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{{Short description|Conflict between Moldova and its breakaway region of Transnistria since 1990}} {{Short description|Conflict between Moldova and its breakaway region of Transnistria since 1990}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2023}} {{Use dmy dates|date=April 2022}}
{{Multiple issues| {{Multiple issues|
{{More footnotes|date=December 2023}} {{More footnotes|date=December 2016}}
{{More citations needed|date=December 2023}} {{More citations needed|date=December 2016}}
{{outdated|date=December 2023}} {{outdated|date=May 2022}}
}} }}
{{Infobox military conflict {{Infobox military conflict
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| status = ]; ] | status = ]; ]
| combatant1 = {{flag|Moldova}} | combatant1 = {{flag|Moldova}}
* ]
{{plainlist| {{plainlist|
* '''Supported by:''' * '''Supported by:'''
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}} }}
| combatant2 = {{flag|Transnistria}} | combatant2 = {{flag|Transnistria}}
* ]
{{plainlist| {{plainlist|
* '''Supported by:''' * '''Supported by:'''
* {{flagicon|Russia|1991}}/{{flag|Russia}} (military and diplomatic support)<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25469836|title=The role of the Russian Federation in the Pridnestrovian conflict: an international humanitarian law perspective|first1=Kieran|last1=O'Reilly|first2=Noelle|last2=Higgins|publisher=]|journal=Irish Studies in International Affairs|volume=19|pages=57–72|year=2008|doi=10.3318/ISIA.2008.19.57|jstor=25469836|s2cid=154866746 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=875460|title=The hybrid warfare triggered by Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova|first=Anatol|last=Munteanu|journal=Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România|volume=12|issue=1|pages=129–162|year=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.polygraph.info/a/russia-defends-peacekeepers-the-new-moldovan-president-wants-out/30984597.html|title=Russia defends "peacekeepers" the new Moldovan president wants out|newspaper=]|date=7 December 2020}}</ref> * {{flagicon|Russia|1991}}/{{flag|Russia}} (military and diplomatic support)<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25469836|title=The role of the Russian Federation in the Pridnestrovian conflict: an international humanitarian law perspective|first1=Kieran|last1=O'Reilly|first2=Noelle|last2=Higgins|publisher=]|journal=Irish Studies in International Affairs|volume=19|pages=57–72|year=2008|doi=10.3318/ISIA.2008.19.57|jstor=25469836|s2cid=154866746 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=875460|title=The hybrid warfare triggered by Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova|first=Anatol|last=Munteanu|journal=Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România|volume=12|issue=1|pages=129–162|year=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.polygraph.info/a/russia-defends-peacekeepers-the-new-moldovan-president-wants-out/30984597.html|title=Russia defends "peacekeepers" the new Moldovan president wants out|newspaper=]|date=7 December 2020}}</ref>
*{{flagicon image|Flag of Ukraine (1991–1992).svg}}/{{flagcountry|Ukraine}} (only during the ])<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Uuw1kNq11YkC&pg=PA221 |title=Moldova: Arena of International Influences |date= 8 May 2012|isbn=9780739173923 |accessdate=2022-09-04|last1=Kosienkowski |first1=Marcin |last2=Schreiber |first2=William |publisher=Lexington }}</ref>}}
| commander1 = Unknown
| commander2 = Unknown
| casualties1 = Unknown
| casualties2 = Unknown
}} }}
{{Campaignbox Post-Soviet conflicts}}
}}
{{Campaignbox Transnistria conflict}}
{{Politics of Transnistria}} {{Politics of Transnistria}}


The '''Transnistria conflict''' ({{lang-ro|Conflictul din Transnistria}}; {{lang-ru|Приднестровский конфликт|Pridnestrovskiy konflikt}}; {{lang-uk|Придністровський конфлікт|Prydnistrovskyy konflikt}}) is an ] ] between ] and the ] of ]. Its most active phase was the ]. There have been several attempts to resolve the conflict, although none have been successful.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13511610601029813|title=Nationalism and identity in Transnistria|first=Natalia|last=Cojocaru|journal=Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research|volume=19|issue=3–4|pages=261–272|year=2006|doi=10.1080/13511610601029813|s2cid=53474094}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233093071|title=Regionalism in Moldova: the case of Transnistria and Gagauzia|first=Steven D.|last=Roper|journal=Regional & Federal Studies|volume=11|issue=3|pages=101–122|year=2001|doi=10.1080/714004699|s2cid=154516934}}</ref> The conflict may be considered as having started on 2 September 1990, when Transnistria made a formal sovereignty declaration from Moldova (then part of the ]).<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178|title=From secessionist conflict toward a functioning state: processes of state- and nation-building in Transnistria|first1=Helge|last1=Blakkisrud|first2=Pål|last2=Kolstø|journal=Post-Soviet Affairs|volume=27|issue=2|pages=178–210|year=2013|doi=10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178|s2cid=143862872}}</ref> The '''Transnistria conflict''' ({{langx|ro|Conflictul din Transnistria}}; {{langx|ru|Приднестровский конфликт|Pridnestrovsky konflikt}}; {{langx|uk|Придністровський конфлікт|Prydnistrovskyi konflikt}}) is an ] ] between ] and the ] of ]. Its most active phase was the ]. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13511610601029813|title=Nationalism and identity in Transnistria|first=Natalia|last=Cojocaru|journal=Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research|volume=19|issue=3–4|pages=261–272|year=2006|doi=10.1080/13511610601029813|s2cid=53474094}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233093071|title=Regionalism in Moldova: the case of Transnistria and Gagauzia|first=Steven D.|last=Roper|journal=Regional & Federal Studies|volume=11|issue=3|pages=101–122|year=2001|doi=10.1080/714004699|s2cid=154516934}}</ref> The conflict may be considered to have started on 2 September 1990, when Transnistria made a formal sovereignty declaration from Moldova (then part of the ]).<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178|title=From secessionist conflict toward a functioning state: processes of state- and nation-building in Transnistria|first1=Helge|last1=Blakkisrud|first2=Pål|last2=Kolstø|journal=Post-Soviet Affairs|volume=27|issue=2|pages=178–210|year=2013|doi=10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178|s2cid=143862872}}</ref>


Transnistria is internationally recognised as a part of ]. It obtained ] only from three post-Soviet unrecognized states: ], ], and the former ]. Transnistria is internationally recognized as a part of ]. It has ] only from two Russian-backed separatist states: ] and ].


==Historical status of Transnistria== ==Historical status of Transnistria==
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=== Until the Second World War === === Until the Second World War ===
The ] in the 1930s had an autonomous region of Transnistria inside ], called the ] (MASSR), where nearly half of the population were ]-speaking people, and with ] as its capital.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} The ] in the 1930s had an autonomous region of Transnistria inside ], called the ] (MASSR), half of whose population were ]-speaking people, and with ] as its capital.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


During ], when ], aided by ], took control of ], it did not attempt to annex the occupied territory during the war, although it had plans to do so in the future.<ref>Charles King: "The Moldovans", Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1999, page 93</ref><ref>Memoirs of ], ] 1941–1944, in ANR-DAIC, d.6</ref> During ], when ], aided by ], took control of ], it did not attempt to annex the occupied territory during the war, although it planned do so in the future.<ref>Charles King: "The Moldovans", Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1999, page 93</ref><ref>Memoirs of ], ] 1941–1944, in ANR-DAIC, d.6</ref>


=== Territorial consequences of the 1992 conflict === === Territorial consequences of the 1992 conflict ===


==== Left bank of the Dniester ==== ==== Left bank of the Dniester ====
During the ], some villages in the central part of Transnistria (on the eastern bank of the ]), rebelled against the new separatist Transnistria (PMR) authorities. They have been under effective Moldovan control as a consequence of their rebellion against the PMR. These localities are: commune ] (including village ''Vasilievca''), commune ] (including village ''Roghi''), commune ] (including village ''Mahala''), commune ] (including village ''Pohrebea''), commune ], and commune ]. The village of ] is in fact divided between PMR and Moldovan central government areas of control. Roghi is also controlled by the PMR authorities.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} During the ], some villages in the central part of Transnistria (on the eastern bank of the ]) rebelled against the new separatist Transnistria (PMR) authorities. They have been under effective Moldovan control as a consequence of their rebellion against the PMR. These localities are: commune ] (including village ''Vasilievca''), commune ] (including village ''Roghi''), commune ] (including village ''Mahala''), commune ] (including village ''Pohrebea''), commune ], and commune ]. The village of ] is in fact divided between PMR and Moldovan central government areas of control. Roghi is also controlled by the PMR authorities.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


==== Right bank of the Dniester ==== ==== Right bank of the Dniester ====
At the same time, some areas which are situated on the right bank of the Dniester are under PMR control. These areas consist of the city of ] with its suburb ], the communes ], ] (including villages Mereneşti and Zahorna), and the commune of ], formally{{clarify|reason=formally or formerly?|date=March 2016}} in the ], situated south of the city of Bender.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} At the same time, some areas on the right bank of the Dniester are under PMR control. These areas consist of the city of ] with its suburb ], the communes ], ] (including villages Mereneşti and Zahorna), and the commune of ], formally{{clarify|reason=formally or formerly?|date=March 2016}} in the ], situated south of the city of Bender.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


The breakaway PMR authorities also claim the communes of ], in the ], a northern suburb of Bender, and ], in the Căușeni District, south of Chițcani, but these villages remain under Moldovan control.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} The breakaway PMR authorities also claim the communes of ], in the ], a northern suburb of Bender, and ], in the Căușeni District, south of Chițcani, but these villages remain under Moldovan control.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


=== Later tensions === === Later tensions ===
Several disputes have arisen from these cross-river territories. In 2005, PMR Militia entered ], which is located over the strategic road linking ] and ], but withdrew after a few days.<ref>{{cite web|title=Moldova Azi|url=http://www.azi.md/news?ID=33404|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060514224130/http://www.azi.md/news?ID=33404|archive-date=14 May 2006|access-date=23 December 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Locuitorii satului Vasilievca de pe malul stâng al Nistrului trăiesc clipe de coșmar|url=http://www2.dw-world.de/romanian/politik/1.129357.1.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050318063305/http://www2.dw-world.de/romanian/politik/1.129357.1.html|archive-date=18 March 2005|access-date=20 January 2007}}</ref> In 2006 there were tensions around ]. In 2007 there was a confrontation between Moldovan and PMR forces in the ]-] area; however, there were no casualties. On 13 May 2007, the mayor of the village of ], which is under Moldovan control, was arrested by the PMR militsia (police) together with a councilor of Moldovan-controlled part of the ].<ref>{{cite web|title=Ineffectiveness of peacekeeping mechanism leads to incidents in Moldova's Security Zone|url=http://conflict.md/stiri.php?ID=2467|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927010610/http://conflict.md/stiri.php?ID=2467|archive-date=27 September 2007|access-date=8 February 2016}}</ref> Several disputes have arisen from these cross-river territories. In 2005, PMR militia entered ], which is located over the strategic road linking ] and ], but withdrew after a few days.<ref>{{cite web|title=Moldova Azi|url=http://www.azi.md/news?ID=33404|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060514224130/http://www.azi.md/news?ID=33404|archive-date=14 May 2006|access-date=23 December 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Locuitorii satului Vasilievca de pe malul stâng al Nistrului trăiesc clipe de coșmar|url=http://www2.dw-world.de/romanian/politik/1.129357.1.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050318063305/http://www2.dw-world.de/romanian/politik/1.129357.1.html|archive-date=18 March 2005|access-date=20 January 2007}}</ref> In 2006 there were tensions around ]. In 2007 there was a confrontation between Moldovan and PMR forces in the ]-] area; however, there were no casualties. On 13 May 2007, the mayor of the village of ], which is under Moldovan control, was arrested by the PMR militsia (police) together with a councilor of Moldovan-controlled part of the ].<ref>{{cite web|title=Ineffectiveness of peacekeeping mechanism leads to incidents in Moldova's Security Zone|url=http://conflict.md/stiri.php?ID=2467|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927010610/http://conflict.md/stiri.php?ID=2467|archive-date=27 September 2007|access-date=8 February 2016}}</ref>


===Russian invasion of Ukraine=== ===Russian invasion of Ukraine===
Amid the ], on 14 January 2022 Ukrainian military intelligence declared that Russian special services were preparing "provocations" against Russian soldiers ] in Transnistria at the time to create a '']'' for a Russian invasion of ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/russia-is-preparing-a-pretext-for-invading-ukraine-us-official|title=Russia is preparing a pretext for invading Ukraine: US official|newspaper=]|date=14 January 2022}}</ref> Amid the ], on 14 January 2022 Ukrainian military intelligence declared that Russian special services were preparing "provocations" against Russian soldiers ] in Transnistria at the time to create a '']'' for a Russian invasion of ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/russia-is-preparing-a-pretext-for-invading-ukraine-us-official|title=Russia is preparing a pretext for invading Ukraine: US official|newspaper=]|date=14 January 2022}}</ref>


On 24 February, on the first day of ], there were allegations that some rockets that had hit Ukraine had been launched from Transnistria, although ]'s ] denied this.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moldova tightens security after explosions heard close to Russia-backed Transnistria|url=https://intellinews.com/moldova-tightens-security-after-explosions-heard-close-to-russia-backed-transnistria-236052/|access-date=24 February 2022|agency=Intellinews}}</ref> Later, on 6 March, there were again claims that ] that had hit ]'s ] had been launched from Transnistria, although Moldovan officials again denied this and said that they had been launched from Russian ships in the ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/6/7328856/|title=Missiles which hit Vinnytsia were not launched from the Transnistria – Ministry of Defence of Moldova|newspaper=]|date=6 March 2022}}</ref> On 24 February, on the first day of ], there were allegations that some rockets that had hit Ukraine had been launched from Transnistria, although ]'s ] denied this.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moldova tightens security after explosions heard close to Russia-backed Transnistria|url=https://intellinews.com/moldova-tightens-security-after-explosions-heard-close-to-russia-backed-transnistria-236052/|access-date=24 February 2022|agency=Intellinews}}</ref> On 4 March, Ukraine blew up a railway bridge on its border with Transnistria to prevent the 1,400 Russian troops stationed in the breakaway territory from crossing into Ukraine.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ernst |first1=Iulian |title=Ukraine blows up bridge to Transnistria after Tiraspol reasserts its independence |url=https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-blows-up-bridge-to-transnistria-after-tiraspol-reasserts-its-independence-237137/ |access-date=12 March 2022 |work=intellinews |date=7 March 2022 |archive-date=7 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220307200553/https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-blows-up-bridge-to-transnistria-after-tiraspol-reasserts-its-independence-237137/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Later, on 6 March, there were again claims that ] that had hit ]'s ] had been launched from Transnistria, although Moldovan officials again denied this and said that they had been launched from Russian ships in the ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/6/7328856/|title=Missiles which hit Vinnytsia were not launched from the Transnistria – Ministry of Defence of Moldova|newspaper=]|date=6 March 2022}}</ref>


Amid rumors that Transnistria would attack Ukraine, the ] ] declared that Transnistria is a peaceful state which never had any plans to attack its neighbors and that those who spread these allegations were people without control over the situation or provocateurs with malicious intentions. He also made reference to the large ethnically ] population of Transnistria and how ] is taught in Transnistrian schools and is one of the official languages of the republic.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.stiripesurse.ro/liderul-de-la-tiraspol-vadim-krasnoselski-transnistria-este-un-stat-pasnic-nu-am-avut-niciodata-planuri-de-natura-agresiva-fata-de-vecinii-nostri_2261995.html |title=Liderul de la Tiraspol, Vadim Krasnoselski: Transnistria este un stat pașnic. Nu am avut niciodată planuri de natură agresivă față de vecinii noștri |trans-title=Tiraspol leader Vadim Krasnoselski: Transnistria is a peaceful state. We have never had aggressive plans against our neighbors |first=Bogdan |last=Antonescu |newspaper=stiripesurse.ro |date=26 February 2022 |language=ro}}</ref> However, in March, an image of the ] ] standing in front of a battle plan map of the invasion of Ukraine was leaked. This map showed a supposed incursion of Russian troops from the Ukrainian city port of ] into Transnistria and Moldova, revealing that Transnistria could become involved in the war.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/596409-belarus-president-stands-in-front-of-battle-map-indicating-moldova/|title=Belarus president stands in front of map indicating Moldova invasion plans|first=Ellen|last=Mitchell|newspaper=]|date=1 March 2022}}</ref> Amid rumors that Transnistria would attack Ukraine, ] ] declared Transnistria to be a peaceful state which never had any plans to attack its neighbors and that those who spread these allegations were people without control over the situation or provocateurs with malicious intentions. He also made reference to the large ethnically ] population of Transnistria and how ] is taught in Transnistrian schools and is one of the official languages of the republic.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.stiripesurse.ro/liderul-de-la-tiraspol-vadim-krasnoselski-transnistria-este-un-stat-pasnic-nu-am-avut-niciodata-planuri-de-natura-agresiva-fata-de-vecinii-nostri_2261995.html |title=Liderul de la Tiraspol, Vadim Krasnoselski: Transnistria este un stat pașnic. Nu am avut niciodată planuri de natură agresivă față de vecinii noștri |trans-title=Tiraspol leader Vadim Krasnoselski: Transnistria is a peaceful state. We have never had aggressive plans against our neighbors |first=Bogdan |last=Antonescu |newspaper=stiripesurse.ro |date=26 February 2022 |language=ro}}</ref> However, in March, an image of the ] ] standing in front of a battle plan map of the invasion of Ukraine was leaked. This map showed a supposed incursion of Russian troops from the Ukrainian city port of ] into Transnistria and Moldova, revealing that Transnistria could become involved in the war.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/596409-belarus-president-stands-in-front-of-battle-map-indicating-moldova/|title=Belarus president stands in front of map indicating Moldova invasion plans|first=Ellen|last=Mitchell|newspaper=]|date=1 March 2022}}</ref>


On 22 April 2022, Russia's Brigadier General ] in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolayiv–Odesa front in the Ukraine war further west to include the Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova.<ref name="dw">{{cite news |last=Hubenko |first=Dmytro |date=22 April 2022 |title=Russia eyes route to Trans-Dniester: What do we know? |publisher=] |url=https://www.dw.com/en/russia-eyes-route-to-trans-dniester-what-do-we-know/a-61559127}}</ref><ref name="aljr">{{cite news |date=22 April 2022 |title=Russia plans to seize Donbas, southern Ukraine: Military official |publisher=] |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/22/russia-says-it-plans-to-seize-donbas-southern-ukraine}}</ref> Minnekaev announced that the plan of Russia's military action in Ukraine included taking full control of Southern Ukraine and achieving a land corridor to Transnistria. He also talked about the existence of supposed evidence of "oppression of the Russian-speaking population" of Transnistria, echoing Russia's justifications for the war in Ukraine.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=April 26, 2022 |title=Moldova holds urgent security meeting after Transnistria blasts |work=Aljazeera |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/26/blasts-hit-ministry-in-moldovas-transnistria-near-ukraine}}</ref> The ] described this intention as ], saying that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine".<ref name="dw"/> Ukrainian military officials had identified the establishment of a "land corridor" to Transnistria as one of Russia's primary objectives since the first day of the invasion.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/24/7325571/|date=2022-02-24|access-date=2024-03-12|lang=uk|website=]|title=Російські війська хочуть прорватися до Миколаєва, йдуть бої в околицях Чернігова}}</ref> On 22 April 2022, Russia's Brigadier General Rustam Minnekayev in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolaiv–Odesa front in the Ukraine war further west to include the Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova.<ref name="dw">{{cite news |last=Hubenko |first=Dmytro |date=22 April 2022 |title=Russia eyes route to Trans-Dniester: What do we know? |publisher=] |url=https://www.dw.com/en/russia-eyes-route-to-trans-dniester-what-do-we-know/a-61559127}}</ref><ref name="aljr">{{cite news |date=22 April 2022 |title=Russia plans to seize Donbas, southern Ukraine: Military official |publisher=] |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/22/russia-says-it-plans-to-seize-donbas-southern-ukraine}}</ref> Minnekaev announced that the plan of Russia's military action in Ukraine included taking full control of Southern Ukraine and achieving a land corridor to Transnistria. He also talked about the existence of supposed evidence of "oppression of the Russian-speaking population" of Transnistria, echoing Russia's justifications for the war in Ukraine.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=April 26, 2022 |title=Moldova holds urgent security meeting after Transnistria blasts |work=Aljazeera |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/26/blasts-hit-ministry-in-moldovas-transnistria-near-ukraine}}</ref> The ] described this intention as ], saying that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine".<ref name="dw"/>


On 26 April, Ukrainian presidential adviser ] said during an interview that Moldova was a close neighbor to Ukraine, that Ukraine was not indifferent to it and that Moldova could turn to Ukraine for help. He also declared that Ukraine was able to solve the problem of Transnistria "in the blink of an eye", but only if Moldovan authorities requested the country's help; and that Romania could also come to Moldova's aid as "they are in fact the same people", with the same language as he continued, even though "there are many Moldovans who would not agree with me".<ref name="auto1"/> Moldova officially rejected this suggestion from Ukraine, expressing its support only for a peaceful outcome of the conflict.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-rejects-ukraine-s-offer-to-seize-transnistria-242742/|title=Moldova rejects Ukraine's offer to seize Transnistria|first=Iulian|last=Ernst|publisher=]|date=28 April 2022}}</ref> On 26 April, Ukrainian presidential adviser ] said during an interview that Moldova was a close neighbor to Ukraine, that Ukraine was not indifferent to it and that Moldova could turn to Ukraine for help. He also declared that Ukraine was able to solve the problem of Transnistria "in the blink of an eye", but only if Moldovan authorities requested the country's help; and that Romania could also come to Moldova's aid as "they are in fact the same people", with the same language as he continued, even though "there are many Moldovans who would not agree with me".<ref name="auto1"/> Moldova officially rejected this suggestion from Ukraine, expressing its support only for a peaceful outcome of the conflict.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-rejects-ukraine-s-offer-to-seize-transnistria-242742/|title=Moldova rejects Ukraine's offer to seize Transnistria|first=Iulian|last=Ernst|publisher=]|date=28 April 2022}}</ref>

On 12 September 2024, a Moldovan soldier was killed under unclear circumstances in the demarcation line of Transnistria.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fakti.bg/en/bulgaria/911766-a-moldovan-soldier-was-killed-in-an-incident-on-the-demarcation-line-with-transnistria|title=A Moldovan soldier was killed in an incident on the demarcation line with Transnistria}}</ref>


==Position of the PMR government advocates== ==Position of the PMR government advocates==


According to PMR advocates, the territory to the east of the ] never belonged either to ], nor to its predecessors, such as the ]. This territory was split off from the ] in a political maneuver of the ] to become a seed of the ] (in a manner similar to the creation of the ]). In 1990, the ] was proclaimed in the region by a number of conservative local Soviet officials opposed to ]. This action was immediately declared void by the then ] ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://pridnestrovie.net/un-report.html |title=UN and OSCE: Pridnestrovie is "different" and "distinct" |access-date=18 September 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100927094220/http://pridnestrovie.net/un-report.html |archive-date=27 September 2010 }}</ref> According to PMR advocates, the territory to the east of the ] never belonged either to ] nor to its predecessors, such as the ]. This territory was split off from the ] in a political maneuver of the ] to become a seed of the ] (in a manner similar to the creation of the ]). In 1990, the ] was proclaimed in the region by a number of conservative local Soviet officials opposed to ]. This action was immediately declared void by the then ] ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://pridnestrovie.net/un-report.html |title=UN and OSCE: Pridnestrovie is "different" and "distinct" |access-date=18 September 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100927094220/http://pridnestrovie.net/un-report.html |archive-date=27 September 2010 }}</ref>


At the ] in 1991, Moldova became independent. The ] denounced the ] and declared the 2 August 1940 "Law of the USSR on the establishment of the Moldavian SSR" null and void. The PMR side argues that, since this law was the only legislative document binding Transnistria to Moldova, there is neither historical nor legal basis for Moldova's claims over the territories on the left bank of the ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://pridnestrovie.net/moldova_declaration_of_independence.html |title=Moldova: "null and void" merging with Pridnestrovie |access-date=18 September 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070617065530/http://pridnestrovie.net/moldova_declaration_of_independence.html |archive-date=17 June 2007 }}</ref> At the ] in 1991, Moldova became independent. The ] denounced the ] and declared the 2 August 1940 "Law of the USSR on the establishment of the Moldavian SSR" null and void. The PMR side argues that, since this law was the only legislative document binding Transnistria to Moldova, there is neither historical nor legal basis for Moldova's claims over the territories on the left bank of the ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://pridnestrovie.net/moldova_declaration_of_independence.html |title=Moldova: "null and void" merging with Pridnestrovie |access-date=18 September 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070617065530/http://pridnestrovie.net/moldova_declaration_of_independence.html |archive-date=17 June 2007 }}</ref>


A 2010, study conducted by the ] showed that the majority of Transnistria's population supports the country's separation from Moldova. According to the study, more than 80% of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, and 60% of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria preferred independence or annexation by Russia rather than reunification with Moldova.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/|title=How people in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria feel about annexation by Russia|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=17 December 2016}}</ref> A 2010 study conducted by the ] showed that the majority of Transnistria's population supports the country's separation from Moldova. According to the study, more than 80% of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians and 60% of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria preferred independence or annexation by Russia to reunification with Moldova.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/|title=How people in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria feel about annexation by Russia|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=17 December 2016}}</ref>


In 2006, officials of the country decided to hold a ] to determine the status of Transnistria. There were two statements on the ballot: the first one was, "Renunciation of independence and potential future integration into Moldova"; the second was, "Independence and ]". The results of this double referendum were that a large section of the population was against the first statement (96.61%)<ref>{{Cite web|title=Transnistrische Moldawische Republik (Moldawien), 17. September 2006 : Verzicht auf Unabhängigkeit – |url=https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?id=md022006|last=ch|first=Beat Müller, beat (at-sign) sudd (dot)|website=www.sudd.ch|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> and in favor of the second one (98.07%).<ref>{{Cite web|title=Transnistrische Moldawische Republik (Moldawien), 17. September 2006 : Unabhängigkeitskurs und Beitritt zu Russland – |url=https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?id=md012006|last=ch|first=Beat Müller, beat (at-sign) sudd (dot)|website=www.sudd.ch|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> In 2006, officials of the country held a ] to determine the status of Transnistria. There were two statements on the ballot: the first one was, "Renunciation of independence and potential future integration into Moldova"; the second was, "Independence and ]". The results of this double referendum were that a large section of the population was against the first statement (96.61%)<ref>{{Cite web|title=Transnistrische Moldawische Republik (Moldawien), 17. September 2006 : Verzicht auf Unabhängigkeit – |url=https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?id=md022006|last=ch|first=Beat Müller, beat (at-sign) sudd (dot)|website=www.sudd.ch| date=17 September 2006 |language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> and in favor of the second one (98.07%).<ref>{{Cite web|title=Transnistrische Moldawische Republik (Moldawien), 17. September 2006 : Unabhängigkeitskurs und Beitritt zu Russland – |url=https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?id=md012006|last=ch|first=Beat Müller, beat (at-sign) sudd (dot)|website=www.sudd.ch| date=17 September 2006 |language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref>


==Moldovan position== ==Moldovan position==
Moldova lost ''de facto'' control of ] in 1992, in the wake of the ]. However, the ] considers itself the rightful ] to the ] (which was guaranteed the right to ] from the ] under the ]). By the principle of ], Moldova claims that any form of secession from the state without the consent of the central Moldovan government is illegal.{{Citation needed|date=May 2020}} The Moldavian side hence believes that its position is backed by international law.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Looking for a Solution Under International Law for the Moldova – Transnistria Conflict|url=http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/17/looking-for-a-solution-under-international-law-for-the-moldova-transnistria-conflict/|date=17 March 2020|website=Opinio Juris|language=en-US|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> Moldova lost ''de facto'' control of ] in 1992, in the wake of the ]. However, the ] considers itself the rightful ] to the ] (which was guaranteed the right to ] from the ] under the ]). By the principle of ], Moldova claims that any form of secession from the state without the consent of the central Moldovan government is illegal.{{Citation needed|date=May 2020}} The Moldavian side hence believes that its position is backed by international law.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Looking for a Solution Under International Law for the Moldova – Transnistria Conflict|url=http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/17/looking-for-a-solution-under-international-law-for-the-moldova-transnistria-conflict/|date=17 March 2020|website=Opinio Juris|language=en-US|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref>

It considers the current Transnistria-based PMR government to be illegitimate and not the rightful representative of the region's population, which has a ] plurality (39.9% as of 1989).<ref>{{Cite web|title=Refworld {{!}} World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Transnistria (unrecognised state)|url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce57c.html|last=Refugees|first=United Nations High Commissioner for|website=Refworld|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> The Moldovan side insists that Transnistria cannot exist as an independent political entity and must be ].{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} It considers the current Transnistria-based PMR government to be illegitimate and not the rightful representative of the region's population, which has a ] plurality (39.9% as of 1989).<ref>{{Cite web|title=Refworld {{!}} World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Transnistria (unrecognised state)|url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce57c.html|last=Refugees|first=United Nations High Commissioner for|website=Refworld|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> The Moldovan side insists that Transnistria cannot exist as an independent political entity and must be ].{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


According to Moldovan sources, the political climate in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of the will of the people of the region and supporters of reintegration of Transnistria in Moldova are subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrests and other types of intimidation from separatist authorities.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}} According to Moldovan sources, the political climate in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of the will of the people of the region and supporters of reintegration of Transnistria in Moldova are subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrests and other types of intimidation from separatist authorities.{{Citation needed|date=April 2022}}


Because of the non-recognition of Transnistria's independence, Moldova believes that all inhabitants of Transnistria are legally speaking, citizens of Moldova. However, it is estimated that 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants of Transnistria acquired Russian citizenship<ref name="auto">{{Cite web|title=Refworld {{!}} Moldova and Russia: Whether a holder of Ukrainian citizenship, born in Tiraspol, could return to Tiraspol and acquire Russian citizenship (2005)|url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/42df61d337.html|last=Refugees|first=United Nations High Commissioner for|website=Refworld|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> and around 20,000 Transnistrians have acquired Ukrainian citizenship. As a result, Moldovan authorities have tried to block the installation of a Russian and Ukrainian consulate in ].<ref name="auto"/> Because of the non-recognition of Transnistria's independence, Moldova believes that all inhabitants of Transnistria are legally citizens of Moldova. However, it is estimated that 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants of Transnistria have acquired Russian citizenship<ref name="auto">{{Cite web|title=Refworld {{!}} Moldova and Russia: Whether a holder of Ukrainian citizenship, born in Tiraspol, could return to Tiraspol and acquire Russian citizenship (2005)|url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/42df61d337.html|last=Refugees|first=United Nations High Commissioner for|website=Refworld|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020}}</ref> and around 20,000 have acquired Ukrainian citizenship. As a result, Moldovan authorities have tried to block the installation of a Russian and Ukrainian consulate in ].<ref name="auto"/>


==International recognition of the sovereignty of Transnistria== == International recognition of Transnistria ==
Only three ] recognize ]'s sovereignty, which are themselves largely unrecognized states: ], ] and ]. All four states are members of the ]. Only two ] recognize ]'s sovereignty, each itself a largely unrecognized state: ] and ]. These two states are members of the ].


On 21 February 2023, Russian president ] revoked the foreign policy document that declared Russian commitment to Moldovan sovereignty in the context of the Transnistria conflict.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-cancels-decree-underpinning-moldovas-sovereignty-separatist-conflict-2023-02-22/ | title=Putin cancels decree underpinning Moldova's sovereignty in separatist conflict | newspaper=Reuters | date=22 February 2023 | last1=Tanas | first1=Alexander }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/02/22/Russia-s-Putin-cancels-decree-underpinning-Moldova-sovereignty-in-separatist-conflict | title=Russia's Putin cancels decree underpinning Moldova sovereignty in separatist conflict | date=22 February 2023 }}</ref> On 21 February 2023, Russian president ] revoked the foreign policy document that declared Russian commitment to Moldovan sovereignty in the context of the Transnistria conflict.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-cancels-decree-underpinning-moldovas-sovereignty-separatist-conflict-2023-02-22/ | title=Putin cancels decree underpinning Moldova's sovereignty in separatist conflict | newspaper=Reuters | date=22 February 2023 | last1=Tanas | first1=Alexander }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/02/22/Russia-s-Putin-cancels-decree-underpinning-Moldova-sovereignty-in-separatist-conflict | title=Russia's Putin cancels decree underpinning Moldova sovereignty in separatist conflict | date=22 February 2023 }}</ref>

=== Positions taken by states ===
{| class="wikitable" align=center width=100%
! width=175px |State !! Notes
|-
|{{flag|Albania}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Albania supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Belarus}} || Officially, Belarus does not recognise Transnistria as independent.<ref></ref> De facto, Belarusian corporations and officials treat Transnistria as independent.<ref>{{dead link|date=April 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} </ref><ref>{{dead link|date=April 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{dead link|date=April 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{dead link|date=April 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref></ref><ref></ref>
|-
|{{flag|Bosnia and Herzegovina}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Bosnia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Croatia}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Croatia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Georgia}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Georgia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Liechtenstein}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Liechtenstein supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Moldova}} || Moldova's Prime Minister ] wanted to see the Russian army presence replaced with an international civil mission and hoped for European support.<ref name="rianovosti">{{Cite web |url=http://en.rian.ru/valdai_foreign_media/20100519/159073808.html |title=The Transnistrian conflict: Russia and Ukraine talk about "coordinated effort" &#124; Russia in Foreign Media &#124; RIA Novosti |access-date=27 June 2010 |archive-date=18 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121018122529/http://en.rian.ru/valdai_foreign_media/20100519/159073808.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Deputy Prime Minister ] said that Moldova was a European problem. When the ] passed the ] and created the new position of ] he said "The results of these efforts (to have more powerful tools for an effective foreign policy) will be very important, along with the place that the Transnistrian problem will occupy on the agenda of the EU and its new institution. Our task here is to attract attention to the Transnistrian problem, precisely so that it will occupy a higher place in the foreign and security policy agenda of the EU. We will always seek a solution through peaceful means, but we should never forget that we are talking about a conflict. We are talking about an administration ]] that has and is developing military capabilities and a very fragile situation that could deteriorate and create risky situations in the East of Europe. This affects the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Romania – because Romania is not indifferent to the developments – and other countries from the region. Experiences from other frozen conflicts show that it is not a good idea to wait until a major incident happens."<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.euractiv.com/en/east-mediterranean/moldova-deputy-pm-transnistria-european-problem-interview-460684 |title=Moldova Deputy PM: Transnistria is a European problem &#124; EurActiv |access-date=27 June 2010 |archive-date=26 May 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100526100329/http://www.euractiv.com/en/east-mediterranean/moldova-deputy-pm-transnistria-european-problem-interview-460684 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
|{{flag|Montenegro}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Montenegro supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|North Macedonia}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, North Macedonia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Norway}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Norway supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Russia}} || {{Main|Russia–Transnistria relations}} During a visit to Kyiv, President ] said he supported "special status" for Transnistria and recognised the "important and stabilising" role of the Russian army.<ref name="rianovosti"/> There have been calls from Russian figures to recognize the separatist republic.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/primele-atacuri-rusia-victoria-maiei-sandu-jirinovski-chisinaul-incerca-ocupe-transnistria-cale-militara-trebuie-protejam-1_5fb54d635163ec4271ff9480/index.html|title=Primele atacuri din Rusia după victoria Maiei Sandu. Jirinovski: Chișinăul va încerca să ocupe Transnistria pe cale militară. Trebuie să o apărăm|first=Iurii|last=Botnarenco|newspaper=Adevărul|date=18 November 2020|language=ro}}</ref> However, to date, Russia officially recognizes Moldovan sovereignty over Transnistria.
|-
|{{flag|Serbia}} || Initially, Serbia, along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/> In November 2015 Serbian politicians participated in a conference in Tiraspol. At the end of the conference, those politicians adopted a resolution which proclaimed that the "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR) and the Republic of Serbia are interested in broadening their multifaceted cooperation with the Russian Federation, including in the military-political sphere."<ref></ref>
|-
|{{flag|Turkey}} || Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Turkey supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."<ref name="eu"/>
|-
|{{flag|Ukraine}} || {{Main|Transnistria–Ukraine relations}} In June 1992, then Ukrainian President ] said that Ukraine would guarantee the independence of Transnistria in case of a ].<ref>''Moldawiens Präsident: Wir haben Krieg mit Rußland'', in: ], 23.06.1992.</ref> Over the following two decades Ukraine had an ambivalent relationship with Transnistria. In 2014, then Ukrainian President ] has said that Pridnestrovie is not a sovereign state, but rather, the name of a region along the Ukraine–Moldova border.<ref name="UNIAN 2014">{{cite news|language=ru|access-date=9 December 2014|url=http://www.unian.net/politics/1000039-ne-suschestvuet-gosudarstva-pmr-suschestvuet-lish-pridnestrovskiy-uchastok-granitsyi-poroshenko.html|title=Не существует государства ПМР, существует лишь приднестровский участок границы - Порошенко|date=23 October 2014|website=]}}</ref> In 2017, Transnistrian president ] said that Transnistria had "traditionally good relations with (Ukraine), we want to maintain them" and "we must build our relations with Ukraine – this is an objective necessity".<ref></ref>
|}

=== Positions taken by international organizations ===
{| class="wikitable" align=center width=100%
! width=175px |Organization !! Notes
|-
|{{flag|Commonwealth of Independent States}} || In June 2015, the Secretary General of the ] (CSTO), ], said that " is no military solution to ]. If a war breaks out in the region it will last for a long time and cause great bloodshed."<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://en.apa.az/xeber_csto_secretary_general__any_war_in_karab_228581.html |title=''CSTO secretary general: Any war in Karabakh and Transnistria will last for long time and cause great bloodshed'', en.apa.az 18 June 2015. |access-date=26 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151226193049/http://en.apa.az/xeber_csto_secretary_general__any_war_in_karab_228581.html |archive-date=26 December 2015 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
|{{flag|European Union}} || European Union took note of and welcomed "the objectives of Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova".<ref name="eu">{{cite web |title= Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova |work= Council of the European Union |date= 13 March 2009 |url= http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106648.pdf |access-date= 27 June 2010 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20100821123838/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106648.pdf |archive-date= 21 August 2010 |url-status= dead}}</ref> The EU was asked to restart negotiations for the ].<ref name="rianovosti"/>
|}


==United Nations Resolution A/72/L.58== ==United Nations Resolution A/72/L.58==
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* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
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| isbn = 0-87609-310-1 | isbn = 0-87609-310-1
| page = 102 | page = 102
| publisher = Council on Foreign Relations Press
}} }}
# {{cite news # {{cite news
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;Moldovan side ;Moldovan side


* * {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090209204608/http://eurojournal.org/index.php?id=C0_5_1 |date=9 February 2009 }}
* (developed by Moldova-Ukraine-Romania expert group) * (developed by Moldova-Ukraine-Romania expert group)


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{{Transnistria topics}} {{Transnistria topics}}
{{Post-Cold War European conflicts}} {{Post-Cold War European conflicts}}
{{Ongoing military conflicts}}


] ]

Latest revision as of 00:46, 3 December 2024

Conflict between Moldova and its breakaway region of Transnistria since 1990

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Transnistria conflict
Part of the post-Soviet conflicts

   Moldova    Transnistria
Date2 September 1990 – present
(34 years, 3 months, 3 weeks and 3 days)
LocationMoldovan eastern bank of the Dniester, the city of Bender (Tighina) and some villages at the western bank of the Dniester (Chițcani, Cremenciug, Gîsca).
Status Ongoing; frozen conflict
Territorial
changes
  • De facto independence of the Moldovan eastern bank of the Dniester as Transnistria
  • Transnistria gains control of Tighina (Bender) and some villages at the west bank of the Dniester
  • Moldova retains direct control of some villages at the east bank of the Dniester
  • Establishment of the autonomous Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of the Dniester in 2005, encompassing all lands at the eastern bank of the Dniester, but not those at the western bank of it, controlled by Transnistria
Belligerents

 Moldova

  • Supported by:
  •  Romania (military and diplomatic support)
  •  Ukraine (diplomatic support, military support offered if requested by Moldova)

 Transnistria

Post-Soviet conflicts
Caucasus

Central Asia

Eastern Europe
Politics of Transnistria
Constitution
Executive
LegislatureSupreme Council Speaker
Alexander Korshunov
Political parties
Elections
Administrative divisions
  • Five Raions
  • One Municipality
Foreign relations

Diplomatic missions of / in Transnistria

The Transnistria conflict (Romanian: Conflictul din Transnistria; Russian: Приднестровский конфликт, romanizedPridnestrovsky konflikt; Ukrainian: Придністровський конфлікт, romanizedPrydnistrovskyi konflikt) is an ongoing frozen conflict between Moldova and the unrecognized state of Transnistria. Its most active phase was the Transnistria War. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict. The conflict may be considered to have started on 2 September 1990, when Transnistria made a formal sovereignty declaration from Moldova (then part of the Soviet Union).

Transnistria is internationally recognized as a part of Moldova. It has diplomatic recognition only from two Russian-backed separatist states: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Historical status of Transnistria

Main article: History of Transnistria
Territorial situation of the conflict
Administrative divisions of actual Transnistria

Until the Second World War

The Soviet Union in the 1930s had an autonomous region of Transnistria inside Ukraine, called the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), half of whose population were Romanian-speaking people, and with Tiraspol as its capital.

During World War II, when Romania, aided by Nazi Germany, took control of Transnistria, it did not attempt to annex the occupied territory during the war, although it planned do so in the future.

Territorial consequences of the 1992 conflict

Left bank of the Dniester

During the War of Transnistria, some villages in the central part of Transnistria (on the eastern bank of the Dniester) rebelled against the new separatist Transnistria (PMR) authorities. They have been under effective Moldovan control as a consequence of their rebellion against the PMR. These localities are: commune Cocieri (including village Vasilievca), commune Molovata Nouă (including village Roghi), commune Corjova (including village Mahala), commune Coșnița (including village Pohrebea), commune Pîrîta, and commune Doroțcaia. The village of Corjova is in fact divided between PMR and Moldovan central government areas of control. Roghi is also controlled by the PMR authorities.

Right bank of the Dniester

At the same time, some areas on the right bank of the Dniester are under PMR control. These areas consist of the city of Bender with its suburb Proteagailovca, the communes Gîsca, Chițcani (including villages Mereneşti and Zahorna), and the commune of Cremenciug, formally in the Căușeni District, situated south of the city of Bender.

The breakaway PMR authorities also claim the communes of Varnița, in the Anenii Noi District, a northern suburb of Bender, and Copanca, in the Căușeni District, south of Chițcani, but these villages remain under Moldovan control.

Later tensions

Several disputes have arisen from these cross-river territories. In 2005, PMR militia entered Vasilievca, which is located over the strategic road linking Tiraspol and Rîbnița, but withdrew after a few days. In 2006 there were tensions around Varnița. In 2007 there was a confrontation between Moldovan and PMR forces in the Dubăsari-Cocieri area; however, there were no casualties. On 13 May 2007, the mayor of the village of Corjova, which is under Moldovan control, was arrested by the PMR militsia (police) together with a councilor of Moldovan-controlled part of the Dubăsari district.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Amid the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 14 January 2022 Ukrainian military intelligence declared that Russian special services were preparing "provocations" against Russian soldiers stationed in Transnistria at the time to create a casus belli for a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

On 24 February, on the first day of the invasion, there were allegations that some rockets that had hit Ukraine had been launched from Transnistria, although Moldova's Ministry of Defense denied this. On 4 March, Ukraine blew up a railway bridge on its border with Transnistria to prevent the 1,400 Russian troops stationed in the breakaway territory from crossing into Ukraine. Later, on 6 March, there were again claims that attacks that had hit Vinnytsia's airport had been launched from Transnistria, although Moldovan officials again denied this and said that they had been launched from Russian ships in the Black Sea.

Amid rumors that Transnistria would attack Ukraine, Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselski declared Transnistria to be a peaceful state which never had any plans to attack its neighbors and that those who spread these allegations were people without control over the situation or provocateurs with malicious intentions. He also made reference to the large ethnically Ukrainian population of Transnistria and how Ukrainian is taught in Transnistrian schools and is one of the official languages of the republic. However, in March, an image of the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko standing in front of a battle plan map of the invasion of Ukraine was leaked. This map showed a supposed incursion of Russian troops from the Ukrainian city port of Odesa into Transnistria and Moldova, revealing that Transnistria could become involved in the war.

Ukrainian military officials had identified the establishment of a "land corridor" to Transnistria as one of Russia's primary objectives since the first day of the invasion. On 22 April 2022, Russia's Brigadier General Rustam Minnekayev in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolaiv–Odesa front in the Ukraine war further west to include the Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova. Minnekaev announced that the plan of Russia's military action in Ukraine included taking full control of Southern Ukraine and achieving a land corridor to Transnistria. He also talked about the existence of supposed evidence of "oppression of the Russian-speaking population" of Transnistria, echoing Russia's justifications for the war in Ukraine. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine described this intention as imperialism, saying that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine".

On 26 April, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said during an interview that Moldova was a close neighbor to Ukraine, that Ukraine was not indifferent to it and that Moldova could turn to Ukraine for help. He also declared that Ukraine was able to solve the problem of Transnistria "in the blink of an eye", but only if Moldovan authorities requested the country's help; and that Romania could also come to Moldova's aid as "they are in fact the same people", with the same language as he continued, even though "there are many Moldovans who would not agree with me". Moldova officially rejected this suggestion from Ukraine, expressing its support only for a peaceful outcome of the conflict.

On 12 September 2024, a Moldovan soldier was killed under unclear circumstances in the demarcation line of Transnistria.

Position of the PMR government advocates

According to PMR advocates, the territory to the east of the Dniester River never belonged either to Romania nor to its predecessors, such as the Principality of Moldavia. This territory was split off from the Ukrainian SSR in a political maneuver of the USSR to become a seed of the Moldavian SSR (in a manner similar to the creation of the Karelo-Finnish SSR). In 1990, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian SSR was proclaimed in the region by a number of conservative local Soviet officials opposed to perestroika. This action was immediately declared void by the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev.

At the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova became independent. The Moldovan Declaration of Independence denounced the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and declared the 2 August 1940 "Law of the USSR on the establishment of the Moldavian SSR" null and void. The PMR side argues that, since this law was the only legislative document binding Transnistria to Moldova, there is neither historical nor legal basis for Moldova's claims over the territories on the left bank of the Dniester.

A 2010 study conducted by the University of Colorado Boulder showed that the majority of Transnistria's population supports the country's separation from Moldova. According to the study, more than 80% of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians and 60% of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria preferred independence or annexation by Russia to reunification with Moldova.

In 2006, officials of the country held a referendum to determine the status of Transnistria. There were two statements on the ballot: the first one was, "Renunciation of independence and potential future integration into Moldova"; the second was, "Independence and potential future integration into Russia". The results of this double referendum were that a large section of the population was against the first statement (96.61%) and in favor of the second one (98.07%).

Moldovan position

Moldova lost de facto control of Transnistria in 1992, in the wake of the War of Transnistria. However, the Republic of Moldova considers itself the rightful successor state to the Moldavian SSR (which was guaranteed the right to secession from the Soviet Union under the last version of the Soviet Constitution). By the principle of territorial integrity, Moldova claims that any form of secession from the state without the consent of the central Moldovan government is illegal. The Moldavian side hence believes that its position is backed by international law. It considers the current Transnistria-based PMR government to be illegitimate and not the rightful representative of the region's population, which has a Moldovan plurality (39.9% as of 1989). The Moldovan side insists that Transnistria cannot exist as an independent political entity and must be reintegrated into Moldova.

According to Moldovan sources, the political climate in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of the will of the people of the region and supporters of reintegration of Transnistria in Moldova are subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrests and other types of intimidation from separatist authorities.

Because of the non-recognition of Transnistria's independence, Moldova believes that all inhabitants of Transnistria are legally citizens of Moldova. However, it is estimated that 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants of Transnistria have acquired Russian citizenship and around 20,000 have acquired Ukrainian citizenship. As a result, Moldovan authorities have tried to block the installation of a Russian and Ukrainian consulate in Tiraspol.

International recognition of Transnistria

Only two states recognize Transnistria's sovereignty, each itself a largely unrecognized state: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two states are members of the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations.

On 21 February 2023, Russian president Vladimir Putin revoked the foreign policy document that declared Russian commitment to Moldovan sovereignty in the context of the Transnistria conflict.

Positions taken by states

State Notes
 Albania Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Albania supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Belarus Officially, Belarus does not recognise Transnistria as independent. De facto, Belarusian corporations and officials treat Transnistria as independent.
 Bosnia and Herzegovina Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Bosnia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Croatia Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Croatia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Georgia Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Georgia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Liechtenstein Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Liechtenstein supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Moldova Moldova's Prime Minister Vlad Filat wanted to see the Russian army presence replaced with an international civil mission and hoped for European support. Deputy Prime Minister Victor Osipov said that Moldova was a European problem. When the EU passed the Lisbon Treaty and created the new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy he said "The results of these efforts (to have more powerful tools for an effective foreign policy) will be very important, along with the place that the Transnistrian problem will occupy on the agenda of the EU and its new institution. Our task here is to attract attention to the Transnistrian problem, precisely so that it will occupy a higher place in the foreign and security policy agenda of the EU. We will always seek a solution through peaceful means, but we should never forget that we are talking about a conflict. We are talking about an administration that has and is developing military capabilities and a very fragile situation that could deteriorate and create risky situations in the East of Europe. This affects the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Romania – because Romania is not indifferent to the developments – and other countries from the region. Experiences from other frozen conflicts show that it is not a good idea to wait until a major incident happens."
 Montenegro Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Montenegro supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 North Macedonia Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, North Macedonia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Norway Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Norway supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Russia Main article: Russia–Transnistria relations During a visit to Kyiv, President Dmitri Medvedev said he supported "special status" for Transnistria and recognised the "important and stabilising" role of the Russian army. There have been calls from Russian figures to recognize the separatist republic. However, to date, Russia officially recognizes Moldovan sovereignty over Transnistria.
 Serbia Initially, Serbia, along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova." In November 2015 Serbian politicians participated in a conference in Tiraspol. At the end of the conference, those politicians adopted a resolution which proclaimed that the "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR) and the Republic of Serbia are interested in broadening their multifaceted cooperation with the Russian Federation, including in the military-political sphere."
 Turkey Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Turkey supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."
 Ukraine Main article: Transnistria–Ukraine relations In June 1992, then Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said that Ukraine would guarantee the independence of Transnistria in case of a Moldovan-Romanian union. Over the following two decades Ukraine had an ambivalent relationship with Transnistria. In 2014, then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said that Pridnestrovie is not a sovereign state, but rather, the name of a region along the Ukraine–Moldova border. In 2017, Transnistrian president Vadim Krasnoselsky said that Transnistria had "traditionally good relations with (Ukraine), we want to maintain them" and "we must build our relations with Ukraine – this is an objective necessity".

Positions taken by international organizations

Organization Notes
 Commonwealth of Independent States In June 2015, the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Nikolay Bordyuzha, said that " is no military solution to Transnistria conflict. If a war breaks out in the region it will last for a long time and cause great bloodshed."
 European Union European Union took note of and welcomed "the objectives of Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova". The EU was asked to restart negotiations for the 5+2 format.

United Nations Resolution A/72/L.58

Results of the United Nations General Assembly vote about the withdrawal of foreign soldiers in Transnistria.   In favour   Against   Abstained   Absent when the vote took place   Non-UN member

On 22 June 2018, the Republic of Moldova submitted a UN resolution that calls for "Complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria." The resolution was adopted by a simple majority.

See also

References

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