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American Empire is a term sometimes used to describe the historical expansionism and the current political, economic, and cultural influence of the United States on a global scale.

It is usually part of a politically charged debate which involves three basic questions:

1. Is the United States currently an empire?
2. If the United States is an empire, when did it become one?
3. If the United States is an empire, is that good or bad?

However, there are also more neutral uses of the term.

Definition of empire

The term "empire" has two meanings. In one sense, the U.S. is not an empire, because it lacks a legal emperor, king, despot, or other hereditary head of state. In another sense, the U.S. satisfies the definition of an empire, because it possesses sovereignty over territories which it has not annexed as states, such as Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and in the past the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Cuba, Occupied Japan, Occupied Germany, Okinawa and the Philippines. As of 2006 the U.S. maintains over 702 bases in 135 of the 195 sovereign independent nations of the world.

Controversy exists over whether the U.S. consistently behaves like an empire across the world, and if it would be accurate to describe it as such. The term imperialism was coined in the mid-1800s to describe empire-like behavior, carried out by states which might or might not be formal empires. The Oxford English Dictionary gives three definitions of imperialism:

1. An imperial system of government; the rule of an emperor, esp. when despotic or arbitrary.
2. The principle or spirit of empire; advocacy of what are held to be imperial interests.
3. Used disparagingly. In Communist writings: the imperial system or policy of the Western powers. Used conversely in some Western writings: the imperial system or policy of the Communist powers.

Debate exists over whether the U.S. is an empire in the politically-charged sense of the latter two definitions. Some have suggested that this use of the term is an abuse of language. Historian Stuart Creighton Miller argues that the overuse and abuse of the term "imperialism" makes it nearly meaningless as an analytical concept. Historian Archibald Paton Thorton wrote that "imperialism is more often the name of the emotion that reacts to a series of events than a definition of the events themselves. Where colonization finds analysts and analogies, imperialism must contend with crusaders for and against." Political theorist Michael Walzer argues that the term "hegemony" is better than "empire" to describe the US' role in the world.

American exceptionalism

Stuart Creighton Miller points out that the question of US imperialism has been the subject of agonizing debate ever since the United States acquired formal empire at the end of the nineteenth century during the 1898 Spanish-American War. Miller argues that this agony is because of America’s sense of innocence, produced by a kind of "immaculate conception" view of America's origins. When European settlers came to America they miraculously shed their old ways upon arrival in the New World, as one might discard old clothing, and fashioned new cultural garments based solely on experiences in a new and vastly different environment. Miller believes that school texts, patriotic media, and patriotic speeches on which Americans have been reared do not stress the origins of America's system of government, that these sources often omit or downplay that the

"United States Constitution owes its structure as much to the ideas of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes as to the experiences of the Founding Fathers; that Jeffersonian thought to a great extent paraphrases the ideas of earlier Scottish philosophers; and that even the allegedly unique frontier egalitarian has deep roots in seventeenth century English radical traditions."

Philosopher Douglas Kellner traces the identification of American exceptionalism as a distinct phenomenon back to 19th century French observer Alexis de Tocqueville, who concluded by agreeing that the U.S., uniquely, was "proceeding along a path to which no limit can be perceived."

American exceptionalism is popular among people within the US, but its validity and its consequences are disputed. Miller argues that US citizens fall within three schools of thought about the question whether the United States is imperialistic:

• Overly self-critical Americans tend to exaggerate the nation’s flaws, failing to place them in historical or worldwide contexts.
• At the other end of the scale, the tendency of highly patriotic Americans is to deny such abuses and even assert that they could never exist in their country. (As a Monthly Review editorial describes the phenomenon,

"in Britain, empire was justified as a benevolent 'white man’s burden'. And in the United States, empire does not even exist; 'we' are merely protecting the causes of freedom, democracy, and justice worldwide.")

• In the middle are Americans who assert that "Imperialism was an aberration."

First school of thought: "Empire at the heart of US foreign policy"

Since the Spanish-American War, Marxists and the New Left tend to view imperialism as an unmitigated necessity. US imperialism, in their view, traces its beginning not to the Spanish-American war, but to Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory, or even to the displacement of Native Americans prior to the American Revolution, and continues to this day. Historian Sidney Lens argues that

"the United States, from the time it gained its own independence, has used every available means—political, economic, and military—to help and nurture other nations."

Numerous U.S. foreign interventions, ranging from early actions under the Monroe Doctrine to 21st-century interventions in the Middle East, are typically described by these authors as imperialistic. Some critics of imperialism have a more positive view of America's early era, however. Prominent conservative writer Patrick Buchanan argues that the modern United States's drive to empire is "far from what the Founding Fathers had intended the young Republic to become." This latter point of view is often identified with American isolationism, in the tradition of either the Old Right (Buchanan), or libertarianism (for example, Justin Raimondo).

Lens describes American exceptionalism as a myth, which allows any number of "excesses and cruelties, though sometimes admitted, usually regarded as momentary aberrations." Linguist and left-wing political critic Noam Chomsky argues that it is the result of a systematic strategy of propaganda, maintained by an "elite domination of the media" which allows it to "fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda campaigns."

This critical historical view is usually continued to present US foreign policy. Historian Andrew Bacevich, drawing on the work of Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams, argues that the end of the Cold War did not mark the end of an era in US history, because US foreign policy did not fundamentally change after the Cold War. US foreign policy has long been driven by the desire to expand access to foreign markets in order to benefit the domestic economy. The moralistic reasons given for American foreign intervention mask the true economic reasons, and Bacevich warns that US economic imperialism (in the guise of globalization) may not be in the best interests of the United States.

This is a common extension of the critique of American empire; Buchanan and, from the opposite side of the political spectrum, prominent left-wing writer Tariq Ali, argue independently but similarly that acts of terrorism against the United States, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks, are the direct result of the U.S.'s ill-fated attempts to help others out of the nation's endless reserve of kindness and goodwill.

Ethnic studies professor Ward Churchill is almost alone, however, in extending this critique further to argue that at least some of the victims of the 9/11 attacks - the "little Eichmanns" who "formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of the US' global financial empire – the 'mighty engine of profit' to which the military dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved" - deserved their fates. A different extension is more common; many critics of US imperialism argue, like Marxist sociologist John Bellamy Foster, that the United States' sole-superpower status makes it now the most dangerous world imperialist.

As the surviving superpower at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. could focus its assets in new directions, the future "up for grabs" according to former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz in 1991. This list, first published by Arundhati Roy in the Manchester Guardian (10/23/01), shows countries the U.S. has been at war with - and bombed - since World War II: China (1945-46, 1950-53), Korea (1950-53), Guatemala (1954, 1967-69), Indonesia (1958), Cuba (1959-60), Vietnam (1961-73), the Belgian Congo (1964), Laos (1964-73), Peru (1965), Cambodia (1969-70), Nicaragua (the 1980s), El Salvador (the 1980s), Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Iraq (1991-99, 2003-07), Bosnia (1995), Sudan (1998), Yugoslavia (1999), and Afghanistan (2001-07). From this, the years 1947-49, 1955-57, 1974-79, 1990 and 2000 were the only peaceful ones. 73% of the years, from World War II's end to 1989, the U.S. bombed somewhere. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 (not counting conflicts like Colombia where governing elites request help against rebellious subpopulations) the U.S. bombed at least 88% of the years into 2007.

From this, the U.S.S.R.'s existence does not explain the U.S. pattern of war making, except negatively, as a deterrent. What the U.S. may have faced all along is a series of nationalist insurgencies -- for want of a better explanation covering both periods, during and after the Cold War. These were against U.S. acquiring natural resources by political device, colonialism by proxy, whereby the U.S. organizes and arms elite minorities in those countries, who then let U.S. companies and military in. Soviet use of the same device, in this view, was largely reactive. The nearly inevitable insurgencies against the elites, and U.S. or Soviets, were (and continue to be for the U.S.) linked out of necessity, with religion or political ideology being only secondary. Mere practical necessity explains much. Soviet advisors helped set up the Kuomintang who then allied with the U.S. when Japan threatened. Ho Chi Minh patterned his Vietnamese constitution on the U.S. until turning to the Soviets and Chinese for aid against the U.S. Only immediate, practical necessity explains such apparently fundamental shifts in ideology. The U.S. must note what similar necessities it may continue to create.

U.S. military bases abroad as the neo-colony

Proponents who claim that the U.S.A. is indeed an empire point to American military bases abroad (which currently number over 700), even when they might not be popular with the vast majority of that nation as a sign of an empire. Some see another sign of an empire in the Unified Combatant Command, a military group composed of forces from two or more services that has the entire world divided into five areas of military responsibility. One author, Chalmers Johnson, notes that America's version of the colony is the military base. Professor Chip Pitts accepts U.S. empire as an empirical reality, but argues that empire is profoundly at odds with the better instincts of U.S. citizens and policymakers, and that rejecting neo-colonialism by military means such as those employed during the Iraq War, is a prerequisite to restoring domestic civil liberties and human rights that have been infringed upon by the imperial presidency -- while simultaneously being crucial to promoting peace and stability in the Middle East and beyond.

Theories of U.S. empire

Left-wing journalist Ashley Smith divides theories of the U.S. as an empire into 5 broad categories: "liberal" theories, "social-democratic" theories, "Leninist" theories, theories of "super-imperialism", and "Hardt-and-Negri-ite" theories. According to Smith,

• A "liberal" theory asserts that U.S. policies are the products of particular elected politicians (e.g. the Bush administration) or political movements (e.g. neo-conservatism). These policies are not an essential product of U.S. political or economic structures, and are straightforwardly counter to U.S. interests. Liberal theories are held by most Democratic critics of U.S. imperialism, whose proposed solution is typically electing better officials.
• A "social-democratic" theory asserts that imperialistic U.S. policies are the products of the excessive influence of certain sectors of U.S. business and government, the arms industry in alliance with military and political bureaucracies and sometimes other industries such as oil and finance, a combination often referred to as the "military-industrial complex". The complex is said to benefit from war profiteering and the looting of natural resources, often at the expense of the public interest. The proposed solution is typically unceasing popular vigilance in order to apply counter-pressure. Left-wing ex-CIA consultant Chalmers Johnson holds a version of this view; other versions are typically held by right-wing anti-interventionists, such as Buchanan, Bacevich, and Raimondo.
• A "Leninist" theory asserts that imperialistic U.S. policies are the products of the unified interest of the predominant sectors of U.S. business, which need to ensure and manipulate export markets for both goods and capital. Business, on this Marxist view, essentially controls government, and international military competition is simply an extension of international economic competition, both driven by the inherently expansionist nature of capitalism. Smedley Butler, a retired general in the United States Marine Corps, took this view when he said that his job had been to be a "muscle man for big business." The proposed solution is typically revolutionary economic change. The theory was first systematized during the World War I by Russian Bolsheviks Vladimir Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin, although their work was based on that of earlier Marxists, socialists, and anarchists. Ali, Chomsky, Foster, Lens, and Zinn each hold some version of this view, as does Smith himself.
• A theory of "super-imperialism" is similar to the Leninist theory in its view of the roots of imperialism, but asserts that global economic interdependence has superseded the association of businesses with a single country, so that among developed nations economic and military cooperation is now more common than competition. The central conflict in modern imperialism is said to be between the global core and the global periphery rather than between imperialist powers. Political scientists Leo Panitch and Samuel Gindin hold versions of this view.
• A "Hardt-and-Negri-ite" theory asserts that the Leninist theory was valid when formulated, but that the U.S. is no longer imperialistic in the classic sense, because the world has passed the era of imperialism and entered a new era. (However, see note.) This new era still has colonizing power but has moved from national military forces based on an economy of physical goods to networked biopower based on an informational and affective economy. On this view, the U.S. is central to the development and constitution of a new global regime of international power and sovereignty, termed "Empire", but the "Empire" is decentralized and global, and not ruled by one sovereign state; literary theorist Michael Hardt and philosopher Antonio Negri argue that "the United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European imperialist powers, but from its differences." Hardt and Negri draw on the theories of Spinoza, Foucault, Deleuze, and Italian autonomist marxists. Critical international relations theorist James Der Derian and philosopher Jean Baudrillard hold related though less systematic views, as do many in the traditions of postcolonialism, postmodernism and globalization theory.

Second school of thought: "US empire never existed"

Many citizens of the United States, however, defend the historical role of the US against allegations of imperialism or other "evil." This is especially common among prominent mainstream political figures; former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, has said:

"we don't seek empires. We're not imperialistic. We never have been."

The early 20th century US occupation of the Philippines, by contrast, is perhaps the most frequently cited evidence that US military intervention abroad has an imperial character. War crimes by US soldiers, conducted by orders from superior military officers, have been documented. General Jacob H. Smith told his officers:

"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States."

Nevertheless, conservative military historian Max Boot defends US actions in the Philippines, pointing out that the "atrocities" committed there were relatively insignificant in scope and circumstance, and defending the US motives, which he views as well-intentioned and ultimately beneficial for both America and the Philippines in the long run.

Boot argues that that the United States altruistically went to war with Spain to liberate Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos from their tyrannical yoke. If US troops lingered on too long in the Philippines, it was to protect the Filipinos from European predators waiting in the wings for American withdrawal and to tutor them in American-style democracy. In the Philippines, the US followed its usual pattern:

"the United States would set up a constabulary, a quasi-military police force led by Americans and made up of local enlisted men. Then the Americans would work with local officials to administer a variety of public services, from vaccinations and schools to tax collection. American officials, though often resented, usually proved more efficient and less venal than their native predecessors... Holding fair elections became a top priority because once a democratically elected government was installed, the Americans felt they could withdraw."

Boot argues that this was far from "the old-fashioned imperialism bent on looting nations of their natural resources." Just as with Iraq and Afghanistan, "some of the poorest countries on the planet", in the early 20th century:

"the United States was least likely to intervene in those nations (such as Argentina and Costa Rica) where American investors held the biggest stakes. The longest occupations were undertaken in precisely those countries--Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic--where the United States had the smallest economic stakes... Unlike the Dutch in the East Indies, the British in Malaya, or the French in Indochina, the Americans left virtually no legacy of economic exploitation."

Stuart Creighton Miller claims that this more patriotic and comprehensive interpretation is no longer heard very often by historians.

"The Benevolent Empire"

But Boot in fact is willing to use the term "imperialism" to describe United States policy, not only in the early 20th century but "since at least 1803", though this is primarily a simple difference in terminology, since he still argues that US foreign policy has been consistently benevolent. Boot is not alone; as conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer puts it,, "People are now coming out of the closet on the word 'empire.'" This embrace of empire is made by many neoconservatives, including British historian Paul Johnson, and writers Dinesh D'Souza and Mark Steyn. It is also made by some liberal hawks, such as political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Michael Ignatieff.

For example, British historian Niall Ferguson, a professor at Harvard University, argues that the United States is an empire, but believes that this is a good thing. Ferguson has drawn parallels between the British Empire and the imperial role of the United States in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, though he describes the United States' political and social structures as more like those of the Roman Empire than of the British. Ferguson argues that all these empires have had both positive and negative aspects, but that the positive aspects of the US empire will, if it learns from history and its mistakes, greatly outweigh its negative aspects.

Third school of thought: "Empire was an aberration"

Another point of view admits United States expansion overseas as imperialistic, but sees this imperialism as a temporary phenomenon, a corruption of American ideals or the relic of a past historical era. Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis argues that Spanish-American War expansionism was a short lived imperialistic impulse and "a great aberration in American history", a very different form of territorial growth than that of earlier American history. Historian Walter LaFeber sees the Spanish-American War expansionism not as an aberration, but as a culmination of United States expansion westward. But both agree that the end of the occupation of the Philippines marked the end of US empire - they deny that present United States foreign policy is imperialist.

Right-wing historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that the US does not pursue world domination, but maintains worldwide influence by a system of mutually beneficial exchanges:

"If we really are imperial, we rule over a very funny sort of empire... The United States hasn't annexed anyone's soil since the Spanish-American War... Imperial powers order and subjects obey. But in our case, we offer the Turks strategic guarantees, political support — and money... Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism."

Liberal internationalists argue that even though the present world order is dominated by the United States, the form taken by that dominance is not imperial. International relations scholar John Ikenberry argues that international institutions have taken the place of empire;

"the United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial... the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven... they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent."

I.R. scholar Nye argues that US power is more and more based on "soft power", which comes from cultural hegemony rather than raw military or economic force. This includes such factors as the widespread desire to emigrate to the United States, the prestige and corresponding high proportion of foreign students at US universities, and the spread of US styles of popular music and cinema. Thus the US, no matter how hegemonic, is no longer an empire in the classic sense.

This point of view might be considered the mainstream or official interpretation of United States history within the US. The United States Information Agency writes that,

"With the exception of the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, American territory had remained fixed since 1848. In the 1890s a new spirit of expansion took hold... Yet Americans, who had themselves thrown off the shackles of empire, were not comfortable with administering one. In 1902 American troops left Cuba... The Philippines obtained... complete independence in 1946. Puerto Rico became a self-governing commonwealth... and Hawaii became a state in 1959."

Cultural imperialism

The debates about the issue of American cultural imperialism are largely separate from the debates about American military imperialism that are the subject of this article.

However, some critics of imperialism argue that cultural imperialism is not independent from military imperialism. Edward Said, one of the founders of the study of post-colonialism, claims that,

"So influential has been the discourse insisting on American specialness, altruism and opportunity, that imperialism in the United States as a word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently in accounts of the United States culture, politics and history. But the connection between imperial politics and culture in North America, and in particular in the United States, is astonishingly direct."

He identifies the way non-Americans, particularly non-Westerns, are usually thought of within the US in a tacitly racist manner, in a way that allows imperialism to be justified through such ideas as the White Man's Burden.

Opponents of theories of cultural imperialism argue that it is not connected to any kind of military domination. International relations scholar David Rothkop claims that alleged cultural imperialism is the innocent result of globalization, which allows many consumers across the world who desire US products and ideas access to them. A worldwide fascination with the United States has not been forced on anyone in ways similar to what is traditionally described as an empire, differentiating it from the actions of the British Empire and other more easily identified empires throughout history. Rothkop identifies the desire to preserve the purity of one's culture as xenophobic. A similar analysis can be found in Matthew Fraser's Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire (St. Martin's Press, 2005), though Fraser joins the neo-conservative thesis by arguing that America's global cultural influence is a good thing.

Economic imperialism

Many comentators have stressed the close relationship between military expansionism and economic hegemony, arguing that warfare is only undertaken in order to obtain profit. Proponents of this point of view suggest that risky expansionist military adventures are conspicuously absent from American history, and that, far from being a powerful military country, the US has assiduously avoided war unless it was with a wholly insignificant opponent. Instead, the US prefers to wait on the sidelines until both sides have fought themselves to a stalemate, while profiting by selling arms and other essential services. US actions in both World Wars are cited in support of this view, together with the tendency of the US military to make excessive claims for their weapons systems which are not fulfilled in practice.

According to this thesis, American power is a temporary and illusory phenomenon. The powerful position which the US occupies in world affairs was handed to it after the World Wars as a result of the disruption of all other major trading countries, and the US has done its best to maintain this position by fostering a 'status quo' during the Cold War. Once this ends, the old Power Blocs in Europe and Asia will reassert themselves.

Notes and references

1. "American Empire". Western Washington University. Retrieved 2006-03-20."empire". Dictionary.com. Retrieved 2006-06-13.
2. Lawrence M. Vance "The US Global Empire" (http://www.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance8.html)
3. Oxford English Dictionary (1989). "imperialism". Retrieved 2006-04-12.
4. Oxford English Dictionary (1989). "empire". Retrieved 2006-04-12.
5. Miller, Stuart Creighton (1982). "Benevolent Assimilation" The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02697-8. p. 3.
6. Thornton, Archibald Paton (September, 1978). Imperialism in the Twentieth Century. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-24848-1. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
7. Walzer, Michael. "Is There an American Empire?". www.freeindiamedia.com. Retrieved 2006-06-10.
8. Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 1.
9. Kellner, Douglas (2003-04-25). "American Exceptionalism". Retrieved 2006-02-20. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
10. Edwords, Frederick (1987). "The religious character of American patriotism. It's time to recognize our traditions and answer some hard questions". The Humanist (p. 20-24, 36). {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
11. Magdoff, Harry (2001). "After the Attack...The War on Terrorism". Monthly Review. 53 (6): p. 7. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
12. Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 1-3.
13. Lens, Sidney (2003). The Forging of the American Empire. Haymarket Books and Pluto Press. ISBN 0-7453-2100-3. Book jacket.
14. Buchanan, Patrick (1999). A Republic, Not and Empire. Regnery Publishing. ISBN 0-89526-272-X. p. 165.
15. Lens (2003), op. cit. Book jacket.
16. Chomsky, Noam (1988). Manufacturing Consent. Pantheon Books. ISBN 0-375-71449-9.
17. Bacevich, Andrew (2004). American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-01375-1.
18. Churchill, Ward (2003). Reflections on the Justice of Roosting Chickens. AK Press. ISBN 1-902593-79-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
19. Foster, John Bellamy (2003). "The New Age of Imperialism". Monthly Review. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
20. ERIC SCHMITT, "Washington at Work; Ex-Cold Warrior Sees the Future as 'Up for Grabs'" The New York Times December 23, 1991.
21. America's Empire of Bases
22. Pitts, Chip (November 8, 2006). "The Election on Empire". The National Interest. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
23. Smith, Ashley (June 24, 2006). "The Classical Marxist Theory of Imperialism". Socialism 2006. Columbia University. {{cite conference}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
24. Hardt and Negri no longer hold that the world has already entered the new era of Empire, but only that it is emerging. According to Hardt, the Iraq War is a classically imperialist war, but represents the last gasp of a doomed strategy. Hardt, Michael (July 13, 2006). "From Imperialism to Empire". The Nation. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
25. Negri, Antonio (2000). Empire. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00671-2. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help) p. xiii-xiv.
26. Bookman, Jay (June 25, 2003). "Let's just say it's not an empire". Atlanta Journal-Constitution. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
27. Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 220. See also Wikiquote: Philippine-American War Quotes.
28. Boot, Max (November 2003). "Neither New nor Nefarious: The Liberal Empire Strikes Back". Current History. 102 (667).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
29. Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 136.
30. Boot, Max (May 6, 2003). "American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away From the Label". USA Today. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
31. Heer, Jeet (March 23, 2003). "Operation Anglosphere". Boston Globe. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
32. Ferguson, Niall (June 2, 2005). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-101700-7. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
33. Miller (1982), op. cit. p. 3.
34. Lafeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9048-0.
35. Hanson, Victor Davis (2002). "A Funny Sort of Empire". National Review. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
36. Ikenberry, G. John (March/April 2004). "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order". Foreign Affairs. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
37. ed. George Clack (September 1997). "A brief history of the United States". A Portrait of the USA. United States Information Agency. Retrieved 2006-03-20. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
38. Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism, speech at York University, Toronto, February 10, 1993.
39. Rothkop, David (June 22, 1997). "Globalization and Culture". Foreign Policy. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)

See also

External links

• Bellah, Robert N. (2003). "Imperialism, American-style". The Christian Century: 20–25. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• "America and Empire: Manifest Destiny Warmed Up?". The Economist. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help) Argues that the U.S. is going through an imperial phase, but like previous phases, this will be temporary, since (they argue) empire is incompatible with traditional U.S. policies and beliefs.
• "9/11 and the American Empire". Retrieved 2006-05-05. A website that looks at the events of 9/11 which point towards government orchestration with the intention of using mass public fear as a catalyst for creating a stronger American Empire..
• "The American Empire Project". Retrieved 2006-06-10. A series of books from left-wing writers such as Noam Chomsky, critical of the "American Empire".
• "An American Question". tygerland.net by AS Heath. Retrieved 2006-06-10. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |work= (help) July 25, 2005
• Boot, Max (2003). "American imperialism? No need to run away from label". USA today. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) Argues that "U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century."
• Hitchens, Christopher, "Imperialism: Superpower dominance, malignant and benign". Slate.com. Retrieved 2006-06-10., warns that the U.S.—whether or not you call it an empire—should be careful to use its power wisely.
• Johnson, Paul, "America's New Empire for Liberty". Article from conservative writer and historian, argues that the U.S. has always been an empire—and a good one at that.
• Motyl, Alexander J. (2006). "Empire Falls Alexander J. Motyl". Foreign Affairs. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help) Two new books attempt to explain U.S. power and policy in imperial terms.
• "Empire?". Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 2006-08-07.
• Niall Ferguson. ""Empire Falls"". Vanity Fair. Retrieved 2006-10-01.
• "The American Empire:Pax Americana or Pox Americana?". Monthly Review. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
• Is President Bush Destroying the American Empire? An Update on America's Inadvertent Empire Transcript of presentation by Robert Dujarric on April 14, 2004

Further reading

• Perkins, John (2004). Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. ISBN 1-57675-301-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Zepezauer, Mark (2002). Boomerang! : How Our Covert Wars Have Created Enemies Across the Middle East and Brought Terror to America. ISBN 1-56751-222-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Tremblay, Rodrigue (2004). The New American Empire. Infinty publishing. ISBN 0-7414-1887-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Card, Orson Scott (2006). Empire. TOR. ISBN 0-7653-1611-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Odom, William (2004). America's Inadvertent Empire. Yale University Press. ISBN 0300100698. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthours= ignored (help)
• Johnson, Chalmers (2000). Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. ISBN 0-8050-6239-4.
• Johnson, Chalmers (2004). The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. ISBN 0-8050-7004-4.
• Johnson, Chalmers (2007). Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. ISBN 0-8050-7911-4.

• Foreign relations of the United States
• History of the foreign relations of the United States
• Empires
• International relations