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Politics of North Korea
Constitution Juche  (state ideology) Songun  ("military-first" policy) Eternal leaders Kim Il Sung Kim Jong Il
Workers' Party of Korea Congress (8th) General Secretary and Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Personal Secretariat Rules Central Committee (8th) Politburo (8th) Presidium (8th) Kim Jong Un Choe Ryong-hae Jo Yong-won Kim Tok-hun Ri Pyong-chol Secretariat (8th) Central Military Commission (8th) Chairman Kim Jong Un Vice Chairman Ri Yong-gil Ri Pyong-chol Central Auditing Commission (8th) Chairman Kim Jae-ryong Organization and Guidance Department Propaganda and Agitation Department United Front Department
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Officially, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) – the ruling party of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) – is a communist party guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, a synthesis of the ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The party is committed to Juche, an ideology attributed to Kim Il Sung which promotes national independence and development through the efforts of the masses. Although Juche was originally presented as the Korean interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, the party now presents it as a freestanding philosophy of Kim Il Sung. The WPK recognizes the ruling Kim family as the ultimate source of its political thought. The fourth party conference, held in 2012, amended the party rules to state that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism was "the only guiding idea of the party". Under Kim Jong Il, who governed as chairman of the National Defence Commission, communism was steadily removed from party and state documents in favour of Songun, or military-first politics. The military, rather than the working class, was established as the base of political power. However, Kim Jong Il's successor Kim Jong Un reversed this position in 2021, replacing Songun with "people-first politics" as the party's political method and reasserting the party's commitment to communism.

The WPK maintains a leftist image, and normally sends a delegation to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, where it has some support. The WPK's party rules say it upholds "the revolutionary principles of Marxism–Leninism". However, a number of scholars argue that the WPK's ideology is better characterized as nationalist or far-right.

Juche

Relationship to Marxism–Leninism

Although the term "Juche" was first used in Kim Il Sung's speech (given in 1955), "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work", Juche as a coherent ideology did not develop until the 1960s. Similar to Stalinism, it led to the development of an unofficial (later formalized) ideological system defending the central party leadership. Until about 1972, Juche was called a "creative application" of Marxism–Leninism and "the Marxism–Leninism of today", and Kim Il Sung was hailed as "the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our time". However, by 1976 Juche had become a separate ideology; Kim Jong Il called it "a unique ideology, the contents and structures which cannot simply be described as Marxist–Leninist."

At the 5th Congress, Juche was elevated to the same level as Marxism–Leninism. It gained in prominence during the 1970s, and at the 6th Congress in 1980 it was recognized as the WPK's only ideology. During the following decade, Juche transformed from practical to pure ideology. On the Juche Idea, the primary text on Juche, was published in Kim Jong Il's name in 1982. Juche is, according to this study, inexorably linked with Kim Il Sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean Revolution ... we are confronted with the honourable task of modelling the whole society on the Juche idea". In the work, Kim Jong Il says that Juche is not simply a creative application of Marxism–Leninism but "a new era in the development of human history". The WPK's break with basic Marxist–Leninist premises is spelt out clearly in the article, "Let Us March Under the Banner of Marxism–Leninism and the Juche Idea".

Despite Juche's conception as a creative application of Marxism and Leninism, some scholars argue it has little direct connection to them. Policies may be explained without a Marxist or Leninist rationale, making the identification of specific influences from these ideologies difficult. Some analysts say it is easier to connect Juche with nationalism, but not a unique form of nationalism. Although the WPK claims to be socialist-patriotic, some analysts state its socialist patriotism would be more similar to bourgeois nationalism; the chief difference is that socialist patriotism is nationalism in a socialist state. Juche developed as a reaction to foreign occupation, involvement and influence (primarily by the Chinese and Soviets) in North Korean affairs, and may be described "as a normal and healthy reaction of the Korean people to the deprivation they suffered under foreign domination." However, there is nothing uniquely Marxist or Leninist in this reaction; the primary reason for its description as "communist" is that it occurred in a self-proclaimed socialist state. The WPK (and the North Korean leadership in general) have not explained in detail how their policies are Marxist, Leninist or communist; Juche is defined as "Korean", and the others as "foreign".

Basic tenets

You requested me to give a detailed explanation of the Juche idea. But there is no end to it. All the policies and lines of our party emanate from the Juche idea and they embody this idea.

Juche's primary objective for North Korea is political, economic and military independence. Kim Il Sung, in his "Let Us Defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-reliance, and Self-defense More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities" speech to the Supreme People's Assembly in 1967, summarized Juche:

The government of the republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defence to consolidate the political independence of the country (chaju), build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip) and increasing the country's defence capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force (chawi), by splendidly embodying our Party's idea of Juche in all fields."

The principle of political independence known as chaju is one of Juche's central tenets. Juche stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, asserting that every state has the right to self-determination. In practice, the beliefs in self-determination and equal sovereignty have turned North Korea into a perceived "hermit kingdom". As interpreted by the WPK, yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate chaju and threaten the country's ability to defend its sovereignty. This may explain why Kim Jong Il believed that the Korean revolution would fail if North Korea became dependent on a foreign entity. In relations with fellow socialist countries China and the Soviet Union Kim Il Sung urged cooperation, mutual support and dependence, acknowledging that it was important for North Korea to learn from other countries. Despite this, he abhorred the idea that North Korea could (or should) depend on the two nations and did not want to dogmatically follow their example. Kim Il Sung said that the WPK needed to "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing the success of North Korea on the WPK's independence in implementing policies. To ensure North Korean independence, official pronouncements stressed the need for the people to unite under the WPK and the Great Leader.

Economic independence (charip) is seen as the material basis of chaju. One of Kim Il Sung's greatest fears involved North Korean dependence on foreign aid; he believed it would threaten the country's ability to develop socialism, which only a state with a strong, independent economy could do. Charip emphasizes an independent national economy based on heavy industry; this sector, in theory, would then drive the rest of the economy. Kim Jong Il said:

Building an independent national economy means building an economy which is free from dependence on others and which stands on its own feet, an economy which serves one's own people and develops on the strength of the resources of one's own country and by the efforts of one's people.

Kim Il Sung considered military independence (chawi) crucial. Acknowledging that North Korea might need military support in a war against imperialist enemies, he emphasized a domestic response and summed up the party's (and state's) attitude towards military confrontation: "We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists."

According to Juche, because of his consciousness man has ultimate control over himself and the ability to change the world. This differs from classical Marxism, which believes that humans depend on their relationship to the means of production more than on themselves. The Juche view of a revolution led by a Great Leader, rather than a group of knowledgeable revolutionaries, is a break from Lenin's concept of a vanguard party.

Songun

Songun (선군정치; Sŏn'gun chŏngch'i; lit. military-first politics) was first mentioned on 7 April 1997 in Rodong Sinmun under the headline "There Is a Victory for Socialism in the Guns and Bombs of the People's Army" (인민군대의 총창우에 사회주의의 승리가 있다). Its description in the article echoed the military-centered thinking of the time: " the revolutionary philosophy to safeguard our own style of socialism under any circumstances". The concept was credited to Kim Jong Il, who posited that Songun was the next stage of development of Juche.

A joint editorial entitled "Our Party's Military-First Politics Will Inevitably Achieve Victory and Will Never Be Defeated" (우리 당의 선군정치는 필승불패이다) was published by Kulloja and Rodong Sinmun (the WPK's theoretical magazine and newspaper, respectively) on 16 June 1999. In it, it was stated that Songun meant "the leadership method under the principle of giving priority to the military and resolving the problems that may occur in the course of revolution and construction as well as establishing the military as the main body of the revolution in the course of achieving the total tasks of socialism". While the article often referred to "our Party", this was not a reference to the WPK but rather to the personal leadership of Kim Jong Il.

The National Defence Commission, the highest military body, was designated the supreme body of the state by a 1998 revision of the North Korean Constitution. The Songun era is considered to have begun with this revision.

In late 2021, Kim Jong Un declared that the "military-first" politics of Songun would be replaced by "people-first politics" (인민대중제일주의) guided by himself.

Suryong

Suryong (수령형상창조; Suryŏng hyŏngsang ch'angjo; lit. creation of the lead figure) is a revolutionary theory concerning the relationship between leadership and society. Unlike Marxism–Leninism, which considers developments in the material conditions of production and exchange as the driving force of historical progress (known as historical materialism), Juche considers human beings in general the driving force in history. It is summarized as "the popular masses are placed in the center of everything, and the leader is the center of the masses". Juche, North Korea maintains, is a "man-centered ideology" in which "man is the master of everything and decides everything". In contrast to Marxism–Leninism, in which a people's decisions are conditioned by their relations to the means of production, Juche argues that people's decisions take consideration of, but are independent from, external factors. Just like Marxism–Leninism, Juche believes history is law-governed, but that it is only man who drives progress, stating that "the popular masses are the drivers of history". The process for the masses to reach consciousness, independence, and creativity requires the "leadership of a great leader". Marxism–Leninism argues that the popular masses will lead (on the basis of their relation to production), but in North Korea the role of a correct leadership is required to organize a unified and effective group. South Korean political scientist Lee Kyo-duk argues that Suryong helped Kim Il Sung establish a unitary system over North Korea.

The theory says the leader has a decisive role as an absolute supreme leader. The leader is like the brain of the working class, who is the driving force of revolution. The leader is also a flawless human being who never commits mistakes, who guides the masses. The popular masses are the driving force of history, but they require the guidance of the party leadership.

Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism

Kimilsungism (김일성주의) and the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System were formally introduced by Kim Jong Il in 1974. Kim Jong Il reportedly did so to strengthen his position within the WPK, taking advantage of his father's political supremacy. Kimilsungism refers to the ideas of Kim Il Sung, while the Ten Principles serve as a guide for North Korean political and social life. Kim Jong Il argued that his father's ideas had evolved and they therefore deserved their own distinct name. North Korean state media had previously described Kim Il Sung's ideas as "contemporary Marxism–Leninism"; by calling them "Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il sought to elevate the ideas of his father to the same level of prestige as Stalinism and Maoism. Not long after the introduction of "Kimilsungism" into the North Korean lexicon, Kim Jong Il began calling for a "Kimilsungist transformation" of North Korean society.

Political analyst Lim Jae-cheon argues that there is no discernible difference between Kimilsungism and Juche, and that the two terms are interchangeable. However, in his 1976 speech "On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the "Juche idea and a far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea". He further added that "Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of Marxism–Leninism. The Juche idea, which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism, is an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind". Kim Jong Il went further, stating that Marxism–Leninism had become obsolete and must be replaced by Kimilsungism:

The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism–Leninism. On the basis of Juche idea, the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national liberation, class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era of Juche.

According to analyst Shin Gi-wook, the ideas of Juche and Kimilsungism are in essence the "expressions of North Korean particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism–Leninism". The new terminology signalled a move from socialism to nationalism. This was evident in a speech presented by Kim Jong Il in 1982, during celebrations of his father's 70th birthday, in which he stated that love for the nation came before love for socialism. This particularism gave birth to such concepts as "A Theory of the Korean Nation as Number One" (조선민족제일주의) and "Socialism of Our Style" (우리식사회주의).

Following the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kimilsungism became Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism (김일성-김정일주의) at the 4th Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2012. Party members at the conference also stated that the WPK was "the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il" and declared Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party". Afterwards, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that "the Korean people have long called the revolutionary policies ideas of the President and Kim Jong Il as Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism and recognized it as the guiding of the nation". Kim Jong Un, the son of Kim Jong Il who succeeded him as leader of the WPK, said:

Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is an integral system of the idea, theory and method of Juche and a great revolutionary ideology representative of the Juche era. Guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President and the General .

Kimjongunism

In late 2021, South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported to the country's legislature that Kim Jong Un had begun using the neologism "Kimjongunism" (김정은주의) to promote his own ideas and importance as opposed to those of his father and grandfather. However, as of 2023, the term has yet to appear in any major state or party publication, such as the Rodong Sinmun.

Prior to the 2021 briefing by the NIS, Kim Jong Un had made several moves to cement his political primacy, including appointing himself general secretary of the WPK (a title previously reserved as a posthumous designation for Kim Jong Il), removing portraits of his father and grandfather from important party buildings (such as the interior of the April 25 House of Culture), and adding the term "Kim Jong Un's Revolutionary Thought" (김정은의 혁명사상) to the party rules. A number of South Korean and Western political analysts argue that these actions indicated Kim Jong Un's desire to form his own legacy, separate from that of his predecessors. Major elements of Kim Jong Un's ideological shift include his emphasis on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and his reassertion of the WPK's commitment to communism.

Nationalism

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did not clarify the difference between the state and law, focusing on class divisions within nations. They argued that nation and law (as it existed then) would be overthrown and replaced by proletarian rule. This was the mainstream view of Soviet theoreticians during the 1920s; however, with Stalin at the helm in 1929, it was under attack. He criticized Nikolai Bukharin's position that the proletariat was hostile to the inclinations of the state, arguing that since the state (the Soviet Union) was in transition from capitalism to socialism the relationship between the state and the proletariat was harmonious. By 1936, Stalin argued that the state would still exist if the Soviet Union reached the communist mode of production but the socialist world was encircled by capitalist forces. Kim Il Sung took this position to its logical conclusion, arguing that the state would exist after North Korea reached the communist mode of production until a future world revolution. As long as capitalism survived, even if the socialist world predominated, North Korea could still be threatened by the restoration of capitalism.

The revival of the term "state" in the Soviet Union under Stalin led to the revival of the term "nation" in North Korea under Kim Il Sung. Despite official assertions that the Soviet Union was based on "class" rather than "state", the latter was revived during the 1930s. In 1955, Kim Il Sung expressed a similar view in his speech, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work":

What we are doing now is not a revolution in some foreign country but our Korean revolution. Therefore, every ideological action must benefit the Korean revolution. To fulfil the Korean revolution, one should be perfectly cognizant of the history of our national struggle, of Korea's geography, and our customs.

From then on, he and the WPK stressed the roles of "revolutionary tradition" and Korea's cultural tradition in its revolution. At party meetings, members and cadres learned about North Korea's national prestige and its coming rejuvenation. Traditional customs were revived, to showcase Korean-ness. By 1965, Kim Il Sung stated that if communists continued opposing individuality and sovereignty, the movement would be threatened by dogmatism and revisionism. He criticized those communists who, he believed, subscribed to "national nihilism by praising all things foreign and vilifying all things national" and tried to impose foreign models on their own country. By the 1960s, Juche was a full-fledged ideology calling for a distinct path for North Korean socialist construction and non-interference in its affairs; however, a decade later it was defined as a system whose "fundamental principle was the realization of sovereignty".

Although WPK theoreticians were initially hostile towards the terms "nation" and "nationalism" because of the influence of the Stalinist definition of "state", by the mid-1960s their definition that a nation was a "a stable, historically formed community of people based on common language, territory, economic life, and culture" was revised and the characteristic of a "shared bloodline" was added to the definition. During the 1980s a common economic life was removed from the definition, with shared bloodline receiving increased emphasis. The WPK revised the meaning of nationalism in response to the democratic transition in South Korea and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Previously defined in Stalinist terms as a bourgeois weapon to exploit the workers, nationalism changed from a reactionary to a progressive idea. Kim Il Sung differentiated "nationalism" from what he called "genuine nationalism"; while genuine nationalism was a progressive idea, nationalism remained reactionary:

True nationalism (genuine nationalism) is similar to patriotism. Only a genuine patriot can become a devoted and true internationalist. In this sense, when I say communist, at the same time, I mean nationalist and internationalist.

Allegations of xenophobia and racism

Whatever the name and however elaborate his claim, Kim's Juche idea is nothing more than xenophobic nationalism that has little relevance to communism.

During the 1960s the WPK began forcing ethnic Koreans to divorce their European spouses (who were primarily from the Eastern Bloc), with a high-ranking WPK official calling the marriages "a crime against the Korean race" and Eastern Bloc embassies in the country beginning to accuse the regime of fascism. In May 1963, a Soviet diplomat described Kim Il Sung's political circle as a "political Gestapo". Similar remarks were made by other Eastern Bloc officials in North Korea, with the East German ambassador calling the policy "Goebbelsian" (a reference to Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's minister of propaganda). Although this was said during a low point in relations between North Korea and the Eastern Bloc, it illustrated a perception of racism in Kim Il Sung's policies.

In his book The Cleanest Race (2010), Brian Reynolds Myers dismisses the idea that Juche is North Korea's leading ideology. He views its public exaltation as being designed to deceive foreigners; it exists to be praised rather than followed. Myers writes that Juche is a sham ideology, developed to extol Kim Il Sung as a political thinker comparable to Mao Zedong. According to Myers, North Korean military-first policy, racism and xenophobia (exemplified by race-based incidents such as the attempted lynching of black Cuban diplomats and forced abortions for North Korean women pregnant with ethnic Chinese children) indicate a base in far-right politics (inherited from Imperial Japan during its colonial occupation of Korea) rather than the far-left.

North Korean class analysis

Unlike the Joseon dynasty, where there was a huge gap between the upper and lower classes, the North Korean government developed the concept of a gathered-together "people". Instead of a strict social hierarchy, the North Korean government divided the country's population into three classes – the industrial workers, the peasants, and the samuwon (사무원) – North Korea is a society in which all three classes are considered equally important. The samuwon class consists of the intelligentsia and the petite bourgeoisie, such as clerks, small traders, bureaucrats, professors and writers. This class is unique to North Korean class analysis and it was conceptualized in order to increase the rates of education and literacy among the country's population.

Normally, Marxist–Leninist states would only value the farmers or the labourers, thus, in the Soviet Union, the intelligentsia was not defined as an independent class of its own. Instead, it was defined as a "social stratum" that recruited itself from members of almost all classes: the proletariat, the petite bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. However, a "peasant intelligentsia" was never mentioned, and the "proletarian intelligentsia" was exalted because it consisted of progressive scientists and communist theoreticians, but the "bourgeois intelligentsia" was condemned for producing "bourgeois ideologies", i.e. non-Marxist–Leninist worldviews.

North Koreans believed in achieving rapid industrialization through labour and by subjecting nature to human will. By restructuring social classes into a mass of people who are all theoretically equal, the North Korean government claimed that it would be able to attain self-reliance in upcoming years. However, this assertion has been questioned by foreign observers because of the country's severe food shortages and consequent dependence on foreign aid.

Socialism of Our Style

"Socialism of Our Style" (우리식사회주의), also referred to as "Korean-style socialism" and "our-style socialism" within North Korea, is an ideological concept Kim Jong Il introduced on 27 December 1990 in the speech "Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by the Juche Idea" (우리 나라 사회주의는 주체 사상을 구현한 우리식 사회주의이다). Speaking after the Revolutions of 1989 that brought down the Eastern Bloc countries, Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that North Korea needed – and survived because of – Socialism of Our Style. He argued that socialism in Eastern Europe failed because they "imitated the Soviet experience in a mechanical manner". According to Kim, they failed to understand that the Soviet experience was based on specific historical and social circumstances and could not be used by other countries aside from the Soviet Union itself. He added that "if experience is considered absolute and accepted dogmatically it is impossible to build Socialism properly, as the times change and the specific situation of each country is different from another". Kim Jong Il went on to criticize "dogmatic application" of Marxism–Leninism, stating:

Marxism–Leninism presented a series of opinions on building of Socialism and Communism, but it confined itself to presupposition and hypothesis owing to the limitations of the conditions of their ages and practical experiences ... But many countries applied the principles of Marxist–Leninist materialistic conception of history dogmatically, failing to advance revolution continually after the establishment of the socialist system.

North Korea would not encounter such difficulties because of the conceiving of Juche. In his words, North Korea was "a backward, colonial semifeudal society" when the communists took over, but since the North Korean communists did not accept Marxism, which was based on European experiences with capitalism, or Leninism, which was based on Russia's experience, they conceived of Juche. He believed that the situation in North Korea was more complex because of the American presence in nearby South Korea. Thanks to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il argued, the revolution had "put forward original lines and policies suited to our people's aspirations and the specific situation of our country". "The Juche idea is a revolutionary theory which occupies the highest stage of development of the revolutionary ideology of the working class", Kim Jong Il said, further stating that the originality and superiority of the Juche idea defined and strengthened Korean socialism. He then conceded by stating that Socialism of Our Style was "a man-centered Socialism", explicitly making a break with basic Marxist–Leninist thought, which argues that material forces are the driving force of historical progress, not people. Socialism of Our Style was presented as an organic sociopolitical theory, using the language of Marxism–Leninism, saying:

The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and united leadership.

See also

• Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party
• Ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

References

Citations

1. ^ Kim 2021.
2. Frank et al. 2013, p. 45.
3. ^ Yonhap News Agency 2021.
4. ^ Myers 2011, pp. 9, 11–12.
5. KKE 2011.
6. ^ Becker 2005, p. 66.
7. Suh 1988, p. 313 & 139.
8. Cheong 2000, pp. 138–139.
9. ^ Cheong 2000, p. 139.
10. ^ So & Suh 2013, p. 107.
11. ^ Kwak 2009, p. 19.
12. Kwak 2009, p. 20.
13. Suh 1988, p. 302.
14. ^ Suh 1988, p. 309.
15. Suh 1988, pp. 309–310.
16. ^ Suh 1988, p. 310.
17. Suh 1988, pp. 310–313.
18. Oh & Hassig 2000, p. 18.
19. Lee 2003, p. 105.
20. Lee 2003, pp. 105–106.
21. ^ Lee 2003, p. 106.
22. ^ Lee 2003, p. 107.
23. Lee 2003, p. 109.
24. ^ Lee 2003, p. 111.
25. Kihl & Kim 2006, p. 63.
26. Foreign Languages Publishing House 2014, p. 61.
27. Rodong Sinmun 1999.
28. ^ Kihl & Kim 2006, p. 64.
29. ^ Lee 2004, p. 4.
30. ^ Lee 2004, p. 5.
31. ^ Lee 2004, p. 6.
32. ^ Lee 2004, p. 7.
33. Lee 2004, p. 8.
34. Lee 2004, p. 9.
35. ^ Lim 2012, p. 561.
36. ^ Shin 2006, pp. 89–90.
37. Shin 2006.
38. ^ Shin 2006, p. 90.
39. Shin 2006, pp. 90–91.
40. ^ Shin 2006, p. 91.
41. ^ Rüdiger 2013, p. 45.
42. Alton & Chidley 2013, p. 109.
43. Kim 2012, p. 6.
44. ^ Parry 2021.
45. ^ Hancocks & Seo 2021.
46. Hirai 2023.
47. ^ Kim & Jang 2021, pp. 1–2.
48. ^ Chung 2022.
49. ^ Cheong 2000, p. 140.
50. ^ Cheong 2000, p. 141.
51. ^ Cheong 2000, p. 142.
52. ^ Cheong 2000, p. 143.
53. Suh 1988, p. 313.
54. ^ Rank 2012.
55. Marshall 2010.
56. Hitchens 2010.
57. ^ Cumings 2005, pp. 404–405.
58. ^ Shin 2006, pp. 91–92.
59. ^ Shin 2006, p. 92.
60. ^ Shin 2006, pp. 92–93.

Sources

Books

• Alton, David; Chidley, Rob (2013). Building Bridges: Is There Hope for North Korea?. Lion Books. ISBN 9780745955988.
• Becker, Jasper (2005). Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198038108.
• ——— (2005). Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (2nd ed.). New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
• Frank, Rüdiger; Hoare, Jim; Köllner, Patrick; Pares, Susan (2013). North Korea in 2012: Domestic Politics, the Economy and Social Issues. Brill Publishers. pp. 41–72. ISBN 9789004262973. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015.
• Jo, Eun A. (2018). "North Korea's Public Relations Strategy, 2018". Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 2018 (PDF). Korea Economic Institute of America.
• Juche Idea: Answers to Hundred Questions. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 2014.
• Kihl, Young; Kim, Hong Nack (2006). North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 9780765616388.
• Kim, Jong Un (6 April 2012). Let Us Brilliantly Accomplish the Revolutionary Cause of Juche, Holding Kim Jong-il in High Esteem as the Eternal General Secretary of Our Party (PDF). Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
• Kwak, Tae-Hwan (2009). North Korea's Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0754677390.
• Lee, Kyo Duk (2004). "'Peaceful Utilization of the DMZ' as a National Strategy". The successor theory of North Korea. Korean Institute for National Reunification. pp. 1–52. ISBN 978-8984792258.
• Myers, Brian (2011). The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters. Melville House Publishing. ISBN 978-1933633916.
• Oh, Kong Dan; Hassig, Ralph (2000). North Korea Through the Looking Glass. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0815764366.
• Rüdiger, Frank (2013). North Korea in 2012: Domestic Politics, the Economy and Social Issues. Brill Publishers. pp. 41–72. ISBN 9789004262973. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015.
• Shin, Gi-wook (2006). Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804754088.
• So, Chae-Jong; Suh, Jae-Jung (2013). Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0739176580.
• Suh, Dae-sook (1988). Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (1st ed.). Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231065733.
• Young, Benjamin R. (22 March 2021). Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503627642. ISBN 9781503627642. S2CID 243242009.

Journal articles

• Cheong, Seong-Chang (2000). "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of Ideology and Power" (PDF). Asian Perspective. 24 (1): 133–161. doi:10.1353/apr.2000.0039. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 October 2016. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• Lee, Grace (2003). "The Political Philosophy of Juche" (PDF). Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs. 3 (1): 105–111.
• Lim, Jae-cheon (May–June 2012). "North Korea's Hereditary Succession Comparing Two Key Transitions in the DPRK". Asian Survey. 52 (3): 550–70. doi:10.1525/as.2012.52.3.550. JSTOR 10.1525/as.2012.52.3.550.

News and magazine articles

• Chung, Kyo-jin (27 October 2022). "Gimjeong-eungwa Sijinping-ui Dalm-eunkkol Jeongchiwa Naemilhan Gongjo" 김정은과 시진핑의 닮은꼴 정치와 내밀한 공조 [Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping's similar politics and secret cooperation]. Daily NK (in Korean).
• Hancocks, Paula; Seo, Yoonjung (17 December 2021). "The pandemic forced Kim Jong Un into retreat. The world should brace for his resurgence". CNN.
• Hirai, Hisashi (20 February 2023). "Research Report: "Comrade Kim Jong-un's revolutionary thought"". The Japan Institute of International Affairs.
• Hitchens, Christopher (1 February 2010). "A Nation of Racist Dwarfs". Fighting Words. Slate. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
• Marshall, Colin (12 April 2010). "Immersion in propaganda, race-based nationalism and the un-figure-outable vortex of Juche Thought: Colin Marshall talks to B.R. Myers, author of The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters". 3 Quarks Daily. Retrieved 13 April 2010.
• Parry, Richard Lloyd (2 November 2021). "Kim Jong-un coins Kimjongunism as new doctrine of North Korea". The Times.
• "Uli Dang-ui Seongunjeongchineun Pilseungbulpaeida" 우리 당의 선군정치는 필승불패이다 [Our Party's Military-First Politics Will Inevitably Achieve Victory and Will Never Be Defeated]. Rodong Sinmun (in Korean). 16 June 1999. Archived from the original on 24 November 2002.

Other

• "13th IMCWP: An event of major importance". Communist Party of Greece. 29 November 2011. Archived from the original on 8 January 2012. Retrieved 4 June 2022.
• Kim, Jong Un (7 April 2021). "Closing Speech to the 6th Conference of WPK Cell Secretaries". National Committee of North Korea. Retrieved 11 August 2021.
• Kim, Kap-sik; Jang, Cheol-wun (16 December 2021). "'Kimjongunism'? Or 'Kim Jong-un Thought'?" (PDF). Korea Institute for National Unification.
• Rank, Michael (10 April 2012). "Lifting the cloak on North Korean secrecy: The Cleanest Race, How North Koreans See Themselves by B. R. Myers". Asia Times (Book review). Archived from the original on 12 January 2013. Retrieved 13 December 2012.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
• "Joseonlodongdang-gyuyag" 조선로동당규약 [Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea] (PDF). Voice of America (in Korean). 2010. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 June 2017.
• "Bughan Nodongdang Gyuyag Juyo Gaejeong Naeyong" 북한 노동당 규약 주요 개정 내용 [Major Amendments to the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea]. Yonhap News Agency (in Korean). 1 June 2021. Retrieved 13 June 2021.

v t e Workers' Party of Korea
Central Committee	Leaders Pak Hon-yong (1945) Kim Yong-bom (1945) Kim Il Sung (1945–1946) Kim Tu-bong (1946–1949) Kim Il Sung (1949–1994) Vacant (1994–1997) Kim Jong Il (1997–2011) Vacant (2011–2012) Kim Jong Un (2012–present) Decision-making bodies Personal Secretariat Presidium Politburo (General Secretary and Secretary) Secretariat Central Military Commission Central Auditing Commission Departments and offices Organisation and Guidance Department Propaganda and Agitation Department Cadres Department Light Industry Department Economic Affairs Science and Education Department International Department Military Department Machine-Building Industry Working Organisation Department Agriculture Department Party History Institute Document Archives Civil Defense Department Appeals Office Finance Accounting Department General Affairs Department United Front Department Office 39 Kim Il Sung Higher Party School Publishing House Publications Rodong Sinmun Kulloja
National meetings	Congress CPK / CPSK (1945) WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Conference 1st (1958) [ko] 2nd (1966) 3rd (2010) 4th (2012) CC plenums 1st Joint Plenum, 2nd CC (1949) 12th Plenum, 2nd CC (1953) 2nd Plenum, 3rd CC (1956) 14th Plenum, 4th CC (1966) 15th Plenum, 4th CC (1967)
Leadership sittings	Presidium 1st WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd—none (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Politburo CPK (1945) NKBB (1945) 1st WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Secretariat CPK (1945) 4th (1966) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Central Committee CPK (1945) NKBB (1945) 1st WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Auditing Commission 1st WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Military Commission 4th (1962) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) 8th (2021) Control Commission 1st WPNK / WPSK (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956) 4th (1961) 5th (1970) 6th (1980) 7th (2016) Organisation Committee CPK (1945) 1st (1946) 2nd (1948) 3rd (1956)
Wider organisation	Rules Korean People's Army Socialist Patriotic Youth League Korean Children's Union Socialist Women's Union of Korea General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea Anti-Imperialist National Democratic Front
Ideology	Juche Songun Baekdu bloodline North Korean cult of personality Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System
Abolished organs	Chairman and Vice Chairman Control Commission Executive Policy Bureau Organisation Committee
Predecessors	Party Foundation Day Communist Party of Korea North Korean Branch Bureau / Communist Party of North Korea Workers' Party of North Korea Workers' Party of South Korea
Category

• Ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea