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] Soviet recruitment poster with the Ukrainization theme. It uses traditional Ukrainian imagery with Ukrainian-language text: "Son! Enrol in the school of ], and the defence of ] will be ensured."]] | ] Soviet recruitment poster with the Ukrainization theme. It uses traditional Ukrainian imagery with Ukrainian-language text: "Son! Enrol in the school of ], and the defence of ] will be ensured."]] | ||
'''Ukrainization''' (or Ukrainianization) is the policy |
'''Ukrainization''' (or Ukrainianization), in general, is the state policy to increase the prominence of ] and/or representation of ] within state institutions, mostly, but not exclusively, within ]. It has been cited as a reverse of ] and ]. ] of modern Ukraine consider the implementation of these policies to be a forced ]. For a detailed discussion of modern language issues, see ]. | ||
== Ukrainization after the Russian Revolution == | |||
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Following the ] of ], the ] was broken up. In different parts of the former empire, several nations, including Ukrainians, developed a renewed sense of national identity. In the chaotic post-revolutionary years, Ukraine went through several short-lived independent and quasi-independent states (see ]), and the Ukrainian language, for the first time in modern history, gained usage in most government affairs. Initially, this trend continued under the ] government of the ], which in a political struggle with the old regime had their own reasons to encourage the national movements of the former Russian Empire. While trying to ascertain and consolidate its power, the Bolshevik government was by far more concerned about many political oppositions connected to the pre-revolutionary order than about the national movements inside the former empire. | Following the ] of ], the ] was broken up. In different parts of the former empire, several nations, including Ukrainians, developed a renewed sense of national identity. In the chaotic post-revolutionary years, Ukraine went through several short-lived independent and quasi-independent states (see ]), and the Ukrainian language, for the first time in modern history, gained usage in most government affairs. Initially, this trend continued under the ] government of the ], which in a political struggle with the old regime had their own reasons to encourage the national movements of the former Russian Empire. While trying to ascertain and consolidate its power, the Bolshevik government was by far more concerned about many political oppositions connected to the pre-revolutionary order than about the national movements inside the former empire. | ||
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The policy even reached those regions of southern ] where the ethnic Ukrainian population was significant, particularly the areas by the ] and especially ] in the ]. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia. | The policy even reached those regions of southern ] where the ethnic Ukrainian population was significant, particularly the areas by the ] and especially ] in the ]. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia. | ||
Starting from the early ], the Ukrainization policies were abruptly reversed. In the following fifty years the Soviet policies towards Ukrainian varied between quiet discouragement and suppression to persecution and cultural purges. All effects of Ukrainization were undone and Ukraine gradually became ] to a significant degree. | Starting from the early ], the Ukrainization policies were abruptly reversed. In the following fifty years the Soviet policies towards Ukrainian varied between quiet discouragement and suppression to persecution and cultural purges. All effects of Ukrainization were undone and Ukraine gradually became ] to a significant degree. These policies softened somewhat only in the mid-to-late ] and were completely reversed again in newly-independent ] in the ]. | ||
==Ukrainization after independence== | |||
{{section-POV}} | |||
Since ], independent Ukraine has made Ukrainian the only ] and implemented government policies to broaden the use of Ukrainian. The educational system in Ukraine has been transformed over the first decade of independence from a system that is partly Ukrainian to one that is overwhelmingly so. The government has also mandated a progressively increased role for Ukrainian in the media and commerce. In some cases, the abrupt changing of the language of instruction in institutions of secondary and higher education, led to the charges of Ukrainization, raised mostly by the Russian-speaking population. However, the transition lacked most of the controversies that surrounded the de-] in several of the other former ]. | |||
In two presidential elections (] and ]), the adoption of ] as a second state language was an election promise by one of the main candidates (] in 1994, ] in 2004). This promise contributed to Kuchma's win by bringing him the support of the eastern and southern regions but after the electoral win, Kuchma did not follow on his pledge to make Russian a state language in two 5-year terms of his presidency. A similar promise by Yanukovych might have also increased the turnout of his base, but it was rebutted during the campaign by his opponent (]), who pointed out that Yanukovych could have already implemented this change while he was ] should this have really been his priority. (Yanukovych eventually lost that ]). | |||
After Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration, the pace of Ukrainization has been accelerated. As of ], there have been numerous rallies against Ukrainization in the ] and other regions of ], prompted by the authorities' arbitrary transfers of Russian-language schools in ] and other historically Russophone territories of Ukraine to Ukrainian language of instruction, without any public consultation. The new round of government's efforts to limit the use of Russian on television and radio stations have also raised concerns from citizens and ]s alike. | |||
According to newly-enacted laws of civil and administrative procedure, all legal and court proceedings in Ukraine are to be conducted in Ukrainian, which is the only ]. Although the law has a provision guaranteeing interpretation service for any language desired by a defendant, it is viewed as a part of the wider ukrainization campaign. On ], 2005, the ] Foreign Ministry protested the measure issuing a statement <sup></sup> that the change infringes on the rights of the Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens. | |||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
== Referencies == | |||
⚫ | Енциклопедія українознавства (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies), ], ], ISBN: 5-7702-0554-7, (in Ukrainian). | ||
] | ] | ||
] | |||
] | ] | ||
== Further reading == | |||
⚫ | *Енциклопедія українознавства (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies), ], ], ISBN: 5-7702-0554-7, (in Ukrainian). <!--page and number please!--> | ||
] | |||
] | |||
] | |||
] | |||
] | ] |
Revision as of 14:41, 6 October 2005
For other uses, see Ukrainization (disambiguation).Ukrainization (or Ukrainianization), in general, is the state policy to increase the prominence of Ukrainian language and/or representation of Ukrainian people within state institutions, mostly, but not exclusively, within Ukraine. It has been cited as a reverse of Polonization and Russification. Ethnic minorities of modern Ukraine consider the implementation of these policies to be a forced assimilation. For a detailed discussion of modern language issues, see Ukrainian language.
Ukrainization after the Russian Revolution
Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Russian Empire was broken up. In different parts of the former empire, several nations, including Ukrainians, developed a renewed sense of national identity. In the chaotic post-revolutionary years, Ukraine went through several short-lived independent and quasi-independent states (see Ukrainian People's Republic), and the Ukrainian language, for the first time in modern history, gained usage in most government affairs. Initially, this trend continued under the Bolshevik government of the Soviet Union, which in a political struggle with the old regime had their own reasons to encourage the national movements of the former Russian Empire. While trying to ascertain and consolidate its power, the Bolshevik government was by far more concerned about many political oppositions connected to the pre-revolutionary order than about the national movements inside the former empire.
The widening use of Ukrainian further developed in the first years of Bolshevik rule into a policy called Korenization ("putting down roots"). The government pursued a policy of Ukrainization (Ukrayinizatsiya, actively promoting the Ukrainian language), both in the government and among party personnel, and implemented an impressive education program which raised the literacy of the Ukrainophone rural areas. Newly-generated academic efforts from the period of independence were co-opted by the Bolshevik government. The party and government apparatus was mostly Russian-speaking but were encouraged to learn the Ukrainian language. Simultaneously, the newly-literate ethnic Ukrainians migrated to the cities, which became rapidly largely Ukrainianized—in both population and in education.
The policy even reached those regions of southern Russian SFSR where the ethnic Ukrainian population was significant, particularly the areas by the Don River and especially Kuban in the North Caucasus. Ukrainian language teachers, just graduated from expanded institutions of higher education in Soviet Ukraine, were dispatched to these regions to staff newly opened Ukrainian schools or to teach Ukrainian as a second language in Russian schools. A string of local Ukrainian-language publications were started and departments of Ukrainian studies were opened in colleges. Overall, these policies were implemented in thirty-five administrative districts in southern Russia.
Starting from the early 1930s, the Ukrainization policies were abruptly reversed. In the following fifty years the Soviet policies towards Ukrainian varied between quiet discouragement and suppression to persecution and cultural purges. All effects of Ukrainization were undone and Ukraine gradually became Russified to a significant degree. These policies softened somewhat only in the mid-to-late 1980s and were completely reversed again in newly-independent Ukraine in the 1990s.
Ukrainization after independence
Since 1991, independent Ukraine has made Ukrainian the only official state language and implemented government policies to broaden the use of Ukrainian. The educational system in Ukraine has been transformed over the first decade of independence from a system that is partly Ukrainian to one that is overwhelmingly so. The government has also mandated a progressively increased role for Ukrainian in the media and commerce. In some cases, the abrupt changing of the language of instruction in institutions of secondary and higher education, led to the charges of Ukrainization, raised mostly by the Russian-speaking population. However, the transition lacked most of the controversies that surrounded the de-Russification in several of the other former Soviet Republics.
In two presidential elections (1994 and 2004), the adoption of Russian as a second state language was an election promise by one of the main candidates (Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Viktor Yanukovych in 2004). This promise contributed to Kuchma's win by bringing him the support of the eastern and southern regions but after the electoral win, Kuchma did not follow on his pledge to make Russian a state language in two 5-year terms of his presidency. A similar promise by Yanukovych might have also increased the turnout of his base, but it was rebutted during the campaign by his opponent (Viktor Yushchenko), who pointed out that Yanukovych could have already implemented this change while he was Prime Minister should this have really been his priority. (Yanukovych eventually lost that presidential election).
After Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration, the pace of Ukrainization has been accelerated. As of 2005, there have been numerous rallies against Ukrainization in the Crimea and other regions of Ukraine, prompted by the authorities' arbitrary transfers of Russian-language schools in Crimea and other historically Russophone territories of Ukraine to Ukrainian language of instruction, without any public consultation. The new round of government's efforts to limit the use of Russian on television and radio stations have also raised concerns from citizens and NGOs alike.
According to newly-enacted laws of civil and administrative procedure, all legal and court proceedings in Ukraine are to be conducted in Ukrainian, which is the only official state language. Although the law has a provision guaranteeing interpretation service for any language desired by a defendant, it is viewed as a part of the wider ukrainization campaign. On September 6, 2005, the Russian Foreign Ministry protested the measure issuing a statement that the change infringes on the rights of the Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens.
See also
Further reading
- Енциклопедія українознавства (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies), Lviv, 1994, ISBN: 5-7702-0554-7, (in Ukrainian).