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Ukrainian Insurgent Army Українська Повстанська Армія Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya
Flag of the UPA
Leaders	Vasyl Ivakhiv Dmytro Klyachkivsky Roman Shukhevych Vasyl Kuk
Dates of operation	1943–1949 (Active) 1949–1956 (Localised)
Active regions	Volhynia Galicia Carpathia
Part of	OUN-B
Allies	Nazi Germany (temporary)
Opponents	Nazi Germany Soviet Union Armia Krajowa People's Republic of Poland

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Template:Lang-ua, "Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya," or "UPA") was a group of Ukrainian nationalist partisans who engaged in a series of guerrilla conflicts during World War II. The group was the military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — Bandera faction (the OUN-B), originally formed in Volyn (northwestern Ukraine) in the spring and summer of 1943.

The OUN's stated immediate goal was to protect ethnic Ukrainians from repression and exploitation by Polish governing authorities; its ultimate goal was an independent and unified Ukrainian state. The organization began as a resistance group and developed into a guerrilla army. During its existence, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fought a large variety of military forces, including the Nazi German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, the Polish underground army (Armia Krajowa) and Soviet forces — including Soviet partisans, the Red Army, NKVD, SMERSH, MGB and MVD. From late spring 1944, the UPA and OUN-B — faced with Soviet advances — also cooperated with the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, SiPo and SD against the Soviets and Poles. The army played a substantial role in the killing and ethnic cleansing of much of Western Ukraine's Polish population. In the last year of the war, the Polish communist army — the Armia Ludowa — was massively attacked by the UPA.

After the end of World War II, the UPA remained active and fought against Poland until 1947 and against the Soviet Union until 1949. It was particularly strong in the Carpathian Mountains, the entirety of Galicia and in Volyn — in modern Western Ukraine. It drew substantial moral support from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and to a lesser extent from Ukrainian Orthodox clergy. Among the anti-Nazi resistance movements it was unique in that it had no significant foreign support. Its growth and strength were a reflection of the popularity it enjoyed among the people of Western Ukraine. Outside of Western Ukraine, support was minimal, and the majority of the Soviet (eastern) Ukrainian population considered the OUN/UPA to have been primarily collaborators with the Germans.

UPA was formally disbanded in early September, 1949. Some of its units continued operations until 1956.

Note: Another separate, independent UPA also existed in Volyn from 1941 until July 1943. It was nominally formed earlier in late November 1941 and from spring 1942 was a most active Ukrainian nationalist armed group before the formal formation of UPA in spring 1943. This group belonged to political opponents of the OUN(B) - OUN(UNR), and allied itself politically with OUN(M). This grouping led by Taras Bulba-Borovets had links to the UNR in exile. It was renamed the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army in July 1943 before being later partially and forcibly absorbed into the UPA of the OUN(B).

Organization of the UPA

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the underground nationalist political party, the OUN, in a sophisticated centralized network. The UPA was responsible for military operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. Despite the division between UPA and the OUN, there was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leaders were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from the German, Polish and Soviet military, while UPA units planned to be trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual. The General Staff, formed at the end of 1943 consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers, were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys (literally bee swarm), with 8-10 soldiers, were equivalent to squads. Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahin or Brigade.

UPA's leaders were: Vasyl Ivakhiv (spring – 13 of May 1943), Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Shukhevych (January 1944 until 1950) and finally Vasyl Kuk.

In November 1943, UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and three areas (group} commands: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. Three military schools for unqualified command staff were also established.

In terms of UPA soldiers' social background, 60% were peasants of low to moderate means, 20-25% were from the working class (primarily from the rural lumber and food industries), and 15% members of the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of UPA's military trainers and officer corps. With respect to the origins of UPA's members, sixty percent were from Galicia and 30% from Volyn and Polesia

The number of UPA fighters varied. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000. By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25-30 thousand fighters up to 100,000 or even 200,000 soldiers

The armaments of the UPA

Initially, UPA used the weapons collected from the battlefields of 1939 and 1941. Later they bought weapons from peasants and individual soldiers, or captured them in combat. Some light weapons were also brought in by deserting Ukrainian auxiliary policemen. In 1944 UPA were armed directly by German units but with Soviet arms. For the most part, the UPA used the light infantry weapons of Soviet and to a lesser extent German origin (for the lack of ammo). Many kurins were equipped with light 51 mm and 82 mm mortars. During large-scale operations in 1943-1944, insurgent forces also used artillery (45 mm and 76.2 mm). In 1943 a light Hungarian tank was used in Volyn. In 1944 the Soviets captured from UPA a U-2 aircraft and 1 armored car and 1 personnel carrier. However, it was not stated that they were in operable condition, while no OUN/UPA documents noted the usage of such equipment. By end of WWII in Europe from UPA by NKVD were captured 45 artillery systems (45 and 76.2 mm calibers) and 423 mortars. In the attacks against Polish civilians, axes, and pikes were used. However, the light infantry weapon was the basic weapon used by the UPA.

UPA's Formation

1941

In a Memorandum from August, 14 1941 the OUN (B) proposed to the Germans, to create a Ukrainian Army “which will join the German Аrmy ... until the latter will win”, in exchange for German recognition of an allied Ukrainian independent state The Ukrainian Army was planned to have been formed on the basis of DUN (Detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsiоnalistiv) and specifically on the basis of the “Ukrainian legion”, at that time composed of two battalions “Nachtigall” and “Roland.” These two battalions were included in the Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. These proposals however, were not accepted by the Germans, and by the middle of September 1941 the Germans began a campaign of repression against the most proactive OUN members.

At the beginning of October 1941, during the first OUN Conference the OUN formulated its future strategy. This called for transferring part of its organizational structure underground, in order to avoid conflict with the Germans. It also refrained from open anti-German propaganda activities. At the same time, the OUN tried to infiltrate its own members into and create its own network within the German Auxiliary police.

A captured German document of November 25, 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered: "It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..." By the end of November 1941, both the “Ukrainian Legions” Roland and Nachtigall were disbanded and the remaining soldiers (approximately 650 persons) were given the option of signing a contract for military service after being transferred to Germany for further military training. At the same time (end of November 1941) the Germans started a second wave of repression in Reichskommissariat Ukraine specifically targeting OUN (B) members. Most of the captured OUN activists in Reichskommissariat Ukraine however, belonged to OUN (M) wing.

1942

At the Second Conference of the OUN(B) held in April 1942 the policies for the “creation, build-up and development of Ukrainian political and future military forces”, and “action against partisan activity supported by Moscow” were adopted. Although German policies were criticized, the primary enemy targeted were the Soviet partisans.

In July 1942 OUN (B) issued a statement in which it stated that the main enemy targeted was “Moscow”, while the Germans was ephemerally criticized for their policy concerning the Ukrainian independent state. Until December 1942, OUN(B)'s principal activity was propaganda and the development of its own underground network, while actions against the Germans were described at that time as undesirable and provocative.

In December 1942 near Lviv the “Military conference of OUN(B)” was held. It resulted in the adoption of a policy for the accelerated growth for the establishment of OUN(B) Military forces. The Conference emphasised that “all combat capable population must support, under OUN banners, the struggle against the Bolshevik enemy”. On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation.

UPA's relations with Germany

Hostilities

Despite the stated opinions of Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to their main enemies - the Soviet partisans and Poles - the Third Conference of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists held near Lviv from 17-21 February 1943, adopted the decision to commence open warfare against the Germans (OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison earlier on February 7 of that year). Accordingly, the OUN (B) leadership on March 20, 1943 issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German auxiliary police in 1941-1942 to desert with their weapons and to join the units of UPA in Volyn. This process often involved engaging in armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent them from doing so. The number of trained and armed soldiers deserting into the ranks of UPA was estimated as being between 4 to 5 thousand. Initially, the military formation of the OUN under Bandera's leadership was called the "military detachment of OUN (SD)" but after April 1943 UPA, the name "Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya" (UPA) was adopted as the official title.

Anti-German actions were limited to situations where the Germans attacked the Ukrainian population or UPA units. Indeed, according to German Eastern Front General Ernst Kostring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow nor Germany."

Under German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on police stations and military convoys. In the region of Zhytomyr insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of the farmland. The UPA was able to send small groups of raiders deep into eastern Ukraine.

According to the OUN/UPA, on May 12, 1943 Germans attacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside the Nazi Army who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and mass extermination), where the Germans as well as insurgents suffered heavy losses. Soviet partisans reported the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces at Kolki for the end of April until the middle of May, 1943

In June 1943 German SS and police forces under the command of General von dem Bach-Zelewski, chosen by Himmler and seen as an expert in anti-guerilla warfare, attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volyn during Operation "BB" (Bandenbekämpfung).

According to Ukrainian accounts, the initial stage of Operation “BB” (Bandenbekämpfung) under the command of Sturmbannführer SS General Platle and later under General Hintzler against the UPA had produced no results whatsoever. This catastrophic development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in General von dem Bach-Zelewski being sent to Ukraine and being responsible only to Hitler himself.

General Prutzmann, von dem Bach-Zelewski's successor as commander of the "BB" did not introduce any new methods in combating the UPA. The UPA-North grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.

According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid to late 1943 in Volyn: in July, 35; in August, 24; in September, 15; October-November, 47." During the summer of 1943, the Germans lost over 3,000 men killed or wounded while the UPA lost 1237 killed or wounded. By the fall of 1943, UPA and German clashes declined, such that Erich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech mentioned that “nationalistic bands in forests do not pose any major threat” for the Germans .

UPA, fighting a two-front war against both the Germans and approaching Soviets (as well as Soviet partisans), did not focus all of its efforts against the Germans. Indeed, it considered the Soviets to be a greater threat. Adopting a strategy analogous to that of the Chetnik leader General Draža Mihailović, UPA held back against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the Communists. Because of this, although UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukrainian regions and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine. Due to its focus on the Soviets as the principal threat, UPA's anti-German struggle did not contribute significantly to the liberation of Ukrainian territories by Soviet forces.

Collaboration

In autumn 1943 some detachments of UPA attempted to find reapproachment with the Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943, such actions were not halted. In early 1944 UPA forces in several Western regions engaged in cooperation with the German Wehrmacht, Waffen SS, SiPo and SD. In March-July 1944 a senior leader of OUN(B) in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, resulting in a German decision to supply UPA with arms and ammunitions. In May of that year, the OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which had been conducted against the Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets.".

However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against the repressive actions of the German administration. For example, on January 20, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.

In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the Army Group” on the southern Front. By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"

After the front had passed, by the end of 1944 the Germans supplied OUN/UPA by air with arms and equipment. There even existed, in the region of Ivano-Frankivsk, a small landing strip for German transport planes. Some German personnel trained to conduct terrorist and intelligence activities behind Soviet lines, as well as some OUN-B leaders, were also transported through this channel.

UPA and Poles

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UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing actions of ethnic Poles from areas of Ukrainian autonomous settlement through terrorist acts and the mass-murder of Polish civilians. Ethnic cleansing operations against the Polish population began on a large scale in March 1943.

Brutal methods such as beheading, disembowelling, and killing with knives and axes were employed against Polish villagers. In addition to the UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence, and large groups of armed "bandit" marauders, unafiliated with UPA, brutalized civilians. so the exact number of Poles killed specifically by UPA is unknown. The UPA also killed ethnic Ukrainians who were believed to be associated with communists, as well as those Ukrainians who had intermarried with Poles. In anti-Polish actions from Autumn 1943 in Halychyna, the UPA conducted cooperative actions with detachments from the Galician Division. The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 (Edward Prus, 2006) to 500,000 (Norman Davies, 1996); many more Poles fled the area because of the post-war chaos.

The UPA's soldiers very often had had finished Polish schools and universities and so they knew Polish language quite well. Many of them were involved in terrorist actions against the Polish state already before the IIWW. It is not true that UPA's actions were matched by similar actions by the Polish Armia Krajowa. The brutal conflict escalated out of control with many thousands of civilians being murdered by Ukrainians. Some Ukrainian historians try to distort the history by claiming that Polish insurgents did the same to the Ukrainian. No historic sources confirm such facts. It is true that Polish guerrillas made retaliatory actions but these were aimed only against bandits form UPA. There are no relations that the Polish killed innocent women or children.

UPA's war with the Soviet Union

Under German occupation

The total number of local Soviet Partisans acting in Western Ukraine was never high, due to the region enduring only two years of Soviet rule (some places even less). Only towards the end of the war, in 1944 did the number and activity of Soviet Partisans in Ukraine increase. UPA first encountered them in late 1942.

In 1943, the Soviet partisan leader Sydir Kovpak with help from the Nikita Khruschev went on to the Carpathian Mountains. His tour to the western Ukraine he described in his famous book Vid Putivlia do Karpat (From Putivl to the Carpathian Mountains). Well-armed with supplies delivered to secret airfields he formed a group which consisted of several thousand men which went deep into the Carpathians. Attacks by the German air force and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units In 1944 which were attacked by UPA units on way back. Famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members, after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform.

Fighting the Soviet Army (1944-45)

As the Red Army approached western Ukraine, the UPA avoided clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military fearing their offensive action would annihilate them. Instead, the UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet administration. Soviet archival data shows that UPA attacks were focused on small units and groups of Soviet soldiers, often ending with killing of the captured and wounded. The UPA opposed the mobilization of able-bodied men into the Soviet Army through the extermination of whole families of those who joined. The UPA also disrupted Soviet efforts at collectivization.

In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded front commander Army General Nikolai Vatutin, who led the liberation of Kiev. Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne. This began a full-scale operation in the spring of 1944, initially involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn. Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. A letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded. Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while the Soviet forces lost 2,000. The first significant sabotage operations against communications of the Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by UPA in April-May 1944. Such actions were promptly stopped by the Soviet Army and NKVD troops, after which the OUN/UPA submitted an order to temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for further struggle against the Soviets.

Despite heavy casualties on both sides during the initial clashes, the struggle was inconclusive. New large scale actions of UPA, especially in Ternopil Oblast, were launched in July-August 1944, when the Red Army advanced West. By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area of 160,000 square kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people and had established a shadow government.

In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout Western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set forests on fire. Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26,304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them.

During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 killed, approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and the disappearance of 427 others. Despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in Western Ukraine. In February 1945 UPA issued an order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and to act predominantly by choty’s (platoons).

Spring 1945- late 1946

After Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Soviet authorities turned their attention to insurgencies taking place in Ukraine and the Baltics. Combat units were re-organised and special forces were sent in. One of the major complications that arose was the local support the UPA had from the population.

Areas of UPA activity were depopulated. The estimates on numbers deported vary; officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1952 a total of 182,543 people deported while other sources indicate the number may have been as high as to 500,000.

Mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine. Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent torture; (reports exist of some prisoners being burned alive). The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with UPA were subjected to torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them and get them to reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents. Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were put on public display. Ultimately, between 1944 and 1952 as many as 600,000 people may have been arrested in Western Ukraine, with about one third executed and the rest imprisoned or exiled.

UPA responded to the Soviet methods by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, suspected collaborators and their families. This work was particularly attributed to the Sluzhba Bezbeky (SB), the anti-espionage wing of UPA. In a typical incident in Lviv region, in front of horrified villagers, UPA troops gouged out the eyes of two entire families suspected of reporting on insurgent movements to Soviet authorities, before hacking their bodies to pieces. Due to public outrage concerning these violent punitive acts, UPA stopped the practice of killing the families of collaborators by mid 1945. Other victims of UPA included Soviet activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food in to collective farms. The effect of such terrorist acts was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940s villages chose single men with no dependants as their leaders.

The UPA also proved to be especially adept at assassinating key Soviet administrative officials. According to NKVD data, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine. In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed ten members of the Soviet activ and a secretary of the county Communist party, and also kidnapped four other officials. UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members. According to a 1946 report by Khrushchenv's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A.A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against UPA by Destructive Battalions in Western Ukraine, only 10 percent had positive results - in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped. Morale amongst the NKVD in Western Ukraine was particularly low. Even within the dangerous context of Soviet state service in the late-Stalin era, West Ukraine was considered to be a "hardship post", and personnel files reveal higher rates of transfer requests, alcoholism, and nervous breakdowns and refusal to serve among NKVD field agents there at that time.

The first success of the Soviet authorities came in early 1946 in the Carpathians, which were blockaded from January 11 until April 10. The UPA operating there ceased to exist as a combat unit. The continuous heavy casualties elsewhere forced the UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home, when the Soviet Union offered three amnesties during 1947-1948.

By 1946, UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defense minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and the USA. Although the UPA obtained some help from the CIA and British intelligence during the latter phase of its struggle, the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. After the huge winter 1945/46 operation by the NKVD, UPA/OUN fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 the Soviets estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters.

The end of the UPA and OUN Resistance (1947-1955)

The turning point in the struggle against the UPA came in 1947, when the Soviets established an intelligence gathering network within the UPA and shifted the focus of their actions from mass terror to infiltration and espionage. After 1947 the UPA's activity began to subside. On May 30, 1947 Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare . In 1947-1948 UPA resistance was weakened enough to allow the Soviets to begin implementation of large-scale collectivization throughout Western Ukraine. In 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within the UPA had taken their toll on morale and on the UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing of one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks tried to take us from within...you can never know exactly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated..." In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against the UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the removal of "Myron", the head of the UPA's counterintelligence SB unit.

The Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by making significant investments into Western Ukraine, and by setting up a quick dispatch groups in many regions to combat the UPA. According to one retired MVD major, "By 1948 ideologically we had the support of most of the population." The Soviets skillfully exploited Polish-Ukrainian ethnic friction by recruitiing Poles as informants. This contributed to the growing isolation of the UPA which was further helped by the Polish government implementing Operation Wisła in 1947. On September 3, 1949 Shukhevych issued an order, liquidating UPA units and headquarters and integrating UPA's personnel into the OUN (B) underground.

The UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed during an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950 (in an ironic turn of events, he died from his wounds on the same day that Stalin would die 3 years later). Although sporadic UPA activity continued until the mid 1950's, after Shukhevich's death the UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA's manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956".

A controversy exists that there were NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population. among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954. One famous example of an ex-UPA turned MVD fighter was Bohdan Stashynsky who would then climb the ladder of MGB (and later KGB) hierarchy to become a foreign agent who assassinated the OUN chief Lev Rebet in 1957 and later Stepan Bandera in 1959.

Prominent people killed by UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church, killed when travelling in a German convoy, and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan.

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.

UPA and Soviet infiltration

From the beginning of 1944, the Soviets waged an active war against the UPA launching a large-scale assault against the Ukrainian underground in several directions, propaganda among the population; military operations; repression against members and their families. Soviet anti-insurgent propaganda was concentrated on discrediting and dividing the national liberation movement. Soviet propaganda emphasised their thesis on the treason and crimes of "Ukrainian-German nationalists" and their collaboration with "fascist invaders".

From 1944 through the 1950s initially frontal sections of the Red Army and SMERSH were directed against the UPA. Later the function of fighting the UPA fell to the NKVD.

In 1944-1945 the NKVD carried out 26,693 operations against the Ukrainian underground. These resulted in the deaths of 22.474 Ukrainian soldiers and the capture of 62,142 prisoners. During this time the NKVD formed special groups known as spetshrupy made up of former Soviet partisans. The goal of these groups was to discredit the and disorganize the OUN and UPA. In August 1944 Sydir Kovpak was placed under NKVD authority. Posing as Ukrainian insurgents these special formations used violence against the civilian population of Western Ukraine. In June 1945 there were 156 such special groups with 1783 members.

The Soviets used"extermination battalions" (strybky) recruiting secret collaborators in each population point. Attempts were made to place agents at all leading levels of the OUN and UPA.

From December 1945-1946 15,562 operations were carried out in which 4,200 were killed and more than 9,400 were arrested. From 1944-1953,the Soviets killed 153,000 and arrested 134,000 members of the UPA. 66,000 Families (204,000 people) were forcibly deported to Siberia and half a million people were subject to repressions. In the same period Polish authorities deported 450,000 people.--->

UPA's relationships with Western Ukraine's Jews

In contrast to the links between UPA and atrocities committed on Polish civilians, there is a lack of consensus among historians about the involvement of UPA in the massacre of Western Ukraine's Jews. Numerous accounts ascribe to UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation.. Some Ukrainian historian try not to ascribe horrific atrocities done on Jews but it seems to be very unobjective and has no serious background. Prior to the formation of UPA, in 1941-1942, when it was still working closely with Germany, the political organization from which it was formed, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, made numerous violently antisemitic statements. For example, in instructions to its members concerning how the OUN should behave during the war, it declared that "in times of chaos...one can allow oneself to liquidate Polish, Russian and Jewish figures, particularly the servants of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism" and further, when speaking of Russians, Poles, and Jews, to "destroy in the struggle, especially those, who defend the regime: send them to their lands, destroy them especially the intelligentsia...assimilation of the Jews is ruled out." Nevertheless, some Jews were protected by the OUN. According to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin dated March 30, 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews.".

By early 1943 the OUN had entered into open armed conflict with Nazi Germany. In 1944, the OUN formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity" Despite the allegations of UPA's involvement in the killing of Jews and earlier anti-Jewish statements by the OUN, there were cases of Jewish participation within the ranks of UPA, some of whom held high positions. Jewish participation included fighters but was particularly visible among its medical personnel. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians. One Ukrainian historian has claimed that almost every UPA unit included Jewish support personnel. The latter individual was the recipient of UPA's Golden Cross of Merit. Isolated reports of the Jewish families being sheltered by UPA have also surfaced. UPA's cooperation with Jews was extensive enough that, according to former head of the Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation at the USIA, some Soviet propaganda works complained about Zionists "closely cooperating with" Bandera ringleaders. One can conclude that the relationship between UPA and Western Ukraine's Jews was complex and not one-sided.

Aftermath

According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950.".

Reconciliation

During the following years the UPA was however officially taboo in the Soviet Union, and mentioned only as a terrorist organization. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, there have been heated debates to award former UPA members official recognition as legitimate combatants, with accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. UPA veterans have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Soviet Army veterans and some Ukrainian politicians particularly from the south and east of the country. Neighbouring governments in Russia and Poland have also reacted negatively.

Attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations. In 2007, president Yushchenko awarded the title "Hero of Ukraine", the country's highest honour to UPA leader Roman Shukhevych.

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds. Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.

Without waiting for official Kiev notice, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have been erected, including a monument to Stepan Bandera himself which opened in October 2007. In response to this, many eastern provinces responded with opening of memorials to their victims, the first one of which opened in Simferopol, Crimea in September 2007.

Recognition by the Ukrainian Government

On January 10, 2008 President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko submitted a draft law "On the official Status of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in 20s–90s of the 20th century". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920-1990 as part of the:

• Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)
• Karpatska Sich
• OUN
• UPA
• Ukrainian Main Liberation Army,

as well as persons who assisted these organizations shall be recognized as war veterans.

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to make public original sources.

Since 2006 the SBU has been actively involved in declassifying documents relating to the operations of Soviet security services and the history of liberation movement in Ukraine. The SBU Information Center provides an opportunity for scholars to get acquainted with electronic copies of archive documents. The documents are arranged by topics (1932-1933 Holodomor, OUN/UPA Activities, Repression in Ukraine, Movement of Dissident).

See also

• Ukrainian nationalism
• 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galizien (1st Ukrainian)
• Galicia (Central Europe)
• Operation Wisła
• Ukrainian Military Organization

References

1. Українська Повстанська Армія — Історія нескорених, Lviv, 2007 p.28 Template:Uk icon
2. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 4 pp. 193–199 Chapter 5
3. ^ Norman Davies. (1996). Europe: a History. Oxford: Oxford University Press
4. Subtelny, p. 474 Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 800. ISBN 0802083900.
5. Interview with historian Viktor Korol "The very fact that in contrast to practically all the other resistance movements in the countries occupied in WWII by Germany, the Ukrainian resistance movement was not getting any outside help, and the fact that it could go on fighting first against the Germans and later against the Soviets showed that the UPA had a very substantial support of the local Ukrainian population."
6. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 180
7. Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія Chapter 3 p.118-153
8. ^ Yuri Zhukov, "Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army", Small Wars and Insurgencies, v.18, no. 3, pp.439-466] Cite error: The named reference "Zhukov" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
9. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
10. Пастка для «Щура» 4 листопада одному з засновників УПА Дмитрові Клячківському виповнилося 95 років in Ukrainian-Russian "Zerkalo Nedeli" Magazine
11. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 172
12. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 188
13. ^ Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
14. Petro Sodol - Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943-1949. Handbook. New – York 1994 p.28
15. John Armstrong. (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. pg. 156
16. William Taubman. (2004). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-05144-7 pg. 193
17. ^ Motyka, p. 148
18. However it is not true that UPA had a Soviet T-35 tank.
19. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.585
20. Template:Uk icon Українська Повстанська Армія - Історія нескорених - Львів, 2007 p.203
21. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p.69
22. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.92
23. InfoUkes: Ukrainian History - World War II in Ukraine
24. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.95-97.
25. Banderivtsi Nationalistic Portal (Бандерівці ідуть! in Націоналістичний портал) Template:Uk icon
26. Template:Uk icon Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія p.164
27. p.181
28. Template:Uk icon Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія p.165
29. Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Military Formations of the OUN During World War II, by Ivan Mukovsky, 2002 (Ukrainian)
30. Template:Uk icon Організація українських націоналістів і Українська повстанська армія p.178
31. Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC - 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987, UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, pg. 58.
32. Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954). Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. (page # missing).
33. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 P.58-59
34. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p, 384 p.391
35. James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army, Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
36. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.238-239
37. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-80823 p.242-243
38. Ukrainian Institute of Military History, Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Military Formations of the OUN During the Second World War, Ivan Mukovsky, Oleksander Lysenko, #5-6, 2002
39. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 186
40. L. Shankovskyy (1953). History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg. p. 32.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
41. Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Military Formations of the OUN During World War II, by Ivan Mukovsky, 2002 (Ukrainian) "...Ось сумна статистика тих боїв: у липні відбулося 35 сутичок, у серпні - 24, у вересні - 15; втрати повстанців становили 1237 бійців і старшин, ворожі втрати склали 3000 чоловік..."
42. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, pg. 190
43. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 3, pp. 179-180
44. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, pp. 179-180
45. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, pg. 199
46. p.190-194
47. p.192
48. p.192-194
49. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Ukraine 1772-1999"
50. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14
51. p.196
52. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, pg. 197
53. ^ http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
54. Martovych O. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). – Munchen, 1950 p.20
55. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, p.338
56. http://artukraine.com/events/ukr_rep65.htm
57. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16, pg. 247-295 and lasted until the end of 1944 Cite error: The named reference "autogenerated7" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
58. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
59. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 p 96
60. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
61. Edward Prus. (2006). Operacja "Wisła", pg 16]]
62. Partisan Movement in Ukraine
63. Subtelny, p. 476
64. Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 January 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
65. ^ Vladimir Perekrest, former NKVD officer, Source: FSB.ru
66. ^ Krokhmaluk, Y. (1972). UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York: Vantage Press. p. (page 242).
67. Grenkevich, L., translated by David Glantz. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
68. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 15, p. 213-214
69. ^ Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
70. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armored trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
71. Exact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February - December 1944 UPA suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. The UPA's actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 - 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.604-605
72. ^ Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: a history, pp. 489, University of Toronto Press, 2000, ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 Cite error: The named reference "Subtelny367" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
73. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
74. Template:Uk iconexternal link
75. Theses include deported (1944-47): families of OUN/UPA members–– 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.545-546
76. Subtelny, p. 489
77. Burds, p.97
78. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11.
79. William Taubman. (2004). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-05144-7 pg. 195
80. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 106 - 110
81. ^ Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 113-114
82. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 123
83. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pg. 120
84. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
85. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
86. Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11 pp. 125-130
87. журнал "Воєнна історія" #5-6 за 2002 рік Війна після війни
88. Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 15.
89. Ukrainian Weekly, July 28, 2002, written by Dr. Taras Kuzio
90. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P 460-464, 470-477
91. Ukrainian News
92. John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 205-206
93. Simpson, Christopher (1988). "Guerrillas for World War III". - America's recruitment of Nazis, and its disastrous effect on our domestic and foreign policy. Collier Books / Macmillan. p. 148. ISBN 978-0020449959. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help)
94. http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/24.pdf p.439
95. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 21, pp. 385-386
96. Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust, Israel Gutman, editor-in-chief. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 4 volumes. ISBN 0-02-896090-4.
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98. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 2, pp.62-63
99. Cite error: The named reference autogenerated8 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
100. ^ Divide and Conquer: the KGB Disinformation Campaign Against Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainian Quarterly, Fall 2004. By Herbert Romerstein
101. Leo Heiman, "We Fought for Ukraine - The Story of Jews Within UPA", Ukrainian Quarterly Spring 1964, pp.33-44.
102. Friedman, P. "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science v. 12, pp. 259–96, 1958–59". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
103. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd edition. Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990. ISBN 0872877558 (2nd edition: New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) pp.223-224
104. Wprost 24 - Pojednanie na cmentarzu
105. A.Przewoźnik: w Polsce nie można stawiać pomników UPA
106. Information website of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
107. Lenta.ru В Крыму открыт монумент жертвам бандеровцев 14.September 2007. Retrieved 2 April 2008.
108. 'Yushchenko pushes for official recognition of OUN-UPA combatants'
109. SBU to study archive documents on activity of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists / News / NRCU
110. http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2008/10/15/120230.html

Sources

• Template:En icon Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5808-6.
• Template:En icon Davies, Norman (2005). God's playground: a history of Poland: in two volumes, Vol. 2, Chapter 19. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925340-4.
• Template:Pl icon Sowa, Andrzej (1998). Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939-1947. Kraków. ISBN 83-909631-5-8. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Template:Pl icon Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942-1960. Warszawa: ISP PAN / RYTM. ISBN 83-788373-163-8. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Template:Uk icon УПА розпочинає активні протинімецькі дії (UIA Start the Active anti-German actions) (За матеріалами звіту робочої групи істориків Інституту історії НАН України під керівництвом проф. Станіслава Кульчицького)
• Documents on Ukrainian Polish Reconciliation
• Template:En icon Jeffrey Burds (1997). "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48", East European Politics and Societies v.11

External links

• UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army
• Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Encyclopedia of Ukraine
• Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

• Articles needing cleanup from March 2008
• Cleanup tagged articles without a reason field from March 2008
• Misplaced Pages pages needing cleanup from March 2008
• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from January 2009
• Anti-communism
• Guerrilla organizations
• Military history of Ukraine
• History of Poland
• History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia
• National liberation movements
• World War II resistance movements
• Eastern European World War II resistance movements
• Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
• Ukrainian nationalism
• Massacres of Poles in Volhynia