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Eastern Front
Part of the European theatre of World War I
Clockwise from top left: soldiers stationed in the Carpathian Mountains, 1915; German soldiers in Kiev, March 1918; the Russian ship Slava, October 1917; Russian infantry, 1914; Romanian infantry
Date 1 August 1914 – 3 March 1918 Location Central and Eastern Europe Result Central Powers victory
Belligerents
Central Powers:  Germany  Austria-Hungary  Bulgaria (1916–1917)  Ottoman Empire (1916–1917)	Allied Powers:  Russia (1914–1917)  Romania (1916–1917)  Serbia (1916–1917) Belgium (1915–1917)  United Kingdom (1916–1917)  France (1916–1917) Soviet Russia (1917–1918)
Commanders and leaders
Wilhelm II Paul von Hindenburg Erich Ludendorff Leopold of Bavaria Max Hoffmann Franz Joseph I Conrad von Hötzendorf A. A. von Straußenburg Ferdinand I of Bulgaria Nikola Zhekov Enver Pasha	Nicholas II Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhail Alekseyev Aleksei Brusilov Lavr Kornilov Ferdinand I Constantin Prezan Nikolai Krylenko
Units involved
Units East Prussia 8th Army 10th Army Poland 9th Army 1st Army Polish Legionnaires Galicia 2nd Army 3rd Army 4th Army 11th Army XV Corps Ukrainian People's Army Romania 9th Army Danube Army 1st Army 3rd Army VI Corps Naval units German Navy (Baltic Sea) Constantinople Flotilla Ottoman Navy (Black Sea) Danube Flotilla	Units Northern Front 1st Army 5th Army 6th Army 12th Army Western Front 2nd Army 10th Army Special Army Southwestern Front 3rd Army 4th Army 7th Army 11th Army Romanian Front 4th Army 6th Army 8th Army 9th Army 2nd Army 1st Army 4th Army 3rd Army Czechoslovak Legions 1st Serbian Division Expeditionary Corps Expeditionary Force French Military Mission Naval units Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet Black Sea Fleet Danube Flotilla Baltic Submarine Flotilla
Strength
October 1917 1,178,600 infantry 39,000 cavalry 1,690 light guns 2,230 heavy guns	October 1917 2,166,700 infantry 110,600 cavalry 1,226 light guns 1,139 heavy guns
Casualties and losses
1,612,089–2,000,000 317,118 dead 1,151,153 wounded 143,818 captured 4,377,000–5,172,000: 726,000–1,150,000 dead 2,172,000 wounded 1,479,289–1,850,000 captured 45,000: 8,000 dead 22,000 wounded 10,000 captured 30,250 Total: 5,952,000–6,452,000+ casualties 1,038,000–1,458,000 dead	6,500,000–9,000,000 See casualties section 535,700: 335,706 dead 120,000 wounded 80,000 captured Total: ~7,035,700–8,054,569+ casualties 1,110,706–2,590,100 dead
Civilian deaths: 2,000,000+ Russian Empire: 410,000 civilians died due to military action 730,000 civilians died of war-related causes Kingdom of Romania: 130,000 civilians died due to military action 200,000 civilians died of war-related causes Austria-Hungary: 120,000 civilians died due to military action 467,000 civilians died of war-related causes

The Eastern Front or Eastern Theater of World War I  was a theater of operations that encompassed at its greatest extent the entire frontier between Russia and Romania on one side and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, and Germany on the other. It ranged from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, involved most of Eastern Europe, and stretched deep into Central Europe. The term contrasts with the Western Front, which was being fought in Belgium and France. Unlike the static warfare on the Western Front, the fighting on the geographically larger Eastern Front was more dynamic, often involving the flanking and encirclement of entire formations, and resulted in over 100,000 square miles of territory becoming occupied by a foreign power.

At the start of the war Russia launched offensives against both Germany and Austria-Hungary that were meant to achieve a rapid victory. The invasion of East Prussia was completely defeated while the advance into Austria-Hungary stalled in the Carpathians, and following successful offensives by the Central Powers in 1915 its gains were reversed. Germany and Austria-Hungary defeated Russian forces in Galicia and Poland, causing Russia to abandon the Polish salient, parts of Belarus and the Baltic region, and Galicia. However, the campaigns of 1914–1915 also failed to achieve Germany's objective of taking Russia out of the war, and by 1916 Germany prioritized its resources for winning in the West.

Russia went on the offensive to take pressure off of France at Verdun: Russia's attack near Lake Naroch in early 1916 was quickly defeated by Germany, but in the summer of 1916 the Brusilov offensive became the largest Entente victory in the war. Russia inflicted over one million casualties on Austria-Hungary and forced Germany to redeploy divisions from the Western Front, at the cost of its own heavy losses. In August 1916 Romania entered the war but was quickly overrun by Germany, though Russia helped prevent a total Romanian collapse. The events of the February Revolution in March [O.S. February] 1917, caused by food shortages in Russian cities, began a decline in discipline among the troops.

After the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II, the Russian Provisional Government chose to continue the war to fulfill its obligations to the Entente. In July 1917 Russia's last offensive of the war ended in failure, and in September Germany captured Riga, bringing the German Army closer to the Russian capital. This was followed by a military coup attempt that weakened the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian Republic in the October Revolution of November [O.S. October] 1917. Despite the political instability, the majority of the Russian Army was still intact and stayed at the front line until early 1918, though the Bolsheviks began taking steps to dissolve it in December 1917 while maintaining some forces against the Central Powers as their negotiations were ongoing.

The new Soviet government established by the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers in March 1918 after Operation Faustschlag, taking Russia out of the war; leading to a Central Powers victory. However, the Western Entente soon defeated the Central Powers, with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk being annulled by the Armistice of 11 November 1918. Romania and the Central Powers signed a separate peace treaty on 7 May 1918, but it was canceled by Romania on 10 November 1918.

Background

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand eventually led to Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914 with German backing, and after the Serbian response to it was rejected, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia on 28 July. Russia had made a decision to support Serbia and defend its interests in the Balkans before that, and on 29 July Russian emperor Nicholas II ordered a partial mobilization of the Russian Army in the military districts that bordered Austria. The following day he was convinced by his advisors to order a full mobilization to follow the military's existing mobilization schedule. Nicholas hoped Germany would see this as a regional conflict between Russia and Austria, but because their war plans depended on taking advantage of Russia's slower mobilization speed, and due to the position of both countries, they felt pressure to go to war immediately. Austria-Hungary began full mobilization on 31 July, and Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914.

Russia

Russia's plan at the outbreak of war was known as Schedule 19. Approved by Emperor Nicholas II in July 1910 and amended over the next two years, the plan concentrated Russia's armies on its western border with Germany and Austria-Hungary and was initially defensive. The original Schedule 19 would have had the Russian Army mobilize its troops to locations that were a significant distance away from its western border and leave the entire Polish salient to be defended by local fortresses and the Warsaw garrison. Under this version Russia would not have taken any offensive action and would have waited to react to movements by Germany and Austria-Hungary. The defensive nature of Russian planning went back to the military reforms in the 1860s following the Crimean War and was also influenced by the limited capability of Russia's railway network to facilitate the quick mobilization of troops, though that was gradually improving.

Russian strategy remained this way until developments that took place starting in 1911. That was the year that the French Army chief of staff visited Russia and asked the Russian high command to plan for an immediate offensive if war with Germany broke out to help prevent them from capturing Paris. This was also in accordance with Russia's 1892 promise to attack Germany if France was invaded in order to open a second front. In 1912 the Russian chief of staff, Yakov Zhilinsky, told the French that Russia would go on the offensive against Germany fifteen days after the start of its mobilization. By this point, the improvements in Russia's infrastructure made this a lot more feasible, and there was also domestic pressure for Russia to not abandon its borderlands to foreign occupation. In 1911 new proposals for modifying Schedule 19 were made by army officers, with the most notable among them being Quartermaster-General Yuri Danilov's argument for going on the offensive against both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In early 1912, the Russian high command decided on a variant of the plan known as Schedule 19A, in which two Russian armies would invade East Prussia while four armies would invade Galicia. This did not give Russia the decisive advantage in either location, but it tried to balance the need for Russia to support France by attacking Germany while also acknowledging that the main interest of Russian foreign policy was in the Balkans. The plan also meant that Russia would begin its offensive before its army was fully mobilized, but it was believed that this was a necessary risk, because there would be a limited amount of time to attack Germany in support of France. The adoption of Schedule 19A in 1912 marked the first time in decades that Russian war planning was primarily offensive.

Germany

Prior to the outbreak of war, German strategy was based on the Schlieffen Plan. With the Franco-Russian Agreement in place from the early 1890s, Germany knew that war with either of these combatants would result in war with the other, which meant that there would be a two-front war in both the west and the east. Therefore, the German General Staff, led by Alfred von Schlieffen from 1891 to 1906, developed a plan that called for German armies to pass through Belgium and then turn south to quickly capture Paris, while a smaller German force would pin down the French defenders along the Franco-German border. With France being defeated before Russia could fully mobilize, Germany could then turn its focus on Russia, which Schlieffen believed would not be taken out of the war as quickly because of its much larger territory. The Schlieffen Plan was actually a change from his predecessor in the 1880s, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who believed that Germany should first be on the defensive in the west and should coordinate with Austria to defeat Russia.

Schlieffen's successor at the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, maintained the basic plan that Schlieffen put forward in 1905 of quickly knocking out France in the west before turning to focus on Russia, thereby avoiding a two-front war. This strategy was fully adopted by the German government in 1913. But the plan did not take into account that the growing military capabilities of Russia in the years since the Russo-Japanese War meant that the Russian mobilization would proceed faster than Schlieffen had originally thought. Another problem with the German strategy was the deliberate choice to not coordinate it with their allies in Austria-Hungary. Moltke the Younger wanted Austria to assist Germany by going on the offensive against Russia in the early stages of the war, and never told his Austrian counterpart, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, that Germany was not going have its own offensive in the east. Conrad, for his part, was also misleading the Germans by allowing them to think Austria would prioritize an attack against Russia, when he actually planned to focus the Austro-Hungarian offensive power against Serbia.

Conversely, the Imperial German Navy believed it could be victorious over Britain with Russian neutrality, something which Moltke knew would not be possible.

Austria-Hungary

Austria-Hungary's participation in the outbreak of World War I has been neglected by historians, as emphasis has traditionally been placed on Germany's role as the prime instigator. However, the "spark" that ignited the First World War is attributed to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, which took place on 28 June 1914. Approximately a month later, on 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. This act led to a series of events that would quickly expand into the First World War; thus, the Habsburg government in Vienna initiated the pivotal decision that would begin the conflict.

The causes of the Great War have generally been defined in diplomatic terms, but certain deep-seated issues in Austria-Hungary undoubtedly contributed to the beginnings of the First World War. The Austro-Hungarian situation in the Balkans pre-1914 is a primary factor in its involvement in the war. The movement towards South Slav unity was a major problem for the Habsburg Empire, which was facing increasing nationalist pressure from its multinational populace. As Europe's third largest state, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was hardly homogeneous; comprising over fifty million people and eleven nationalities, the Empire was a conglomeration of a number of diverse cultures, languages, and peoples.

Specifically, the South Slavic people of Austria-Hungary desired to amalgamate with Serbia in an effort to officially solidify their shared cultural heritage. Over seven million South Slavs lived inside the Empire, while three million lived outside it. With the growing emergence of nationalism in the twentieth century, unity of all South Slavs looked promising. This tension is exemplified by Conrad von Hötzendorf's letter to Franz Ferdinand:

The unification of the South Slav race is one of the powerful national movements which can neither be ignored nor kept down. The question can only be, whether unification will take place within the boundaries of the Monarchy – that is at the expense of Serbia's independence – or under Serbia's leadership at the expense of the Monarchy. The cost to the Monarchy would be the loss of its South Slav provinces and thus of almost its entire coastline. The loss of territory and prestige would relegate the Monarchy to the status of a small power.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 by Austrian foreign minister Baron von Aehrenthal in an effort to assert domination over the Balkans inflamed Slavic nationalism and angered Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina became a "rallying cry" for South Slavs, with hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia steadily increasing. The situation was ripe for conflict, and when the Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Austrian imperial heir, Franz Ferdinand, these longstanding hostilities culminated into an all-out war.

The Allied Powers wholeheartedly supported the Slavs' nationalistic fight. George Macaulay Trevelyan, a British historian, saw Serbia's war against Austria-Hungary as a "war of liberation" that would "free South Slavs from tyranny." In his own words: "If ever there was a battle for freedom, there is such a battle now going on in Southeastern Europe against Austrian and Magyar. If this war ends in the overthrow of the Magyar tyranny, an immense step forward will have been taken toward racial liberty and European peace."

Romania

In the immediate years preceding the First World War, the Kingdom of Romania was involved in the Second Balkan War on the side of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and the Ottoman Empire against Bulgaria. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913, ended the Balkan conflict and added 6,960 square kilometers to Romania's territory. Although militarized, Romania decided upon a policy of neutrality at the start of the First World War, mainly due to having territorial interests in both Austria-Hungary (Transylvania and Bukovina) and in Russia (Bessarabia). Strong cultural influences also affected Romanian leanings, however. King Carol I, as a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, favoured his Germanic roots, while the Romanian people, influenced by their Orthodox church and Latin-based language, were inclined to join France. Perhaps King Carol's attempts at joining the war on the side of the Central powers would have been fruitful had he not died in 1914, but Romanian disenchantment with Austria-Hungary had already influenced public and political opinion. French endorsement of Romanian action against Bulgaria, and support of the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest was particularly effective at inclining Romania towards the Entente. Furthermore, Russian courting of Romanian sympathies, exemplified by the visit of the Tsar to Constanța on 14 June 1914, signaled in a new era of positive relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, King Ferdinand I of Romania maintained a policy of neutrality, intending to gain the most for Romania by negotiating between competing powers. The result of the negotiations with the Entente was the Treaty of Bucharest (1916), which stipulated the conditions under which Romania agreed to join the war on the side of the Entente, particularly territorial promises in Austria-Hungary: Transylvania, Crișana and Maramureș, the whole Banat and most of Bukovina. According to historian John Keegan, these enticements offered by the Allies were never concrete, for in secret, Russia and France agreed not to honor any conventions when the end of the war came.

1914

In the years prior to 1914, Austro-Russian co-operation was both crucial for European peace and difficult to maintain. Old suspicions exacerbated by the Bosnian crisis stood in the way of agreement between the two empires, as did ethnic sensitivities.

The Russian military was the largest in the world consisting of 1,400,000 men. They could also mobilize up to 5 million men, but only had 4.6 million rifles to give them. Russian troops were satisfactorily supplied at the beginning of the war, there was more light artillery than France, and no less than Germany.

The empires clash

The first events were the capture of Kalish and Chenhostov by the Germans without fighting, and the first real clash was clashes at Wierzbołów.
The first full-scale operation was invasion of East Prussia on 17 August 1914 and the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. The Russian offensive in the Battle of Stallupönen, which was the opening battle of the Eastern Front, quickly turned to a disastrous defeat following the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914; even though the Russians were successfully defending at Gumbinnen a while before Tannenberg. After the Russian disaster, German troops under the command of Hindenburg inflicted another crushing defeat on the numerically superior Russian army in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. A second Russian incursion into Galicia was more successful, with the Russians controlling almost all of that region by the end of 1914, routing four Austrian armies in the process. Under the command of Nikolai Ivanov, Nikolai Ruzsky and Aleksei Brusilov, the Russians won the Battle of Galicia in September and began the Siege of Przemyśl, the next fortress on the road towards Kraków.

This early Russian success in 1914 on the Austro-Russian border was a reason for concern to the Central Powers and caused considerable German forces to be transferred to the East to take pressure off the Austrians, leading to the creation of the new German Ninth Army. The Austro-Hungarian government accepted the Polish proposal of establishing the Supreme National Committee as the Polish central authority within the Empire, responsible for the formation of the Polish Legions, an auxiliary military formation within the Austro-Hungarian army. At the end of 1914, the main focus of the fighting shifted to central part of Russian Poland, west of the river Vistula. The October Battle of the Vistula River, Augustow operation, and the November Battle of Łódź they brought the Germans only huge losses, and the strengthening of the Russians in the region. Germans' initial plans to destroy the Russians in Poland ended in desperate attempts to prevent their invasion of Silesia

At the same time, Austria-Hungary was trying to regain the territories lost in the summer, they attacked the Russians on the San River, and after a long period of fighting they were forced to retreat. The Russians went on the offensive, came close to Krakow and occupied Chernivtsi, but a counterattack by the Central Powers saved the situation.

The year ended with a bloody battle on the rivers Bzura, Ravka, Nida and Pilica, where the Central Powers planned to take Warsaw, but could not and were forced to withdraw from the battle.

1915

Central Powers victories, retreat of the Imperial Russian Army

In 1915 the Chief of German Great General Staff, General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn decided to make its main effort on the Eastern Front, and accordingly transferred considerable forces there. The year began with a successful German offensive in the area of the Masurian lakes. At the same time, a large battle for the city of Przasnysz took place on the Polish front. The city changed hands several times but eventually remained in Russian hands. As a result of the battle, the Germans lost from 38,000 to 60,000 soldiers and Russian losses amounted to about 40,000 men. In March, the Germans tried to take Poland again, the third Battle of Warsaw began, and like the previous two, ended with the defeat of Germany. In May 1915, to eliminate the Russian threat the Central Powers began the successful Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive in Galicia.

After the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the Eastern Front functioned under a unified command. The offensive soon turned into a general advance and a corresponding strategic retreat by the Russian Army. The cause of the reverses suffered by the Russian Army, despite a significant numerical superiority over the German enemy, was not so many errors in the tactical sphere, as the deficiency in technical equipment, particularly in artillery and ammunition as well as the corruption and incompetence of the Russian officers. Only by 1916 did the buildup of Russian war industries increase the production of war material and improve the supply situation.

By mid-1915, the Russians had been expelled from Russian Poland, The whole campaign cost the Russians about 400,000 men, however, the Germans and Austrians suffered setbacks, their attempt to break through to Lublin was repulsed with losses of 37,500 people, the Russians lost 9,524 people, and hence pushed hundreds of kilometers away from the borders of the Central Powers, removing the threat of Russian invasion of Germany, although there was still slight Russian penetration into Austria-Hungary. At the end of 1915 the German-Austrian advance was stopped on the line Riga–Jakobstadt–Dünaburg–Baranovichi–Pinsk–Dubno–Tarnopol. The general outline of this front line did not change until the Russian collapse in 1917.

During the campaign of 1915, the Russian Empire lost the entire line of western fortresses, and more than 4,000 guns. The causes of heavy defeats and losses of personnel, weapons, and as a result - vast territories (the entire Kingdom of Poland, part of the Baltic states, Grodno, partly Volhynia and Podolia provinces - up to 300,000 square kilometers) were to a large extent systemic shortcomings in the management of the armed forces and the defense industry. The multi-stage placement of military orders, their slow passage in the depths of the War Ministry, the disunity of the front and rear played a negative role. Thus, until the autumn of 1915, the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief only coordinated the actions of the commanders-in-chief of the armies of the fronts, distributed reinforcements, requesting them from the War Ministry. The Minister of War was responsible for organizing the production of weapons and ammunition, the implementation of the replenishment of troop personnel, military transportation outside the provinces declared a theater of military operations. The military districts in the theater of operations were subordinate to the commanders-in-chief of the armies of the fronts, but not to the Headquarters. Military production also lagged behind: until the end of autumn, the active army suffered from a shortage of rifles and ammunition, the consumption of which turned out to be incommensurable with the volume of production.

Contemporaries also noted the isolation of the Russian commanding staff from the soldiers, the lack of practical warfare skills among the top-level commanders. "We did have courage to send people to mass slaughter, hiding behind the difficulty of tactical responsibility, to slaughter often without purpose. We sent them, being ourselves far away, not seeing either our own or the enemy, and therefore not conforming to reality. Instead of punishment, we reward such leaders, because as far as the leaders were far away, the same, but still more, the higher leaders kept even more distant. People ceased to be people, but turned into pawns. We went to the fight in a state of some kind of oblivion and stunnedness", wrote the representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General Fyodor Palitzin, in his diary.

Failures in the Russian system of command and control of troops and the organization of hostilities occurred at other levels. Thus, serious shortcomings in reconnaissance led to the absence of any analysis of the enemy's plans and actions. With a general superiority in forces, almost every Central Powers's operation in 1915 was "unexpected" for the command from the front to the regimental level. Passion for undercover intelligence in the highest Russian headquarters did not justify itself, and tactical intelligence was still based on barely reliable testimony of prisoners, in the absence of which the command up to the army, inclusive, was simply "blind". The separation of artillery from infantry with subordination to the inspectors of the corps and ammunition supply units (park brigades and divisions) created difficulties in the operational replenishment of ammunition and shells in the combat units. At the same time, huge stockpiles of ammunition were created in the fortresses, which were then delivered to the enemy during the retreat or destroyed due to the impossibility of evacuation. Special units were not created for the construction of fortifications in the rear of the troops. Most often, such work was hastily carried out by militia squads and the mobilized local population, sometimes including women, and then brought to the necessary defensive state by the combat units retreating on them, already exhausted by battles and night marches.

Russian strategic expanses allowed the army to take a break from failures and start active resistance, the Germans could no longer use the lack of artillery supplies from the Russians and the first setbacks began, the breakthrough to Minsk and the offensive on Dvinsk completely failed with heavy losses for the Germans, the offensive in central Belarus also turned out to be unsuccessful, the Russians began to behave more actively on the southern front, where Austria-Hungary suffered a heavy defeat near Lutsk, the situation was saved by German reserves. The Russians also began to go on the offensive to ease the pressure on Serbia, although unsuccessfully, but there was a turning point in the war in favor of Russia, failing to finish the campaign in 1915, the Germans were deprived of the opportunity to win the war.

Russo-Turkish offensive, winter 1915–1916

After the Battle of Sarikamish, the Russo-Turkish front quickly turned in favor of Russian forces. The Turks were concerned with reorganizing their army and also fighting the massive Allied armada that landed in Galipoli. Meanwhile, Russia was preoccupied with other armies on the Eastern Front. However, the appointment of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich as Viceroy and Commander in the Caucasus in September 1915 revived the situation of the Russo-Turkish front.

When the Allies withdrew from Gallipoli in December, the Caucasus Army's Chief of Staff General Nikolai Yudenich believed Turkish forces would take action against his army. This concern was legitimate: Bulgaria's entry into the war as Germany's ally in October caused serious alarm, as a land route from Germany to Turkey was now open and would allow for an unrestricted flow of German weapons to the Turks. A "window of opportunity" appeared that would allow the Russians to destroy the Turkish Third Army, as the British required assistance in Mesopotamia (now modern day Iraq). Britain's efforts to besiege Baghdad had been halted at Ctesiphon, and they were forced to retreat. This led to an increasing number of attacks by Turkish forces. The British requested the Russians to attack in an attempt to distract the Turks, and Yudenich agreed. The resulting offensive began on 10 January 1916.

This offensive was unanticipated by the Turks, as it was in the middle of winter. The Turkish situation was exacerbated by the absences of Third Army's commander Kamil Pasha and Chief of Staff Major Guse. Coupled with an imbalance of forces – the Russians had 325,000 troops while the Turks only 78,000 – the situation appeared grim for the Central Powers. After three months of fighting, the Russians captured the city of Trabzon on 18 April 1916.

1916

Allied operations in 1916 were dictated by an urgent need to force Germany to transfer forces from its Western to Eastern fronts, to relieve the pressure on the French at the Battle of Verdun. This was to be accomplished by a series of Russian offensives which would force the Germans to deploy additional forces to counter them. The first such operation was the Lake Naroch Offensive in March–April 1916, the Germans repulsed the attacks, but the offensive achieved its main goal - the Germans stopped the attack on Verdun, giving the French a break.

Brusilov offensive

The Italian operations during 1916 had one extraordinary result: Austrian divisions were pulled away from the Russian southern front. This allowed the Russian forces to organize a counter-offensive. The Brusilov offensive was a large tactical assault carried out by Russian forces against Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia. General Aleksei Brusilov believed victory against the Central Powers was possible if close attention was paid to preparation. Brusilov suggested that the Russians should attack on a wide front, and to position their trenches a mere 75 yards (69 m) away from Austrian trenches.

Brusilov's plan worked impeccably. The Russians outnumbered the Austrians 200,000 to 150,000, and held a considerable advantage in guns, with 904 large guns to 600. Most importantly innovative new tactics similar to those independently invented by Erwin Rommel were used to perform quick and effective close-range surprise attacks that allowed a steady advance. The Russian Eighth Army overwhelmed the Austrian Fourth and pushed on to Lutsk, advancing 40 miles (64 km) beyond the starting position. Over a million Austrians were lost, with over 500,000 men killed or taken prisoner by mid-June.

Although the Brusilov offensive was initially successful, it slowed down considerably. An inadequate number of troops and poorly maintained supply lines hindered Brusilov's ability to follow up on the initial victories in June. The Brusilov offensive is considered to be the greatest Russian victory of the First World War. Although it cost the Russians half a million casualties during the first two months alone, the offensive successfully diverted substantial forces of the Central Powers from the Western front, and persuaded Romania to join the war, diverting even more Central Powers forces to the East.

Development of Russian industry

A series of failures in 1915 gave the Russians time to reconfigure industry for wartime, and they did it successfully, Russian industry began to overtake Austrian in terms of growth rates and eventually increased the productivity of ammunition several times. Here is what information was announced at the Duma meeting:

The production of rifles doubled, the production of machine guns increased 6 times, the production of light guns increased 9 times, the production of artillery shells increased 40 times, the production of heavy artillery increased 4 times, and finally, the production of aircraft increased 4 times.

Romania enters the war

It is no exaggeration to say that Roumania may be the turning-point of the campaign. If the Germans fail there it will be the greatest disaster inflicted upon them. Afterwards it will only be a question of time. But should Germany succeed I hesitate to think what the effect will be on the fortunes of the campaign. … and yet no one seems to have thought it his particular duty to prepare a plan...

— David Lloyd George, War Memoirs

Up until 1916, the Romanians followed the tides of war with interest, while attempting to situate themselves in the most advantageous position. French and Russian diplomats had begun courting the Romanians early on, but persuasion tactics gradually intensified. For King Ferdinand to commit his force of half a million men, he expected the Allies to offer a substantial incentive. Playing on Romanian anti-Hungarian sentiment the Allies promised the Austria-Hungarian territory of Ardeal (Transylvania) to Romania. Transylvanian demographics strongly favoured the Romanians. Romania succumbed to Allied enticement on 18 August 1916. Nine days later, on 27 August, Romanian troops marched into Transylvania.

Romania's entry into the war provoked major strategic changes for the Germans. In September 1916, German troops were mobilized to the Eastern Front. Additionally, the German Chief of the General Staff, General Erich Von Falkenhayn was forced to resign from office though his successor appointed him to command the combined Central Powers forces against Romania, along with General August von Mackensen. Kaiser Wilhelm II immediately replaced Falkenhayn with Paul von Hindenburg. Von Hindenburg's deputy, the more adept Erich Ludendorff, was given effective control of the army and ordered to advance on Romania. On 3 September, the first troops of the Central Powers marched into Romanian territory. Simultaneously, the Bulgarian Air Force commenced an incessant bombing of Bucharest. In an attempt to relieve some pressure, French and British forces launched a new offensive known as the Battle of the Somme, while the Brusilov offensive continued in the East.

It is certain that so relatively small a state as Rumania had never before been given a role so important, and, indeed, so decisive for the history of the world at so favorable a moment. Never before had two Great Powers like Germany and Austria found themselves so much at the mercy of the military resources of a country which had scarcely one twentieth of the population of the two great states. Judging by the military situation, it was to be expected that Rumania had only to advance where she wished to decide the world war in favor of those Powers which had been hurling themselves at us in vain for years. Thus everything seemed to depend on whether Rumania was ready to make any sort of use of her momentary advantage.

— Paul von Hindenburg, Out of My Life

The entrance of Romania into the war was disconcerting for von Hindenburg. On 15 September, Paul von Hindenburg issued the following order, stating that: "The main task of the Armies is now to hold fast all positions on the Western, Eastern, Italian and Macedonian Fronts, and to employ all other available forces against Rumania." Fortunately for the Central Powers, the quantity and quality of the Romanian Army was overestimated. Although numbering half a million men, the Romanian Army suffered from poor training and a lack of appropriate equipment.

The initial success of the Romanian Army in Austria-Hungarian territory was quickly undermined by the Central Powers. German and Austro-Hungarian troops advanced from the north, while Bulgarian-Turkish-German forces marched into Romania from the south. Although thought to be a tactical blunder by contemporaries, the Romanians opted to mount operations in both directions. By the middle of November the German force passed through the Carpathians, suffering significant casualties due to determined Romanian resistance. By 5 December, Bulgarian troops had crossed the Danube and were approaching the capital, Bucharest. At the same time as the Austro-Hungarian troops moved east, and as the Bulgarians marched north, the Turks had sent in two army divisions by sea to the Dobruja from the east. Eventually, the Romanian forces were pushed back behind the Siret in northern Moldavia. They received help from the Allies, notably from France which sent a military mission of more than a thousand officers, health and support staff.

Proclamation to win over the Poles

The Act of 5 November 1916 was proclaimed then to the Poles jointly by the Emperors Wilhelm II of Germany and Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary. This act promised the creation of the Kingdom of Poland out of territory of Congress Poland, envisioned by its authors as a puppet state controlled by the Central Powers. The origin of that document was the dire need to draft new recruits from German-occupied Poland for the war with Russia. Following the Armistice of 11 November 1918 ending the World War I, in spite of the previous initial total dependence of the kingdom on its sponsors, it ultimately served against their intentions as the cornerstone proto state of the nascent Second Polish Republic, the latter composed also of territories never intended by the Central Powers to be ceded to Poland.

Aftermath of 1916

By January 1917, the ranks of the Romanian army had been significantly thinned. Roughly 150,000 Romanian soldiers had been taken prisoner, 200,000 men were dead or wounded, and lost two thirds of their country, including the capital. Importantly, the Ploiești oilfields, the only significant source of oil in Europe west of the Black Sea, had been destroyed before they were abandoned to the Central Powers.

1917

The Russian Army in 1917

Most modern people believe that the Russian army was destined to lose the war after 1916. However, Russian General Aleksei Brusilov held a different opinion and wrote in his memoirs: "People mistakenly believe that after the retreat of 1915, the Russian army could not fight, by the end of 1916 it was well trained and accomplished an incredible feat... She defeated the superior forces of the enemy, and in such numbers that no other army in the world could have won." Russia's withdrawal from the war turned out to be a nightmare for the Western Allies. Even the entry of the United States into the war did not immediately help the Allies recover from the loss of strength and assistance that the Russian army had brought to the Allied war effort.

Winston Churchill also confirms the strength of the Russian army: "History was not so merciless to any country as to Russia. Her ship was pulled when the harbor was already visible, the ship was wrecked when the storm passed. All the victims had already been transferred, the work was already over. Despair and change overcame the authorities when the task was already completed.” These words are also supported by Russian monogrophist Sergei Oldenburg, who wrote one of the largest works about the time of Tsar Nicholas II. Oldenburg believes that the Russian troops were in excellent condition by the beginning of 1917, he claims the army was well supplied and well fed, and there were 50 percent more Russians than Austro-Germans in terms of the number of armed men at the front, and the Russians had 10 percent more artillery in terms of the number of guns. The supply of new guns was also significant, allegedly almost as much as the total of Britain and France combined. In the army of the Central Powers, due to the war, there were declines in industrial opportunities, except for Austria, but the growth rate of Russian industry was still higher.

Even the armies of the Central Powers assessed the condition of the Russians and their combat strength, more than 72 percent of all infantry divisions were characterized by the information committee of the Austrian General Staff as: "outstanding units" and "first-class troops". However, all these material successes came to naught after the February Revolution, which killed the moral composition of the army, causing an incredible wave of deserters. Also worth noting is the Russian Expeditionary Force, which continued to maintain a presence on both the Western Front and the Macedonian front, even after the October Revolution, remaining on those fronts until the Armistice on 11 November 1918. Even after the February Revolution, most of the Russian Army remained intact and the front, willing to fight defensively but ineffective on the offensive. The demands of the soldiers after the revolution were mainly about reducing certain powers that officers had, and many still supported fighting a defensive war. Units in the rear were most likely to demand immediate peace than front line units. Desertions on a significant scale only began after the October Revolution, and accelerated in February 1918 when peace negotiations between the Bolsheviks and Germans broke down.

Russia – the February Revolution

The Russian February Revolution aimed to topple the Russian monarchy and resulted in the creation of the Provisional Government. The revolution was a turning point in Russian history, and its significance and influence can still be felt in many countries today. Although many Russians wanted a revolution, no one had expected it to happen when it did – let alone how it did.

On International Women's Day, Thursday, 23 February 1917/8 March 1917, as many as 90,000 female workers in the city of Petrograd left their factory jobs and marched through the streets, shouting "Bread", "Down with the autocracy!" and "Stop the War!" These women were tired, hungry, and angry, after working long hours in miserable conditions to feed their families because their menfolk were fighting at the front. They were not alone in demanding change; more than 150,000 men and women took to the streets to protest the next day.

By Saturday, 25 February, the city of Petrograd was essentially shut down. No one was allowed to work or wanted to work. Even though there were a few incidents of police and soldiers firing into the crowds, those groups soon mutinied and joined the protesters. Tsar Nicholas II, who was not in Petrograd during the revolution, heard reports of the protests but chose not to take them seriously. By 1 March, it was obvious to everyone except the Tsar himself, that his rule was over. On 2 March it was made official. From this point onwards Russia was administered by the Russian Provisional Government until the October Revolution.

Romania – the Summer Campaign

In early July 1917, on a relatively small area of the Romanian front, there began one of the largest concentrations of combat forces and means known during the conflagration: nine armies, 80 infantry divisions with 974 battalions, 19 cavalry divisions with 550 squadrons and 923 artillery batteries; in total they numbered some 800,000 men, with about one million in their immediate reserve. Between late July and early September, the Romanian Army fought the battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, managing to stop the German-Austro-Hungarian advance, inflicting heavy losses in the process and winning the most important Allied victories on the Eastern Front in 1917. As a result of these operations, the remaining Romanian territories remained unoccupied, tying down nearly 1,000,000 Central Powers troops and prompting The Times to describe the Romanian front as "The only point of light in the East".

Kerensky offensive

On 29 June 1917, Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of War in the Russian Provisional Government, launched the Kerensky offensive to end Austria-Hungary once and for all. The Russians made only 6 miles (9.7 km) of progress but the Austrians counterattacked and drove them almost entirely out of Austria-Hungary, and they retreated 150 miles (240 km), losing Tarnopol, Stanislau and Czernowitz. This defeat was accompanied by 60,000 casualties and contributed greatly to the October Revolution.

Russia – the October Revolution

Although the February Revolution had overthrown the Tsar, the Bolsheviks still were not satisfied. In their view, the new Provisional Government was merely a more deceptive continuation of the previous government; they still refused to withdraw from the war despite how badly it was going. The upper class still wielded considerable influence in Russian economics and politics, so by September 1917, Lenin began advocating for a second revolution - one that would allow the workers and peasants to gain total control over the country. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party convened on 10 October, and after much heated debate, agreed that it was time to begin planning for an armed insurrection. Troops who were loyal to the Bolsheviks took control of the telegraph stations, power stations, strategic bridges, post offices, train stations, and state banks.

Petrograd was officially in the hands of the Bolsheviks, who greatly increased their organization in factory groups and in many barracks throughout Petrograd. They concentrated on devising a plan for overturning the Provisional Government, with a coup d'état. On 24 October, Lenin emerged from hiding in a suburb, entered the city, set up his headquarters at the Smolny Institute and worked to complete his three-phase plan. With the main bridges and the main railways secured, only the Winter Palace, and with it the Provisional Government, remained to be taken. On the evening of 7 November, the troops that were loyal to the Bolsheviks infiltrated the Winter Palace. After an almost bloodless coup, the Bolsheviks were the new leaders of Russia. Lenin announced that the new Bolshevik government would immediately be seeking an end to the war, implementing a system of worker's democracy, and establishing collective ownership of all farms and factories.

1918

Lenin's new Bolshevik government tried to end the war, with a ceasefire being declared on 15 December 1917 along lines agreed in November. At the same time, the Bolsheviks launched a full-scale military offensive against its opponents: Ukraine and separatist governments in the Don region. During the peace negotiations between the Soviets and the Central Powers, the Germans demanded enormous concessions, eventually resulting in the failure of the long-drawn-out peace negotiations on 17 February 1918. At the same time, the Central Powers concluded a military treaty with Ukraine which was losing ground in the fight with invading Bolshevik forces. The Russian Civil War, which started just after November 1917, would tear apart Russia for three years. As a result of the events in 1917, many groups opposed to Lenin's Bolsheviks had formed. With the fall of Nicholas II, many parts of the Russian Empire took the opportunity to declare their independence, one of which was Finland, which did so in December 1917; however, Finland too collapsed into a civil war. Finland declared itself independent on 6 December 1917, and this was accepted by Lenin a month later. The Finnish Parliament elected a German prince as King of Finland. However, the Socialists (The Reds) and the Whites in Finland fell into war with each other in January 1918. The Reds wanted Finland to be a Soviet republic and were aided by Russian forces still in Finland. The Whites of Finland were led by General C.G.E.Mannerheim, a Finnish baron who had been in the Tsar's service since he was 15 years old. The Whites were also offered help by a German Expeditionary Corps led by German General Goltz. Though Mannerheim never accepted the offer, the German corps landed in Finland in April 1918.

Formation of the Red Army

Although the majority of the Russian army was still at the front lines in late 1917, the Council of People's Commissars headed by Leon Trotsky set about creating a new army controlled by the Bolsheviks. By a decree on 28 January 1918, the council created the Workers' and Peoples' Red Army; it began recruitment on a voluntary basis, but on 22 April, the Soviet government made serving in the army compulsory for anyone who did not employ hired labor. Several officers who had served in the Russian Imperial Army defected to the Red Army in support of the Bolshevik cause. Many of them were of an aristocratic background but became disillusioned with imperialism and monarchism, although the Red Army still mostly consisted of ordinary workers and peasants.

Aftermath

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918)

With the German Army just 85 miles (137 km) from the Russian capital Petrograd (St. Petersburg) on 3 March 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed and the Eastern Front ceased to be a war zone. In the treaty, Soviet Russia ceded 34% of the former empire's population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railroads. The total losses in land amounted to 1 million square kilometers. Lenin bitterly called the settlement "that abyss of defeat, dismemberment, enslavement and humiliation." While the treaty was practically obsolete before the end of the year, it did provide some relief to the Bolsheviks, who were embroiled in a civil war, and affirmed the independence of Ukraine. However, Estonia and Latvia were intended to become a United Baltic Duchy to be ruled by German princes and German nobility as fiefdoms under the German Kaiser. A rump Polish state was also foreseen on the formerly Russian territories. Finland's sovereignty had already been declared in December 1917, and accepted by most nations, including France and Russia, but not by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Treaty of Bucharest (May 1918)

On 7 May 1918 Romania signed the Treaty of Bucharest with the Central Powers, which recognised Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia in return for ceding control of passes in the Carpathian Mountains to Austria-Hungary and granting oil concessions to Germany. Although approved by Parliament, Ferdinand I refused to sign the treaty, hoping for an Allied victory; Romania re-entered the war on 10 November 1918 on the side of the Allies and the Treaty of Bucharest was formally annulled by the Armistice of 11 November 1918. Between 1914 and 1918, an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 ethnic Romanians served with the Austro-Hungarian army, of whom up to 150,000 were killed in action; total military and civilian deaths within contemporary Romanian borders are estimated at 748,000.

The Germans were able to repair the oil fields around Ploiești and by the end of the war had pumped a million tons of oil. They also requisitioned two million tons of grain from Romanian farmers. These materials were vital in keeping Germany in the war to the end of 1918.

End of war

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With the end of major combat on the Eastern Front, the Germans were able to transfer substantial forces to the west in order to mount an offensive in France in the spring of 1918.

This offensive on the Western Front failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, and the arrival of more and more American units in Europe was sufficient to offset the German advantage. Even after the Russian collapse, about a million German soldiers remained tied up in the east until the end of the war, attempting to run a short-lived addition to the German Empire in Europe.

In the end, the Central Powers had to relinquish all of their captured lands on the eastern front, with Germany even being forced to cede territory they held before the war, under various treaties (such as the Treaty of Versailles) signed after the armistice in 1918. Although the Allied Powers' victory led to the Central Powers being forced to cancel the treaty signed with Russia, the victors were at the time intervening in the Russian Civil War, causing bad relations between Russia and the Allied Powers.

For Versailles Peace Brest Peace was canceled, as well as reserved the rights of Russia to demand reparations.

New conflicts

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After the central powers capitulated, the countries in the east took advantage of the situation: Soviet Russia immediately cancelled the peace treaty and launched an offensive against the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine. Romania formally rejoined the war a day before its end in the West, soon followed by conflict with newly independent Hungary.

Role of women

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In comparison to the attention directed to the role played by women on the Western Front during the First World War, the role of women in the east has garnered limited scholarly focus. It is estimated that 20 percent of the Russian industrial working class was conscripted into the army; therefore, women's share of industrial jobs increased dramatically. There were percentage increases in every industry, but the most noticeable increase happened in industrial labour, which increased from 31.4 percent in 1913 to 45 percent in 1918.

Women also fought on the Eastern Front. In the later stages of Russia's participation in the war, Russia began forming all-woman combat units, the Women's Battalions, in part to fight plummeting morale among male soldiers by demonstrating Russian women's willingness to fight. In Romania, Ecaterina Teodoroiu actively fought in the Romanian Army and is remembered today as a national hero.

British nursing efforts were not limited to the Western Front. Nicknamed the "Gray partridges" in reference to their dark gray overcoats, Scottish volunteer nurses arrived in Romania in 1916 under the leadership of Elsie Inglis. In addition to nursing injured personnel, Scottish nurses manned transport vehicles and acted as regimental cooks. The "Gray Partridges" were well respected by Romanian, Serbian and Russian troops and as a result, the Romanian press went as far as to characterize them as "healthy, masculine, and tanned women." As a testament to her abilities, Elsie Inglis and her volunteers were entrusted to turn an abandoned building in the city of Galați into an operational hospital, which they did in a little more than a day. Yvonne Fitzroy's published journal, "With the Scottish Nurses in Roumania," provides an excellent first hand account of Scottish nursing activities in the Eastern Front.

Propaganda

Propaganda was a key component of the culture of World War I. It was often shown through state-controlled media, and helped to bolster nationalism and patriotism within countries. On the Eastern Front, propaganda took many forms such as opera, film, spy fiction, theater, spectacle, war novels and graphic art. Across the Eastern Front the amount of propaganda used in each country varied from state to state. Propaganda took many forms within each country and was distributed by many different groups. Most commonly the state produced propaganda, but other groups, such as anti-war organizations, also generated propaganda.

In order for the Russians to legitimize their war efforts, the government constructed an image of the enemy through state-instituted propaganda. Their main aim was to help overcome the legend of the "invincible" German war machine, in order to boost the morale of civilians and soldiers. Russian propaganda often took the form of showing the Germans as a civilized nation, with barbaric "inhuman" traits. Russian propaganda also exploited the image of the Russian POWs who were in the German camps, again in order to boost the morale of their troops, serving as encouragement to defeat the enemy and to get their fellow soldiers out of German POW camps that were perceived as inhumane.

An element of the Russian propaganda was the Investigate Commission formed in April 1915. It was led by Aleksei Krivtsov, and the study was tasked with the job of studying the legal violations committed by of the Central Powers and then getting this information to the Russian public. This commission published photographs of letters that were allegedly found on fallen German soldiers. These letters document the German correspondents saying to "take no prisoners." A museum was also set up in Petrograd, which displayed pictures that showed how "inhumanly" the Germans were treating prisoners of war.

Also, the Russians chose to discard the name Saint Petersburg to remove the German-sounding "Saint" and "-burg", favouring the more Russian-sounding Petrograd.

Prisoners of war in Russia

During World War I, approximately 200,000 German soldiers and 2.5 million soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian army entered Russian captivity. During the 1914 Russian campaign the Russians began taking thousands of Austrian prisoners. As a result, the Russian authorities made emergency facilities in Kiev, Penza, Kazan, and later Turkestan to hold the Austrian prisoners of war. As the war continued Russia began to detain soldiers from Germany as well as a growing number from the Austro-Hungarian army. The Tsarist state saw the large population of POWs as a workforce that could benefit the war economy in Russia. Many POWs were employed as farm laborers and miners in Donbas and Krivoi Rog. However, the majority of POWs were employed as laborers constructing canals and building railroads. The living and working environments for these POWs was bleak. There was a shortage of food, clean drinking water and proper medical care. During the summer months malaria was a major problem, and the malnutrition among the POWs led to many cases of scurvy. While working on the Murmansk rail building project over 25,000 POWs died. Information about the bleak conditions of the labor camps reached the German and Austro-Hungarian governments. They began to complain about the treatment of POWs. The Tsarist authorities initially refused to acknowledge the German and Habsburg governments. They rejected their claims because Russian POWs were working on railway construction in Serbia. However, they slowly agreed to stop using prison labor. Life in the camps was extremely rough for the men who resided in them. The Tsarist government could not provide adequate supplies for the men living in their POW camps. The Russian government's inability to supply the POWs in their camps with supplies was due to inadequate resources and bureaucratic rivalries. However, the conditions in the POW camps varied; some were more bearable than others. The attitude towards Russian prisoners from the Central Powers was even worse, in some camps the mattress was for 4 people, and in others people were starved on purpose. At the beginning of 1915, a case was recorded of three prisoners being forced to run around the camp without stopping, in parallel they were stabbed with bayonets and beaten.

Disease

Disease played a critical role in the loss of life on the Eastern Front. In the East, disease accounted for approximately four times the number of deaths caused by direct combat, in contrast to the three to one ratio in the West. Malaria, cholera, and dysentery contributed to the epidemiological crisis on the Eastern Front; however, typhus fever, transmitted by pathogenic lice and previously unknown to German medical officers before the outbreak of the war, was the most deadly. There was a direct correlation between the environmental conditions of the East and the prevalence of disease. With cities excessively crowded by refugees fleeing their native countries, unsanitary medical conditions created a suitable environment for diseases to spread. Primitive hygienic conditions, along with general lack of knowledge about proper medical care was evident in the German-occupied Ober Ost.

Ultimately, a large scale sanitation program was put into effect. This program, named Sanititätswesen (Medical Affairs), was responsible for ensuring proper hygienic procedures were being carried out in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Quarantine centers were built, and diseased neighbourhoods were isolated from the rest of the population. Delousing stations were prevalent in the countryside and in cities to prevent the spread of typhus fever, with mass numbers of natives being forced to take part in this process at military bathhouses. A "sanitary police" was also introduced to confirm the cleanliness of homes, and any home deemed unfit would be boarded up with a warning sign. Dogs and cats were also killed for fear of possible infection.

To avoid the spread of disease, prostitution became regulated. Prostitutes were required to register for a permit, and authorities demanded mandatory medical examinations for all prostitutes, estimating that seventy percent of prostitutes carried a venereal disease. Military brothels were introduced to combat disease; the city of Kowno emphasized proper educational use of contraceptives such as condoms, encouraged proper cleansing of the genital area after intercourse, and gave instructions on treatment in the case of infection.

Casualties

Russian casualties

The Russian casualties in the First World War are difficult to estimate, due to the poor quality of available statistics.

Cornish gives a total of 2,006,000 military dead (700,000 killed in action, 970,000 died of wounds, 155,000 died of disease and 181,000 died while POWs). This measure of Russian losses is similar to that of the British Empire, 5% of the male population in the 15 to 49 age group. He says civilian casualties were five to six hundred thousand in the first two years, and were then not kept, so a total of over 1,500,000 is not unlikely. He has over five million men passing into captivity, the majority during 1915. However, these figures on the number of prisoners are very contradictory, since the extreme reports on prisoners issued by the official commission of the USSR called the figure at 3.3 million. These data have been criticized by Imperial Russian Army general and military historian Golovin, who conducted a study together with German veterans in the archives of the central powers, and named a figure of 2,410,000 people.

When Russia withdrew from the war, ~2,500,000 Russian POWs were in German and Austrian hands. This by far exceeded the total number of prisoners of war (1,880,000) lost by the armies of Britain, France and Germany combined. Only the Austro-Hungarian Army, with 2,200,000 POWs, came even close.

According to other data, the number of irretrievable losses in Russia ranges from 700,000 to 1,061,000. Golovin wrote a huge work dedicated to the losses of Russians in World Wat I, he based on the documents of the headquarters and the documents of the German archive, working there together with German veterans, correlated the losses and came to the conclusion that the total losses are 7,917,000, including 1,300,000 dead, 4,200,000 wounded and 2,410,000 prisoners. Later estimates have adjusted this number to 2,420,000 people. Per Alexei Oleynikov total losses for the 1914–1917 campaigns look like this:

• 1914: 1,000,000+
• 1915: 3,000,000
• 1916: 2,000,000
• 1917: 400,000

The death toll of a maximum of ~1,000,000+ people is also shared by other authors. There is also an estimate by Krivosheev, according to him, the Russians lost 2,254,000 dead, but this estimate does not at all match the number of wounded - 2,844,500. According to the Russian historian Kernosovsky [ru], Russia's losses amounted to 9,000,000.

Central Powers casualties

At that time, the losses of the Austro-German troops were as great. As General Günther Blumentritt wrote in his memoirs: «I will cite a little-known but significant fact, our losses on the eastern front were much higher than on the western.» Historian Oleynikov estimated the total losses at 5,100,000 people, The maximum estimate was up to 6,000,000 casualties, this ratio is much better than on the western front.

Similarly, the losses of the central powers in the East in the period from 1914 to 1916 were greater than similar losses on all other fronts, the Russian army was able to inflict damage to the enemy, estimates range from 4,600,000 to 5,400,000 people from a total loss of 8,090,000. The Russians also took the most prisoners, as many as 2,130,000, and according to other data 1,961,000. There is also an estimate of 2,200,000 prisoners, but the general trend remains to estimate about 2,000,000 people, which is six times more than all those prisoners who were captured by all the Entente countries combined.

Territorial changes

Austria

The empire of Austria lost approximately 60% of its territory as a result of the war, and evolved into a smaller state with a small homogeneous population of 6.5 million people. With the loss, Vienna was now an imperial capital without an empire to support it. The states that were formed around Austria feared the return of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and put measures into place to prevent it from re-forming.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia was created through the merging of the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, previously under Austrian rule, united with Slovakia and Ruthenia, which were part of Hungary. Although these groups had many differences between them, they believed that together they would create a stronger state. The new country was a multi-ethnic state. The population consisted of Czechs (51%), Slovaks (16%), Germans (22%), Hungarians (5%) and Rusyns (4%), with other ethnic groups making up 2%. Many of the Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Poles and some Slovaks, felt oppressed because the political elite did not generally allow political autonomy for minority ethnic groups. The state proclaimed the official ideology that there are no Czechs and Slovaks, but only one nation of Czechoslovaks (see Czechoslovakism), to the disagreement of Slovaks and other ethnic groups. Once a unified Czechoslovakia was restored after World War II the conflict between the Czechs and the Slovaks surfaced again.

Hungary

After the war Hungary was severely disrupted by the loss of 72% of its territory, 64% of its population and most of its natural resources. The loss of territory was similar to that of Austria after the breaking up the Austria-Hungary territory. They lost the territories of Transylvania, Slovakia, Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia, and Banat.

Italy

Italy incorporated the regions of Trieste and South Tyrol from Austria.

Poland

The creation of a free and Independent Poland was one of Wilson's fourteen points. At the end of the 18th century, the state of Poland was broken apart by Prussia, Russia, and Austria. During the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, the Commission on Polish Affairs was created which recommended there be a passageway across West Prussia and Posen, in order to give Poland access to the Baltic through the port of Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula River. The creation of the state of Poland would separate East Prussia from the rest of Germany, as it was before the Partitions of Poland. Poland also received Upper Silesia. British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon proposed Poland's eastern border with Russia. Neither the Soviet Russians nor the Polish were happy with the demarcation of the border.

Romania

The state of Romania was enlarged greatly after the war. As a result of the Paris peace conference Romania kept the Dobrudja and Transylvania. Between the states of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania an alliance named the Little Entente was formed. They worked together on matters of foreign policy in order to prevent a Habsburg restoration.

Yugoslavia

Initially Yugoslavia began as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. The State secured its territory at the Paris peace conference after the end of the war. The state suffered from many internal problems because of the many diverse cultures and languages within the state. Yugoslavia was divided on national, linguistic, economic, and religious lines.

See also

• Middle Eastern theatre of World War I
• Belgian Expeditionary Corps in Russia, a Belgian armoured car unit that fought within the Russian military.
• Diplomatic history of World War I
• Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

Notes

1. Russian Empire during 1914–1917, Russian Provisional Government and Republic during 1917.
2. The data varies too much
3. Other names: German: Ostfront; Romanian: Frontul de răsărit), for Russia Second Patriotic War (Russian: Вторая Отечественная Война)
4. Bessarabia remained part of Romania until 1940, when it was annexed by Joseph Stalin as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic; following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, it became the independent Republic of Moldova
5. 1,700,000

References

1. Pearson, Raymond (2014). The Longman Companion to European Nationalism 1789-1920. Routledge. p. 15. ISBN 9781317897774. Cheered by the Central Powers' victory on, then dissolution of, the eastern front, Germany finds herself fighting on one front for the first time.
2. Weinhauer, Klaus; McElligott, Anthony; Heinsohn, Kirsten (2015). Germany 1916-23: A Revolution in Context. transcript Verlag. p. 159. ISBN 9783839427347. The defeat of Russia gave Ludendorff only a small window of opportunity in order to concentrate military forces in France prior to an inevitable flood of fresh American troops.
3. Churchill, W. S. (1923–1931). The World Crisis (Odhams 1938 ed.). London: Thornton Butterworth. Page 558. Total German casualties for "Russia and all other fronts" (aside from the West) are given as 1,693,000 including 517,000 dead.
4. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 261.
5. ^ Sanitatsbericht uber das Deutsche Heer (Deutsches Feld- und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkrieg 1914-1918
6. Bodart, Gaston: "Erforschung der Menschenverluste Österreich-Ungarns im Weltkriege 1914–1918", Austrian State Archive, War Archive Vienna, Manuscripts, History of the First World War, in general, A 91. Reports that 60% of Austro-Hungarian killed/wounded were incurred on the Eastern Front (including 312,531 out of 521,146 fatalities). While the casualty records are incomplete (Bodart on the same page estimates the missing war losses and gets a total figure of 1,213,368 deaths rather than 521,146), the proportions are accurate. 60% of casualties equates to 726,000 dead and 2,172,000 wounded.
7. Россия в мировой войне 1914—1918 (в цифрах). — М.: ЦСУ, 1925. — Табл. 33. — С. 41.
8. Volgyes, Ivan. (1973). "Hungarian Prisoners of War in Russia 1916–1919". Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 14(1/2). Page 54. Gives the figure of 1,479,289 prisoners captured in the East, from the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Defence archives.
9. The most common data on Austrian prisoners vary from 1,800,000 to 1,950,000
10. Erickson, Edward J. Ordered to die : a history of the Ottoman army in the first World War, p. 147. Total casualties of 20,000 are given for the VI Army Corps in Romania.
11. Atlı, Altay (25 September 2008). "Campaigns, Galicia". turkesywar.com. Archived from the original on 20 July 2011. Total casualties of 25,000 are given for the XV Army Corps in Galicia.
12. ^ "turkeyswar, Campaigns, Eastern Europe". Archived from the original on 20 July 2011. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
13. Yanikdag, Yucel (2013). Healing the Nation: Prisoners of War, Medicine and Nationalism in Turkey, 1914–1939. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-0-7486-6578-5.
14. Министерство на войната (1939), p. 677 (in Bulgarian)
15. Симеонов, Радослав, Величка Михайлова и Донка Василева. Добричката епопея. Историко-библиографски справочник, Добрич 2006, с. 181 (in Bulgarian)
16. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 245.
17. Cox, Michael; Ellis, John (2001). The World War I Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for all the Combatants. London: Aurum Press.
18. Erlikman, Vadim (2004). Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow. Page 18 ISBN 978-5-93165-107-1.(Civilians killed on Eastern Front)
19. Erlikman, Vadim (2004). Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow. Page 51 ISBN 978-5-93165-107-1.
20. Erlikman, Vadim (2004). Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow. Page 49 ISBN 978-5-93165-107-1.
21. Stone 2015, p. 1.
22. Stone 2015, p. 312.
23. Reese 2023, pp. 96–98.
24. Stone 2015, p. 6.
25. Reese 2023, pp. 98–100.
26. "Brusilov Offensive Begins". history.com. Archived from the original on 30 March 2015. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
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• Goldman, Wendy Z. (2002). Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Coroban, Costel (2012). Potarnichile gri. Spitalele Femeilor Scotiene in Romania (1916–1917). Targoviste: Cetatea de Scaun.
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• Vinogradov, V.N (1992). "Romania in the First World War: The Years of Neutrality, 1914–16." The International History Review 14 (3): 452–461.
• Gatrell, Peter (2005). "Prisoners of War on the Eastern Front during World War I". Kritika 6 (3): 557–566. Retrieved 18 March 2014.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (1998). The Great War 1914–18. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 220–223.
• Борисюк, Андрей (2023). История России, которую приказали забыть. Николай II и его время; . St. Petersburg: Питер. ISBN 978-5-4484-3841-7.
• Oleynikov, Alexei (2016). Россия-щит Антанты [Russia-Shield of Entente]. Foreword by Nikolai Starikov. St.Petersburg: Piter. ISBN 978-5-496-01795-4.
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Further reading

• Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-7470-7.
• Dyboski, Roman (1922). Siedem lat w Rosji i na Syberji, 1915–1921 [Seven Years in Russia and Siberia] (in Polish) (Cherry Hill Books 1970 translation ed.). Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff. OCLC 500586245.
• Snow, Edgar (1933). Far Eastern Front. New York: Harrison Smith & Robert Haas. OCLC 1318490.
• Stone, Norman (2004) . The Eastern Front 1914–1917. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-026725-5.
• Tallon, James N. (2024). "International Actors Intervening in a Local War: The Long World War I of the Eastern Mediterranean, 1911–23". In Brice, Lee L.; Roberts, Timothy M. (eds.). The Boundaries of War: Local and Global Perspectives in Military History. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. pp. 214–226. doi:10.56686/9798987336144. ISBN 979-8-9873361-4-4.

External links

• Dowling, Timothy C.: Eastern Front, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Sanborn, Joshua A.: Russian Empire, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Steinberg, John W.: Warfare 1914–1918 (Russian Empire), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Szlanta, Piotr, Richter, Klaus: Warfare 1914–1918 (East Central Europe), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Zhvanko, Liubov: Ukraine, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Sergeev, Evgenii Iur'evich: Pre-war Military Planning (Russian Empire), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Nachtigal, Reinhard, Radauer, Lena: Prisoners of War (Russian Empire), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Szlanta, Piotr, Richter, Klaus: Prisoners of War (East Central Europe), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• Shcherbinin, Pavel Petrovich: Women's Mobilization for War (Russian Empire), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• "WWI Eastern Front Foto". Flickr. 18 June 2005.
• "WWI Eastern Front Part II". Flickr. 26 October 2005.
• With the Russian army, 1914–1917 by Alfred Knox
• War And Revolution In Russia 1914–1917 by General Basil Gourko.
• WWI German Military Cemeteries in Belarus modern photos by Andrey Dybowski (rus).
• Der Vormarsch der Flieger Abteilung 27 in der Ukraine (The advance of Flight Squadron 27 in the Ukraine). This portfolio, comprising 263 photographs mounted on 48 pages, is a photo-documentary of the German occupation and military advances through the southern Ukraine in the spring and summer of 1918.

• Eastern Front (World War I)
• Campaigns and theatres of World War I
• European theatre of World War I
• Austria-Hungary in World War I
• Bulgaria in World War I
• German Empire in World War I
• Ottoman Empire in World War I
• Romania in World War I
• Russian Empire in World War I
• Ukraine in World War I
• Invasions of Russia
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