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Its new, restrained manner made it a more appropriate representative of the British establishment, and the company established ties with King ], beginning a close relationship with the ] that would endure until Barings' collapse (] was the great granddaughter of one of the Barings family). The descendants of the original five male branches of the Baring family were all appointed to the ] with the titles ], ], ], ] and ]. The company's restraint during this period would cost it its pre-eminence in the world of finance, but would later pay dividends when its refusal to take a chance on financing ]'s recovery from ] saved it the painful losses experienced by other British banks at the onset of the ]. | Its new, restrained manner made it a more appropriate representative of the British establishment, and the company established ties with King ], beginning a close relationship with the ] that would endure until Barings' collapse (] was the great granddaughter of one of the Barings family). The descendants of the original five male branches of the Baring family were all appointed to the ] with the titles ], ], ], ] and ]. The company's restraint during this period would cost it its pre-eminence in the world of finance, but would later pay dividends when its refusal to take a chance on financing ]'s recovery from ] saved it the painful losses experienced by other British banks at the onset of the ]. | ||
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==Second collapse== | ||
The Barings Bank collapse of 1995 is considered a pivotal turning point in the ] and has become a textbook example of ]. Over a period of three years, ], a ]-based management employee of ] Barings Bank, lost ]827 million (US$1.4 billion), primarily on ] speculation, and through manipulating the records, hid his actions until February 1995. When the losses were revealed, Barings Bank, the oldest ] in the ], the Queen's bankers, and the financier of the ], were forced to ] on its accounts.<ref name="JamesReason">{{cite book|last=Reason|first=James|year=1997|title=Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents|publisher=Ashgate Publishing Limited|pages=28-34}}</ref> | The Barings Bank collapse of 1995 is considered a pivotal turning point in the ] and has become a textbook example of ]. Over a period of three years, ], a ]-based management employee of ] Barings Bank, lost ]827 million (US$1.4 billion), primarily on ] speculation, and through manipulating the records, hid his actions until February 1995. When the losses were revealed, Barings Bank, the oldest ] in the ], the Queen's bankers, and the financier of the ], were forced to ] on its accounts.<ref name="JamesReason">{{cite book|last=Reason|first=James|year=1997|title=Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents|publisher=Ashgate Publishing Limited|pages=28-34}}</ref> | ||
Revision as of 19:58, 2 January 2008
Industry | Banking |
---|---|
Founded | 1762 |
Defunct | 1995 |
Fate | Collapsed (Purchased for £1 by ING). |
Successor | ING Group |
Headquarters | London |
Key people | Sir Francis Baring (founder) |
Barings Bank (1762 to 1995) was the oldest merchant bank in London until its collapse in 1995 after one of the bank's employees, Nick Leeson, lost £827 million ($1.4 billion) speculating - primarily on futures contracts.
History
Barings Bank was founded in 1762 as the 'John and Francis Baring Company' by Sir Francis Baring. In 1806 his son Alexander Baring joined the firm and they renamed it Baring Brothers & Co., merging it with the London offices of Hope & Co., where Alexander worked with Henry Hope.
Barings had a long and storied history. In 1802, it helped finance the Louisiana Purchase, despite the fact that Britain was at war with France, and the sale had the effect of financing Napoleon's war effort. Technically the United States did not purchase Louisiana from Napoleon. Louisiana was purchased from the Baring brothers and Hope & Co.. The payment for the purchase was made in US bonds, which Napoleon sold to Barings at a discount of 87 1/2 per each $100. As a result, Napoleon received only $8,831,250 in cash for Louisiana. Alexander Baring, working for Hope & Co., conferred with the French Director of the Public Treasury François Barbé-Marbois in Paris and then went to the United States to pick up the bonds before taking them to France.
Later daring efforts in underwriting got the firm into serious trouble through overexposure to Argentine and Uruguayan debt, and the bank had to be rescued by a consortium organized by the governor of the Bank of England, William Lidderdale, in the Panic of 1890. While recovery from this incident was swift, it destroyed the company's former bravado.
Its new, restrained manner made it a more appropriate representative of the British establishment, and the company established ties with King George V, beginning a close relationship with the British monarchy that would endure until Barings' collapse (Diana, Princess of Wales was the great granddaughter of one of the Barings family). The descendants of the original five male branches of the Baring family were all appointed to the peerage with the titles Baron Revelstoke, Earl of Northbrook, Baron Ashburton, Baron Howick of Glendale and Earl of Cromer. The company's restraint during this period would cost it its pre-eminence in the world of finance, but would later pay dividends when its refusal to take a chance on financing Germany's recovery from World War I saved it the painful losses experienced by other British banks at the onset of the Great Depression.
Second collapse
The Barings Bank collapse of 1995 is considered a pivotal turning point in the history of banking and has become a textbook example of accounting fraud. Over a period of three years, Nick Leeson, a Singapore-based management employee of London's Barings Bank, lost £827 million (US$1.4 billion), primarily on futures contract speculation, and through manipulating the records, hid his actions until February 1995. When the losses were revealed, Barings Bank, the oldest merchant bank in the City of London, the Queen's bankers, and the financier of the Napoleonic Wars, were forced to default on its accounts.
Internal auditing
Barings Futures Singapore (BFS)'s management structure through 1995 enabled Leeson to operate without supervision from London headquarters. Leeson was not only the floor manager for Barings' trading on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, he was also the head of settlement operations, charged with ensuring accurate accounting for the unit. Normally the positions would have been held by two different employees. As trading floor manager, Leeson reported to an office (head of settlement operations) inside Barings Bank which he himself held, which short-circuited normal accounting and auditing safeguards. After the collapse, several observers, including Leeson himself, placed much of the blame on the bank's own deficient internal auditing and risk management practices.
People at the London end of Barings were all so know-all that nobody dared ask a stupid question in case they looked silly in front of everyone else.
— Nick Leeson, Rogue Trader (1996)
Some people did raise eyebrows about Leeson's activities but were ignored.
Awaiting breakdown from my buddy Nick … (once they creatively allocate the numbers).
— Brenda Granger, Head of Futures and Options Settlements in London, January 1995 internal e-mail
Corruption
Because of the absence of oversight, Leeson was able to make seemingly small gambles in the futures arbitrage market at Barings Futures Singapore (BFS) and cover for his shortfalls by reporting losses as gains to Barings in London. Specifically, Leeson altered the branch's error account, subsequently known by its account number 88888 as the "five-eights account," to prevent the London office from receiving the standard daily reports on trading, price, and status. Leeson claims the losses started when one of his colleagues bought contracts when she should have sold them.
By December 1994 Leeson had cost Barings £200 million. He reported to British tax authorities a £102 million profit. If the company had uncovered his true financial dealings then, collapse might have been avoided as Barings had capital of £350 million.
Kobe earthquake
Using the hidden "five-eights account," Leeson began to aggressively trade in futures and options on SIMEX. His decisions routinely lost substantial sums, but he used money entrusted to the bank by subsidiaries for use in their own accounts. He falsified trading records in the bank's computer systems, and used money intended for margin payments on other trading. Barings Bank management in London at first congratulated and rewarded Leeson for what seemed to be his outstanding trading profits. However, his luck ran out when the Kobe earthquake sent the Asian financial markets into a tailspin. Leeson bet on a rapid recovery by the Nikkei Stock Average which failed to materialize.
Discovery
On Thursday, 23 February 1995 Leeson left Singapore to fly to Kuala Lumpur. Barings Bank auditors finally discovered the fraud, around the same time that Barings' chairman, Peter Barings, received a confession note from Leeson, but it was too late. The Bank of England attempted a weekend bailout but it was unsuccessful. Barings was declared insolvent on Sunday, 26 February 1995 and appointed administrators began managing the finances of Barings Group and its subsidiaries. The same day, the Board of Banking Supervision of the Bank of England launched an investigation led by Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer and their report was released on 18 July 1995. Here are some excerpts from the House of Lords' debate on the report:
Even the provisional conclusions of the report are interesting. I should like to give them to the House so that we may be reminded what the supervisory body itself decided at the end of such investigation as it was able to make. It stated on page 250:
"Barings' collapse was due to the unauthorised and ultimately catastrophic activities of, it appears, one individual (Leeson) that went undetected as a consequence of a failure of management and other internal controls of the most basic kind".
The words I venture to emphasise to your Lordships are these:
"as a consequence of a failure of management and other internal controls of the most basic kind".
Noble Lords who have read through paragraph 14.2 of the report will be aware that it specifies these deficiencies. The report states:
"Management teams have a duty to understand fully the businesses they manage".
Really! They really have to understand the businesses! I would have thought that it was an elementary assumption to make that the controllers should understand the nature of the businesses they are trying to control.
The next requirement is this:
"Responsibility for each business activity has to be clearly established and communicated".
Hooray for that! I wonder how businesses in this country manage in their generality to continue without that qualification.
The third requirement is:
"Clear segregation of duties is fundamental to any effective control system".
Tut, tut! We are now treating the real elementum of the whole art and science of management, and it needs to be repeated here.
The report continues: "Relevant internal controls, including independent risk management, have to be established for all business activities".
Hooray for that! These are matters of plain, ordinary common sense. One does not need to be an accountant or a management consultant to be aware of that.
Finally: "Top management and the Audit Committee have to ensure that significant weaknesses, identified to them by internal audit or otherwise, are resolved quickly".
Well, well, well! These are all respects which this control body finds were absent from Barings. Do noble Lords really know what is being said? It is being said that Barings ought not to have been authorised bankers from the beginning, because any business—I do not care whether it is a whelk stall (one must not insult whelk stall owners in the context of this catastrophe) or what—knows that these are the basic conditions for the continuance of the business. It seems to me that the Bank of England ought never to have authorised this concern without verifying that all these conditions were in place.
By 27 February 1995, Leeson's activities had generated losses totalling £827 million (US$1.4 billion), twice the bank's available trading capital. The collapse (costing another £100 million) was dramatic; employees around the world did not receive their bonuses.
Aftermath
ING, a Dutch bank, purchased Barings Bank in 1995 for the nominal sum of £1 and assumed all of Barings' liabilities, forming the subsidiary ING Barings. In 2001, ING sold the U.S. based operations to ABN Amro for $275 million, and folded the rest of ING Barings into its European banking division. This left only the asset management division, Baring Asset Management. In March 2005, BAM was then split and sold by ING to MassMutual (acquiring BAM’s investment management activities and the rights to use the Baring Asset Management name) and Northern Trust (acquiring BAM’s Financial Services Group). Barings Bank therefore no longer has a separate corporate existence, although the Barings name still lives on as the MassMutual subsidiary Baring Asset Management. Nick Leeson fled Singapore but was arrested in Germany and extradited back to Singapore, where he was convicted of fraud and sentenced to six and a half years imprisonment. While in Changi prison he was diagnosed with cancer, recovered and was divorced by his wife. Upon early release in 1999, he wrote an autobiography, Rogue Trader, covering the events leading up to the collapse. Film-maker James Dearden later dramatized the book in the film Rogue Trader.
See also
- Re Barings plc (No.5) 1 BCLC 433
- Leonard Ingrams, former Managing Director and founder of Garsington Opera.
- Rogue Trader 1999 film starring Ewan McGregor.
Notes
- Reason, James (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate Publishing Limited. p. 29.
- ^ Reason, James (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate Publishing Limited. pp. 28–34.
- "Case Study : Barings". Sungard Bancware Erisk. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
- ^ "Implications of the Barings Collapse for Bank Supervisors" (pdf). Reserve Bank of Australia. 1995. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
- ^ Howard Chua-Eoan (2007). "The Collapse of Barings Bank, 1995". TIME magazine. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
- "Lords Hansard 21 Jul 1995". Retrieved 2007-11-27.
- Kapner, Suzanne (2001-01-31). "WORLD BUSINESS BRIEFING: EUROPE; MORE RESTRUCTURING BY ING GROUP" (html). New York Times. Retrieved 2007-11-26.
- "ING Group agrees to sell Baring Asset Management" (HTML). ING Group. 2004-11-22. Retrieved 2007-11-26.
- "ING ends link with Baring name" (HTML). BBC News. 2004-11-22. Retrieved 2007-11-26.
Further reading
- Rogue Trader (1996, hardcover) ISBN 0-316-51856-5; (1997, softcover) ISBN 0-7515-1708-9, Book by Nick Leeson giving his account of the Barings Bank collapse.
External links
- Nick Leeson Official Website of the Barings Rogue Trader
- http://www.numa.com/ref/barings/
- http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/f/fay-collapse.html