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Monte Melkonian (in Armenian: in WA Մոնթէ Մելքոնեան, in EA Մոնթե Մելքոնյան November 25, 1957 – June 12, 1993) was a famed Armenian military commander in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. He is largely credited for major military victories against Azerbaijan from the late autumn of 1992 to his death in June 1993. Melkonian had no prior service record in any country's army before being placed in command of an estimated 4,000 men in the war. He had largely built his military experience beginning from the late 1970s and 1980s where he fought against the various splintering factions in the Lebanese Civil War, against Israeli troops in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and was a member of the Armenian guerrilla organization ASALA.

An Armenian-American, Melkonian left the United States and arrived in Iran in 1978 during the beginning of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, taking part in demonstrations against the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Following the collapse of the Shah's monarchy in 1979, he traveled to Lebanon during the height of the civil war and served in an Armenia militia group in the Beirut suburb of Bourj Hammoud. In ASALA, he took part in the assassinations of several Turkish diplomats in Europe during the early to mid-1980s and was later arrested and sent to prison in France. In 1989, he was released and in the following year, acquired a visa to travel to Armenia.

Throughout his tenure, Melkonian carried several different aliases including "Abu Sindi", "Saro", "Timothy Sean McCormack" and "Commander Avo"; the last of which was the name addressed by troops under his command in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. He was killed by Azerbaijani troops on June 12, 1993 in Nagorno-Karabakh and was subsequently buried in Yerablur in Yerevan, Armenia and is revered by many Armenians as a national hero.

Early life

Youth

Melkonian was born on November 25, 1957 at Visalia Municipal Hospital in Visalia, California. He was the third of four children born to a self-employed cabinetmaker and an elementary-school teacher. At the age of fifteen, he left for Japan, originally in a youth exchange program. Once there, however, he extended his stay to a year, studying martial arts and learning the language. (In the early 1980s, Monte went to serve as a Japanese-French translator at a press conference for members of the Japanese Red Army) From Japan he traveled on his own to southeast Asia, including Vietnam not long before the North defeated the South in 1975. This trip exerted a lifelong influence on him. In a videotaped interview in early 1992, he pointed to the Vietnamese national liberation struggle as an inspirational example for the struggle of Nagorno-Karabakh. Returning to the U.S., he graduated from high school and entered the University of California, Berkeley, majoring in ancient Asian history and Archaeology. In 1978 he helped to organize an exhibition of Armenian cultural artifacts at one of the university’s libraries. The section of the exhibit dealing with the 1915-19 genocide was removed by university authorities, at the request of the Turkish consul general in San Francisco. The display that was removed was eventually reinstalled following a campus protest movement.

Trip to Turkey

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Departure from home

Teaching in Iran

After graduating from U.C. Berkeley in the spring of 1978, Monte traveled to Iran, where he taught English and participated in the movement to overthrow the Shah. He helped organize a teachers’ strike at his school in Tehran, and was in the vicinity of the Meydān-e Zhāleh (Jaleh Square) when the Shah’s troops opened fire on protesters, killing and injuring many. Later, he found his way to Iranian Kurdistan, where Kurdish partisans made a deep impression on him. Years later, in southern Lebanon, he occasionally wore the uniform of the Kurdish peshmerga which he was given in Iranian Kurdistan.

Civil war in Lebanon

In the fall of 1978, Monte made his way to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, in time to participate in the defense of the Armenian quarter against by the right-wing Phalange forces. At this time, he met his long-time confidante and future wife, Seta Kbranian. Monte was a member of the Armenian militia in Bourj Hammoud for almost two years, during which time he participated in several street battles against rightist forces. He also began working behind the lines in Phalangist controlled territory, on behalf of the "Leftist and Muslim" Lebanese National Movement. By this time, he was speaking Armenian - a language he had not learned until adulthood (Armenian was the fourth or fifth language Monte learned to speak fluently, after Spanish, French and Japanese. In addition, he spoke passable Arabic, Italian and Turkish, as well as some Persian and Kurdish).

Participation in ASALA

In the spring of 1980, Monte was inducted into the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenian, ASALA, and secretly relocated to West Beirut. For the next three years he was an ASALA militant and contributor to the group’s journal, Hayastan. During this time several Palestinian resistance organizations provided their Armenian comrade with extensive military training. Monte carried out armed operations in Rome, Athens and elsewhere, and he helped to plan and train commandos for the "Van Operation" of September 24, 1981, in which four ASALA militants took over the Turkish embassy in Paris and held it for several days. In November 1981, French police arrested and imprisoned a young, suspected terrorist carrying a Cypriot passport bearing the name "Dimitri Georgiu." Following the detonation of several bombs in Paris aimed gaining his release, "Georgiu" was returned to Lebanon where he revealed his identity as Monte Melkonian.

In mid-July 1983, ASALA violently split into two factions, one opposed to the group’s despotic leader, whose nom de guerre was Hagop Hagopian, and another supporting him. Although the lines of fissure had been deepening over the course of several years, one event-the shooting of Hagopian’s two closest aids at a military camp in Lebanon-finally led to the open breach. This impetuous action was perpetrated by one individual who was not closely affiliated with Monte. As a result of this action, however, Hagopian took revenge by personally torturing an executing two of Monte’s dearest comrades, Garlen Ananian and Arum Vartanian.

Arrest and imprisonment

In the aftermath of this split Monte spent over two years underground, in Lebanon and later in France. After testifying secretly for the defense in the trial of Armenian militant and accused bank robber Levon Minassian, he was arrested in Paris in November 1985, and sentenced to six years in prison for possession of falsified papers and carrying an illegal handgun.

Armenia

Monte spent over three years in Fresnes and Poissy prisons. He was released in early 1989 and sent from France to South Yemen, where he was reunited with Seta. He then spent another year and a half living underground in eastern Europe, as one regime after another disintegrated. Eventually, he made his way to what was then still Soviet Armenia. Seta and Monte were married at the monastery of Geghart in August 1991. Finding himself on Armenian soil after many long years, he wrote in a letter that he found a lot of confusion among his compatriots. Armenia faced enormous economic, political and environmental problems at every turn, problems that had festered for decades. New political forces bent on dismantling the Soviet Union were taking Armenia in a direction that Monte believed was bound to exacerbate the crisis and produce more problems. Yerevan was swept up in an atmosphere of chauvinism and exasperatingly foolish illusions about the West.

Under these circumstances, it quickly became clear to Monte that, for better or for worse, the Soviet Union had no future and the coming years would be perilous ones for the Armenian people. He then focused his energy on Karabagh. "If we lose ," the bulletin of the Karabakh Defense Forces quoted him as saying, "we turn the final page of our people’s history." He believed that, if Azeri forces succeeded in deporting Armenians from Karabagh, they would advance on Zangezur and other regions of Armenia. Thus, he saw the fate of Karabagh as crucial for the long-term security of the entire Armenian nation.

Nagorno-Karabakh

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Melkonian fought in the Shahumian region north of Karabagh for three months in the fall of 1991. Forces with which he fought helped to recapture several Armenian villages from Azeri forces. In a video lecture recorded in early 1992, Monte stated that, within the coming year, Armenians would either establish a land bridge linking the Republic of Armenia with Karabagh, or the Azeri military would succeed in "solving" the problem of Karabagh once and for all, by deporting Armenians through masses. Within a year Armenian forces, including fighters Monte led, opened an overland corridor through the town of Lachin, thus linking the Armenia with Karabagh. After a short stint fighting Azeri forces in the Ichevan region in northeastern Armenia, Monte accepted a position as commander of the region of Martuni, in southeastern Karabagh. There, he reorganized fighters into an effective and disciplined force, armed in large part with captured Azeri equipment. Under his command, his three to four thousand fighters and fifty tanks successfully defended a mountainous region of 200 square miles, populated by some 28,000 people, mostly peasants involved in agriculture and wine production. His fighters recaptured much land and won one battle after another. Monte’s forces also fought on other fronts, in Mardakert and elsewhere.

In April 1993, Melkonian was one of the chief military strategists who planned and led the operation to capture the region of Kalbajar, which lies between the Republic of Armenia and Karabagh. Although outnumbered, Armenian forces captured the region in four days of heavy fighting, sustaining far fewer fatalities than the enemy. Throughout these operations, Monte maintained respect for Azeri non-combatants. On one occasion, his troops evacuated Azeri residents caught in the fighting, delivering them to safety by armored personnel carrier. In Kalbajar he addressed enemy soldiers by megaphone, assuring them in Turkish that those who were to lay down their arms and pull back from the front would not be fired on.

Conduct

In the early stages of fighting in Karabakh, small groups of volunteers Fedayee, or "brigades" (jogadner) played a major role in the fighting. Monte was a member of one such group in the Shahumian region. He quickly became disenchanted with them, however, for a number of reasons: their tendency to emulate the Azeri practice of executing captured prisoners; their adoption, in more than one case, of the aesthetic trapping of fascism: and their military inefficiency, compared to more professionally organized and disciplined regional. For these and perhaps other reasons, he set out to curtail the activities of the Fedayeen in Martuni. Monte never wore a pistol; he never smoked; he swore very rarely; and he never drank liquor while in military uniform. When he participated in the traditional toasts, he would raise a glass of yogurt. He handed his monthly salary over to cooks, cleaning women and the families of wounded soldiers, and time and again he turned down privileges, preferring to live under the same conditions as the fighters under his command. He established a policy of collecting a tax in kind on Martuni wine, in the form of diesel and ammunition for his fighters. One night in January 1993, he personally stopped a truck smuggling contraband wine to Stepanakert, and dumped the entire tank load onto the road. A couple of weeks before his death, he incurred the wrath of local Mafia bosses in Karabagh-and defied the advice of close friends-by burning a large field of cultivated cannabis plants.

Monte’s activities in Martuni were not limited to the military field. He supported the operation of a cooperative bakery in Martuni; he visited reactivated elementary schools and hospitals; and at the time of his death, he and Seta were planning to set up a worker-owned carpet manufacture, to employ local women who were skilled weavers. In a country with a rigidly patriarchal culture, Monte discouraged discrimination against women, chiefly setting an example for men to follow in the conduct of their daily affairs. He washed dishes, appealed to women to fight on the front lines and considered female staff in the radio room and the kitchen at headquarters to be fighters on an equal footing with uniformed soldiers on the battlefield. His reputation for modesty and directness earned him the affection of the civilians he defended.

Death

Monte was killed in the abandoned Azeri village of Merzuli in the early afternoon of June 12, 1993, with controversial reports about the circumstances of his death.

Monte was buried with full military honors on June 19, 1993 in Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan, Armenia. According to one estimate, some 15,000 people filed past his open casket as it lay in state at the Officer’s Hall in Yerevan. Among the dignitaries present were Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia, high-ranking Armenian and C.I.S. military leaders, and members of all the major political parties in the country.

Quotes

On Failed Armenian Strategies & Lessons from the Armenian Genocide

At the turn of the century, of course, the Armenian people were subject to extremely heavy oppression by the Ottoman sultan. Entertaining tragically misguided hopes of being aided by the European powers, some inexperienced and naive Armenian leaders embraced a very regrettable strategy—one which even more regrettably has not been abandoned to this day: they attempted to enlist the imperialist powers to intervene on behalf of the Armenians... In an almost pathetic attempt to establish such a common ground, some Armenian intellectuals pulled religion and linguistics out of their hat... Well, subsequent events—and one and one-half million martyrs—show how convincing this line of argument was for our "Indo-European brothers."
—The Right to Struggle, p.6

On Self-Reliance

...By continuing to invoke Wilson's map and the Treaty of Sèvres we are in fact promoting an unjust notion of our homeland. And this is neither realistic nor in any way conducive to an equitable understanding with other people in the region. Even worse, to do so is to propagate the historically disastrous notion that the best interests of the Armenian people are better defined and "guaranteed" by imperialist governments than by the Armenian people themselves.
—The Right to Struggle, p.8

...The right to self-determination refers to the right of a given population (usually a nation) to create its own future more or less free from external coercion, but within the limits of the historical realities with which it is faced.
—The Right to Struggle, p.17

As a first step, we should recognize that the Armenian people's fight for national self-determination is first and foremost the duty and task of the Armenian people themselves. We do not believe in benevolent friends, the inevitable triumph of justice, or covertly and cleverly manipulating the superpowers. If we are to achieve national self-determination, then we ourselves, the Armenian people, will have to fight for it. We believe in the power of organized masses and in the capacity of our people to determine their own future. We believe in revolution.
—The Right to Struggle, p.60

No amount of moral admonishment or "indirect pressure" will guarantee that our demands are met, in the absence of our own organizational presence on the ground. Only by struggling ourselves can we convince our allies of our attachment to the revolution, to the land, and to our national rights. And only by struggling ourselves will we have the chance to impose our demands, in the face of all reactionary opposition."
—The Right to Struggle, p.63

On Strategy and Realism

...Let us ask ourselves whether in principle a "Free, Independent Armenia" is a realistic goal that would serve the interests of the Armenian people in the long run. As we seek an answer to this question, we should keep in mind that realism is a guiding principle for revolutionaries. Before advancing political slogans, one should first pose the question: Is it realizable? If it is not, then it should not be adopted.
—The Right to Struggle, p.13

It is time we spoke frankly about a taboo subject: historical developments since 1915 have rendered more distant than ever the reunification of the whole Armenian homeland. The sooner we face this fact, the sooner we can set out with full force to realize the goal of Armenian national self-determination.
—The Right to Struggle, p.61

In view of our strategic goal, and keeping in mind that objective conditions within "Western Armenia" have made it necessary to re-evaluate the future status of that region vis-a-vis the Armenians, we have argued that the much-vaunted "Free, Independent and United Armenia" is neither attainable nor preferable, from the position of the interests of the Armenian people. Propagating this chimerical goal only depletes our already limited human and material resources and wastes time which we cannot afford to waste.
—The Right to Struggle, p.62

On the Necessity of a Homeland

...The relationship of a people to their homeland is crucial. A people will naturally have a difficult time maintaining a common cultural identity without a collective presence in their homeland. Only in its homeland can a people develop economically, culturally and socially as a homogeneous entity. In fact, this is the crux of why some of us consider it necessary to struggle to live in our homeland.
—The Right to Struggle, p.13

Criticism of the A.R.F.

...In essence, the A.R.F.'s present strategy does not differ from the strategy it pursued at the turn of the century. The A.R.F. viewed its armed propaganda as a means of introducing the "Armenian Cause" (Hai Tad) into the arena of international politics. In fact, almost all of the A.R.F.'s tactics, armed or not, are still aimed at somehow convincing "Western" governments and diplomatic circles to sponsor the party's demands... This strategy is very dependent on foreign initiatives, and it implies a belief that the Armenian people's future cannot be determined primarily by the Armenian people themselves.
—The Right to Struggle, p.55-56

Another characteristic of the A.R.F.'s "Western"-dependent strategy is its complete disregard for the need to transfer the Armenian armed struggle to the historic Armenian homeland, the need to build a mass-based guerrilla force closely aligned with Turkish and Kurdish revolutionaries. Many appeals in A.R.F. literature and propaganda are directed to "international public opinion" and other non-Armenian audiences. Meanwhile, few appeals are directed to the Armenian people themselves...
—The Right to Struggle, p.57

And fully in keeping with the demagogic prejudices of the party, no A.R.F leader would seriously propose participating cooperatively in the struggle of the people of Turkey against the fascist regime there... While the A.R.F. reprints maps showing the borders of a supposed "Armenia" proposed in the unratified Treaty of Sèvres, the party's literature ignores the native population within the borders of this "Armenia." It should be pointed out that this population, consisting of Kurds, Turks, Lazes and others, exceeds six million. One wonders what kind of Armenia the A.R.F. envisions in which Armenians will be an absolute—if not minuscule—minority...
—The Right to Struggle, p.57

In practice abandons the fate of our people to the caprice of the "Western" powers, particularly the U.S.A.—and these are states whose interests are opposed to ours.
—The Right to Struggle, p.57

Criticism of Criminal Assassinations and Suicidal Violence

While many of us feel a strong emotional attachment to our homeland, we should not allow emotions to deter us from speaking of things the way they really are. It should be remembered that this very surrender to emotion has led to insane and counterproductive atrocities on the scale of the Ankara and Istanbul suicide assaults, as well as the Orly bombing and the Lisbon disaster. By surrendering to emotions we enable the A.R.F. and slogans like "Hagop Hagopian" to lead thousands of well-intentioned patriots down a path which does not lead to Armenia, and to sacrifice the lives of young fighters in campaigns which directly contradict the interests of the Armenian people. If we are to achieve even the minimum requirements for Armenian national self-determination, we must approach problems in a serious and sober manner.
—The Right to Struggle, p.60

In spite of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation rhetoric, armed propaganda is not a tactic which can "force" foreign powers to support our political demands; nor does it deal "lethal blows" to the Turkish regime.
—The Right to Struggle, p.64

References

1. Melkonian, Markar (2005). My Brother's Road, An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. New York: I. B. Tauris. p. 4. ISBN 1-85043-635-5.
2. de Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. p. 208. ISBN 0-8147-1945-7.

Bibliography

• de Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press
• Melkonian, Markar (2005). My Brother's Road, An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. New York: I.B. Tauris
• Melkonian, Monte (1990). The Right to Struggle: Selected Writings of Monte Melkonian on the Armenian National Question. San Fransisco: Sardarabad Collective

External links

• 2 part documentary video about Monte, including rare interviews, on Google Video: Part 1 and Part 2. (In Armenian.)
• 5 part interview with Monte Melkonian, in English, on YouTube: , , , ,

• 1957 births
• 1993 deaths
• Armenian-Americans
• Armenian people
• Armenian soldiers
• Turkophobia