathas Vol 2|date=1946|pages=}}</ref>

{{cquote|The Marathas fought with the greatest valour which was beyond the capacity of other races... These dauntless blood-shedders did not fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds.... Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow... and the wretched Deccanis suffered defeat.
}}


The battle proved the inspiration for ]'s poem "With Scindia to Delhi". The battle was referred to in ]'s poem "With Scindia to Delhi".


"Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair, <br> {{cquote|Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair, <br />
When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ] , <br> When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ], <br />
Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there." Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there.}}


It is, however, also remembered as a scene of valour on both sides. Santaji Wagh's corpse was found with over 40 mortal wounds. The bravery of Vishwas Rao, the Peshwa's son, was acknowledged even by the Afghans.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.panipatrefinery.net/left.asp?mSection=General | title = Walking the streets of Panipat | last = Rao | first = S | publisher = Indian Oil News | accessdate = 8 April 2008 | archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20080428055719/http://www.panipatrefinery.net/left.asp?mSection=General| archivedate= 28 April 2008 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> Yashwantrao Pawar also fought with great courage, killing many Afghans. It is, however, also remembered as a scene of valour on both sides. Atai Khan, the adopted son of the Wazir Shah Wali Khan, was said to have been killed during this time when Yeshwantrao Pawar climbed atop his elephant and struck him down.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.historyfiles.co.uk/FeaturesFarEast/India_Modern_Peshwas04.htm |title=India_Modern_Peshwas04 |access-date=24 November 2019 |archive-date=8 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210208100935/https://www.historyfiles.co.uk/FeaturesFarEast/India_Modern_Peshwas04.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Santaji Wagh's corpse was found with over 40 mortal wounds.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.panipatrefinery.net/left.asp?mSection=General |title=Walking the streets of Panipat |last=Rao |first=S |publisher=Indian Oil News |access-date=8 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080428055719/http://www.panipatrefinery.net/left.asp?mSection=General |archive-date=28 April 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref>


==In popular culture==
Afghan military prowess was to inspire hope in many orthodox Muslims and Mughal royalists and fear in the British.
*Bengali poet ] wrote a long poem ''Mahashmashan'' based on this battle.
*Bengali playwright ]’s play ''Roktakto Prantor'' (1959) is based on the Third Battle of Panipat.
*''Panipat'', a 2005 novel in ] by Indian writer ] is about this battle.<ref>{{cite book |title=Panipata |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57710656 |via=] |publisher=Navabhārata Sāhitya Mandira|oclc=57710656 }}</ref>
*The 2019 Indian film '']'', directed by director ], starring ], ] and ] is based on the Third Battle of Panipat with several major historical inaccuracies.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tewari |first=Saagar |date=2019-12-07 |title=A Historian's Perspective: 'Panipat - The Great Betrayal' Indeed! |url=https://www.thequint.com/entertainment/bollywood/panipat-the-great-betrayal-film-historical-inaccuracies-arjun-kapoor-sanjay-dutt-kriti-sanon |access-date=2022-04-16 |website=TheQuint |language=en |archive-date=10 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810145048/https://www.thequint.com/entertainment/bollywood/panipat-the-great-betrayal-film-historical-inaccuracies-arjun-kapoor-sanjay-dutt-kriti-sanon |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Panipat - Official Trailer |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpXnmy-6w1g | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211030/zpXnmy-6w1g| archive-date=2021-10-30|publisher=] |date=Nov 5, 2019}}{{cbignore}}</ref>


==See also== == See also ==
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ]


==References== == References ==
{{reflist}} {{Reflist|30em}}
<ref name="thebaluch.com"/>


==Further reading== == Further reading ==
* H. G. Rawlinson, ''An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat and of the Events Leading To It,'' Hesperides Press (2006) {{ISBN|978-1-4067-2625-1}}
* Retrieved 24 May 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
* ], ''Panipat 1761'' Deccan College Monograph Series. I., Pune (1946) * ], ''Panipat''&nbsp;– a novel based on the 3rd battle of Panipat, Venus (1990)
* H. G. Rawlinson, ''An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat and of the Events Leading To It,'' Hesperides Press (2006) ISBN 978-1406726251 * Uday S. Kulkarni, 'Solstice at Panipat 14 January 1761' Mula-Mutha Publishers, Pune (2011). {{ISBN|978-81-921080-0-1}}
* Third Battle of Panipat by Abhas Verma {{ISBN|9788180903397}} Bharatiya Kala Prakashana
* ], ''Panipat"&nbsp;– a novel based on the 3rd battle of Panipat, Venus (1990)
* Uday S. Kulkarni, A Non Fiction book - 'Solstice at Panipat - 14 January 1761' Mula-Mutha Publishers, Pune (2011). ISBN 978-81-921080-0-1 An Authentic Account of the Campaign of Panipat.
* Third Battle of Panipat by Abhas Verma ISBN 9788180903397 Bharatiya Kala Prakashana


==External links== == External links ==
{{Sister project links|Battle of Panipat (1761)}} {{Sister project links|Battle of Panipat (1761)}}
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== Notes ==
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Latest revision as of 06:12, 21 November 2024

1761 battle between the Durrani empire and Marathas

Third Battle of Panipat
Part of Indian Campaign of Ahmad Shah Durrani and the Afghan–Maratha War

c. 1770 Faizabad-style painting of the Third Battle of Panipat; the centre of the image is dominated by the twin arcs of the lines of guns firing at each other with smoke and destruction in between.
Date14 January 1761
LocationPanipat (present-day Haryana, India)29°23′N 76°58′E / 29.39°N 76.97°E / 29.39; 76.97
Result Durrani victory
Belligerents
Durrani Empire
Supported by:
Kingdom of Rohilkhand
Khanate of Kalat
Kingdom of Awadh
Amb State
Sind State
Mughal nobles
Commanders and leaders
Ahmad Shah Durrani
(Shah of the Durrani Empire)
Afghan officers:
Rohilla, Kalat, Awadh, Amb, Sindh and Mughal officers:
Sadashiv Rao Bhau 
(Amatya of the Maratha Confederacy)
Maratha officers:
Strength
42,000 Afghan cavalry, of which 28,000 was regular cavalry
32,000 Rohilla infantry 2,000 Zamburak (camel gun)
55,000 Maratha cavalry, of which 11,000 was regular cavalry
9,000 Gardi infantry
200,000 non-combatants (pilgrims and camp-followers)
Casualties and losses
15,000 Rohillas killed and wounded
5,000 Afghans killed and wounded
30,000 killed in battle
10,000 killed while retreating
10,000 missing
50,000 non-combatants executed following the battle
9,000 in revenge killings following the battle
Estimated 22,000 enslaved
Indian campaign of Ahmad Shah Durrani
Campaigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani

The Third Battle of Panipat took place on 14 January 1761 between the Maratha Confederacy and the invading army of the Durrani Empire. The battle took place in and around the city of Panipat, approximately 97 kilometres (60 mi) north of Delhi. The Afghans were supported by three key allies in India: Najib ad-Dawlah who persuaded the support of the Rohilla chiefs, elements of the declining Mughal Empire, and most prized the Oudh State under Shuja-ud-Daula. The Maratha army was led by Sadashivrao Bhau, who was third-highest authority of the Maratha Confederacy after the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa. The bulk of the Maratha army was stationed in the Deccan Plateau with the Peshwa.

Militarily, the battle pitted the artillery, musketry, and cavalry of the Marathas against the heavy cavalry, musketry (jezail) and mounted artillery (zamburak) of the Afghans and the Rohillas led by Abdali and Najib ad-Dawlah. The battle is considered to have been one of the largest and most eventful fought in the 18th century, and it had perhaps the largest number of fatalities in a single day reported in a classic formation battle between two armies.

The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 troops; protracted skirmishes occurred, with losses and gains on both sides. The Afghan army ultimately emerged victorious from the battle after successfully destroying several Maratha flanks. The extent of the losses on both sides is heavily disputed by historians, but it is believed that between 60,000 and 70,000 troops were killed in the fighting, while the numbers of injured and prisoners taken vary considerably. According to the single-best eyewitness chronicle—the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raja—about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were collectively slaughtered on the day after the battle. British historian Grant Duff includes an interview of a survivor of these massacres in his History of the Marathas and generally corroborates this number. Shejwalkar, whose monograph Panipat 1761 is often regarded as the single-best secondary source on the battle, says that "not less than 100,000 Marathas (soldiers and non-combatants) perished during and after the battle".

Background

Decline of the Mughal Empire

Main article: Decline of the Mughal Empire
Extent of the Maratha Confederacy, 1760

The 27-year Mughal-Maratha war (1680–1707) led to rapid territorial loss of the Maratha Empire to the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. However, after his death in 1707, this process reversed following the Mughal succession war between the sons of Aurangzeb. By 1712, Marathas quickly started retaking their lost lands. Under Peshwa Baji Rao, Gujarat, Malwa and Rajputana came under Maratha control. Finally, in 1737, Baji Rao defeated the Mughals on the outskirts of Delhi and brought much of the former Mughal territories in the south of Agra under Maratha control. Baji Rao's son Balaji Baji Rao further increased the territory under Maratha control by invading Punjab in 1758.

Raghunathrao's letter to the Peshwa, 4 May 1758.

Lahore, Multan and other subahs on eastern side of Attock are under our rule for the most part, and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Shah Durrani's son Timur Shah Durrani and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops... So Ahmad Shah Durrani has returned to Kandahar with some 12–14 thousand broken troops.. Thus all have risen against Ahmad who has lost control over the region. We have decided to extend our rule up to Kandahar.

This brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the Durrani empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali (also known as Ahmad Shah Durrani). In 1759, he raised an army the core of which was from the Qizilbash, and recruited other troops such as the Pashtun tribes, Kurds, and Uzbeks. and made several gains against the smaller Maratha garrisons in Punjab. He then joined his Indian allies—the Rohillas of the Gangetic Doab, the Muslims of Northern India, and Shuja-ud-Daula—forming a broad coalition against the Marathas.

To counter this, Raghunathrao was supposed to go north to handle the situation. Raghunathrao asked for large number of an army soldiers, which was denied by Sadashivrao Bhau, his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa. Therefore, he declined to go. Sadashivrao Bhau was instead made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought.

The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of between 45,000 and 60,000, which was accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants, a number of whom were pilgrims desirous of making pilgrimages to Hindu holy sites in northern India. The Marathas started their northward journey from Patdur on 14 March 1760. Both sides tried to get the Nawab of Awadh, Shuja-ud-Daulah, into their camp. By late July Shuja-ud-Daulah made the decision to join the Afghan-Rohilla coalition, preferring to join what was perceived as the "army of Islam". This was strategically a major loss for the Marathas, since Shuja provided much-needed finances for the long Afghan stay in North India. It is doubtful whether the Afghan-Rohilla coalition would have the means to continue their conflict with the Marathas without Shuja's support.

Rise of the Marathas

Grant Duff, describing the Maratha army:

The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broadcloths, were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a distance... Vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses, magnificently caparisoned ... seemed to be collected from every quarter ... it was an imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the Mughuls in the zenith of their glory.

The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of India in the intervening period (1712–1757). In 1758 they nominally occupied Delhi, captured Lahore and drove out Timur Shah Durrani, the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended north of the Sindhu river all the way down south to northern Kerala. This territory was ruled through the Peshwa, who talked of placing his son Vishwasrao on the Mughal throne. However, Delhi still remained under the control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergies in India were frightened at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat. The Marathas attempted to turn over the support of the Gujarati Muslim Babis, the Indian Rohillas, Nizam brothers of the Deccan, and Shuja-ud-Dawlah.

Sadashivrao Bhau

Prelude

Ahmad Shah Durrani (Ahmad Shah Abdali), angered by the news from his son and his allies, was unwilling to allow the Marathas' spread go unchecked. By the end of 1759 Abdali with his Qizilbash and the Afghan tribes, had reached Lahore as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons, and was joined by the Muslims of Northern India, the Rohillas, and Shuja-ud-Daula. Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to Anupshahr, on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the Nawab of Oudh Shuja-ud-Daula to join his alliance against the Marathas. The Marathas had earlier helped Safdarjung (father of Shuja) in defeating Rohillas in Farrukhabad.

The Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau responded to the news of the Afghans' return to North India by raising an army, and they marched North. Bhau's force was bolstered by some Maratha forces under Holkar, Scindia, Gaikwad and Govind Pant Bundele. Suraj Mal (the Jat ruler of Bharatpur) also had joined Bhausaheb initially. This combined army captured the Mughal capital, Delhi, from an Afghan garrison in December 1759. Delhi had been reduced to ashes many times due to previous invasions, and in addition there being acute shortage of supplies in the Maratha camp. Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city. He is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, on the Delhi throne. The Jats withdrew their support from the Marathas. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in its result. The first blood was drawn when the leader of the Rohillas, an Indian Muslim named Qutb Khan, attacked a small Maratha army led by Dattaji Shinde at Burari Ghat. Dattaji camped at the Buradi Fort, south of Panipat, deciding to only engage with Abdali with the aid of Malharao Holkar. He was beheaded and killed in an attack by Qutb Khan.

Suraj Mal's advice to Sadashiv Rao Bhau

Before Battle of Panipat a war council was formed by Maratha commander-in-chief Sadashiv Rao Bhau in which Maharaja Suraj Mal was invited to give advice for war strategy against Abdali.

Jat chief Surajmal provided following advice :

  • Women, children, old people, families of soldier and non combatants should either be left on the other side of Chambal in Maratha's stronghold of Jhansi and Gwalior or in protection of Suraj Mal’s one of 4 forts in Jat strongholds.
  • Large baggage and heavy artillery should not be taken as they will slow down Maratha movement in the battlefield against Durrani’s forces.
  • If Marathas find themselves on losing ground then a quick moving force will be able to move backwards in friendly country easily and Abdali will not be keen on crossing Chambal.
  • Road for supply lines should be kept open so that Maratha army will not face problems in getting supplies during war
  • One division of the Maratha army should be sent to Lahore and other to the east to destroy the supply lines so that Abdali will not be able to secure supplies from his allies for his army.
  • A light cavalry guerrilla warfare will be suggested instead of conventional face-to-face warfare as Durrani will not be able to sustain a long warfare and when Monsoon will come both sides will find forces moving much slower, Durrani will be in much more disadvantage without supplies compared to Marathas and this will force Abdali to move back to his country.

Many of the Maratha generals found it good strategy as they themselves prefer guerrilla warfare but Sadashiv Rao Bhau found it dishonourable for a king and took this as result of Maratha general's old age and Suraj Mal's foolishness.

Portrait of Ahmad Shah Durrani

Skirmishes before the battle

Afghan defeat at Kunjpura

Main article: Battle of Kunjpura

With both sides poised for battle, maneuvering followed, with skirmishes between the two armies fought around Karnal and Kunjpura. Abdus Samad Khan, the faujdar of Sirhind, had come to Kunjpura, on the banks of the Yamuna river 60 miles to the north of Delhi with a force of more than ten thousand and supplies for the Afghan force. Kunjpura was stormed by the Marathas who was running short of supplies. Aided by the musketeers under Ibrahim Gardi, the Marathas achieved a rather easy victory at Kunjpura against an army of around 15,000 Afghans posted there. Some of Abdali's best generals like Najabat Khan were killed. Abdus Samad Khan the faujdar of Sirhind was also killed during the battle. Qutab shah who was responsible for beheading Dattaji Shinde at the battle of Barari ghat was executed by the Marathas after their capture of Kunjpura. Ahmad Shah was encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains, and was powerless to aid the garrison. The whole Afghan garrison was killed or enslaved. The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated Abdali to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.

Afghans cross Yamuna and the Battles of Samalkha and Meerut

Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from Shahdara, marching south. Taking a calculated risk, Abdali plunged into the river, followed by his bodyguards and troops. Between 23 and 25 October they were able to cross at Baghpat(a small town about 24 miles up the river), unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura and visit to nearby Kurukshetra; an important Hindu pilgrimage destination.

After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces from crossing the Yamuna River, they set up defensive works in the ground near Panipat, thereby blocking his access back to Afghanistan, just as Abdali's forces blocked theirs to the south. However, on the afternoon of 26 October, Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Samalkha, about halfway between Sonepat and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Marathas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost 1000 men but drove the Marathas back to their main body, which kept retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, Govind Pant Bundele, with 10,000 light cavalry who weren't formally trained soldiers, was on a foraging mission with about 500 men. They were surprised by an Afghan force near Meerut, and in the ensuing fight, Bundele was killed. This was followed by the loss of a contingent of 2,000 Maratha soldiers who had left Delhi to deliver money and rations to Panipat. This completed the encirclement, as Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha army's supply lines.

With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions started rising in the Maratha camp. Initially the Marathas had moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range, French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the time. The Marathas' plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.

Preliminary moves

During the next two months of the siege, constant skirmishes and duels took place between units from the two sides. In one of these Najib lost 3,000 of his Rohillas and was nearly killed himself. Facing a potential stalemate, Abdali decided to seek terms, which Bhau was willing to consider. However, Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on religious grounds and sowed doubt about whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.

After the Marathas moved from Kunjpura to Panipat, Diler Khan Marwat, with his father Alam Khan Marwat and a force of 2500 Pashtuns, attacked and took control of Kunjpura, where there was a Maratha garrison of 700–800 soldiers. At that time Atai Khan Baluch, son of the Shah Wali Khan, the Wazir of Abdali, came from Afghanistan with 10,000 cavalry and cut off the supplies to the Marathas. The Marathas at Panipat were surrounded by Abdali in the south, Pashtun tribes (Yousufzai, Afridi, Khattak) in the east, Shuja, Atai Khan and others in the north and other Pashtun tribes (Gandapur, Marwat, Durranis and Kakars) in the west. Unable to continue without supplies or wait for reinforcements from Pune any longer, Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.

Formations

Plan of the Third Battle of Panipat based on Kashiraj Pandit's memoirs
Plan of the Third Battle of Panipat based on Kashi raja (Casi Raja) Pandit's account

With the Maratha chiefs pressurizing Sadashivrao Bhau, to go to battle rather than perish by starvation, on 13 January, the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00 a.m.

The Maratha lines began a little to the north of Kala Amb. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time were blocked from heading south—in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies—by those same troops. Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the royal guard (Huzurat), was in the centre. The left wing consisted of the Gardis under Ibrahim Khan. Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.

The Maratha line was formed up some 12 km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the civilians. Many were ordinary men, women and children on their pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young, inexperienced soldiers.

On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, a few metres to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib and their right by two brigades of troops. Their left centre was led by two Viziers, Shuja-ud-daulah with 3,000 soldiers and 50–60 cannons and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen. The right centre consisted of 15,000 Rohillas under Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry. Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.

Battle

Early phases

Balaji Rao's troops under the command of his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau fighting at Panipat

Before dawn on 14 January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with sugared water in the camp and prepared for combat. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2 km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire.

The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack by Najib Khan's Rohillas was broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas.

In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and the Afghan soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success and the ferocity of the charge, the attack did not attain complete success as many of the half-starved Maratha mounts were exhausted. Also, there were no heavy armoured cavalry units for the Marathas to maintain these openings. In order to turn about the deserting Afghan troopers, Abdali deployed his Nascibchi musketeers to gun down the deserters who finally stopped and returned to the field.

Final phase

Ahmad Shah Durrani in battle

The Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib. Najib successfully fought a defensive action, however, keeping Scindia's forces at bay. By noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the centre was cut in two and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and 2,000 swivel-mounted shutarnaals or Ushtranaal—cannons—on the backs of camels.

The shutarnaals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry, at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. Abdali therefore, sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to punish the front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhau in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizier in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00 hrs. By 16:00 hrs, the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.

Outflanked

Sadashivrao Bhau wounded in battle

Sadashiv Rao Bhau who had not kept any reserves, seeing his forward lines dwindling, civilians behind and upon seeing Vishwasrao disappear in the midst of the fighting, felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle.

Taking advantage of this, the Afghan soldiers who had been captured by the Marathas earlier during the Siege of Kunjpura revolted. The prisoners unwrapped their green belts and wore them as turbans to impersonate the troops of the Durrani Empire and began attacking from within. This brought confusion and great consternation to the Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from the rear. Some Maratha troops in the vanguard, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant and the chaos ensuing in the rear, panicked and scattered in disarray towards the rear.

Abdali had given a part of his army the task of surrounding and killing the Gardis, who were at the leftmost part of the Maratha army. Bhausaheb had ordered Vitthal Vinchurkar (with 1500 cavalry) and Damaji Gaikwad (with 2500 cavalry) to protect the Gardis. However, after seeing the Gardis having no clearing for directing their cannon fire at the enemy troops, they lost their patience and decided to fight the Rohillas themselves. Thus, they broke their position and went all out on the Rohillas. The Rohilla riflemen started accurately firing at the Maratha cavalry, which was equipped only with swords. This gave the Rohillas the opportunity to encircle the Gardis and outflank the Maratha centre while Shah Wali pressed on attacking the front. Thus the Gardis were left defenseless and started falling one by one.

Vishwasrao had already been killed by a shot to the head. Bhau and the Huzurati royal forces fought till the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. At this stage, the Holkar and Scindia contingents, realising the battle was lost, merged their forces with one contingent breaking from the Maratha right flank and escaped from the opening in the Durrani lines southwards as Jankoji Rao Scindia lead the other contingent to reinforce the thinning lines of Marathas. The Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sunset. Choosing not to launch a night attack, many Maratha troops escaped that night. Bhau's wife Parvatibai, who was assisting in the administration of the Maratha camp, escaped to Pune with her bodyguard, Janu Bhintada along with Nana Fadnavis under the protection of Malhar Rao Holkar's contingent. Some 15,000 soldiers managed to reach Gwalior.

Reasons for the outcome

Durrani had both numeric as well as qualitative superiority over Marathas. The combined Afghan army was much larger than that of Marathas. Though the infantry of Marathas was organized along European lines and their army had some of the best French-made guns of the time, their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast-moving Afghan forces. The heavy mounted artillery of Afghans proved much better in the battlefield than the light artillery of Marathas. None of the other Hindu kings joined forces to fight Abdali. Allies of Abdali, namely, Najib, Shuja and the Rohillas knew North India very well. He was also diplomatic, striking agreements with Hindu leaders, especially the Jats and Rajputs, and former rivals like the Nawab of Awadh, appealing to him in the name of religion.

Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy. Some of them did not support the idea of a pitched battle and wanted to fight using guerrilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on. The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was 1000 miles away from their capital Pune.

Raghunathrao was supposed to go north to reinforce the army. Raghunathrao asked for large amount of wealth and troops, which was denied by Sadashivrao Bhau, his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa, so he declined to go. Sadashivrao Bhau was there upon made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought. Some historians have opined, that Peshwa's decision to appoint Sadashivrao Bhau as the Supreme Commander instead of Malharrao Holkar or Raghunathrao proved to be an unfortunate one, as Sadashivrao was totally ignorant of the political and military situation in North India.

If Holkar had remained in the battlefield, the Maratha defeat would have been delayed but not averted. Ahmad Shah's superiority in pitched battle could've been averted by guerrilla warfare, as advised by Malharrao Holkar and Suraj Mal. However it is described as impossible to implement due to the camp followers of Bhau's army, and the general quality of his men. It is also believed that the Afghans would not be susceptible to such tactics, due to the Afghan horses being able to outmaneuver the Marathas in battle. Abdali was in no position to maintain his field army in India indefinitely due to external threats.

Massacres after the battle

After the defeat the Marathas fled in all directions, and the Afghans, Mughals, Rohillas and Awadh troops fell upon them and were busy in plundering and slaying soldiers and civilians. Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of Marathas the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area. They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eyewitness chronicle – the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Casi Raja(Kashi Raja) – about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle. According to Hamilton, a reporter of the Bombay Gazette, about half a million Marathi people were present there in Panipat town and he gives a figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans. Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat and Abdus Samad Khan's son killed 5,000 near Bahadurgad, to avenge their fathers deaths. Some 22,000 women and children were driven off as slaves.

All of the prisoners were transported on bullock carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.

Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin says:

The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded... and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves – twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land.

Aftermath

Mahadaji Shinde restored Maratha domination over northern India, within a decade after the war.

The bodies of Vishwasrao and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to their custom. Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to Pune.

Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with a relief force and supplies when he heard of the defeat. He returned to Pune and never recovered from the shock of the debacle at Panipat. According to Kashi Raja Pundit, "It was Balaji Bajirao's love of pleasure which was responsible for Panipat. He delayed at Paithan celebrating his second marriage until December 27, when it was too late."

Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. Ibrahim Khan Gardi was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers. The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the largest empire in the Indian subcontinent and managed to retake Delhi ten years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three Anglo-Maratha Wars, in the early 19th century.

The Jats under Suraj Mal benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting.

These circumstances made Abdali leave India at the earliest. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognise Shah Alam II as Emperor.

Map of India in 1765

Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal emperor, an annual tribute of four million rupees, which was never actually paid. This was to be Ahmad Shah's final major expedition to North India, as the losses in the battle left him without the capacity to wage any further war against the Marathas, and as he became increasingly preoccupied with the rise of the Sikhs. Thus, he retreated and never invaded Delhi after that.

Shah Shuja's forces (including Persian advisers) played a decisive role in collecting intelligence against the Maratha forces and was notorious in ambushing the leading in hundreds of casualties.

After the Battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and Firozabad to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler, who restored Delhi to a large extent. However, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the forces of the British East India Company. Najib died on 30 October 1770.

To save their kingdom, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, Bahadur Shah II, was accused of being involved in the Indian Rebellion and exiled.

The result of the battle was the temporary halting of further Maratha advances in the north and destabilisation of their territories for roughly ten years. This period is marked by the rule of Peshwa Madhavrao, who is credited with the revival of Maratha domination following the defeat at Panipat. In 1771, ten years after Panipat, Mahadji Shinde led a large Maratha army into northern India in a counter offensive in which he along with others re-established the fallen Maratha supremacy in the area and punished refractory powers that had either sided with the Afghans, such as the Rohillas, or had shaken off Maratha domination after Panipat. But their success was short-lived. Crippled by Madhavrao's untimely death at the age of 28, infighting ensued among Maratha chiefs soon after, and they were ultimately defeated and annexed by the British East India Company administration in 1819.

Legacy

Further information: First Anglo-Maratha War, Second Anglo-Maratha War, and Third Anglo-Maratha War

The valour displayed by the Marathas was extolled by Ahmad Shah Abdali in his letter to his ally, Madho Singh, the king of Jaipur.

The Marathas fought with the greatest valour which was beyond the capacity of other races... These dauntless blood-shedders did not fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds.... Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow... and the wretched Deccanis suffered defeat.

The battle was referred to in Rudyard Kipling's poem "With Scindia to Delhi".

Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair,

When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ~Mlech~,

Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there.

It is, however, also remembered as a scene of valour on both sides. Atai Khan, the adopted son of the Wazir Shah Wali Khan, was said to have been killed during this time when Yeshwantrao Pawar climbed atop his elephant and struck him down. Santaji Wagh's corpse was found with over 40 mortal wounds.

In popular culture

See also

References

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Further reading

  • H. G. Rawlinson, An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat and of the Events Leading To It, Hesperides Press (2006) ISBN 978-1-4067-2625-1
  • Vishwas Patil, Panipat – a novel based on the 3rd battle of Panipat, Venus (1990)
  • Uday S. Kulkarni, – 'Solstice at Panipat – 14 January 1761' Mula-Mutha Publishers, Pune (2011). ISBN 978-81-921080-0-1
  • Third Battle of Panipat by Abhas Verma ISBN 9788180903397 Bharatiya Kala Prakashana

External links

Links to related articles
Durrani dynasty (1747–1842)
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Notes

  1. Afghani: د پاني پت درېيمه جګړه
    Marathi: पानिपतची तिसरी लढाई
    Persian: سومین نبرد پانی پت
    Sanskrit: पाणिपेतस्य तृतीयं युद्धम्
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