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{{short description|Sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent}}
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'''Reality''' is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within the ], as opposed to that which is only ], nonexistent or nonactual. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reality|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160926223327/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reality|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 26, 2016|title=reality {{!}} Definition of reality in English by Oxford Dictionaries|website=Oxford Dictionaries {{!}} English|access-date=2017-10-28}}</ref> In ] terms, reality is the totality of a system, known and unknown.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Saridakis |first=E. |date=2016 |title=Information, reality, and modern physics |journal=International Studies in the Philosophy of Science |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=327–341 |doi=10.1080/02698595.2017.1331980 |s2cid=126411165}}</ref>
'''Reality''', in everyday usage, means "the state of things as they actually exist." <ref>Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, Oxford University Press, 2005 (Full entry for ''reality'': "reality • noun (pl. realities) 1 the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them. 2 a thing that is actually experienced or seen. 3 the quality of being lifelike. 4 the state or quality of having existence or substance.")</ref> The term ''reality'', in its widest sense, includes everything that ], whether or not it is ] or ]. Reality in this sense may include both ] and ]ness, whereas '']'' is often restricted to being (compare with '']'').


Philosophical questions about the nature of reality or existence or being are considered under the ] of ], which is a major branch of ] in the Western philosophical tradition. Ontological questions also feature in diverse branches of ], including the ], ], ], and ]. These include questions about whether only physical objects are real (i.e., ]), whether reality is fundamentally immaterial (e.g. ]), whether hypothetical unobservable entities posited by scientific theories exist, whether a ] exist, whether numbers and other ] exist, and whether ]s exist. ] is concerned with what can be ] or inferred as ] and how, whereby in the modern world emphasis is put on ], ] and ] as sources and methods to determine or investigate reality.
In the strict sense of ], there are levels or gradation to the nature and ]ion of reality. These levels include, from the most ] to the most ]ous: ], ], ], and ].


== Phenomenological reality == == World views ==
On a much broader and more subjective level, the private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and selectivity involved in the personal interpretation of an event shapes reality as seen by one and only one individual and hence is called ]. This form of reality might be common to others as well, but at times could also be so unique to oneself as to be never experienced or agreed upon by any one else. Much of the kind of experience deemed ] occurs on this level of reality. From a phenomenological perspective, reality is that which is phenomenally real and unreality is nonexistent. Individual perception can be based upon an individual's personality, focus and style of attribution, causing him or her to see only what he or she wants to see or believes to be true.


=== World views and theories ===
== Truth ==
{{main|Truth}} {{Further|World view}}
According to the less realist trends in philosophy, such as ]/], truth is subjective. When two or more individuals agree upon the interpretation and experience of a particular event, a consensus about an event and its experience begins to be formed. This being common to a few individuals or a larger group, then becomes the 'truth' as seen and agreed upon by a certain set of people &mdash; the ]. Thus one particular ] may have a certain set of agreed truths, while another group might have a different set of consensual 'truths'. This lets different ] and ] have varied and extremely different ] of reality and truth of the external world. The ] and beliefs of people or communities are a fine example of this level of ] 'reality'. Truth cannot simply be considered truth if one speaks and another hears because individual bias and fallibility challenge the idea that certainty or objectivity are easily grasped. For ], the inaccessibility of any final, objective truth means that there is no truth beyond the socially-accepted consensus. (Although this means there are truths, not truth).


A common colloquial usage would have ''reality'' mean "perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward reality", as in "My reality is not your reality." This is often used just as a ] indicating that the parties to a conversation agree, or should agree, not to quibble over deeply different conceptions of what is real. For example, in a religious discussion between friends, one might say (attempting humor), "You might disagree, but in my reality, everyone goes to heaven."
For ], the world is a set of definite ]s, which obtain independently of humans ("The world is all that is the case" &mdash; '']''), and these facts are the final arbiter of truth. ] expresses this in terms of the principle
of ]<ref> Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Michael Dummett</ref>: Lady Macbeth had three children or she did not; a tree falls or it does not. A statement will be true if it ] to these facts &mdash; ''even if the correspondence cannot be established''. Thus the dispute between the realist and anti-realist conception of truth hinges on reactions to the ] accessibility (knowability, graspability) of facts.


Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a world view (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map.
== Fact ==
{{main|Fact}}
A fact or factual entity is a phenomenon that is perceived as an elemental principle. It is rarely one that could be subject to personal interpretation. Instead, it is most often an observed phenomenon of the natural world. The proposition 'viewed from most places on Earth, the sun rises in the east', is a fact. It is a fact for people belonging to any group or nationality, regardless of which language they speak or which part of the hemisphere they come from. The ] proposition in support of the ] ], that the ] is the center of the ] is one that states the fact of the ]. However, during his lifetime Galileo was ridiculed for that factual proposition, because far too few people had a consensus about it in order to accept it as a truth. Fewer propositions are factual in content in the world, as compared to the many truths shared by various communities, which are also fewer than the innumerable individual ]. Much of ], ], ] and ] is done on this level.


{{Excerpt|Worldview|hat=no|files=0}}
This view of reality is well expressed by ]'s statement that "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away."
Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, ], and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such theory is that there simply and literally ''is'' no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} Such attitudes are summarized in popular statements, such as "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with" (]), and they indicate ]&nbsp;– that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not.


Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined ] and ]. This idea was elaborated by ] in his book '']'' (1962). '']'', a book about the ] written by ] and ], was published in 1966. It explained how knowledge is acquired and used for the comprehension of reality. Out of all the realities, the reality of everyday life is the most important one since our consciousness requires us to be completely aware and attentive to the experience of everyday life.
== What reality might ''not'' be ==
"Reality," the concept, is contrasted with a wide variety of other concepts, largely depending upon the intellectual discipline. It can help us to understand what we mean by "reality" to note that what we say ''is not'' real but usually if there is no original and related proofs it isn't reality.


== Related concepts ==
In ], reality is contrasted with ] (penguins do exist; so they are real) and mere ] (a mountain made of gold is merely possible, but is not known to be real—that is, actual rather than possible—unless one is discovered). Sometimes philosophers speak as though reality is contrasted with ] itself, though ordinary language and many other philosophers would treat these as synonyms. They have in mind the notion that there is ''a kind'' of reality &mdash; a mental or ] reality, perhaps &mdash; that imaginary objects, such as the aforementioned golden mountain, have. ] is famous, or infamous, for holding that such things have so-called subsistence, and thus a kind of reality, even while they do not actually exist. Most philosophers find the very notion of "subsistence" mysterious and unnecessary, and one of the ]s and starting points of ] ] has been the forceful rejection of the notion of subsistence &mdash; of "real" but nonexistent objects.
{{See also|Truth|Fact}}


===A priori and a posteriori===
Some schools of ] hold that reality is something void of description, the formless which forms all illusions or ]. Buddhists hold that we can only discuss objects which are not reality itself and that nothing can be said of reality which is true in any absolute sense. Discussions of a permanent self are necessarily about the reality of self which cannot be pointed to nor described in any way. Similar is the ] saying, that the ] that can be named is not the true Tao, or way.
{{Excerpt|A priori and a posteriori|paragraphs=1|files=0}}


===Potentiality and actuality===
It is worth saying at this point that many philosophers are not content with saying merely what reality ''is not'' &mdash; some of them have positive theories of what broad categories of objects are real, in addition. See '']'' as well as '']''; these topics are also briefly treated below.
{{Excerpt|Potentiality and actuality|paragraphs=1,2}}


===Belief===
In ], ], and the ], reality is often contrasted with what is "]."
{{Excerpt|Belief}}


====Belief studies====
One of the fundamental issues in ethics is called the ], and it can be formulated as follows: "Given our knowledge of the way the world 'is,' how can we know the way the world 'ought to be'?" Most ethical views hold that the world we live in (the ''real'' world) is ''not ideal'' &mdash; and, as such, there is room for improvement.
{{Excerpt|Belief|Belief studies}}


== Western philosophy ==
In the arts there was a broad movement beginning in the ], ] (which led to ]), which sought to portray characters, scenes, and so forth, realistically. This was in contrast and reaction to ], which portrayed their subjects idealistically. Commentary about these artistic movements is sometimes put in terms of the contrast between the real and the ideal: on the one hand, the average, ordinary, and natural, and on the other, the superlative, extraordinary, improbable, and sometimes even supernatural. Obviously, when speaking in this sense, "real" (or "realistic") does not have the same meaning as it does when, for example, a philosopher uses the term to distinguish, simply, what exists from what does not exist.
Philosophy addresses two different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself, and the relationship between the ] (as well as ] and culture) and reality.


On the one hand, ] is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general ] and how they are interrelated. If a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of ] has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is ''not'' a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades.
In the arts, and also in ordinary life, the notion of reality (or realism) is also often contrasted with illusion. A painting that precisely indicates the visually-appearing shape of a depicted object is said to be realistic in that respect; one that distorts features, as ]'s paintings are famous for doing, are said to be unrealistic, and thus some observers will say that they are "not real." But there are also tendencies in the visual arts toward so-called '']'' and more recently '']'' that invite a different sort of contrast with the real. ] (French, "fool the eye") paintings render their subjects so "realistically" that the casual observer might temporarily be deceived into thinking that he is seeing something, indeed, ''real'' &mdash; but in fact, it is merely an illusion, and an intentional one at that.


On the other hand, particularly in discussions of ] that have feet in both ] and epistemology, philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way ''dependent upon'' (or, to use fashionable ], "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as religions and ]s, on up to the vague notion of a common cultural ], or {{lang|de|]}}.
In psychiatry, reality, or rather the idea of being ''in touch with reality'', is integral to the notion of ], which has often been defined in part by reference to being "out of touch" with reality. The schizophrenic is said to have ''hallucinations'' and ''delusions'' which concern people and events that are not "real." However, there is controversy over what is considered "out of touch with reality," particularly due to the noticeable comparison of the process of forcibly institutionalising individuals for expressing their beliefs in society to ]. The practice's possible covert use as a political tool can perhaps be illustrated by the ] psychiatric sentences in the U.S. of black slaves for 'crazily' attempting to escape. See also '']'' and one of its prominent figures, the psychiatrist ].


=== Realism ===
In each of these cases, discussions of reality, or what counts as "real," take on quite different casts; indeed, what we say about reality often depends on what we say it is not.
The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called ]. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism ''about''" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object, the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism ''about''" that object.


A ] of knowledge about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the ] can ] that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the ] and say that this ] exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it.
== Reality, Worldviews, and Theories of Reality ==


===Anti-realism===
{{See|World view}}
One can also speak of ''anti''-realism about the same objects. ''Anti-realism'' is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was ], so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ''ideas''. ] is the view, propounded by the Irish ] ], that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. In this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since, in Berkeley's view, perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called ]. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by ], tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such ]s. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for ''any'' view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called ], is one variety of anti-realism. ] is the view that ] such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially ].


=== Being ===
A common colloquial usage would have "reality" mean "perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward reality," as in "My reality is not your reality." This is often used just as a colloquialism indicating that the parties to a conversation agree, or should agree, not to quibble over deeply different conceptions of what is real. For example, in a religious discussion between friends, one might say (attempting humor), "You might disagree, but in my reality, everyone goes to heaven."
The nature of ] is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For instance, ] taught that reality was a single unchanging Being, whereas ] wrote that all things flow. The 20th-century philosopher ] thought previous philosophers have lost sight of the question of Being (qua Being) in favour of the questions of beings (existing things), so he believed that a return to the Parmenidean approach was needed. An ] is an attempt to list the fundamental constituents of reality. The question of whether or not ] is a ] has been discussed since the Early Modern period, not least in relation to the ]. Existence, ''that'' something is, has been contrasted with '']'', the question of ''what'' something is.
Since existence without essence seems blank, it associated with ] by philosophers such as Hegel. ] represents an extremely negative view of being, the ] a positive one.


==== Explanations for the existence of something rather than nothing ====
Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a worldview (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map.
{{Excerpt|Why there is anything at all|files=0}}


=== Perception ===
Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, literary criticism, and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such belief is that there simply and literally ''is'' no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality. Such attitudes are summarized in the popular statement, "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with"], and they indicate ], that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not. These topics will be discussed in greater detail below.
The question of ], as opposed to ], arises in the ] and ] out of the debate over the nature of ] ];<ref name=lehar>Lehar, Steve. (2000). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151021061139/http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html |date=2015-10-21 }}, ''Consciousness and Cognition''.</ref><ref name=ce>Lehar, Steve. (2000). {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120811172229/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html |date=2012-08-11 }}, ''The Function of Conscious Experience''.</ref> the ] question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by ] processes in our brain. ] is known as ''direct'' realism when developed to counter ''indirect'' or representative realism, also known as ],<ref>Lehar, Steve. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120905185905/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html |date=2012-09-05 }}</ref> the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature ] replica of the world.


] coined the influential term ], by which he means a kind of ]. The theory states that, with a subconscious set of mental filters formed from their beliefs and experiences, every individual interprets the same world differently, hence "Truth is in the eye of the beholder". His ideas influenced the work of his friend ].
Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined ] and ]. This idea was well elaborated by ] in his book ] (]).


=== Abstract objects and mathematics ===
== Philosophical views of reality ==
The status of ] entities, particularly numbers, is a topic of discussion in mathematics.
] addresses two different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself, and the relationship between the ] (as well as ] and ]) and reality.


In the philosophy of mathematics, the best known form of realism about numbers is ], which grants them abstract, immaterial existence. Other forms of realism identify mathematics with the concrete physical universe.
On the one hand, ] is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general ] and how they are interrelated. If &mdash; what is rarely done &mdash; a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of analytic philosophy has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is ''not'' a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades.


Anti-realist stances include ] and ].
On the other hand, particularly in discussions of ] that have feet in both ] and ], philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way ''dependent upon'' (or, to use fashionable ], "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as ]s and political movements, on up to the vague notion of a common cultural ], or ].


Some approaches are selectively realistic about some mathematical objects but not others. ] rejects ] quantities. ] accepts finite quantities up to a certain amount. ] and ] are realistic about objects that can be explicitly constructed, but reject the use of the ] to prove existence by ].
The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called ]. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism ''about''" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism ''about''" that object.


The traditional debate has focused on whether an abstract (immaterial, intelligible) realm of numbers has existed ''in addition to'' the physical (sensible, concrete) world. A recent development is the ], the theory that ''only'' a mathematical world exists, with the finite, physical world being an illusion within it.
One can also speak of ''anti''-realism about the same objects. '']'' is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was ], so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ''ideas''. ] is the view, propounded by the Irish ] ], that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. On this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since on Berkeley's view perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called ]. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by ], tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such ]s. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for ''any'' view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called ], is one variety of anti-realism. ] is the view that social issues such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially cultural artifact.


An extreme form of realism about mathematics is the ] advanced by ]. Tegmark's sole postulate is: ''All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically''. That is, in the sense that "in those complex enough to contain self-aware substructures will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world".<ref name="Tegmark2008">{{cite journal|last=Tegmark |first=Max |date=February 2008 |title=The Mathematical Universe |journal=Foundations of Physics |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=101–150 |doi=10.1007/s10701-007-9186-9 |arxiv=0704.0646|bibcode = 2008FoPh...38..101T |s2cid=9890455 }}</ref><ref>Tegmark (1998), p. 1.</ref> The hypothesis suggests that worlds corresponding to different sets of initial conditions, physical constants, or altogether different equations should be considered real. The theory can be considered a form of ] in that it posits the existence of mathematical entities, but can also be considered a ] in that it denies that anything exists except mathematical objects.
A ] of ] about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the ] can verify that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the Rocky Mountains and say that this mountain range exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it. However, there is nothing that we can observe and name, and then say that it will exist forever. Eternal ], if they exist, would need to be described by some method other than scientific.{{Fact|date=May 2007}}


=== Properties ===
== Quantum physical views of reality ==
{{Main|Problem of universals}}


The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether ] exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, ], kinds or ], such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas or a certain colour,<ref>Loux, Michael J. (2001). "The Problem of Universals" in ''Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings'', Michael J. Loux (ed.), N.Y.: Routledge, pp.&nbsp;3–13, </ref> that can be predicated of individuals or particulars or that individuals or particulars can be regarded as sharing or participating in. For example, Scott, Pat, and Chris have in common the universal quality of ''being human'' or ''humanity''.
{{see|Principle of locality|Interpretation of quantum mechanics|Philosophy of physics}}


The realist school claims that universals are real&nbsp;– they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms are ] and ].<ref>] (1953). "Universals and Resemblance", Ch. 1 of ''Thinking and Experience'', Hutchinson's University Library, among others, sometimes uses such Latin terms.</ref> ''Platonic realism'' is the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars. ''Aristotelian realism'', on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them.
] (QM) has kept ]s and ]s in debate on the nature of reality since its invention.
QM states that prior to observation, nothing can be said about a physical system other than a probability function which seems to be definable to a degree by assumptions about the system's elements. With observation a system's probability wave function will collapse into a precise quantity which is predictable by the means of measuring the device applied. ] states that there are certain measurements that reduce the accuracy of other measurements of the same system. Primarily, one cannot measure the location and velocity of sub-atomic elements such as an electron precisely because the more one looks for the former the less accuracy one can achieve for the latter. This imprecision introduces an uncertainty into the overall state of the system and the necessity of a choice on the part of the one making the measurement, namely which aspect will he find accurately at the cost of the other. This decision on the part of the measurer has created no small problem for objectivists who insist that at its core reality is objectively present whether anyone notices or not. Several experiments such as the ], and tests of ] and the ] have confirmed that the simple act of observing does impact the system's state in a noticeable way; since the detector itself has to be changed to detect anything at all, there is necessarily a change in the observed particle because of quantum entanglement. But also the state of correlated particles which have not been measured appears to be affected. Even the notion of cause and effect is brought into question in the quantum world where irreducible randomness cannot currently be avoided as a basic assumption. In theory large numbers of random quantum elements seen as a group from a very great distance can seem like cause and effect which is why our level of experience appears to function almost completely deterministically.


] and ] are the main forms of anti-realism about universals.
It has led some people to assume that there is no reality existing, independent of our own consciousness as observer. However, there is no clear evidence that human consciousness has any special role to play beyond the influence of instrument-settings on result. These phenomena can also be given the more cautious interpretation that quantum systems do contain properties, but not properties directly corresponding to measurements preformed on the system by macroscopic instruments.<ref></ref>

=== Time and space ===
{{Main|Philosophy of space and time}}

A traditional realist position in ontology is that time and space have existence apart from the human mind. ] deny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some ] whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless doubt the independent existence of time and space.

], in the '']'', described time as an '']'' notion that, together with other ''a priori'' notions such as ], allows us to comprehend ]. Kant denies that either space or time are ], entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds rather that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial ]s are used to ] how far apart ] are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) ]. Although space and time are held to be ''transcendentally ideal'' in this sense, they are also ''empirically real'', i.e. not mere illusions.

Idealist writers such as ] in '']'' have argued that time is an illusion.

As well as differing about the reality of time as a whole, metaphysical theories of time can differ in their ascriptions of reality to the ], present and ] separately.
* ] holds that the past and future are unreal, and only an ever-changing present is real.
* The ] theory, also known as Eternalism, holds that past, present and future are all real, but the passage of time is an illusion. It is often said to have a scientific basis in ].
* The ] theory holds that past and present are real, but the future is not.

Time, and the related concepts of process and ] are central to the ] of ] and ].

=== Possible worlds ===
The term "]" goes back to ] theory of possible worlds, used to analyse necessity, ], and similar ]. ] is the view, notably propounded by ], that all ] are as real as the actual world. In short: the actual world is regarded as merely one among an ] ] of ] worlds, some "nearer" to the actual world and some more remote. Other theorists may use the Possible World framework to express and explore problems without committing to it ontologically. Possible world theory is related to ]: a proposition is ''necessary'' if it is true in all possible worlds, and ''possible'' if it is true in at least one. The ] of quantum mechanics is a similar idea in science.

=== Theories of everything (TOE) and philosophy ===
{{Main|Theory of everything (philosophy)}}

The philosophical implications of a physical TOE are frequently debated. For example, if philosophical ] is true, a physical TOE will coincide with a philosophical theory of everything.

The ] style of metaphysics attempts to answer ''all'' the important questions in a coherent way, providing a complete picture of the world. ] and ] could be said to be early examples of comprehensive systems. In the early modern period (17th and 18th centuries), the system-building ''scope'' of philosophy is often linked to the rationalist ''method'' of philosophy, that is the technique of deducing the nature of the world by pure ''a priori'' reason. Examples from the early modern period include the ]'s ], ]'s ], ]'s ]. ]'s ] and ]'s ] were later systems.

Other philosophers do not believe its techniques can aim so high. Some scientists think a more mathematical approach than philosophy is needed for a TOE, for instance ] wrote in '']'' that even if we had a TOE, it would necessarily be a set of equations. He wrote, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"<ref>as quoted in </ref>

=== Phenomenology ===
On a much broader and more subjective level,{{Specify|date=August 2011}} private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and the selectivity involved in personal interpretation of events shapes reality as seen by one and only one person<ref>"Present-time consciousness",
Francisco J. Varela,
''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' 6 (2-3):111-140 (1999)</ref> and hence is called ]. While this
form of reality might be common to others as well, it could at times also be so unique to oneself as to never be experienced or agreed upon by anyone else. Much of the kind of experience deemed ] occurs on this level of reality.<ref>
For the concept of "levels of reality", compare: {{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TD90EAAAQBAJ |title=Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy: Re-examining the Multi-level Structure of Reality |date=8 June 2022 |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=9783030994259 |editor-last1=Ioannidis |editor-first1=Stavros |series=Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science |publication-place=Cham, Zug |access-date=31 May 2024 |editor-last2=Vishne |editor-first2=Gal |editor-last3=Hemmo |editor-first3=Meir |editor-last4=Shenker |editor-first4=Orly |editor-link4=Orly Shenker}}
</ref>

Phenomenology is a ] developed in the early years of the twentieth century by ] (1859–1938) and a circle of followers at the universities of ] and ] in Germany. Subsequently, phenomenological themes were taken up by philosophers in France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work.

The word ''phenomenology'' comes from the ] ''phainómenon'', meaning "that which appears", and ''lógos'', meaning "study". In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the ] which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such reflection was to take place from a highly modified "]" viewpoint, studying phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness whatsoever. Husserl believed that phenomenology could thus provide a firm basis for all human ], including ], and could establish philosophy as a "rigorous science".<ref>{{cite book |author=Kockelmans |first=Joseph |author-link=Joseph Kockelmans |title=Edmund Husserl's phenomenology |publisher=] Press |year=2001 |isbn=1-55753-050-5 |edition=2 |pages=311–314}}</ref>

Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticised and developed by his student and assistant ] (1889–1976), by ] like ] (1908–1961) and ] (1905–1980), and by other philosophers, such as ] (1913–2005), ] (1906–1995), and ] (1889–1977).<ref>{{cite book |author=Crowell |first=Steven Galt |title=Husserl, Heidegger, and the space of meaning: paths toward transcendental phenomenology |publisher=] Press |year=2001 |isbn=0-8101-1805-X |page=160}}
</ref>

=== Skeptical hypotheses ===
] that believes it is walking]]
Skeptical hypotheses in philosophy suggest that reality could be very different from what we think it is; or at least that we cannot prove it is not. Examples include:
* The "]" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals. This hypothesis is related to the Matrix hypothesis below.
* The "]" of Descartes and ] supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream.
* Descartes' ] is a being "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me."
* The ] (or ] or ]) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age.
* Diminished reality refers to artificially diminished reality, not due to limitations of sensory systems but via artificial ].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mori |first1=Shohei |last2=Ikeda |first2=Sei |last3=Saito |first3=Hideo |title=A survey of diminished reality: Techniques for visually concealing, eliminating, and seeing through real objects |journal=IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications |date=28 June 2017 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=17 |doi=10.1186/s41074-017-0028-1 |s2cid=21053932 |issn=1882-6695|doi-access=free }}</ref>
* ] hypothesis or ] suggest that we might be inside a ] or ]. Related hypotheses may also involve simulations with signals that allow the inhabitant species in virtual or simulated reality to perceive the external reality.

== Non-western ancient philosophy and religion ==
=== Jain philosophy ===
{{Main|Tattva (Jainism)}}
] postulates that seven '''tattva''' (truths or fundamental principles) constitute reality.{{sfn|Jain|1992|p=6}} These seven ''tattva'' are:{{sfn|Jain|1992|p=7}}
# '']'' – The ] which is characterized by consciousness.
# '']'' – The non-soul.
# '']'' – Influx of ].
# '']'' – The bondage of karma.
# '']'' – Obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul.
# '']'' – Shedding of karmas.
# '']'' – Liberation or Salvation, i.e. the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul).

== Physical sciences ==

=== Scientific realism ===
] is, at the most general level, the view that the world (the universe) described by science (perhaps ideal science) is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within ], it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of entities that are ] discussed by ]. Generally, those who are scientific realists state that one can make reliable claims about these entities (viz., that they have the same ] status) as directly observable entities, as opposed to ]. The most used and studied scientific theories today state more or less the truth.

=== Realism and locality in physics ===
{{main | Principle of locality}}
''Realism'' in the sense used by physicists does not equate to ] in metaphysics.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Against 'Realism'|first=Travis|last=Norsen|date=26 February 2007|journal=Foundations of Physics|volume=37|issue=3|pages=311–340|doi=10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1|arxiv=quant-ph/0607057|bibcode=2007FoPh...37..311N|s2cid=15072850}}</ref> The latter is the claim that the world is mind-independent: that even if the results of a measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer. Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or ]. A property can be '']al'' (or potential), i.e. it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not ''actually'' break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability. Such an ontology would be metaphysically realistic, without being realistic in the physicist's sense of "local realism" (which would require that a single value be produced with certainty).

A closely related term is ] (CFD), used to refer to the claim that one can meaningfully speak of the definiteness of results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).

] is a significant feature of classical mechanics, of ], and of classical ]; but not ]. In a work now called the ], Einstein relied on local realism to suggest that ] were missing in quantum mechanics. However, ] subsequently showed that the predictions of quantum mechanics are inconsistent with hidden variables, a result known as ]. The predictions of quantum mechanics have been verified: Bell's inequalities are violated, meaning either local realism ''or'' counterfactual definiteness must be incorrect.<ref>{{cite book| last1=Nielsen |first1=Michael A. |last2=Chuang |first2=Isaac L. |year=2000 |title=Quantum Computation and Quantum Information |publisher=] |pages=112–113| isbn=978-0-521-63503-5}}</ref>{{rp|117}} Different ] violate different parts of local realism and/or ].

The transition from "possible" to "actual" is a major topic of ], with related theories including ].

==== Role of "observation" in quantum mechanics ====
{{See also|Quantum decoherence}}
The ]–body problem refers to the philosophical discussions of the ] in the context of quantum mechanics. Since quantum mechanics involves ]s, which ], some ] place conscious observers in a special position.

The founders of quantum mechanics debated the role of the observer, and of them, ] and ] believed that quantum mechanics expressed the observers knowledge and when an experiment was completed the additional knowledge should be incorporated in the wave function, an effect that came to be called state reduction or ]. This point of view, which was never fully endorsed by ], was denounced as mystical and anti-scientific by ]. Pauli accepted the term, and described quantum mechanics as ''lucid mysticism''.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Marin |first=Juan Miguel |year=2009 |title='Mysticism' in quantum mechanics: the forgotten controversy |journal=European Journal of Physics |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=807–822 |bibcode=2009EJPh...30..807M |doi=10.1088/0143-0807/30/4/014 |s2cid=122757714}} , summarized here . {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606092933/http://www.physorg.com/news163670588.html%7Care/|date=2011-06-06}}.</ref>

Heisenberg and Bohr always described quantum mechanics in ] terms. Bohr also took an active interest in the philosophical implications of quantum theories such as his ], for example.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Honner |first=John |year=2005 |title=Niels Bohr and the Mysticism of Nature |journal=Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science |volume=17-3 |pages=243–253}}</ref> He believed quantum theory offers a complete description of nature, albeit one that is simply ill-suited for everyday experiences&nbsp;– which are better described by classical mechanics and probability. Bohr never specified a demarcation line above which objects cease to be quantum and become classical. He believed that it was not a question of physics, but one of philosophy.

] reformulated the "]" ] as "]" and proposed that the consciousness of an observer is the demarcation line which precipitates collapse of the wave function, independent of any realist interpretation. Commonly known as "]", this controversial ] states that ] by a ] observer is what makes the wave function collapse. However, this is a minority view among quantum philosophers, considering it a misunderstanding.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Schlosshauer |first=M. |author2=Koer |first2=J. |author3=Zeilinger |first3=A. |year=2013 |title=A Snapshot of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics |journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics |volume=44 |issue=3 |pages=222–230 |arxiv=1301.1069 |bibcode=2013SHPMP..44..222S |doi=10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.04.004 |s2cid=55537196}}</ref> There are other possible solutions to the "]" thought experiment, which do not require consciousness to be different from other physical processes. Moreover, Wigner shifted to those interpretations in his later years.<ref name="Esfeld">Michael Esfeld, (1999), , published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 30B, pp. 145–154, Elsevier Science Limited.</ref>

=== Multiverse ===
The ] is the ] set of multiple possible ]s (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that exists: the entirety of ], time, ], and energy as well as the ]s and ] that describe them. The term was coined in 1895 by the American philosopher and psychologist ].<ref>James, William, ''The Will to Believe'', 1895; and earlier in 1895, as cited in ]'s new 2003 entry for "multiverse": "1895 W. JAMES in Internat. Jrnl. Ethics 6 10 Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a multiverse, as one might call it, and not a universe."</ref> In the ] (MWI), one of the mainstream ], there are an infinite number of universes and every possible quantum outcome occurs in at least one universe, albeit there is ].

The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in ], physics, ], religion, philosophy, ] and fiction, particularly in science fiction and fantasy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternative universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternative realities", "alternative timelines", and "dimensional planes", among others.

{{Excerpt|Multiverse#Cyclic theories|hat=no}}

===Anthropic principle===
{{Excerpt|Anthropic principle|only=paragraph|files=0}}

===Personal and collective reality===
] within a human brain, as visualized by ] ]]]
Each individual has a different ], with different memories and personal history, knowledge, personality traits and experience.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Savin-Baden |first1=Maggi |last2=Burden |first2=David |title=Digital Immortality and Virtual Humans |journal=Postdigital Science and Education |date=1 April 2019 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=87–103 |doi=10.1007/s42438-018-0007-6 |s2cid=149797460 |language=en |issn=2524-4868|doi-access=free }}</ref> This system, mostly referring to the ], affects ] and behavior and into this complex new ], memories,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Kesteren |first1=Marlieke T. R. |last2=Rignanese |first2=Paul |last3=Gianferrara |first3=Pierre G. |last4=Krabbendam |first4=Lydia |last5=Meeter |first5=Martijn |title=Congruency and reactivation aid memory integration through reinstatement of prior knowledge |journal=Scientific Reports |date=16 March 2020 |volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=4776 |doi=10.1038/s41598-020-61737-1 |pmid=32179822 |pmc=7075880 |bibcode=2020NatSR..10.4776V |language=en |issn=2045-2322}}</ref> information, ]s and experiences are continuously integrated.<ref>{{cite news |title=Understanding reality through algorithms |url=https://news.mit.edu/2022/understanding-reality-through-algorithms-fernanda-de-la-torre-0925 |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=MIT News {{!}} Massachusetts Institute of Technology |language=en}}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=November 2022}} The ] – ] in brains – is thought to be a key factor in ] in terms of cognition or the way we perceive the world (as a context) and related features or processes.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Popova |first1=Maria |title=The Connectome: A New Way To Think About What Makes You You |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-connectome-a-new-way-to-think-about-what-makes-you-you/255023/ |website=The Atlantic |access-date=6 November 2022 |date=28 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Seung |first1=Sebastian |title=Connectome: How the Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are |year=2012 |publisher=HMH |isbn=978-0547508177 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GXwEuoYl3wQC |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Quest for the connectome: scientists investigate ways of mapping the brain |url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/may/07/quest-connectome-mapping-brain |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=The Guardian |date=7 May 2012 |language=en}}</ref> ] is the process by which people give ] to their experiences and make sense of the world they live in. ] is relating to questions like how a unique individual is persisting through time.

Sensemaking and determination of reality also occurs collectively, which is investigated in ] and related approaches. From the ] perspective, the intelligence of the individual human (and potentially AI entities) is substantially limited and advanced intelligence emerges when multiple entities collaborate over time.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Peeters |first1=Marieke M. M. |last2=van Diggelen |first2=Jurriaan |last3=van den Bosch |first3=Karel |last4=Bronkhorst |first4=Adelbert |last5=Neerincx |first5=Mark A. |last6=Schraagen |first6=Jan Maarten |last7=Raaijmakers |first7=Stephan |title=Hybrid collective intelligence in a human–AI society |journal=AI & Society |date=1 March 2021 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=217–238 |doi=10.1007/s00146-020-01005-y |s2cid=220050285 |language=en |issn=1435-5655|url=https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/files/205948801/Peeters_2020_Hybrid_collective_intelligence_in_a.pdf }}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=November 2022}} ] is an important component of the social construction of reality<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Luckmann |first1=Thomas |title=On Social Interaction and the Communicative Construction of Personal Identity, Knowledge and Reality |journal=Organization Studies |date=February 2008 |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=277–290 |doi=10.1177/0170840607087260 |s2cid=145106025 |language=en |issn=0170-8406}}</ref> and communication and communication-related systems, such as media systems, may also be major components {{see below|]}}.

Philosophy of perception raises questions based on the evolutionary history of humans' perceptual apparatuses, particularly or especially individuals' ], described as "e don't see reality—we only see what was useful to see in the past", partly suggesting that "ur species has been so successful not in spite of our inability to see reality but because of it".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Draaisma |first1=Douwe |title=Perception: Our useful inability to see reality |journal=Nature |date=April 2017 |volume=544 |issue=7650 |pages=296 |language=en |doi=10.1038/544296a|bibcode=2017Natur.544..296D |s2cid=4400770 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Scientific theories of everything ===
A ] (TOE) is a putative ] of ] that fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of ''any'' experiment that could be carried out ''in principle''. The theory of everything is also called the '''final theory'''.<ref>Weinberg (1993)</ref> Many candidate theories of everything have been proposed by theoretical physicists during the twentieth century, but none have been confirmed experimentally. The primary problem in producing a TOE is that ] and quantum mechanics are hard to unify. This is one of the ].

Initially, the term "theory of everything" was used with an ironic connotation to refer to various overgeneralized theories. For example, a great-grandfather of ], a character from a cycle of ]'s science fiction stories of the 1960s, was known to work on the "General Theory of Everything". Physicist ]<ref>{{cite journal
| first = John | last = Ellis
| year = 2002
| journal = ]
| title = Physics gets physical (correspondence)
| volume = 415 | page =957
| doi =10.1038/415957b
|bibcode = 2002Natur.415..957E
| issue=6875
| pmid=11875539| doi-access = free
}}</ref> claims to have introduced the term into the technical literature in an article in '']'' in 1986.<ref>{{Cite journal
| first = John | last = Ellis
| year = 1986
| journal = Nature
| title = The Superstring: Theory of Everything, or of Nothing?
| volume = 323 | pages = 595–598
| doi = 10.1038/323595a0
|bibcode = 1986Natur.323..595E
| issue=6089| s2cid = 4344940
}}</ref> Over time, the term stuck in popularizations of ] to describe a theory that would unify or explain through a single model the theories of all ]s and of all particles of nature: general relativity for gravitation, and the ] of elementary particle physics&nbsp;– which includes quantum mechanics&nbsp;– for electromagnetism, the two nuclear interactions, and the known elementary particles.

Current candidates for a theory of everything include ], ], and ].

== Technology ==

=== Media ===
{{See also|#Personal and collective reality|#Belief studies}}
Media – such as ], ], websites including ],<ref>{{cite book |last1=McDowell |first1=Zachary J. |last2=Vetter |first2=Matthew A. |title=Misplaced Pages and the Representation of Reality |date=2022 |url=https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/50520 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |doi=10.4324/9781003094081 |hdl=20.500.12657/50520 |isbn=978-1003094081 |s2cid=238657838 |language=English}}</ref> and ]<ref name="1999-02377-025">{{cite book |last1=Prentice |first1=D. |last2=Gerrig |first2=R. |chapter=Exploring the boundary between fiction and reality |date=1999 |editor1=S. Chaiken |editor2=Y. Trope |title=Dual-process theories in social psychology |pages=529–546 |publisher=The Guilford Press. |url=https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1999-02377-025 |language=en}}</ref> – shape individuals' and society's perception of reality (including as part of belief and attitude formation)<ref name="1999-02377-025"/> and are partly used intentionally as means to ] about reality. Various technologies have changed society's relationship with reality such as the advent of radio and TV technologies.

Research investigates interrelations and effects, for example aspects in the social construction of reality.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gamson |first1=William A. |last2=Croteau |first2=David |last3=Hoynes |first3=William |last4=Sasson |first4=Theodore |title=Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality |journal=Annual Review of Sociology |date=1992 |volume=18 |pages=373–393 |doi=10.1146/annurev.so.18.080192.002105 |jstor=2083459 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2083459 |issn=0360-0572}}</ref> A major component of this shaping and representation of perceived reality is ] – not only (or primarily) the quality, tone and types of content – which influences, for instance, the public agenda.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McCombs |first1=Maxwell E. |last2=Shaw |first2=Donald L. |title=The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |date=1972 |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=176 |doi=10.1086/267990}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=McCombs |first1=Maxwell |last2=Reynolds |first2=Amy |title=Media Effects |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203877111-7/news-shapes-civic-agenda-maxwell-mccombs-amy-reynolds |chapter=How the news shapes our civic agenda and News Influence on Our Pictures of the World |year=2009 |pages=17–32 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780203877111-7 |isbn=978-0203877111 }}</ref> Disproportional news attention for low-probability incidents – such as high-consequence accidents – can distort audiences' ]s with harmful consequences.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van der Meer |first1=Toni G. L. A. |last2=Kroon |first2=Anne C. |last3=Vliegenthart |first3=Rens |date=20 July 2022 |title=Do News Media Kill? How a Biased News Reality can Overshadow Real Societal Risks, The Case of Aviation and Road Traffic Accidents |journal=Social Forces |volume=101 |issue=1 |pages=506–530 |doi=10.1093/sf/soab114 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Various biases such as ], public attention dependence reactions like ] and domination by "current events",<ref>{{cite news |title=How the news took over reality |url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/03/how-the-news-took-over-reality |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=The Guardian |date=3 May 2019 |language=en}}</ref> as well as various interest-driven uses of media such as marketing can also have major impacts on the perception of reality. ] found that e.g. in 2018 the average U.S. American "spent around eleven hours every day looking at screens".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Gorvett |first1=Zaria |title=How the news changes the way we think and behave |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200512-how-the-news-changes-the-way-we-think-and-behave |access-date=6 November 2022 |work=BBC |language=en}}</ref>

==== Filter bubbles and echo chambers ====
{{Excerpt|Filter bubble|only=paragraph|files=0}}

{{Excerpt|Filter bubble#Extensions of concept|hat=no|paragraphs=1}}

=== Virtual reality and cyberspace ===
Virtual reality (VR) is a ] environment that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world, as well as in imaginary worlds.

]The ] is a continuous scale ranging between the completely virtual, a virtuality, and the completely real: reality. The reality–virtuality continuum therefore encompasses all possible variations and compositions of real and ] objects. It has been described as a concept in ] and ], but in fact it could be considered a matter of ]. The concept was first introduced by Paul Milgram.<ref>{{cite conference |last=Milgram |first=Paul |author2=Takemura |first2=H. |author3=Utsumi |first3=A. |author4=Kishino |first4=F. |year=1994 |title=Augmented Reality: A class of displays on the reality-virtuality continuum |url=http://vered.rose.utoronto.ca/publication/1994/Milgram_Takemura_SPIE1994.pdf |conference=Telemanipulator and Telepresence Technologies |pages=2351–2434 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061004044435/https://vered.rose.utoronto.ca/publication/1994/Milgram_Takemura_SPIE1994.pdf |archive-date=2006-10-04 |access-date=2007-03-15 |book-title=Proceedings of Telemanipulator and Telepresence Technologies |url-status=dead}}</ref>

The area between the two extremes, where both the real and the virtual are mixed, is the so-called ]. This in turn is said to consist of both ], where the virtual augments the real, and ], where the real augments the virtual.
], the world's computer systems considered as an interconnected whole, can be thought of as a virtual reality; for instance, it is portrayed as such in the ] fiction of ] and others. '']'' and ]s such as '']'' are examples of artificial environments or ]s (falling some way short of full virtual reality) in cyberspace.

=== "RL" in internet culture ===
On the Internet, "]" refers to life in the real world. It generally references ] or ], in contrast to an environment seen as fiction or fantasy, such as virtual reality, lifelike experience, ]s, novels, or movies. Online, the ] "IRL" stands for "in real life", with the meaning "not on the Internet".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.acronymfinder.com/IRL.html|title=IRL – Definition by AcronymFinder|website=www.acronymfinder.com}}</ref> ]s engaged in the study of the Internet have determined that someday, a distinction between online and real-life worlds may seem "quaint", noting that certain types of online activity, such as sexual intrigues, have already made a full transition to complete legitimacy and "reality".<ref name="Slater">{{cite book |author=Slater |first=Don |title=Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs |publisher=Sage Publications Incorporated |year=2002 |isbn=0-7619-6510-6 |editor-last=Livingstone |editor-first=Sonia |editor-link=Sonia Livingstone |pages=533–543 |chapter=Social Relationships and Identity On-line and Off-line |editor2-last=Lievrouw |editor2-first=Leah}}</ref> The ] "RL" stands for "real life". For example, one can speak of "meeting in RL" someone whom one has met in a ] or on an ]. It may also be used to express an inability to use the Internet for a time due to "RL problems".


== See also == == See also ==
{{cols|colwidth=26em}}
*]
*] * ]
*] * ]
*] * ]
* ]
*]
*] * ]
*] * ]
*] * ]
{{colend}}
*]

== Notes ==
{{Reflist}}


== References == == References ==
{{refbegin}}
<references/>
* {{cite book |last1=Berger |first1=Peter L. |last2=Luckmann |first2=Thomas |title=The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge |date=1966 |publisher=Anchor Books |location=New York |pages=21–22}}
* {{Cite book |last=Durrant |first=Michael |title=Aristotle's De Anima in Focus |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3RcOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA206 |year=1993 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-0-415-05340-2}}
* {{cite book |first=S. A. |last=Jain |title=Reality |date=1992 |publisher=Jwalamalini Trust |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uRIaAAAAMAAJ |quote=Not in Copyright}}
* {{cite encyclopedia |last=Macleod |first=Christopher |date=25 August 2016 |title=John Stuart Mill |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Summer 2020 |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-last=Zalta |via=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/mill/}}
* {{cite book |last=Sachs |first=Joe |title=Aristotle's Metaphysics, a New Translation |location=Santa Fe, New Mexico |year=1999 |publisher=Green Lion Books |isbn=1-888009-03-9}}
* {{cite journal |last=Sachs |first=Joe |title=Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature |year=2005 |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-mot/ |journal=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}
* {{cite journal |last=Sommers |first=Tamler |editor-last=Jarman |editor-first=Casey |url=http://www.believermag.com/issues/200303/?read=interview_strawson |title=Galen Strawson (interview) |publisher=McSweeney's McMullens |location=San Francisco, California |journal=Believer Magazine |date=March 2003 |access-date=10 July 2013 |volume=1 |issue=1}}
{{refend}}


==Further reading==
{{Philosophy (navigation)}}
* ], "Virtual Reality: How close can physics bring us to a truly fundamental understanding of the world?", '']'', vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp.&nbsp;30–35.
** "] is ... the bedrock of the broader search for ].... Yet sometimes seem to be struck by a collective ].... Truth can be elusive even in the best-established theories. ] is as well tested a theory as can be, yet its interpretation remains inscrutable. The deeper physicists dive into reality, the more reality seems to evaporate."

== External links ==
{{Sister project links|Reality}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=realism |title=Realism |last=Miller |first=Alexander}}
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{{Philosophy topics}}
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{{World view}}
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Latest revision as of 16:30, 23 December 2024

Sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent Not to be confused with Realty. For other uses, see Reality (disambiguation).

Reality is the sum or aggregate of all that is real or existent within the universe, as opposed to that which is only imaginary, nonexistent or nonactual. The term is also used to refer to the ontological status of things, indicating their existence. In physical terms, reality is the totality of a system, known and unknown.

Philosophical questions about the nature of reality or existence or being are considered under the rubric of ontology, which is a major branch of metaphysics in the Western philosophical tradition. Ontological questions also feature in diverse branches of philosophy, including the philosophy of science, of religion, of mathematics, and philosophical logic. These include questions about whether only physical objects are real (i.e., physicalism), whether reality is fundamentally immaterial (e.g. idealism), whether hypothetical unobservable entities posited by scientific theories exist, whether a god or gods exist, whether numbers and other abstract objects exist, and whether possible worlds exist. Epistemology is concerned with what can be known or inferred as likely and how, whereby in the modern world emphasis is put on reason, empirical evidence and science as sources and methods to determine or investigate reality.

World views

World views and theories

Further information: World view

A common colloquial usage would have reality mean "perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward reality", as in "My reality is not your reality." This is often used just as a colloquialism indicating that the parties to a conversation agree, or should agree, not to quibble over deeply different conceptions of what is real. For example, in a religious discussion between friends, one might say (attempting humor), "You might disagree, but in my reality, everyone goes to heaven."

Reality can be defined in a way that links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks): Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not. It is what a world view (whether it be based on individual or shared human experience) ultimately attempts to describe or map.

A worldview (also world-view) or Weltanschauung is the fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society encompassing the whole of the individual's or society's knowledge, culture, and point of view. A worldview can include natural philosophy; fundamental, existential, and normative postulates; or themes, values, emotions, and ethics.

Certain ideas from physics, philosophy, sociology, literary criticism, and other fields shape various theories of reality. One such theory is that there simply and literally is no reality beyond the perceptions or beliefs we each have about reality. Such attitudes are summarized in popular statements, such as "Perception is reality" or "Life is how you perceive reality" or "reality is what you can get away with" (Robert Anton Wilson), and they indicate anti-realism – that is, the view that there is no objective reality, whether acknowledged explicitly or not.

Many of the concepts of science and philosophy are often defined culturally and socially. This idea was elaborated by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). The Social Construction of Reality, a book about the sociology of knowledge written by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, was published in 1966. It explained how knowledge is acquired and used for the comprehension of reality. Out of all the realities, the reality of everyday life is the most important one since our consciousness requires us to be completely aware and attentive to the experience of everyday life.

Related concepts

See also: Truth and Fact

A priori and a posteriori

This section is an excerpt from A priori and a posteriori. A priori ('from the earlier') and a posteriori ('from the later') are Latin phrases used in philosophy to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on experience. A priori knowledge is independent from any experience. Examples include mathematics, tautologies and deduction from pure reason. A posteriori knowledge depends on empirical evidence. Examples include most fields of science and aspects of personal knowledge.

Potentiality and actuality

This section is an excerpt from Potentiality and actuality.

In philosophy, potentiality and actuality are a pair of closely connected principles which Aristotle used to analyze motion, causality, ethics, and physiology in his Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and De Anima.

The concept of potentiality, in this context, generally refers to any "possibility" that a thing can be said to have. Aristotle did not consider all possibilities the same, and emphasized the importance of those that become real of their own accord when conditions are right and nothing stops them. Actuality, in contrast to potentiality, is the motion, change or activity that represents an exercise or fulfillment of a possibility, when a possibility becomes real in the fullest sense. Both these concepts therefore reflect Aristotle's belief that events in nature are not all natural in a true sense. As he saw it, many things happen accidentally, and therefore not according to the natural purposes of things.

Belief

This section is an excerpt from Belief.

A belief is a subjective attitude that something is true or a state of affairs is the case. A subjective attitude is a mental state of having some stance, take, or opinion about something. In epistemology, philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be either true or false. To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the proposition "snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require active introspection. For example, few individuals carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not be occurrent (e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white"), but can instead be dispositional (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white").

There are various ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam). Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including eliminativists about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our folk psychological concept of belief (Paul Churchland) and formal epistemologists who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either we have a belief or we don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").

Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)?", "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?", and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"

Belief studies

This section is an excerpt from Belief § Belief studies.
Socio-demographic correlates of witchcraft beliefs
There is research investigating specific beliefs, types of beliefs and patterns of beliefs. For example, a study estimated contemporary prevalence and associations with belief in witchcraft around the world, which (in its data) varied between 9% and 90% between nations and is still a widespread element in worldviews globally. It also shows associations such as with lower "innovative activity", higher levels of anxiety, lower life expectancy, and higher religiosity. Other research is investigating beliefs in misinformation and their resistance to correction, including with respect to misinformation countermeasures. It describes cognitive, social and affective processes that leave people vulnerable to the formation of false beliefs. A study introduced the concept of false social reality which refers to widespread perceptions of public opinion that are shown to be false, such as underestimated general public support in the U.S. for climate change mitigation policies. Studies also suggested some uses of psychedelics can shift beliefs in some humans in certain ways, such as increasing attribution of consciousness to various entities (including plants and inanimate objects) and towards panpsychism and fatalism.

Western philosophy

Philosophy addresses two different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself, and the relationship between the mind (as well as language and culture) and reality.

On the one hand, ontology is the study of being, and the central topic of the field is couched, variously, in terms of being, existence, "what is", and reality. The task in ontology is to describe the most general categories of reality and how they are interrelated. If a philosopher wanted to proffer a positive definition of the concept "reality", it would be done under this heading. As explained above, some philosophers draw a distinction between reality and existence. In fact, many analytic philosophers today tend to avoid the term "real" and "reality" in discussing ontological issues. But for those who would treat "is real" the same way they treat "exists", one of the leading questions of analytic philosophy has been whether existence (or reality) is a property of objects. It has been widely held by analytic philosophers that it is not a property at all, though this view has lost some ground in recent decades.

On the other hand, particularly in discussions of objectivity that have feet in both metaphysics and epistemology, philosophical discussions of "reality" often concern the ways in which reality is, or is not, in some way dependent upon (or, to use fashionable jargon, "constructed" out of) mental and cultural factors such as perceptions, beliefs, and other mental states, as well as cultural artifacts, such as religions and political movements, on up to the vague notion of a common cultural world view, or Weltanschauung.

Realism

The view that there is a reality independent of any beliefs, perceptions, etc., is called realism. More specifically, philosophers are given to speaking about "realism about" this and that, such as realism about universals or realism about the external world. Generally, where one can identify any class of object, the existence or essential characteristics of which is said not to depend on perceptions, beliefs, language, or any other human artifact, one can speak of "realism about" that object.

A correspondence theory of knowledge about what exists claims that "true" knowledge of reality represents accurate correspondence of statements about and images of reality with the actual reality that the statements or images are attempting to represent. For example, the scientific method can verify that a statement is true based on the observable evidence that a thing exists. Many humans can point to the Rocky Mountains and say that this mountain range exists, and continues to exist even if no one is observing it or making statements about it.

Anti-realism

One can also speak of anti-realism about the same objects. Anti-realism is the latest in a long series of terms for views opposed to realism. Perhaps the first was idealism, so called because reality was said to be in the mind, or a product of our ideas. Berkeleyan idealism is the view, propounded by the Irish empiricist George Berkeley, that the objects of perception are actually ideas in the mind. In this view, one might be tempted to say that reality is a "mental construct"; this is not quite accurate, however, since, in Berkeley's view, perceptual ideas are created and coordinated by God. By the 20th century, views similar to Berkeley's were called phenomenalism. Phenomenalism differs from Berkeleyan idealism primarily in that Berkeley believed that minds, or souls, are not merely ideas nor made up of ideas, whereas varieties of phenomenalism, such as that advocated by Russell, tended to go farther to say that the mind itself is merely a collection of perceptions, memories, etc., and that there is no mind or soul over and above such mental events. Finally, anti-realism became a fashionable term for any view which held that the existence of some object depends upon the mind or cultural artifacts. The view that the so-called external world is really merely a social, or cultural, artifact, called social constructionism, is one variety of anti-realism. Cultural relativism is the view that social issues such as morality are not absolute, but at least partially cultural artifact.

Being

The nature of being is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For instance, Parmenides taught that reality was a single unchanging Being, whereas Heraclitus wrote that all things flow. The 20th-century philosopher Heidegger thought previous philosophers have lost sight of the question of Being (qua Being) in favour of the questions of beings (existing things), so he believed that a return to the Parmenidean approach was needed. An ontological catalogue is an attempt to list the fundamental constituents of reality. The question of whether or not existence is a predicate has been discussed since the Early Modern period, not least in relation to the ontological argument for the existence of God. Existence, that something is, has been contrasted with essence, the question of what something is. Since existence without essence seems blank, it associated with nothingness by philosophers such as Hegel. Nihilism represents an extremely negative view of being, the absolute a positive one.

Explanations for the existence of something rather than nothing

This section is an excerpt from Why is there anything at all?. "Why is there anything at all?" or "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is a question about the reason for basic existence which has been raised or commented on by a range of philosophers and physicists, including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger, who called it "the fundamental question of metaphysics".

Perception

The question of direct or "naïve" realism, as opposed to indirect or "representational" realism, arises in the philosophy of perception and of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience; the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain. Naïve realism is known as direct realism when developed to counter indirect or representative realism, also known as epistemological dualism, the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world.

Timothy Leary coined the influential term Reality Tunnel, by which he means a kind of representative realism. The theory states that, with a subconscious set of mental filters formed from their beliefs and experiences, every individual interprets the same world differently, hence "Truth is in the eye of the beholder". His ideas influenced the work of his friend Robert Anton Wilson.

Abstract objects and mathematics

The status of abstract entities, particularly numbers, is a topic of discussion in mathematics.

In the philosophy of mathematics, the best known form of realism about numbers is Platonic realism, which grants them abstract, immaterial existence. Other forms of realism identify mathematics with the concrete physical universe.

Anti-realist stances include formalism and fictionalism.

Some approaches are selectively realistic about some mathematical objects but not others. Finitism rejects infinite quantities. Ultra-finitism accepts finite quantities up to a certain amount. Constructivism and intuitionism are realistic about objects that can be explicitly constructed, but reject the use of the principle of the excluded middle to prove existence by reductio ad absurdum.

The traditional debate has focused on whether an abstract (immaterial, intelligible) realm of numbers has existed in addition to the physical (sensible, concrete) world. A recent development is the mathematical universe hypothesis, the theory that only a mathematical world exists, with the finite, physical world being an illusion within it.

An extreme form of realism about mathematics is the mathematical multiverse hypothesis advanced by Max Tegmark. Tegmark's sole postulate is: All structures that exist mathematically also exist physically. That is, in the sense that "in those complex enough to contain self-aware substructures will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world". The hypothesis suggests that worlds corresponding to different sets of initial conditions, physical constants, or altogether different equations should be considered real. The theory can be considered a form of Platonism in that it posits the existence of mathematical entities, but can also be considered a mathematical monism in that it denies that anything exists except mathematical objects.

Properties

Main article: Problem of universals

The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, properties, kinds or relations, such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas or a certain colour, that can be predicated of individuals or particulars or that individuals or particulars can be regarded as sharing or participating in. For example, Scott, Pat, and Chris have in common the universal quality of being human or humanity.

The realist school claims that universals are real – they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms are Platonic realism and Aristotelian realism. Platonic realism is the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars. Aristotelian realism, on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them.

Nominalism and conceptualism are the main forms of anti-realism about universals.

Time and space

Main article: Philosophy of space and time

A traditional realist position in ontology is that time and space have existence apart from the human mind. Idealists deny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some anti-realists whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless doubt the independent existence of time and space.

Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, described time as an a priori notion that, together with other a priori notions such as space, allows us to comprehend sense experience. Kant denies that either space or time are substance, entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds rather that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial measurements are used to quantify how far apart objects are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) events. Although space and time are held to be transcendentally ideal in this sense, they are also empirically real, i.e. not mere illusions.

Idealist writers such as J. M. E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time have argued that time is an illusion.

As well as differing about the reality of time as a whole, metaphysical theories of time can differ in their ascriptions of reality to the past, present and future separately.

  • Presentism holds that the past and future are unreal, and only an ever-changing present is real.
  • The block universe theory, also known as Eternalism, holds that past, present and future are all real, but the passage of time is an illusion. It is often said to have a scientific basis in relativity.
  • The growing block universe theory holds that past and present are real, but the future is not.

Time, and the related concepts of process and evolution are central to the system-building metaphysics of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Possible worlds

The term "possible world" goes back to Leibniz's theory of possible worlds, used to analyse necessity, possibility, and similar modal notions. Modal realism is the view, notably propounded by David Kellogg Lewis, that all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. In short: the actual world is regarded as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some "nearer" to the actual world and some more remote. Other theorists may use the Possible World framework to express and explore problems without committing to it ontologically. Possible world theory is related to alethic logic: a proposition is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds, and possible if it is true in at least one. The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is a similar idea in science.

Theories of everything (TOE) and philosophy

Main article: Theory of everything (philosophy)

The philosophical implications of a physical TOE are frequently debated. For example, if philosophical physicalism is true, a physical TOE will coincide with a philosophical theory of everything.

The "system building" style of metaphysics attempts to answer all the important questions in a coherent way, providing a complete picture of the world. Plato and Aristotle could be said to be early examples of comprehensive systems. In the early modern period (17th and 18th centuries), the system-building scope of philosophy is often linked to the rationalist method of philosophy, that is the technique of deducing the nature of the world by pure a priori reason. Examples from the early modern period include the Leibniz's Monadology, Descartes's Dualism, Spinoza's Monism. Hegel's Absolute idealism and Whitehead's Process philosophy were later systems.

Other philosophers do not believe its techniques can aim so high. Some scientists think a more mathematical approach than philosophy is needed for a TOE, for instance Stephen Hawking wrote in A Brief History of Time that even if we had a TOE, it would necessarily be a set of equations. He wrote, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"

Phenomenology

On a much broader and more subjective level, private experiences, curiosity, inquiry, and the selectivity involved in personal interpretation of events shapes reality as seen by one and only one person and hence is called phenomenological. While this form of reality might be common to others as well, it could at times also be so unique to oneself as to never be experienced or agreed upon by anyone else. Much of the kind of experience deemed spiritual occurs on this level of reality.

Phenomenology is a philosophical method developed in the early years of the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and a circle of followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. Subsequently, phenomenological themes were taken up by philosophers in France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's work.

The word phenomenology comes from the Greek phainómenon, meaning "that which appears", and lógos, meaning "study". In Husserl's conception, phenomenology is primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness, objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such reflection was to take place from a highly modified "first person" viewpoint, studying phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness whatsoever. Husserl believed that phenomenology could thus provide a firm basis for all human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and could establish philosophy as a "rigorous science".

Husserl's conception of phenomenology has been criticised and developed by his student and assistant Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), by existentialists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), and by other philosophers, such as Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), and Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977).

Skeptical hypotheses

A brain in a vat that believes it is walking

Skeptical hypotheses in philosophy suggest that reality could be very different from what we think it is; or at least that we cannot prove it is not. Examples include:

  • The "Brain in a vat" hypothesis is cast in scientific terms. It supposes that one might be a disembodied brain kept alive in a vat, and fed false sensory signals. This hypothesis is related to the Matrix hypothesis below.
  • The "Dream argument" of Descartes and Zhuangzi supposes reality to be indistinguishable from a dream.
  • Descartes' Evil demon is a being "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me."
  • The five minute hypothesis (or omphalos hypothesis or Last Thursdayism) suggests that the world was created recently together with records and traces indicating a greater age.
  • Diminished reality refers to artificially diminished reality, not due to limitations of sensory systems but via artificial filters.
  • The Matrix hypothesis or Simulated reality hypothesis suggest that we might be inside a computer simulation or virtual reality. Related hypotheses may also involve simulations with signals that allow the inhabitant species in virtual or simulated reality to perceive the external reality.

Non-western ancient philosophy and religion

Jain philosophy

Main article: Tattva (Jainism)

Jain philosophy postulates that seven tattva (truths or fundamental principles) constitute reality. These seven tattva are:

  1. Jīva – The soul which is characterized by consciousness.
  2. Ajīva – The non-soul.
  3. Asrava – Influx of karma.
  4. Bandha – The bondage of karma.
  5. Samvara – Obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul.
  6. Nirjara – Shedding of karmas.
  7. Moksha – Liberation or Salvation, i.e. the complete annihilation of all karmic matter (bound with any particular soul).

Physical sciences

Scientific realism

Scientific realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world (the universe) described by science (perhaps ideal science) is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of entities that are not directly observable discussed by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists state that one can make reliable claims about these entities (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as directly observable entities, as opposed to instrumentalism. The most used and studied scientific theories today state more or less the truth.

Realism and locality in physics

Main article: Principle of locality

Realism in the sense used by physicists does not equate to realism in metaphysics. The latter is the claim that the world is mind-independent: that even if the results of a measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer. Furthermore, a mind-independent property does not have to be the value of some physical variable such as position or momentum. A property can be dispositional (or potential), i.e. it can be a tendency: in the way that glass objects tend to break, or are disposed to break, even if they do not actually break. Likewise, the mind-independent properties of quantum systems could consist of a tendency to respond to particular measurements with particular values with ascertainable probability. Such an ontology would be metaphysically realistic, without being realistic in the physicist's sense of "local realism" (which would require that a single value be produced with certainty).

A closely related term is counterfactual definiteness (CFD), used to refer to the claim that one can meaningfully speak of the definiteness of results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).

Local realism is a significant feature of classical mechanics, of general relativity, and of classical electrodynamics; but not quantum mechanics. In a work now called the EPR paradox, Einstein relied on local realism to suggest that hidden variables were missing in quantum mechanics. However, John S. Bell subsequently showed that the predictions of quantum mechanics are inconsistent with hidden variables, a result known as Bell's theorem. The predictions of quantum mechanics have been verified: Bell's inequalities are violated, meaning either local realism or counterfactual definiteness must be incorrect. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics violate different parts of local realism and/or counterfactual definiteness.

The transition from "possible" to "actual" is a major topic of quantum physics, with related theories including quantum darwinism.

Role of "observation" in quantum mechanics

See also: Quantum decoherence

The quantum mind–body problem refers to the philosophical discussions of the mind–body problem in the context of quantum mechanics. Since quantum mechanics involves quantum superpositions, which are not perceived by observers, some interpretations of quantum mechanics place conscious observers in a special position.

The founders of quantum mechanics debated the role of the observer, and of them, Wolfgang Pauli and Werner Heisenberg believed that quantum mechanics expressed the observers knowledge and when an experiment was completed the additional knowledge should be incorporated in the wave function, an effect that came to be called state reduction or collapse. This point of view, which was never fully endorsed by Niels Bohr, was denounced as mystical and anti-scientific by Albert Einstein. Pauli accepted the term, and described quantum mechanics as lucid mysticism.

Heisenberg and Bohr always described quantum mechanics in logical positivist terms. Bohr also took an active interest in the philosophical implications of quantum theories such as his complementarity, for example. He believed quantum theory offers a complete description of nature, albeit one that is simply ill-suited for everyday experiences – which are better described by classical mechanics and probability. Bohr never specified a demarcation line above which objects cease to be quantum and become classical. He believed that it was not a question of physics, but one of philosophy.

Eugene Wigner reformulated the "Schrödinger's cat" thought experiment as "Wigner's friend" and proposed that the consciousness of an observer is the demarcation line which precipitates collapse of the wave function, independent of any realist interpretation. Commonly known as "consciousness causes collapse", this controversial interpretation of quantum mechanics states that observation by a conscious observer is what makes the wave function collapse. However, this is a minority view among quantum philosophers, considering it a misunderstanding. There are other possible solutions to the "Wigner's friend" thought experiment, which do not require consciousness to be different from other physical processes. Moreover, Wigner shifted to those interpretations in his later years.

Multiverse

The multiverse is the hypothetical set of multiple possible universes (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, and energy as well as the physical laws and constants that describe them. The term was coined in 1895 by the American philosopher and psychologist William James. In the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), one of the mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics, there are an infinite number of universes and every possible quantum outcome occurs in at least one universe, albeit there is a debate as to how real the (other) worlds are.

The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in cosmology, physics, astronomy, religion, philosophy, transpersonal psychology and fiction, particularly in science fiction and fantasy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called "alternative universes", "quantum universes", "interpenetrating dimensions", "parallel dimensions", "parallel worlds", "alternative realities", "alternative timelines", and "dimensional planes", among others.

In several theories, there is a series of, in some cases infinite, self-sustaining cycles – typically a series of Big Crunches (or Big Bounces). However, the respective universes do not exist at once but are forming or following in a logical order or sequence, with key natural constituents potentially varying between universes (see § Anthropic principle).

Anthropic principle

This paragraph is an excerpt from Anthropic principle. The anthropic principle, also known as the observation selection effect, is the hypothesis that the range of possible observations that could be made about the universe is limited by the fact that observations are only possible in the type of universe that is capable of developing intelligent life. Proponents of the anthropic principle argue that it explains why the universe has the age and the fundamental physical constants necessary to accommodate intelligent life. If either had been significantly different, no one would have been around to make observations. Anthropic reasoning has been used to address the question as to why certain measured physical constants take the values that they do, rather than some other arbitrary values, and to explain a perception that the universe appears to be finely tuned for the existence of life.

Personal and collective reality

White matter tracts within a human brain, as visualized by MRI tractography

Each individual has a different view of reality, with different memories and personal history, knowledge, personality traits and experience. This system, mostly referring to the human brain, affects cognition and behavior and into this complex new knowledge, memories, information, thoughts and experiences are continuously integrated. The connectomeneural networks/wirings in brains – is thought to be a key factor in human variability in terms of cognition or the way we perceive the world (as a context) and related features or processes. Sensemaking is the process by which people give meaning to their experiences and make sense of the world they live in. Personal identity is relating to questions like how a unique individual is persisting through time.

Sensemaking and determination of reality also occurs collectively, which is investigated in social epistemology and related approaches. From the collective intelligence perspective, the intelligence of the individual human (and potentially AI entities) is substantially limited and advanced intelligence emerges when multiple entities collaborate over time. Collective memory is an important component of the social construction of reality and communication and communication-related systems, such as media systems, may also be major components (see #Technology).

Philosophy of perception raises questions based on the evolutionary history of humans' perceptual apparatuses, particularly or especially individuals' physiological senses, described as "e don't see reality—we only see what was useful to see in the past", partly suggesting that "ur species has been so successful not in spite of our inability to see reality but because of it".

Scientific theories of everything

A theory of everything (TOE) is a putative theory of theoretical physics that fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of any experiment that could be carried out in principle. The theory of everything is also called the final theory. Many candidate theories of everything have been proposed by theoretical physicists during the twentieth century, but none have been confirmed experimentally. The primary problem in producing a TOE is that general relativity and quantum mechanics are hard to unify. This is one of the unsolved problems in physics.

Initially, the term "theory of everything" was used with an ironic connotation to refer to various overgeneralized theories. For example, a great-grandfather of Ijon Tichy, a character from a cycle of Stanisław Lem's science fiction stories of the 1960s, was known to work on the "General Theory of Everything". Physicist John Ellis claims to have introduced the term into the technical literature in an article in Nature in 1986. Over time, the term stuck in popularizations of quantum physics to describe a theory that would unify or explain through a single model the theories of all fundamental interactions and of all particles of nature: general relativity for gravitation, and the standard model of elementary particle physics – which includes quantum mechanics – for electromagnetism, the two nuclear interactions, and the known elementary particles.

Current candidates for a theory of everything include string theory, M theory, and loop quantum gravity.

Technology

Media

See also: § Personal and collective reality, and § Belief studies

Media – such as news media, social media, websites including Misplaced Pages, and fiction – shape individuals' and society's perception of reality (including as part of belief and attitude formation) and are partly used intentionally as means to learn about reality. Various technologies have changed society's relationship with reality such as the advent of radio and TV technologies.

Research investigates interrelations and effects, for example aspects in the social construction of reality. A major component of this shaping and representation of perceived reality is agenda, selection and prioritization – not only (or primarily) the quality, tone and types of content – which influences, for instance, the public agenda. Disproportional news attention for low-probability incidents – such as high-consequence accidents – can distort audiences' risk perceptions with harmful consequences. Various biases such as false balance, public attention dependence reactions like sensationalism and domination by "current events", as well as various interest-driven uses of media such as marketing can also have major impacts on the perception of reality. Time-use studies found that e.g. in 2018 the average U.S. American "spent around eleven hours every day looking at screens".

Filter bubbles and echo chambers

This paragraph is an excerpt from Filter bubble. A filter bubble or ideological frame is a state of intellectual isolation that can result from personalized searches, recommendation systems, and algorithmic curation. The search results are based on information about the user, such as their location, past click-behavior, and search history. Consequently, users become separated from information that disagrees with their viewpoints, effectively isolating them in their own cultural or ideological bubbles, resulting in a limited and customized view of the world. The choices made by these algorithms are only sometimes transparent. Prime examples include Google Personalized Search results and Facebook's personalized news-stream. A filter bubble has been described as exacerbating a phenomenon that called splinternet or cyberbalkanization, which happens when the internet becomes divided into sub-groups of like-minded people who become insulated within their own online community and fail to get exposure to different views. This concern dates back to the early days of the publicly accessible internet, with the term "cyberbalkanization" being coined in 1996. Other terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, including "ideological frames" and "the figurative sphere surrounding you as you search the internet."

Virtual reality and cyberspace

Virtual reality (VR) is a computer-simulated environment that can simulate physical presence in places in the real world, as well as in imaginary worlds.

Reality-virtuality continuum

The virtuality continuum is a continuous scale ranging between the completely virtual, a virtuality, and the completely real: reality. The reality–virtuality continuum therefore encompasses all possible variations and compositions of real and virtual objects. It has been described as a concept in new media and computer science, but in fact it could be considered a matter of anthropology. The concept was first introduced by Paul Milgram.

The area between the two extremes, where both the real and the virtual are mixed, is the so-called mixed reality. This in turn is said to consist of both augmented reality, where the virtual augments the real, and augmented virtuality, where the real augments the virtual. Cyberspace, the world's computer systems considered as an interconnected whole, can be thought of as a virtual reality; for instance, it is portrayed as such in the cyberpunk fiction of William Gibson and others. Second Life and MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft are examples of artificial environments or virtual worlds (falling some way short of full virtual reality) in cyberspace.

"RL" in internet culture

On the Internet, "real life" refers to life in the real world. It generally references life or consensus reality, in contrast to an environment seen as fiction or fantasy, such as virtual reality, lifelike experience, dreams, novels, or movies. Online, the acronym "IRL" stands for "in real life", with the meaning "not on the Internet". Sociologists engaged in the study of the Internet have determined that someday, a distinction between online and real-life worlds may seem "quaint", noting that certain types of online activity, such as sexual intrigues, have already made a full transition to complete legitimacy and "reality". The abbreviation "RL" stands for "real life". For example, one can speak of "meeting in RL" someone whom one has met in a chat or on an Internet forum. It may also be used to express an inability to use the Internet for a time due to "RL problems".

See also

Notes

  1. "reality | Definition of reality in English by Oxford Dictionaries". Oxford Dictionaries | English. Archived from the original on September 26, 2016. Retrieved 2017-10-28.
  2. Saridakis, E. (2016). "Information, reality, and modern physics". International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 30 (4): 327–341. doi:10.1080/02698595.2017.1331980. S2CID 126411165.
  3. Funk, Ken (2001-03-21). "What is a Worldview?". Retrieved 2019-12-10.
  4. Palmer, Gary B. (1996). Toward A Theory of Cultural Linguistics. University of Texas Press. p. 114. ISBN 978-0-292-76569-6.
  5. Some associationist philosophers have contended that mathematics comes from experience and is not a form of any a priori knowledge (Macleod 2016)
  6. Galen Strawson has stated that an a priori argument is one in which "you can see that it is true just lying on your couch. You don't have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical world. You don't have to do any science." (Sommers 2003)
  7. dynamis–energeia, translated into Latin as potentia–actualitas (earlier also possibilitas–efficacia). Giorgio Agamben, Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty (2013), p. 46.
  8. Sachs (2005).
  9. Sachs (1999, p. lvii).
  10. Durrant (1993, p. 206).
  11. Primmer, Justin (2018), "Belief", in Primmer, Justin (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, archived from the original on 15 November 2019, retrieved 2008-09-19
  12. ^ "Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
  13. "Formal Representations of Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 11 July 2020. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
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References

  • Berger, Peter L.; Luckmann, Thomas (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books. pp. 21–22.
  • Durrant, Michael (1993). Aristotle's De Anima in Focus. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-05340-2.
  • Jain, S. A. (1992). Reality. Jwalamalini Trust. Not in Copyright Alt URL
  • Macleod, Christopher (25 August 2016). "John Stuart Mill". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 ed.) – via Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  • Sachs, Joe (1999). Aristotle's Metaphysics, a New Translation. Santa Fe, New Mexico: Green Lion Books. ISBN 1-888009-03-9.
  • Sachs, Joe (2005). "Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Sommers, Tamler (March 2003). Jarman, Casey (ed.). "Galen Strawson (interview)". Believer Magazine. 1 (1). San Francisco, California: McSweeney's McMullens. Retrieved 10 July 2013.

Further reading

  • George Musser, "Virtual Reality: How close can physics bring us to a truly fundamental understanding of the world?", Scientific American, vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp. 30–35.
    • "Physics is ... the bedrock of the broader search for truth.... Yet sometimes seem to be struck by a collective impostor syndrome.... Truth can be elusive even in the best-established theories. Quantum mechanics is as well tested a theory as can be, yet its interpretation remains inscrutable. The deeper physicists dive into reality, the more reality seems to evaporate."

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