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{{Short description|War between North and South Korea, 1950–1953}} | |||
{{update|date=January 2010}} | |||
{{For-multi|other conflicts and wars involving Korea|List of Korean battles|the conflict from 1945 to the present|Korean conflict}} | |||
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{{Korean War Infobox}} | |||
{{Use American English|date=May 2019}} | |||
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{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2020}} | |||
{{Campaignbox Korean War}} | |||
{{very long|date=December 2024}} | |||
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{{Infobox military conflict | |||
| conflict = Korean War | |||
| partof = the ] and the ] | |||
| image = {{multiple image|border=infobox|perrow=2/2/2|total_width=300px | |||
| image1=Chosin.jpg | |||
| image2=Korean_War_bombing_Wonsan_(cropped).jpg | |||
| image3=Battle_of_Inchon_(cropped).png | |||
| image4=Namdaemun,_Main_Southern_Entrance_to_Seoul_(cropped).jpg | |||
| image5=KoreanWarRefugeeWithBaby_(cropped).jpg | |||
| image6=C-119B_Flying_Boxcar_drops_supplies_near_Chungju_1951.JPEG | |||
| footer = '''Clockwise from top left:'''{{Flatlist| | |||
* Infantry and armor of the U.S. ] during its ], 1950 | |||
* U.S. bombing during the ], {{circa|1951}} | |||
* Damaged gate of the ] in ], {{circa|1951}} | |||
* U.S. ] airdropping supplies near ], 1951 | |||
* Korean refugees in front of a U.S. ] tank, 1951 | |||
* UN amphibious landing at the ], 1950 | |||
}} | |||
}} | |||
| date = 25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953{{efn|End of physical conflict and signing of an armistice. De jure, North and South Korea are still at war.}}<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=6|day1=25|year1=1950|month2=7|day2=27|year2=1953}}) | |||
| place = ], ], ], ], ] | |||
| territory = ] established | |||
* North Korea gains the city of ], but loses a net total of {{Convert|1506|sqmi|km2|abbr=on|order=flip}}, including the city of ], to South Korea<ref>{{Cite book |last=Birtle |first=Andrew J. |url=https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-stale/stale.htm |title=The Korean War: Years of Stalemate |date=2000 |publisher=U.S. Army Center of Military History |page=34 |access-date=21 August 2021 |archive-date=24 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724211722/https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-stale/stale.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
| result = Inconclusive | |||
| combatant1 = {{Flagcountry|First Republic of Korea|1949}} | |||
| combatant1a = {{Flagdeco|United Nations}} ]{{Refn | name = nbUNforces | group = lower-alpha | On 9 July 1951 troop constituents were: US: 70.4%; ROK: 23.3%; other UNC: 6.3%.<ref name="kim-1996">{{Cite thesis |last=Kim |first=Heesu |title=Anglo-American Relations and the Attempts to Settle the Korean Question 1953–1960 |publisher=London School of Economics and Political Science |url=http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2408/1/U615357.pdf |page=213 |date=1996 |access-date=9 April 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170410050726/http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2408/1/U615357.pdf |archive-date=10 April 2017}}</ref>}}{{blist | |||
| {{Flag|United States|1912}} | |||
| {{Flag|United Kingdom}} | |||
| {{Flag|Canada|1921}} | |||
| {{Flag|Turkey}} | |||
| {{Flag|Australia}} | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Third Philippine Republic|1936}} | |||
| {{Flag|New Zealand}} | |||
| {{Flagdeco|Thailand|1917}} ] | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Ethiopian Empire}} | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Kingdom of Greece|state}} | |||
| {{Flag|French Fourth Republic|name=France}} | |||
| {{Flag|Colombia}} | |||
| {{Flag|Belgium}} | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Union of South Africa}} | |||
| {{Flag|Netherlands}} | |||
| {{Flag|Luxembourg}} | |||
}} | |||
| combatant2 = {{flag|North Korea|1948|size=23px}} | |||
| combatant2a = {{Plainlist | | |||
* {{Flag|China}} | |||
* {{Flag|Soviet Union|1936}} | |||
}} | |||
| commander1 = {{Plainlist | | |||
* {{flagdeco|First Republic of Korea|1949}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|First Republic of Korea|1949}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|First Republic of Korea|1949}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|First Republic of Korea|1949}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|First Republic of Korea|1949}} ] | |||
}} | |||
| commander1a = {{Plainlist | | |||
* {{flagdeco|United Nations}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United Nations}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912|size=23px}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United States|1912}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United Kingdom}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|United Kingdom}} ] | |||
}} | |||
| commander2 = {{Plainlist | | |||
* {{flagdeco|North Korea|1948}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|North Korea|1948}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|North Korea|1948}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|North Korea|1948}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|North Korea|1948}} ]{{KIA}} | |||
}} | |||
| commander2a = {{Plainlist | | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|China}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union|1936}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Soviet Union|1936}} ] | |||
}} | |||
| strength1 = {{Collapsible list | |||
|title= '''Peak strength<br />(combat troops):''' | |||
|{{Flagicon|First Republic of Korea|1948|size=23px}} 602,902<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9JFvmnDiH-gC&pg=PA692 |title=The Korean War, Volume 3 |publisher=U of Nebraska Press |others=Korea Institute of Military History |date=2001 |isbn=978-0803277960 |editor-last=Millett |editor-first=Allan Reed |page=692 |quote=Total Strength 602,902 troops |access-date=16 February 2013}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|United States|1912|size=23px}} 326,863<ref>{{Multiref2 | |||
|1={{Cite web |last=Kane |first=Tim |author-link=Tim Kane |date=27 October 2004 |title=Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003 |url=http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130128071747/http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 |archive-date=28 January 2013 |access-date=15 February 2013 |department=Reports |publisher=]}} | |||
|2={{Cite news |last=Ashley Rowland |date=22 October 2008 |title=U.S. to keep troop levels the same in South Korea |work=] |url=http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-to-keep-troop-levels-the-same-in-south-korea-1.84294 |url-status=live |access-date=16 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130512203739/http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-to-keep-troop-levels-the-same-in-south-korea-1.84294 |archive-date=12 May 2013}}<br />{{Cite web |last=Colonel Tommy R. Mize, United States Army |date=12 March 2012 |title=U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea, Anachronistic? |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562829.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130408133136/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562829 |archive-date=8 April 2013 |access-date=16 February 2013 |website=] |publisher=Defense Technical Information Center}} | |||
|3={{Cite web |last1=Louis H. Zanardi |last2=Barbara A. Schmitt |last3=Peter Konjevich |last4=M. Elizabeth Guran |last5=Susan E. Cohen |last6=Judith A. McCloskey |date=August 1991 |title=Military Presence: U.S. Personnel in the Pacific Theater |url=http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150991.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130615234749/http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150991.pdf |archive-date=15 June 2013 |access-date=15 February 2013 |website=Reports to Congressional Requesters |publisher=]}}}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|United Kingdom|1801|size=23px}} 14,198<ref name="UNC-USFK">{{Cite web |last=USFK Public Affairs Office |title=USFK United Nations Command |url=http://www.usfk.mil/About/United-Nations-Command/ |access-date=29 July 2016 |department=United States Forces Korea |publisher=United States Department of Defense |quote=Republic of Korea – 590,911<br />Colombia – 1,068<br />United States – 302,483<br />Belgium – 900<br />United Kingdom – 14,198<br />South Africa – 826<br />Canada – 6,146<br />Netherlands – 819<br />Turkey – 5,453<br />Luxembourg – 44<br />Australia – 2,282<br />Philippines – 1,496<br />New Zealand – 1,385<br />Thailand – 1,204{{Clarify|reason=Conflicts with data on ] article|date=December 2021}}<br />Ethiopia – 1,271<br />Greece – 1,263<br />France – 1,119|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160711030514/http://www.usfk.mil/About/United-Nations-Command |archive-date=11 July 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Multiref2 | |||
|1={{Cite book |last=Rottman |first=Gordon L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NpOp2OO1-DAC&pg=PA126 |title=Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950–1953 |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |date=2002 |isbn=978-0275978358 |page=126 |quote=A peak strength of 14,198 British troops was reached in 1952, with over 40,000 total serving in Korea. |access-date=16 February 2013 }} | |||
|2={{cite web |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=9 February 2012 |title=UK-Korea Relations |url=http://ukindprk.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-dprk/uk-korea-relations |access-date=16 February 2013 |website=British Embassy Pyongyang |publisher=] |quote=When war came to Korea in June 1950, Britain was second only to the United States in the contribution it made to the UN effort in Korea. 87,000 British troops took part in the Korean conflict, and over 1,000 British servicemen lost their lives }}{{Dead link|date=January 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} | |||
|3={{Cite web |last=Jack D. Walker |title=A Brief Account of the Korean War |url=http://www.kwva.org/brief_account_of_the_korean_war.htm |access-date=17 February 2013 |website=Information |publisher=Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History |quote=Other countries to furnish combat troops, with their peak strength, were: United States (302,483), United Kingdom (14,198), Canada (6,146), Turkey (5,455), Australia (2,282), Thailand (2,274), Philippines (1,496), New Zealand (1,389), France (1,185), Colombia (1,068), Ethiopia (1,271), Greece (1,263), Belgium (900), Netherlands (819), Republic of South Africa (826), Luxembourg (44) |archive-date=19 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200519043212/http://www.kwva.org/brief_account_of_the_korean_war.htm |url-status=live }} | |||
}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Canada|1921|size=23px}} 8,123<ref>{{Cite web |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=7 January 2013 |title=Land of the Morning Calm: Canadians in Korea 1950–1953 |url=http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/collections/korea/didyouknow |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130323093839/http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/collections/korea/didyouknow |archive-date=23 March 2013 |access-date=22 February 2013 |website=Veterans Affairs Canada |publisher=Government of Canada |quote=Peak Canadian Army strength in Korea was 8,123 all ranks.}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Turkey|size=23px}} 5,455<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Australia|size=23px}} 2,282<ref name="UNC-USFK"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Thailand|size=23px}} 2,274<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Third Philippine Republic|1936|size=23px}} 1,496<ref name="UNC-USFK"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|New Zealand|size=23px}} 1,389<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Ethiopian Empire|size=23px}} 1,271<ref name="517KWA"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Kingdom of Greece|state|size=23px}} 1,263<ref name="UNC-USFK"/><ref name="517KWA"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|French Fourth Republic|size=23px}} 1,185<ref name="517KWA">{{Cite book |last=Edwards |first=Paul M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5gYCm0bM68sC&pg=PA517 |title=Korean War Almanac |publisher=] |date=2006 |isbn=978-0816074679 |series=Almanacs of American wars |page=517 |access-date=22 February 2013}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Colombia|size=23px}} 1,068 <ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Belgium|size=23px}} 900<ref name="UNC-USFK"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Union of South Africa|size=23px}} 826<ref name="UNC-USFK"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Netherlands|size=23px}} 819<ref name="UNC-USFK"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Luxembourg|size=23px}} 44<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| '''Medical support and others:''' | |||
| {{Flagicon|India|size=23px}} 346<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ramachandran |first=D. p |date=19 March 2017 |title=The doctor-heroes of war |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/the-doctor-heroes-of-war/article17529390.ece |via=www.thehindu.com |access-date=8 May 2019 |archive-date=22 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200122164250/https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/the-doctor-heroes-of-war/article17529390.ece |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Sweden|size=23px}} 170<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Japan|1947|size=23px}} 120<ref name="auto">{{Cite journal |last=Morris-Suzuki |first=Tessa |author-link=Tessa Morris-Suzuki |date=29 July 2012 |title=Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War |url=https://apjjf.org/2012/10/31/Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/3803/article.html |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus |volume=10 |issue=31 |access-date=24 February 2018 |archive-date=18 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200518035219/https://apjjf.org/2012/10/31/Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/3803/article.html |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Norway|size=23px}} 109<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Denmark|size=23px}} 100<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flagicon|Italy|size=23px}} 72<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
|'''Together:''' 968,302 | |||
}} | |||
{{Collapsible list | |||
|title='''Total strength<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230709114538/https://new.mnd.go.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn2/625_15/index.html |date=9 July 2023 }} {{in lang|ko}}</ref><ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210111004201/https://www.imhc.mil.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201408070704130850.pdf |date=11 January 2021 }} {{in lang|ko}}</ref><br />(combat troops):'''<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|United States|1912|size=23px}} 1,789,000<ref name="Fact Sheet: America's Wars"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191127070133/https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf |date=27 November 2019 }} U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, Washington D.C., May 2017.</ref><br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|South Korea|size=23px}} 1,300,000<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.mpva.go.kr/ycnc/selectBbsNttView.do?key=493&bbsNo=130&nttNo=215661&searchCtgry=&searchCnd=all&searchKrwd=&pageIndex=1&integrDeptCode= |title=19만7056명 첫 全數조사 "젊은사람들 내 뒤에서 '얼마나 죽였길래' 수군수군 이젠 훈장 안 달고 다녀…세상이 야속하고 나 스스로 비참할 뿐" |access-date=14 July 2023 |archive-date=14 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230714033626/https://www.mpva.go.kr/ycnc/selectBbsNttView.do?key=493&bbsNo=130&nttNo=215661&searchCtgry=&searchCnd=all&searchKrwd=&pageIndex=1&integrDeptCode= |url-status=live }}</ref><br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|United Kingdom|1801|size=23px}} 56,000<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Canada|1921|size=23px}} 26,791<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Turkey|size=23px}} 21,212<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Australia|size=23px}} 17,164<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Third Philippine Republic|1936|size=23px}} 7,420<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Thailand|size=23px}} 6,326<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands|size=23px}} 5,322<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Colombia|size=23px}} 5,100<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Kingdom of Greece|state|size=23px}} 4,992<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|New Zealand|size=23px}} 3,794<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Ethiopian Empire|size=23px}} 3,518<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Belgium|size=23px}} 3,498<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|French Fourth Republic|size=23px}} 3,421<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Union of South Africa|size=23px}} 826<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Luxembourg|size=23px}} 110<br /> | |||
'''Medical support and others:'''<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Sweden|size=23px}} 1,124<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Denmark|size=23px}} 630<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|India|size=23px}} 627<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Norway|size=23px}} 623<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Italy|size=23px}} 189<br /> | |||
|{{Flagicon|Japan|1947|size=23px}} 120<br />'''Together:''' 3,257,797 | |||
}} | |||
| strength2 = {{Plainlist | '''Peak strength<br />(combat troops):''' | |||
* {{Flagicon|North Korea|1948|size=23px}} 266,600<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shrader |first=Charles R. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcGs__qQCzgC&pg=PA90 |title=Communist Logistics in the Korean War |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |date=1995 |isbn=978-0313295096 |series=Issue 160 of Contributions in Military Studies |page=90 |quote=NKPA strength peaked in October 1952 at 266,600 men in eighteen divisions and six independent brigades. |access-date=17 February 2013}}</ref> | |||
* {{Flagicon|China|1949|size=23px}} 1,450,000<ref name="zhang257">{{Harvnb|Zhang|1995|p=257}}.</ref><ref>Xiaobing, Li (2009). ''A History of the Modern Chinese Army'' Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. p. 105: "By December 1952, the Chinese forces in Korea had reached a record high of 1.45 million men, including fifty-nine infantry divisions, ten artillery divisions, five antiaircraft divisions, and seven tank regiments. CPVF numbers remained stable until the armistice agreement was signed in July 1953."</ref> | |||
* {{Flagicon|Soviet Union|1936|size=23px}} 26,000<ref name="Whipped">{{Cite journal |last=Kolb |first=Richard K. |date=1999 |title=In Korea we whipped the Russian Air Force |url=https://www.questia.com/read/1P3-43694886 |journal=VFW Magazine |volume=86 |issue=11 |access-date=17 February 2013 |quote=Soviet involvement in the Korean War was on a large scale. During the war, 72,000 Soviet troops (among them 5,000 pilots) served along the Yalu River in Manchuria. At least 12 air divisions rotated through. A peak strength of 26,000 men was reached in 1952. }}{{Dead link|date=September 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> | |||
'''Together:''' 1,742,000 | |||
}} | |||
'''Total:'''<br />{{Flagicon|China|1949|size=23px}} 2,970,000<ref name="xu"/><br />{{Flagicon|Soviet Union|1936|size=23px}} 72,000<ref name="Whipped"/><br /> '''Together:''' 3,042,000 | |||
The '''World War 3''' was a ] begun on June 25, 1950, and paused by an ] on July 17, 1953, between the ] in support of the ] against the ] and its allies, the ] and the ]. The Korean peninsula was ] according to American government planning and became a prelude to the Cold War of defeating the ] in 1945. In accordance with an agreement with the United States, the ] forces occupied Korea north of the ] in August 1945 to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces, while the Americans occupied Korea south of that line the next month.<ref name="Boose 1995 112-129">{{cite book |last= Boose |first= Donald W |title= Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision |publisher= Winter |year= 1995-96 |pages= 112–129}}</ref> The decision to divide the peninsula in this fashion was made without consulting the Korean people, which would later contribute to social and political unrest in the southern part ruled by the American forces. The failure to hold free elections throughout the Korean Peninsula in 1948 deepened the division between the two sides, and the 38th Parallel increasingly became a political border between the two Koreas. Although reunification negotiations continued in the months preceding the war, tension intensified. Cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th Parallel persisted. The situation escalated into open warfare when the North Korean forces attacked south to reunify Korea on June 25, 1950, precipitating a civil war known to the West as the Korean War.<ref name="Devine 2007 819-821">{{cite book |last= Devine |first= Robert A. |coauthors= Breen, T. H.; Frederickson, George M.; Williams, R. Hal; Gross, Adriela J.; Brands, H.W |title= America Past and Present 8th Ed. Volume II: Since 1865 |publisher= ] |year= 2007 |pages= 819–821 |isbn= 0-321-44661-5}}</ref> It was the first significant armed conflict of the ].<ref name ="TruceTent">{{cite book |last =Hermes, Jr. |first =Walter |title =Truce Tent and Fighting Front |publisher =Center of Military History |year=1966 |pages =2, 6–9 |url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/truce/fm.htm}}</ref> | |||
| casualties1 = | |||
| casualties2 = | |||
| casualties3 = {{Plainlist | | |||
* '''Total civilian deaths:''' 2–3 million (est.)<ref name="Cumings p. 35"/><ref name="Lewy pp. 450-453"/> | |||
* '''South Koreans:'''<br />''990,968 total casualties''<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
* '''North Koreans:''' <br />''1,550,000 total casualties'' (est.)<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
}} | |||
| notes = | |||
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Korean War}} | |||
}} | |||
The '''Korean War''' (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) was an armed conflict on the ] fought between ] (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and ] (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by the ] and the ], while South Korea was supported by the ] (UNC) led by the ]. The conflict was the first major ] of the ]. Fighting ended in 1953 with an ] but no ], leading to the ongoing ]. | |||
The ] and the ] intervened on the side of the unpopular South Korean Government. After early defeats at the hands of the North Korean military, a rapid UN counter-offensive repelled the North Koreans past the ] and almost to the ], the ] (PRC) came to the aid of the North.<ref name="Devine 2007 819-821"/> With the PRC's entry into the conflict, the fighting eventually ceased with an armistice that restored the original border between the Koreas at the ] and created the ], a 2.5 mile wide buffer zone between the two Koreas. North Korea unilaterally withdrew from the armistice on May 27, 2009, thus returning to a ] state of war. | |||
After the end of ] in 1945, Korea, which had been a ] for 35 years, was ] by the Soviet Union and the United States into two occupation zones{{Efn|the ] administered by the Soviets and the ] in the south}} at the ], with plans for a future independent state. Due to political disagreements and influence from their backers, the zones formed their own governments in 1948. North Korea was led by ] in ], and South Korea by ] in ]; both claimed to be the sole ] government of all of Korea and engaged in border clashes as internal unrest was fomented by communist groups in the south. On 25 June 1950, the ] (KPA), equipped and trained by the Soviets, launched an invasion of the south. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative,{{Efn|name=UN|text=At the time, China as a permanent member of the ] (UNSC) was represented by ] not ]. This prompted the Soviet Union's boycott of the UN and absence from the UNSC.<ref>{{cite news |last=White |first=James D. |title=Soviet Union Ending Boycott of United Nation Because War in Korea Getting Bit Too Hot |work=]/] |issue=106 |date=31 July 1950 |location=] |page=9 |via=]}}</ref>}} the ] ] the attack and ] member states to repel the invasion.<ref>Derek W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice, Stevens, London, 1964, pp. 29–60</ref> UN forces comprised 21 countries, with the United States providing around 90% of military personnel.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pembroke |first=Michael |title=Korea: Where the American Century Began |date=2018 |publisher=Hardie Grant Books |page=141}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=United Nations Command > History > 1950–1953: Korean War (Active Conflict)|url=https://www.unc.mil/History/1950-1953-Korean-War-Active-Conflict/|access-date=2020-11-05|website=www.unc.mil|archive-date=20 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230920141812/https://www.unc.mil/History/1950-1953-Korean-War-Active-Conflict/|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
During the war, both North and South Korea were sponsored by external powers, thus facilitating the war's metamorphosis from a ] to a ] between powers involved in the larger ]. | |||
Seoul was captured on 28 June, and by early August, the ] (ROKA) and its allies were nearly defeated, holding onto only the ] in the peninsula's southeast. On 15 September, UN forces ] near Seoul, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines. UN forces broke out from the perimeter on 18 September, re-captured Seoul, and ] in October, capturing Pyongyang and advancing towards the ]—the border with China. On 19 October, the Chinese ] (PVA) crossed the Yalu and entered the war on the side of the north.<ref name="Devine 2007 819-821" /> ] in December, following the PVA's ] and ]. Communist forces ] again in January 1951 before losing it to ] two months later. After an abortive ], UN forces ] roughly up to the 38th parallel. Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but dragged on as the fighting became a ] and the north suffered heavy damage ]. | |||
From a ] perspective, the Korean War combined strategies and tactics of ] and ] — swift ] attacks followed by air ] raids. The initial mobile campaign transitioned to ], lasting from January 1951 until the 1953 border ] and armistice. This perspective, however, largely leaves out the point of views of the Korean people and is only one way to view this conflict. | |||
Combat ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the ], which allowed the exchange of prisoners and created a {{convert|4|km|mi|adj=on}} wide ] (DMZ) along the frontline, with a ] at ]. The conflict caused more than 1 million military deaths and an estimated 2 to 3 million civilian deaths. ] include the ] by Seoul and the torture and starvation of ] by Pyongyang. North Korea became one of the most heavily bombed countries in history,<ref name="Fisher">{{Cite web |last=Fisher |first=Max |date=2015-08-03 |title=Americans have forgotten what we did to North Korea |url=https://www.vox.com/2015/8/3/9089913/north-korea-us-war-crime |access-date=2021-10-18 |website=Vox |language=en |archive-date=7 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220407112255/https://www.vox.com/2015/8/3/9089913/north-korea-us-war-crime |url-status=live }}</ref> and virtually all of Korea's major cities were destroyed.<ref name="Robinson 119-120">{{Cite book |last=Robinson |first=Michael E |url=https://archive.org/details/koreastwentieth00robi/page/119 |title=Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey |date=2007 |publisher=University of Hawaii Press |isbn=978-0824831745 |location=Honolulu, HI |pages=-}}</ref> No peace treaty has been signed, making the war a ].<ref name="HeFeng2013">{{Cite book |last1=He |first1=Kai |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iAaHqijyLy8C&pg=PA50 |title=Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior |last2=Feng |first2=Huiyun |publisher=Routledge |date=2013 |isbn=978-1135131197 |page=50 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170704225317/https://books.google.com/books?id=iAaHqijyLy8C&pg=PA50 |archive-date=4 July 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="LiCribb2014">{{Cite book |last1=Li |first1=Narangoa |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zfMYBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 |title=Historical Atlas of Northeast Asia, 1590–2010: Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Eastern Siberia |last2=Cribb |first2=Robert |publisher=Columbia University Press |date=2014 |isbn=978-0231160704 |page=194 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170704225317/https://books.google.com/books?id=zfMYBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 |archive-date=4 July 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
==Background== | |||
===Terminology=== | |||
In the USA, the war was officially described as a ] owing to the lack of a legitimate ]. Colloquially, it has also been referred to in the United States as '''The Forgotten War''' and '''The Unknown War''', because it was ostensibly a ] conflict, ended in stalemate, had fewer American casualties, and concerned issues much less clear than in previous and subsequent conflicts, such as the ] and the ].<ref>{{cite web |title =Remembering the Forgotten War: Korea, 1950–1953 |publisher =Naval Historical Center |url=http://www.history.navy.mil/ac/korea/korea1.htm |accessdate =2007-08-16}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title= ]|last= Halberstam |first= David |authorlink= David Halberstam |year= 2007 |publisher= ] |location= New York |isbn= 978-1-4013-0052-4 |page= 2 |quote= Over half a century later, the war still remained largely outside American political and cultural consciousness. ''The Forgotten War'' was the apt title of one of the bestbooks on it. Korea was a war that sometimes seemed to have been orphaned by history.}}</ref> | |||
==Names== | |||
In South Korea the war is usually referred to as the 6-2-5 War (yuk-i-o jeonjaeng), reflecting the date of its commencement on June 25. | |||
{{Infobox Chinese | |||
| title = Korean War | |||
| skhangul = 6·25 전쟁 or 한국 전쟁 | |||
| skhanja = 六二五戰爭 or 韓國戰爭 | |||
| skrr = Hanguk Jeonjaeng | |||
| skmr = Han'guk Chŏnjaeng | |||
| northkorea = | |||
| nkhangul = 조국해방전쟁 | |||
| nkhanja = 祖國解放戰爭 | |||
| nkrr = Joguk haebang Jeonjaeng | |||
| nkmr = Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng | |||
| northkorea2 = yes | |||
| ibox-order = ko4, ko3 | |||
}} | |||
In South Korea, the war is usually referred to as the "625 War" ({{Korean|hangul=6·25 전쟁|hanja=六二五戰爭|labels=no}}), the "625 Upheaval" ({{Korean|hangul=6·25 동란|hanja=六二五動亂|rr=yugio dongnan|labels=no}}), or simply "625", reflecting the date of its commencement on 25 June.<ref name="Hoare1999"/> | |||
In North Korea the war is officially referred to as the |
In North Korea, the war is officially referred to as the ''Fatherland Liberation War'' ({{Transliteration|ko|Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng}}) or the '']'' ''War'' ({{Korean|hangul=조선전쟁|mr=Chosŏn chŏnjaeng|context=north|labels=no}}).<ref name="Kim2003"/> | ||
In mainland China, the segment of the war after the intervention of the ] is commonly and officially known as the "Resisting America and Assisting Korea War"<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rawnsley |first=Gary D. |date=2009 |title='The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea': How Beijing Sold the Korean War |journal=] |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=285–315 |doi=10.1177/1750635209345186 |s2cid=143193818}}</ref> ({{Zh|t=抗美援朝战争|p=Kàngměi Yuáncháo Zhànzhēng|c=}}), <!---PRC uses traditional Chinese during the war----> although the term "'']'' War" ({{Zh<!-- -->|t=朝鮮戰爭|p= Cháoxiǎn Zhànzhēng}}) is sometimes used unofficially. The term "'']'' (Korean) War" ({{Zh<!-- -->|t=韓戰|p= Hán Zhàn}}) is most used in ] (Republic of China), ] and ]. | |||
In the ] the war is officially called the ''] Zhan Zheng'' (Korean War), with the word "Chao Xian" referring to Korea in general, and officially North Korea. | |||
In the US, the war was initially described by President ] as a "]" as the US never formally declared war and the operation was conducted under the auspices of the UN.<ref name="Truman1950"/> It has been sometimes referred to in the ] as "The Forgotten War" or "The Unknown War" because of the lack of public attention it received relative to World War II and the ].<ref name="Naval Historical Center"/>{{Sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 2}} | |||
The term ''Korean War'' can also denote the skirmishes before the invasion and since the armistice.<ref name="AMH">{{cite web |title =The Korean War, 1950–1953 (an extract from American Military History, Volume 2—revised 2005) |url =http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/chapter8.htm |accessdate =2007-08-20}}</ref> | |||
==Background== | |||
===Japanese rule (1910–1945)=== | |||
===Imperial Japanese rule (1910–1945)=== | |||
{{Main|Korea under Japanese rule}} | {{Main|Korea under Japanese rule}} | ||
] diminished the influence of ] over Korea in the ] (1894–95).{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=}} A decade later, after defeating ] in the ], Japan made the Korean Empire its ] with the ] in 1905, then annexed it with the ].<ref name="Schnabel1972"/> | |||
Many ] fled the country. The ] was founded in 1919 in ]. It failed to achieve international recognition, failed to unite the nationalist groups, and had a fractious relationship with its US-based founding president, ].{{Sfn|Stueck|2002|pp=19–20}} | |||
In China, the nationalist ] and the communist ] (PLA) helped organize Korean refugees against the Japanese military, which had also occupied parts of China. The Nationalist-backed Koreans, led by ], fought in the ] (1941-45). The communists, led by, among others, ], fought the Japanese in Korea and ].{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=160–61, 195–96}} At the ] in 1943, China, the UK, and the US decided that "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent".<ref name="Early1943"/> | |||
===Korea divided (1945–1949)=== | |||
{{Main|Division of Korea}} | |||
At the ] in 1943 and the ] in February 1945, the Soviet Union promised to join its ] in the ] within three months of the ]. ] and ] on 8 August 1945.{{Sfn|Dear|Foot|1995|p=516}}<ref name="Whelan1991"/> By 10 August, the ] had begun to occupy the north of Korea.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=24, 25}} | |||
On 10 August in ], US Colonels ] and ] were assigned to divide Korea into Soviet and US occupation zones and proposed the ] as the dividing line. This was incorporated into the US ], which responded to the ] on 15 August. Explaining the choice of the 38th parallel, Rusk observed, "Even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by U. S. forces in the event of Soviet disagreement ... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops".{{Sfn|Goulden|1983|p=17}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI - Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d771 |access-date=2023-01-05 |website=history.state.gov |archive-date=5 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230105150706/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d771 |url-status=live }}</ref> ], however, maintained his wartime policy of cooperation, and on 16 August, the Red Army halted at the 38th parallel for three weeks to await the arrival of US forces.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=24, 25}} | |||
On 7 September 1945, General ] issued Proclamation No. 1 to the people of Korea, announcing US military control over Korea south of the 38th parallel and establishing English as the official language during military control.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI - Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d776 |access-date=2022-06-23 |website=history.state.gov |archive-date=11 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211111012102/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d776 |url-status=live }}</ref> On 8 September, US Lieutenant General ] arrived in ] to accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel.{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=}} Appointed as military governor, Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the ] (USAMGIK 1945–48).{{Sfn|Halberstam|2007|p=63}} | |||
In December 1945, Korea was administered by a ], as agreed at the ], to grant independence after a five-year trusteeship.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=25–26}}{{Sfn|Becker|2005|p=53}} Waiting five years for independence was unpopular among Koreans, and riots broke out.<ref name="Schnabel1972" /> To contain them, the USAMGIK banned strikes on 8 December and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and People's Committees on 12 December.{{Sfn|Jager|2013|pp=41–42}} Following further civilian unrest,{{Sfn|Cumings|1981|loc=chapter 3, 4}} the USAMGIK declared ]. | |||
Citing the inability of the Joint Commission to make progress, the US government decided{{when|date=December 2023}} to hold an election under UN auspices to create an independent Korea. The Soviet authorities and Korean communists refused to cooperate on the grounds it would not be fair, and many South Korean politicians boycotted it.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|p=211}}{{Sfn|Jager|2013|p=47}} The ] was held in May.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=26}}<ref name="Time1946" /> The resultant South Korean government promulgated a national political constitution on 17 July and elected Syngman Rhee as ] on 20 July. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948. | |||
In the Soviet-Korean Zone of Occupation, the Soviets agreed to the establishment of a communist government{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=26}} led by Kim Il Sung.<ref name="AMH" /> The ]s took place in August.{{Sfn|Malkasian|2001|p=13}} The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1948 and the US in 1949.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Korea - Division of Korea |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/Division-of-Korea |access-date=24 June 2022 |archive-date=27 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220227041057/https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/Division-of-Korea |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Statement by the President on the Decision To Withdraw U.S. Forces From Korea, 1947-1949. {{!}} The American Presidency Project |url=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-the-decision-withdraw-us-forces-from-korea-1947-1949 |access-date=24 June 2022 |website=presidency.ucsb.edu |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818010130/https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-the-decision-withdraw-us-forces-from-korea-1947-1949 |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
===Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)=== | |||
With the end of the ], the ] resumed in earnest between the ] and the ]-led government. While the Communists were struggling for supremacy in Manchuria, they were supported by the North Korean government with ] and manpower.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=110}} According to Chinese sources, the North Koreans donated 2,000 railway cars worth of supplies while thousands of Koreans served in the Chinese PLA during the war.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|pp=110–11}} North Korea also provided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with a safe refuge for non-combatants and communications with the rest of China.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=110}} As a token of gratitude, between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean veterans who served in the PLA were sent back along with their weapons, and they later played a significant role in the initial invasion of South Korea.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=110}} China promised to support the North Koreans in the event of a war against South Korea.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=111}} | |||
===Communist insurgency in South Korea (1948–1950)=== | |||
{{More citations needed section|date=November 2024}} | |||
By 1948, a North Korea-backed insurgency had broken out in the southern half of the peninsula. This was exacerbated by the undeclared border war between the Koreas, which saw division-level engagements and thousands of deaths on both sides.<ref>Gibby, Bryan (2012). ''Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953''. University Alabama Press. p. 72.</ref>{{additional citations needed|date=September 2024}} The ROK was almost entirely trained and focused on counterinsurgency, rather than conventional warfare. They were equipped and advised by a force of a few hundred American officers, who were successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against ] (Korean People's Army, KPA) forces along the 38th parallel.<ref name="Bryan, p. 76">Bryan, p. 76.</ref> Approximately 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police officers died in the insurgent war and border clashes.<ref name="EB">{{Cite web |title=Korean War | Combatants, Summary, Years, Map, Casualties, & Facts |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |date=29 May 2023 |access-date=25 July 2019 |archive-date=24 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424090911/https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
The ] occurred without direct North Korean participation, though the guerrillas still professed support for the northern government. Beginning in April 1948 on ], the campaign saw arrests and repression by the South Korean government in the fight against the South Korean Labor Party, resulting in 30,000 violent deaths, among them 14,373 civilians, of whom ~2,000 were killed by rebels and ~12,000 by ROK security forces. The ] overlapped with it, as several thousand army defectors waving red flags massacred right-leaning families. This resulted in another brutal suppression by the government and between 2,976 and 3,392 deaths. By May 1949, both uprisings had been crushed.{{cn|date=September 2024}} | |||
Insurgency reignited in the spring of 1949 when attacks by guerrillas in the mountainous regions (buttressed by army defectors and North Korean agents) increased.{{citation needed|date=September 2024}} Insurgent activity peaked in late 1949 as the ROKA engaged so-called People's Guerrilla Units. Organized and armed by the North Korean government, and backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had infiltrated through the border, these guerrillas launched an offensive in September aimed at undermining the South Korean government and preparing the country for the KPA's arrival in force. This offensive failed.<ref>Bryan, pp. 76-77.</ref>{{additional citations needed|date=September 2024}} However, the guerrillas were now entrenched in the Taebaek-san region of the ] and the border areas of the ].<ref name="Bryan, p. 78">Bryan, p. 78.</ref> | |||
Upon defeating ] in the ] (1894–96), the ] occupied the ] (1897–1910) of ]—a peninsula strategic to its ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/> A decade later, on defeating ] in the ] (1904–05), Japan made Korea its ], with the ] in 1905, then annexed it with the ] in 1910.<ref name="FirstYear">{{cite web |last =James F |first =Schnabel |title = United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year |url =http://www.history.army.mil/books/P&D.HTM |pages =3, 18 |accessdate = 2007-08-19}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title =Treaty of Annexation (Annexation of Korea by Japan) |publisher = USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center |url = http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/kore1910.htm |accessdate = 2007-08-19}}</ref> | |||
While the insurgency was ongoing, the ROKA and KPA engaged in battalion-sized battles along the border, starting in May 1949.<ref name="Bryan, p. 76"/> Border clashes between South and North continued on 4 August 1949, when thousands of North Korean troops attacked South Korean troops occupying territory north of the 38th parallel. The 2nd and 18th ROK Infantry Regiments repulsed attacks in Kuksa-bong,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Kuksa-bong |url=https://mapcarta.com/16197292 |access-date=11 November 2017 |website=Mapcarta |archive-date=21 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171021061118/https://mapcarta.com/16197292 |url-status=live }}</ref> and KPA troops were "completely routed".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lY5-7ZirsmgC&q=august+4+1949 |title=The Korean War: A History |date=27 July 2010 |publisher=Random House Publishing Group |isbn=9780679603788 |access-date=11 November 2017 |via=Google Books}}</ref> Border incidents decreased by the start of 1950.<ref name="Bryan, p. 78"/> | |||
]s and the ] fled the country, and some founded the Provisional Korean Government, headed by ], in ], in 1919, that proved a “government-in-exile” recognized by few countries. From 1919 to 1925 and onwards, Korean ] led internal and external warfare against the Japanese.<ref name="Stokesbury1990">{{cite book |title= A Short History of the Korean War |last=Stokesbury |first= James L |year= 1990 |publisher=Harper Perennial |location= New York |isbn= 0688095135}}</ref>{{rp|23}}<ref name="World War II 1995 p.516">''The Oxford Companion to World War II'' (1995) p. 516.</ref> | |||
Meanwhile, counterinsurgencies in the South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather, denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with insurgents and build more partisan cadres; North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA.<ref>Bryan, pp. 79-80.</ref> | |||
] was considered to be part of the ] along with Taiwan, which was part of the ] and was an industrialized ]; in 1937, the colonial Governor–General, General ], commanded the ] to Japan of the colony's 23.5 million people—by banning Korean language, literature, and culture, replaced with that of the Japanese, and that the populace rename themselves as Japanese. In 1938, the Colonial Government established ]; by 1939, 2.6 million Koreans worked overseas as ]ers; by 1942, Korean men were being conscripted to the ]. | |||
On 1 October 1949, the ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in ] and ]. By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, North Korea made final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion was reduced to a single man over the course of engagements by the ROKA ]. The second was annihilated by a two-battalion ] by units of the ROKA ], resulting in a toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded.<ref>Bryan, p. 80.</ref> By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm.<ref>Bryan, p. 82.</ref> | |||
Meanwhile, in China, the nationalist ] and the Communist ] organized the (right-wing and left-wing) refugee Korean patriots. The Nationalists, led by ], fought in the ] (December 1941 – August 1945). The communists, led by ], fought the Japanese in Korea. | |||
===Prelude to war (1950)=== | |||
During ], Japanese utilized Korea's food, livestock, and metals for the ]. Japanese forces in Korea increased from 46,000 (1941) to 300,000 (1945) soldiers. Japanese Korea conscripted 2.6 million forced laborers controlled with a ] Korean police force; some 723,000 people had been sent to work in the overseas empire and in metropolitan Japan. By January 1945, Koreans were 32% of Japan’s labor force; in August 1945, when the US dropped an ], they were about 25% of the people killed.<ref name="World War II 1995 p.516"/> Japanese rule in Korea and Taiwan was not recognized by other world powers at the end of the war. | |||
By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=3–4}} | |||
Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea. PLA forces were still embroiled in the Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=3}} By spring 1950, he believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under ] had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets ], breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=9, 10}} The Soviets had cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with their ], and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=9, 10}} Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the ].{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=11}} | |||
The US-Soviet division of Korea excluded the Koreans—who were represented by US Army colonels ] and ].<ref name="McCullough">{{cite book |last =McCullough |first =David |title = Truman |publisher =Simon & Schuster Paperbacks |year=1992 |pages =785, 786 |isbn =0671869205}}</ref> Two years earlier, at the ] (November 1943), Nationalist China, the UK, and the USA decided that Korea should become independent, “in due course”; Stalin concurred. In February 1945, at the ], the Allies failed to establish the Korean trusteeship first discussed in 1943 by U.S. President Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister ]. | |||
In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack the government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}} For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea. Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the US{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}} | |||
Per the US-Soviet agreement, the USSR declared war against Japan on 9 August 1945, and, by 10 August, the ] occupied the Korean north, via amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel and its Twenty-Fifth Army entering from Manchuria, China.<ref name="World War II 1995 p.516"/><ref>R. Whelan ''Drawing the Line: the Korean War 1950–53''; London (1990) p. 22.</ref> Some three weeks later, on 8 September 1945, Lt. Gen. ], USA, arrived in ] to accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel.<ref name="Appleman">{{cite book |last =Appleman |first =Roy E |title =South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu |publisher =Dept. of the Army |year=1998 |pages =3, 15, 381, 545, 771, 719 |url =http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm |isbn =0160019184 }}</ref> | |||
Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed the economic and military aid promised by the Soviets.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=139–40}} Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support.{{Sfn|Weathersby|1993|p=29}} Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=13}}<ref>Mark O'Neill, "Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives", OAH Magazine of History, Spring 2000, p. 21.</ref> ] argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support.<ref name=Jian>{{cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Chen |title=China's Road to the Korean War |date=27 November 1994 |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |isbn=9780231100250}}</ref>{{rp|112}} Citing more recent scholarship, ] contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via a telegram.<ref name=Zhao>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy|date=2022|publisher=] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=28–29|oclc=1332788951}}</ref>{{rp|28–9}} Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention.<ref name=Zhao/>{{rp|30}} | |||
===Korea divided (1945)=== | |||
At the ] (July–August 1945), the Allies unilaterally decided to divide Korea—without consulting the Koreans—in contradiction of the ] (November 1943) where ], ], and ] declared that Korea would be a free nation and an independent country.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/><ref name="Stokesbury1990"/><ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|24}}<ref name="Appleman" />{{rp|24-25}}<ref name="Cumings1">{{cite book |last =Cumings |first =Bruce |authorlink =Bruce Cumings |title =Origins of the Korean War |publisher =Princeton University Press |year= 1981 |chapter =Chapter 4 |isbn =89-7696-612-0 }}</ref>{{rp|25}}<ref>{{cite book |title= Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea |last=Becker |first= Jasper |year= 2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press, USA |location= New York|isbn= 019517044X |page= 52}}</ref> Moreover, the earlier ] (February 1945) granted to ] European "buffer zones"—]s accountable to Moscow- as well as an expected ] pre-eminence in ] and ],<ref name="Goulden17">{{cite book |last =Goulden |first =Joseph C |title = Korea: The Untold Story of the War |publisher =McGraw-Hill |year=1983 |page =17 |isbn =0070235805}}</ref> as reward for joining the US ] effort against ].<ref name ="Goulden17" /> | |||
Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May{{Sfn|Weathersby|1993|pp=29–30}} and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the ] on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy the ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=14}} | |||
By 10 August, the ] occupied the northern part of the peninsula as agreed, and on 26 August halted at the ] for three weeks to await the arrival of US forces in the south.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|25}}<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|24}} | |||
On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in ] on 15–17 June. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}} On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve a general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=15}} | |||
On 10 August 1945, with the 15 August ] near, the Americans were in doubt that the Soviets would honor their part of the Joint Commission, the US-sponsored ] agreement. A month earlier, to fulfill the politico-military requirements of the US, Colonel ] and Colonel ], divided the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel after hurriedly deciding (in thirty minutes), that the US Korean Zone of Occupation had to have a minimum of two ports.<ref name="Appleman"/><ref>{{Citation |last =McCune |first =Shannon C |title =Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries |journal =Far Eastern Quarterly |volume =May 1946 |issue = No. 5 |pages =286–7 |date=1946-05 }}.</ref><ref>{{Citation |last = Grajdanzev |first =Andrew |title =Korean Divided |journal =Far Eastern Survey |volume =XIV |page =282 |date=1945-10 }}.</ref><ref>{{Citation |last =Grajdanzev |first =Andrew |title =History of Occupation of Korea |volume =I |issue =ch. 4 |page =16 }}.</ref> Explaining why the occupation zone demarcation (38th parallel) was ''so far south'', Rusk observed, “even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by US forces, in the event of Soviet disagreement ... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops”, especially when “faced with the scarcity of US forces immediately available, and time and space factors, which would make it difficult to reach very far north, before Soviet troops could enter the area.”<ref name="Goulden17"/> The Soviets agreed to the US occupation zone demarcation, to improve Soviet ]an-occupation negotiation-leverage, and because each would accept Japanese surrender where they stood.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|25}} | |||
While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at ] and Ongjin, many initiated by the South.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=247–53}}{{Sfn|Stueck|2002|p=71}} The ROK was being trained by the US ] (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice".{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=255–56}} For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat ] visited Korea on 18 June.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=249–58}} | |||
As the ], General ] directly controlled South Korea via the ] (USAMGIK 1945–48).<ref name="Stokesbury2007">{{cite book |title= ] |last= Halberstam |first= David |authorlink= David Halberstam |year= 2007 |publisher= ]|location= New York |isbn= 978-1-4013-0052-4}}</ref>{{rp|63}} He established control by first restoring to power the key Japanese colonial administrators and their Korean and police ],<ref name="TruceTent"/> and second, by refusing the USAMGIK’s official recognition of the ] (PRK) (August–September 1945), the provisional government (agreed with the Japanese Army) with which the Koreans had been governing themselves and the peninsula—because he suspected it was ]. These US policies, voiding popular Korean sovereignty, provoked the civil insurrections and guerrilla warfare preceding, then constituting, the Korean civil war.<ref name="FirstYear"/> On 3 September 1945, Lieutenant General ], Commander, ] , contacted Hodge, telling him that the Soviets were ''south of the 38th parallel'' at ]. Hodge trusted the accuracy of the ] report.<ref name = "Appleman" /> | |||
Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|p=17}} The ] noted the southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tom Gjelten |date=25 June 2010 |title=CIA Files Show U.S. Blindsided By Korean War |work=] |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128092817 |url-status=live |access-date=16 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130824155650/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128092817 |archive-date=24 August 2013}}</ref> On 23 June UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Seth |first=Michael J. |url=https://archive.org/details/historykoreafrom00seth |title=A history of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |date=2010 |isbn=978-0742567160 |location=Lanham, MD |page= |url-access=limited}}</ref> | |||
In December 1945, Korea was administered by the ], agreed at the ] (October 1945). Again excluding the Koreans, the commission decided the country would become independent after a five-year ]eeship—action facilitated by each régime sharing its sponsor's ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|25-26}}<ref>{{cite book |title= Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea |last=Becker |first= Jasper |year= 2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press, USA |location= New York |isbn= 019517044X |page= 53}}</ref> The incensed Korean populace revolted; in the South, some protested, some rose in arms;<ref name="FirstYear" /> to contain them, the USAMGIK banned ]s (8 December 1945) and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and the PRK People's Committees on 12 December 1945. | |||
===Comparison of forces=== | |||
This suppression of sovereignty provoked an 8,000-railroad-worker strike on 23 September 1946 in ], political action which quickly extended throughout US-controlled Korea; the USAMGIK had lost civil control. On 1 October 1946, ] killed three students in the “]”; people counter-attacked, killing 38 policemen. Likewise, on 3 October, some 10,000 people attacked the ] police station, killing three policemen and injuring some 40 more; elsewhere, populaces killed some 20 landlords and pro-Japanese South Korean officials.<ref name="Cumings1">{{cite book |last =Cumings |first =Bruce |authorlink =Bruce Cumings |title =Origins of the Korean War |publisher =Princeton University Press |year= 1981 |chapter =ch. 3, 4 |isbn =89-7696-612-0}}</ref> The USAMGIK declared ] to control South Korea; in controlling the Koreans with Japanese colonial administrators and Korean collaborators, the US discredited its declarations of a “Free Korea”.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} | |||
Chinese involvement was extensive from the beginning, building on previous collaboration between the Chinese and Korean communists during the Chinese Civil War. Throughout 1949 and 1950, the Soviets continued arming North Korea. After the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, ethnic Korean units in the PLA were sent to North Korea.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|p=14}} | |||
In the fall of 1949, two PLA divisions composed mainly of ] troops (the ] and ]) entered North Korea, followed by smaller units throughout the rest of 1949. The reinforcement of the KPA with PLA veterans continued into 1950, with the ] and several other units of the former Fourth Field Army arriving in February; the PLA 156th Division was reorganized as the KPA 7th Division. By mid-1950, between 50,000 and 70,000 former PLA troops had entered North Korea, forming a significant part of the KPA's strength on the eve of the war's beginning.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stuecker |first=William |title=Korean War: World History |date=2004 |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |pages=102–103}}</ref> The combat veterans and equipment from China, the tanks, artillery, and aircraft supplied by the Soviets, and rigorous training increased North Korea's military superiority over the South, armed by the U.S. military with mostly small arms, but no heavy weaponry.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|p=15}} | |||
The ] ], led by nationalist ], opposed the Soviet–American trusteeship of Korea, arguing that after thirty-five years (1910–45) of Japanese ]—''foreign rule''—most Koreans opposed another foreign rule, i.e. US and Soviet. Gaining advantage from the native political temper, the US quit the Soviet-supported ]—and, using the 31 March 1948 ] election deadline to achieve a ] civil government in the US Korean Zone of Occupation—convoked national general elections that the Soviets opposed, then boycotted, insisting that the US honor the Moscow Accords.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|26}}<ref>{{cite news |first= |last= |coauthors= |title= For Freedom|curly=y |work= TIME |page= |date= 20 May 1946 |accessdate=2008-12-10 |quote= Rightist groups in the American zone, loosely amalgamated in the Representative Democratic Council under elder statesman Syngman Rhee, protested heatedly ... |url= http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,792877-1,00.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= http://myhome.shinbiro.com/~mss1/failure.html |title= The Failure of Trusteeship |accessdate=2008-12-10 |work= infoKorea |publisher= |date= }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.mcn.org/e/iii/politics/asian_war/korea_truman_notes.html |title= Korea Notes from Memoirs by Harry S. Truman |accessdate=2008-12-10 |work= The US War Against Asia (notes)|publisher=III Publishing |date= |quote=U.S. proposed general elections (U.S. style) but Russia insisted on Moscow Agreement.}}</ref> | |||
Several generals, such as ], were PLA veterans born to ethnic Koreans in China. While older histories of the conflict often referred to these ethnic Korean PLA veterans as being sent from northern Korea to fight in the Chinese Civil War before being sent back, recent Chinese archival sources studied by Kim Donggill indicate that this was not the case. Rather, the soldiers were indigenous to China, as part of China's longstanding ethnic Korean community, and were recruited to the PLA in the same way as any other Chinese citizen.<ref>Zhihua Shen. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407163505/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZWNbDwAAQBAJ&dq=were+indigenous+in+Northeast+China+and+that+the+North+Korean+regime+never+dispatched+soldiers+to+Manchuria&pg=PT306 |date=7 April 2023 }} Columbia University Press, September 2018.</ref> | |||
The resultant anti-communist South Korean government promulgated a national political constitution (17 July 1948) elected a president, the American-educated ] Syngman Rhee (20 July 1948), and established the ] on 15 August 1948.<ref name = "MacroHistory">{{cite web |title =The Korean War, The US and Soviet Union in Korea |publisher =MacroHistory |url = http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24kor.html |accessdate =2007-08-19 }}</ref> Likewise, in the Russian Korean Zone of Occupation, the USSR established a ] North Korean government<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|26}} led by ].<ref name = "AMH" /> Moreover, President Rhee's régime expelled communists and ]s from southern national politics. Disenfranchised, they headed for the hills, to prepare guerrilla war against the US-sponsored ROK Government.<ref name = "AMH" /> | |||
According to the first official census in 1949, the population of North Korea numbered 9,620,000,<ref>{{Cite book |last=] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=72lpTkNcJQ4C&pg=PA61 |title=Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea During the Cold War Era: 1945–91 |date=27 September 2017 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=9780844742748 |via=Google Books}}</ref> and by mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, ], ], and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 ] tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, 150 ] fighter planes, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the invasion force, the North had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea.{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=}} Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as seaborne artillery for their armies. | |||
As ], both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-Sung were intent upon reunifying Korea under their own political system.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|27}} Partly because they were the better-armed, the North Koreans could escalate the continual border skirmishes and raids, and then invade—with proper provocation—whereas South Korea, with limited US material could not match them.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|27}} During this era of the beginning ], the US government acted as if all communists—regardless of nationality—constituted a ] controlled or at least directly influenced from Moscow; thus the US portrayed the ] in Korea as a Soviet ] maneuver. | |||
In contrast, the South Korean population was estimated at 20 million,<ref name="Armstrong"/> but its army was unprepared and ill-equipped. <!-- In ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu'' (1961), R. E. Appleman reports the ROK forces' low combat readiness --> As of 25 June 1950, the ROK had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-plane air force comprising 12 ] and 10 ] advanced-trainer airplanes. Large U.S. garrisons and air forces were in Japan,{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=17}} but only 200–300 U.S. troops were in Korea.<ref name="james19500625">{{Cite news |last=James |first=Jack |date=25 June 1950 |title=North Koreans invade South Korea |language=en |agency=United Press |url=http://www.upi.com/Archives/1950/06/25/North-Koreans-invade-South-Korea/1012416555294/ |access-date=29 July 2017 |archive-date=6 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170806141249/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1950/06/25/North-Koreans-invade-South-Korea/1012416555294/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
U.S. troops withdrew from Korea in 1949,<ref>{{cite web |url= http://homepages.stmartin.edu/fac_staff/rlangill/PLS%20310/Korea%201949-Isaac.htm|title= Korea 1949–1953|author= Langill, Richard|date= |work= |publisher= |accessdate=7 November 2009 }}</ref> leaving the South Korean army relatively ill-equipped. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sent large amounts of military aid to North Korea to facilitate the invasion planned by Kim Il-Sung. | |||
==Course of the war== | ==Course of the war== | ||
] | |||
=== North Korea Escalates the Conflict (June 1950)=== | |||
] | |||
{{Speculation|section|date=August 2008}} | |||
=== Operation Pokpung === | |||
Although the United Nations received messages that the North Koreans were about to invade, all were rejected. The United States received less than two weeks notice of the Korean War—the Chinese-authorized, North Korean invasion of the South on 25 June 1950. The CIA provided the early notice; before the war, in early 1950, CIA China station officer ] received Chinese and North Korean intelligence forecasting the summer KPA attack on the South so as to unify the country. Earlier, after the US missions had left the communist People's Republic of China, he volunteered to remain and conduct spy operations. Afterward, he and a team of CIA local mercenaries then escaped the Chinese, in a months-long horse trek across the Himalaya mountains; he was killed within miles of ], Tibet — yet his team delivered the intelligence to headquarters. Thirteen days later, the North ] (KPA) crossed the 38th-parallel border and invaded South Korea. Mackiernan was posthumously awarded the CIA ] for valor.<ref>Gup, Ted (2000). ''The Book of Honor: Cover Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA''.</ref> | |||
{{Main|Operation Pokpung}} | |||
At dawn on 25 June 1950, the KPA crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=14}} It justified its assault with the claim ROK troops attacked first and that the KPA were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee".{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=21}} ] on the strategic Ongjin Peninsula in the west.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=260–63}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Buzo |first=Adrian |url=https://archive.org/details/makingmodernkore00buzo |title=The Making of Modern Korea |publisher=Routledge |date=2002 |isbn=978-0415237499 |location=London |page= |url-access=limited}}</ref> There were initial South Korean claims that the ] had counterattacked at Haeju; some scholars argue the claimed counterattack was instead the instigating attack, and therefore that the South Koreans may have fired first.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=260–63}}<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Lone |first1=Stewart |title=Korea since 1850 |last2=McCormack |first2=Gavan |publisher=Longman Cheshire |date=1993 |location=Melbourne |pages=110–111 |author-link2=Gavan McCormack}}</ref> However, the report that contained the Haeju claim contained errors and outright falsehoods.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Simmons |first=Robert R. |date=1973 |title=Some Myths about June 1950 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/652006 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=54 |issue=54 |pages=354–361 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000015563 |jstor=652006 |s2cid=154722887 |issn=0305-7410 |access-date=3 July 2023 |archive-date=6 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210206191426/https://www.jstor.org/stable/652006 |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
KPA forces attacked all along the 38th parallel within an hour. The KPA had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The ROK had no tanks, anti-tank weapons, or heavy artillery. The South Koreans committed their forces in a piecemeal fashion, and these were routed in a few days.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|pp=18–19}} | |||
Under the guise of counter-attacking a South Korean provocation raid, the North Korean Army (KPA) crossed the 38th parallel, behind artillery fire, at Sunday dawn of 25 June 1950.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|14}} The KPA said that ] (ROK Army) troops, under command of the régime of the "bandit traitor ]", had crossed the border ''first''—and that they would arrest and execute Rhee.<ref name= "Appleman" /> In the past year, both Korean armies ''had'' continually harassed each other with skirmishes—and each continually raided the other country across the 38th-parallel border, as in a ]. | |||
On 27 June, Rhee evacuated Seoul with some of the government. At 02:00 on 28 June the ROK ] across the ] in an attempt to stop the KPA. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing it, and hundreds were killed.<ref name="Chosun2010" /><ref name="johnston20">{{Cite book |last=Johnston |first=William |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=64ZAy7NvwCgC&q=Han%20River%20demolish&pg=PA20 |title=A war of patrols: Canadian Army operations in Korea |date=1 November 2011 |publisher=Univ of British Columbia Pr |isbn=978-0774810081 |page=20}}</ref> Destroying the bridge trapped many ROK units north of the river.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|pp=18–19}} In spite of such desperate measures, ] that same day. Some South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and 48 subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=269–70}} | |||
Hours later, the ] unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of South Korea (ROK), with ], so adopted despite the USSR, a ], boycotting the Council meetings since January—protesting that the (Taiwan) ], and not the (mainland) People's Republic of China ] in the UN Security Council.<ref>{{cite book |last=Malkasian |first =Carter |title= The Korean War: Essential Histories |publisher= Osprey Publishing |year =2001 |page =16}}</ref> On 27 June 1950, President Truman ordered US air and sea forces to help the South Korean régime. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published ] recommending member-state military assistance to the Republic of Korea. Incidentally, while awaiting the Council's ''fait accompli'' announcement to the UN, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the US of starting ''armed intervention'' in behalf of South Korea.<ref></ref> | |||
On 28 June, Rhee ordered the ] in his own country.<ref name="Edwards32">{{Cite book |last=Edwards |first=Paul |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=scZN59DXeOwC&q=Rhee%20bodo%20league%20massacre%20order&pg=PA32 |title=Historical Dictionary of the Korean War |date=10 June 2010 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |isbn=978-0810867734 |page=32}}</ref> In five days, the ROK, which had 95,000 troops on 25 June, was down to less than 22,000 troops. In early July, when US forces arrived, what was left of the ROK was placed under US operational command of the ].<ref name="Webb" /> | |||
The USSR challenged the legitimacy of the UN-approved war, because (i) the ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 is based came from US Intelligence; (ii) North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and (iii) the Korean warfare was beyond UN Charter scope, because the initial North–South border fighting was classed as ]. Moreover, the Soviet representative boycotted the UN to prevent Security Council action, to challenge the legitimacy of UN action; legal scholars posited that deciding upon an "action" ''required'' the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.<ref>.</ref><ref>.</ref> | |||
===Factors in U.S. intervention=== | |||
The North Korean Army launched the "Fatherland Liberation War" with a comprehensive air–land invasion using 231,000 soldiers, who captured scheduled objectives and territory—among them, ], ], ], and ]—which they achieved with 274 ] tanks, some 150 ] fighters, 110 attack bombers, 200 artillery pieces, 78 Yak trainers, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft.<ref name="Appleman" /> Additional to the invasion force, the KPA had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in North Korea.<ref name="Appleman" /> At sea, although comprising only several small warships, the North Korean and South Korean navies fought in the war as sea-borne artillery for their in-country armies. | |||
{{Main|United States in the Korean War|Foreign policy of the Harry S. Truman administration}} | |||
The ] was unprepared for the invasion. Korea was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by ] ].{{Sfn|Kim|1973|p=30}} Military strategists were more concerned with the security of Europe against the Soviet Union than that of ].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wells |first=Samuel |date=23 June 2020 |title=Korea and the Fear of World War III |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/korea-and-fear-world-war-iii |publisher=Wilson Center |accessdate=4 July 2021 |archive-date=9 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709185115/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/korea-and-fear-world-war-iii |url-status=live }}</ref> The administration was worried a war in Korea could quickly escalate without American intervention. Diplomat John Foster Dulles stated: "To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war."{{Sfn|Beschloss|2018|p=447}} | |||
While there was hesitance by some in the US government to get involved, considerations about Japan fed into the decision to engage on behalf of South Korea. After the fall of China to the communists, US experts saw Japan as the region's counterweight to the Soviet Union and China. While there was no US policy dealing with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased its importance. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene ... The essential point ... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of U.S. policy toward Japan."{{Sfn|Kim|1973|p=46}}<ref>{{Cite web |last=Andrew Glass |title=Truman orders U.S. military intervention in Korea, June 27, 1950 |url=https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/27/this-day-in-politics-june-27-1950-665397 |access-date=2023-01-05 |website=POLITICO |date=27 June 2018 |language=en |archive-date=5 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230105150709/https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/27/this-day-in-politics-june-27-1950-665397 |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
In contrast, the ROK Army defenders were unprepared. In ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu'' (1998), R.E. Applebaum reports the ROK forces' low combat readiness on 25 June 1950. The ROK Army had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks, and a twenty-two piece air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT6 advanced-trainer airplanes. There were no large foreign military garrisons in Korea at invasion time—but there were large US garrisons and air forces in Japan.<ref name= "Appleman" /> | |||
Another consideration was the Soviet reaction if the US intervened. The Truman administration was fearful a Korean war was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the US committed in Korea. At the same time, "here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from ".{{Sfn|Rees|1964|p=22}} ]—a possible Soviet target because of the ]—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the ]'s post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots".<ref name="schindler19980224">{{Cite journal |last=Schindler, John R. |date=24 February 1998 |title=Dodging Armageddon: The Third World War That Almost Was, 1950 |url=http://20committee.com/2015/09/29/dodging-armageddon-the-third-world-war-that-almost-was-1950/ |url-status=usurped |journal=Cryptologic Quarterly |pages=85–95 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150930082157/http://20committee.com/2015/09/29/dodging-armageddon-the-third-world-war-that-almost-was-1950/ |archive-date=30 September 2015}}</ref> Truman believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would start that would marginalize the UN and encourage communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans, and the US immediately began using air and naval forces in the area to that end. The Truman administration still refrained from committing troops on the ground, because advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.{{Sfn|Rees|1964|p=23}} | |||
Within days of the invasion, masses of ROK Army soldiers—of dubious loyalty to the Syngman Rhee régime—either were retreating southwards or were ] en masse to the ] North, to the KPA.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|23}} | |||
The Truman administration was uncertain whether the attack was a ploy by the Soviet Union, or just a test of US resolve. The decision to commit ground troops became viable when a communiqué was received on 27 June indicating the Soviet Union would not move against US forces in Korea.{{Sfn|Rees|1964|p=26}} The Truman administration believed it could intervene in Korea without undermining its commitments elsewhere. | |||
===Police Action: US intervention=== | |||
===United Nations Security Council resolutions=== | |||
] | |||
{{Further|List of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea}} | |||
On 25 June 1950, the ] unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea with ]. The Soviet Union, a ], had boycotted Council meetings since January 1950, protesting ]'s occupation of ].{{Sfn|Malkasian|2001|p=16}} The Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published ] recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help. On 4 July the Soviet deputy foreign minister accused the U.S. of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.<ref name="Gromyko1950"/> | |||
The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from US Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated ] Article 32; and the fighting was beyond the Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council, some legal scholars posited that deciding upon this type of action required the unanimous vote of all five permanent members.<ref name="Gross1951"/><ref name="Schick1950"/> | |||
] | |||
Within days of the invasion, masses of ROK soldiers—of dubious loyalty to the Syngman Rhee regime—were retreating southwards or ] en masse to the northern side, the KPA.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=23}} | |||
] tank]] | |||
===United States' response (July–August 1950)=== | |||
] | |||
] | |||
As soon as word of the attack was received,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Truman Address on Korea |url=https://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/onkorea.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170408045123/https://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/onkorea.html |archive-date=8 April 2017 |access-date=17 August 2017 |website=www.learner.org}}</ref> Acheson informed Truman that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea.{{Sfn|Goulden|1983|p=48}}<ref name="Hess2001"/> Truman and Acheson discussed a US invasion response and agreed the US was obligated to act, comparing the North Korean invasion with ]'s aggressions in the 1930s, and the mistake of ] must not be repeated.<ref name="Graebner1979"/> US industries were mobilized to supply materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and other services necessary to support the military objectives of the Korean War.<ref>Reis, M. (12 May 2014), "" ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715064838/http://www.historyassociates.com/blog/historical-research-blog/industrial-mobilization-records-overview/ |date=15 July 2014 }}), History Associates, retrieved 17 June 2014.</ref> Truman later explained he believed fighting the invasion was essential to the ] of communism as outlined in the ]: | |||
] | |||
{{Blockquote|Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.<ref name="Truman1980"/>}} | |||
Despite the rapid post–Second World War Allied demobilizations, there were substantial US forces occupying Japan; under Gen. MacArthur’s command, they could fight the North Koreans.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|42}} Moreover, in that time and place, besides the US, only the ] had comparable forces. | |||
In August 1950, Truman and Acheson obtained the consent of ] to appropriate $12 billion for military action, equivalent to ${{Inflation|US|12|1950|fmt=c}} billion in {{Inflation/year|US}}.<ref name="Hess2001"/> Because of the extensive defense cuts and emphasis on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services were able to make a robust response with conventional military strength. General ], Chair of the ], was faced with deploying a force that was a shadow of its World War II counterpart.{{Sfn|Blair|2003|p=290}}<ref>Hofmann, George F., "Tanks and the Korean War: A case study of unpreparedness", ''Armor'', Vol. 109 Issue 5 (Sep/Oct 2000), pp. 7–12: In 1948, the ] had to impose an 80 percent reduction in equipment requirements, deferring any equipment modernization. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a $30 billion total defense budget for FY 1948, the administration capped the ] budget at the $14.4 billion set in 1947 and progressively reduced in succeeding fiscal years until January 1950, when it was reduced again to $13.5 billion.</ref> | |||
On Saturday, June 24, 1950, US Secretary of State ] telephonically informed President ], “Mr. President, I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea.”<ref>''Korea: The Untold Story of the War'', Joseph C. Goulden (1982) p. 48.</ref><ref>''Hess, Gary R. Presidential Decisions for War : Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2001.''</ref> Truman and Acheson discussed a US invasion response with defense department principals, who agreed that the United States was obligated to repel military aggression, paralleling it with Adolf Hitler's 1930s aggressions, and said that the mistake of ] must not be repeated.<ref>Graebner, Norman A. The Age of Global Power: The United States Since 1939. Vol. V3641. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979.</ref> | |||
President Truman acknowledged that fighting the invasion was pertinent to the American global ] of communism: | |||
Acting on Acheson's recommendation, Truman ordered MacArthur, the ] in Japan, to transfer matériel to the South Korean military, while giving air cover to evacuation of US nationals. Truman disagreed with advisers who recommended unilateral bombing of the North Korean forces and ordered the ] to protect Taiwan, whose government asked to fight in Korea. The US denied Taiwan's request for combat, lest it provoke retaliation from the PRC.{{Sfn|Rees|1964|page=27}} Because the US had sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the ], Chinese Premier ] criticized the UN and US initiatives as "armed aggression on Chinese territory".{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=140}} The US supported the ] in the hope these KMT forces would harass China from the ], thereby diverting Chinese resources from Korea.<ref name=":Han">{{Cite book |last=Han |first=Enze |title=The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia |date=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-19-769659-0 |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=65}} | |||
:{{quote|"Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors."<ref>Truman, Harry S. The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. New York: University P of Colorado, 1981. 1955.</ref>}} | |||
===The drive south and Pusan (July–September 1950)=== | |||
President Harry S. Truman announced that the US would counter "unprovoked aggression" and "vigorously support the effort of the security council to terminate this serious breach of peace."<ref name="Hess, Gary R. 2001">Hess, Gary R. ''Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf'' New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2001.</ref> In Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Gen. ] warned against appeasement, saying that Korea was the place "for drawing the line" against communist expansion. In August 1950, the President and the Secretary of State easily persuaded the Congress to appropriate $12 billion to pay for the additional Asian military expenses essential to the goals of '''National Security Council Report 68''' (]), the American global containment of communism.<ref name="Hess, Gary R. 2001"/> | |||
] | |||
] tank along the Nakdong River front, August 1950]] | |||
The ], the first significant US engagement, involved the 540-soldier Task Force Smith, a small forward element of the ] flown in from Japan.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=45}} On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith attacked the KPA at ] but without weapons capable of destroying KPA tanks. The KPA defeated the US, with 180 American casualties. The KPA progressed southwards, pushing back US forces at ], ], and ], forcing the 24th Division's retreat to ], which the KPA captured in the ]. The 24th Division suffered 3,602 dead and wounded and 2,962 captured, including its commander, Major General ].{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=48}} | |||
Per State Secretary Acheson's recommendation, President Truman ordered Gen. MacArthur to transfer materiel to the Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK Army) while giving air cover to the evacuation of US nationals. Moreover, the President disagreed with his advisors recommending unilateral US bombing of the North Korean forces, but did order the ] to protect ] (Chiang Kai-Shek's China), whose ] (confined to Formosa island) asked to fight in Korea. The US denied the Nationalist Chinese request for combat—lest it provoke a communist Chinese intervention.<ref>Korea: The Limited War|Rees|David |1964|MacMillan|London|p. 27.</ref> | |||
By August, the KPA steadily pushed back the ROK and the ] southwards.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=53}} The impact of the Truman administration's defense budget cutbacks was keenly felt, as US troops fought costly rearguard actions. Facing a veteran and well-led KPA force, and lacking sufficient anti-tank weapons, artillery or armor, the Americans retreated and the KPA advanced down the Peninsula.<ref>Dunford, J.F. (Lt. Col.) ''The Strategic Implications of Defensive Operations at the Pusan Perimeter July–September 1950'', Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College (7 April 1999) pp. 6–8, 12</ref><ref>Zabecki, David T., ''Stand or Die: 1950 Defense of Korea's Pusan Perimeter'', Military History (May 2009): The inability of US forces to stop the 1950 North Korean summer offensive cost the Eighth Army 4,280 killed in action, 12,377 wounded, with 2,107 missing and 401 confirmed captured between 5 July and 16 September 1950. In addition, the lives of tens of thousands of South Korean soldiers and civilians were lost as well.</ref> By September, UN forces were hemmed into a corner of southeast Korea, near ]. This {{Convert|140|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=off|adj=on}} perimeter enclosed about 10% of Korea, in a line defined by the ]. | |||
The ''']''' was the first significant USA–KPA fighting in the Korean War, by the 540-Soldier ], which was a small forward element of the ] based in Japan.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|45}} On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith attacked the North Koreans at ] but without weapons capable of destroying the North Korean's tanks, they were unsuccessful, resulting in 180 dead, wounded or taken prisoner. The KPA progressed southwards, forcing the 24th Division's retreat to ], which the KPA also captured in the ];<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|48}} the 24th Division suffered 3,602 dead-wounded and 2,962 captured GIs—including the Division’s Commander, Maj. Gen. ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|48}} Overhead, the KPAF shot down 18 USAF fighters and 29 bombers; the USAF shot down 5 KPAF fighters. | |||
The KPA purged South Korea's intelligentsia by killing civil servants and intellectuals. On 20 August, MacArthur warned Kim Il Sung he would be held responsible for KPA atrocities.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p= 56}} | |||
By August, the KPA had pushed back the ROK Army and the ] to the ] city vicinity, in southeast Korea.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|53}} In their southward advance, the KPA purged the Republic of Korea's ], by killing civil servants and intellectuals.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|56}} On 20 August, Gen. MacArthur warned North Korean Leader Kim Il-Sung that he was responsible for the KPA’s atrocities.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/><ref name="MacroHistory" />{{rp|56}} By September, the UN Command controlled only the Pusan city perimeter, about 10% of Korea. Only on being reinforced, re-equipped, and with naval artillery and air force bombing support, could the UN Command forces stand at the ]. In US military history, this "back-against-the-sea" holding action is known as the "]". | |||
Kim's early successes led him to predict the war would finish by the end of August. Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. To counter a possible US deployment, Zhou secured a Soviet commitment to have the Soviet Union support Chinese forces with air cover, and he deployed 260,000 soldiers along the Korean border, under the command of ]. Zhou authorized a topographical survey of Korea and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou's military adviser in Korea, to analyze the military situation. Lei concluded MacArthur would likely attempt a landing at Incheon.<ref>{{Citation | url = https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP105.pdf | title = THE KOREAN WAR JUNE-OCTOBER 1950: INCHON AND STALIN IN THE "TRIGGER VS. JUSTIFICATION" DEBATE | issue = 105 | author = Tan Kwoh Jack | location = Singapore | publisher = Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies | date = January 2006 | page = 21 | access-date = 28 November 2022 | archive-date = 28 November 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20221128195523/https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP105.pdf | url-status = live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2QoyAAAAMAAJ&q=%E4%BB%81%E5%B7%9D%E7%99%BB%E9%99%86|title=在最高统帅部当参谋: 雷英夫将军回忆录|date=28 November 1997|publisher=百花洲文艺出版社|language=zh-cn|pages=147, 153–154|isbn=9787805798998|access-date=15 December 2022|archive-date=21 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230421193437/https://books.google.com/books?id=2QoyAAAAMAAJ&q=%E4%BB%81%E5%B7%9D%E7%99%BB%E9%99%86|url-status=live}}</ref> After conferring with Mao that this would be MacArthur's most likely strategy, Zhou briefed Soviet and North Korean advisers of Lei's findings, and issued orders to PLA commanders to prepare for US naval activity in the ].{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=141}} | |||
===Escalation=== | |||
] | |||
In the |
In the resulting ], UN forces withstood KPA attacks meant to capture the city at ], ], and ]. The ] (USAF) interrupted KPA logistics with 40 daily ground support ]s, which destroyed 32 bridges, halting daytime road and rail traffic. KPA forces were forced to hide in tunnels by day and move only at night.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=47–48, 66}} To deny military equipment and supplies to the KPA, the USAF destroyed logistics depots, refineries, and harbors, while ] aircraft attacked transport hubs. Consequently, the overextended KPA could not be supplied throughout the south.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=58}} On 27 August, ] aircraft mistakenly attacked facilities in Chinese territory, and the Soviet Union called the Security Council's attention to China's complaint about the incident.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160302173851/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/pg_793 |date=2 March 2016 }} ''] Official Records'' No. 35, p. 25</ref> The US proposed a commission of India and Sweden determine what the US should pay in compensation, but the Soviets vetoed this.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160302165211/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d551 |date=2 March 2016 }} '']'' 1950 Volume VII, Korea, Document 551</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |date=1950 |title=work of the Security Council from August 1, 1950 to September 18, 1950 |journal=] |volume=4 |issue=4 |page=638 |doi=10.1017/S0020818300029465 |s2cid=249414462}}</ref> | ||
Meanwhile, US garrisons in Japan continually dispatched soldiers and |
Meanwhile, US garrisons in Japan continually dispatched soldiers and military supplies to reinforce defenders in the Pusan Perimeter.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=59–60}} MacArthur went so far as to call for Japan's rearmament.<ref name="masuda12">{{cite book |doi=10.7591/cornell/9780801449390.003.0013|chapter=The Korean War and the Dismissal of Mac ''Arthur'', June 1950 to April 1951 |title=Mac ''Arthur'' in Asia |year=2012 |last1=Masuda |first1=Hiroshi |last2=Yamamoto |first2=Reiko |pages=249–274 |isbn=9780801449390 }}</ref> Tank battalions deployed to Korea, from the ] to the ], the largest Korean port. By late August, the Pusan Perimeter had 500 medium tanks battle-ready.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=61}} In early September 1950, UN forces outnumbered the KPA 180,000 to 100,000 soldiers.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=}}{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=61}} | ||
===Battle of Incheon=== | ===Battle of Incheon (September 1950)=== | ||
{{Main|Battle of Incheon}} | {{Main|Battle of Incheon}} | ||
Against the rested and |
Against the rested and rearmed Pusan Perimeter defenders and their reinforcements, the KPA were undermanned and poorly supplied; unlike the UN, they lacked naval and air support.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=58, 61}} To relieve the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur recommended an ] at Incheon, near Seoul, well over {{Convert|100|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} behind the KPA lines.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=67}} On 6 July, he ordered Major General ], commander of the U.S. ], to plan an amphibious landing at Incheon; on 12–14 July, the 1st Cavalry Division embarked from ], Japan, to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division inside the Pusan Perimeter.<ref name="Cavalry Outpost Publications"/> | ||
Soon after the war began, MacArthur began planning an Incheon landing, but ] opposed him.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=67}} When authorized, he activated a combined ] and ], and ROK force. The ], consisted of 40,000 troops of the ], the ] and around 8,600 ROK soldiers.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=68}} By 15 September, the amphibious force faced few KPA defenders at Incheon: military intelligence, ], ] reconnaissance, and protracted bombardment facilitated a light battle. However, the bombardment destroyed most of Incheon.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=70}} | |||
===Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter=== | |||
The Incheon landing allowed the 1st Cavalry Division to begin its northward fighting from the Pusan Perimeter. “Task Force Lynch”—3rd Bn, 7th Cav Rgt, and two 70th Tank Bn units (Charlie Company and the Intelligence–Reconnaissance Platoon)—effected the “Pusan Perimeter Breakout” through 106.4 miles of enemy territory to join the 7th Infantry Division, at Osan.<ref name="first-team.us"/> The X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force in South Korea;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|71-72}} Gen. MacArthur quickly recaptured Seoul;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|77}} and the almost-isolated KPA rapidly retreated north; only 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers survived.<ref name="Schnabel">{{cite book |last =Schnabel |first =James F |title =United States Army In The Korean War: Policy And Direction: The First Year |publisher =Center of Military History |year=1992 |pages =155–92, 212, 283–4, 288–9, 304 |url = http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/P&D.HTM |isbn =0-16-035955-4 }}</ref><ref name="KIMH">{{cite book |last =Korea Institute of Military History |first = |title =The Korean War: Korea Institute of Military History 3 Volume Set |publisher =Bison Books, University of Nebraska Press |pages =vol. 1, p. 730, vol. 2, pp. 512–529 |isbn =0803277946 |nopp =true |year =2000 }}</ref> | |||
{{Main|Pusan Perimeter offensive|UN September 1950 counteroffensive|Second Battle of Seoul}} | |||
] tanks during the ] in September 1950. In the foreground, UN troops round up North Korean prisoners-of-war.]] | |||
On 16 September Eighth Army began its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Task Force Lynch,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hoyt |first=Edwin P. |title=On to the Yalu |publisher=Stein and Day |date=1984 |location=New York |page=104}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=CHAPTER XXVIII: Pursuit and Exploitation |url=https://history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/sn28.htm |access-date=2023-01-05 |website=history.army.mil |archive-date=5 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230205040750/https://www.history.army.mil/BOOKS/KOREA/20-2-1/sn28.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> 3rd Battalion, ], and 70th Tank Battalion units advanced through {{Convert|106.4|mi|order=flip|abbr=on}} of KPA territory to join the 7th Infantry Division at Osan on 27 September.<ref name="Cavalry Outpost Publications"/> X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders around Seoul, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=71–72}} | |||
===The UN Offensive: North Korea invaded (September–October 1950)=== | |||
{{Main|UN Offensive, 1950}} | |||
On 18 September, Stalin dispatched General ] to advise Kim to halt his offensive around the Pusan Perimeter, and redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. Chinese commanders were not briefed on North Korean troop numbers or operational plans. Zhou suggested the North Koreans should attempt to eliminate the UN forces at Incheon only if they had reserves of at least 100,000 men; otherwise, he advised the North Koreans to withdraw their forces north.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=143}} | |||
] | |||
On 25 September, Seoul was recaptured by UN forces. US air raids caused heavy damage to the KPA, destroying most of its tanks and artillery. KPA troops in the south, instead of effectively withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated, leaving ] vulnerable.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=143}} During the retreat, only 25,000-30,000 KPA soldiers managed to reach the KPA lines.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="KIMH" /> On 27 September, Stalin convened an emergency session of the ], where he condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held Soviet military advisers responsible for the defeat.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=143}} | |||
On September 27, Truman sent a top secret National Security Council memorandum, 81/1, to MacArthur reminding MacArthur that operations north of the 38th parallel were authorized only if “at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily…” On September 30, Defense Secretary George Marshall sent an eyes-only message to MacArthur instructing MacArthur “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.”<ref>Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s war: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero, Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-684-83419-7. p.157:158.</ref> | |||
===UN forces invade North Korea (September–October 1950)=== | |||
On 1 October 1950, the UN Command repelled the KPA northwards, past the 38th parallel; the ROK Army crossed after them, into North Korea.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|79-94}} Six days later, on 7 October, with UN authorization, the UN Command forces followed the ROK forces northwards.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|81}} The X Corps landed at ] (SE North Korea) and ] (NE North Korea), already captured by ROK forces.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|87-88}} The Eighth US Army and the ROK Army drove up western Korea, and captured ] city, the North Korean capital, on 19 October 1950.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|90}} At month’s end, UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners of war; the North Korean People’s Army appeared to disintegrate. | |||
{{Main|UN offensive into North Korea}} | |||
On 27 September, MacArthur received secret National Security Council Memorandum 81/1 from Truman reminding him operations north of the 38th parallel were authorized only if "at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily".<ref name="Weintraub2000"/> On 29 September, MacArthur restored the government of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=143}} The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September sent MacArthur a comprehensive directive: it stated the primary goal was the destruction of the KPA, with unification of the Peninsula under Rhee as a secondary objective "if possible"; the Joint Chiefs added this objective was dependent on whether the Chinese and Soviets would intervene, and was subject to changing conditions.<ref>Appleman 1998, pp. 607-609.</ref> | |||
] attacking railroads south of ] on the eastern coast of North Korea]] | |||
Taking advantage of the UN Command’s strategic momentum against the KPA, Gen. MacArthur (and some US politicians),{{Who|date=July 2009}} believed it necessary to extend the Korean War into Communist China to destroy the PRC depots supplying the North Korean war effort. President Truman disagreed, and ordered Gen. MacArthur’s caution at the Sino-Korean border.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|83}} | |||
On 30 September, Zhou warned the US that China was prepared to intervene if the US crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou attempted to advise KPA commanders on how to conduct a general withdrawal by using the same tactics that allowed Chinese Communist forces to escape Nationalist ] in the 1930s, but KPA commanders did not use these tactics effectively.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=143–44}} ] argues, however, that the KPA's rapid withdrawal was strategic, with troops melting into the mountains from where they could launch guerrilla raids on the UN forces spread out on the coasts.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=278–81}} | |||
By 1 October, the UN Command had driven the KPA past the 38th parallel, and RoK forces pursued the KPA northwards.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=79–94}} MacArthur demanded the KPA's unconditional surrender.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=144}} On 7 October, with UN authorization, the UN Command forces followed the ROK forces northwards.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=81}} The Eighth US Army drove up western Korea and ] on 19 October.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=90}} On 20 October, the ] made their first of their two combat jumps during the war ]. The mission was to cut the road north going to China, preventing North Korean leaders from escaping Pyongyang, and to rescue US ]. | |||
===Exchange between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong=== | |||
At month's end, UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners of war. As they neared the Sino-Korean border, the UN forces in the west were divided from those in the east by {{Convert|50–100|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} of mountainous terrain.{{Sfn|Stueck|2002|pp=92–93}} In addition to the 135,000 captured, the KPA had suffered some 200,000 soldiers killed or wounded, for a total of 335,000 casualties since end of June 1950, and lost 313 tanks. A mere 25,000 KPA regulars retreated across the 38th parallel, as their military had collapsed. The UN forces on the peninsula numbered 229,722 combat troops (including 125,126 Americans and 82,786 South Koreans), 119,559 rear area troops, and 36,667 US Air Force personnel.{{Sfn|Clodfelter|1989|p=11}} MacArthur believed it necessary to extend the war into China to destroy depots supplying the North Korean effort. Truman disagreed and ordered caution at the Sino-Korean border.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=83}} | |||
Professor ], who had used his own private fund to pay for large quantities of ex-USSR declassified archives, had translated large numbers of telegram exchanges between Moscow and Beijing before China entered the war. The following is a brief rundown of a number of telegrams between Mao and Stalin. | |||
===China intervenes (October–December 1950)=== | |||
*On 1st/October 1950 ] sent a telegram to China asking for military intervention. On the same day, Mao Zedong had received Stalin's telegram, suggesting China send troops into Korea. | |||
{{stack|]}} | |||
*On 5th/October 1950, under ] and ]'s pressure, the Chinese Communist Central Committee had finalized the decision of military intervention in Korea. | |||
*On 11th/October 1950 Stalin and ] sent a joint signed telegram to Mao, stating: | |||
#Proposed Chinese troops are ill prepared and without tanks and artillery; requested air cover would take two months to arrive. | |||
#Within one month, fully equipped troops had to be in position; otherwise, US troops would step over the 38 parallel line and take over North Korea. | |||
#Fully equipped troops could only be sent into Korea in six months times, by then, North Korea would be occupied by the Americans, any troops would be meaningless. | |||
*On 12/October 1950 15:30 Beijing time, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin through the Russian ambassador:''I agree with your (Stalin and Zhou) decision.'' | |||
*On 12/October 1950 22:12 Beijing time, Mao sent another telegram: ''I agree with 10/October telegram, my troops stay put, I have issued order to cease the advance into Korea plan.'' | |||
*On 12/October 1950, Stalin sent telegram to North Korean ], telling him: ''Russian and Chinese troops are not coming.'' | |||
On 3 October 1950, China attempted to warn the US, through its embassy in India, it would intervene if UN forces crossed the Yalu River.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=42}}<ref name=Jian/>{{Rp|page=169}} The US did not respond as policymakers in Washington, including Truman, considered it a bluff.<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=42}}<ref name=Jian/>{{Rp|page=169}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Shulsky |first1=Abram |title=Deterrence theory and Chinese behavior |date=2000 |publisher=RAND |location=Santa Monica, California |isbn=9780833028532}}</ref>{{Rp|page=57}} | |||
*On 13/October, the Russian ambassador (in Beijing) sent a telegram to Stalin, saying Mao Zedong had informed him that the Chinese communist central committee had approved the decision of sending troops to Korea.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Shen|first=Zhihua|date=2007年第05期|title=斯大林、毛泽东与朝鲜战争再议|journal=《史学集刊》|publisher=中华人民共和国教育部 吉林大学《史学集刊》编辑部|location=吉林大学|issue=2007年第05期|issn=ISSN 0559-8095|language=Chinese|url=http://qkzz.net/magazine/0559-8095/2007/05/1688254_8.htm}}</ref> | |||
On 15 October Truman and MacArthur ]. This was much publicized because of MacArthur's discourteous refusal to meet the president in the contiguous US.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=88}} To Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea,{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=89}} and the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria and 100,000–125,000 at the Yalu River. He concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without Soviet air force protection.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref name="Donovan1996" /> | |||
===China intervenes=== | |||
] | |||
Meanwhile on 13 October, the Politburo decided China would intervene even without Soviet air support, basing its decision on a belief superior morale could defeat an enemy that had superior equipment.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back: transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2022 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=32 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> To that end, 200,000 Chinese ] (PVA) troops crossed the Yalu into North Korea.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=147–48}} UN aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in daytime, because their march and ] discipline minimized detection.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=102}} The PVA marched "dark-to-dark" (19:00–03:00), and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed by 05:30. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers remained motionless if an aircraft appeared;{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=102}} PVA officers were under orders to shoot security violators.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-] army to march the {{Convert|286|mi|order=flip|abbr=on}} from ], Manchuria, to the combat zone in 19 days. Another division night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging {{Convert|18|mi|order=flip|abbr=on}} daily for 18 days.{{Sfn|Appleman|1998|p=}} | |||
On 27 June 1950, two days after the KPA invaded and three months before the October Chinese intervention to the Korean War, President Truman dispatched the 7th US Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, to protect Nationalist ] from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).<ref>http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/20th/korea.html</ref> On 4 August 1950, ] reported to the Politburo that he would intervene when the ] (PVA) was ready to deploy. On 20 August 1950, Premier ] informed the United Nations that “Korea is China’s neighbor ... The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about a solution of the Korean question”—thus, via neutral-country diplomats, China warned the US, that in safeguarding Chinese ], they would intervene against the UN Command in Korea.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|83}} President Truman interpreted the communication as “a bald attempt to blackmail the UN”, and dismissed it.<ref>''Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953'', p. 390 (2002) Stanford University Press, ISBN 0804747741.</ref> The Politburo authorized Chinese intervention in Korea on 2 October 1950—the day after the ROK Army crossed the 38th-parallel border.<ref>Chen Jian, ''China’s Road to the Korean War'', p. 184.</ref> Later, the Chinese claimed that US bombers had violated PRC national airspace when on en route to bomb North Korea—''before'' China intervened.<ref>Communist China’s Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations, International Organization, Vol. 20, No.4 (Autumn 1966), pp. 677–704.</ref> | |||
] in action near the Ch'ongch'on River (20 November 1950).]] | |||
], Uirson, Korea, August 1950.]] | |||
After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the ] on 25 October, attacking advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve days after PVA troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the ] to provide air cover and supported more aid to China.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shen |first=Zhihua |date=2010 |title=China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese–Soviet–Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War |journal=Journal of Strategic Studies |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=211–230 |doi=10.1080/01402391003590291 |s2cid=154427564}}</ref> After inflicting heavy losses on the ROK ] at the ], the first confrontation between Chinese and US military occurred on 1 November 1950. Deep in North Korea, thousands of soldiers from the PVA ] ] and attacked the US ] with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive position flanks in the ].<ref name="Stewart"/> | |||
In September, in Moscow, PRC Premier ] added diplomatic and personal force to Mao’s cables to Stalin, requesting military assistance and material. Stalin delayed; Mao re-scheduled launching the “War to Resist America and Aid Korea” from the 13th to the 19th of October 1950. Moreover, the USSR limited their assistance to air support no closer than 60 miles (100 km) from the battlefront—because Soviet pilots were to fight in the air war to gain experience against the Western air forces; they would be flying MiG-15s (camouflaged as PRC Air Force), and seriously challenged the UN air forces for battlefield air superiority.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} | |||
On 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with ] as field commander.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=147–48}} On 25 November, on the Korean western front, the PVA 13th Army Group attacked and overran the ROK II Corps at the ], and then inflicted heavy losses on the US ] on the UN forces' right flank.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=98–99}} Believing they could not hold against the PVA, the Eighth Army began to ] in mid-December.{{Sfn|Mossman|1990|p=160}} | |||
On 8 October 1950, the day after the US’s northward crossing of the 38th-parallel border into North Korea, Mao Zedong ordered the ]'s North East Frontier Force to be reorganized into the Chinese ],<ref>{{Cite book |last = Chinese Military Science Academy |volume = Volume I |publication-date = Sept. 2000 |title = History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea (抗美援朝战争史) |publisher = Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House |location = Beijing |isbn = 7-80137-390-1 |page = 160}}</ref> who were to fight the “War to Resist America and Aid Korea”. The Soviet materiel would make the Chinese intervention to Korea a strategic maneuver furthering Asian communist revolutionary power, {{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} Mao explained to Stalin: “If we allow the United States to occupy all of Korea, Korean revolutionary power will suffer a fundamental defeat, and the American invaders will run more rampant, and have negative effects for the entire Far East.” | |||
In the east, on 27 November, the PVA 9th Army Group initiated the ]. Here, the UN forces fared better: like the Eighth Army, the surprise attack forced X Corps to retreat from northeast Korea, but they were able to break out from the attempted encirclement by the PVA and execute a ]. X Corps established a defensive perimeter at the port city of ] on 11 December and ], to reinforce the depleted Eighth Army to the south.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=104–11}}{{Sfn|Mossman|1990|p=158}} About 193 shiploads of UN forces and matériel (approximately 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies) were evacuated to Pusan.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=110}} The ] was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN forces ] most of Hungnam, with particular attention to the port.<ref name="Schnabel"/><ref name="DoyleMayer1979"/> | |||
US aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in daytime, because their march and ] discipline minimized aerial detection.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|102}} The PVA marched “dark-to-dark” (19:00–03:00hrs), and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed by 05:30hrs. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers were to remain motionless if an aircraft appeared, until it flew away;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|102}} PVA officers might shoot security violators.<ref name ="Appleman" /> Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-] army to march 286 miles (460 km), from An-tung, Manchuria, to its Korean combat zone, in some 19 days; another division, night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging 18 miles (29 km) daily for 18 days. | |||
In early December UN forces, including the ]'s ], evacuated Pyongyang along with refugees.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pyongyang taken as UN retreats, 1950 |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/pyongyang-taken-as-un-retreats/znhynrd |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=BBC Archive |language=en |archive-date=21 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210821095028/https://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/pyongyang-taken-as-un-retreats/znhynrd |url-status=live }}</ref> Around 4.5 million North Koreans are estimated to have fled South or elsewhere abroad.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Welle (www.dw.com) |first=Deutsche |title=Faces of the Korean War {{!}} DW {{!}} 25.07.2013 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/faces-of-the-korean-war/g-16973830 |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=DW.COM |language=en-GB |archive-date=25 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210925044408/https://www.dw.com/en/faces-of-the-korean-war/g-16973830 |url-status=live }}</ref> On 16 December Truman declared a ] with Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953),<ref>{{Cite web |title=The American Presidency Project Harry S Truman Proclamation 2914—Proclamation 2914—Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency |url=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2914-proclaiming-the-existence-national-emergency |access-date=22 October 2021 |website=UC Santa Barbara |archive-date=22 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211022143108/https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2914-proclaiming-the-existence-national-emergency |url-status=live }}</ref> which remained in force until September 1978.{{Refn|name=nbJolley1971|group=lower-alpha|See 50 U.S.C. S 1601: "All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive agency... as a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on 14 September 1976 are terminated two years from 14 September 1976."; ''Jolley v. INS'', 441 F.2d 1245, 1255 n.17 (5th Cir. 1971).}} The next day, 17 December, Kim Il Sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China.<ref>Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, MAO: The Unknown Story.</ref> | |||
Meanwhile, on 10 October 1950, the 89th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, increasing the armor available for the Northern Offensive. On 15 October, after moderate KPA resistance, the 7th Cavalry Regiment and Charlie Company, 70th Tank Battalion captured ] city. On 17 October, they flanked rightwards, away from the principal road (to Pyongyang), to capture ]. Two days later, the 1st Cavalry Division captured ], the capital city, on 19 October 1950; the US had conquered North Korea. | |||
===Fighting around the 38th parallel (January–June 1951)=== | |||
Elsewhere, also on 15 October 1950, President Truman and Gen. MacArthur met at ] in the mid-Pacific Ocean, for a meeting much publicized by the General’s discourteous refusal to meet the President in the US.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|88}} To President Truman, Gen. MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention to Korea;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|89}} that the PRC’s opportunity for aiding the KPA had elapsed; that the PRC had some 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, and some 100,000–125,000 soldiers at the Yalu River; concluding that, although half of those forces ''might'' cross south, “if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter” without air force protection.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref>{{cite book |last =Donovan |first =Robert J |title = Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949–1953 |publisher =University of Missouri Press |year=1996 |page =285 |url = |isbn =0826210856 }}</ref> | |||
] bomb logistics depots in Wonsan, North Korea, 1951]] | |||
A ceasefire presented by the UN to the PRC, after the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River on 11 December, was rejected by the PRC, which was convinced of the PVA's invincibility after its victory in that battle and the wider ].{{Sfn|Zhang|1995|pp=119–126}}<ref>{{Citation |last=Alexander |first=Bevin R. |title=Korea: The First War We Lost |pages=371–376 |date=1986 |place=New York |publisher=Hippocrene Books, Inc |isbn=978-0-87052-135-5 |author-link=Bevin Alexander}}</ref> With Lieutenant General ] assuming command of the Eighth Army on 26 December, the PVA and the KPA launched their ] on New Year's Eve. Using night attacks in which UN fighting positions were encircled and assaulted by numerically superior troops, who had the element of surprise, the attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which facilitated tactical communication and disoriented the enemy. UN forces had no familiarity with this tactic, and some soldiers panicked, abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=117}} The offensive overwhelmed UN forces, allowing the PVA and KPA to capture Seoul for the second time on 4 January 1951. | |||
]]] | |||
These setbacks prompted MacArthur to consider using ]s against the Chinese or North Korean interiors, intending radioactive fallout zones to interrupt the Chinese supply chains.<ref name="MacArthur"/> However, upon the arrival of the charismatic General Ridgway, the ''esprit de corps'' of the bloodied Eighth Army revived.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=113}} | |||
After two minor skirmishes on October 25, the first major Chinese–American battles occurred on 1 November 1950; deep in North Korea, thousands of PVA soldiers ] and attacked scattered UN Command units with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive-position flanks in the ].<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |title = The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention |publisher = US Army}}</ref> In the west, in late November, at the ], the PVA attacked and over-ran several ROK Army divisions, and the flank of the remaining UN forces.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|98-99}} The UN Command retreated; the ] retreat (longest in US Army history),<ref>{{cite book |last =Cohen |first =Eliot A |coauthors = Gooch, John |title =Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War |publisher =Free Press |year=2005 |pages =165–195 |url = |isbn =0743280822 }}</ref> occurred because of the ] successful, but very costly, rear-guard delaying action at ] (near China), slowed the PVA attack for 4 days, (26–30 November). In the east, at the ], a ] Regimental Combat Team (3000 soldiers) and a USMC division (12,000–15,000 marines), also unprepared for PVA’s three-pronged encirclement tactics, escaped under X Corps support fire—albeit with some 15,000 collective casualties.<ref>{{cite book |last =Hopkins |first =William |title =One Bugle No Drums: The Marines at Chosin Reservoir |publisher =Algonquin |year=1986 |location = |pages = |url = |isbn = }}</ref> | |||
UN forces retreated to ] in the west, ] in the center, and the territory north of ] in the east, where the battlefront stabilized and held.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=117}} The PVA had outrun its logistics capability and thus were unable to press on beyond Seoul as food, ammunition, and matériel were carried nightly, on foot and bicycle, from the border at the Yalu River to the three battle lines.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=118}} On 25 late January, upon finding that the PVA had abandoned their battle lines, Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance-in-force, which became ].{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=121}} A full-scale advance fully exploited the UN's air superiority,{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=120}} concluding with the UN forces reaching the Han River and recapturing Wonju.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=121}} | |||
Initially, frontline PVA infantry had neither heavy fire support nor crew-served light infantry weapons, but quickly took advantage of their disadvantage; in ''How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror'' (2003), ] reports: | |||
Following the failure of ceasefire negotiations in January, the ] passed ] on 1 February, condemning the PRC as an aggressor and calling upon its forces to withdraw from Korea.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1 February 1951 |title=Resolution 498(V) Intervention of the Central People's Government of People's Republic of China in Korea |url=https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170525180549/http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm |archive-date=25 May 2017 |publisher=United Nations}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Cold War International History Project's Cold War Files |url=http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index-3262.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130930121857/http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index-3262.html |archive-date=30 September 2013 |publisher=Wilson Center}}</ref> | |||
{{quote|The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a ] of fifty men to a ] of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics.}} | |||
In early February, the ROK ] ran an operation to destroy guerrillas and pro-DPRK sympathizers in the ].<ref name=jd030210/> The division and police committed the ] and ]s.<ref name="jd030210">{{Cite news |date=10 February 2003 |title=SURVIVOR Hundreds were killed in a 1951 massacre. One man is left to remember. |work=] |url=http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=1932280 |url-status=live |access-date=6 April 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608041139/http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=1932280 |archive-date=8 June 2011}}</ref> In mid-February, the PVA counterattacked with the Fourth Phase Offensive and achieved victory ]. However, the offensive was blunted by US ] at ] in the center.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=121}} The US ] and ] fought a ] that broke the attack's momentum.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=121}} The battle is sometimes known as the "] of the Korean War": 5,600 U.S., and French troops were surrounded by 25,000 PVA. UN forces had previously retreated in the face of large PVA/KPA forces instead of getting cut off, but this time, they stood and won.<ref name="Timmons"/> | |||
In ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu'', R.E. Appleman delineates the PVA’s encirclement attack: | |||
] move out over rugged mountain terrain while closing with North Korean forces.]] | |||
{{quote|In the First Phase Offensive, highly-skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained, disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the UN forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic, which they termed ''Hachi Shiki'', which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move ; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy, while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch’osan, but with only partial success at Pakch’on and the Ch’ongch’on bridgehead.<ref name="Appleman" />}} | |||
In the last two weeks of February 1951, Operation Thunderbolt was followed by ], carried out by the revitalized Eighth Army. It was a full-scale, battlefront-length attack staged for maximum exploitation of firepower to kill as many KPA and PVA troops as possible.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=121}} Operation Killer concluded with US ] re-occupying the territory south of the Han River, and IX Corps capturing Hoengseong.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=122}} On 7 March the Eighth Army attacked with ], expelling the PVA and the KPA from Seoul on 14 March. This was the fourth and final conquest of the city in a year, leaving it a ruin; the 1.5 million pre-war population was down to 200,000 and people were suffering from food shortages.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=122}}<ref name="KIMH"/> | |||
On 6 March MacArthur gave a press conference at Suwon where he stated "Assuming no diminution of the enemy’s flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical stalemate." No one in Washington disputed MacArthur’s prediction that a stalemate could develop out of the conditions obtaining. But a military victory, because of the commitments and risks an attempt to achieve it would entail, was no longer considered a practical objective. The preferred course, preferred because it would be consistent with the greater strategy and ongoing preparations against the possibility of world war, was to seek a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of Korean issues.{{Sfn|Mossman|1990|p=319}} On 12 March Ridgway gave his own press conference at his command post at ] stating that regaining the 38th parallel would be a "tremendous victory" for the Eighth Army. It would mean that the encroachment of communism in Korea had been stopped - exactly what the UNC had set out to accomplish. Conversely, if the Chinese failed to drive the UNC out of Korea, they would have "failed monumentally." In any case, he emphasized, "we didn't set out to conquer China."{{Sfn|Mossman|1990|p=320}} | |||
In late November, the PVA repelled the UN Command forces from northeast North Korea, past the 38th-parallel border. Retreating from the peninsular north faster than they had counter-invaded, they raced to the North Korean east coat to establish a defensive perimeter of the port city ]—and awaited rescue, in December 1950,<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|104-111}} of 193 shiploads of UN Command forces and materiel (ca. 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tons of supplies), embarked to Pusan, at the south end of peninsular Korea.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|110}} The ] was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold only 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN Command forces effected an enemy-denial-operation razing most of Hungam city;<ref name ="Schnabel" /><ref>{{Citation |last =Rear Admiral Doyle |first =James H |last2 =Mayer |first2 =Arthur J |title =December 1950 at Hungnam |journal =U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings |volume =vol. 105 |issue =no. 4 |pages =44–65 |date=April 1979}}.</ref> and, on 16 December 1950, President Truman declared a ] with Presidential Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953),<ref name="espinoza">{{cite court |litigants= Espinoza-Castro v. I.N.S. |vol= 242 |reporter= F.3d |opinion= 1181 |date= 2001 |pinpoint=30 |url= http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/242/242.F3d.1181.99-70588.html}}</ref> effective until 14 September 1978.<ref>See 50 U.S.C. S 1601: “All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive agency ... as a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976 are terminated two years from September 14, 1976.”; Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1255 n.17 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that Presidential Proclamation No. 2914 established a state of national emergency still valid in 1967).</ref> | |||
In late April, Peng sent his deputy, ], to brief Zhou in Beijing. What Chinese soldiers feared, Hong said, was not the enemy, but having no food, bullets, or trucks to transport them to the rear when they were wounded. Zhou attempted to respond to the PVA's logistical concerns by increasing Chinese production and improving supply methods, but these were never sufficient. Large-scale air defense training programs were carried out and the ] (PLAAF) began participating in the war from September 1951 onward.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=149}} The Fourth Phase Offensive had failed to match the achievements of the Second Phase or the limited gains of the Third Phase. The UN forces, after earlier defeats and retraining, proved much harder to infiltrate by Chinese light infantry than in previous months. From 31 January to 21 April, the Chinese suffered 53,000 casualties.<ref>Xiaobing, Li (2014). ''China's Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive''. Indiana University Press. p. 63.</ref> | |||
===Across the parallel: Chinese Winter Offensive (early 1951)=== | |||
] bomb logistics depots in Wonsan, North Korea, 1951.]] | |||
On 11 April Truman ] as supreme commander in Korea for several reasons.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=123–27}} MacArthur had crossed the 38th parallel in the mistaken belief the Chinese would not enter the war, leading to major allied losses. He believed the use of nuclear weapons should be his decision, not the president's.{{Sfn|Stein|1994|p=69}} MacArthur threatened to destroy China unless it surrendered. While MacArthur felt total victory was the only honorable outcome, Truman was more pessimistic about his chances once involved in a larger war, feeling a truce and orderly withdrawal could be a valid solution.{{Sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 600}} MacArthur was the subject of congressional hearings in May and June 1951, which determined he had defied the orders of the president and thus violated the ].{{Sfn|Stein|1994|p=79}} A popular criticism of MacArthur was he never spent a night in Korea and directed the war from the safety of Tokyo.{{Sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 498}} | |||
In January 1951, the PVA and the KPA launched their '''Third Phase Offensive''' (''aka'' the “Chinese Winter Offensive”), utilizing night attacks in which UN Command fighting positions were stealthily encircled and then assaulted by numerically superior enemy troops who had the element of surprise. The attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which fulfilled the double purpose of facilitating tactical communication and mentally disorienting the enemy. UN forces initially had no familiarity with this tactic, and as a result some soldiers "bugged out," abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|117}} The Chinese Winter Offensive overwhelmed the UN Command forces and the PVA and KPA conquered Seoul on 4 January 1951. | |||
], March 1951]] | |||
Adding further to the US Eighth Army's injuries, Commanding General Walker was killed in an automobile accident, demoralizing the troops.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|111}} These setbacks prompted General MacArthur to consider using the ] against the Chinese or North Korean interiors, intending to use the resulting radioactive fallout zones to interrupt the Chinese supply chains.<ref>''Reminiscences''- MacArthur, Douglas.</ref> However, upon the arrival of Walker's replacement, the charismatic Lieutenant-General ], the ''esprit de corps'' of the bloodied Eighth Army immediately began to revive.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|113}} | |||
Ridgway was appointed supreme commander, and he regrouped the UN forces for successful counterattacks{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=127}} while General ] assumed command of the Eighth Army.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=130}} Further attacks depleted the PVA and KPA forces; Operations ] (23–28 March) and ] (23 March) (a combat jump by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team) were joint ground and airborne infiltrations meant to trap PVA forces between Kaesong and Seoul. UN forces advanced to the ''Kansas Line'', north of the 38th parallel.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=131}} | |||
UN forces retreated to ] in the west, ] in the center, and the territory north of ] in the east, where the battlefront stabilized and held.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|117}} The PVA had outrun its logistics and thus was forced to recoil from pressing the attack beyond Seoul;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|118}} food, ammunition, and materiel were carried nightly, on foot and bicycle, from the Yalu River border to the three battle lines. In late January, upon finding that the enemy had abandoned the battle lines, Gen. Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance-in-force, which became ], (5 February 1951)<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}} a full-scale X Corps advance that gradually proceeded while fully exploiting the UN Command’s air superiority,<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|120}} concluding with the UN reaching the ] and re-capturing ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}} In mid-February, the PVA counterattacked with the '''Fourth Phase Offensive''', launched from ] against ] positions at ], in the center.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}} Units of the ] and the ] fought a short but desperate battle that broke the attack’s momentum;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}} | |||
The PVA counterattacked in April 1951, with the ], with three field armies (700,000 men).{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=131–32}} The first thrust of the offensive fell upon I Corps, which fiercely resisted in the ] (22–25 April) and ] (22–25 April), blunting the impetus of the offensive, which was halted at the ''No-name Line'' north of Seoul.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=133–34}} Casualty ratios were grievously disproportionate; Peng had expected a 1:1 or 2:1 ratio, but instead, Chinese combat casualties from 22 to 29 April totaled between 40,000 and 60,000 compared to only 4,000 for the UN—a ratio between 10:1 and 15:1.<ref>Xiaobing 2014, pp. 124-125.</ref> By the time Peng had called off the attack in the western sector on 29 April, the three participating armies had lost a third of their front-line combat strength within a week.<ref>Xiaobing 2014, p. 125.</ref> On 15 May the PVA commenced the second impulse of the spring offensive and ] in the east at the ]. Approximately 370,000 PVA and 114,000 KPA troops had been mobilized, with the bulk attacking in the eastern sector, with about a quarter attempting to pin the I Corps and IX Corps in the western sector. After initial success, they were halted by 20 May and repulsed over the following days, with Western histories generally designating 22 May as the end of the offensive.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=136–37}}<ref>Xiaobing 2014, p. 149.</ref> | |||
In the last two weeks of February 1951, ''Operation Roundup'' was followed with '']'' (mid-February 1951), carried out by the revitalized Eighth Army, restored for a full-scale, battlefront-length attack staged for maximal firepower exploitation to kill as many KPA and PVA troops as possible.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}}<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|121}} ''Operation Killer'', concluded with ] re-occupying the territory south of the Han River, and IX Corps capturing ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|122}} On 7 March 1951, the Eighth Army attacked with '']'', expelling the PVA and the KPA from the South Korean capital city on 14 March 1951. This was the city's fourth conquest in a years’ time, leaving it a ruin; the 1.5 million pre-war population was down to 200,000, and the people were suffering from severe food shortages.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|122}}<ref name ="KIMH" /> | |||
At month's end, the Chinese planned the third step of the Fifth Phase Offensive (withdrawal), which they estimated would take 10-15 days to complete for their 340,000 remaining men, and set the date for the night of 23 May. They were caught off guard when the Eighth Army counterattacked and regained the ''Kansas Line'' on the morning of 12 May, 23 hours before the expected withdrawal.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=137–38}}<ref name="Xiaobing 2014, p. 181">Xiaobing 2014, p. 181.</ref> The surprise attack turned the retreat into "the most severe loss since our forces had entered Korea"; between 16-23 May, the PVA suffered another 45,000 to 60,000 casualties before their soldiers managed to evacuate.<ref name="Xiaobing 2014, p. 181"/> The Fifth Phase Offensive as a whole had cost the PVA 102,000 soldiers (85,000 killed/wounded, 17,000 captured), with significant losses for the KPA.<ref>Xiaobing 2009, pp. 101-102</ref> | |||
MacArthur was criticized for not having spent a night in Korea and for directing the war from Tokyo.<ref>Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, ISBN 1401300529. p.498.</ref> | |||
The end of the Fifth Phase Offensive preceded the start of the ]. During the counteroffensive, the US-led coalition captured land up to about {{Convert|6|mi|km|0|order=flip|abbr=on}} north of the 38th parallel, with most forces stopping at the ''Kansas Line'' and a minority going further to the ''Wyoming Line.'' PVA and KPA forces suffered greatly, especially in the Chuncheon sector and at Chiam-ni and Hwacheon; in the latter sector alone the PVA/KPA suffered over 73,207 casualties, including 8,749 captured, compared to 2,647 total casualties of the IX Corps.<ref>Mossman, Billy (1988). United States Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow November 1950 – July 1951. United States Army Center of Military History. p. 465.</ref> | |||
On 11 April 1951, Commander-in-Chief Truman relieved Gen. MacArthur, the Supreme Commander in Korea, from duty due to ]<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|123-127}} and appointed Gen. Ridgway as Supreme Commander, Korea, who regrouped the UN forces for successful counterattacks,<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|127}} while Gen. ] assumed command of the US Eighth Army.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|130}} Further attacks slowly repelled the PVA and KPA forces; operations ] (23–28 March 1951) and ] (23 March 1951), were a joint ground and air assault meant to trap Chinese forces between ] and ]. UN forces advanced to “Line Kansas”, ''north'' of the 38th parallel.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|131}} | |||
The halt at the ''Kansas Line'' and offensive action stand-down began the stalemate that lasted until the armistice of 1953. The disastrous failure of the Fifth Phase Offensive (which Peng recalled as one of only four mistakes he made in his military career) "led Chinese leaders to change their goal from driving the UNF out of Korea to merely defending China's security and ending the war through negotiations".<ref>Xiaobing 2009, p. 103</ref> | |||
The Chinese counterattacked in April 1951, with the '''Fifth Phase Offensive''' (''aka'' the “Chinese Spring Offensive”) with three field armies (ca. 700,000 men).<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|131}}<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|132}} The principal strike fell upon I Corps, which fiercely resisted in the ] (22–25 April 1951) and the ] (22–25 April 1951), blunting the impetus of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive, which was halted at the “No-name Line” north of Seoul.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|133-134}} On 15 May 1951, the Chinese in the east attacked the ROK Army and the US X Corps, and initially were successful, yet were halted by 20 May.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|136-137}} At month’s end, the US Eighth Army counterattacked and regained “Line Kansas”, just north of the 38th parallel.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|137-138}} The UN's “Line Kansas” halt and subsequent offensive action stand-down began the ] that lasted until the armistice of 1953. | |||
===Stalemate (July |
===Stalemate (July 1951–July 1953)=== | ||
] tanks, painted with tiger heads thought to demoralize Chinese forces]] | |||
For the remainder of the Korean War the UN Command and the PVA fought, but exchanged little territory; the stalemate held. Large-scale bombing of North Korea continued, and protracted armistice negotiations began 10 July 1951 at ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|175-177}}<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|145}} However, combat continued while the belligerents negotiated an armistice; the ROK–UN Command forces’ goal was to recapture all of South Korea, to avoid losing territory.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|159}} The PVA and the KPA attempted similar operations, and later, they effected military and psychological operations in order to test the UN Command’s resolve to continue the war. The principal battles of the stalemate include the ] (18 August – 15 September 1951)<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|160}} and ] (13 September – 15 October 1951),<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|161-162}} the ] (26 June – 4 August 1952), the ] (6–15 October 1952), the ] (14 October – 25 November 1952) and the ] (21 March – 21 June 1952), the sieges of ] (10–18 June 1953), the ] (28–29 May 1953) and the ] (23 March – 16 July 1953). | |||
For the rest of the war, the UN and the PVA/KPA fought but exchanged little territory. Large-scale bombing of North Korea continued, and protracted ] began on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong in the North.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=145, 175–77}} On the Chinese side, Zhou directed peace talks, and ] and Qiao Guanghua headed the negotiation team.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=149}} Combat continued; the goal of the UN forces was to recapture all of South Korea and avoid losing territory.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=159}} The PVA and the KPA attempted similar operations and later effected military and psychological operations to test the UN Command's resolve to continue the war. | |||
] | |||
The sides constantly traded artillery fire along the front, with American-led forces possessing a large firepower advantage over Chinese-led forces. In the last three months of 1952 the UN fired 3,553,518 field gun shells and 2,569,941 mortar shells, while the communists fired 377,782 field gun shells and 672,194 mortar shells: a 5.8:1 ratio.<ref>Clodfelter 1989, p. 22.</ref> The communist insurgency, reinvigorated by North Korean support and scattered bands of KPA stragglers, resurged in the south. | |||
The armistice negotiations continued for two years;<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|144-153}} first at Kaesong (southern North Korea), then at ] (bordering the Koreas).<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|147}} A major, problematic negotiation was ] (POW) repatriation.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|187-199}} The PVA, KPA and UN Command could not agree to a system of repatriation because many PVA and KPA soldiers refused to be repatriated back to the north,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/korea/boose.html |title= Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks|author= Boose, Donald W., Jr.|date= Spring 2000|work= OAH Magazine of History|publisher= Organization of American Historians|accessdate=7 November 2009 |quote= "...the UNC advised that only 70,000 out of over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners desired repatriation."}}</ref>, which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Koreans.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|189-190}} In the final armistice agreement, a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was set up to handle the matter.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|242-245}}<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/united_nations/uncreg/index.htm|title= Korean War Educator: United Nations: Command Repatriation Group|author= Hamblen, A.L.|publisher= Korean War Educator|accessdate=7 November 2009 }}</ref> | |||
In the autumn of 1951, Van Fleet ordered Major General ] to break the back of guerrilla activity. The UN's limited offensive (31 August – 12 November) to shorten and straighten sections of the lines, acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage points, saw heavy fighting by UN forces, with I Corps and X Corps making limited tactical advances against PVA and KPA forces. The campaign resulted in approximately 60,000 casualties, including 22,000 Americans. The intense battles at ], ] and ] underscored the challenges of penetrating the Chinese "active defense." Despite PVA/KPA losses of 100,000–150,000 troops, these were not crippling, and the PVA forces remained resolute. By November, the UNC abandoned major offensive operations, and the PVA launched counterattacks with some success.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-29 |title=Korean War - Armistice, Negotiations, Conflict {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War/Talking-and-fighting-1951-53 |access-date=2024-12-07 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref> | |||
In 1952 the U.S. elected a new president, and on 29 November 1952, the president-elect, ], went to Korea to learn what might end the Korean War.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|240}} With the United Nations’ acceptance of India’s proposed Korean War ], the KPA, the PVA, and the UN Command ] on 27 July 1953, with the battle line approximately at the 38th parallel. Upon agreeing to the armistice, the belligerents established the ] (DMZ), which has since been defended by the KPA and ROKA, USA and UN Command. The Demilitarized Zone runs north-east of the 38th parallel; to the south, it travels west. The Korean old-capital city of ], site of the armistice negotiations, originally lay in the pre-war ROK, but now is in the DPRK. The United Nations Command, supported by the United States, the North Korean Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People's Volunteers, signed the ]; ROK President Syngman Rhee refused to sign it, thus the Republic of Korea never participated in the armistice.<ref>{{cite web |title =Syngman Rhee Biography: Rhee Attacks Peace Proceedings |publisher =Korean War Commemoration Biographies |url =http://korea50.army.mil/history/biographies/rhee.shtml |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref> | |||
From December 1951 to March 1952, ROK security forces claimed to have killed 11,090 partisans and sympathizers and captured 9,916 more.<ref name="EB" /> | |||
===Chosin Battle aftermath: ''Operation Glory''=== | |||
After the war, the UN Command forces buried their dead in a temporary graveyard at Hŭngnam. With ''Operation Glory'' (July–November 1954), each combatant exchanged their dead. The remains of 4,167 US Army and US Marine Corps dead were exchanged for 13,528 KPA and PVA dead, and 546 civilians dead in UN prisoner-of-war camps were delivered to the ROK government.<ref name=OperationGlory>{{cite web|accessdate=2007-12-16 | |||
|url=http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/op_glory.htm | |||
|title=Operation Glory | |||
|publisher=Army Quartermaster Museum, US Army | |||
|location:Fort Lee, Virginia}}</ref> After ''Operation Glory'', 416 Korean War “unknown soldiers” were buried in the ], Hawaii. ] records indicate that the PRC and the DPRK transmitted 1,394 names, of which 858 were correct. From 4,167 containers of returned remains, forensic examination identified 4,219 individuals. Of these, 2,944 were identified as American, all, but 416, identified by name; of 239 unaccounted casualties: 186 not associated with Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns (176 identified, 10 remaining cases 4 were non-American Asians; one British; 3 identified, and 2 unconfirmed. In 1990–94, North Korea excavated and returned some 200 sets of remains, few have been identified, because of co-mingled remains.<ref>.</ref><ref>.</ref> Moreover, from 1996 to 2006, the DPRK recovered 220 remains near the Sino-Korean border.<ref>.</ref> | |||
PVA troops suffered from deficient military equipment, logistical problems, overextended communication and supply lines, and the constant threat of UN bombers. These factors led to a rate of Chinese casualties far greater than the casualties suffered by UN troops. The situation became so serious that in November 1951 Zhou called a conference in ] to discuss the PVA's logistical problems. It was decided to accelerate the construction of railways and airfields, to increase the trucks available to the army, and to improve air defense by any means possible. These commitments did little to address the problems.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=148}} | |||
], South Africa.]] | |||
] | |||
'''Korean War casualties —''' The Western (US–UN Command) numbers of Chinese and North Korean casualties are primarily based upon calculated battlefield-casualty reports, POW interrogations, and military intelligence (documents, spies, etc.); a good sources compilation is the democide web site (see Table 10.1).<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB10.1.GIF |title = North Korean Democide: Sources, Calculations and Estimates |accessdate = 2009-04-25 }}</ref> The Korean War dead: '''US''': 36,940 killed; '''PVA''': 100,000–1,500,000 killed; most estimate some 400,000 killed; '''KPA''': 214,000–520,000; most estimate some 500,000. '''ROK''': Civilian: some 245,000–415,000 killed; Total civilians killed some 1,500,000–3,000,000; most estimate some 2,000,000 killed.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/06/04/korea.deaths/ |title=U.S. death toll from Korean War revised downward, Time reports |publisher=] |date=2000-06-04}}</ref> | |||
In the months after the Shenyang conference, Peng went to Beijing several times to brief Mao and Zhou about the heavy casualties and the increasing difficulty of keeping front lines supplied with basic necessities. Peng was convinced the war would be protracted and that neither side would be able to achieve victory in the near future. On 24 February 1952, the ], presided over by Zhou, discussed the PVA's logistical problems with members of government agencies. After government representatives emphasized their inability to meet the war demands, Peng shouted: "You have this and that problem... You should go to the front and see with your own eyes what food and clothing the soldiers have! Not to speak of the casualties! For what are they giving their lives? We have no aircraft. We have only a few guns. Transports are not protected. More and more soldiers are dying of starvation. Can't you overcome some of your difficulties?" The atmosphere became so tense Zhou was forced to adjourn the conference. Zhou called a series of meetings, where it was agreed the PVA would be divided into three groups, to be dispatched to Korea in shifts; to accelerate training of pilots; to provide more anti-aircraft guns to front lines; to purchase more military equipment and ammunition from the Soviet Union; to provide the army with more food and clothing; and to transfer the responsibility of logistics to the central government.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=148–49}} | |||
With peace negotiations ongoing, the Chinese attempted a final offensive in the final weeks of the war to capture territory: on 10 June, 30,000 Chinese troops struck South Korean and U.S. divisions on a {{Convert|8|mi|km|0|abbr=on|order=flip}} front, and on 13 July, 80,000 Chinese soldiers struck the east-central Kumsong sector, with the brunt of their attack falling on 4 South Korean divisions. The Chinese had success in penetrating South Korean lines but failed to capitalize, particularly when US forces responded with overwhelming firepower. Chinese casualties in their final major offensive (above normal wastage for the front) were about 72,000, including 25,000 killed compared to 14,000 for the UN (most were South Koreans, 1,611 were Americans).<ref>Clodfelter 1989, p. 24.</ref> | |||
The PVA and KPA published a joint declaration after the war, reporting that the armies had "eliminated 1.09 million enemy forces, including 390,000 from the United States, 660,000 from South Korean {{sic}}, and 29,000 from other countries."<ref>Quoted in: {{cite web |last = Xu |first = Yan |authorlink = Xu Yan |title =Korean War: In the View of Cost-effectiveness |publisher = Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in New York |date = 2003-07-29 |url = http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/xw/t31430.htm |accessdate = 2007-08-12}}</ref> No breakdown was given for the number of dead, wounded, and captured, which Chinese researcher Xu Yan suggests may have aided negotiations for POW repatriation.<ref name=xu>Xu.</ref> Xu writes that the PVA "suffered 148,000 deaths altogether, among which 114,000 died in combats {{sic}}, incidents, and winterkill, 21,000 died after being hospitalized, 13,000 died from diseases; and 380,000 were wounded. There were also 29,000 missing, including 21,400 POWs, of whom 14,000 were sent to Taiwan, 7,110 were repatriated." For the KPA, Xu cites 290,000 casualties, 90,000 POWs, and a "large" number of civilian deaths in the north.<ref name=xu/> | |||
While Chinese forces grappled with significant logistical and supply difficulties, the stalemate also stemmed from mounting frustrations within the UNC. Despite superior firepower, the war proved difficult to fight and the US public was becoming impatient of a war that was lacking a victory. By mid-1951, the stalemate had worn away Truman's ], and political pressures mounted on the Truman administration to seek an end to the fighting. On 29 November 1952 U.S. President-elect ] went to Korea to learn what might end the war.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=240}} Eisenhower took office on 20 January 1953 and his administration prioritized containment over rollback and sought to reduce American involvement in the conflict, contributing to the later armistice.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Korean War |url=https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/korean-war |website=Eisenhower Library}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=NSC-68 and the Korean War |url=https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/koreanwar#:~:text=The%20Korean%20War%20was%20difficult,Eisenhower%2C%20as%20the%20next%20President |website=Office of the Historian}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-25 |title=Harry S. Truman - Korean War, 33rd US President, Cold War {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harry-S-Truman/Outbreak-of-the-Korean-War |access-date=2024-12-07 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref> | |||
The information box lists the UN Command forces Korean War casualties, and their estimates of PVA and KPA casualties. | |||
===Armistice (July 1953–November 1954)=== | |||
==Characteristics== | |||
{{Main|Korean Armistice Agreement}} | |||
===Armored warfare=== | |||
], June 1953]] | |||
] fires its 76 mm gun at KPA bunkers in “Napalm Ridge”, Korea, 11 May 1952.]] | |||
The on-again, off-again armistice negotiations continued for two years,{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=144–53}} first at Kaesong, then ].{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=147}} A problematic point was ] repatriation.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=187–99}} The PVA, KPA and UN Command could not agree on a system of repatriation because many PVA and KPA soldiers refused to be repatriated back to the north,<ref name="Boose2000"/> which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Koreans.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=189–90}} A ] was set up to handle the matter.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=242–45}} | |||
Stalin died on 5 March. The new Soviet leaders, engaged in their internal power struggle, had no desire to continue supporting China's efforts and called for an end to the hostilities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Agov |first=Avram |date=2013 |title=North Korea's Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/528256 |journal=The Journal of Korean Studies |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=225–262 |doi=10.1353/jks.2013.0020 |s2cid=145216046 |doi-access=free |access-date=11 February 2022 |archive-date=4 June 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240604110556/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/528256 |url-status=live }}</ref> China could not continue without Soviet aid, and North Korea was no longer a major player. Armistice talks entered a new phase. With UN acceptance of India's proposed Korean War armistice,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison (Lt. Col.) |first=William T. |title=Military Armistice in Korea: A Case Study for Strategic Leaders |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA404504.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130801180412/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404504 |archive-date=1 August 2013 |access-date=11 April 2013}}</ref> the KPA, PVA and UN Command signed the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to sign. The war ended at this point, even though there was no ].<ref name="US neutral commission"/> North Korea nevertheless claims it won the war.<ref name="Ho1993"/><ref name="KCNA2011"/> | |||
] (right) to the larger M20 model (left).]] | |||
Under the agreement, the belligerents established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which mostly follows the 38th parallel. In the eastern part, the DMZ runs north of the 38th parallel; to the west, it travels south of it. Kaesong, site of the initial negotiations, was in pre-war South Korea but is now part of North Korea. The DMZ has since been patrolled by the KPA and the ROKA, with the US still operating as the UN Command. | |||
Initially, North Korean armor dominated the battlefield with Soviet ] medium tanks designed in the Second World War.<ref>{{cite book |title= A Short History of the Korean War|last=Stokesbury |first= James L|year= 1990|publisher=Harper Perennial |location= New York|isbn= 0688095135|pages= 14, 43}}</ref> The KPA’s tanks confronted a tank-less ROK Army armed with few modern anti-tank weapons,<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|39}} including World War II–model 2.36-inch (60 mm) M9 ]s, effective only against the 45 mm side armor of the T-34-85 tank. Moreover, the US forces arriving to Korea were equipped with light ] tanks (on Japan-occupation duty) that also proved ineffective against the heavier KPA T-34 tanks.{{Citation needed|date=March 2008}} | |||
] was conducted from July to November 1954, to allow combatants to exchange their dead. The remains of 4,167 US Army and US Marine Corps dead were exchanged for 13,528 KPA and PVA dead, and 546 civilians dead in UN POW camps were delivered to the South Korean government.<ref name="OperationGlory"/> After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War unknown soldiers were buried in the ], on ], Hawaii. ] (DPMO) records indicate the PRC and North Korea transmitted 1,394 names, of which 858 were correct. From 4,167 containers of returned remains, forensic examination identified 4,219 individuals. Of these, 2,944 were identified as from the US, and all but 416 were identified by name.<ref name="DPMO"/> From 1996 to 2006, North Korea recovered 220 remains near the Sino-Korean border.<ref name="Army Times"/> | |||
During the initial hours of warfare, some under-equipped ROK Army border units used ] as ]s to stop the tanks heading the KPA columns, firing ] (HEAT) over open sights to good effect; at war’s start, the ROK Army had 91 such cannons, but lost most to the invaders.<ref>''Korea: The Untold Story of the War'', Joseph C. Goulden (1982) p. 51.</ref> | |||
===Continued division (1954–present)=== | |||
Countering the initial combat imbalance, the US and UN Command reinforcement materiel included heavier US ], ], ], and British ] and ] tanks that proved effective against North Korean armor, ending its battlefield dominance.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|182-184}} Unlike in the Second World War (1939–45), in which the ] proved a decisive weapon, the Korean War featured few large-scale tank battles. The mountainous, heavily-forested terrain prevented large masses of tanks from maneuvering. In Korea, tanks served largely as infantry support. | |||
{{See also|Korean Demilitarized Zone}} | |||
].]] | |||
The Armistice Agreement provided for monitoring by an international commission. Since 1953, the ], composed of members from the Swiss<ref name="SwissArmy"/> and Swedish<ref name="SwedishArmy"/> armed forces, has been stationed near the DMZ. | |||
In April 1975, ]'s capital of ] by the ]. Encouraged by that communist success, Kim Il Sung saw it as an opportunity to invade South Korea. Kim visited China in April 1975 and met with Mao and Zhou to ask for military aid. Despite Pyongyang's expectations, Beijing refused to help North Korea in another war.<ref name="KimIlsung1975">{{Cite web |last=Ria Chae |date=May 2012 |title=NKIDP e-Dossier No. 7: East German Documents on Kim Il Sung's April 1975 Trip to Beijing |url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-7-east-german-documents-kim-il-sung%E2%80%99s-april-1975-trip-to-beijing#_ftn2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121104124051/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-7-east-german-documents-kim-il-sung%E2%80%99s-april-1975-trip-to-beijing |archive-date=4 November 2012 |access-date=30 May 2012 |series=North Korea International Documentation Project |publisher=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars}}</ref> | |||
===Aerial warfare=== | |||
{{See|MiG Alley|United States Air Force Aircraft of the Korean War}} | |||
] | |||
] shot down by an ].]] | |||
Since the armistice, there have been incursions and acts of aggression by North Korea. From 1966 to 1969, many cross-border incursions took place in what has been referred to as the ] or Second Korean War. In 1968, a North Korean commando team unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate South Korean president ] in the ]. In 1976, the ] was widely publicized. Since 1974, 4 incursion tunnels leading to Seoul have been uncovered. In 2010, a North Korean submarine ] the South Korean ] {{ROKS|Cheonan|PCC-772|6}}, resulting in the deaths of 46 sailors.<ref name="BBC2010"/> Again in 2010, North Korea ] island, killing 2 military personnel and 2 civilians.<ref name="Reuters2010"/> | |||
] in the war.]] | |||
After a new wave of UN sanctions, on 11 March 2013, North Korea claimed that the armistice had become invalid.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Park |first=Madison |date=11 March 2013 |title=North Korea declares 1953 armistice invalid |work=CNN |url=http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/north-korea-armistice/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=11 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130311175505/http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/north-korea-armistice/index.html |archive-date=11 March 2013}}</ref> On 13 March, North Korea confirmed it ended the Armistice and declared North Korea "is not restrained by the North-South declaration on non-aggression".<ref name="end of armistise">{{Cite web |last=Chang-Won |first=Lim |title=North Korea confirms end of war armistice |url=http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/9765-north-korea-confirms-end-of-war-armistice |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140702052515/http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/9765-north-korea-confirms-end-of-war-armistice |archive-date=2 July 2014 |access-date=17 June 2014 |publisher=Tolo News}}</ref> On 30 March, North Korea stated it entered a "state of war" and "the long-standing situation of the Korean peninsula being neither at peace nor at war is finally over".<ref name="NK state of war">{{Cite news |date=30 March 2013 |title=North Korea enters 'state of war' with South |publisher=] |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21979127 |url-status=live |access-date=30 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130330013512/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21979127 |archive-date=30 March 2013}}</ref> Speaking on 4 April, US Secretary of Defense ] said that Pyongyang "formally informed" the Pentagon that it "ratified" the potential use of a nuclear weapon against South Korea, Japan and the US, including Guam and Hawaii.<ref>{{Cite news |date=7 March 2013 |title=North Korea threatens pre-emptive nuclear strike against US |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/07/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-strike-us |url-status=live |access-date=4 April 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131104194322/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/07/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-strike-us |archive-date=4 November 2013}}</ref> Hagel stated the US would deploy the ] ] system to Guam because of a credible and realistic nuclear threat.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 April 2013 |title=North Korea threats: US to move missiles to Guam |publisher=] |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22021832 |url-status=live |access-date=4 April 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130404001650/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22021832 |archive-date=4 April 2013}}</ref> | |||
The Korean War was the first war in which ] played a central role. Once-formidable fighters such as the ], ], and ]<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|174}}—all ], propeller-driven, and designed during World War II—relinquished their air superiority roles to a new generation of faster, ] fighters arriving in the theater. For the initial months of the war, the ], ], and other jets under the UN flag dominated North Korea’s prop-driven air force of Soviet ] and ]s. The balance would shift, however, with the arrival of the swept-wing Soviet ].<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|182}}<ref>Werrell, p. 71.</ref> | |||
In 2016, it was revealed North Korea approached the US about conducting formal peace talks to end the war officially. While the ] agreed to secret peace talks, the plan was rejected because North Korea refused to discuss nuclear disarmament as part of the treaty.<ref name="CassellaChiacu">{{Cite news |last1=Cassella |first1=Megan |last2=Chiacu |first2=Doina |date=21 February 2016 |title=U.S. rejected North Korea peace talks offer before last nuclear test: State Department |work=] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0VU0XE |url-status=live |access-date=22 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160222022637/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0VU0XE |archive-date=22 February 2016}}</ref> In 2018, it was announced that North Korea and South Korea agreed to talk to end the conflict. They committed themselves to the complete denuclearization of the Peninsula.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Griffiths |first=James |date=27 April 2018 |title=North and South Korea vow to end the Korean War in historic accord |work=CNN |url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/asia/korean-summit-intl/index.html |access-date=29 April 2018 |archive-date=27 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180427092617/https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/asia/korean-summit-intl/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> North Korean leader ] and South Korean President ] signed the ].<ref>{{Cite web |last=South Korea: Ministry of Foreign Affairs |date=11 September 2018 |title=Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (2018.4.27) |url=https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm= |access-date=28 April 2023 |website=Ministry of Public Affairs Republic of Korea |archive-date=29 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230429002936/https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm= |url-status=live }}</ref> In September 2021, Moon reiterated his call to end the war formally, in a speech at the UN.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-09-21 |title=South Korean leader repeats call for declaration to end Korean War |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korean-leader-repeats-call-declaration-end-korean-war-2021-09-21/ |access-date=2021-09-22 |website=Reuters |language=en |archive-date=22 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210922131541/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korean-leader-repeats-call-declaration-end-korean-war-2021-09-21/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
The Chinese intervention in late October 1950 bolstered the ] (KPAF) of North Korea with the ], one of the world's most advanced jet fighters.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|182}}<ref name="sandler_7-8">Sandler, pp. 7–8.</ref> The fast, heavily-armed MiG outflew first-generation UN jets such as the American F-80 and ] and British ], posing a real threat to ] bombers even under fighter escort.<ref name="sandler_7-8"/> ] pilots flew missions for the North to learn the West’s aerial combat techniques. This direct Soviet participation is a '']'' (justification for war) that the UN Command deliberately overlooked, lest the war for the Korean peninsula expand, as the US initially feared, to include ''three'' communist countries—North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China—and so escalate to atomic warfare.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|182}}<ref>{{cite web |last =CW2 Sewell |first =Stephen L |title = FEAF/U.N. Aircraft Used in Korea and Losses by Type |publisher =Korean-War.com |url =http://korean-war.com/AirWar/AircraftType-LossList.html |accessdate =2007-08-22}}</ref> | |||
==Casualties== | |||
The ] (USAF) moved quickly to counter the MiG-15, with three squadrons of its most capable fighter, the ], arriving in December 1950.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|183}}<ref>Werrell, pp. 76–77.</ref> Although the MiG's higher ]—{{convert|50000|ft|m|sigfig=2}} vs. {{convert|42000|ft|m|sigfig=2}}—could be advantageous at the start of a ], in level flight, both ] designs attained comparable maximum speeds around {{convert|660|mi/h|km/h|sigfig=2|abbr=on}}. The MiG climbed faster, but the Sabre turned and dove better. {{Citation needed|date=November 2009}} The MiG was armed with one 37 mm and two 23 mm cannons, while the Sabre carried six .50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns aimed with radar-ranged ]. ]s, in their first combat deployment, gave US pilots the biomedical advantage, affording greater resistance to blackouts from the higher ]s of jet-powered dogfights.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}} | |||
About 3 million people were killed in the war, mostly civilians, making it perhaps the deadliest conflict of the Cold War era.<ref name="Cumings p. 35">{{Cite book |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |title=The Korean War: A History |publisher=] |date=2011 |isbn=9780812978964 |page=35 |quote=Various encyclopedias state that the countries involved in the three-year conflict suffered a total of more than 4 million casualties, of which at least 2 million were civilians—a higher percentage than in World War II or Vietnam. A total of 36,940 Americans lost their lives in the Korean theater; of these, 33,665 were killed in action, while 3,275 died there of non-hostile causes. Some 92,134 Americans were wounded in action, and decades later, 8,176 were still reported as missing. South Korea sustained 1,312,836 casualties, including 415,004 dead. Casualties among other UN allies totaled 16,532, including 3,094 dead. Estimated North Korean casualties numbered 2 million, including about one million civilians and 520,000 soldiers. An estimated 900,000 Chinese soldiers lost their lives in combat. |author-link=Bruce Cumings}}</ref><ref name="Lewy pp. 450-453">{{Cite book |last=Lewy |first=Guenter |title=America in Vietnam |title-link=America in Vietnam |publisher=] |date=1980 |isbn=9780199874231 |pages=450–453 |quote=For the Korean War the only hard statistic is that of American military deaths, which included 33,629 battle deaths and 20,617 who died of other causes. The North Korean and Chinese Communists never published statistics of their casualties. The number of South Korean military deaths has been given as in excess of 400,000; the South Korean Ministry of Defense puts the number of killed and missing at 281,257. Estimates of communist troops killed are about one-half million. The total number of Korean civilians who died in the fighting, which left almost every major city in North and South Korea in ruins, has been estimated at between 2 and 3 million. This adds up to almost 1 million military deaths and a possible 2.5 million civilians who were killed or died as a result of this extremely destructive conflict. The proportion of civilians killed in the major wars of this century (and not only in the major ones) has thus risen steadily. It reached about 42 percent in World War II and may have gone as high as 70 percent in the Korean War. ... we find that the ratio of civilian to military deaths is not substantially different from that of World War II and is well below that of the Korean War. |author-link=Guenter Lewy}}</ref><ref name="Kim p.45">{{Cite book |last=Kim |first=Samuel S. |title=International Relations of Asia |publisher=] |date=2014 |isbn=9781442226418 |page=45 |chapter=The Evolving Asian System |quote=With three of the four major Cold War fault lines—divided Germany, divided Korea, divided China, and divided Vietnam—East Asia acquired the dubious distinction of having engendered the largest number of armed conflicts resulting in higher fatalities between 1945 and 1994 than any other region or sub-region. Even in Asia, while Central and South Asia produced a regional total of 2.8 million in human fatalities, East Asia's regional total is 10.4 million including the Chinese Civil War (1 million), the Korean War (3 million), the Vietnam War (2 million), and the ] ] in Cambodia (1 to 2 million).}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=McGuire |first=James |url=https://archive.org/details/wealthhealthdemo00mcgu |title=Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin America |publisher=] |date=2010 |isbn=9781139486224 |page= |quote=In Korea, war in the early 1950s cost nearly 3 million lives, including nearly a million civilian dead in South Korea. |url-access=limited}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Painter |first=David S. |url=https://archive.org/details/coldwarinternati00pain |title=The Cold War: An International History |publisher=] |date=1999 |isbn=9780415153164 |page= |quote=Before it ended, the Korean War cost over 3 million people their lives, including over 50,000 U.S. servicemen and women, and a much higher number of Chinese and Korean lives. The war also set in motion a number of changes that led to the militarization and intensification of the Cold War. |author-link=David S. Painter |url-access=limited}}</ref> Samuel Kim lists the war as the deadliest conflict in East Asia—the region most affected by armed conflict related to the Cold War.<ref name="Kim p.45"/> Though only rough estimates of civilian fatalities are available, scholars have noted that the percentage of civilian casualties in Korea was higher than World War II or the Vietnam War, with Bruce Cumings putting civilian casualties at 2 million and ] in the range of 2-3 million.<ref name="Cumings p. 35"/><ref name="Lewy pp. 450-453"/> | |||
Cumings states that civilians represent at least half the war's casualties, while Lewy suggests it may have gone as high as 70%, compared to his estimates of 42% in World War II and 30%–46% in Vietnam.<ref name="Cumings p. 35" /><ref name="Lewy pp. 450-453" /> Data compiled by the ] lists just under 1 million battle deaths over the war and a mid-estimate of 3 million total deaths, attributing the difference to excess mortality among civilians from one-sided massacres, starvation, and disease.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lacina |first=Bethany |date=September 2009 |title=The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008, Version 3.0 |url=https://files.prio.org/ReplicationData/BattleDeathsDataset/PRIO%20Battle%20Deaths%20Dataset%203.0%20Documentation.pdf |access-date=29 August 2019 |publisher=] |pages=359–362 |archive-date=28 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190328071648/https://files.prio.org/ReplicationData/BattleDeathsDataset/PRIO%20Battle%20Deaths%20Dataset%203.0%20Documentation.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Compounding this devastation for civilians, virtually all major cities on the Peninsula were destroyed.<ref name="Lewy pp. 450-453" /> In per capita and absolute terms, North Korea was the most devastated by the war. According to ], the war resulted in the death of an estimated 12%–15% of the North Korean population ({{Circa}} 10 million), "a figure close to or surpassing the proportion of ]".<ref name="Armstrong">{{Cite journal |last=Armstrong |first=Charles K. |date=20 December 2010 |title=The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950–1960 |url=https://apjjf.org/-Charles-K--Armstrong/3460/article.pdf |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal |volume=8 |issue=51 |page=1 |access-date=13 September 2019 |quote=The number of Korean dead, injured or missing by war's end approached three million, ten percent of the overall population. The majority of those killed were in the North, which had half of the population of the South; although the DPRK does not have official figures, possibly twelve to fifteen percent of the population was killed in the war, a figure close to or surpassing the proportion of Soviet citizens killed in World War II. |archive-date=16 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220116204532/https://apjjf.org/-Charles-K--Armstrong/3460/article.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
By early 1951, the battle lines were established and changed little until 1953. In summer and autumn 1951, the outnumbered Sabres of the USAF's ]—only 44 at one point—continued seeking battle in ], where the ] marks the Chinese border, against Chinese and North Korean air forces capable of deploying some 500 aircraft. Following Colonel ]’s communication with the Pentagon, the ] finally reinforced the beleaguered 4th Wing in December 1951; for the next year-and-a-half stretch of the war, aerial warfare continued so.<ref name="thyngcite">{{cite web |last = |first = |authorlink = |coauthors = |year = |url = http://sabre-pilots.org/classics/v101thyng.htm |title = Harrison R. Thyng |work = |publisher = Sabre Jet Classics |accessdate =2006-12-24 }}</ref>{{Clarify|date=July 2009|reason=How so—elaborate?}} | |||
===Military=== | |||
UN forces gradually gained ] in the Korean theater. This was decisive for the UN: first, for attacking into the peninsular north, and second, for resisting the Chinese intervention.<ref name="Stokesbury1990"/>{{rp|182-184}} North Korea and China also had jet-powered air forces, however their limited training and experience made it strategically untenable to lose them against the better-trained UN air forces. Thus, the US and USSR fed materiel to the war, battling by proxy and finding themselves virtually matched, technologically, when the USAF deployed the F-86F against the MiG-15 late in 1952. | |||
], South Africa.]] | |||
{{See also|Australia in the Korean War|l1=Australia|Belgian Volunteer Corps for Korea|l2=Belgium|Canada in the Korean War|l3=Canada|Colombian Battalion|l4=Colombia|Kagnew Battalion|l5=Ethiopia|French Battalion|l6=France|Greek Expeditionary Force (Korea)|l7=Greece|Luxembourg in the Korean War|l8=Luxembourg|Regiment van Heutsz#Korean War|l9=Netherlands|New Zealand in the Korean War|l10=New Zealand|Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea|l11=Philippines|Thailand in the Korean War|l12=Thailand|Turkish Brigade|l13=Turkey|2 Squadron SAAF#Korean War|l14=South Africa|United Kingdom in the Korean War|l15=United Kingdom|United States in the Korean War|l16=United States}} | |||
After the war, the USAF reported an F-86 Sabre ] in excess of 10:1, with 792 MiG-15s and 108 other aircraft shot down by Sabres, and 78 Sabres lost to enemy fire;{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} post-war data confirms only 379 Sabre kills.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} The Soviet Air Force reported some 1,100 air-to-air victories and 335 MiG combat losses, while China's ] (PLAAF) reported 231 combat losses, mostly MiG-15s, and 168 other aircraft lost. The KPAF reported no data, but the UN Command estimates some 200 KPAF aircraft lost in the war's first stage, and 70 additional aircraft after the Chinese intervention. The USAF disputes Soviet and Chinese claims of 650 and 211 downed F-86s, respectively, as more recent{{When|date=July 2009}} US figures state only 230 losses out of 674 F-86s deployed to Korea.{{Citation needed|date=October 2008}}<ref>{{cite web |title = Korean War Aces, USAF F-86 Sabre jet pilots |publisher =AcePilots.com |url =http://www.acepilots.com/korea_aces.html |accessdate = 2007-08-22 }}</ref> The differing tactical roles of the F-86 and MiG-15 may have contributed to the disparity in losses: MiG-15s primarily targeted B-29 bombers and ground-attack fighter-bombers, while F-86s targeted the MiGs. | |||
{{See also|People's Volunteer Army|l1=China|North Korea in the Korean War|l2=North Korea|Soviet Union in the Korean War|l3=Soviet Union}} | |||
South Korea reported some 137,899 military deaths and 24,495 missing, 450,742 wounded, 8,343 POW.<ref name="ROK Web"/> The US suffered 33,686 battle deaths, 7,586 missing,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dpaa.mil/Our-Missing/Past-Conflicts/|title=Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency > Our Missing > Past Conflicts|website=www.dpaa.mil|access-date=30 April 2020|archive-date=1 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210501075425/https://www.dpaa.mil/Our-Missing/Past-Conflicts/|url-status=live}}</ref> along with 2,830 non-battle deaths. There were 17,730 other non-battle US military deaths that occurred outside Korea during the same period that were erroneously included as war deaths until 2000.<ref name="Vogel">{{Cite news |last=Vogel |first=Steve |date=2000-06-25 |title=Death Miscount Etched Into History |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2000/06/25/death-miscount-etched-into-history/ab9d6830-b10d-429c-a3b0-cbdbaa3a23d1/ |access-date=2023-02-17 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en |archive-date=9 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230109082437/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2000/06/25/death-miscount-etched-into-history/ab9d6830-b10d-429c-a3b0-cbdbaa3a23d1/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="amerdead">{{Cite news |last=Rhem, Kathleen T. |date=8 June 2000 |title=Defense.gov News Article: Korean War Death Stats Highlight Modern DoD Safety Record |publisher=defense.gov. US Department of Defense |url=http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45275 |access-date=3 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120114121831/http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45275 |archive-date=14 January 2012}}</ref> The US suffered 103,284 wounded in action.<ref name=casualties>{{cite book |last1=Micheal Clodfelter |title=Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 |date=2017 |page=664 |publisher=McFarland |isbn=9780786474707 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8urEDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA664}}</ref> UN losses, excluding those of the US or South Korea, amounted to 4,141 dead and 12,044 wounded in action. | |||
] came into its military own in the Korean War. A US Navy ] ''Chickasaw'' flying near the ].<ref name = "Helicopter">{{cite web |url = http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-the-helicopter-during-the-korean-war.htm |publisher = History Net |title = The Rise of the Helicopter During the Korean War}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |publisher = US Army |url = http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/csa/aahist.htm |work = Historic US Army Helicopters |title = World War II thru early Vietnam era helicopters}}</ref>]] | |||
American combat casualties were over 90% of non-Korean UN losses. US battle deaths were 8,516 up to their first engagement with the Chinese on 1 November 1950.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20141221221335/http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-records.jsp?dt=2512&sc=27406,27409,27410,27361,27363,27364,27366,27384,27392&cat=all&tf=F&bc=,sl,fd&q=&as_alq=&as_anq=&as_epq=&as_woq=&nfo_27406=V,10,1900&op_27406=0&txt_27406=&nfo_27409=V,40,1900&op_27409=0&txt_27409=&nfo_27410=V,1,1900&cl_27410=&nfo_27361=N,8,1889&op_27361=3&txt_27361=&txt_27361=&nfo_27363=V,50,1900&op_27363=0&txt_27363=&nfo_27364=V,50,1900&op_27364=0&txt_27364=&nfo_27366=V,2,1900&cl_27366=&nfo_27384=D,8,1950&op_27384=8&txt_27384=06/28/1950&txt_27384=10/31/1950&nfo_27392=V,2,1900&cl_27392=H |date=21 December 2014 }} Korean War Extract Data File. Accessed 21 December 2014.</ref> The first four months prior to the Chinese intervention were by far the bloodiest per day for US forces, as they engaged the well-equipped KPA in intense fighting. American medical records show that from July to October 1950, the army sustained 31% of the combat deaths it ultimately incurred in the entire 37-month war.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200808093826/http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/korea/reister/appb.htm |date=8 August 2020 }}. Accessed 7 January 2019. Table B-1.</ref> The US spent US$30 billion on the war.<ref>Daggett, Stephen. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190116202015/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf |date=16 January 2019 }}. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, p. 2.</ref> Some 1,789,000 American soldiers served in the war, accounting for 31% of the 5,720,000 Americans who served on active duty worldwide from June 1950 to July 1953.<ref name="Fact Sheet: America's Wars"/> | |||
The Korean War marked a major milestone not only for fixed-wing aircraft, but also for ], featuring the first large-scale deployment of ]s for ] (medevac).<ref name = "Helicopter" /> In the Second World War (1939–45), the ] helicopter saw limited ambulance duty, but in Korea, where rough terrain trumped the ] as speedy medevac,<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.olive-drab.com/od_medical_evac_helio_ww2.php |title = WW II Helicopter Evacuation |publisher = Olive Drab}}</ref> helicopters like the ] helped reduce fatal casualties to a dramatic degree when combined with complementary medical innovations such as ]s.<ref>Sandler, p. 9.</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Rotary/MASH/HE12.htm |work = Centennial of Flight |publisher = US Centennial of Flight Commission |title = M.A.S.H./Medevac Helicopters}}</ref> The limitations of jet aircraft for ] highlighted the helicopter's potential in the role, leading to development of the ] and other helicopter gunships used in the ] (1965–75).<ref name = "Helicopter" /> | |||
Deaths from non-American UN militaries totaled 3,730, with another 379 missing.<ref name="ROK Web"/> {{Collapsible list | |||
====Bombing North Korea==== | |||
| bullets = yes | |||
In the three-year Korean War (1950–53), the US Air Force (USAF) and the UN Command air forces bombed the cities and villages of North Korea and parts of South Korea to a degree comparable to the volume of the Allied bombings of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the six-year Second World War (1939–45).{{Dubious|date=July 2009}} On 12 August 1950 the USAF dropped 625 tons of bombs on North Korea; two weeks later, the daily tonnage increased to some 800 tons.<ref>{{cite journal |last = Cumings |first = Bruce |coauthors = Renato Redentor Constantino |year = 2006 |title = Korea: Forgotten Nuclear Threats |journal = The poverty of memory: essays on history and empire |page = 63 |publisher = Foundation for Nationalist Studies |location = Quezon City, Philippines |isbn = 9789718741252 |oclc = 74818792 |accessdate = 2009-07-24}} Essay available online from the .</ref> | |||
| title = Details | |||
| {{Flag|United Kingdom|1801}}:<br />1,109 dead<ref name="BESeoul"/><br />2,674 wounded<ref name="BESeoul">{{Cite web |last=Office of the Defence Attaché |date=30 September 2010 |title=Korean war |url=http://ukinrok.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-korea/defence-relations/korean-war |access-date=16 February 2013 |website=British Embassy Seoul |publisher=] |archive-date=9 April 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120409080726/http://ukinrok.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-korea/defence-relations/korean-war |url-status=dead }}</ref><br />179 MIA<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />977 POW<ref name="ROK Web"/> | |||
| {{Flag|Turkey|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />741 dead<br />2,068 wounded<br />163 MIA<br />244 POW | |||
| {{Flag|Canada|1921|size=23px}}:<br />516 dead<ref>{{Cite web |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=11 October 2011 |title=Korean War WebQuest |url=http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/teach_resources/korwebquest/grp02/korsum |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130130062836/http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/teach_resources/korwebquest/grp02/korsum |archive-date=30 January 2013 |access-date=28 May 2013 |website=Veterans Affairs Canada |publisher=Government of Canada |quote=In Brampton, Ontario, there is a 60-metre long "Memorial Wall" of polished granite, containing individual bronze plaques which commemorate the 516 Canadian soldiers who died during the Korean War.}}<br />{{Cite web |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=1 March 2013 |title=Canada Remembers the Korean War |url=http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/history/KoreaWar/koreawar_fact |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121006110456/http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/history/KoreaWar/koreawar_fact |archive-date=6 October 2012 |access-date=27 May 2013 |website=Veterans Affairs Canada |publisher=Government of Canada |quote=The names of 516 Canadians who died in service during the conflict are inscribed in the Korean War Book of Remembrance located in the Peace Tower in Ottawa.}}</ref><br />1,042 wounded<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Aiysha Abdullah |last2=Kirk Fachnie |date=6 December 2010 |title=Korean War veterans talk of "forgotten war" |url=http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=4854 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130523072128/http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=4854 |archive-date=23 May 2013 |access-date=28 May 2013 |website=Canadian Army |publisher=Government of Canada |quote=Canada lost 516 military personnel during the Korean War and 1,042 more were wounded.}}<br />{{Cite web |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Canadians in the Korean War |url=http://www.kvacanada.com/canadians_in_the_korean_war.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130511043518/http://www.kvacanada.com/canadians_in_the_korean_war.htm |archive-date=11 May 2013 |access-date=28 May 2013 |website=kvacanada.com |publisher=Korean Veterans Association of Canada Inc. |quote=Canada's casualties totalled 1,558 including 516 who died.}}<br />{{Cite news |date=8 January 2013 |title=2013 declared year of Korean war veteran |work=MSN News |agency=The Canadian Press |url=http://news.ca.msn.com/canada/2013-declared-year-of-korean-war-veteran |url-status=dead |access-date=28 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102154432/http://news.ca.msn.com/canada/2013-declared-year-of-korean-war-veteran |archive-date=2 November 2013 |quote=The 1,558 Canadian casualties in the three-year conflict included 516 people who died.}}</ref><br />1 MIA<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />33 POW<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ted Barris |date=1 July 2003 |title=Canadians in Korea |url=http://legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2003/07/canadians-in-korea/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130720042136/http://legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2003/07/canadians-in-korea/ |archive-date=20 July 2013 |access-date=28 May 2013 |website=legionmagazine.com |publisher=Royal Canadian Legion |quote=Not one of the 33 Canadian PoWs imprisoned in North Korea signed the petitions.}}</ref> | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Australia|size=23px}}:<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120328164845/https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/korea/mia/ |date=28 March 2012 }} Retrieved 17 March 2012</ref><br />339 dead<br />1,216 wounded<br />43 MIA<br />26 POW | |||
| {{Flagcountry|French Fourth Republic|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />262 dead<br />1,008 wounded<br />7 MIA<br />12 POW | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Kingdom of Greece|state|size=23px}}<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />192 dead<br />543 wounded<br />3 POW | |||
| {{Flag|Colombia|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />163 dead<br />448 wounded<br />28 POW | |||
| {{Flag|Thailand|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />129 dead<br />1,139 wounded<br />5 MIA{{Clarify|reason=Conflicts with data on ] article|date=December 2021}} | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Ethiopian Empire|size=23px}}<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />121 dead<br />536 wounded | |||
| {{Flag|Netherlands|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />122 dead<br />645 wounded<br />3 MIA | |||
| {{Flag|Belgium|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />101 dead<br />478 wounded<br />5 MIA<br />1 POW | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Third Philippine Republic|1936|size=23px}}:<ref name="GWHQ2002">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L_xxOM85bD8C&pg=PA160 |title=Ground Warfare: H–Q |publisher=ABC-CLIO |date=2002 |isbn=978-1576073445 |editor-last=Sandler |editor-first=Stanley |series=Volume 2 of Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia |page=160 |quote=Philippines: KIA 92; WIA 299; MIA/POW 97<br />New Zealand: KIA 34; WIA 299; MIA/POW 1 |access-date=19 March 2013 |archive-date=20 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320155413/https://books.google.com/books?id=L_xxOM85bD8C&pg=PA160 |url-status=live }}</ref><br />92 dead<br />299 wounded<br />97 MIA/POW | |||
| {{Flag|Japan|1947}}:<ref name="auto"/><br />79 dead | |||
| {{Flagcountry|Union of South Africa|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />34 dead<br />9 POW | |||
| {{Flag|New Zealand|size=23px}}:<ref name="GWHQ2002"/><br />34 dead<br />299 wounded<br />1 MIA/POW | |||
| {{Flag|Norway|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />3 dead | |||
| {{Flag|Luxembourg|size=23px}}:<ref name="ROK Web"/><br />2 dead<br />13 wounded | |||
| {{Flag|India|size=23px}}:<ref name="The Times, 14 August 1950">{{Cite news |date=14 August 1950 |title=Two War Reporters Killed |work=] |location=London |issn=0140-0460 |ref={{SfnRef|''The Times'', 14 August 1950}}}}</ref><br />1 dead | |||
}} | |||
Chinese sources reported that the PVA suffered 114,000 battle deaths, 21,000 deaths from wounds, 13,000 deaths from illness, 340,000 wounded, and 7,600 missing. 7,110 Chinese POWs were repatriated to China.<ref name="xu"/> In 2010, the Chinese government revised their official tally of war losses to 183,108 dead (114,084 in combat, 70,000 deaths from wounds, illness and other causes) and 21,374 POW,<ref>{{Cite web|title=南北375万人死亡した朝鮮戦争 終戦宣言が期待されるも数歩後退に|url=https://www.koreaworldtimes.com/topics/news/8584/|website=KOREA WORLD TIMES|date=30 January 2021|accessdate=2024-01-25|archive-date=5 December 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231205092413/https://www.koreaworldtimes.com/topics/news/8584/|url-status=live}}</ref> 25,621 missing.<ref name="china.org.cn"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130603132334/http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-06/28/content_20365659.htm |date=3 June 2013 }}. China Daily, 28 June 2010. State Council Information Office, Chinese government, Beijing. "According to statistics compiled by the army's medical departments and hospitals, 114,084 servicemen were killed in military action or accidents, and 25,621 soldiers had gone missing. The other about 70,000 casualties died from wounds, illness and other causes, he said. To date, civil affairs departments have registered 183,108 war martyrs, Xu said."</ref> Overall, 73% of Chinese infantry troops served in Korea (25 of 34 armies, or 79 of 109 infantry divisions, were rotated in). More than 52% of the Chinese air force, 55% of the tank units, 67% of the artillery divisions, and 100% of the railroad engineering divisions were sent to Korea as well.<ref>Xiaobing 2009, p. 106</ref> Chinese soldiers who served in Korea faced a greater chance of being killed than those who served in World War II or the Chinese Civil War.<ref>Xiaobing 2009, p. 111.</ref> China spent over 10 billion yuan on the war (roughly US$3.3 billion), not counting USSR aid.<ref name="Xiaobing 2009, p. 112">Xiaobing 2009, p. 112.</ref> This included $1.3 billion in money owed to the Soviet Union by the end of it. This was a relatively large cost, as China had only 4% of the national income of the US.<ref name="xu"/> Spending on the war constituted 34–43% of China's annual government budget from 1950 to 1953, depending on the year.<ref name="Xiaobing 2009, p. 112"/> Despite its underdeveloped economy, Chinese military spending was the world's fourth largest globally for most of the war after that of the US, the Soviet Union, and the UK; however, by 1953, with the winding down of the Korean War and the escalation of the ], French spending also surpassed Chinese spending by about a third.<ref>Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities (v4.0) Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190808224851/https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending |date=8 August 2019 }} Accessed 8 August 2019.</ref> | |||
As a result, eighteen of North Korea’s cities were more than 50% destroyed. The war's highest-ranking American POW, US Maj. Gen. William Dean,<ref>{{cite book |last = Witt |first = Linda |coauthors = Judith Bellafaire, Britta Granrud, and Mary Jo Binker |title = A Defense Weapon Known to be of Value: Servicewomen of the Korean War Era |publisher = ] |year = 2005 |page = 217 |isbn = 9781584654728 |url = http://books.google.com/books?id=B2Axj4NbJ0YC&pg=PA217 |accessdate = 2009-07-24}}</ref> reported that most of the North Korean cities and villages he saw were either ruins or snow-covered wastelands.<ref>http://monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2004/12/10/a0034.text</ref> | |||
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, North Korean military losses totaled 294,151 dead, 91,206 missing, and 229,849 wounded, giving North Korea the highest military deaths of any belligerent in absolute and relative terms.<ref name="Andrew C. Nahm 2004 pages 129-130">Andrew C. Nahm; James Hoare (2004). "Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea". Scarecrow Press, pp. 129–130.</ref> The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset gave a similar figure for North Korean military deaths of 316,579.<ref name="PRIO">Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. ―Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths.‖ European Journal of Population: 21(2–3): 145–166. Korean data available at {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220604135816/https://files.prio.org/ReplicationData/BattleDeathsDataset/PRIO%20Battle%20Deaths%20Dataset%203.0%20Documentation.pdf |date=4 June 2022 }}, pp. 359–362</ref> Chinese sources reported similar figures for the North Korean military of 290,000 "casualties" and 90,000 captured.<ref name="xu"/> The financial cost of the war for North Korea was massive in direct losses and lost economic activity; the country was devastated by the cost of the war and ], which, among other things, destroyed 85% of North Korea's buildings and 95% of its power generation.<ref>Harden, Blaine (2017). ''King of Spies: The Dark Reign of America's Spymaster in Korea''. New York, p. 9.</ref> The Soviet Union suffered 299 dead, with 335 planes lost.<ref name="Krivosheev1997">{{Cite book |last=Krivošeev |first=Grigorij F. |title=Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century |publisher=Greenhill |date=1997 |isbn=978-1853672804 |location=London}}</ref> | |||
===Naval warfare=== | |||
] fires a salvo from its 16-inch guns, Chong Jin, North Korea, 21 October 1950.]] | |||
The Chinese and North Koreans estimated that about 390,000 soldiers from the US, 660,000 soldiers from South Korea and 29,000 other UN soldiers were "eliminated" from the battlefield.<ref name="xu"/> Western sources estimate the PVA suffered about 400,000 killed and 486,000 wounded, while the KPA suffered 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded, and over 101,000 captured or missing.<ref name="Hickey"/> Cumings cites a much higher figure of 900,000 fatalities among Chinese soldiers.<ref name="Cumings p. 35"/> | |||
Because the North Korean navy was not large, the Korean War featured few naval battles; mostly the combatant navies served as naval artillery for their in-country armies. A skirmish between North Korea and the UN Command occurred on 2 July 1950; the US Navy cruiser ], the Royal Navy cruiser ], and the frigate ] fought four North Korean torpedo boats and two mortar gunboats, and sank them. | |||
===Civilian=== | |||
The UN navies sank supply and ammunition ships to deny the sea to North Korea. The ''Juneau'' sank ammunition ships that had been present in her previous battle. The last sea battle of the Korean War occurred at Inchon, days before the Battle of Incheon; the ROK ship ''PC 703'' sank a North Korean mine-layer in a small ] Island, near Inchon. Three other supply ships were sunk by ''PC-703'' two days later in the ].<ref name= "autogenerated2">{{cite web |url = http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/ext.php?ref=http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/navalbattles.htm |publisher = US Navy |title = Naval Battles |last = Marolda |first = Edward |accessdate = 2008-11-02}}</ref> | |||
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, there were over 750,000 confirmed violent civilians deaths during the war, another million civilians were pronounced missing, and millions more ended up as refugees. Estimates of the number of civilians killed in the entire war range from 244,000 to 990,000 for South Korea. The North Korean government has never published estimates of civilian deaths in the war, but more than one million killed has been an estimate common among historians who have studied the Korean War.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Conway-Lanz |first=Sahr |title=Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War II |publisher=Routledge |year=2006 |location=New York |pages=151}}</ref> Over 1.5 million North Koreans fled to the South.<ref name="Andrew C. Nahm 2004 pages 129-130"/> | |||
=== |
=== War crimes === | ||
{{Main|War crimes in the Korean War}} | |||
In ''The Origins of the Korean War'' (1981, 1990), US historian ] reports that in a 30 November 1950 press conference, President Truman's allusions to attacking the KPA with ] “was a threat based on contingency planning to use the bomb, rather than the faux pas so many assumed it to be.” The President sought to dismiss Gen. MacArthur from theater command because his insubordination demonstrated his political unreliability: A US Army officer who might ''disobey'' his civilian Commander in Chief about using or not using atomic bombs. Also on 30 November 1950, the USAF ] was ordered to “augment its capacities, and that this should include ''atomic'' capabilities.” In 1951, the US escalated closest to atomic warfare in Korea, because the PRC had deployed new armies to the Sino-Korean frontier, thus, at the Kadena USAF Base, Okinawa, pit crews assembled atomic bombs for Korean warfare, “lacking only the essential nuclear cores.” | |||
] | |||
] | |||
There were numerous atrocities and massacres of civilians throughout the Korean War committed by both sides, starting in the war's first days. In 2005–2010, a ] investigated atrocities and other human rights violations through much of the 20th century, from the ] through the Korean War and beyond. It excavated some mass graves from the Bodo League massacres and confirmed the general outlines of those political executions. Of the Korean War-era massacres the commission was petitioned to investigate, 82% were perpetrated by South Korean forces, with 18% perpetrated by North Korean forces.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Truth Commission: South Korea 2005 |url=http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-korea-2005 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150610224046/http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-south-korea-2005 |archive-date=10 June 2015 |access-date=23 December 2018 |publisher=]}}</ref><ref>cf. the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's preliminary March 2009 report: {{Cite web |date=March 2009 |title=Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three Years |url=http://jinsil.go.kr/pdf/%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%EB%B0%B1%EC%84%9C_20MS%ED%8C%8C%EC%9D%BC_0205.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303171441/http://jinsil.go.kr/pdf/%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%EB%B0%B1%EC%84%9C_20MS%ED%8C%8C%EC%9D%BC_0205.pdf |archive-date=3 March 2016 |publisher=] |page=39 |quote=Out of those 9,600 petitions, South Korean forces conducted 7,922 individual massacres and North Korean forces conducted 1,687 individual massacres.}}</ref><ref name="bloodbath">{{Cite news |date=10 July 2010 |title=Korea bloodbath probe ends; US escapes much blame |work=The San Diego Union Tribune |url=https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-korea-bloodbath-probe-ends-us-escapes-much-blame-2010jul10-story.html |access-date=11 June 2019 |quote=Last November, after investigating petitions from surviving relatives, the commission announced it had verified and identified 4,934 execution victims. But historian Kim Dong-choon, the former commissioner who led that investigation, estimates at least 60,000 to 110,000 died, and similar numbers were summarily executed when northern troops were driven from South Korea later in 1950 and alleged southern collaborators were rounded up. 'I am estimating conservatively,' he said. Korean War historian Park Myung-lim, methodically reviewing prison records, said he believes perhaps 200,000 were slaughtered in mid-1950 alone. |archive-date=4 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104180904/https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-korea-bloodbath-probe-ends-us-escapes-much-blame-2010jul10-story.html |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
The commission also received petitions alleging more than 200 large-scale killings of South Korean civilians by the U.S. military during the war, mostly air attacks. It confirmed several such cases, including refugees crowded into a cave attacked with napalm bombs, which survivors said killed 360 people, and an air attack that killed 197 refugees gathered in a field in the far south. It recommended South Korea seek reparations from the United States, but in 2010, a reorganized commission under a new, conservative government concluded that most U.S. mass killings resulted from "military necessity", while in a small number of cases, they concluded, the U.S. military had acted with "low levels of unlawfulness", but the commission recommended against seeking reparations.<ref name="bloodbath"/> | |||
On 5 April 1950, the ] (JCS) issued orders for the retaliatory atomic-bombing of Manchurian PRC military bases, if either their armies crossed into Korea or if PRC or KPA bombers attacked Korea from there. The President ordered transferred nine Mark-IV nuclear capsules “to the Air Force’s Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons ... signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets”—which he never transmitted, having out-witted the JCS to agreeing to sack the insubordinate Soldier MacArthur (announced 10 April 1950), and because neither the PRC nor USSR likewise escalated the war.<ref name = "Cumings1">{{cite book |last =Cumings |first =Bruce |authorlink =Bruce Cumings |title =Korea's Place in the Sun: A History |publisher =WW Norton & Company |year=1997 |pages =289–92 |isbn =0393316815 }}</ref>{{Verify source|date=August 2008}} | |||
] | |||
Moreover (and contradictorily), President Truman also remarked that his government were actively considering using the atomic bomb to end the war in Korea (implying that Gen. MacArthur would control it), but that only ''he''—the US President—commanded atomic bomb use, ''and'' that he had not given authorization. For the matter of atomic warfare was ''solely'' a US decision, ''not'' the collective decision of the UN—hence his 4 December 1950 meeting with UK PM ] (and Commonwealth spokesman), French Premier ], and Foreign Minister ] to discuss their worries about Korean atomic warfare and its likely continental expansion. The Indian Ambassador, ], reports, "that Truman announced that he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed totally unmoved by this threat ... The propaganda against American aggression was stepped up. The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was made the slogan for increased production, greater national integration, and more rigid control over anti-national activities. One could not help feeling that Truman's threat came in very useful to the leaders of the Revolution, to enable them to keep up the tempo of their activities."<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref>{{cite book |last =Knightley |first =Phillip |title =The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker |publisher =Quartet |year=1982 |page =334 |isbn =080186951X }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last = Panikkar |first =Kavalam Madhava |authorlink =Kavalam Madhava Panikkar |title =In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat |publisher = Hyperion Press |year=1981 |isbn =0830500138 }}</ref> | |||
Almost every substantial building in North Korea was destroyed during the war.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=297–98}}{{Sfn|Jager|2013|pp=237–42}} The war's highest-ranking U.S. POW, Major General William F. Dean,<ref name="Witt2005" /> reported that the majority of North Korean cities and villages he saw were either rubble or snow-covered wasteland.<ref name="Cumings2004" /><ref>William F Dean (1954) ''General Dean's Story'', (as told to William L Worden), Viking Press, pp. 272–73.</ref> North Korean factories, schools, hospitals, and government offices were forced to move underground, and air defenses were "non-existent".<ref name="japanfocus.org">{{Cite journal |last=Armstrong |first=Charles |date=20 December 2010 |title=The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950–1960 |url=http://www.japanfocus.org/-charles_k_-armstrong/3460/article.html |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal |volume=8 |issue=51 |access-date=13 June 2015 |archive-date=15 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150615003900/http://www.japanfocus.org/-charles_k_-armstrong/3460/article.html |url-status=live }}</ref> North Korea ranks as among the most heavily bombed countries in history,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kiernan |first1=Ben |author-link=Ben Kiernan |last2=Owen |first2=Taylor |date=27 April 2015 |title=Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications |url=http://apjjf.org/2015/13/16/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal |volume=13 |issue=17 |access-date=30 August 2019 |archive-date=12 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912002843/http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> and the U.S. dropped a total of 635,000 tons of bombs (including 32,557 tons of napalm) on Korea, more than during the entire Pacific War.<ref name="Walkom2010" /><ref name="japanfocus.org" /> By the end of the war, eighteen of the twenty-two major cities in North Korea had been at least half obliterated according to damage assessments by the U.S. Air Force.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Crane |first=Conrad C. |title=American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 |publisher=University of Kansas Press |year=2000 |location=Lawrence, KS}}</ref> During a Senate hearing in the spring of 1951, MacArthur expressed his horror at the devastation that the war was inflicting on the Koreans, describing it as the worst he had ever seen in his military career. As the most humane solution, MacArthur suggested that the war should be escalated in order to bring it to an end sooner.<ref>Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, 43, 82-83, 194, 219, 397-398,1362-1363. MacArthur's comments were popular with the weekly news magazines. See "The MacArthur Hearing," Time, May 14, 1951, 20.</ref> | |||
Six days later, on 6 December 1950, after the Chinese intervention repelled the ROK, US, and UN Command armies from northern North Korea, Gen. ] (Army Chief of Staff), Gen. MacArthur, Admiral ], Gen. ], and staff officers Maj. Gen. Doyle Hickey, Maj. Gen. ], and Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, met in Tokyo to plan strategy countering the Chinese intervention; they composed three atomic warfare hypotheses encompassinging the next weeks and months of warfare.<ref name="Schnabel" /> In the first hypothesis: if the PVA continue attacking in full— ''and'' the UN Command are forbidden to blockade and bomb China, ''and'' without Nationalist Chinese reinforcements, ''and'' without increasing Gen. MacArthur's US forces until April 1951 ] divisions]—''then'' atomic bombs might be used in ''North Korea''.<ref name="Schnabel" /> In the second: if the PVA continue full attacks—''and'' the UN Command have blockaded China and effective aerial reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese interior, ''and'' the Nationalist Chinese soldiers are maximally exploited, and ''tactical'' atomic-bombing is to hand, ''then'' Gen. MacArthur could hold positions deep in North Korea.<ref name="Schnabel" /> In the third: if the PRC agree to not cross the 38th-parallel border, Gen. MacArthur recommends UN acceptance of an armistice disallowing PVA and KPA troops south of the parallel, and requiring PVA and KPA guerrillas to withdraw northwards. The US Eighth Army remains protecting the Seoul–Incheon area, while X Corps retreats to Pusan. A UN commission should supervise implementation of armistice.<ref name="Schnabel" /> | |||
==Characteristics== | |||
President Truman did not immediately threaten atomic warfare after the October 1950 Chinese intervention, but, 45 days later, did remark about using it after the PVA repelled the UN Command from North Korea. Gen. MacArthur ''et al.'' did not compose the atomic warfare hypotheses until after the President's 30 November press conference. The US’s forgoing atomic warfare was not because of “a disinclination by the USSR and PRC to escalate” the Korean War, but because UN Ally pressure—notably from the UK, the Commonwealth, and France—about a ] imbalance rendering NATO defenseless, while the US fought China, who then might persuade the USSR to conquer Western Europe.<ref name="Schnabel" /><ref>{{cite book |last =Truman |first =Harry S |authorlink =Harry S. Truman |title =Memoirs (2 volumes) |publisher =Doubleday |date=1955–1956 |pages =vol. II, pp. 394–5 |isbn =156852062X |nopp =true }}</ref> | |||
===U.S. unpreparedness=== | |||
In postwar analysis of the unpreparedness of US forces deployed during the summer and fall of 1950, Army Major General ] stated "Many who never lived to tell the tale had to fight the full range of ground warfare from offensive to delaying action, unit by unit, man by man ... hat we were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat ... does not relieve us from the blame of having placed our own flesh and blood in such a predicament."<ref>Lewis, Adrian R., ''The American culture of war'', New York: Taylor & Francis Group, {{ISBN|978-0415979757}} (2007), p. 82</ref> | |||
] | |||
By 1950, US Secretary of Defense ] had established a policy of faithfully following Truman's defense economization plans and aggressively attempted to implement it, even in the face of steadily increasing external threats. He consequently received much of the blame for the initial setbacks and widespread reports of ill-equipped and inadequately trained military forces in the war's early stages.{{Sfn|Blair|2003|p=}} | |||
In October 1951, the US effected ] to establish ]-use capability. USAF B-29 bombers practiced individual bombing runs (using dummy nuclear or conventional bombs) from ] to North Korea, coordinated from ], in east-central Japan. ''Hudson Harbor'' tested “actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons -assembly and -testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming”. The bombing run data indicated that atomic bombs would be tactically ineffective against massed infantry, because the “timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare.”<ref>{{Citation |last =Hasbrouck |first =S. V |title =memo to file (November 7, 1951), G-3 Operations file, box 38-A |publisher =Library of Congress |year =1951}}.</ref><ref>{{Citation |last =Army Chief of Staff |title =memo to file (November 20, 1951), G-3 Operations file, box 38-A |publisher =Library of Congress |year =1951}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last =Watson |first =Robert J |coauthors =Schnabel, James F. |title =The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1951, The Korean War and 1951–1953, The Korean War (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III, Parts I and II) |publisher =Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |year=1998 |pages =part 1, p. v; part 2, p. 614 |nopp=true }}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last =Commanding General, Far East Air Force |title =Memo to 98th Bomb Wing Commander, Okinawa |year =1951 }}.</ref><ref>{{Citation |last =Far East Command G-2 Theater Intelligence |title =Résumé of Operation, Record Group 349, box 752 |year =1951}}.</ref> | |||
As an initial response to the invasion, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could be imposed only "on paper" since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request.{{Sfn|Blair|2003|p=}}<ref name="blockade">{{Cite web |date=6 July 1950 |title=Memorandum of Information for the Secretary – Blockade of Korea |url=http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week2/kw_78_1.jpg |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070809213846/http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week2/kw_78_1.jpg |archive-date=9 August 2007 |access-date=28 July 2007 |publisher=Truman Presidential Library – Archives}}</ref> Army officials, desperate for weaponry, ] ]s and other equipment from Pacific War battlefields and reconditioned them for shipment to Korea.{{Sfn|Blair|2003|p=}} Army ordnance officials at ] pulled down ] tanks from display pedestals around Fort Knox in order to equip the third company of the Army's hastily formed ].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Connor |first=Arthur W. |title=The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications For Today |publisher=U.S. Army War College |date=1992 |page=73}}</ref> Without adequate numbers of tactical fighter-bomber aircraft, the Air Force took ] propeller-driven aircraft out of storage or from existing ] squadrons and rushed them into front-line service. A shortage of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel resulted in improvised repairs and overhauls. A Navy helicopter pilot aboard an active duty warship recalled fixing damaged rotor blades with masking tape in the absence of spares.<ref>Close, Robert A. (Cmdr), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120214182049/https://www.usna.com/SSLPage.aspx?pid=656 |date=14 February 2012 }}, Class of '45, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association & Foundation: "There were insufficient spare sets of blades for all ships having helos. Naturally, the ship didn't have a set. So we used our hands to smooth the busted ribs and fabric back into reasonable aerodynamic shape and bandaged the wound with masking tape...Flew that way for two weeks."</ref> | |||
===War crimes=== | |||
====Crimes against civilians==== | |||
{{Main|No Gun Ri massacre}} | |||
] | |||
U.S. ] and ] infantry soldiers and new inductees (called to duty to fill out understrength infantry divisions) found themselves short of nearly everything needed to repel the North Korean forces: artillery, ammunition, heavy tanks, ground-support aircraft, even effective anti-tank weapons such as the ].<ref>Blair, Clay, ''The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953'', Naval Institute Press (2003), p. 50: The planned introduction into service of the M20, an antitank weapon urgently required to defeat the thick cast armor of Soviet tanks being supplied to the North Koreans, had been cancelled due to budget cuts.</ref> Some Army combat units sent to Korea were supplied with worn-out, "red-lined" ] or ] in immediate need of ordnance depot overhaul or repair.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1999–2000 |title=Memoirs, William E. Anderson sub. Defective Weapons |url=http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/anderson_william/index.htm#Defective |access-date=8 July 2018 |publisher=Korean War Educator |archive-date=13 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191013162139/http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/anderson_william/index.htm#Defective |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2012 |title=Veterans' Memoirs: George W. Gatliff |url=http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/gatliff_george/index.htm |access-date=23 June 2017 |website=Korean War Educator |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304031418/http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/gatliff_george/index.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Only the Marine Corps, whose commanders had stored and maintained their World War II surplus inventories of equipment and weapons, proved ready for deployment, though they still were woefully understrength,<ref>Warren, James A., ''American Spartans: The U.S. Marines'', New York: Simon & Schuster (2005), pp. 139–40: Repeated cuts in active-duty ]s (FMF), planned combat deployments in the Atlantic and ] (in the event of war with the Soviet Union), and ] deployments in the Mediterranean left only the under-strength ] – a reserve unit – available for combat in the western Pacific.</ref> as well as in need of suitable landing craft to practice amphibious operations (Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had transferred most of the remaining craft to the Navy and reserved them for use in training Army units).<ref name="Shipmate2000">{{Cite journal |last=Krulak |first=Lieutenant General Victor H. (USMC retired) |date=June 2000 |title=You Can't Get There From Here: The Inchon Story |url=http://www.usna.com/News_pubs/Publications/Shipmate/2000/2000_06/inchon.htm |journal=Shipmate |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20021113195108/http://www.usna.com/News_pubs/Publications/Shipmate/2000/2000_06/inchon.htm |archive-date=13 November 2002}}</ref> | |||
], South Korea, October 1950.]] | |||
===Armored warfare=== | |||
In occupied areas, North Korean Army ] purged South Korean society of its ], by assassinating every educated person—academic, governmental, religious—who might lead resistance against the North; the purges continued during NPA retreat.<ref name="SOD">{{cite book |last =Rummel |first =R.J |title =Statistics of Democide |pages =Chapter 10, Statistics Of North Korean Democide Estimates, Calculations, And Sources |url =http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP10.HTM |isbn = |nopp=true }}</ref> Likewise, in combating enemy ]—immediately after the invasion in June 1950—the South Korean Government ordered the nation-wide "pre-emptive apprehension" of politically-suspect (disloyal) citizens. | |||
The initial assault by KPA forces was aided by the use of Soviet ] tanks.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=14, 43}} A KPA ] equipped with about 120 T-34s spearheaded the invasion. These faced an ROK that had few anti-tank weapons adequate to deal with the T-34s.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=39}} Additional Soviet armor was added as the offensive progressed.{{Sfn|Perrett|1987|pp=134–35}} The KPA tanks had a good deal of early successes against ROK infantry, Task Force Smith, and the U.S. ] light tanks that they encountered.<ref>]</ref>{{Sfn|Stein|1994|p=18}} Interdiction by ground attack aircraft was the only means of slowing the advancing KPA armor. The tide turned in favor of the UN forces in August 1950 when the KPA suffered major tank losses during a series of battles in which the UN forces brought heavier equipment to bear, including American ] and M26 medium tanks, alongside British ], ] and ] tanks.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|pp=182–84}} | |||
The Incheon landings on 15 September cut off the KPA supply lines, causing their armored forces and infantry to run out of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of this and the Pusan perimeter breakout, the KPA had to retreat, and many of the T-34s and heavy weapons had to be abandoned. By the time the KPA withdrew from the South, 239 T-34s and 74 ] self-propelled guns were lost.{{Sfn|Perrett|1987|p=135}} After November 1950, KPA armor was rarely encountered.<ref>]</ref> | |||
The military police and ] ] (civilian) armies—abetted by the US—summarily executed thousands of left-wing and communist political prisoners at Daejeon Prison and in the ] (1948–49).<ref>{{cite web |url = http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080519/ap_on_re_as/korea_mass_executions |title = AP Impact: Thousands killed in 1950 by US' Korean ally |publisher Yahoo! |work = News}}</ref> US diplomat Gregory Henderson, then in Korea, calculates some 100,000 pro-North political prisoners were killed and buried in ]s. The South Korean ] received reports of some 7,800 civilian killings, in 150 places, occurred before and during the war. | |||
Following the initial assault by the North, the Korean War saw limited use of tanks and featured no large-scale tank battles. The mountainous, forested terrain, especially in the eastern central zone, was poor tank country, limiting their mobility. Through the last two years of the war in Korea, UN tanks served largely as infantry support and mobile artillery pieces.{{Sfn|Ravino|Carty|2003|p=130}} | |||
In addition to conventional military operations, North Korean soldiers also fought the US–UN forces by ] ] among refugees—who (usually) could approach soldiers for food and help in a battlefield. For a time, US troops fought under a "shoot-first-ask-questions-later" policy against every civilian-refugee approaching US battlefield positions;{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} an unwise tactical ''carte blanche'' that led US Soldiers to indiscriminately kill some 400 civilians at ] (26–29 July 1950), in central Korea.<ref name="wash">{{cite news |first =Charles J. |last =Hanley |coauthors =Martha Mendoza |date = 2006-05-29 |title =U.S. Policy Was to Shoot Korean Refugees |url =http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900485.html |work = ] |publisher = ] |accessdate = 2007-04-15 }}</ref><ref name="Letter_reveals" >{{cite news |first = Charles J. |last = Hanley |coauthors = Martha Mendoza |title = Letter reveals US intent at No Gun Ri |url = http://www.nola.com/newsflash/topstories/index.ssf?/base/international-21/1176512119139600.xml&storylist=topstories |work = ] |publisher = ] |date = 2007-04-13 |accessdate = 2007-04-14}}</ref> | |||
===Naval warfare=== | |||
The warfare of the Korean armies included forcibly ] the available civilian men and women to their war efforts. In ''Statistics of Democide'' (1997), Prof. ] reports that the North Korean Army conscripted some 400,000 South Korean citizens.<ref name="SOD"/> The South Korean Government reported that before the US re-captured Seoul, in September 1950, the North abducted some 83,000 citizens; the North says they ].<ref>{{cite news |last =Choe |first = Sang-Hun |title =A half-century wait for a husband abducted by North Korea |publisher =International Herald Tribune:Asia Pacific |date =2007-06-25 |url =http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/25/news/missing.php |accessdate =2007-08-22 l}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title =S Korea 'regrets' refugee mix-up |publisher =British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) |date =2007-01-18 |url =http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6274297.stm |accessdate =2008-08-22 }}</ref> | |||
{{Further|List of US Navy ships sunk or damaged in action during the Korean War}} | |||
{{Naval engagements of the Korean War}} | |||
], North Korea, 21 October 1950]] | |||
Because neither Korea had a significant navy, the war featured few naval battles. A skirmish between North Korea and the UN Command occurred on 2 July 1950; the U.S. Navy cruiser {{USS|Juneau|CL-119|6}}, the Royal Navy cruiser {{HMS|Jamaica|44|6}} and the Royal Navy frigate {{HMS|Black Swan|L57|6}} fought four North Korean torpedo boats and two mortar gunboats, and sank them. USS ''Juneau'' later sank several ammunition ships that had been present. The last sea battle of the Korean War occurred days before the Battle of Incheon; the ROK ship ''PC-703'' sank a North Korean minelayer in the ] Island, near Incheon. Three other supply ships were sunk by ''PC-703'' two days later in the Yellow Sea.<ref name="Marolda2003"/> | |||
During most of the war, the UN navies patrolled the west and east coasts of North Korea, sinking supply and ammunition ships and denying the North Koreans the ability to resupply from the sea. Aside from very occasional gunfire from North Korean shore batteries, the main threat to UN navy ships was from ]s. During the war, five U.S. Navy ships were lost to mines: two minesweepers, two minesweeper escorts, and one ocean tug. Mines and coastal artillery damaged another 87 U.S. warships.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Korean War |url=http://www.korean-war.com/USNavy/usnavyshipssunk.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120050209/http://www.korean-war.com/USNavy/usnavyshipssunk.html |archive-date=20 January 2013 |website=korean-war.com}}</ref> | |||
====Bodo League anti–communist massacre==== | |||
{{Main|Bodo League massacre}} | |||
===Aerial warfare=== | |||
To outmaneuver a possible ] in the Republic of Korea, President Syngman Rhee’s régime assassinated its “enemies of the state”—South Koreans ''suspected'' of being “communists”, “pro-North Korea”, and “leftist”—by imprisoning them for political re-education in the ''Gukmin Bodo Ryeonmaeng'' (National Rehabilitation and Guidance League, ''aka'' the Bodo League). The true purpose of the anti–communist “Bodo League”, abetted by the ], was the régime’s hasty assassination of some 10,000 to 100,000 “enemies of the state” whom they dumped in trenches, mines, and the sea — before and after the 25 June 1950 North Korean invasion. Contemporary calculations report some 200,000 to 1,200,000.<ref> The Hankyoreh Plus.</ref> USAMGIK officers were present at one political execution site; at least one US officer sanctioned the mass killings of political prisoners whom the North Koreans would free upon conquering the peninsular south.<ref name="breitbart_D94TJ7800">{{cite web |date=December 6, 2008 |url = http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=2008-12-06_D94TJ7800|title = Children 'executed' in 1950 South Korean killings|publisher = ] |accessdate = 2008-12-15 |last=CHARLES J. HANLEY and JAE-SOON CHANG |quote=}}</ref> | |||
{{Further|USAF units and aircraft of the Korean War|Bombing of North Korea}} | |||
The war was the first in which ] played the central role in air combat. Once-formidable fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, ], and ]{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=174}}—all ], propeller-driven, and designed during World War II—relinquished their air-superiority roles to a new generation of faster, ] fighters arriving in the theater. For the initial months of the war, the ], ], ], and other jets under the UN flag dominated the ] (KPAF) propeller-driven Soviet ] and ]s.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=182}}{{Sfn|Werrell|2005|p=71}} By early August 1950, the KPAF was reduced to only about 20 planes.<ref name="airforcemag1april20">{{Cite web |last=Correll |first=John T. |date=1 April 2020 |title=The Difference in Korea |url=https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-difference-in-korea/ |access-date=14 June 2020 |website=] |archive-date=15 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200715062930/https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-difference-in-korea/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
The South Korean ] reports that petitions requesting explanation of the summary execution of leftist South Koreans outnumber, six-to-one, the petitions requesting explanation of the summary execution of rightist South Koreans.<ref>.</ref> These data apply solely to South Korea, because North Korea is not integral to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Bodo League massacre survivor, seventy-one-year-old Kim Jong-chol, whose South Korean border guard father was press-ganged to work with the KPA, was executed by the Rhee Government as a ]; his grandparents and a seven-year-old sister also were assassinated; about his experience in ] city, he says: | |||
] dropping napalm in Korea, May 1952]] | |||
{{Cquote2|Young children or whatever, were all killed en masse. What did the family do wrong? Why did they kill the family? When the people from the other side came here, they didn’t kill many people.|Kim Jong-chol<ref name="breitbart_D94TJ7800"/>}} | |||
The Chinese intervention in late October 1950 bolstered the KPAF with the ], one of the world's most advanced jet fighters.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=182}} The USAF countered the MiG-15 by sending over three squadrons of its most capable fighter, the ]. These arrived in December 1950.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=183}}{{Sfn|Werrell|2005|pp=76–77}} The Soviet Union denied the involvement of their personnel in anything other than an advisory role, but air combat quickly resulted in Soviet pilots dropping their code signals and speaking over the radio in Russian. This known direct Soviet participation was a '']'' that the UN Command deliberately overlooked, lest the war expand to include the Soviet Union and potentially escalate into atomic warfare.{{Sfn|Stokesbury|1990|p=182}} | |||
After the war and to the present day, the USAF reported an inflated F-86 Sabre ] in excess of 10:1, with 792 MiG-15s and 108 other aircraft shot down by Sabres, and 78 Sabres lost to enemy fire.<ref name="Puckett2005"/><ref>{{Cite book |last=Frans P.B. Osinga |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3DtoVuj_Sn4C&pg=PA24 |title=Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd |date=24 January 2007 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1134197095 |page=24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150903234731/https://books.google.com/books?id=3DtoVuj_Sn4C&pg=PA24 |archive-date=3 September 2015 |url-status=live}}<br />{{Cite book |last1=Mark A. Lorell |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EhtEM2Knh_cC&pg=PA48 |title=The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircraft R&D |last2=Hugh P. Levaux |publisher=Rand Corporation |date=1998 |isbn=978-0833025951 |page=48 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150921220856/https://books.google.com/books?id=EhtEM2Knh_cC&pg=PA48 |archive-date=21 September 2015 |url-status=live}}<br />{{Cite book |last=Craig C. Hannah |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CEb1sFobGgcC&pg=PA90 |title=Striving for Air Superiority: The Tactical Air Command in Vietnam |publisher=Texas A&M University Press |date=2002 |isbn=978-1585441464 |page=90 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924044307/https://books.google.com/books?id=CEb1sFobGgcC&pg=PA90 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |url-status=live}}</ref> The Soviet Air Force reported some 1,100 air-to-air victories and 335 MiG combat losses, while China's PLAAF reported 231 combat losses, mostly MiG-15s, and 168 other aircraft lost. The KPAF reported no data, but the UN Command estimates some 200 KPAF aircraft lost in the war's first stage, and 70 additional aircraft after the Chinese intervention. The USAF disputes Soviet and Chinese claims of 650 and 211 downed F-86s, respectively.<ref>Sewell, Stephen L. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061101081848/http://www.korean-war.com/sovietunion.html|date=1 November 2006}} ''korean-war.com''. Retrieved: 19 July 2011.</ref><ref>Zhang, Xiaoming. ''Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea''. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. {{ISBN|1-58544-201-1}}.</ref> | |||
Moreover, USAMGIK officers photographed the mass killings at ] city in central South Korea, where the Truth Commission believe some 3,000 to 7,000 people were shot and buried in mass graves in early July 1950. Other declassified records report that a US Army lieutenant colonel approved the assassination of 3,500 political prisoners, by the ROK Army unit to which he was military advisor, when the KPA reached the southern port city of ] (Pusan).<ref name="breitbart_D94TJ7800"/> In that time, US diplomats reported having urged the Rhee régime’s restraint against its political opponents, and that the USAMGIK, who formally controlled the peninsular south, did not halt the mass assassinations.<ref name="breitbart_D94TJ7800"/> | |||
More modern American estimates place the overall USAF kill ratio at around 1.8:1 with the ratio dropping to 1.3:1 against MiG-15s with Soviet pilots but increasing to a dominant 12:1 against Chinese and North Korean adversaries.<ref>Dorr, Robert F.; Lake, Jon; and Thompson, Warren E. ''Korean War Aces''. London: Osprey Publishing, 2005. {{ISBN|1-85532-501-2}}.</ref><ref>Stillion, John and Scott Perdue. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121006120643/http://www.mossekongen.no/downloads/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf|date=6 October 2012}} ''Project Air Force'', Rand, August 2008. Retrieved 11 March 2009.</ref><ref>Igor Seidov and Stuart Britton. ''Red Devils over the Yalu: A Chronicle of Soviet Aerial Operations in the Korean War 1950–53'' (Helion Studies in Military History). Helion and Company 2014. {{ISBN|978-1909384415}}. Page 554.</ref> | |||
====Prisoners of war==== | |||
{{See also|Korean War POWs detained in North Korea}} | |||
] | |||
Reports by Lieutenant General ], commander of Soviet air forces in Korea, are more favorable to the communist side. The 64th Corps claimed a total 1,097 enemy aircraft of all types during operations, for the loss of 335 aircraft (including lost to enemy ground fire, accidents, etc) and 110 pilots. Soviet reports put the overall kill ratio at 3.4:1 in favor of Soviet pilots.<ref name="digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org">{{cite web | url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/report-64th-fighter-aviation-corps-soviet-air-forces-korea | title=Report from the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps of the Soviet Air Forces in Korea | Wilson Center Digital Archive | access-date=25 December 2022 | archive-date=25 December 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221225231244/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/report-64th-fighter-aviation-corps-soviet-air-forces-korea | url-status=live }}</ref> As reported, effectiveness of the Soviet fighters declined as the war progressed. from an overall kill ratio of 7.9:1 from November 1950 through January 1952, declining to 2.2:1 in later 1952 and 1.9:1 in 1953. This was because more advanced jet fighters appeared on the UN side as well as improved U.S. tactics.<ref name="digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org"/> | |||
As with the ideological ''raisons d’être'' fueling the Korean War, the combatants—North Korea, South Korea, the US, and the UN each treated prisoners of war (POWs) differently; notwithstanding the ].{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} To wit, the US reported that North Korea mistreated prisoners of war: soldiers were beaten, starved, put to ], ], and ].<ref>{{cite news |first = Charles |last = Potter |authorlink = Charles Potter |title = Korean War Atrocities |url = http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/KW-atrocities-part2.pdf |format = PDF, online |work = United States Senate Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent Subcommittee of the Investigations of the ]. |publisher = US GPO |date = December 3, 1953 |accessdate =2008-01-18 |quote = We marched days. The first night, we got some hay, and we slept in the hay, cuddling together, to keep warm. The second night, we slept in pigpens, about six-inches' space between the logs. That night, I froze my feet. Starting out again, the next morning, after bypassing the convoy, I picked up two rubber boots, what we call 'snow packs'. They was both for the left foot; I put those on. After starting out the second morning, I didn't have time to massage my feet to get them thawed out. I got marching the next sixteen days after that. During that march, all the meat had worn off my feet, all the skin had dropped off, nothing, but the bones, showing. After arriving in Kanggye, they put us up, there, in mud huts—''Korean mud huts''. We stayed there—all sick and wounded, most of us was—stayed there, in the first part of January 1951. Then, the Chinese come around, in the night, about twelve o'clock, and told us those who was sick and wounded, they was going to move us out, to the hospital; which, we knew better. There ''could'' have been such a thing, but we didn't think so. —— Sgt. Wendell Treffery, RA. 115660.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last =Carlson |first =Lewis H |title =Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of Korean War POWs |publisher =St. Martin's Griffin |year=2003 |isbn =0312310072 }}</ref> | |||
Regardless of the actual ratio, American Sabres were very effective at controlling the skies over Korea. Since no other UN fighter could contend with the MiG-15, F-86s largely took over air combat once they arrived, relegating other aircraft to air-to-ground operations. Despite much greater numbers (the number of Sabres in theater never exceeded 150 while MiG-15s reached 900 at their peak), communist aircraft were seldom encountered south of Pyongyang. UN ground forces, supply lines, and infrastructure were not attacked from the air. Although North Korea had 75 airfields capable of supporting MiGs, after 1951, any serious effort to operate from them was abandoned. The MiGs were instead based across the Yalu River in the safety of China. This confined most air-to-air engagements to ]. UN aircraft had free rein to conduct strike missions over enemy territory with little fear of interception. Although jet dogfights are remembered as a prominent part of the Korean War, counter-air missions comprised just 12% of ] sorties, and four times as many sorties were performed for close air support and interdiction.<ref name="airforcemag1april20"/> | |||
The KPA killed POWs at the battles for Hill 312, Hill 303, the Pusan Perimeter, and Daejeon—discovered during early after-battle mop-up actions by the UN forces. Later, a US Congress ]s investigation, the ''United States Senate Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent Subcommittee of the Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations'' reported that “... two-thirds of all American prisoners of war in Korea died as a result of war crimes”.<ref>{{cite web |last = Lakshmanan |first =Indira A.R |title =Hill 303 Massacre |publisher =Boston Globe |year=1999 |url =http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/hill303.htm |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last =Van Zandt |first =James E |title ='You are about to die a horrible death'—Korean War — the atrocities committed by the North Koreans during the Korean War |publisher =VFW Magazine |month=February |year=2003 |url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0LIY/is_6_90/ai_97756107 |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title =American Ex-Prisoners of War |publisher =Department of Veterans Affairs |pages = |url =http://www1.va.gov/vhi/docs/pow_www.pdf |isbn = |format=PDF}}</ref> | |||
The war marked a major milestone not only for fixed-wing aircraft, but also for ], featuring the first large-scale deployment of ]s for ] (medevac).<ref name="Kreisher2007"/> In 1944–45, during World War II, the ] had seen limited ambulance duty. In Korea, where rough terrain prevented use of the ] as a speedy medevac vehicle,<ref name="OliveDrab"/> helicopters like the ] were heavily used. This helped reduce fatal casualties to a dramatic degree when combined with complementary medical innovations such as ]s (MASH).<ref name="Day"/> As such, the medical evacuation and care system for the wounded was so effective for the UN forces that a wounded soldier who arrived at a MASH unit alive typically had a 97% chance of survival.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=King |first1=Booker |last2=Jatoi |first2=Ismail |date=May 2005 |title=The Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH): A Military and Surgical Legacy |journal=Journal of the National Medical Association |volume=97 |issue=5 |pages=650–651 |pmc=2569328 |pmid=15926641 |quote=Air evacuation undoubtedly contributed to the dramatic reduction in the death rate of wounded soldiers in the Korean War, compared with previous conflicts (World War I, 8.5%; World War II, 4%; and Korean War, 2.5%)}}</ref> The limitations of jet aircraft for ] highlighted the helicopter's potential in the role, leading to the development of the helicopter gunships used in the Vietnam War.<ref name="Kreisher2007"/> | |||
The North Korean Government reported some 70,000 ROK Army POWs; 8,000 were repatriated. South Korea repatriated 76,000 ] (KPA) POWs.<ref>{{cite web |last =Lee |first =Sookyung |title =Hardly Known, Not Yet Forgotten, South Korean POWs Tell Their Story |publisher =AII POW-MIA InterNetwork |year=2007 |url =http://www.aiipowmia.com/inter27/in250107skoreapw.html |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref> Besides the 12,000 US–UN Command forces POWs dead in captivity, the KPA might have press-ganged some 50,000 ROK POWs into the North Korean military.<ref name="SOD"/> Per the ], there remained some 560 ] in 2008; from 1994 ’til 2003, some 30 ROK POWs escaped the North.<ref>{{cite news |title =S Korea POW celebrates escape |publisher =British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) |date =2004-01-19 |url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3409835.stm |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=January 2010}} | |||
===U.S. threat of atomic warfare=== | |||
The North Korean Government denied having POWs from the Korean War, and, via the ], reported that the UN forces killed some 33,600 KPA POWs; that on 19 July 1951, in POW Camp No. 62, some 100 POWs were killed as machine-gunnery targets; that on 27 May 1952, in the 77th Camp, Koje Island, with flamethrowers, the ROK Army incinerated some 800 KPA POWs who rejected "voluntary repatriation" South, and instead demanded repatriation North; and that some 1,400 KPA POWs were secretly sent to the US to be atomic-weapon experimental subjects.<ref>.</ref><ref>United Nations Yearbook, 1950, 1951, 1952.</ref> | |||
]]] | |||
On 5 November 1950, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders for the retaliatory atomic bombing of Manchurian PRC military bases, if either of their armies crossed into Korea or if PRC or KPA bombers attacked Korea from there. President Truman ordered the transfer of nine ]s "to the Air Force's ], the designated carrier of the weapons ... signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets", which he never transmitted.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=289–92}} | |||
==Legacy== | |||
{{Main|Legacy of the Korean War}} | |||
Many U.S. officials viewed the deployment of nuclear-capable (but not nuclear-armed) B-29 bombers to Britain as helping to resolve the ] of 1948–1949. Truman and Eisenhower both had military experience and viewed nuclear weapons as potentially usable components of their military. During Truman's first meeting to discuss the war on 25 June 1950, he ordered plans be prepared for attacking Soviet forces if they entered the war. By July, Truman approved another B-29 deployment to Britain, this time with bombs (but without their ]), to remind the Soviets of U.S. offensive ability. Deployment of a similar fleet to ] was leaked to ''The New York Times''. As UN forces retreated to Pusan, and the ] reported that mainland China was building up forces for a possible invasion of Taiwan, the Pentagon believed that Congress and the public would demand using nuclear weapons if the situation in Korea required them.<ref name="jstor2538736">{{Cite journal |last=Dingman |first=R. |date=1988–1989 |title=Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War |journal=International Security |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages=50–91 |doi=10.2307/2538736 |jstor=2538736 |s2cid=154823668}}</ref> | |||
], ].]] | |||
As PVA forces pushed back the UN forces from the Yalu River, Truman stated during a 30 November 1950 press conference that using nuclear weapons was "always active consideration", with control under the local military commander.{{R|jstor2538736}} Indian ambassador ] reports "that Truman announced he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed unmoved by this threat ... The PRC's propaganda against the U.S. was stepped up. The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was made the slogan for increased production, greater national integration, and more rigid control over anti-national activities. One could not help feeling that Truman's threat came in useful to the leaders of the Revolution, to enable them to keep up the tempo of their activities."<ref name="Schnabel"/><ref name="Knightley1982"/><ref name="Panikkar1981"/> | |||
] | |||
After his statement caused concern in Europe, Truman met on 4 December with UK Prime Minister and ] spokesman ], French Premier ], and French Foreign Minister ] to discuss their worries about atomic warfare and its likely continental expansion. The U.S.' forgoing atomic warfare was not because of "a disinclination by the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China to escalate ", but because UN allies—notably the UK, the Commonwealth, and France—were concerned about a ] imbalance rendering ] defenseless while the U.S. fought China, who then might persuade the Soviet Union to conquer Western Europe.<ref name="Schnabel"/><ref name="Truman1955"/> The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to tell Attlee that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons only if necessary to protect an evacuation of UN troops, or to prevent a "major military disaster".{{R|jstor2538736}} | |||
The Korean War (1950–53) was the first ] in the ] (1945–91), the prototype of the following ] wars, e.g. the ] (1945–75). The Korean War established proxy war as one way that the ] ]s indirectly conducted their rivalry in third-party countries. The ] ] Policy extended the cold war from the occupied Europe of 1945 to the rest of the world.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} | |||
On 6 December after the Chinese intervention repelled the UN armies from northern North Korea, General ] (Army Chief of Staff), General MacArthur, Admiral ], General ] and staff officers Major General ], Major General ] and Major General ] met in Tokyo to plan strategy countering the Chinese intervention; they considered three potential atomic warfare scenarios encompassing the next weeks and months of warfare.<ref name="Schnabel"/> | |||
Fighting ended at the 38th parallel, now the ] (DMZ)—248x4 km (155x2.5 mi)—peninsular demarcation between the countries. Moreover, the Korean War affected other participant combatants; ], for example, entered ] in 1952.<ref>M. Galip Baysan,"Turkish Brigade in Korean War- Kunuri Battles, Turkish Weekly, 09 January 2007.</ref> | |||
* In the first scenario: If the PVA continued attacking in full and the UN Command was forbidden to blockade and bomb China, and without Taiwanese reinforcements, and without an increase in U.S. forces until April 1951 (four National Guard divisions were due to arrive), then atomic bombs might be used in North Korea.<ref name="Schnabel"/> | |||
* In the second scenario: If the PVA continued full attacks and the UN Command blockaded China and had effective aerial reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese interior, and the Taiwanese soldiers were maximally exploited, and tactical atomic bombing was to hand, then the UN forces could hold positions deep in North Korea.<ref name="Schnabel"/> | |||
* In the third scenario: if China agreed not to cross the 38th parallel border, MacArthur would recommend UN acceptance of an armistice disallowing PVA and KPA troops south of the parallel, and requiring PVA and KPA guerrillas to withdraw northwards. The Eighth Army would remain to protect the Seoul–Incheon area, while X Corps would retreat to Pusan. A UN commission should supervise implementation of the armistice.<ref name="Schnabel"/> | |||
Both the Pentagon and the State Department were cautious about using nuclear weapons because of the risk of general war with China and the diplomatic ramifications. Truman and his senior advisors agreed and never seriously considered using them in early December 1950 despite the poor military situation in Korea.{{R|jstor2538736}} | |||
Post-war recovery was different in the two Koreas; South Korea stagnated in the first post-war decade, but later industrialized and modernized. Contemporary North Korea still remains underdeveloped, while ] is a modern free-market economy, member of the ] and ] groups. In the 1990s North Korea faced significant economic disruptions. The ] is believed to have killed as many as 2.5 million people.<ref>"". Reuters AlertNet. 10-07-2008. Retrieved 2010-01-15.</ref> The ] estimates North Korea's ] (]) is $40 billion, which is 3.0% of South Korea's $1.196 trillion GDP (PPP). North Korean personal income is $1,800 ], which is 7.0% of the South Korean $24,500 per capita income. | |||
In 1951, the U.S. escalated closest to atomic warfare in Korea. Because China deployed new armies to the Sino-Korean frontier, ground crews at the ], ], assembled atomic bombs for Korean warfare, "lacking only the essential pit nuclear cores." In October 1951, the United States effected ] to establish a nuclear weapons capability. USAF B-29 bombers practiced individual bombing runs from Okinawa to North Korea (using dummy nuclear or conventional bombs), coordinated from ] in east-central Japan. Hudson Harbor tested "actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming". The bombing run data indicated that atomic bombs would be tactically ineffective against massed infantry, because the "timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare".<ref name="Hasbrouck1951"/><ref name="Chiefof Staff1951"/><ref name="Watson1998"/><ref name="CommandingGeneral1951"/><ref name="FarEastCommand"/> | |||
Anti-communism remains in ROK politics. The ] practiced a "]" towards North Korea; the US often disagreed with the Uri Party and (former) ROK Pres. ] about relations between the Koreas. The conservative ] (GNP), the Uri Party's principal opponent, is anti-North Korea.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} | |||
Ridgway was authorized to use nuclear weapons if a major air attack originated from outside Korea. An envoy was sent to Hong Kong to deliver a warning to China. The message likely caused Chinese leaders to be more cautious about potential U.S. use of nuclear weapons, but whether they learned about the B-29 deployment is unclear, and the failure of the two major Chinese offensives that month likely was what caused them to shift to a defensive strategy in Korea. The B-29s returned to the United States in June.{{R|jstor2538736}} | |||
==Depictions== | |||
===Film=== | |||
====Western Films==== | |||
Compared to World War II, there are relatively few Western ]s depicting the Korean War. | |||
*'']'' (]) is a ] directed by ] and produced by ] during the Korean War. It was the first studio film about the war, and the first of several war films by producer-director-writer Fuller. | |||
*'']'' (1957) stars ] as Colonel ], a preacher become pilot who accidentally destroyed a German orphanage during World War II. He later returned to the USAF in Korea and rescued orphans during that war.<ref name="afmil1"> | |||
{{cite web |url = http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1913 |title = Factsheets : Col. Dean Hess |accessdate = 2009-11-08 |publisher = af.mil }}</ref><ref name="imdbcom1">{{cite web |url = http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050171/ |title = Battle Hymn (1957) |accessdate = 2009-11-08 |publisher = imdb.com }}</ref> | |||
*'']'' (1955) stars ] as a ] assigned to destroy the bridges at Toko Ri, while battling doubts; it is based on an eponymous ] novel. | |||
*'']'' (2004) features a decimated tank unit, lost behind enemy lines, battling the vicissitudes of the war, as well as their own demons. | |||
* '']'' (1958), adapted from the novel '']'' by ], stars ] and ] as two very different United States Air Force fighter pilots in the midst of the Korean War. | |||
* ''The Hook'' (1963), starring ], portrays the dilemma of three American soldiers on board a ship who are ordered to kill a Korean Prisoner of War. | |||
* '']'' (1982) portrays the Battle of Inchon, a turning point in the war. Controversially, the film was partially financed by ]'s ]. It became a notorious financial and critical failure, losing an estimated $40 million of its $46 million budget, and remains the last mainstream Hollywood film to use the war as its backdrop. The film was directed by ], and starred an elderly ] as General Douglas MacArthur. According to press materials from the film, psychics hired by Moon's church contacted MacArthur in heaven and secured his posthumous approval of the casting. | |||
*'']'' (]) is a documentary written and directed by Brian McKenna, which provides new information and adopts a more objective editorial line. It interviews researches that allege that the US committed war crimes by using biological warfare on North Korean territory. The documentary provides information that certain munitions found on the battlefield point to the use of anthrax, bubonic plague and encephalitis by US forces. It also provides information that the US Army deliberately killed civilians on a large scale for fear that the communists were infiltrating them. | |||
* '']'', a 1959 thriller novel, was cinematically adapted to '']'' (1962), directed by ], and featuring ] and ]. It is about ] POWs of the US Army, and an officer's investigation to learn what happened to him and his platoon in the war. | |||
* '']'', by ] (pseudonym for H. Richard Hornberger), was later adapted into ] and a ]; the TV series had a total of 251 episodes, lasted 11 years, and won awards, and its final episode was the most-watched program in television history.<ref>{{cite web |title =What is M*A*S*H |url =http://www.mash4077.co.uk/what.html |accessdate =2007-08-22 }}</ref> Yet the sensibilities they presented were more of the 1970s than of the 1950s; the Korean War setting was an oblique and uncontroversial treatment of the then-current American war in Vietnam.<ref>Halberstam, David, ''The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War'', p. 4.</ref> | |||
* '']'' (1959) is a ]-directed film with ] as an infantry lieutenant fighting the bitterly fierce first ], between the US Army's ], and Chicom (Chinese Communist) forces at war's end in April 1953. The movie is lampooned by the ] album '']'' in the story of Lieutenant Tirebiter. | |||
Despite the greater destructive power that atomic weapons would bring to the war, their effects on determining the war's outcome would have likely been minimal. Tactically, given the dispersed nature of PVA/KPA forces, the relatively primitive infrastructure for staging and logistics centers, and the small number of bombs available (most would have been conserved for use against the Soviets), atomic attacks would have limited effects against the ability of China to mobilize and move forces. Strategically, attacking Chinese cities to destroy civilian industry and infrastructure would cause the immediate dispersion of the leadership away from such areas and give propaganda value for the communists to galvanize the support of Chinese civilians. Since the Soviets were not expected to intervene with their few primitive atomic weapons on China or North Korea's behalf, the threat of a possible nuclear exchange was unimportant in the decision not to deploy atomic bombs; their use offered little operational advantage and would undesirably lower the "threshold" for using atomic weapons against non-nuclear states in future conflicts.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=5 January 2016 |title=What If the United States had Used the Bomb in Korea? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if-the-united-states-had-used-the-bomb-in-korea/ |access-date=5 January 2016 |website=] |archive-date=7 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160107130940/http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if-the-united-states-had-used-the-bomb-in-korea/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
====South Korean films==== | |||
* '']'' (Spring in my Hometown) (1998), directed by Lee Kwangmo, though not focused especially on the fighting, takes place in a South Korean village during the war as it deals with the war's upheavals. | |||
* '']'' (The Marines Who Never Returned) (1963), directed by Lee Man-hee, a film about South Korean marines fighting to the last man against North Korean and Chinese soldiers during the Korean War. | |||
* '']'' (2004), directed by ], became extremely popular in South Korea and at the 50th ], ''Taegukgi'' won the "Best Film", while Kang Je-gyu was awarded the "Best Director". Taegukgi saw a limited release in the United States. | |||
* '']'' (2005) shows the effect of the warring sides on a remote village. The titular village soon becomes home to surviving North Korean and South Korean soldiers, who in time lose their suspicion and hatred for each other and work together to help save the village after the Americans mistakenly identify it as an enemy camp. | |||
When Eisenhower succeeded Truman in early 1953, he was similarly cautious about using nuclear weapons in Korea. The administration prepared contingency plans to use them against China, but like Truman, he feared that doing so would result in Soviet attacks on Japan. The war ended as it began, without U.S. nuclear weapons deployed near battle.{{R|jstor2538736}} | |||
====North Korean films==== | |||
In North Korea the Korean War has always been a favorite subject of film, both for its dramatic appeal and its potential as propaganda. The North Korean government film industry has produced many scores of films about the war. These have portrayed war crimes by American or South Korean soldiers while glorifying members of the North Korean military as well as North Korean ideals.<ref>Delisle, Guy ''Pyongyang: A Journey Into North Korea'', pp. 63, 146, 173. Drawn & Quarterly Books.</ref>{{Verify source|date=June 2009}} Some of the most prominent of these films include: | |||
==Aftermath== | |||
* '']'', a multi-part film produced between 1978–1981 and which included in the cast several American soldiers who had defected to North Korea. It tells the story of a spy in Seoul during the Korean War. | |||
{{Main|Aftermath of the Korean War|Korean reunification}} | |||
=== |
=== North Korea === | ||
As a result of the war, "North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society". After the armistice, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet economic and industrial assistance. In September 1953, the Soviet government agreed to "cancel or postpone repayment for all ... outstanding debts", and promised to grant North Korea one billion ] in monetary aid, industrial equipment and consumer goods. Eastern European members of the ] also contributed with "logistical support, technical aid, medical supplies". China canceled North Korea's war debts, provided 800 million ], promised trade cooperation and sent in thousands of troops to rebuild damaged infrastructure.<ref name="japanfocus.org" /> Contemporary North Korea remains underdeveloped<ref>. View.koreaherald.com (18 August 2010). Retrieved on 12 July 2013.</ref> and continues to be a ] dictatorship since the end of the war, with an elaborate ] around the ].<ref name=":9">{{Cite news |date=9 April 2018 |title=North Korea country profile |publisher=] |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15256929 |access-date=24 March 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308085335/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15256929 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite news |title=Kim Jong Un's North Korea: Life inside the totalitarian state |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/north-korea-defectors/ |access-date=24 March 2021 |archive-date=1 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210201200057/https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/north-korea-defectors/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="britannica">{{Cite web |date=2018 |title=Totalitarianism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/totalitarianism |publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=24 March 2021 |archive-date=16 August 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150816213316/https://www.britannica.com/topic/totalitarianism |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
* '']'' (Shanggan Ling, Chinese: 上甘岭) is a depiction of the Korean War from the Chinese point of view, made in 1956. The movie is about a group of Chinese soldiers blocked in ] area for several days and survive until they are relieved. | |||
] at night, shown in a 2017 composite photograph from ]]] | |||
====Philippine films==== | |||
* ''Batalyon Pilipino sa Korea'' (1954) is a Filipino movie about the ]. | |||
Present-day North Korea follows '']'', or "military-first" policy and has the ] in the world, with 7,769,000 active, reserve and paramilitary personnel, or approximately {{Percentage|7,769,000|{{UN_Population|Dem. People's Republic of Korea}}}} of its population. Its active-duty army of 1.28 million is the fourth largest in the world, after China, the United States and India; consisting of {{Percentage|1280000|{{UN_Population|Dem. People's Republic of Korea}}|1}} of its population. North Korea ]. A 2014 UN inquiry into abuses of ] concluded that, "the gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world," with ] and ] holding similar views.<ref name="Amnesty International 2007">{{Cite web |last=Amnesty International |author-link=Amnesty International |date=2007 |title=North Korea: Human Rights Concerns |url=http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/north_korea/index.do |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070329050950/http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/north_korea/index.do |archive-date=29 March 2007 |access-date=1 August 2007 }}</ref><ref name="ohchr.org">{{Citation |title=Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chapter VII. Conclusions and recommendations |date=17 February 2014 |url=http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.CRP.1_ENG.doc |work=United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |page=346 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227104633/http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.CRP.1_ENG.doc |access-date=1 November 2014 |archive-date=27 February 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="hrw1">{{Cite web |last=Kay Seok |date=15 May 2007 |title=Grotesque indifference |url=http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/16/nkorea15944.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929174709/http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/16/nkorea15944.htm |archive-date=29 September 2007 |access-date=1 August 2007 |website=]}}</ref><ref name="hrw2">{{Cite web |date=17 February 2009 |title=Human Rights in North Korea |url=https://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/17/human-rights-north-korea |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429044053/http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/17/human-rights-north-korea |archive-date=29 April 2011 |access-date=13 December 2010 |author1=Kay Seok |publisher=Human Rights Watch}}</ref> | |||
===Literature=== | |||
* The essay '']'' (1951) by Chinese writer ] is considered to be the most famous literary and ] piece produced by China during the Korean War. | |||
* The war-memoir novel '']'' (2004), by ], is a drafted PVA soldier's experience of the war, combat, and captivity under the UN Command, and of the retribution Chinese POWs feared from other PVA prisoners, when suspected of being unsympathetic to Communism or to the war. | |||
=== |
=== South Korea === | ||
Postwar recovery was different in the two Koreas. South Korea, which started from a far lower industrial base than North Korea (the latter contained 80% of Korea's heavy industry in 1945),<ref name="Robinson 119-120" /> stagnated in the first postwar decade. In 1953, South Korea and the United States signed a ]. | |||
] ] sings about the Korean War in his song ''Korea'' at the album ]. | |||
South Korean ] after the war was fueled by the presence and behavior of ] military personnel and U.S. support for Park's authoritarian regime, a fact still evident during the country's democratic transition in the 1980s.<ref name="NYTimes12July1987" /> However, anti-Americanism has declined significantly in South Korea in recent years, from 46% favorable in 2003 to 74% favorable in 2011,<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310043046/http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy/ |date=10 March 2013 }}. Pew Research Center. 27 June 2007.</ref> making South Korea one of the most pro-U.S. countries.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121123070720/http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCEvalsUS_Mar11_rpt.pdf |date=23 November 2012 }}, 7 March 2011.</ref> | |||
===Painting=== | |||
'']'' (1951), by ], depicts war violence against civilians. | |||
A large number of ] "GI babies" (offspring of U.S. and other UN soldiers and Korean women) were filling up the country's orphanages. Because Korean traditional society places significant weight on paternal family ties, bloodlines, and purity of race, children of mixed race or those without fathers are not easily accepted in South Korean society. International adoption of Korean children began in 1954.<ref name="Jang1998"/> The U.S. ] legalized the ] of non-Blacks and non-Whites as U.S. citizens and made possible the entry of military spouses and children from South Korea. With the passage of the ], which substantially changed U.S. immigration policy toward non-Europeans, ] became one of the fastest-growing ] groups in the United States.<ref name="Choe2005"/> | |||
===Photography=== | |||
<gallery> | |||
Image:DestroyedBridgeTank.jpg|The wreckage of a bridge and North Korean ] tank south of Suwon, Korea. The tank was caught on a bridge and put out of action by the US Air Force. 7 October 1950. | |||
Image:SeoulWarDamage3.jpg|Scene of war damage in residential section of Seoul, Korea. The capitol building can be seen in the background (right). 18 October 1950. Sfc. Cecil Riley. (US Army) | |||
Image:SeoulWarDamage2.jpg|An aged Korean woman pauses in her search for salvageable materials among the ruins of Seoul, Korea. 1 November 1950. Capt. C. W. Huff. (US Army) | |||
Image:SeoulWarDamage1.jpg|Korean women and children search the rubble of Seoul for anything that can be used or burned as fuel. 1 November 1950. Capt. F. L. Scheiber. (US Army) | |||
Image:KoreanWarDamage4.jpg|A small South Korean child sits alone in the street, after elements of the US 1st Marine Div. and South Korean Marines invaded the city of Inchon, in an offensive launched against the North Korean forces in that area. 16 September 1950. Pfc. Ronald L. Hancock. (US Army) | |||
Image:KoreanWarRefugees.jpg|Long trek southward: Seemingly endless file of Korean refugees slogs through snow outside of Kangnung, blocking withdrawal of ROK I Corps. 8 January 1951. Cpl. Walter Calmus. (US Army) | |||
Image:ActorsPerformForTroops1.jpg|Marilyn Monroe, motion picture actress, appearing with the USO, poses for pictures after a performance at the 3rd US Inf. Div. area. 17 February 1954. Cpl. Welshman. (US Army) | |||
Image:AirAttackKoreanWar.jpg|Lt. R. P. Yeatman, from the USS Bon Homme Richard, is shown rocketing and bombing Korean bridge. November 1952. (US Navy) | |||
Image:BobHopeKoreanWar3.jpg|Bob Hope sits with men of US X Corps, as members of his troupe entertain at Womsan, Korea. 26 October 1950. (US Army) | |||
</gallery> | |||
=== |
=== Communism === | ||
] in 2009]] | |||
*'''Australia''': ] | |||
*'''United States''': ] | |||
Mao Zedong's decision to take on the United States was a direct attempt to confront what the communist bloc viewed as the strongest anti-communist power in the world, undertaken at a time when the Chinese communist regime was still consolidating its own power. Mao supported intervention not to save North Korea, but because he believed that a military conflict with the U.S. was inevitable after the U.S. entered the war, and to appease the Soviet Union to secure military dispensation and achieve Mao's goal of making China a major world military power. Mao was equally ambitious in improving his own prestige inside the communist international community. In his later years, Mao believed that Stalin only gained a positive opinion of him after China's entrance into the Korean War. Inside mainland China, the war improved the long-term prestige of Mao, Zhou, and Peng, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to increase its legitimacy while weakening anti-communist dissent.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=150}} | |||
===Theater=== | |||
The Colombian theatrical work (''The Barren Mount'') created by Jairo Aníbal Niño, used two ex-soldiers (Sebastian and the colonel) of the Colombia battalion (which participated in the Korean war) and an ex-clown (Canute) to criticize all militarist or warmonger views, and also to show what war is and what happens to those who live through it. | |||
The Chinese government has encouraged the viewpoint that the war was initiated by the United States and South Korea, though ComIntern documents have shown that Mao sought approval from Stalin to enter the war. In Chinese media, the Chinese war effort is considered as an example of China's engaging the strongest power in the world with an underequipped army, forcing it to retreat, and fighting it to a military stalemate. These successes were contrasted with China's ] by Japan and by Western powers over the previous hundred years, highlighting the abilities of the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party. The most significant negative long-term consequence of the war for China was that it led the United States to guarantee the safety of Chiang Kaishek's regime in Taiwan, effectively ensuring that Taiwan would remain outside of PRC control through the present day.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=150}} ], which were already a significant factor during the Chinese Civil War, were ingrained into Chinese culture during the ] campaigns of the Korean War.<ref>{{Citation |last=Zhang |first=Hong |title=The Making of Urban Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953 |pages=164–167 |date=2002 |place=Westport, CT |publisher=Greenwood Press |isbn=978-0313310010}}</ref> | |||
The Korean War affected other participant combatants. ], for example, entered NATO in 1952,<ref name="StateDept"/> and the foundation was laid for bilateral diplomatic and trade ].<ref name="Turquie2010"/> The war also played a role in the ]. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
{{Portal|North Korea|South Korea|1950s}} | |||
* ] | |||
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}} | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ]—the UN Command Military Armistice Commission operating from 1953 to the present | |||
* ] | |||
* ]—the 1950 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea | |||
* ] | |||
* ]—the 1951 UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
*] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
*] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
*] | |||
* ] | |||
*] | |||
* ] operating from 1953 to the present | |||
*] | |||
* ] | |||
*] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
{{Div col end}} | |||
===War memorials=== | |||
]]] | |||
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}} | |||
* ],{{Ref|25|map}} ], Ontario | |||
* ], Washington, D.C. | |||
* ], ], China | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ], ], ] | |||
* ], ], ] {{In lang|tr}} | |||
* ], Pyongyang, North Korea | |||
* ] ], Yongsan-gu, Seoul, South Korea | |||
{{Div col end}} | |||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
{{ |
{{Notelist}} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
===Citations=== | |||
<div class="references-small"> | |||
{{Reflist|refs = | |||
* Brune, Lester and Robin Higham, eds., ''The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research'' (Greenwood Press, 1994) | |||
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* Edwards, Paul M. '' Korean War Almanac'' (2006) | |||
* Foot, Rosemary, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," ''Diplomatic History'' 15 (Summer 1991): 411–31, in JSTOR | |||
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* Goulden, Joseph C., ''Korea: The Untold Story of the War'', New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982. | |||
* Hickey, Michael, ''The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950–1953'' (London: John Murray, 1999) ISBN 0719555590 9780719555596 | |||
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* Kaufman, Burton I. ''The Korean Conflict'' (Greenwood Press, 1999). | |||
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* Knightley, P. ''The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker'' (Quartet, 1982) | |||
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* Korea Institute of Military History, ''The Korean War'' (1998) (English edition 2001), 3 vol, 2600 pp; highly detailed history from South Korean perspective, U of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-7802-0 | |||
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* Leitich, Keith. ''Shapers of the Great Debate on the Korean War: A Biographical Dictionary'' (2006) covers Americans only | |||
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* James I. Matray, ed., ''Historical Dictionary of the Korean War'' (Greenwood Press, 1991) | |||
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* {{cite news |last=Masatake |first=Terauchi |url=http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/kore1910.htm |title=Treaty of Annexation |publisher=USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center |date=1910-08-27 |accessdate=2007-01-16}} | |||
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* Millett, Allan R, "A Reader's Guide To The Korean War" ''Journal of Military History'' (1997) Vol. 61 No. 3; p. 583+ full text in JSTOR; | |||
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* Millett, Allan R. "The Korean War: A 50 Year Critical Historiography," ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 24 (March 2001), pp. 188–224. full text in Ingenta and Ebsco; discusses major works by British, American, Korean, Chinese, and Russian authors | |||
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* Sandler, Stanley ed., ''The Korean War: An Encyclopedia'' (Garland, 1995) | |||
* Summers, Harry G. ''Korean War Almanac'' (1990) | |||
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<!--<ref name="HankyorehJanuary2009">{{Cite news |date=8 January 2009 |title=439 civilians confirmed dead in Yeosu-Suncheon Uprising of 1948 New report by the Truth Commission places blame on Syngman Rhee and the Defense Ministry, advises government apology |work=] |url=http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/332032.html |url-status=live |access-date=16 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511184103/http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/332032.html |archive-date=11 May 2011}}</ref> --> | |||
<!--<ref name="Chosun2009">{{Cite news |date=6 August 2009 |script-title=ko:'문경학살사건' 유족 항소심도 패소 |language=ko |work=] |url=http://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/08/06/2009080600689.html |url-status=dead |access-date=16 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501014757/http://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/08/06/2009080600689.html |archive-date=1 May 2011}}</ref> --> | |||
<!--ref name="OhMyNews2009">{{Cite news |date=17 February 2009 |script-title=ko:두 민간인 학살 사건, 상반된 판결 왜 나왔나?'울산보도연맹' – ' 문경학살사건' 판결문 비교분석해 봤더니... |language=ko |work=] |url=http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001070694 |access-date=16 July 2010}}</ref--> | |||
<ref name="Chosun2010">{{Cite news |date=29 June 2010 |script-title=ko:만물상 625 한강다리 폭파의 희생자들 |language=ko |work=] |url=http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/29/2010062902370.html |url-status=live |access-date=15 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501063615/http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/29/2010062902370.html |archive-date=1 May 2011}}</ref> | |||
<!--ref name="HankyorehJune2010">{{Cite news |date=25 June 2010 |script-title=ko:60년 만에 만나는 한국의 신들러들 |language=ko |work=] |url=http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/special/special_general/27607.html |url-status=live |access-date=15 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110427181702/http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/special/special_general/27607.html |archive-date=27 April 2011}}</ref--> | |||
<!--ref name="OhMyNews2007">{{Cite news |date=4 July 2007 |script-title=ko:"보도연맹 학살은 이승만 특명에 의한 것" 민간인 처형 집행했던 헌병대 간부 최초증언 출처 : "보도연맹 학살은 이승만 특명에 의한 것" – 오 마이뉴스 |language=ko |work=] |url=http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000420451 |url-status=dead |access-date=15 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110503211221/http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000420451 |archive-date=3 May 2011}}</ref--> | |||
<ref name="Webb">{{cite web |last=Webb |first=William J. |title=The Korean War: The Outbreak |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/KW-Outbreak/outbreak.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100612073344/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/KW-Outbreak/outbreak.htm |archive-date=12 June 2010 |access-date=16 December 2011 |publisher=United States Army Center for Military History}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Gromyko1950">{{Cite web |last=Gromyko |first=Andrei A. |date=4 July 1950 |title=On American Intervention in Korea, 1950 |url=http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1950-gromyko-korea.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120206141853/http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1950-gromyko-korea.html |archive-date=6 February 2012 |access-date=16 December 2011 |website=Modern History Sourcebook |publisher=Fordham University |location=New York}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Gross1951">{{Cite journal |last=Gross |first=Leo |date=February 1951 |title=Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from Meetings |url=https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5390&context=ylj |journal=The Yale Law Journal |volume=60 |issue=2 |pages=209–257 |doi=10.2307/793412 |jstor=793412 |access-date=14 December 2019 |archive-date=26 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190426173818/https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5390&context=ylj |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Schick1950">{{Cite journal |last=Schick |first=F. B. |date=September 1950 |title=Videant Consules |journal=The Western Political Quarterly |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=311–325 |doi=10.2307/443348 |jstor=443348}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Hess2001">{{Cite book |last=Hess |first=Gary R. |title=Presidential Decisions for War : Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf |publisher=] |date=2001 |isbn=978-0801865152 |location=Baltimore, MD}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Graebner1979">{{Cite book |last1=Graebner |first1=Norman A. |title=The Age of Global Power: The United States Since 1939 |last2=Trani |first2=Eugene P. |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |date=1979 |volume=V3641 |location=New York |oclc=477631060 |author-link2=Eugene P. Trani}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Truman1980">{{Cite book |last1=Truman |first1=Harry S. |title=The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman |last2=Ferrell |first2=Robert H. |publisher=University Press of Colorado |date=1980 |isbn=978-0870810909 |location=Boulder, CO |author-link=Harry S. Truman |author-link2=Robert H. Ferrell}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Cavalry Outpost Publications"> | |||
{{Cite web |title=History of the 1st Cavalry Division and Its Subordinate Commands |url=http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100308064029/http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/ |archive-date=8 March 2010 |access-date=27 March 2010 |publisher=Cavalry Outpost Publications}}<!--Reliable?--></ref> | |||
<ref name="Schnabel">{{Cite book |last=Schnabel |first=James F |url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/P&D.HTM |title=United States Army in the Korean War: Policy And Direction: The First Year |publisher=] |date=1992 |isbn=978-0160359552 |pages=155–92, 212, 283–84, 288–89, 304 |id=CMH Pub 20-1-1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110517132751/http://www.history.army.mil/books/P%26D.HTM |archive-date=17 May 2011 |url-status=live |orig-year=1972}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="KIMH">{{Cite book |last=Korea Institute of Military History |title=The Korean War: Korea Institute of Military History |publisher=Bison Books, University of Nebraska Press |date=2000 |isbn=978-0803277946 |series=3-volume set |volume=1, 2 |pages=512–29, 730}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Weintraub2000">{{Cite book |last=Weintraub |first=Stanley |url=https://archive.org/details/macarthurswarkor00wein/page/157 |title=MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero |publisher=] |date=2000 |isbn=978-0684834191 |location=New York |pages= |author-link=Stanley Weintraub}}</ref> | |||
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<ref name="Offner2002">{{Cite book |last=Offner |first=Arnold A. |title=Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 |publisher=Stanford University Press |date=2002 |isbn=978-0804747745 |location=Stanford, CA |page=390}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Weng1966">{{Cite journal |last=Weng |first=Byron |date=Autumn 1966 |title=Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations |journal=International Organization |volume=20 |issue=4 |pages=677–704 |doi=10.1017/S0020818300012935 |oclc=480093623 |s2cid=154687870}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Academy2000">{{Cite book |last=Chinese Military Science Academy |date=September 2000 |publisher=Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House |isbn=978-7801373908 |volume=I |location=Beijing |page=160 |language=zh |script-title=zh:抗美援朝战争史 |trans-title=History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="AcademyB2000">{{Cite book |last=Chinese Military Science Academy |date=September 2000 |publisher=Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House |isbn=978-7801373908 |volume=I |location=Beijing |pages=86–89 |language=zh |script-title=zh:抗美援朝战争史 |trans-title=History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="AcademyC2000">{{Cite book |last=Chinese Military Science Academy |date=September 2000 |publisher=Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House |isbn=978-7801373908 |volume=I |location=Beijing |pages=35–36 |language=zh |script-title=zh:抗美援朝战争史 |trans-title=History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea}}</ref> | |||
REFS NOT BEING USED --> | |||
<ref name="Donovan1996">{{Cite book |last=Donovan |first=Robert J |url=https://archive.org/details/tumultuousyearsp0000dono/page/285 |title=Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949–1953 |publisher=University of Missouri Press |date=1996 |isbn=978-0826210852 |page=}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Stewart">{{Cite web |editor-last=Stewart |editor-first=Richard W |title=The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111203234437/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |archive-date=3 December 2011 |access-date=17 December 2011 |website=history.army.mil |publisher=U.S. Army Center of Military History}}</ref> | |||
<!-- not used<ref name="CohenGooch2006">{{Cite book |last=Cohen |first=Eliot A. |title=Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War |last2=Gooch |first2=John |publisher=Free Press |date=2006 |isbn=978-0743280822 |location=New York |pages=165–95}}</ref>--> | |||
<!--<ref name="Hopkins1986">{{Cite book |last=Hopkins |first=William B. |title=One Bugle No Drums: The Marines at Chosin Reservoir |publisher=Algonquin |date=1986 |isbn=978-0912697451 |location=Chapel Hill, NC}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Roe1996">{{Cite web |last=Roe |first=Patrick C. |date=August 1996 |title=The Chinese Failure at Chosin |url=http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/frontline/chosin.htm |access-date=17 December 2011 |publisher=Korean War Project |location=Dallas, TX}}</ref>--> | |||
<ref name="DoyleMayer1979">{{Cite journal |last1=Doyle |first1=James H. |last2=Mayer |first2=Arthur J |date=April 1979 |title=December 1950 at Hungnam |journal=U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings |volume=105 |issue=4 |pages=44–65}}</ref> | |||
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<ref name="Espinoza2001">{{Cite court |litigants=Espinoza-Castro v. I.N.S. |date=2001 |vol=242 |reporter=F.3d |opinion=1181 |pinpoint=30 |url=http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/242/242.F3d.1181.99-70588.html}}</ref> | |||
Not in use--> | |||
<ref name="MacArthur">''Reminiscences'', MacArthur, Douglas.</ref><!unacceptable as-is; data will have to be confirmed or removed--> | |||
<ref name="Timmons">{{Cite web |last=Timmons |first=Robert |title=Allies mark 60th anniversary of Chipyong-ni victory |url=http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/20110222chipyongni-timmons.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113141628/http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/20110222chipyongni-timmons.asp |archive-date=13 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=8tharmy.korea.army.mil |publisher=US Eighth Army}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Boose2000">{{Cite web |last=Boose | first=Donald W. Jr. |date=Spring 2000 |title=Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks |url=http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/korea/boose.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070712210732/http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/korea/boose.html |archive-date=12 July 2007 |access-date=7 November 2009 |website=OAH Magazine of History |publisher=Organization of American Historians |quote=... the UNC advised that only 70,000 out of over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners desired repatriation.}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Ho1993">{{Cite book |last=Ho |first=Jong Ho |title=The US Imperialists started the Korean War |publisher=] |date=1993 |location=Pyongyang, N. Korea |page=230 |asin=B0000CP2AZ}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="KCNA2011">{{Cite web |date=1 August 2011 |title=War Victory Day of DPRK Marked in Different Countries |url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201108/news01/20110801-02ee.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120529130625/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201108/news01/20110801-02ee.html |archive-date=29 May 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |publisher=]}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="OperationGlory">{{Cite web |title=Operation Glory |url=http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/op_glory.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071228095437/http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/op_glory.htm |archive-date=28 December 2007 |access-date=16 December 2007 |publisher=Army Quartermaster Museum, US Army |location=Fort Lee, VA}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="DPMO">{{Cite web |last=US Department of Defense |title=DPMO White Paper: Punch Bowl 239 |url=http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/news/special_reports/documents/010228_punch_bowl_239.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106054156/http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/news/special_reports/documents/010228_punch_bowl_239.pdf |archive-date=6 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Army Times">{{Cite news |date=1 March 2008 |title=Remains from Korea identified as Ind. soldier |publisher=Army News |url=http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/03/ap_korea_remains_022908/ |access-date=25 December 2011}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="SwissArmy">{{Cite web |title=NNSC in Korea |url=http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/vtg/en/home/themen/einsaetze/peace/korea.parsys.0003.downloadList.53335.DownloadFile.tmp/nnsc2011e.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100825200823/http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Forces-abroad/Korea-/ |archive-date=25 August 2010 |access-date=22 December 2011 |publisher=Swiss Armed Forces, International Command}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="SwedishArmy">{{Cite web |date=1 November 2007 |title=Korea – NSCC |url=http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Forces-abroad/Korea-/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100825200823/http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Forces-abroad/Korea-/ |archive-date=25 August 2010 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=Forsvarsmakten.se |publisher=Swedish Armed Forces}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="BBC2010">{{Cite news |date=20 May 2010 |title='North Korean torpedo' sank South's navy ship – report |publisher=] |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129703 |url-status=live |access-date=22 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111210225444/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129703 |archive-date=10 December 2011}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Reuters2010">{{Cite news |last1=Kim |first1=Jack |last2=Lee |first2=Jae-won |date=23 November 2010 |title=North Korea shells South in fiercest attack in decades |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-artillery-idUSTRE6AM0YS20101123 |url-status=live |access-date=22 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120104032417/http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/23/us-korea-north-artillery-idUSTRE6AM0YS20101123 |archive-date=4 January 2012}}</ref> | |||
<!-- | |||
<ref name="CNN2000">{{Cite news |date=4 June 2000 |title=U.S. death toll from Korean War revised downward, Time reports |publisher=CNN |url=http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/06/04/korea.deaths/ |access-date=22 December 2011}}{{Failed verification|date=December 2011}}</ref> | |||
--> | |||
<ref name="xu">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Yan |date=29 July 2003 |title=Korean War: In the View of Cost-effectiveness |url=http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/xw/t31430.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110715215412/http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/xw/t31430.htm |archive-date=15 July 2011 |access-date=12 August 2007 |publisher=Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in New York}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Puckett2005">{{Cite web |last=Puckett |first=Allen L. |date=1 April 2005 |title=Say 'hello' to the bad guy |url=http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123010176 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119204158/http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123010176 |archive-date=19 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=af.mil |publisher=US Air Force}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Kreisher2007">{{Cite web |last=Kreisher |first=Otto |date=16 January 2007 |title=The Rise of the Helicopter During the Korean War |url=http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-the-helicopter-during-the-korean-war.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106153420/http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-the-helicopter-during-the-korean-war.htm |archive-date=6 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=historynet.com |publisher=Weider History Group}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="OliveDrab"> | |||
{{Cite web |title=WW II Helicopter Evacuation |url=http://www.olive-drab.com/od_medical_evac_helio_ww2.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113060208/http://olive-drab.com/od_medical_evac_helio_ww2.php |archive-date=13 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |publisher=Olive Drab}}<!--reliable?--></ref> | |||
<ref name="Day">{{Cite web |last=Day |first=Dwayne A. |title=M.A.S.H./Medevac Helicopters |url=http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Rotary/MASH/HE12.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119001032/http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Rotary/MASH/HE12.htm |archive-date=19 January 2012 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=CentennialOfFlight.gov |publisher=US Centennial of Flight Commission}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Walkom2010">{{Cite web |last=Walkom |first=Thomas |date=25 November 2010 |title=Walkom: North Korea's unending war rages on |url=https://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/896502--walkom-north-korea-s-unending-war-rages-on |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501192619/http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/896502--walkom-north-korea-s-unending-war-rages-on |archive-date=1 May 2011 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=Toronto Star}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Witt2005">{{Cite book |last1=Witt |first1=Linda |title=A Defense Weapon Known to be of Value: Servicewomen of the Korean War Era |last2=Bellafaire |first2=Judith |last3=Granrud |first3=Britta |last4=Binker |first4=Mary Jo |publisher=] |date=2005 |isbn=978-1584654728 |page=217}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Cumings2004">{{Cite web |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |date=10 December 2004 |title=Napalm über Nordkorea |url=http://monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2004/12/10/a0034.text |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111206082821/http://monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2004/12/10/a0034.text |archive-date=6 December 2011 |access-date=22 December 2011 |publisher=Le Monde diplomatique |language=de}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Marolda2003">{{Cite web |last=Marolda |first=Edward |date=26 August 2003 |title=Naval Battles |url=http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/navalbattles.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070629131922/http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/navalbattles.htm |archive-date=29 June 2007 |access-date=22 December 2011 |publisher=US Navy}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Knightley1982">{{Cite book |last=Knightley |first=Phillip |title=The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker |publisher=Quartet |date=1982 |isbn=978-0801869518 |page=334}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Panikkar1981">{{Cite book |last=Panikkar |first=Kavalam Madhava |title=In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat |publisher=Hyperion Press |date=1981 |isbn=978-0830500130 |author-link=Kavalam Madhava Panikkar}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Truman1955">{{Cite book |last=Truman |first=Harry S |title=Memoirs (2 volumes) |date=1955–1956 |publisher=Doubleday |isbn=978-1568520629 |volume=II |pages=394–395 |author-link=Harry S. Truman |no-pp=true}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Hasbrouck1951">{{Citation |last=Hasbrouck |first=S. V. |date=1951 |title=memo to file (November 7, 1951), G-3 Operations file, box 38-A |publisher=Library of Congress}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Chiefof Staff1951">{{Citation |author=Army Chief of Staff |date=1951 |title=memo to file (November 20, 1951), G-3 Operations file, box 38-A |publisher=Library of Congress}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Watson1998">{{Cite book |last1=Watson |first1=Robert J. |title=The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1951, The Korean War and 1951–1953, The Korean War |last2=Schnabel |first2=James F. |publisher=Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |date=1998 |series=History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III, Parts I and II |pages=part 1, p. v; part 2, p. 614 |no-pp=true}}</ref> | |||
<ref name="CommandingGeneral1951"> | |||
{{Citation |author=Commanding General, Far East Air Force |date=1951 |title=Memo to 98th Bomb Wing Commander, Okinawa}}<!--WTF? unverifiable as is--></ref> | |||
<ref name="FarEastCommand"> | |||
{{Citation |author=((Far East Command G-2 Theater Intelligence)) |date=1951 |title=Résumé of Operation, Record Group 349, box 752}}<!--unverifiable as is--></ref> | |||
<!--(this citation is not used in content and was thus giving a cite error) | |||
<ref name="Kim2010">{{Cite web |last=Kim Dong‐choon |date=5 March 2010 |title=The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea: Uncovering the Hidden Korean War |url=http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Information/notice/read.asp?num=500 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131101112431/http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Information/notice/read.asp?num=500 |archive-date=1 November 2013 |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=jinsil.go.kr |df=dmy-all}}</ref> --> | |||
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<ref name="HanleyMendoza2006">{{Cite news |last1=Hanley |first1=Charles J. |last2=Mendoza |first2=Martha |date=29 May 2006 |title=U.S. Policy Was to Shoot Korean Refugees |newspaper=The Washington Post |agency=Associated Press |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900485.html |url-status=live |access-date=25 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110427192855/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900485.html |archive-date=27 April 2011}}</ref--> | |||
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<ref name="Choe2007">{{Cite news |last=Choe |first=Sang-Hun |date=25 June 2007 |title=A half-century wait for a husband abducted by North Korea |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/asia/25iht-missing.1.6313858.html |url-status=live |access-date=25 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118095323/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/asia/25iht-missing.1.6313858.html |archive-date=18 January 2012}}</ref> | |||
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<ref name="KCNA">{{Cite web |title=DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum on GI mass killings |url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2000/200003/news03/22.htm#14 |access-date=22 December 2011 |website=Kcna.co.jp |publisher=]}} | |||
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<ref name="StateDept">{{Cite web |date=9 December 2011 |title=Turkey |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=State.gov |publisher=US Department of State |archive-date=29 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129164010/https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
<ref name="Turquie2010">{{Cite web |date=26 June 2010 |title=Revue de la presse turque 26.06.2010 |url=http://www.turquie-news.fr/spip.php?article4494 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721022746/http://www.turquie-news.fr/spip.php?article4494 |archive-date=21 July 2011 |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=turquie-news.fr |language=fr}}</ref> | |||
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<ref name="Independent2006">{{Cite news |date=13 July 2006 |title=Leading article: Africa has to spend carefully |work=] |publisher=] |location=London |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/leading-article-africa-has-to-spend-carefully-407666.html |url-status=live |access-date=24 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120124072325/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/leading-article-africa-has-to-spend-carefully-407666.html |archive-date=24 January 2012 |issn=0951-9467 |oclc=185201487}}</ref--> | |||
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<ref name="CIA2011">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=Country Comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity) |url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Ghana&countryCode=gh®ionCode=afr&rank=86#gh |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111118194700/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Ghana&countryCode=gh®ionCode=afr&rank=86 |archive-date=18 November 2011 |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=The World Factbook |publisher=CIA}}</ref--> | |||
<ref name="NYTimes12July1987">{{Cite news |last=Kristof |first=Nicholas D. |date=12 July 1987 |title=Anti-Americanism Grows in South Korea |work=The New York Times |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE7D6113FF931A25754C0A961948260 |access-date=11 April 2008}}</ref> | |||
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<ref name="Shin2003">{{Cite web |last=Shin |first=Gi-Wook |date=5 January 2003 |title=A new wave of anti-Americanism in South Korea |url=https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/A-new-wave-of-anti-Americanism-in-South-Korea-2717192.php |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=San Francisco Chronicle}}</ref>--> | |||
<ref name="Jang1998">{{Cite news |last=Jang |first=Jae-il |date=11 December 1998 |title=Adult Korean Adoptees in Search of Roots |work=] |url=http://www.geocities.ws/Heartland/Village/5473/articles/11.html |url-status=live |access-date=24 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120040603/http://www.geocities.ws/Heartland/Village/5473/articles/11.html |archive-date=20 January 2013}}</ref> | |||
==Further reading== | |||
], Korea.]] | |||
<ref name="Choe2005">{{Cite web |last1=Choe |first1=Yong-Ho |last2=Kim |first2=Ilpyong J. |last3=Han |first3=Moo-Young |date=2005 |title=Annotated Chronology of the Korean Immigration to the United States: 1882 to 1952 |url=http://www.duke.edu/~myhan/kaf0501.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120102130808/http://www.duke.edu/~myhan/kaf0501.html |archive-date=2 January 2012 |access-date=24 December 2011 |website=Duke.edu}}</ref> | |||
===Combat studies, soldiers=== | |||
* Appleman, Roy E. ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu'' (1961), Official US Army history covers the Eighth Army and X Corps from June to November 1950 | |||
* Appleman, Roy E.. ''East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea'' (1987); ''Escaping the Trap: The US Army in Northeast Korea, 1950'' (1987); ''Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur'' (1989); ''Ridgway Duels for Korea'' (1990). | |||
* Blair, Clay. ''The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953'' (1987), revisionist study that attacks senior American officials | |||
* Field Jr., James A. ''History of United States Naval Operations: Korea'', University Press of the Pacific, 2001, ISBN 0-89875-675-8. official US Navy history | |||
* Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony. ''The British Part in the Korean War'', HMSO, 1995, hardcover 528 pages, ISBN 0-11-630962-8 | |||
* Futrell, Robert F. ''The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953,'' rev. ed. (Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), official US Air Force history | |||
* ]. ''The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War'', Hyperion, 2007, ISBN 1401300529. | |||
* Hallion, Richard P. ''The Naval Air War in Korea'' (1986). | |||
* Hamburger, Kenneth E. ''Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-Ni.'' Texas A. & M. U. Press, 2003. 257 pp. | |||
* Hastings, Max. ''The Korean War'' (1987). British perspective | |||
* James, D. Clayton ''The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964'' (1985) | |||
* James, D. Clayton with Anne Sharp Wells, ''Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950–1953'' (1993) | |||
* Johnston, William. ''A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea.'' U. of British Columbia Press, 2003. 426 pp. | |||
* Kindsvatter, Peter S. ''American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam.'' U. Press of Kansas, 2003. 472 pp. | |||
* Millett, Allan R. ''Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945–1953.'' Brassey's, 2003. 310 pp. | |||
* Montross, Lynn et al., ''History of US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953,'' 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954–72), | |||
* Mossman, Billy. ''Ebb and Flow'' (1990), Official US Army history covers November 1950 to July 1951. | |||
* Russ, Martin. ''Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950'', Penguin, 2000, 464 pages, ISBN 0-14-029259-4 | |||
* Toland, John. ''In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953'' (1991) | |||
* Varhola, Michael J. ''Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950–1953'' (2000) | |||
* Watson, Brent Byron. ''Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953.'' 2002. 256 pp. | |||
{{cite journal | last=Kim | first=Jinhyouk | title=Development and Influence of Military Medicine during the Korean War: the Medical Field Service School and Training in the U.S. | journal=Korean Journal of Medical History | volume=32 | issue=3 | date=2023-12-31 | issn=1225-505X | doi=10.13081/kjmh.2023.32.891 | pages=891–930| pmid=38273724 | pmc=10822703 }} | |||
===Origins, politics, diplomacy=== | |||
* Chen Jian, ''China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation'' (Columbia University Press, 1994). | |||
* Cumings, Bruce. ''Origins of the Korean War'' (two volumes), Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990. | |||
* Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis; and Xue Litai, ''Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War'', Stanford University Press, 1993, ISBN 0-8047-2521-7, diplomatic | |||
* Kaufman, Burton I. ''The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command''. Temple University Press, 1986), focus is on Washington | |||
* Matray, James. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," ''Journal of American History'' 66 (September, 1979), 314–33. Online at JSTOR | |||
* Millett, Allan R. ''The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning'' vol 1 (2005)ISBN 0-7006-1393-5, origins | |||
* | |||
* Spanier, John W. ''The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War'' (1959). | |||
* Stueck, William. ''Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History.'' Princeton U. Press, 2002. 285 pp. | |||
* Stueck, Jr., William J. ''The Korean War: An International History'' (Princeton University Press, 1995), diplomatic | |||
* Zhang Shu-gang, ''Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953'' (University Press of Kansas, 1995) | |||
{{cite web | last=Millett | first=Allan R. | title=Korean War—Invasion, Counterinvasion, 1950-51 - Combatants, Summary, Years, Map, Casualties, & Facts | website=Encyclopedia Britannica | date=1999-05-04 | url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War | access-date=25 July 2019 | archive-date=24 April 2016 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424090911/https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War | url-status=live }} | |||
===Reference sources=== | |||
* Edwards, Paul M. ''The A to Z of the Korean War.'' The Scarecrow Press, 2005. 307 pp. | |||
* Edwards, Paul M. ''The Hill Wars of the Korean Conflict : A Dictionary of Hills, Outposts and other Sites of Military Action.'' McFarland & Co., 2006. 267 pp. | |||
* Edwards, Paul M. ''The Korean War : a Historical Dictionary.'' The Scarecrow Press, 2003. 367 pp. | |||
* Matray, James I. (ed.) ''Historical Dictionary of the Korean War.'' Greenwood Press, 1991. 626 pp. | |||
}} | |||
===Primary sources=== | |||
=== Bibliography === | |||
* Bassett, Richard M. ''And the Wind Blew Cold: The Story of an American POW in North Korea.'' Kent State U. Press, 2002. 117 pp. | |||
{{See also|United States in the Korean War#Further reading|Bibliography of Stalinism and the Soviet Union}} | |||
* Bin Yu and Xiaobing Li, eds. ''Mao's Generals Remember Korea'', University Press of Kansas, 2001, hardcover 328 pages, ISBN 0-7006-1095-2 | |||
{{Refbegin|30em}} | |||
* ], ''The River and the Gauntlet'' (1953) on combat | |||
*{{Cite book |last=Appleman |first=Roy E |title=South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu |publisher=] |date=1998 |isbn=978-0160019180|access-date=14 July 2010 |url=https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-2/|orig-year=1961}}{{PD-notice}} | |||
* ], ''The Korean War'' (1967). | |||
* {{Cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |title=Zhou Enlai: A Political Life |last2=Yu |first2=Changgeng |publisher=Chinese University Press |date=2006 |isbn=978-9629962807 |location=Hong Kong}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Becker |first=Jasper |url=https://archive.org/details/rogueregimekimjo00beck |title=Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2005 |isbn=978-0195170443 |location=New York }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Beschloss |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TSxyDwAAQBAJ |title=Presidents of War: The Epic Story, from 1807 to Modern Times |publisher=Crown |date=2018 |isbn=978-0-307-40960-7 |location=New York }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Blair |first=Clay |title=The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 |publisher=Naval Institute Press |date=2003 |author-link=Clay Blair}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Chen |first=Jian |title=China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation |publisher=Columbia University Press |date=1994 |isbn=978-0231100250 |location=New York}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Clodfelter |first=Micheal |title=A Statistical History of the Korean War: 1950-1953 |publisher=Merriam Press |date=1989 |location=Bennington, Vermont}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |title=Korea's Place in the Sun : A Modern History |publisher=] |date=2005 |isbn=978-0393327021 |location=New York |author-link=Bruce Cumings}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |title=Origins of the Korean War |publisher=Princeton University Press |date=1981 |isbn=978-8976966124 |chapter=3, 4 |author-link=Bruce Cumings}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last1=Dear |first1=Ian |url=https://archive.org/details/oxfordcompaniont00dear/page/516 |title=The Oxford Companion to World War II |last2=Foot |first2=M.R.D. |publisher=] |date=1995 |isbn=978-0198662259 |location=Oxford, NY |page= |author-link=I. C. B. Dear |author-link2=M. R. D. Foot }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Goulden |first=Joseph C |title=Korea: The Untold Story of the War |publisher=] |date=1983 |isbn=978-0070235809 |location=New York |page=17}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Halberstam |first=David |title=The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War |title-link=The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War |publisher=Hyperion |date=2007 |isbn=978-1401300524 |location=New York |author-link=David Halberstam}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Jager |first=Sheila Miyoshi |title=Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea |publisher=Profile Books |date=2013 |isbn=978-1846680670 |location=London |author-link=Sheila Miyoshi Jager}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Kim |first=Yǒng-jin |title=Major Powers and Korea |publisher=Research Institute on Korean Affairs |date=1973 |location=Silver Spring, MD |oclc=251811671}} | |||
* {{cite journal | last=Lee | first=Steven Hugh | title=The Korean War in History and Historiography | journal=The Journal of American-East Asian Relations | volume=21 | issue=2 | date=2014-06-14 | issn=1058-3947 | doi=10.1163/18765610-02102010 | pages=185–206}} | |||
* Lin, L., et al. "Whose history? An analysis of the Korean war in history textbooks from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China". ''Social Studies'' 100.5 (2009): 222–232. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220217110137/https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John-Hoge/publication/249038081_Whose_History_An_Analysis_of_the_Korean_War_in_History_Textbooks_from_the_United_States_South_Korea_Japan_and_China/links/55108ab00cf20352196c0c69/Whose-History-An-Analysis-of-the-Korean-War-in-History-Textbooks-from-the-United-States-South-Korea-Japan-and-China.pdf |date=17 February 2022 }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Malkasian |first=Carter |title=The Korean War, 1950–1953 |publisher=Fitzroy Dearborn |date=2001 |isbn=978-1579583644 |series=Essential Histories |location=London; Chicago}} | |||
* Matray, James I., and Donald W. Boose Jr, eds. ''The Ashgate research companion to the Korean War'' (2014) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210901052646/https://www.amazon.com/Ashgate-Research-Companion-Korean-War/dp/0367669382 |date=1 September 2021 }}; covers historiography | |||
* Matray, James I. "Conflicts in Korea" in Daniel S. Margolies, ed. ''A Companion to Harry S. Truman'' (2012) pp 498–531; emphasis on historiography. | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Millett |first=Allan R. |title=The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography |publisher=Potomac Books Inc. |date=2007 |isbn=978-1574889765 |series=The Essential Bibliography Series |location=Dulles, VA}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Mossman |first=Billy C. |title=Ebb and Flow, November 1950 – July 1951 |publisher=Center of Military History, United States Army |date=1990 |series=United States Army in the Korean War |volume=5 |location=Washington, DC |oclc=16764325 |access-date=3 May 2010 |url=https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-4/}}{{PD-notice}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Bryan |url=https://archive.org/details/sovietarmoursinc0000perr |title=Soviet Armour Since 1945 |publisher=Blandford |date=1987 |isbn=978-0713717358 |location=London }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last1=Ravino |first1=Jerry |title=Flame Dragons of the Korean War |last2=Carty |first2=Jack |publisher=Turner |date=2003 |location=Paducah, KY}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Rees |first=David |title=Korea: The Limited War |publisher=St Martin's |date=1964 |location=New York |oclc=1078693}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Stein |first=R. Conrad |url=https://archive.org/details/koreanwarthefor00stei |title=The Korean War: "The Forgotten War" |publisher=Enslow Publishers |date=1994 |isbn=978-0894905261 |location=Hillside, NJ }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Stokesbury |first=James L |title=A Short History of the Korean War |publisher=Harper Perennial |date=1990 |isbn=978-0688095130 |location=New York}} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Stueck |first=William W. |title=The Korean War: An International History |url=https://archive.org/details/koreanwarinterna0000stue |date=1995 |place=Princeton, NJ |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691037677 }} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Stueck |first=William W. |title=Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History |date=2002 |place=Princeton, NJ |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691118475}} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Weathersby |first=Kathryn |title=Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–50: New Evidence From the Russian Archives |url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/soviet-aims-korea-and-the-origins-the-korean-war-1945-50-new-evidence-the-russian |date=1993 |publisher=Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 8 |access-date=21 April 2013 |archive-date=25 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225022000/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/soviet-aims-korea-and-the-origins-the-korean-war-1945-50-new-evidence-the-russian |url-status=live }} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Weathersby |first=Kathryn |title="Should We Fear This?" Stalin and the Danger of War with America |url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/should-we-fear-stalin-and-the-danger-war-america |date=2002 |publisher=Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 39 |access-date=21 April 2013 |archive-date=25 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225031023/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/should-we-fear-stalin-and-the-danger-war-america |url-status=live }} | |||
* {{Cite book |last=Werrell |first=Kenneth P. |title=Sabres Over MiG Alley |publisher=] |date=2005 |isbn=978-1591149330 |location=Annapolis, MD}} | |||
* {{Cite book |last1=Zaloga |first1=Steven J. |title=Soviet Tanks in Combat 1941–45: The T-28, T-34, T-34-85, and T-44 Medium Tanks |last2=Kinnear |first2=Jim |last3=Aksenov |first3=Andrey |last4=Koshchavtsev |first4=Aleksandr |date=1997 |publisher=Concord Publication |isbn=9623616155 |series=Armor at War |location=Hong Kong |ref=Zaloga-1997}} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Zhang |first=Shu Guang |title=Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 |date=1995 |place=Lawrence, KS |publisher=University Press of Kansas |isbn=978-0700607235}} | |||
{{Refend}} | |||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||
{{ |
{{Sister project links|Korean War|voy=Korean War}} | ||
* Records of {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421195550/https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-commission-for-unification-and-rehabilitation-of-korea-uncurk-1950-1973 |date=21 April 2021 }} at the United Nations Archives | |||
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* Online newsreel archive featuring films on the war | |||
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* showing the dynamics of the front. | |||
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===Historical=== | |||
==Additional source== | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230709122734/https://new.mnd.go.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/thekoreanwar01/index.html |date=9 July 2023 }} | |||
*{{zh icon}} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230607035938/https://www.imhc.mil.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_202303310234112240.pdf |date=7 June 2023 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230709122735/https://new.mnd.go.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/thekoreanwar02/index.html |date=9 July 2023 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230607120011/https://www.imhc.mil.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_202303310233492010.pdf |date=7 June 2023 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230709122732/https://new.mnd.go.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/thekoreanwar03/index.html |date=9 July 2023 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230607132444/https://www.imhc.mil.kr/user/imhc/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_202303310233258330.pdf |date=7 June 2023 }} | |||
* The Research Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150221204021/http://www.shapell.org/btl.aspx?60th-anniversary-of-the-korean-war-armistice |date=21 February 2015 }} Shapell Manuscript Foundation | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140626024426/http://eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/korean_war.html |date=26 June 2014 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530002127/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/north-korea-international-documentation-project |date=30 May 2021 }} | |||
* | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309061111/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/opinion/25KoreaIntro.html |date=9 March 2021 }} – four testimonials in '']'' | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210427055750/http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/KW.html |date=27 April 2021 }} an online collection of the ] | |||
* U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210314194140/http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/home.htm |date=14 March 2021 }} | |||
* {{Internet Archive short film|id=gov.archives.li.263.927|name=Film No. 927}} | |||
===Media=== | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210316035459/https://westpoint.edu/academics/academic-departments/history/korean-war |date=16 March 2021 }} | |||
* – slideshows by '']'' magazine | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308080531/https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/sets/72157607808414225/ |date=8 March 2021 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131105223106/http://www.awesomestories.com/history/korean-war/war-pictures |date=5 November 2013 }} | |||
* | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106060612/http://www.britishpathe.com/workspace.php?id=32&display=listBritish |date=6 January 2012 }} Online newsreel archive featuring films on the war | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108131646/http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/war-conflict/korean-war/forgotten-heroes-canada-and-the-korean-war/canadas-troops-head-to-korea.html |date=8 November 2012 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210815185949/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26287786 |date=15 August 2021 }}. ''Air Power History.'' (Spring 1997). '''44''', 1, 32–45. | |||
===Organizations=== | |||
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* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307162850/http://www.kwva.org/pow_mia/index.htm |date=7 March 2021 }} | |||
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===Memorials=== | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304075426/http://www.koreanchildren.org/ |date=4 March 2021 }} | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226202230/http://www.china.org.cn/e-America/index.htm |date=26 February 2021 }} | |||
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Latest revision as of 19:06, 22 December 2024
War between North and South Korea, 1950–1953 For other conflicts and wars involving Korea, see List of Korean battles. For the conflict from 1945 to the present, see Korean conflict.
This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. (December 2024) |
Korean War | |||||||||
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Part of the Cold War and the Korean conflict | |||||||||
Clockwise from top left:
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Belligerents | |||||||||
South Korea | North Korea | ||||||||
United Nations | |||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Peak strength (combat troops):
(combat troops): |
Peak strength (combat troops): Together: 1,742,000 Total:2,970,000 72,000 Together: 3,042,000 | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) was an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula fought between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, while South Korea was supported by the United Nations Command (UNC) led by the United States. The conflict was the first major proxy war of the Cold War. Fighting ended in 1953 with an armistice but no peace treaty, leading to the ongoing Korean conflict.
After the end of World War II in 1945, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for 35 years, was divided by the Soviet Union and the United States into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel, with plans for a future independent state. Due to political disagreements and influence from their backers, the zones formed their own governments in 1948. North Korea was led by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, and South Korea by Syngman Rhee in Seoul; both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea and engaged in border clashes as internal unrest was fomented by communist groups in the south. On 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA), equipped and trained by the Soviets, launched an invasion of the south. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative, the UN Security Council denounced the attack and recommended member states to repel the invasion. UN forces comprised 21 countries, with the United States providing around 90% of military personnel.
Seoul was captured on 28 June, and by early August, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and its allies were nearly defeated, holding onto only the Pusan Perimeter in the peninsula's southeast. On 15 September, UN forces landed at Inchon near Seoul, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines. UN forces broke out from the perimeter on 18 September, re-captured Seoul, and invaded North Korea in October, capturing Pyongyang and advancing towards the Yalu River—the border with China. On 19 October, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) crossed the Yalu and entered the war on the side of the north. UN forces retreated from North Korea in December, following the PVA's first and second offensive. Communist forces captured Seoul again in January 1951 before losing it to a UN counter-offensive two months later. After an abortive Chinese spring offensive, UN forces retook territory roughly up to the 38th parallel. Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but dragged on as the fighting became a war of attrition and the north suffered heavy damage from U.S. bombing.
Combat ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which allowed the exchange of prisoners and created a 4-kilometre (2.5 mi) wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the frontline, with a Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. The conflict caused more than 1 million military deaths and an estimated 2 to 3 million civilian deaths. Alleged war crimes include the mass killing of suspected communists by Seoul and the torture and starvation of prisoners of war by Pyongyang. North Korea became one of the most heavily bombed countries in history, and virtually all of Korea's major cities were destroyed. No peace treaty has been signed, making the war a frozen conflict.
Names
Korean War | |||||||
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South Korean name | |||||||
Hangul | 6·25 전쟁 or 한국 전쟁 | ||||||
Hanja | 六二五戰爭 or 韓國戰爭 | ||||||
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North Korean name | |||||||
Chosŏn'gŭl | 조국해방전쟁 | ||||||
Hancha | 祖國解放戰爭 | ||||||
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In South Korea, the war is usually referred to as the "625 War" (6·25 전쟁; 六二五戰爭), the "625 Upheaval" (6·25 동란; 六二五動亂; yugio dongnan), or simply "625", reflecting the date of its commencement on 25 June.
In North Korea, the war is officially referred to as the Fatherland Liberation War (Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng) or the Chosŏn War (조선전쟁; Chosŏn chŏnjaeng).
In mainland China, the segment of the war after the intervention of the People's Volunteer Army is commonly and officially known as the "Resisting America and Assisting Korea War" (Chinese: 抗美援朝战争; pinyin: Kàngměi Yuáncháo Zhànzhēng), although the term "Chosŏn War" (Chinese: 朝鮮戰爭; pinyin: Cháoxiǎn Zhànzhēng) is sometimes used unofficially. The term "Hán (Korean) War" (Chinese: 韓戰; pinyin: Hán Zhàn) is most used in Taiwan (Republic of China), Hong Kong and Macau.
In the US, the war was initially described by President Harry S. Truman as a "police action" as the US never formally declared war and the operation was conducted under the auspices of the UN. It has been sometimes referred to in the English-speaking world as "The Forgotten War" or "The Unknown War" because of the lack of public attention it received relative to World War II and the Vietnam War.
Background
Imperial Japanese rule (1910–1945)
Main article: Korea under Japanese ruleImperial Japan diminished the influence of China over Korea in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). A decade later, after defeating Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan made the Korean Empire its protectorate with the Eulsa Treaty in 1905, then annexed it with the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910.
Many Korean nationalists fled the country. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was founded in 1919 in Nationalist China. It failed to achieve international recognition, failed to unite the nationalist groups, and had a fractious relationship with its US-based founding president, Syngman Rhee.
In China, the nationalist National Revolutionary Army and the communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) helped organize Korean refugees against the Japanese military, which had also occupied parts of China. The Nationalist-backed Koreans, led by Yi Pom-Sok, fought in the Burma campaign (1941-45). The communists, led by, among others, Kim Il Sung, fought the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, China, the UK, and the US decided that "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent".
Korea divided (1945–1949)
Main article: Division of KoreaAt the Tehran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviet Union promised to join its allies in the Pacific War within three months of the victory in Europe. The USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria on 8 August 1945. By 10 August, the Red Army had begun to occupy the north of Korea.
On 10 August in Washington, US Colonels Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel III were assigned to divide Korea into Soviet and US occupation zones and proposed the 38th parallel as the dividing line. This was incorporated into the US General Order No. 1, which responded to the Japanese surrender on 15 August. Explaining the choice of the 38th parallel, Rusk observed, "Even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by U. S. forces in the event of Soviet disagreement ... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops". Joseph Stalin, however, maintained his wartime policy of cooperation, and on 16 August, the Red Army halted at the 38th parallel for three weeks to await the arrival of US forces.
On 7 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur issued Proclamation No. 1 to the people of Korea, announcing US military control over Korea south of the 38th parallel and establishing English as the official language during military control. On 8 September, US Lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived in Incheon to accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel. Appointed as military governor, Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK 1945–48).
In December 1945, Korea was administered by a US–Soviet Union Joint Commission, as agreed at the Moscow Conference, to grant independence after a five-year trusteeship. Waiting five years for independence was unpopular among Koreans, and riots broke out. To contain them, the USAMGIK banned strikes on 8 December and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and People's Committees on 12 December. Following further civilian unrest, the USAMGIK declared martial law.
Citing the inability of the Joint Commission to make progress, the US government decided to hold an election under UN auspices to create an independent Korea. The Soviet authorities and Korean communists refused to cooperate on the grounds it would not be fair, and many South Korean politicians boycotted it. The 1948 South Korean general election was held in May. The resultant South Korean government promulgated a national political constitution on 17 July and elected Syngman Rhee as president on 20 July. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948.
In the Soviet-Korean Zone of Occupation, the Soviets agreed to the establishment of a communist government led by Kim Il Sung. The 1948 North Korean parliamentary elections took place in August. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1948 and the US in 1949.
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)
With the end of the war with Japan, the Chinese Civil War resumed in earnest between the Communists and the Nationalist-led government. While the Communists were struggling for supremacy in Manchuria, they were supported by the North Korean government with matériel and manpower. According to Chinese sources, the North Koreans donated 2,000 railway cars worth of supplies while thousands of Koreans served in the Chinese PLA during the war. North Korea also provided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with a safe refuge for non-combatants and communications with the rest of China. As a token of gratitude, between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean veterans who served in the PLA were sent back along with their weapons, and they later played a significant role in the initial invasion of South Korea. China promised to support the North Koreans in the event of a war against South Korea.
Communist insurgency in South Korea (1948–1950)
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By 1948, a North Korea-backed insurgency had broken out in the southern half of the peninsula. This was exacerbated by the undeclared border war between the Koreas, which saw division-level engagements and thousands of deaths on both sides. The ROK was almost entirely trained and focused on counterinsurgency, rather than conventional warfare. They were equipped and advised by a force of a few hundred American officers, who were successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against North Korean military (Korean People's Army, KPA) forces along the 38th parallel. Approximately 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police officers died in the insurgent war and border clashes.
The first socialist uprising occurred without direct North Korean participation, though the guerrillas still professed support for the northern government. Beginning in April 1948 on Jeju Island, the campaign saw arrests and repression by the South Korean government in the fight against the South Korean Labor Party, resulting in 30,000 violent deaths, among them 14,373 civilians, of whom ~2,000 were killed by rebels and ~12,000 by ROK security forces. The Yeosu–Suncheon rebellion overlapped with it, as several thousand army defectors waving red flags massacred right-leaning families. This resulted in another brutal suppression by the government and between 2,976 and 3,392 deaths. By May 1949, both uprisings had been crushed.
Insurgency reignited in the spring of 1949 when attacks by guerrillas in the mountainous regions (buttressed by army defectors and North Korean agents) increased. Insurgent activity peaked in late 1949 as the ROKA engaged so-called People's Guerrilla Units. Organized and armed by the North Korean government, and backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had infiltrated through the border, these guerrillas launched an offensive in September aimed at undermining the South Korean government and preparing the country for the KPA's arrival in force. This offensive failed. However, the guerrillas were now entrenched in the Taebaek-san region of the North Gyeongsang Province and the border areas of the Gangwon Province.
While the insurgency was ongoing, the ROKA and KPA engaged in battalion-sized battles along the border, starting in May 1949. Border clashes between South and North continued on 4 August 1949, when thousands of North Korean troops attacked South Korean troops occupying territory north of the 38th parallel. The 2nd and 18th ROK Infantry Regiments repulsed attacks in Kuksa-bong, and KPA troops were "completely routed". Border incidents decreased by the start of 1950.
Meanwhile, counterinsurgencies in the South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather, denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with insurgents and build more partisan cadres; North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA.
On 1 October 1949, the ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in South Cholla and Taegu. By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, North Korea made final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion was reduced to a single man over the course of engagements by the ROKA 8th Division. The second was annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil maneuver by units of the ROKA 6th Division, resulting in a toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded. By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm.
Prelude to war (1950)
By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him.
Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea. PLA forces were still embroiled in the Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea. By spring 1950, he believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under Mao Zedong had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb, breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance. The Soviets had cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with their embassy in Moscow, and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation. Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.
In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack the government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed. For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea. Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the US
Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed the economic and military aid promised by the Soviets. Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support. Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations. Chen Jian argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support. Citing more recent scholarship, Zhao Suisheng contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via a telegram. Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention.
Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy the ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports.
On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in Haeju on 15–17 June. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright. On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve a general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change.
While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The ROK was being trained by the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.
Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened. The Central Intelligence Agency noted the southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely". On 23 June UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent.
Comparison of forces
Chinese involvement was extensive from the beginning, building on previous collaboration between the Chinese and Korean communists during the Chinese Civil War. Throughout 1949 and 1950, the Soviets continued arming North Korea. After the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, ethnic Korean units in the PLA were sent to North Korea.
In the fall of 1949, two PLA divisions composed mainly of Korean-Chinese troops (the 164th and 166th) entered North Korea, followed by smaller units throughout the rest of 1949. The reinforcement of the KPA with PLA veterans continued into 1950, with the 156th Division and several other units of the former Fourth Field Army arriving in February; the PLA 156th Division was reorganized as the KPA 7th Division. By mid-1950, between 50,000 and 70,000 former PLA troops had entered North Korea, forming a significant part of the KPA's strength on the eve of the war's beginning. The combat veterans and equipment from China, the tanks, artillery, and aircraft supplied by the Soviets, and rigorous training increased North Korea's military superiority over the South, armed by the U.S. military with mostly small arms, but no heavy weaponry.
Several generals, such as Lee Kwon-mu, were PLA veterans born to ethnic Koreans in China. While older histories of the conflict often referred to these ethnic Korean PLA veterans as being sent from northern Korea to fight in the Chinese Civil War before being sent back, recent Chinese archival sources studied by Kim Donggill indicate that this was not the case. Rather, the soldiers were indigenous to China, as part of China's longstanding ethnic Korean community, and were recruited to the PLA in the same way as any other Chinese citizen.
According to the first official census in 1949, the population of North Korea numbered 9,620,000, and by mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, Chuncheon, Uijeongbu, and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, 150 Yak fighter planes, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the invasion force, the North had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as seaborne artillery for their armies.
In contrast, the South Korean population was estimated at 20 million, but its army was unprepared and ill-equipped. As of 25 June 1950, the ROK had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-plane air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT-6 advanced-trainer airplanes. Large U.S. garrisons and air forces were in Japan, but only 200–300 U.S. troops were in Korea.
Course of the war
Operation Pokpung
Main article: Operation PokpungAt dawn on 25 June 1950, the KPA crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. It justified its assault with the claim ROK troops attacked first and that the KPA were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin Peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that the 17th Regiment had counterattacked at Haeju; some scholars argue the claimed counterattack was instead the instigating attack, and therefore that the South Koreans may have fired first. However, the report that contained the Haeju claim contained errors and outright falsehoods.
KPA forces attacked all along the 38th parallel within an hour. The KPA had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The ROK had no tanks, anti-tank weapons, or heavy artillery. The South Koreans committed their forces in a piecemeal fashion, and these were routed in a few days.
On 27 June, Rhee evacuated Seoul with some of the government. At 02:00 on 28 June the ROK blew up the Hangang Bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the KPA. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing it, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge trapped many ROK units north of the river. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. Some South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and 48 subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.
On 28 June, Rhee ordered the massacre of suspected political opponents in his own country. In five days, the ROK, which had 95,000 troops on 25 June, was down to less than 22,000 troops. In early July, when US forces arrived, what was left of the ROK was placed under US operational command of the United Nations Command.
Factors in U.S. intervention
Main articles: United States in the Korean War and Foreign policy of the Harry S. Truman administrationThe Truman administration was unprepared for the invasion. Korea was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Military strategists were more concerned with the security of Europe against the Soviet Union than that of East Asia. The administration was worried a war in Korea could quickly escalate without American intervention. Diplomat John Foster Dulles stated: "To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war."
While there was hesitance by some in the US government to get involved, considerations about Japan fed into the decision to engage on behalf of South Korea. After the fall of China to the communists, US experts saw Japan as the region's counterweight to the Soviet Union and China. While there was no US policy dealing with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased its importance. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene ... The essential point ... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of U.S. policy toward Japan."
Another consideration was the Soviet reaction if the US intervened. The Truman administration was fearful a Korean war was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the US committed in Korea. At the same time, "here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from ". Yugoslavia—a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would start that would marginalize the UN and encourage communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans, and the US immediately began using air and naval forces in the area to that end. The Truman administration still refrained from committing troops on the ground, because advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.
The Truman administration was uncertain whether the attack was a ploy by the Soviet Union, or just a test of US resolve. The decision to commit ground troops became viable when a communiqué was received on 27 June indicating the Soviet Union would not move against US forces in Korea. The Truman administration believed it could intervene in Korea without undermining its commitments elsewhere.
United Nations Security Council resolutions
Further information: List of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning North KoreaOn 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea with Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted Council meetings since January 1950, protesting Taiwan's occupation of China's permanent seat. The Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help. On 4 July the Soviet deputy foreign minister accused the U.S. of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.
The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from US Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the fighting was beyond the Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council, some legal scholars posited that deciding upon this type of action required the unanimous vote of all five permanent members.
Within days of the invasion, masses of ROK soldiers—of dubious loyalty to the Syngman Rhee regime—were retreating southwards or defecting en masse to the northern side, the KPA.
United States' response (July–August 1950)
As soon as word of the attack was received, Acheson informed Truman that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. Truman and Acheson discussed a US invasion response and agreed the US was obligated to act, comparing the North Korean invasion with Adolf Hitler's aggressions in the 1930s, and the mistake of appeasement must not be repeated. US industries were mobilized to supply materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and other services necessary to support the military objectives of the Korean War. Truman later explained he believed fighting the invasion was essential to the containment of communism as outlined in the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68):
Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.
In August 1950, Truman and Acheson obtained the consent of Congress to appropriate $12 billion for military action, equivalent to $152 billion in 2023. Because of the extensive defense cuts and emphasis on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services were able to make a robust response with conventional military strength. General Omar Bradley, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was faced with deploying a force that was a shadow of its World War II counterpart.
Acting on Acheson's recommendation, Truman ordered MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, to transfer matériel to the South Korean military, while giving air cover to evacuation of US nationals. Truman disagreed with advisers who recommended unilateral bombing of the North Korean forces and ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan, whose government asked to fight in Korea. The US denied Taiwan's request for combat, lest it provoke retaliation from the PRC. Because the US had sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai criticized the UN and US initiatives as "armed aggression on Chinese territory". The US supported the Kuomintang in Burma in the hope these KMT forces would harass China from the southwest, thereby diverting Chinese resources from Korea.
The drive south and Pusan (July–September 1950)
The Battle of Osan, the first significant US engagement, involved the 540-soldier Task Force Smith, a small forward element of the 24th Infantry Division flown in from Japan. On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith attacked the KPA at Osan but without weapons capable of destroying KPA tanks. The KPA defeated the US, with 180 American casualties. The KPA progressed southwards, pushing back US forces at Pyongtaek, Chonan, and Chochiwon, forcing the 24th Division's retreat to Taejeon, which the KPA captured in the Battle of Taejon. The 24th Division suffered 3,602 dead and wounded and 2,962 captured, including its commander, Major General William F. Dean.
By August, the KPA steadily pushed back the ROK and the Eighth United States Army southwards. The impact of the Truman administration's defense budget cutbacks was keenly felt, as US troops fought costly rearguard actions. Facing a veteran and well-led KPA force, and lacking sufficient anti-tank weapons, artillery or armor, the Americans retreated and the KPA advanced down the Peninsula. By September, UN forces were hemmed into a corner of southeast Korea, near Pusan. This 230-kilometre (140-mile) perimeter enclosed about 10% of Korea, in a line defined by the Nakdong River.
The KPA purged South Korea's intelligentsia by killing civil servants and intellectuals. On 20 August, MacArthur warned Kim Il Sung he would be held responsible for KPA atrocities.
Kim's early successes led him to predict the war would finish by the end of August. Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. To counter a possible US deployment, Zhou secured a Soviet commitment to have the Soviet Union support Chinese forces with air cover, and he deployed 260,000 soldiers along the Korean border, under the command of Gao Gang. Zhou authorized a topographical survey of Korea and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou's military adviser in Korea, to analyze the military situation. Lei concluded MacArthur would likely attempt a landing at Incheon. After conferring with Mao that this would be MacArthur's most likely strategy, Zhou briefed Soviet and North Korean advisers of Lei's findings, and issued orders to PLA commanders to prepare for US naval activity in the Korea Strait.
In the resulting Battle of Pusan Perimeter, UN forces withstood KPA attacks meant to capture the city at the Naktong Bulge, P'ohang-dong, and Taegu. The United States Air Force (USAF) interrupted KPA logistics with 40 daily ground support sorties, which destroyed 32 bridges, halting daytime road and rail traffic. KPA forces were forced to hide in tunnels by day and move only at night. To deny military equipment and supplies to the KPA, the USAF destroyed logistics depots, refineries, and harbors, while U.S. Navy aircraft attacked transport hubs. Consequently, the overextended KPA could not be supplied throughout the south. On 27 August, 67th Fighter Squadron aircraft mistakenly attacked facilities in Chinese territory, and the Soviet Union called the Security Council's attention to China's complaint about the incident. The US proposed a commission of India and Sweden determine what the US should pay in compensation, but the Soviets vetoed this.
Meanwhile, US garrisons in Japan continually dispatched soldiers and military supplies to reinforce defenders in the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur went so far as to call for Japan's rearmament. Tank battalions deployed to Korea, from the port of San Francisco to the port of Pusan, the largest Korean port. By late August, the Pusan Perimeter had 500 medium tanks battle-ready. In early September 1950, UN forces outnumbered the KPA 180,000 to 100,000 soldiers.
Battle of Incheon (September 1950)
Main article: Battle of IncheonAgainst the rested and rearmed Pusan Perimeter defenders and their reinforcements, the KPA were undermanned and poorly supplied; unlike the UN, they lacked naval and air support. To relieve the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur recommended an amphibious landing at Incheon, near Seoul, well over 160 km (100 mi) behind the KPA lines. On 6 July, he ordered Major General Hobart R. Gay, commander of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, to plan an amphibious landing at Incheon; on 12–14 July, the 1st Cavalry Division embarked from Yokohama, Japan, to reinforce the 24th Infantry Division inside the Pusan Perimeter.
Soon after the war began, MacArthur began planning an Incheon landing, but the Pentagon opposed him. When authorized, he activated a combined US Army and Marine Corps, and ROK force. The X Corps, consisted of 40,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division and around 8,600 ROK soldiers. By 15 September, the amphibious force faced few KPA defenders at Incheon: military intelligence, psychological warfare, guerrilla reconnaissance, and protracted bombardment facilitated a light battle. However, the bombardment destroyed most of Incheon.
Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter
Main articles: Pusan Perimeter offensive, UN September 1950 counteroffensive, and Second Battle of SeoulOn 16 September Eighth Army began its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Task Force Lynch, 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and 70th Tank Battalion units advanced through 171.2 km (106.4 mi) of KPA territory to join the 7th Infantry Division at Osan on 27 September. X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders around Seoul, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force.
On 18 September, Stalin dispatched General H. M. Zakharov to advise Kim to halt his offensive around the Pusan Perimeter, and redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. Chinese commanders were not briefed on North Korean troop numbers or operational plans. Zhou suggested the North Koreans should attempt to eliminate the UN forces at Incheon only if they had reserves of at least 100,000 men; otherwise, he advised the North Koreans to withdraw their forces north.
On 25 September, Seoul was recaptured by UN forces. US air raids caused heavy damage to the KPA, destroying most of its tanks and artillery. KPA troops in the south, instead of effectively withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated, leaving Pyongyang vulnerable. During the retreat, only 25,000-30,000 KPA soldiers managed to reach the KPA lines. On 27 September, Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo, where he condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held Soviet military advisers responsible for the defeat.
UN forces invade North Korea (September–October 1950)
Main article: UN offensive into North KoreaOn 27 September, MacArthur received secret National Security Council Memorandum 81/1 from Truman reminding him operations north of the 38th parallel were authorized only if "at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily". On 29 September, MacArthur restored the government of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September sent MacArthur a comprehensive directive: it stated the primary goal was the destruction of the KPA, with unification of the Peninsula under Rhee as a secondary objective "if possible"; the Joint Chiefs added this objective was dependent on whether the Chinese and Soviets would intervene, and was subject to changing conditions.
On 30 September, Zhou warned the US that China was prepared to intervene if the US crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou attempted to advise KPA commanders on how to conduct a general withdrawal by using the same tactics that allowed Chinese Communist forces to escape Nationalist encirclement campaigns in the 1930s, but KPA commanders did not use these tactics effectively. Bruce Cumings argues, however, that the KPA's rapid withdrawal was strategic, with troops melting into the mountains from where they could launch guerrilla raids on the UN forces spread out on the coasts.
By 1 October, the UN Command had driven the KPA past the 38th parallel, and RoK forces pursued the KPA northwards. MacArthur demanded the KPA's unconditional surrender. On 7 October, with UN authorization, the UN Command forces followed the ROK forces northwards. The Eighth US Army drove up western Korea and captured Pyongyang on 19 October. On 20 October, the US 187th Airborne Regiment made their first of their two combat jumps during the war at Sunchon and Sukchon. The mission was to cut the road north going to China, preventing North Korean leaders from escaping Pyongyang, and to rescue US prisoners of war.
At month's end, UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners of war. As they neared the Sino-Korean border, the UN forces in the west were divided from those in the east by 80–161 km (50–100 mi) of mountainous terrain. In addition to the 135,000 captured, the KPA had suffered some 200,000 soldiers killed or wounded, for a total of 335,000 casualties since end of June 1950, and lost 313 tanks. A mere 25,000 KPA regulars retreated across the 38th parallel, as their military had collapsed. The UN forces on the peninsula numbered 229,722 combat troops (including 125,126 Americans and 82,786 South Koreans), 119,559 rear area troops, and 36,667 US Air Force personnel. MacArthur believed it necessary to extend the war into China to destroy depots supplying the North Korean effort. Truman disagreed and ordered caution at the Sino-Korean border.
China intervenes (October–December 1950)
On 3 October 1950, China attempted to warn the US, through its embassy in India, it would intervene if UN forces crossed the Yalu River. The US did not respond as policymakers in Washington, including Truman, considered it a bluff.
On 15 October Truman and MacArthur met at Wake Island. This was much publicized because of MacArthur's discourteous refusal to meet the president in the contiguous US. To Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea, and the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria and 100,000–125,000 at the Yalu River. He concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without Soviet air force protection.
Meanwhile on 13 October, the Politburo decided China would intervene even without Soviet air support, basing its decision on a belief superior morale could defeat an enemy that had superior equipment. To that end, 200,000 Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) troops crossed the Yalu into North Korea. UN aerial reconnaissance had difficulty sighting PVA units in daytime, because their march and bivouac discipline minimized detection. The PVA marched "dark-to-dark" (19:00–03:00), and aerial camouflage (concealing soldiers, pack animals, and equipment) was deployed by 05:30. Meanwhile, daylight advance parties scouted for the next bivouac site. During daylight activity or marching, soldiers remained motionless if an aircraft appeared; PVA officers were under orders to shoot security violators. Such battlefield discipline allowed a three-division army to march the 460 km (286 mi) from An-tung, Manchuria, to the combat zone in 19 days. Another division night-marched a circuitous mountain route, averaging 29 km (18 mi) daily for 18 days.
After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the First Phase Offensive on 25 October, attacking advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve days after PVA troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the Soviet Air Forces to provide air cover and supported more aid to China. After inflicting heavy losses on the ROK II Corps at the Battle of Onjong, the first confrontation between Chinese and US military occurred on 1 November 1950. Deep in North Korea, thousands of soldiers from the PVA 39th Army encircled and attacked the US 8th Cavalry Regiment with three-prong assaults—from the north, northwest, and west—and overran the defensive position flanks in the Battle of Unsan.
On 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou overall commander and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng Dehuai as field commander. On 25 November, on the Korean western front, the PVA 13th Army Group attacked and overran the ROK II Corps at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, and then inflicted heavy losses on the US 2nd Infantry Division on the UN forces' right flank. Believing they could not hold against the PVA, the Eighth Army began to retreat, crossing the 38th parallel in mid-December.
In the east, on 27 November, the PVA 9th Army Group initiated the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. Here, the UN forces fared better: like the Eighth Army, the surprise attack forced X Corps to retreat from northeast Korea, but they were able to break out from the attempted encirclement by the PVA and execute a successful tactical withdrawal. X Corps established a defensive perimeter at the port city of Hungnam on 11 December and evacuated by 24 December, to reinforce the depleted Eighth Army to the south. About 193 shiploads of UN forces and matériel (approximately 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies) were evacuated to Pusan. The SS Meredith Victory was noted for evacuating 14,000 refugees, the largest rescue operation by a single ship, even though it was designed to hold 12 passengers. Before escaping, the UN forces razed most of Hungnam, with particular attention to the port.
In early December UN forces, including the British Army's 29th Infantry Brigade, evacuated Pyongyang along with refugees. Around 4.5 million North Koreans are estimated to have fled South or elsewhere abroad. On 16 December Truman declared a national state of emergency with Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1953), which remained in force until September 1978. The next day, 17 December, Kim Il Sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China.
Fighting around the 38th parallel (January–June 1951)
A ceasefire presented by the UN to the PRC, after the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River on 11 December, was rejected by the PRC, which was convinced of the PVA's invincibility after its victory in that battle and the wider Second Phase Offensive. With Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway assuming command of the Eighth Army on 26 December, the PVA and the KPA launched their Third Phase Offensive on New Year's Eve. Using night attacks in which UN fighting positions were encircled and assaulted by numerically superior troops, who had the element of surprise, the attacks were accompanied by loud trumpets and gongs, which facilitated tactical communication and disoriented the enemy. UN forces had no familiarity with this tactic, and some soldiers panicked, abandoning their weapons and retreating to the south. The offensive overwhelmed UN forces, allowing the PVA and KPA to capture Seoul for the second time on 4 January 1951.
These setbacks prompted MacArthur to consider using nuclear weapons against the Chinese or North Korean interiors, intending radioactive fallout zones to interrupt the Chinese supply chains. However, upon the arrival of the charismatic General Ridgway, the esprit de corps of the bloodied Eighth Army revived.
UN forces retreated to Suwon in the west, Wonju in the center, and the territory north of Samcheok in the east, where the battlefront stabilized and held. The PVA had outrun its logistics capability and thus were unable to press on beyond Seoul as food, ammunition, and matériel were carried nightly, on foot and bicycle, from the border at the Yalu River to the three battle lines. On 25 late January, upon finding that the PVA had abandoned their battle lines, Ridgway ordered a reconnaissance-in-force, which became Operation Thunderbolt. A full-scale advance fully exploited the UN's air superiority, concluding with the UN forces reaching the Han River and recapturing Wonju.
Following the failure of ceasefire negotiations in January, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 498 on 1 February, condemning the PRC as an aggressor and calling upon its forces to withdraw from Korea.
In early February, the ROK 11th Division ran an operation to destroy guerrillas and pro-DPRK sympathizers in the South Gyeongsang Province. The division and police committed the Geochang and Sancheong–Hamyang massacres. In mid-February, the PVA counterattacked with the Fourth Phase Offensive and achieved victory at Hoengseong. However, the offensive was blunted by US IX Corps at Chipyong-ni in the center. The US 23rd Regimental Combat Team and French Battalion fought a short but desperate battle that broke the attack's momentum. The battle is sometimes known as the "Gettysburg of the Korean War": 5,600 U.S., and French troops were surrounded by 25,000 PVA. UN forces had previously retreated in the face of large PVA/KPA forces instead of getting cut off, but this time, they stood and won.
In the last two weeks of February 1951, Operation Thunderbolt was followed by Operation Killer, carried out by the revitalized Eighth Army. It was a full-scale, battlefront-length attack staged for maximum exploitation of firepower to kill as many KPA and PVA troops as possible. Operation Killer concluded with US I Corps re-occupying the territory south of the Han River, and IX Corps capturing Hoengseong. On 7 March the Eighth Army attacked with Operation Ripper, expelling the PVA and the KPA from Seoul on 14 March. This was the fourth and final conquest of the city in a year, leaving it a ruin; the 1.5 million pre-war population was down to 200,000 and people were suffering from food shortages.
On 6 March MacArthur gave a press conference at Suwon where he stated "Assuming no diminution of the enemy’s flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical stalemate." No one in Washington disputed MacArthur’s prediction that a stalemate could develop out of the conditions obtaining. But a military victory, because of the commitments and risks an attempt to achieve it would entail, was no longer considered a practical objective. The preferred course, preferred because it would be consistent with the greater strategy and ongoing preparations against the possibility of world war, was to seek a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of Korean issues. On 12 March Ridgway gave his own press conference at his command post at Yoju stating that regaining the 38th parallel would be a "tremendous victory" for the Eighth Army. It would mean that the encroachment of communism in Korea had been stopped - exactly what the UNC had set out to accomplish. Conversely, if the Chinese failed to drive the UNC out of Korea, they would have "failed monumentally." In any case, he emphasized, "we didn't set out to conquer China."
In late April, Peng sent his deputy, Hong Xuezhi, to brief Zhou in Beijing. What Chinese soldiers feared, Hong said, was not the enemy, but having no food, bullets, or trucks to transport them to the rear when they were wounded. Zhou attempted to respond to the PVA's logistical concerns by increasing Chinese production and improving supply methods, but these were never sufficient. Large-scale air defense training programs were carried out and the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) began participating in the war from September 1951 onward. The Fourth Phase Offensive had failed to match the achievements of the Second Phase or the limited gains of the Third Phase. The UN forces, after earlier defeats and retraining, proved much harder to infiltrate by Chinese light infantry than in previous months. From 31 January to 21 April, the Chinese suffered 53,000 casualties.
On 11 April Truman relieved General MacArthur as supreme commander in Korea for several reasons. MacArthur had crossed the 38th parallel in the mistaken belief the Chinese would not enter the war, leading to major allied losses. He believed the use of nuclear weapons should be his decision, not the president's. MacArthur threatened to destroy China unless it surrendered. While MacArthur felt total victory was the only honorable outcome, Truman was more pessimistic about his chances once involved in a larger war, feeling a truce and orderly withdrawal could be a valid solution. MacArthur was the subject of congressional hearings in May and June 1951, which determined he had defied the orders of the president and thus violated the US Constitution. A popular criticism of MacArthur was he never spent a night in Korea and directed the war from the safety of Tokyo.
Ridgway was appointed supreme commander, and he regrouped the UN forces for successful counterattacks while General James Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army. Further attacks depleted the PVA and KPA forces; Operations Courageous (23–28 March) and Tomahawk (23 March) (a combat jump by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team) were joint ground and airborne infiltrations meant to trap PVA forces between Kaesong and Seoul. UN forces advanced to the Kansas Line, north of the 38th parallel.
The PVA counterattacked in April 1951, with the Fifth Phase Offensive, with three field armies (700,000 men). The first thrust of the offensive fell upon I Corps, which fiercely resisted in the Battle of the Imjin River (22–25 April) and Battle of Kapyong (22–25 April), blunting the impetus of the offensive, which was halted at the No-name Line north of Seoul. Casualty ratios were grievously disproportionate; Peng had expected a 1:1 or 2:1 ratio, but instead, Chinese combat casualties from 22 to 29 April totaled between 40,000 and 60,000 compared to only 4,000 for the UN—a ratio between 10:1 and 15:1. By the time Peng had called off the attack in the western sector on 29 April, the three participating armies had lost a third of their front-line combat strength within a week. On 15 May the PVA commenced the second impulse of the spring offensive and attacked the ROK and U.S. X Corps in the east at the Soyang River. Approximately 370,000 PVA and 114,000 KPA troops had been mobilized, with the bulk attacking in the eastern sector, with about a quarter attempting to pin the I Corps and IX Corps in the western sector. After initial success, they were halted by 20 May and repulsed over the following days, with Western histories generally designating 22 May as the end of the offensive.
At month's end, the Chinese planned the third step of the Fifth Phase Offensive (withdrawal), which they estimated would take 10-15 days to complete for their 340,000 remaining men, and set the date for the night of 23 May. They were caught off guard when the Eighth Army counterattacked and regained the Kansas Line on the morning of 12 May, 23 hours before the expected withdrawal. The surprise attack turned the retreat into "the most severe loss since our forces had entered Korea"; between 16-23 May, the PVA suffered another 45,000 to 60,000 casualties before their soldiers managed to evacuate. The Fifth Phase Offensive as a whole had cost the PVA 102,000 soldiers (85,000 killed/wounded, 17,000 captured), with significant losses for the KPA.
The end of the Fifth Phase Offensive preceded the start of the UN May–June 1951 counteroffensive. During the counteroffensive, the US-led coalition captured land up to about 10 km (6 mi) north of the 38th parallel, with most forces stopping at the Kansas Line and a minority going further to the Wyoming Line. PVA and KPA forces suffered greatly, especially in the Chuncheon sector and at Chiam-ni and Hwacheon; in the latter sector alone the PVA/KPA suffered over 73,207 casualties, including 8,749 captured, compared to 2,647 total casualties of the IX Corps.
The halt at the Kansas Line and offensive action stand-down began the stalemate that lasted until the armistice of 1953. The disastrous failure of the Fifth Phase Offensive (which Peng recalled as one of only four mistakes he made in his military career) "led Chinese leaders to change their goal from driving the UNF out of Korea to merely defending China's security and ending the war through negotiations".
Stalemate (July 1951–July 1953)
For the rest of the war, the UN and the PVA/KPA fought but exchanged little territory. Large-scale bombing of North Korea continued, and protracted armistice negotiations began on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong in the North. On the Chinese side, Zhou directed peace talks, and Li Kenong and Qiao Guanghua headed the negotiation team. Combat continued; the goal of the UN forces was to recapture all of South Korea and avoid losing territory. The PVA and the KPA attempted similar operations and later effected military and psychological operations to test the UN Command's resolve to continue the war.
The sides constantly traded artillery fire along the front, with American-led forces possessing a large firepower advantage over Chinese-led forces. In the last three months of 1952 the UN fired 3,553,518 field gun shells and 2,569,941 mortar shells, while the communists fired 377,782 field gun shells and 672,194 mortar shells: a 5.8:1 ratio. The communist insurgency, reinvigorated by North Korean support and scattered bands of KPA stragglers, resurged in the south.
In the autumn of 1951, Van Fleet ordered Major General Paik Sun-yup to break the back of guerrilla activity. The UN's limited offensive (31 August – 12 November) to shorten and straighten sections of the lines, acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage points, saw heavy fighting by UN forces, with I Corps and X Corps making limited tactical advances against PVA and KPA forces. The campaign resulted in approximately 60,000 casualties, including 22,000 Americans. The intense battles at Bloody Ridge, the Punchbowl and Heartbreak Ridge underscored the challenges of penetrating the Chinese "active defense." Despite PVA/KPA losses of 100,000–150,000 troops, these were not crippling, and the PVA forces remained resolute. By November, the UNC abandoned major offensive operations, and the PVA launched counterattacks with some success.
From December 1951 to March 1952, ROK security forces claimed to have killed 11,090 partisans and sympathizers and captured 9,916 more.
PVA troops suffered from deficient military equipment, logistical problems, overextended communication and supply lines, and the constant threat of UN bombers. These factors led to a rate of Chinese casualties far greater than the casualties suffered by UN troops. The situation became so serious that in November 1951 Zhou called a conference in Shenyang to discuss the PVA's logistical problems. It was decided to accelerate the construction of railways and airfields, to increase the trucks available to the army, and to improve air defense by any means possible. These commitments did little to address the problems.
In the months after the Shenyang conference, Peng went to Beijing several times to brief Mao and Zhou about the heavy casualties and the increasing difficulty of keeping front lines supplied with basic necessities. Peng was convinced the war would be protracted and that neither side would be able to achieve victory in the near future. On 24 February 1952, the Military Commission, presided over by Zhou, discussed the PVA's logistical problems with members of government agencies. After government representatives emphasized their inability to meet the war demands, Peng shouted: "You have this and that problem... You should go to the front and see with your own eyes what food and clothing the soldiers have! Not to speak of the casualties! For what are they giving their lives? We have no aircraft. We have only a few guns. Transports are not protected. More and more soldiers are dying of starvation. Can't you overcome some of your difficulties?" The atmosphere became so tense Zhou was forced to adjourn the conference. Zhou called a series of meetings, where it was agreed the PVA would be divided into three groups, to be dispatched to Korea in shifts; to accelerate training of pilots; to provide more anti-aircraft guns to front lines; to purchase more military equipment and ammunition from the Soviet Union; to provide the army with more food and clothing; and to transfer the responsibility of logistics to the central government.
With peace negotiations ongoing, the Chinese attempted a final offensive in the final weeks of the war to capture territory: on 10 June, 30,000 Chinese troops struck South Korean and U.S. divisions on a 13 km (8 mi) front, and on 13 July, 80,000 Chinese soldiers struck the east-central Kumsong sector, with the brunt of their attack falling on 4 South Korean divisions. The Chinese had success in penetrating South Korean lines but failed to capitalize, particularly when US forces responded with overwhelming firepower. Chinese casualties in their final major offensive (above normal wastage for the front) were about 72,000, including 25,000 killed compared to 14,000 for the UN (most were South Koreans, 1,611 were Americans).
While Chinese forces grappled with significant logistical and supply difficulties, the stalemate also stemmed from mounting frustrations within the UNC. Despite superior firepower, the war proved difficult to fight and the US public was becoming impatient of a war that was lacking a victory. By mid-1951, the stalemate had worn away Truman's public approval, and political pressures mounted on the Truman administration to seek an end to the fighting. On 29 November 1952 U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Korea to learn what might end the war. Eisenhower took office on 20 January 1953 and his administration prioritized containment over rollback and sought to reduce American involvement in the conflict, contributing to the later armistice.
Armistice (July 1953–November 1954)
Main article: Korean Armistice AgreementThe on-again, off-again armistice negotiations continued for two years, first at Kaesong, then Panmunjom. A problematic point was prisoner of war repatriation. The PVA, KPA and UN Command could not agree on a system of repatriation because many PVA and KPA soldiers refused to be repatriated back to the north, which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Koreans. A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was set up to handle the matter.
Stalin died on 5 March. The new Soviet leaders, engaged in their internal power struggle, had no desire to continue supporting China's efforts and called for an end to the hostilities. China could not continue without Soviet aid, and North Korea was no longer a major player. Armistice talks entered a new phase. With UN acceptance of India's proposed Korean War armistice, the KPA, PVA and UN Command signed the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to sign. The war ended at this point, even though there was no peace treaty. North Korea nevertheless claims it won the war.
Under the agreement, the belligerents established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which mostly follows the 38th parallel. In the eastern part, the DMZ runs north of the 38th parallel; to the west, it travels south of it. Kaesong, site of the initial negotiations, was in pre-war South Korea but is now part of North Korea. The DMZ has since been patrolled by the KPA and the ROKA, with the US still operating as the UN Command.
Operation Glory was conducted from July to November 1954, to allow combatants to exchange their dead. The remains of 4,167 US Army and US Marine Corps dead were exchanged for 13,528 KPA and PVA dead, and 546 civilians dead in UN POW camps were delivered to the South Korean government. After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War unknown soldiers were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, on Oahu, Hawaii. Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) records indicate the PRC and North Korea transmitted 1,394 names, of which 858 were correct. From 4,167 containers of returned remains, forensic examination identified 4,219 individuals. Of these, 2,944 were identified as from the US, and all but 416 were identified by name. From 1996 to 2006, North Korea recovered 220 remains near the Sino-Korean border.
Continued division (1954–present)
See also: Korean Demilitarized ZoneThe Armistice Agreement provided for monitoring by an international commission. Since 1953, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, composed of members from the Swiss and Swedish armed forces, has been stationed near the DMZ.
In April 1975, South Vietnam's capital of Saigon was captured by the People's Army of Vietnam. Encouraged by that communist success, Kim Il Sung saw it as an opportunity to invade South Korea. Kim visited China in April 1975 and met with Mao and Zhou to ask for military aid. Despite Pyongyang's expectations, Beijing refused to help North Korea in another war.
Since the armistice, there have been incursions and acts of aggression by North Korea. From 1966 to 1969, many cross-border incursions took place in what has been referred to as the Korean DMZ Conflict or Second Korean War. In 1968, a North Korean commando team unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee in the Blue House Raid. In 1976, the Korean axe murder incident was widely publicized. Since 1974, 4 incursion tunnels leading to Seoul have been uncovered. In 2010, a North Korean submarine torpedoed and sank the South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan, resulting in the deaths of 46 sailors. Again in 2010, North Korea fired artillery shells on Yeonpyeong island, killing 2 military personnel and 2 civilians.
After a new wave of UN sanctions, on 11 March 2013, North Korea claimed that the armistice had become invalid. On 13 March, North Korea confirmed it ended the Armistice and declared North Korea "is not restrained by the North-South declaration on non-aggression". On 30 March, North Korea stated it entered a "state of war" and "the long-standing situation of the Korean peninsula being neither at peace nor at war is finally over". Speaking on 4 April, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that Pyongyang "formally informed" the Pentagon that it "ratified" the potential use of a nuclear weapon against South Korea, Japan and the US, including Guam and Hawaii. Hagel stated the US would deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system to Guam because of a credible and realistic nuclear threat.
In 2016, it was revealed North Korea approached the US about conducting formal peace talks to end the war officially. While the White House agreed to secret peace talks, the plan was rejected because North Korea refused to discuss nuclear disarmament as part of the treaty. In 2018, it was announced that North Korea and South Korea agreed to talk to end the conflict. They committed themselves to the complete denuclearization of the Peninsula. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in signed the Panmunjom Declaration. In September 2021, Moon reiterated his call to end the war formally, in a speech at the UN.
Casualties
About 3 million people were killed in the war, mostly civilians, making it perhaps the deadliest conflict of the Cold War era. Samuel Kim lists the war as the deadliest conflict in East Asia—the region most affected by armed conflict related to the Cold War. Though only rough estimates of civilian fatalities are available, scholars have noted that the percentage of civilian casualties in Korea was higher than World War II or the Vietnam War, with Bruce Cumings putting civilian casualties at 2 million and Guenter Lewy in the range of 2-3 million.
Cumings states that civilians represent at least half the war's casualties, while Lewy suggests it may have gone as high as 70%, compared to his estimates of 42% in World War II and 30%–46% in Vietnam. Data compiled by the Peace Research Institute Oslo lists just under 1 million battle deaths over the war and a mid-estimate of 3 million total deaths, attributing the difference to excess mortality among civilians from one-sided massacres, starvation, and disease. Compounding this devastation for civilians, virtually all major cities on the Peninsula were destroyed. In per capita and absolute terms, North Korea was the most devastated by the war. According to Charles K. Armstrong, the war resulted in the death of an estimated 12%–15% of the North Korean population (c. 10 million), "a figure close to or surpassing the proportion of Soviet citizens killed in World War II".
Military
See also: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States See also: China, North Korea, and Soviet UnionSouth Korea reported some 137,899 military deaths and 24,495 missing, 450,742 wounded, 8,343 POW. The US suffered 33,686 battle deaths, 7,586 missing, along with 2,830 non-battle deaths. There were 17,730 other non-battle US military deaths that occurred outside Korea during the same period that were erroneously included as war deaths until 2000. The US suffered 103,284 wounded in action. UN losses, excluding those of the US or South Korea, amounted to 4,141 dead and 12,044 wounded in action.
American combat casualties were over 90% of non-Korean UN losses. US battle deaths were 8,516 up to their first engagement with the Chinese on 1 November 1950. The first four months prior to the Chinese intervention were by far the bloodiest per day for US forces, as they engaged the well-equipped KPA in intense fighting. American medical records show that from July to October 1950, the army sustained 31% of the combat deaths it ultimately incurred in the entire 37-month war. The US spent US$30 billion on the war. Some 1,789,000 American soldiers served in the war, accounting for 31% of the 5,720,000 Americans who served on active duty worldwide from June 1950 to July 1953.
Deaths from non-American UN militaries totaled 3,730, with another 379 missing.
Details- United Kingdom:
1,109 dead
2,674 wounded
179 MIA
977 POW - Turkey:
741 dead
2,068 wounded
163 MIA
244 POW - Canada:
516 dead
1,042 wounded
1 MIA
33 POW - Australia:
339 dead
1,216 wounded
43 MIA
26 POW - France:
262 dead
1,008 wounded
7 MIA
12 POW - Greece
192 dead
543 wounded
3 POW - Colombia:
163 dead
448 wounded
28 POW - Thailand:
129 dead
1,139 wounded
5 MIA - Ethiopia
121 dead
536 wounded - Netherlands:
122 dead
645 wounded
3 MIA - Belgium:
101 dead
478 wounded
5 MIA
1 POW - Philippines:
92 dead
299 wounded
97 MIA/POW - Japan:
79 dead - South Africa:
34 dead
9 POW - New Zealand:
34 dead
299 wounded
1 MIA/POW - Norway:
3 dead - Luxembourg:
2 dead
13 wounded - India:
1 dead
Chinese sources reported that the PVA suffered 114,000 battle deaths, 21,000 deaths from wounds, 13,000 deaths from illness, 340,000 wounded, and 7,600 missing. 7,110 Chinese POWs were repatriated to China. In 2010, the Chinese government revised their official tally of war losses to 183,108 dead (114,084 in combat, 70,000 deaths from wounds, illness and other causes) and 21,374 POW, 25,621 missing. Overall, 73% of Chinese infantry troops served in Korea (25 of 34 armies, or 79 of 109 infantry divisions, were rotated in). More than 52% of the Chinese air force, 55% of the tank units, 67% of the artillery divisions, and 100% of the railroad engineering divisions were sent to Korea as well. Chinese soldiers who served in Korea faced a greater chance of being killed than those who served in World War II or the Chinese Civil War. China spent over 10 billion yuan on the war (roughly US$3.3 billion), not counting USSR aid. This included $1.3 billion in money owed to the Soviet Union by the end of it. This was a relatively large cost, as China had only 4% of the national income of the US. Spending on the war constituted 34–43% of China's annual government budget from 1950 to 1953, depending on the year. Despite its underdeveloped economy, Chinese military spending was the world's fourth largest globally for most of the war after that of the US, the Soviet Union, and the UK; however, by 1953, with the winding down of the Korean War and the escalation of the First Indochina War, French spending also surpassed Chinese spending by about a third.
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, North Korean military losses totaled 294,151 dead, 91,206 missing, and 229,849 wounded, giving North Korea the highest military deaths of any belligerent in absolute and relative terms. The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset gave a similar figure for North Korean military deaths of 316,579. Chinese sources reported similar figures for the North Korean military of 290,000 "casualties" and 90,000 captured. The financial cost of the war for North Korea was massive in direct losses and lost economic activity; the country was devastated by the cost of the war and the American strategic bombing campaign, which, among other things, destroyed 85% of North Korea's buildings and 95% of its power generation. The Soviet Union suffered 299 dead, with 335 planes lost.
The Chinese and North Koreans estimated that about 390,000 soldiers from the US, 660,000 soldiers from South Korea and 29,000 other UN soldiers were "eliminated" from the battlefield. Western sources estimate the PVA suffered about 400,000 killed and 486,000 wounded, while the KPA suffered 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded, and over 101,000 captured or missing. Cumings cites a much higher figure of 900,000 fatalities among Chinese soldiers.
Civilian
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, there were over 750,000 confirmed violent civilians deaths during the war, another million civilians were pronounced missing, and millions more ended up as refugees. Estimates of the number of civilians killed in the entire war range from 244,000 to 990,000 for South Korea. The North Korean government has never published estimates of civilian deaths in the war, but more than one million killed has been an estimate common among historians who have studied the Korean War. Over 1.5 million North Koreans fled to the South.
War crimes
Main article: War crimes in the Korean WarThere were numerous atrocities and massacres of civilians throughout the Korean War committed by both sides, starting in the war's first days. In 2005–2010, a South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigated atrocities and other human rights violations through much of the 20th century, from the Japanese colonial period through the Korean War and beyond. It excavated some mass graves from the Bodo League massacres and confirmed the general outlines of those political executions. Of the Korean War-era massacres the commission was petitioned to investigate, 82% were perpetrated by South Korean forces, with 18% perpetrated by North Korean forces.
The commission also received petitions alleging more than 200 large-scale killings of South Korean civilians by the U.S. military during the war, mostly air attacks. It confirmed several such cases, including refugees crowded into a cave attacked with napalm bombs, which survivors said killed 360 people, and an air attack that killed 197 refugees gathered in a field in the far south. It recommended South Korea seek reparations from the United States, but in 2010, a reorganized commission under a new, conservative government concluded that most U.S. mass killings resulted from "military necessity", while in a small number of cases, they concluded, the U.S. military had acted with "low levels of unlawfulness", but the commission recommended against seeking reparations.
Almost every substantial building in North Korea was destroyed during the war. The war's highest-ranking U.S. POW, Major General William F. Dean, reported that the majority of North Korean cities and villages he saw were either rubble or snow-covered wasteland. North Korean factories, schools, hospitals, and government offices were forced to move underground, and air defenses were "non-existent". North Korea ranks as among the most heavily bombed countries in history, and the U.S. dropped a total of 635,000 tons of bombs (including 32,557 tons of napalm) on Korea, more than during the entire Pacific War. By the end of the war, eighteen of the twenty-two major cities in North Korea had been at least half obliterated according to damage assessments by the U.S. Air Force. During a Senate hearing in the spring of 1951, MacArthur expressed his horror at the devastation that the war was inflicting on the Koreans, describing it as the worst he had ever seen in his military career. As the most humane solution, MacArthur suggested that the war should be escalated in order to bring it to an end sooner.
Characteristics
U.S. unpreparedness
In postwar analysis of the unpreparedness of US forces deployed during the summer and fall of 1950, Army Major General Floyd L. Parks stated "Many who never lived to tell the tale had to fight the full range of ground warfare from offensive to delaying action, unit by unit, man by man ... hat we were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat ... does not relieve us from the blame of having placed our own flesh and blood in such a predicament."
By 1950, US Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson had established a policy of faithfully following Truman's defense economization plans and aggressively attempted to implement it, even in the face of steadily increasing external threats. He consequently received much of the blame for the initial setbacks and widespread reports of ill-equipped and inadequately trained military forces in the war's early stages.
As an initial response to the invasion, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could be imposed only "on paper" since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request. Army officials, desperate for weaponry, recovered Sherman tanks and other equipment from Pacific War battlefields and reconditioned them for shipment to Korea. Army ordnance officials at Fort Knox pulled down M26 Pershing tanks from display pedestals around Fort Knox in order to equip the third company of the Army's hastily formed 70th Tank Battalion. Without adequate numbers of tactical fighter-bomber aircraft, the Air Force took F-51 (P-51) propeller-driven aircraft out of storage or from existing Air National Guard squadrons and rushed them into front-line service. A shortage of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel resulted in improvised repairs and overhauls. A Navy helicopter pilot aboard an active duty warship recalled fixing damaged rotor blades with masking tape in the absence of spares.
U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard infantry soldiers and new inductees (called to duty to fill out understrength infantry divisions) found themselves short of nearly everything needed to repel the North Korean forces: artillery, ammunition, heavy tanks, ground-support aircraft, even effective anti-tank weapons such as the M20 3.5-inch (89 mm) "Super Bazooka". Some Army combat units sent to Korea were supplied with worn-out, "red-lined" M1 rifles or carbines in immediate need of ordnance depot overhaul or repair. Only the Marine Corps, whose commanders had stored and maintained their World War II surplus inventories of equipment and weapons, proved ready for deployment, though they still were woefully understrength, as well as in need of suitable landing craft to practice amphibious operations (Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had transferred most of the remaining craft to the Navy and reserved them for use in training Army units).
Armored warfare
The initial assault by KPA forces was aided by the use of Soviet T-34-85 tanks. A KPA tank corps equipped with about 120 T-34s spearheaded the invasion. These faced an ROK that had few anti-tank weapons adequate to deal with the T-34s. Additional Soviet armor was added as the offensive progressed. The KPA tanks had a good deal of early successes against ROK infantry, Task Force Smith, and the U.S. M24 Chaffee light tanks that they encountered. Interdiction by ground attack aircraft was the only means of slowing the advancing KPA armor. The tide turned in favor of the UN forces in August 1950 when the KPA suffered major tank losses during a series of battles in which the UN forces brought heavier equipment to bear, including American M4A3 Sherman and M26 medium tanks, alongside British Centurion, Churchill and Cromwell tanks.
The Incheon landings on 15 September cut off the KPA supply lines, causing their armored forces and infantry to run out of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of this and the Pusan perimeter breakout, the KPA had to retreat, and many of the T-34s and heavy weapons had to be abandoned. By the time the KPA withdrew from the South, 239 T-34s and 74 SU-76 self-propelled guns were lost. After November 1950, KPA armor was rarely encountered.
Following the initial assault by the North, the Korean War saw limited use of tanks and featured no large-scale tank battles. The mountainous, forested terrain, especially in the eastern central zone, was poor tank country, limiting their mobility. Through the last two years of the war in Korea, UN tanks served largely as infantry support and mobile artillery pieces.
Naval warfare
Further information: List of US Navy ships sunk or damaged in action during the Korean WarNaval engagements of the Korean War (1950–1953) and post-armistice incidents | |
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Because neither Korea had a significant navy, the war featured few naval battles. A skirmish between North Korea and the UN Command occurred on 2 July 1950; the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Juneau, the Royal Navy cruiser HMS Jamaica and the Royal Navy frigate HMS Black Swan fought four North Korean torpedo boats and two mortar gunboats, and sank them. USS Juneau later sank several ammunition ships that had been present. The last sea battle of the Korean War occurred days before the Battle of Incheon; the ROK ship PC-703 sank a North Korean minelayer in the Battle of Haeju Island, near Incheon. Three other supply ships were sunk by PC-703 two days later in the Yellow Sea.
During most of the war, the UN navies patrolled the west and east coasts of North Korea, sinking supply and ammunition ships and denying the North Koreans the ability to resupply from the sea. Aside from very occasional gunfire from North Korean shore batteries, the main threat to UN navy ships was from magnetic mines. During the war, five U.S. Navy ships were lost to mines: two minesweepers, two minesweeper escorts, and one ocean tug. Mines and coastal artillery damaged another 87 U.S. warships.
Aerial warfare
Further information: USAF units and aircraft of the Korean War and Bombing of North KoreaThe war was the first in which jet aircraft played the central role in air combat. Once-formidable fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, F4U Corsair, and Hawker Sea Fury—all piston-engined, propeller-driven, and designed during World War II—relinquished their air-superiority roles to a new generation of faster, jet-powered fighters arriving in the theater. For the initial months of the war, the P-80 Shooting Star, F9F Panther, Gloster Meteor, and other jets under the UN flag dominated the Korean People's Air Force (KPAF) propeller-driven Soviet Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-9s. By early August 1950, the KPAF was reduced to only about 20 planes.
The Chinese intervention in late October 1950 bolstered the KPAF with the MiG-15, one of the world's most advanced jet fighters. The USAF countered the MiG-15 by sending over three squadrons of its most capable fighter, the F-86 Sabre. These arrived in December 1950. The Soviet Union denied the involvement of their personnel in anything other than an advisory role, but air combat quickly resulted in Soviet pilots dropping their code signals and speaking over the radio in Russian. This known direct Soviet participation was a casus belli that the UN Command deliberately overlooked, lest the war expand to include the Soviet Union and potentially escalate into atomic warfare.
After the war and to the present day, the USAF reported an inflated F-86 Sabre kill ratio in excess of 10:1, with 792 MiG-15s and 108 other aircraft shot down by Sabres, and 78 Sabres lost to enemy fire. The Soviet Air Force reported some 1,100 air-to-air victories and 335 MiG combat losses, while China's PLAAF reported 231 combat losses, mostly MiG-15s, and 168 other aircraft lost. The KPAF reported no data, but the UN Command estimates some 200 KPAF aircraft lost in the war's first stage, and 70 additional aircraft after the Chinese intervention. The USAF disputes Soviet and Chinese claims of 650 and 211 downed F-86s, respectively.
More modern American estimates place the overall USAF kill ratio at around 1.8:1 with the ratio dropping to 1.3:1 against MiG-15s with Soviet pilots but increasing to a dominant 12:1 against Chinese and North Korean adversaries.
Reports by Lieutenant General Sidor Slyusarev, commander of Soviet air forces in Korea, are more favorable to the communist side. The 64th Corps claimed a total 1,097 enemy aircraft of all types during operations, for the loss of 335 aircraft (including lost to enemy ground fire, accidents, etc) and 110 pilots. Soviet reports put the overall kill ratio at 3.4:1 in favor of Soviet pilots. As reported, effectiveness of the Soviet fighters declined as the war progressed. from an overall kill ratio of 7.9:1 from November 1950 through January 1952, declining to 2.2:1 in later 1952 and 1.9:1 in 1953. This was because more advanced jet fighters appeared on the UN side as well as improved U.S. tactics.
Regardless of the actual ratio, American Sabres were very effective at controlling the skies over Korea. Since no other UN fighter could contend with the MiG-15, F-86s largely took over air combat once they arrived, relegating other aircraft to air-to-ground operations. Despite much greater numbers (the number of Sabres in theater never exceeded 150 while MiG-15s reached 900 at their peak), communist aircraft were seldom encountered south of Pyongyang. UN ground forces, supply lines, and infrastructure were not attacked from the air. Although North Korea had 75 airfields capable of supporting MiGs, after 1951, any serious effort to operate from them was abandoned. The MiGs were instead based across the Yalu River in the safety of China. This confined most air-to-air engagements to MiG Alley. UN aircraft had free rein to conduct strike missions over enemy territory with little fear of interception. Although jet dogfights are remembered as a prominent part of the Korean War, counter-air missions comprised just 12% of Far East Air Forces sorties, and four times as many sorties were performed for close air support and interdiction.
The war marked a major milestone not only for fixed-wing aircraft, but also for rotorcraft, featuring the first large-scale deployment of helicopters for medical evacuation (medevac). In 1944–45, during World War II, the YR-4 helicopter had seen limited ambulance duty. In Korea, where rough terrain prevented use of the jeep as a speedy medevac vehicle, helicopters like the Sikorsky H-19 were heavily used. This helped reduce fatal casualties to a dramatic degree when combined with complementary medical innovations such as Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH). As such, the medical evacuation and care system for the wounded was so effective for the UN forces that a wounded soldier who arrived at a MASH unit alive typically had a 97% chance of survival. The limitations of jet aircraft for close air support highlighted the helicopter's potential in the role, leading to the development of the helicopter gunships used in the Vietnam War.
U.S. threat of atomic warfare
On 5 November 1950, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders for the retaliatory atomic bombing of Manchurian PRC military bases, if either of their armies crossed into Korea or if PRC or KPA bombers attacked Korea from there. President Truman ordered the transfer of nine Mark 4 nuclear bombs "to the Air Force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons ... signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets", which he never transmitted.
Many U.S. officials viewed the deployment of nuclear-capable (but not nuclear-armed) B-29 bombers to Britain as helping to resolve the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949. Truman and Eisenhower both had military experience and viewed nuclear weapons as potentially usable components of their military. During Truman's first meeting to discuss the war on 25 June 1950, he ordered plans be prepared for attacking Soviet forces if they entered the war. By July, Truman approved another B-29 deployment to Britain, this time with bombs (but without their cores), to remind the Soviets of U.S. offensive ability. Deployment of a similar fleet to Guam was leaked to The New York Times. As UN forces retreated to Pusan, and the CIA reported that mainland China was building up forces for a possible invasion of Taiwan, the Pentagon believed that Congress and the public would demand using nuclear weapons if the situation in Korea required them.
As PVA forces pushed back the UN forces from the Yalu River, Truman stated during a 30 November 1950 press conference that using nuclear weapons was "always active consideration", with control under the local military commander. Indian ambassador K. Madhava Panikkar reports "that Truman announced he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed unmoved by this threat ... The PRC's propaganda against the U.S. was stepped up. The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was made the slogan for increased production, greater national integration, and more rigid control over anti-national activities. One could not help feeling that Truman's threat came in useful to the leaders of the Revolution, to enable them to keep up the tempo of their activities."
After his statement caused concern in Europe, Truman met on 4 December with UK Prime Minister and Commonwealth spokesman Clement Attlee, French Premier René Pleven, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to discuss their worries about atomic warfare and its likely continental expansion. The U.S.' forgoing atomic warfare was not because of "a disinclination by the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China to escalate ", but because UN allies—notably the UK, the Commonwealth, and France—were concerned about a geopolitical imbalance rendering NATO defenseless while the U.S. fought China, who then might persuade the Soviet Union to conquer Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to tell Attlee that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons only if necessary to protect an evacuation of UN troops, or to prevent a "major military disaster".
On 6 December after the Chinese intervention repelled the UN armies from northern North Korea, General J. Lawton Collins (Army Chief of Staff), General MacArthur, Admiral C. Turner Joy, General George E. Stratemeyer and staff officers Major General Doyle Hickey, Major General Charles A. Willoughby and Major General Edwin K. Wright met in Tokyo to plan strategy countering the Chinese intervention; they considered three potential atomic warfare scenarios encompassing the next weeks and months of warfare.
- In the first scenario: If the PVA continued attacking in full and the UN Command was forbidden to blockade and bomb China, and without Taiwanese reinforcements, and without an increase in U.S. forces until April 1951 (four National Guard divisions were due to arrive), then atomic bombs might be used in North Korea.
- In the second scenario: If the PVA continued full attacks and the UN Command blockaded China and had effective aerial reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese interior, and the Taiwanese soldiers were maximally exploited, and tactical atomic bombing was to hand, then the UN forces could hold positions deep in North Korea.
- In the third scenario: if China agreed not to cross the 38th parallel border, MacArthur would recommend UN acceptance of an armistice disallowing PVA and KPA troops south of the parallel, and requiring PVA and KPA guerrillas to withdraw northwards. The Eighth Army would remain to protect the Seoul–Incheon area, while X Corps would retreat to Pusan. A UN commission should supervise implementation of the armistice.
Both the Pentagon and the State Department were cautious about using nuclear weapons because of the risk of general war with China and the diplomatic ramifications. Truman and his senior advisors agreed and never seriously considered using them in early December 1950 despite the poor military situation in Korea.
In 1951, the U.S. escalated closest to atomic warfare in Korea. Because China deployed new armies to the Sino-Korean frontier, ground crews at the Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, assembled atomic bombs for Korean warfare, "lacking only the essential pit nuclear cores." In October 1951, the United States effected Operation Hudson Harbor to establish a nuclear weapons capability. USAF B-29 bombers practiced individual bombing runs from Okinawa to North Korea (using dummy nuclear or conventional bombs), coordinated from Yokota Air Base in east-central Japan. Hudson Harbor tested "actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming". The bombing run data indicated that atomic bombs would be tactically ineffective against massed infantry, because the "timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare".
Ridgway was authorized to use nuclear weapons if a major air attack originated from outside Korea. An envoy was sent to Hong Kong to deliver a warning to China. The message likely caused Chinese leaders to be more cautious about potential U.S. use of nuclear weapons, but whether they learned about the B-29 deployment is unclear, and the failure of the two major Chinese offensives that month likely was what caused them to shift to a defensive strategy in Korea. The B-29s returned to the United States in June.
Despite the greater destructive power that atomic weapons would bring to the war, their effects on determining the war's outcome would have likely been minimal. Tactically, given the dispersed nature of PVA/KPA forces, the relatively primitive infrastructure for staging and logistics centers, and the small number of bombs available (most would have been conserved for use against the Soviets), atomic attacks would have limited effects against the ability of China to mobilize and move forces. Strategically, attacking Chinese cities to destroy civilian industry and infrastructure would cause the immediate dispersion of the leadership away from such areas and give propaganda value for the communists to galvanize the support of Chinese civilians. Since the Soviets were not expected to intervene with their few primitive atomic weapons on China or North Korea's behalf, the threat of a possible nuclear exchange was unimportant in the decision not to deploy atomic bombs; their use offered little operational advantage and would undesirably lower the "threshold" for using atomic weapons against non-nuclear states in future conflicts.
When Eisenhower succeeded Truman in early 1953, he was similarly cautious about using nuclear weapons in Korea. The administration prepared contingency plans to use them against China, but like Truman, he feared that doing so would result in Soviet attacks on Japan. The war ended as it began, without U.S. nuclear weapons deployed near battle.
Aftermath
Main articles: Aftermath of the Korean War and Korean reunificationNorth Korea
As a result of the war, "North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society". After the armistice, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet economic and industrial assistance. In September 1953, the Soviet government agreed to "cancel or postpone repayment for all ... outstanding debts", and promised to grant North Korea one billion rubles in monetary aid, industrial equipment and consumer goods. Eastern European members of the Soviet Bloc also contributed with "logistical support, technical aid, medical supplies". China canceled North Korea's war debts, provided 800 million yuan, promised trade cooperation and sent in thousands of troops to rebuild damaged infrastructure. Contemporary North Korea remains underdeveloped and continues to be a totalitarian dictatorship since the end of the war, with an elaborate cult of personality around the Kim dynasty.
Present-day North Korea follows Songun, or "military-first" policy and has the highest number of military and paramilitary personnel in the world, with 7,769,000 active, reserve and paramilitary personnel, or approximately 30% of its population. Its active-duty army of 1.28 million is the fourth largest in the world, after China, the United States and India; consisting of 4.9% of its population. North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. A 2014 UN inquiry into abuses of human rights in North Korea concluded that, "the gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world," with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch holding similar views.
South Korea
Postwar recovery was different in the two Koreas. South Korea, which started from a far lower industrial base than North Korea (the latter contained 80% of Korea's heavy industry in 1945), stagnated in the first postwar decade. In 1953, South Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty.
South Korean anti-Americanism after the war was fueled by the presence and behavior of United States Forces Korea military personnel and U.S. support for Park's authoritarian regime, a fact still evident during the country's democratic transition in the 1980s. However, anti-Americanism has declined significantly in South Korea in recent years, from 46% favorable in 2003 to 74% favorable in 2011, making South Korea one of the most pro-U.S. countries.
A large number of mixed-race "GI babies" (offspring of U.S. and other UN soldiers and Korean women) were filling up the country's orphanages. Because Korean traditional society places significant weight on paternal family ties, bloodlines, and purity of race, children of mixed race or those without fathers are not easily accepted in South Korean society. International adoption of Korean children began in 1954. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1952 legalized the naturalization of non-Blacks and non-Whites as U.S. citizens and made possible the entry of military spouses and children from South Korea. With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, which substantially changed U.S. immigration policy toward non-Europeans, Koreans became one of the fastest-growing Asian groups in the United States.
Communism
Mao Zedong's decision to take on the United States was a direct attempt to confront what the communist bloc viewed as the strongest anti-communist power in the world, undertaken at a time when the Chinese communist regime was still consolidating its own power. Mao supported intervention not to save North Korea, but because he believed that a military conflict with the U.S. was inevitable after the U.S. entered the war, and to appease the Soviet Union to secure military dispensation and achieve Mao's goal of making China a major world military power. Mao was equally ambitious in improving his own prestige inside the communist international community. In his later years, Mao believed that Stalin only gained a positive opinion of him after China's entrance into the Korean War. Inside mainland China, the war improved the long-term prestige of Mao, Zhou, and Peng, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to increase its legitimacy while weakening anti-communist dissent.
The Chinese government has encouraged the viewpoint that the war was initiated by the United States and South Korea, though ComIntern documents have shown that Mao sought approval from Stalin to enter the war. In Chinese media, the Chinese war effort is considered as an example of China's engaging the strongest power in the world with an underequipped army, forcing it to retreat, and fighting it to a military stalemate. These successes were contrasted with China's historical humiliations by Japan and by Western powers over the previous hundred years, highlighting the abilities of the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party. The most significant negative long-term consequence of the war for China was that it led the United States to guarantee the safety of Chiang Kaishek's regime in Taiwan, effectively ensuring that Taiwan would remain outside of PRC control through the present day. Anti-U.S. sentiments, which were already a significant factor during the Chinese Civil War, were ingrained into Chinese culture during the communist propaganda campaigns of the Korean War.
The Korean War affected other participant combatants. Turkey, for example, entered NATO in 1952, and the foundation was laid for bilateral diplomatic and trade relations with South Korea. The war also played a role in the refugee crisis in Turkey in 1950–1951.
See also
- Korean War in popular culture
- Korean–American Volunteer Group
- List of books about the Korean War
- List of Korean War Medal of Honor recipients
- List of Korean War weapons
- List of military equipment used in the Korean War
- Partisans in the Korean War
- Transfer of People's Volunteer Army soldiers' remains from South Korea to China
- UN Command Military Armistice Commission operating from 1953 to the present
- UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
- UN Temporary Commission on Korea
- United Service Organizations
War memorials
- Korean War Memorial Wall, Brampton, Ontario
- Korean War Veterans Memorial, Washington, D.C.
- Memorial of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Dandong, China
- National War Memorial (New Zealand)
- Philadelphia Korean War Memorial
- United Nations Memorial Cemetery, Busan, Republic of Korea
- Memorial of Turks Who Fought in Korea, Ankara, Turkey (in Turkish)
- Victorious War Museum, Pyongyang, North Korea
- War Memorial of Korea Yongsan-dong, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, South Korea
Notes
- On 9 July 1951 troop constituents were: US: 70.4%; ROK: 23.3%; other UNC: 6.3%.
- End of physical conflict and signing of an armistice. De jure, North and South Korea are still at war.
- the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea administered by the Soviets and the United States Army Military Government in Korea in the south
- At the time, China as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was represented by Taipei not Beijing. This prompted the Soviet Union's boycott of the UN and absence from the UNSC.
- See 50 U.S.C. S 1601: "All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive agency... as a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on 14 September 1976 are terminated two years from 14 September 1976."; Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1255 n.17 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Total Strength 602,902 troops
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Republic of Korea – 590,911
Colombia – 1,068
United States – 302,483
Belgium – 900
United Kingdom – 14,198
South Africa – 826
Canada – 6,146
Netherlands – 819
Turkey – 5,453
Luxembourg – 44
Australia – 2,282
Philippines – 1,496
New Zealand – 1,385
Thailand – 1,204
Ethiopia – 1,271
Greece – 1,263
France – 1,119 -
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- Matray, James I., and Donald W. Boose Jr, eds. The Ashgate research companion to the Korean War (2014) excerpt Archived 1 September 2021 at the Wayback Machine; covers historiography
- Matray, James I. "Conflicts in Korea" in Daniel S. Margolies, ed. A Companion to Harry S. Truman (2012) pp 498–531; emphasis on historiography.
- Millett, Allan R. (2007). The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography. The Essential Bibliography Series. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 978-1574889765.
- Mossman, Billy C. (1990). Ebb and Flow, November 1950 – July 1951. United States Army in the Korean War. Vol. 5. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC 16764325. Retrieved 3 May 2010. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- Perrett, Bryan (1987). Soviet Armour Since 1945. London: Blandford. ISBN 978-0713717358.
- Ravino, Jerry; Carty, Jack (2003). Flame Dragons of the Korean War. Paducah, KY: Turner.
- Rees, David (1964). Korea: The Limited War. New York: St Martin's. OCLC 1078693.
- Stein, R. Conrad (1994). The Korean War: "The Forgotten War". Hillside, NJ: Enslow Publishers. ISBN 978-0894905261.
- Stokesbury, James L (1990). A Short History of the Korean War. New York: Harper Perennial. ISBN 978-0688095130.
- Stueck, William W. (1995), The Korean War: An International History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691037677
- Stueck, William W. (2002), Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0691118475
- Weathersby, Kathryn (1993), Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–50: New Evidence From the Russian Archives, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 8, archived from the original on 25 February 2021, retrieved 21 April 2013
- Weathersby, Kathryn (2002), "Should We Fear This?" Stalin and the Danger of War with America, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 39, archived from the original on 25 February 2021, retrieved 21 April 2013
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (2005). Sabres Over MiG Alley. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1591149330.
- Zaloga, Steven J.; Kinnear, Jim; Aksenov, Andrey; Koshchavtsev, Aleksandr (1997). Soviet Tanks in Combat 1941–45: The T-28, T-34, T-34-85, and T-44 Medium Tanks. Armor at War. Hong Kong: Concord Publication. ISBN 9623616155.
- Zhang, Shu Guang (1995), Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 978-0700607235
External links
- Records of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (1950–1973) Archived 21 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine at the United Nations Archives
Historical
- THE KOREAN WAR (1) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1997 (E-BOOK) Archived 9 July 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- THE KOREAN WAR (1) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1997 (PDF) Archived 7 June 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- THE KOREAN WAR (2) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1998 (E-BOOK) Archived 9 July 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- THE KOREAN WAR (2) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1999 (PDF) Archived 7 June 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- THE KOREAN WAR (3) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1999 (E-BOOK) Archived 9 July 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- THE KOREAN WAR (3) - ROK Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 1998 (PDF) Archived 7 June 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People (PDF) The Research Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice: Truman on Acheson's Crucial Role in Going to War Archived 21 February 2015 at the Wayback Machine Shapell Manuscript Foundation
- Korean War resources, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Archived 26 June 2014 at the Wayback Machine
- North Korea International Documentation Project Archived 30 May 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- Grand Valley State University Veteran's History Project digital collection
- The Forgotten War, Remembered Archived 9 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine – four testimonials in The New York Times
- Collection of Books and Research Materials on the Korean War Archived 27 April 2021 at the Wayback Machine an online collection of the United States Army Center of Military History
- Korean War, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
- Koreanwar-educator.org Archived 14 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- The short film Film No. 927 is available for free viewing and download at the Internet Archive.
Media
- West Point Atlas of the Korean War Archived 16 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- The Korean War You Never Knew – slideshows by Life magazine
- U.S. Army Korea Media Center official Korean War online image archive Archived 8 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- Rare pictures of the Korean War from the U.S. Library of Congress and National Archives Archived 5 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine
- Land of the Morning Calm Canadians in Korea – multimedia project including veteran interviews
- Pathé Archived 6 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine Online newsreel archive featuring films on the war
- CBC Digital Archives – Forgotten Heroes: Canada and the Korean War Archived 8 November 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- Uncertain Enemies: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War Archived 15 August 2021 at the Wayback Machine. Air Power History. (Spring 1997). 44, 1, 32–45.
Organizations
- Korea Defense Veterans of America
- Korean War Ex-POW Association
- Korean War Veterans Association Archived 7 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- The Center for the Study of the Korean War
Memorials
- Korean Children's War Memorial Archived 4 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine
- Chinese 50th Anniversary Korean War Memorial Archived 26 February 2021 at the Wayback Machine
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