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Republic of Rhodesia
1965–1979
Flag of Rhodesia Flag Coat of arms of Rhodesia Coat of arms
Motto: Sit Nomine Digna (Latin: May she be worthy of the name)
Anthem: "Rise O Voices of Rhodesia" (from 1974)
Capital	Salisbury
Common languages	English
Government	Republic
President¹
• 1970-1975	Clifford Dupont
• 1976-1978	John Wrathall
Officer Administering the Government¹
• 1965-1970	Clifford Dupont
Prime minister
• 1965-1979	Ian Smith
Historical era	Cold War
• Independence (UDI)	November 11 1965
• Republic declared	March 2, 1970
• Zimbabwe-Rhodesia	June 1 1979
• Zimbabwe	April 17, 1980
Area
1978	390,580 km (150,800 sq mi)
Population
• 1978	6,930,000
Currency	Pound (until 1970) Dollar (from 1970)
Preceded by Succeeded by File:Rhodesia Flag 1965 - 1979.gif Southern Rhodesia Zimbabwe Rhodesia
¹ Between 1965 and 1970 Queen Elizabeth II was still considered to be the official Head of State. The highest official of Rhodesia held the title "Officer Administering the Government" as they acted in lieu of a Governor-General, a post never appointed by the Queen. After a republic was declared in March 1970 it was changed into the office of a republican president.

Rhodesia was the common name of the erstwhile British colony of Southern Rhodesia between the renaming of Northern Rhodesia as Zambia in 1964 and the establishment of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979. After a brief return to colonial status as Southern Rhodesia from 1979 to 1980 the country became the independent nation of Zimbabwe in April 1980. The country is landlocked and located in southern Africa. It was governed by predominantly white Settler Governments until 1979, initially as a self governing colony then, after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence as a self-proclaimed sovereign Dominion and latterly a Republic. The colony was named after Cecil Rhodes, whose British South Africa Company acquired the land in the nineteenth century. The colony gained internationally recognition of its independence in 1980 as the Republic of Zimbabwe. Before 1964 the name "Rhodesia" referred to the territory of modern Zambia and Zimbabwe.

History

Rhodesia was known as Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony of the British Empire, prior to 1964.

UDI

The British government adopted a policy known as No Independence Before Majority African Rule (NIBMAR). This policy dictated that those colonies with a substantial population of white settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of universal suffrage and majority rule. This policy was opposed by the European minority Rhodesian Front (RF) government, led by Ian Smith.

After failed negotiations with the UK government, on 11 November 1965, Smith's government declared the country independent from British government rule in what became known as UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence). The timing of Smith's telegram announcing UDI to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson is significant. It was sent precisely at 1 p.m. local time (11 a.m. in London) on 11 November, at the precise moment that the UK started its traditional one minute of silence to mark the end of World War I and honour its war dead. The not-so-hidden message to “kith and kin”, as Smith put it, was to recall the fact that Southern Rhodesia had helped the UK in its time of need in World War I and World War II and that the British should not forget that. British High Commissioner John Barnes Johnston, who disliked Smith, cleaned out the High Commission building of all official documents and left Rhodesia (though Smith left strict instructions that the High Commission building be left untouched, much to Johnston's surprise).

Part of a series on the
History of Zimbabwe
Ancient history Leopard's Kopje c. 650 – c. 1075 Mapungubwe Kingdom c. 1220 – c. 1300 Zimbabwe Kingdom c. 1300 – c. 1450 Mutapa Kingdom c. 1430–1760 Butua Kingdom c. 1450–1683
White settlement pre-1923 Rozvi Empire c. 1660–1866 Mthwakazi 1840–1893 Rudd Concession 1888 BSA Company rule 1890–1923 First Matabele War 1893–1894 Second Matabele War 1896–1897 World War I involvement 1914–1918 Colony of Southern Rhodesia 1923–1965 World War II involvement 1939–1945 Malayan Emergency involvement 1948–1960 Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953–1963 Rhodesian Bush War 1964–1979 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 1965 Rhodesia 1965–1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia June–December 1979 Lancaster House Agreement December 1979 British Dependency 1979–1980 Zimbabwe 1980–present Gukurahundi 1982–1987 Second Congo War 1998–2003 Coup d'état 2017
v t e

UDI was internationally condemned, and at the behest of Britain, Rhodesia was placed under the first United Nations Security Council authorised sanctions, beginning in 1965 and lasting until the restoration of British rule in December 1979. The terms of these sanctions forbade most forms of trade or financial exchange with Rhodesia. Sanctions were not universally adhered to, however. South Africa, Portugal, Israel, Iran and some Arab states helped Rhodesia in various ways. In the case of the US, the 1971 Byrd Amendment allowed the importation of chrome, ferrochrome and nickel from Rhodesia. In the immediate term, Rhodesia was able to evade sanctions but the means of evasion typically involved “selling at a discount and buying at a premium”. Also, few outsiders would invest in Rhodesia.

From the time of UDI onwards, the Rhodesian government struggled to obtain international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. No significant state ever granted recognition to Rhodesia, and in 1970 the US government categorically stated that “under no circumstances” would it recognise Rhodesia.

Initially, the state maintained its loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II as “Queen of Rhodesia” (a title to which she never consented) but not to her representative, the Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs, whose constitutional duties were exercised by an “Officer Administering the Government”, Clifford Dupont. On 2 March 1970, Rhodesia's government formally severed links with the British Crown, and Rhodesia was declared a republic, with Dupont as President. Dupont was a London solicitor who had emigrated to Rhodesia in 1953. The Rhodesians hoped that the declaration of a Republic would finally prompt sympathetic states to grant recognition. But the only visible result was that the US (under pressure from the UK government) closed down its consulate in Salisbury.

The impact of UDI

In 2005, the 40th anniversary of UDI prompted memorial events of various kinds. 40 years was sufficient time to make UDI history and allow it to be considered in proper perspective. But many people who were directly affected by or who participated in UDI were still alive. A two day conference on UDI ('UDI : 40 Years On'), funded by the British Academy, was held at the London School of Economics in January 2006. This conference viewed UDI as a joint product of racial conflict and the cold war. UDI had an international dimension and was not just a product of domestic events in Rhodesia.

Critics of UDI maintain that it was intended to defend the privileges of a small white elite at the expense of the black majority. In this view of things, UDI created a vacuum which the Mugabe regime eventually filled. Alternatively, until well into the 1990s, many Rhodesians sought to justify UDI on the ground that it had delayed independence by 15 years. They claimed that this delay contained the spread of communism in Africa and enabled Zimbabwe to avoid some of the economic and political problems suffered by many other newly independent African nations.

Tobacco generated more than half of Rhodesia's foreign currency throughout the UDI era and a highly-organised cartel smuggled it out to world markets disguised as South African or Portuguese product. However, sanctions that followed UDI affected tobacco production badly. The volume sold quickly declined from 150m kg (US$75m) in 1964 to around 60m kg (US$30m) per year.

"From the industry’s point of view, UDI was the worst setback it ever faced. Zimbabwe would be producing 400m kg of tobacco a year (double actual 1990 output) if it were not for UDI"

Ted Jeffreys (Rhodesia Tobacco Association President, 1962-1965), 1991

During UDI, white tobacco farmers switched to the production of maize and beef for sale on the domestic market. This provided severe competition to black farmers, whose share of marketed home food production declined from 65% to 30% during the UDI period. The black peasant farming sector never recovered from this. At the same time, sanctions provided an artificial protection for domestic manufacturing, which allowed the buildup of industries, though these businesses faltered when exposed to international competition in the post-independence era.

As the Bush War got underway, defence expenditure rose from R$30m (8.5% of national budget) in 1971/72 to R$400m in 1978/79 (47% of national budget). In 1980 the post-independence government of Zimbabwe inherited a US$500m national debt.

Start of the Bush War

A lengthy armed campaign by ZANLA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and ZIPRA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), against the Rhodesian government followed UDI. This became known as the "Bush War" by White Rhodesians and as the "Second Chimurenga" (or rebellion in Shona) by supporters of the guerrillas. The war is generally considered to have started in 1972 with scattered attacks on isolated white-owned farms.

ZANU was led by Robert Mugabe, latterly based in Mozambique and was supported by the People's Republic of China. ZAPU was led by Joshua Nkomo, based in Zambia and was supported by the Soviet Union. ZANU and ZAPU together formed 'the Patriotic Front'. Broadly, ZANU represented the 80% of the Black population who were Shona speaking and ZAPU represented the 20% who were Ndebele-speaking. The degree of support offered by China and the Soviet Union to the nationalist parties was probably less than was commonly thought at the time. The nationalist parties were often described as 'Marxist', but events showed that this Marxism was largely superficial. The main priority of ZANU and ZAPU was to end white rule in Rhodesia.

Once the war started, an impression quickly took root that the Rhodesians were going to lose. Even the South Africans realised that attempting to sustain white minority rule in a situation where blacks outnumbered whites by 22:1 was untenable. (In 1978, the total European population was approximately 260,000, while the African population exceeded six million.) International business groups involved in the country (e.g. Lonrho) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Nkomo was feted on his visits to Europe by business leaders and politicians. Funding was provided for his ZAPU party and associated ZIPRA military operations. This funding allowed ZIPRA to purchase sophisticated weaponry on the international arms market, which ultimately helped lead to the demise of Rhodesia. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take.

Initially, the war was very one-sided since the Rhodesian government was able to deploy an overwhelming superiority in manpower, fire-power and mobility. Containing the insurgency required little more than a police action. But the situation changed suddenly after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, was pressing for a settlement.

A meeting, brokered by South Africa and Zambia, was held between the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists at Victoria Falls in August 1975. These talks never got beyond the procedural phase and Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war in order to prevent majority rule.

"Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seem to have made the tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is becoming increasingly slippery with blood." – Rand Daily Mail editorial, May 1976

At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA guerrillas. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow guerrilla bases to be set up in their territories. From 1976, guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia - attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions.

The government adopted a 'strategic hamlets' policy of the kind used in Malaya and Vietnam to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government. The protected villages were compared by some observers to concentration camps. Contemporary accounts indicate that this interference in the lives of local residents induced many of them who had previously been neutral to support the insurgents. The war degenerated into rounds of increasing brutality from all three parties involved (Rhodesian army, ZANU and ZAPU)."The war was both bloody and brutal and brought out the very worst in the opposing combatants on all three sides" - Mike Subritzky (former NZ Army ceasefire monitor in Rhodesia, 1980)

The Rhodesian government faced a serious economic struggle during the 1970s as a result of sanctions, emigration, and the strain imposed on the economic system by conscription of all white men. At this time volunteers were recruited from overseas to help in the fight. One particular source of volunteers was Vietnam war veterans (mostly USA and Australian nationals) who had found it difficult to adjust to civilian life. From the start of 1977, the Rhodesians began to take serious casualties, which left few white families untouched.

End of the Bush War

Rhodesia began to lose vital economic and military support from South Africa, which, while sympathetic to the white minority government, never accorded it diplomatic recognition. The South Africans placed limits on the fuel and munitions they supplied to the Rhodesian military. They also withdrew the personnel and equipment that they had previously provided to aid the war effort. In 1976 the South African and US governments combined to place pressure on Smith to agree to a form of majority rule. The Rhodesians now offered more concessions, but those concessions were not sufficient to end the war.

At the time, some Rhodesians claimed that one reason why South Africa started to withdraw aid from Rhodesia was the still embittered history between the British-dominated Rhodesia and the Afrikaner-dominated South Africa. Ian Smith claimed in his memoirs that even though many white South Africans supported Rhodesia, South African Prime Minister John Vorster's policy of détente with the Black African states ended up with Rhodesia being offered as the "sacrificial lamb" in order to buy more time for South Africa. Other observers perceive South Africa's distancing itself from Rhodesia as being an early move in the process that led to majority rule in South Africa itself.

"In 1976 South Africa saw settlement of the Rhodesian question as vital on several fronts: to cauterize the wound of the psychological blow … caused by her defeat in the Angolan conflict; to pre-empt possible Cuban intervention in Rhodesia and the possibility of South Africa being sucked into another Cold War regional conflict without the support and endorsement of the western powers"

Dr Sue Onslow, 'South Africa and UDI'

By early 1978 the Rhodesian armed forces were on the defensive. The early strategy of trying to defend the borders was abandoned in favour of trying to defend key economic areas and lines of communication with South Africa, while the rest of the countryside became a patchwork of "no-go areas". Rhodesia's front-line forces never contained more than 25,000 troops, eight tanks (Polish made T-55s) and nine old Hawker Hunter jets. Those forces could still launch raids on enemy bases, but Rhodesia was facing diplomatic isolation, economic collapse and military defeat.

During the closing stages of the conflict, the Rhodesian government resorted to biological warfare. Watercourses at several sites close to the Mozambique border were deliberately contaminated with cholera and the toxin sodium coumadin (an anti-coagulant commonly used in rat poison). Food stocks in the area were contaminated with anthrax spores. These biological attacks had little impact on the fighting capability of ZANLA, but caused considerable distress to the local population. Over 10,000 people contracted anthrax in the period 1978 to 1980 of whom 200 died. The facts about this episode became known during the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission during the late 1990s.

The morale of Rhodesians and their overseas supporters was stiffened by the work of journalists such as Lord Richard Cecil, son of the Marquess of Salisbury. Lord Richard produced regular news reports such as the Thames TV ‘Frontline Rhodesia’ features. These reports typically contrasted the incompetent insurgents with the “superbly professional” white government troops. On 20 April 1978 Lord Richard was killed when he parachuted into enemy territory with a Rhodesian airborne unit and landed in the midst of a group of ZANLA insurgents.

The shooting down on 3 September 1978 of the civilian Vickers Viscount airliner Hunyani, Air Rhodesia Flight RH825, in the Kariba area by ZIPRA insurgents using a surface-to-air missile, and the subsequent massacre of its survivors, is widely considered to be the event that finally destroyed the Rhodesians' will to continue the war. Although militarily insignificant, the loss of this aircraft (and a second Viscount, the Umniati, in 1979) demonstrated just how vulnerable Rhodesian civil society was to insurgent attack.

The Rhodesians’ means to continue the war were also eroding fast. In December 1978, a ZANLA unit penetrated the outskirts of Salisbury and fired a volley of rockets and incendiary device rounds into the main oil storage depot – the most heavily defended economic asset in the country. The storage tanks burned for five days giving off a column of smoke that could be seen 80 miles away. Half a million barrels of petroleum product (comprising Rhodesia’s strategic oil reserve) were lost. At a stroke, the country’s annual budget deficit was increased by 20%.

The end of UDI

The Rhodesian army continued its "mobile counter-offensive" strategy of holding key positions ("vital asset ground") while carrying out raids into the no-go areas and into neighbouring countries. These raids became increasingly costly and unproductive. For example, in April 1979 special forces carried out a raid on Joshua Nkomo's residence in Lusaka (Zambia) with the stated intention of assassinating him. Nkomo and his family left hastily a few hours before the raid – having clearly been warned that the raid was coming. Rumours of treachery circulated within Rhodesia. It was variously suggested that the army command had been penetrated by British MI6 or that people in the Rhodesian establishment were positioning themselves for life after independence. The loyalty of the country's Central Intelligence Organization became suspect.

In 1979, some special forces units were accused of using counter terrorist operations as cover for ivory poaching and smuggling. Colonel Reid-Daly (commander of the Selous Scouts) was court martialled and dismissed for insubordination. Meanwhile, support for ZANU-PF was growing amongst the black soldiers who made up 70% of the Rhodesian army.

By the end of 1978, the need to cut a deal was apparent to most Rhodesians, but not to all. Ian Smith had dismissed his intransigent Defence Minister, P. K. van der Byl as early as 1976. "PK" had been a hard-line opponent of any form of compromise with domestic opposition or the international community since before UDI.

"... it is better to fight to the last man and the last cartridge and die with some honour. Because, what is being presented to us here is a degree of humiliation ..."

P. K. van der Byl in 1977, commenting on a British peace plan.

PK eventually retired to his country estate outside Cape Town, but there were elements in Rhodesia, mainly embittered former security force personnel, who forcibly opposed majority rule up to and well beyond independence. New white immigrants continued to arrive in Rhodesia right up to the eve of independence.

As the result of an "internal settlement" between the Rhodesian government and some fringe African nationalist parties, which were not in exile and not involved in the war, elections were held in April 1979. The UANC (United African National Council) party won a majority in this election, and its leader, Abel Muzorewa (a United Methodist Church bishop), became the country's nominal prime minister on June 1 1979. The country's name was changed to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The internal settlement left control of the country's police, security forces, civil service and judiciary in white hands. It assured whites of about one third of the seats in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement which did not amount to majority rule. However, the United States Senate voted to end economic sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia on June 12.

While the 1979 election was described by the Rhodesian government as non-racial and democratic, it did not include the main nationalist parties ZANU and ZAPU. In spite of offers from Ian Smith, the latter parties declined to participate in an election leading to anything less than full and immediate majority rule.

Bishop Muzorewa's government did not receive international recognition. The Bush War continued unabated and sanctions were not lifted. The international community refused to accept the validity of any agreement which did not incorporate the main nationalist parties. The British Government (then led by the recently elected Margaret Thatcher) issued invitations to all parties to attend a peace conference at Lancaster House. These negotiations took place in London in late 1979. The three-month-long conference almost failed to reach conclusion, due to disagreements on Land reform, but resulted in the Lancaster House Agreement. UDI ended, and Rhodesia reverted to the status of a British colony ('The British Dependency of Southern Rhodesia').

The outcome was an internationally supervised general election in early 1980. ZANU (PF) led by Robert Mugabe won this election. Elements in the Rhodesian armed forces toyed with the idea of mounting a coup ("Operation Quartz") to prevent ZANU taking over government of the country, but the coup was never realised.

Independence

Mugabe and the victorious black nationalists were rather less concerned by Operation Quartz than by the possibility that there might be a mass exodus of the white community of the kind that had caused chaos in Mozambique five years earlier. Such an exodus had been prepared for by the South African government. With the agreement of the British Governor of Rhodesia, South African troops had entered the country to secure the road approaches to the Beit Bridge border crossing point. Refugee camps had been prepared in the Transvaal. On the day the election results became known, most white families had prepared contingency plans for flight, including the packing of cars and suitcases.

However, after a meeting with Robert Mugabe and the central committee of ZANU (PF), Ian Smith was reassured that whites could, and should stay in the new Zimbabwe. Mugabe promised that he would abide strictly by the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement and that changes in Zimbabwe would be made gradually and by proper legal process.

On April 18, 1980 the country became independent as the Republic of Zimbabwe, and its capital, Salisbury, was renamed Harare two years later.

Foreign relations

Throughout the period of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965 to 1979), Rhodesia pursued a foreign policy of attempting to secure recognition as an independent country, and insisting that its political system would include 'gradual steps to majority rule.' Ardently anti-communist, Rhodesia tried to present itself to the West as a front-line state against communist expansion in Africa, to little avail. Rhodesia never received any international recognition during its existence; recognition only occurred after elections in 1980 and a transition to black African rule.

Rhodesia wished to retain its economic prosperity and also feared communist elements in the rebel forces, and thus felt their policy of white minority rule was justified. However, the international community refused to accept this rationale, believing that their policies were perpetuating racism. This attitude was part of the larger decolonisation context, during which Western powers such as United Kingdom, France, and Belgium hastened to grant independence to their colonies in Africa.

Britain and the UDI

Rhodesia was originally a British colony. Although decolonisation in Africa had commenced after World War II, it began accelerating in the early 1960s, causing Britain to rapidly negotiate independence with several of its colonies. During this period, it adopted a foreign policy called NIBMAR, or No Independence Before Majority African Rule, mandating democratic reforms that placed governance in the hands of the majority black Africans. The governing white minority of Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, opposed the policy and its implications. On 11 November 1965, Rhodesia's minority white government made a unilateral declaration of independence, or UDI, from the United Kingdom, as it became apparent that negotiations would not lead to independence under the white regime.

Until late 1969, Rhodesia still recognised Queen Elizabeth II as head of state, even though it opposed the British government itself for hindering its goals of independence. The Queen, however, refused to accept the title Queen of Rhodesia. Eventually, the Smith government abandoned attempts to remain loyal to the Crown, and in 1969, a majority of whites voted in referendum to declare Rhodesia a republic. They hoped that this move would facilitate recognition as an independent state by the international community, but the issues of white minority control remained and hindered this effort, and like UDI before it, the government lacked international recognition.

Sanctions

After the declaration of independence, and indeed for the entire duration of its existence, Rhodesia did not receive official recognition from any state, although it did maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa, another white minority regime, and Portugal, an authoritarian government which ceased relations with Rhodesia after its democratic Carnation Revolution in 1974. The day following the declaration of independence, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/216) calling upon all states to not accord Rhodesia recognition, and to refrain from any assistance. The Security Council also imposed selective mandatory economic sanctions, which were later made comprehensive.

International perspective

Rhodesia desired to be accepted as part of the international community and invoked the doctrine of non-intervention in internal affairs as justification for rebuking external criticism of its internal policies. However, the emerging doctrine of self-determination in colonial situations meant that most nations regarded Rhodesia as illegitimate because of the non-democratic nature of its regime.

Zambia (the former Northern Rhodesia) took a pragmatic approach towards Rhodesia. It was heavily dependent on access through Rhodesia for its copper ore exports and fuel and power imports. Rhodesia still allowed Zambia to export and import its goods through its territory to Mozambique ports, despite the Zambian government's official policy of hostility and non-recognition of the post-UDI Smith Administration.

The United States of America, like all other Western nations, refused to recognise Rhodesia, though unlike others, allowed its Consulate-General to function as a communications conduit between Washington DC and Salisbury. When Rhodesia set up an information office in Washington DC, there were loud protests by OAU nations, but Washington simply responded that as the Rhodesian mission and its staff had no official diplomatic status, it was not illegal under United States law.

Portugal pursued a middle path with Rhodesia. While not officially recognising Rhodesia under Ian Smith, the government of Antonio Salazar did permit Rhodesia to establish a diplomatic mission in Lisbon, and permitted Rhodesian exports and imports through their colony of Mozambique. The Portuguese government in power at that time, which was authoritarian and ardently anti-communist, gave active behind-the-scenes support in Rhodesia's fight against the guerrilla groups.

South Africa, itself under international pressure as a white minority regime, was at this time pursuing a policy of détente with the black African states. These states wanted South Africa to pressure Ian Smith to accept a faster transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, in return for pledges of non-interference in South Africa's internal affairs. Prime Minister John Vorster, believing this to be South Africa's best chance for international acceptance, used a number of pressure tactics such as holding up shipments of fuel and ammunition to Rhodesia, and pulling out friendly South African forces from Rhodesia. The combination of the loss of Mozambique and the loss of support from South Africa were a critical blow to the Rhodesian government.

Legations

After the UDI, Rhodesia House in London (the Rhodesian High Commission) simply became a representative office with no official diplomatic status. Other locations which had Rhodesian representative offices were:

• Until 1975
  • Lourenço Marques, Mozambique
  • Lisbon, Portugal

• Until 1979
  • Pretoria, South Africa
  • Washington, D.C., United States
  • Bonn, West Germany
  • Tokyo, Japan

The most important representative offices for Rhodesia were Lisbon and Pretoria.

Results

Continuing civil war and a lack of international support eventually led the Rhodesian government to submit to an agreement with the UK in 1979. This led to internationally supervised elections, won by ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe, establishing the internationally-recognised Zimbabwe.

Footnote

After independence in April 1980, the history of Rhodesians became that of the whites in Zimbabwe. However, many of the issues associated with UDI and the Bush War were not resolved immediately. In the early 1980s, South Africa sought to secure its position in the region by various means including the destabilisation of neighbouring states through support for dissident groups such as UNITA (in Angola) and Renamo (in Mozambique). In Zimbabwe, the South African intelligence service promoted ZIPRA dissidents in what became known as the super-ZAPU insurgency in Matabeleland.

During the Bush War of the 1970s some white farmers were able to carry on operations due to the tolerance of guerrilla commanders (who did not want to damage vital economic assets) and/or by paying protection money to those commanders. The super-ZAPU insurgency of the early 1980s was much less manageable. Super-ZAPU targeted white farmers, missionaries and tourists on the grounds that their murders would make "international headlines."

"... then the super-ZAPU element came in and this really unseated us – South Africa targeting white farmers. I mean it changed a few perspectives, I can tell you..."

Ed Cumming, Matabeleland white farmer

The insurgency was equipped and coordinated by South African intelligence, working through white former members of the Rhodesian security services. The super-ZAPU insurgency was eventually resolved at a military level by the Zimbabwe army Fifth Brigade’s sweep through Matabeleland in 1983 (operation “Gukurahundi”) and at a political level by the Unity Accord of 1987. Operation Gukurahundi was associated with the massacre of between four and ten thousand civilians. Those last figures are estimated by sources ranging from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace to Parade magazine.

The Matabeleland police reserve (still a largely white force in 1983) provided a degree of support to operation Gukurahundi. White police officers manning roadblocks and checkpoints were a commonly observed feature in Matabeleland at the time of the operation.

In the ten years after independence, around 2/3 of the white population of Zimbabwe emigrated. Most emigrated to white, English speaking countries where they formed expatriate communities. Many expatriates and some of the whites who stayed in Zimbabwe became deeply nostalgic for Rhodesia. These individuals are known as "Rhodies". Those native whites who are more accepting of the new order are known as "Zimbos".

Politics

Southern Rhodesia was self-governing from 1923, although it never gained full Dominion status within the old Commonwealth. Its electoral register had property and education qualifications (unexceptional for the early twentieth century) which allowed white settlers to dominate the government. Over the years, various electoral arrangements were made at a national and municipal level to maintain white dominance. For example, the franchise for the first Legislative Council election in 1899 contained the following requirement:

voters to be British subjects, male, 21 years of age and older, able to write their address and occupation, and then to fulfill the following financial requirements: (a) ownership of a registered mining claim in Southern Rhodesia, or (b) occupying immovable property worth £75, or (c) receiving wages or salary of £50 per annum in Southern Rhodesia. Six months' continuous residence was also required for qualifications (b) and (c).

That was innocuous by the standards of the time, but the practical effect was to exclude black people from the electorate. Whites never comprised more than 5% of the country's total population, but up to 1979 they never had less than 95% of the total vote in national elections.

Up until the 1950s, Southern Rhodesia had a vibrant political life with right and left wing parties (by white settler standards) competing for power. The Rhodesia Labour Party held seats in the Assembly and in municipal councils throughout the 1920s and 30s. From 1953 to 1958 the prime minister was Garfield Todd, a liberal who did much to promote the development of the Black community through investment in education, housing and healthcare. However, Todd was forced from office when he attempted to widen the franchise in order to allow Blacks up to 20% of the total votes.

From 1958 onwards, white settler politics consolidated and ossified around one issue - resistance to majority rule. This set the scene for UDI. The 1961 Constitution governed Southern Rhodesia and independent Rhodesia up until 1969. It used the Westminster Parliamentary System modified by a system of separate voter rolls with differing property and education qualifications. The system ensured that whites had the majority of Assembly seats.

Under the 1969 republican constitution, there was a bicameral Parliament consisting of an indirectly elected Senate and a directly elected House of Assembly, in which the majority of seats were effectively reserved for whites. The office of President was a ceremonial post, with executive power remaining with the Prime Minister.

Under the Constitution of the short-lived Zimbabwe Rhodesia, which saw a black-led government elected for the first time, 28 of the 100 parliamentary seats were reserved for whites. The independence constitution, agreed at Lancaster House retained reserved seats for whites (20 out of 100 in the House of Assembly and 8 out of 40 seats in the Senate). The constitution prohibited the Zimbabwe authorities from altering it for seven years without unanimous consent, and for a further three years a three quarters vote in Parliament was needed. In 1987, the Constitution was amended to abolish the seats reserved for whites, and replace the office of Prime Minister with an executive President. In 1990 the Senate was abolished.

See also

• Ahrn Palley
• British involvement in Rhodesia
• British South Africa Police
• Elections in Southern Rhodesia
• Flag of Rhodesia
• Flags of Rhodesia 1896-1979
• History of Zimbabwe
• P. K. van der Byl
• President of Rhodesia
• Prime Minister of Rhodesia
• Rhodesian Light Infantry
• Rhodesian Bush War
• Rhodesian dollar
• Rhodesian Ridgeback
• Rhodie
• Southern Rhodesia general election, 1962
• Selous Scouts
• History of Scouting in Rhodesia
• Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)
• Whites in Zimbabwe
• ZANLA
• Zimbabwe
• Zimbabwe Rhodesia
• ZIPRA

External links

• Embassy of Rhodesia in Iceland: Extensive collection of information pertaining to Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and Africa in general.
• The Viscount disasters of 1978 and 1979
• Ironing the lawn in Salisbury - the last days of Rhodesia (The Guardian)
• Ian Beckett, an account of the Bush War (in 2 parts)
• Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s
• 1975 BBC report on the failure of negotiations between the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists
• The Brookings Institution : Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa - Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
• Selby, Angus (2006) “Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1890-2005”, PhD Thesis, Oxford University
• Rhodesia Roll of Honour, - Those who died in defence of UDI

Audio and Video

• 'Sweet Banana' - song of the RAR regiment
• Audio of Ian Smith's radio address announcing UDI
• 2 years of independence, 1967 Rhodesian MoI film, You Tube (7 mins)
• Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, You Tube collection of film clips (6 mins)
• Songs of UDI, 3 songs from 1977, You Tube (9 mins)

References

1. The Past is Another Country, Martin Meredith, p 218
2. BBC: 1970: Ian Smith declares Rhodesia a republic
3. LSE Conference :UDI : 40 Years On
4. Herald online :a critique of UDI
5. Rumor Mill posting:justification of UDI, partisan comment
6. Selby thesis :p66
7. Selby thesis:p88
8. Ian Beckett :report on Bush War, para 10
9. APF newsletter, 1975 :appraisal of Rhodesia in 1975
10. Ian Beckett :report on Bush War, para 10
11. The Guardian, 21 April 2000 British Multimillionaire bankrolls Mugabe party
12. Brookings Institution :p156, study on conflict resolution
13. BBC report, 1975:peace talks fail
14. Time magazine :p2
15. Time magazine, 3 May 1976: A Strike at the Lifeline
16. APF Newsletter, 1976 :Rhodesia's "Protected" Blacks
17. NZ History article:Operation Agila, "The British Empire's Last Sunset"
18. Mazoe: Rhodesian Roll of Honour
19. APF newsletter, 1976:appraisal of Rhodesia in 1976
20. LSE conference, UDI - 40 years on abstracts
21. Time magazine, 7 August 1978 :Rhodesia faces collapse
22. Time magazine, 1 August 1978 :taking the chicken run
23. Southern African News Feature:the plague wars
24. The Guardian, 15 July 2003 :obituary of sixth Marquess of Salisbury
25. Nick Downie report :caution, partisan comment
26. The Viscount Disasters - The Story
27. The Atlantic Monthly : The Fragility of Domestic Energy, see page 5
28. Ian Beckett :report on Bush War, para 7
29. Ian Beckett :report on Bush War
30. Rhodesia Worldwide:"PK"
31. The Past is Another Country, Martin Meredith, p291
32. Newsnet report :saboteurs hit Zimbabwean military, partisan comment
33. Time magazine, October 1977 :The Land of Opportunity
34. BBC "On this day" report :1 June 1979
35. SENATE VOTES DOWN A MOVE TO PRESERVE RHODESIA SANCTIONS; ARMS-BILL VETO THREATENED White House Says 52-to-41 Margin Shows President Has Support to Prevent an Override, June 13, 1979. The New York Times.
36. Operation Quartz :possible military coup Rhodesia 1980
37. Wars of the World :Renamo insurgency, 1976-1992
38. Selby thesis :p170
39. Selby thesis :p84
40. Selby thesis :p171
41. Newsnet report :caution, partisan comment
42. Selby thesis :p175
43. Selby thesis :p174
44. Selby thesis :p174
45. Rhodesian elections: Elections in Rhodesia, background to Rhodesian elections

• British Empire
• Former place names
• Rhodesia
• Special territories