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Archive 1 (March 2006 - June 2008) Archive 2 (July 2008 - March 2009)

Metaphysics and Science

Another new writer with suggested references, content to follow. Physicist Fred Alan Wolf was referenced but I suggest his book "The Spiritual Universe" (Moment Point Press: 1999); "Matrix Energetics" by Richard Bartlett, D.C., N.D.(Atria Books: 2007): "The Biology of Belief: Unleashing the Power of Consciousness, Matter, and Miracles" by Bruce Lipton, PhD. (cell biology) (Hay House: 2008). The latter two books are non-serious material appealing to the general public. The science vs. metaphysics conflict is that quantum mechanics describes mathematically what can't be visualized, or the implications of various interpretations appear implausible, so where do you go with the information represented by the math? You look at various models, any of which appear irrational but likely approach "truth" to some extent, the degree of which is unknown. I welcome the serious extemporization, and appreciate the difficulties involved. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Chempst (talk • contribs) 17:08, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Metaphysics, not Science

Hi, I'm new to Misplaced Pages. There are already existing science articles (e.g. quantum mechanics. Is this not a metaphysical article? Shouldn't it be written with a lighter touch? Please discuss. Trelawnie (talk) 04:53, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

Interpretation vs. Theory

There is no sharp demarcation between "fact" and "interpretation" in quantum mechanics. The only facts are that quantum mechanics gives you the probabilities of certain experimental outcomes, when the interaction of the experimental devices and the quantum system is particularly simple. When talking about how the perception of observers emerges in quantum theory, it's all philosophy. The rewrite made things less clear.

For example: the many worlds interpretation is not the most preferred by mystics, it is the least preferred. Mystics prefer Copenhagen interpretation, because it explicitly rejects describing observers with quantum mechanics. No source is needed for the obvious statement "the atoms of the brain do not stay the same", since all atoms enter and leave the body. The discussion of subtle points of consciousness is not improved by introducing the sentence "mystics believe" every once in a while, because non-mystics also need to answer the question of what consciousness is just as well, or leave it alone.

That means that the discussion is going to be completely philosophical, it can't be helped, hinging on the most annoying points of "what is my experience made of" and "how is this consciousness-stuff represented in quantum mechanics".

There are some very clear facts associated with quantum mechanics: Double-slit experiment, Hydrogen spectral series, and the time evolution of Bose–Einstein condensate are all facts and the Bohr model of the atom could be considered a stipulation. Its important to remember that all applications of modeling reality off a wave functions are extrapolated from hydrogen like atoms. Its not a fact that "wave functions spread into the world" its an interpretation of a sparse number of facts, readers should be reminded that there are many interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its very important to distinguish between "fact" and "interpretation" especially when describing QM's relationship to "mysticism".

The problem with the atoms and brain statement is not the idea that the atoms of the brain change.

"It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same."

The problem is that by changing a classical explanation based around atoms is in sufficient since they change location. This is similar to saying that classical mechanics is insufficient to explain the solar system because the planets move. Classical methods fail it both situation but not for the implied reasons. The sentence contains wp:synthesis I was giving the author an opportunity to attribute the sentence before I or another editor deletes the text.

As for the "mystic believe" qualifiers not everyone believes in philosophical zombie. But the bigger problem is whole premising of the hypothetical question in "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" includes a host of assumptions and is contextualized in a mystic belief system. For example the idea that consciousness is a "stream" is inane from my perspective I think of it as a temporal physical pattern, given the right tools and resources a pattern could be replicated an infinite number of times. But I would never add that to the text because that would be wp:synthesis so I qualified, through attribution, the verifiable text. Thats what I can say for now.--OMCV (talk) 02:11, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

Don't be ridiculous--- that whole history section is the toughest thing to source, as is anything else on this subject. The issue is this--- quantum mechanics is not classical mechanics. It does not describe the positions of atoms. It describes wavefunctions. So even if you take the perspective the consciousness is the clockwork in the brain, that doesn't tell you what consciousness is in quantum mechanics because quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork. It describes wavefunctions.Likebox (talk) 05:58, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

A Newtonian clockwork consciousness model does not need to meet the standards of QM, it only needs to meet its own standards which still allows atoms to exchange. If the classical model of mind and brain is failing by QM's standards the sentence needs to be rewritten and no matter what the sentence still needs citation. Furthermore if something is difficult to cite wp:verify odds are that it doesn't belong in an encyclopedia.--OMCV (talk) 12:50, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

It's not impossible, just difficult to cite.Likebox (talk) 18:02, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Like I said rewrite it so it makes sense and then cite it.--OMCV (talk) 04:03, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Consciousness Causes Collapse

This needs to be separated out from this article. This article should focus on mysticism and relations between mysticism and QM. CCC is just a straighforward add-on to Copenhagen, a half-way house between Copenhagen and full blown many-worlds. Many worlds can best be described as : consciousness seems to cause collapse from its own point of view.Likebox (talk) 05:53, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

If the main CCC article is going to be Wigner's interpretation of quantum mechanics then Consciousness causes collapse should presumably redirect there, not here. 1Z (talk) 06:38, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Removed Paragraph

The laws of quantum physics allow by calculation the prediction of observables, which can be tested in repeated experiments to a very high precision. This is a property shared with all other physical theories, but not with mystical beliefs. However, Ken Wilber asserts that meditation with the aim of experiencing higher consciousness may be regarded an experimental science (as it was and is regarded by some Buddhist sect.

This paragraph has no purpose except to misrepresent quantum mechanics as a mundane kind of physical theory, sort of like Newton's theory, except more precise and probalistic. That's not quantum mechanics. Nobody who knows quantum mechanics ever thinks of it that way.

Quantum mechanics does allow prediction of experimental outcomes after interpretation. The theory distinguishes between "measurements" and "physical processes", and this distinction is essential. A person is always performing measurements, and there is no obvious way of making sense out of the quantum state of a person. More generally, the entire classical world can only be extracted out of the theory itself by taking a many-worlds type interpretation. Otherwise, the theory is dualistic, just the same as mysticism.

Mysticism is not science, but the type of mysticism supported by quantum mechanics is of a very limited sort: it is just the statement that the consciousness-stuff is not reducible in an obvious way to material-stuff. The reason is that no classical-stuff is reducible in an obvious way to wavefunction-stuff. That separation is the entire content of quantum mysticism.Likebox (talk) 19:01, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

A deterministic perspective is a very common interpretation of quantum mechanics. More importantly most researchers (regardless of their religious or mystical beliefs) treat quantum mechanics as a mathematical formalism when they work; which means they are agnostic to determinism or more likely assume some form of determinism as is the norm in all physical sciences. With that said I see know reason to keep the paragraph other than it being a well cited opinion of a quantum mystics, even if a lesser quantum mystics. Did you know that the double-slit experiment has been conducted with bucky balls (Arndt, M. et al. Nature 401, 680–682 (1999)). I don't think the double-slit experiment has been conducted with humans yet but it would be a reason experiment to conducted if we wanted to quantitatively measure how much our wave component contributed to our physical behavior.--OMCV (talk) 02:44, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

What is a "deterministic perspective" in quantum mechanics? Do you mean many worlds? That's still subjectively probablistic.Likebox (talk) 05:56, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Scientists before they conduct experiments make the assumption that cause and event are linked through the material world, that some aspect of the world they are trying to understand is going to have intelligible deterministic behavior. Likebox you appear to be very hung up on theoretical perspectives and seem to have trouble distinguishing between QM models of reality and known experimental facts. Most of these perspectives over step their data otherwise their wouldn't be so many perspectives. As stated before we are going to have to do better to distinguish between "facts" and "interpretations".--OMCV (talk) 13:01, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

What do you mean "cause and effect are linked through the material world?" Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same results? That's certainly wrong. Do you mean that if you do something twice you get the same probabilities? That's also incorrect, if you do certain experiments. Please don't impose your own pet philosophy on this article--- it is discussing subtle issues which are difficult to explain.Likebox (talk) 18:00, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

I'm hardly describing a pet philosophy, its the operational philosophy of the vast majority of people working in scientific research stated in plain language. Its also off topic.--OMCV (talk) 04:08, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

I agree that it's a little off topic, but I want to know where you are coming from. If our discussion here is free enough, we might come to agree on a text by mutual understanding. So be patient, I am just core-dumping my POV, so that you can do the same, and we can compare our POV and see if it is possible to make the article pleasing to both of us.

The "science is about measurements" philosophy is so minimalistic, it suggests that science has absolutely nothing to say about consciousness or mysticism in any way. While this is a self-consistent point of view, and was held by Bohr, it is no secret that many people believe that a theory is about reality. So if you say that "electrons are fully described by wavefunctions", some will go further and say "electrons can be identified with wavefunctions". This was explicitly the point of view of Everett. It rejects the Bohr notion that science is just about explicitly described feasable measurements, and it incorporates the Wigner point of view that the rules of conscious perception is why we percieve collapse.

This point of view is not very sensible sounding to Bohr people, because they think of the wavefunction as somehow representing "information about the system", but the Bohr perspective is not self-evident. One reason is that the wavefunction is not a probability, so an "ignorance" interpretation makes it natural to ask "ignorance of what exactly?" a Bohrist would say it is ignorance of incompatible classical position and momentum, but a modern person would say "but position and momentum are fully quantum concepts, not classical ones. The classical ones are just approximations. And there are probably no hidden variables underneath to be ignorant of." Bohr would say "that's complementarity!" and so on.

Some people view the idea that the quantum description does not describe systems that include observers as mystical all by itself--- since it separates out the world of physics and the world of experience. Some people view the role of consciousness in CCC as mystical, because it separates out "experience" from "physical description". But it's always the same thing that people are pointing out as "mystical", and I wanted to explain what it is as clearly as possible.Likebox (talk) 04:44, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

What's wrong with the rewrite

Within Newtonian mechanics, the question of consciousness is not directly addressed since consciousness can not be directly measured and or quantified.

Yes, yes, we know, and everyone who reads this knows this. It is not useful to state the obvious.

Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness suggests the content and function of a mind might be identified with the position and velocity of the atoms of the brain. Knowing the state of the atoms determines the future, so in a verificationalist sense it determines all measurable aspects of conscious behavior.

This is exactly what was said more pithily before. It is not useful to say "adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective" instead of "In Newtonian mechanics", because that obfuscates the issue

Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.

Proponents of quantum mysticism do not specifically claim this. This is stuff that nobody disputes (as far as I know). This is an expository paragraph, designed to get the reader to the point where the explanations of mysticism in a physical theory can make sense. So it explains why you can't obviously point to a certain collection of atoms and say "that's my consciousness", because 1. what if the pattern moves into different atoms, like when atoms get replaced in the brain? And what if you copy the pattern into a duplicate, but keep the original, which way does the consciousness go subjectively? These two questions need to be asked to get the reader to understand the perspective of Everett. These questions are only raised by not answered, because if you haven't thought about these before, you aren't going to understand anything.

It has been suggested that the brain can't be explained though atoms since the atoms which constitute the brain do not stay the same. Individuals have put forward certain contrived thought experiments in which they claim the identity of mind and brain can become confused. For example, when a conscious Newtonian observer is duplicated, by copying all the relative positions and velocities of the observer's atoms. It is is argued that it is not obvious which way the stream of conscious experience for the observer will go but it assumed to go one way or both (but not duplicated). If the consciousness only goes one way, the duplicate will be left a philosophical zombie, without a consciousness of its own. But if the consciousness goes both ways, both observers start off with the same internal state, so that the subjective experience of the consciousness after the split requires extra information to describe. This information is what determines which path the consciousness will take. It has been argued that the value of this information is subjectively very important for the duplicated- since the information predicts the relative futures' of the duplicated pair - but this information is not contained in the relative positions and velocities of the observer's internal atoms.

This is OK, but overqualified. The Dennett stuff is classical, no QM, it just talks about copying consciousnesses. This is implicit in Everett too. It is not particularly mystical, and the "suggestion" is overly strong: the suggestion is not that the brain cannot be explained through atoms, the suggestion is that there is more information in the pattern of consciousness than what you can see in the position of the atoms. For example, which way a duplicated observer's consciousness "goes" is a bit of information like that.

The source for moving the brain pattern into a different system (a remote electronic machine in this case) was discussed by Dennett in "Where am I". This is the source for the statement "The atoms don't stay the same", but it is a loose paraphrase of ideas, as is the whole thing, frankly.Likebox (talk) 06:20, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

The first section states how Newtonian Mechanics sees the world and I'm glad we agree its accurate but I disagree that it will be obvious to anyone who comes to this page. There is a great deal of misunderstandings of scientific philosophy that revolves around quantum mysticism and its best to be clear, especially when it takes a single sentence. In the next section "Adaptation of a Newtonian mechanic perspective to explain the nature of consciousness..." is stated the way it is because there has never been an experiment based in Newtonian physics conducted on the "nature of consciousness" this line of thought is extrapolation. If there was such research it would be worth citing here.

Proponents of Quantum mysticism claim that even in a Newtonian universe, there are philosophical doubts about explain(ing) consciousness through the position and velocity of atoms.

This sentence has been attributed to "Proponents of Quantum mysticism" because it is a disputable statement. Seriously the "Newtonian model" of the universe lacks a proper description of atoms, the whole idea pitting the two models against each other in this way is contrived and thus needs attribution. It seems the following hypothetical statements are primers for Everett's theories, or perhaps from Everett's works, and as such be attributed to Everett or purged as wp:synth. I've already stated that the hypothetical question is bad. The idea that our "stream of consciousness" is hiding in the subatomic activities of ground state atoms/molecules flies in the face of modern neuroscience which at no point invokes subatomic activity. Consider they whole hypothetical question in need of citation or deletion. Paraphrasing even if its loose should be attributed and if its too loose its wp:synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:42, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

It's only SYNTH if people who aren't familiar with the ideas think it is. Everyone knows that there is nothing original about these ideas--- they have been kicking around for 60 years. The statement that there are "philsoophical doubts about explaining all the contents of consciousness through positions of atoms" is not debatable--- the doubts exist. Whether they are justified or not is another story.

To explain these doubts--- if someone makes a copy of you, and puts the copy in Antarctica--- do you feel that you are still where you are, or that you are teleported to Antarctica? What if it is the original that is moved very very quickly to Antarctica, while the copy is left here? What if the atoms are split between you and copy half/half.

The question of consciousness is where you feel yourself to be. This is a different question than where the atoms actually are.Likebox (talk) 18:06, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

If its been around for 60 years it should be very easy to cite as it is I've deleted it as OR. Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical. They would also realize that the situation of identical observers could theoretically never be achieved because of the uncertainty principle even if all the practical difficulties are ignored.

The vast majority of biochemical activity contributing to all of life can be explained without QM. There are two exception that I know of, quantum tunneling must be invoked to explain the reaction rates of H+ and e-. All heavier atoms are well explained through classical chemical kinetics. Subatomic states play no known role in consciousness for example the magnetic alignment of nuclei that occurs in an MRI machine has not been demonstrated to the biological activity of anything. It seems the contrived hypothetical question concerning the twin observers, the stream of consciousness, and their "feelings" is Likebox's OR as such its been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 04:26, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

It is well cited--- it is in Dennett and Hofstadter. The sentence you give "Someone who understands QM would realize that two observers whose atoms relative positions and relative velocities are identical would be identical" shows that you do not understand QM at all, and should not edit this article.Likebox (talk) 04:49, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

What I meant by that cryptic statement above is that it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum. It is not allowed in QM, even hypothetically. You can't view the uncertainty principle as a limitation to measuring the position and momentum (but they exist anyway secretly inside). That's a completely wrong point of view.

Your hypothetical unknown simultaneous position and momentum would be local hidden variables, and would violate Bell's inequality. They would not obey Newton's laws, and they would have to be in constant communication faster than the speed of light. This type of misunderstanding is not shared by ANY quantum mechanics practitioner, and it is serious enough error for me to ask you to please get a better understanding for quantum mechanics before mucking around with this article.Likebox (talk) 05:02, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

If "it is impossible to even imagine that two observers' atoms have a definite position and definite momentum" than the hypothetical needs to be restated. I was thinking well within the ridiculous hypothetical to say that two observers with identical atoms and velocities are identical, I never said that they would stay identical, its best not to make to many interpretations your bound to get something wrong.--OMCV (talk) 05:27, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

The hypothetical is a pure hypothetical, in Newtonian mechanics. It imagines that you make a clone of a classical observer, and the clone then goes off and does other things. But at the instant that the clone is made, it has the same relative (classical) positions and velocities. This thought experiment assumes the world is classical, and that a classical world could include conscious beings just like ourselves. This might not be clear enough in the article.

In quantum mechanics, there is no analogous copying, because you can't precisely duplicate a quantum state. But the analogous thing in QM is just a macroscopic superposition itself. In Everett's view, an observer in a superposition "feels" unsuperposed. This is the main point, echoed in Wigner's consciousness causes collapse article.Likebox (talk) 21:58, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Its a hypothetical! You say it not possible to "precisely duplicate a quantum state" well in classical mechanics its not possible precisely position a collection of atoms and the classical mechanics doesn't even have the Bohr model. What I think you real mean is that quantum states spread infinitely so internal states can't be distinguished from external states thus the idea of duplicating internally relative state is a fallacy. I'm fine with that. Then again that assumes a quantum state at infinity is relevant. In the practical application of quantum mechanics, "Matter" has a very localized wave function and the influence of more distant aspects of these wave functions are considered inconsequential for everyone but mystics. That's why delocalizing matter in a Bose–Einstein condensate was such a big deal.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) I think you are confusing "quantum mysticism" with the unrelated idea that Quantum Mechanics has something to do with the functioning of the brain and consciousness itelf. Those two ideas have nothing to do with one another.

"Quantum mysticism" is an interpretation of the fact that the laws of quantum mechanics make reference to an observer, and that these references are unavoidable, unlike in classical mechanics.

The idea that quantum effects or tunneling have to do with the functioning of the brain is a completely separate idea with very little support. This is called "quantum consciounsness" or something.

Quantum mechanics is still mystical even if you view the mind as clockwork. The reason is that quantum mechanics does not describe clockwork, it describes clockwork in superposition.Likebox (talk) 17:42, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Also from reading your comment again, you seem to suggest that objects in the classical limit have "tight" compressed wavefunctions which lump around the classical position and momentum. This is incorrect. It is correct for the part of the wavefunction which describes the relative state, meaning the relative positions and momentum of the different interacting particles, but the overall state of a system will always end up in a gross superposition of macroscopically different possibilities. This doesn't require a sophisticated Bose-Einstein condensate, it's just Schrodinger's cat.Likebox (talk) 17:46, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

First, Schrodinger's cat is intended to illustrate difference in interpretations. The thought experiment would have very little meaning without actual experimental evidence of quantum mechanic phenomenon like the double-slit experiments. Its backwards to say that Schrodinger's cat is evidence of phenomenon. Second this line of exchange is hopelessly off topic and I won't respond here again.--OMCV (talk) 02:05, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

It is not off topic. This article is on quantum mysticism. You must understand quantum mechanics to understand what it is all about. I think you don't have a very good grasp of quantum mechanics, so you don't understand why some people think it is mystical. If you learn the quantum mechanics, you will have a better perspective on the text you wish to delete.

The "double slit experiment" or "stern Gerlach experiment" are preliminaries. They are designed to get a person used to thinking in terms of probability amplitudes. Once you understand that a particle's position and spin is described by a wavefunction, you next have to understand that two particles position is described by a single wavefunction in six dimensional space. That three particles are described in nine dimensions, and that 20 particles live in 60 dimensions.

These enormous spaces are required in QM, and they are not illustrated in regular explanations. The point of "Schrodinger's cat" is to explain what kinds of things happen in this enormous space. The cat becomes a superposition of dead and alive. But does a wavefunction in 10^25 dimensions really describe cats? If it does, and the cat is superposed, does the cat "feel" simultaneously dead and alive?

These questions are the central ones in the philosophy of science and philsoophy of mind. That's where quantum mysticism comes from.Likebox (talk) 20:54, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Why the edits in the next section are no good

Unlike classical mechanics, in quantum mechanics, there is no naive way of identifying the true state of the world or its components such as observers. The state of all parts of reality is believed to be measurably indefinite as described by the uncertainty principle.

This is not just about the uncertainty principle. It is about the wavefunction. Using the uncertainty principle in this context can make it sound like there is a secret hidden variable underneath.

The implications of this finding on the nature of reality is unclear since there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) the wavefunction, that describes matter and energy, spreads out describing an ever larger superposition of different worlds. In this interpretation an observer observing a superposition can be described by a superposition of different observers seeing different things, but in actual experience, an observer never feels a superposition, but always feels that one of the outcomes has occurred with certainty. This apparent conflict between a wavefunction description and classical experience is called the problem of observation. The founders of quantum mechanics each interpreted the theory and associated assumptions different, each interpretation has different implications on an observer and their relationship to the world.

This is pretty much OK, but it is equivalent to what was there before. I don't understand these nitpicking rewrites. If you aren't going to change the content at all, why make it sound worse?Likebox (talk) 06:17, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

There is a need to distinguish between undisputed "facts" and "interpretations" or "models". I don't dispute the statements listed above have been made, they just need to be attributed and cited. Thats what all my edits have been about.--OMCV (talk) 13:46, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

Have you read the sources already there? If you do, then I think you will be satisfied that there is no original thought in the whole section.Likebox (talk) 18:08, 16 August 2009 (UTC)

To quote Wigners conclusions on his own paper:

"The present writer is well aware of the fact that he is not the first one to discuss the questions which form the subject of this article and that the surmises of his predecessors were either found to be wrong or unprovable, hence, in the long run, uninteresting. He would not be greatly surprised if the present article share the fate of those of his predecessors."

I'm not overly worried that these ideas are OR, I'm worried that ideas are being stated as undisputed facts when they are interpretations that need to be attributed to an individual or a school of thought.--OMCV (talk) 04:42, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Considering that nothing here is stated as fact, that is a surprising assertion. To say "there are philosophical doubts" is not the same as saying "this is true", or "this is false". It just says people have raised doubts (they have).Likebox (talk) 05:06, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Lets say you heard someone say that they thought my sister could be a slut. I still want this non-fact cited and attributed. But thats not what the problem is the version I edited stated to the effect that "quantum mechanics states this", I changed it to "an interpretation of quantum mechanics states this". There is a big difference in one quantum mechanics is treated as a single entity, I would be fine with that if you where dealing with things a mathematical formalism. Instead you are invoking ideas almost whole derived from an interpretation of quantum mechanics completely unrelated to the mathematical formalism and its supporting experimental evidence.--OMCV (talk) 14:27, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) I agree that there is some justification necessary for the emphasis on many-worlds in this section. I believe this is justified, because the many-worlds article came somewhat before Wigner's article on consciousness, and some have suggested that it inspired Wigner's article. Wigner's point of view directly inspired some of the quantum mysticism, but Schrodinger's point of view also was somewhat similar, and everyone was aware of the pitfalls of describing an observer using quantum theory.

The many-worlds literature is the historical source for nearly all modern interpretations of QM. The interesting part is that Everett's point of view has also been influential in the philosophy of mind, through the work of Dennett and Hofstadter. That's because the mind-subtleties that arise in many-worlds can be made to arise in any mechanistic theory of consciousness. So I think the emphasis is appropriate.

But the main issue of what quantum mechanics says and so on is pretty much without dispute, and independent of intepretational details, so I didn't bother to qualify it. Maybe you could be more specific about what statements are underqualified.Likebox (talk) 17:25, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Cites for Mind/Body Problem in Classical Mechanics

All the philosophy there is contained in great detail in the articles by Dennett from the late 70's early 80's, and reprinted and expanded upon in the Hofstadter/Dennett book cited. To be clear: there is no quantum mechanics in what Dennett and Hofstadter discuss, it's all about representing consciousness as a pattern in atoms, but the ideas are certainly inspired by Many Worlds interpretation.

Please do not make this section less clear: the statement that is made is that which way you "feel" yourself to go when your atoms are duplicated is an extra bit of information which is not present before the split, but is present after. This bit is apparent to you, as a subjective observer, but it has no objective meaning inside the atoms, because your consciousness goes both ways. This point is a little subtle, and I ask you to understand it before editing the section. The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms. Not "extra information" or "some claim that there is extra information". It is exactly one bit, and no more.

This extra bits is the "world selection" in many worlds, or equivalently the "results of past measurements" in some variants of Copenhagen, or with the "outcome of the consciousness collapse" in CCC, or with the "actually realized histories" in decoherent histories, or any other of the equivalent up-to-philosophy intepretations. The role of consciousness here in making the world appear as it is is similar to the role of consciousness in making time "go forward" subjectively. The feeling of time "going forward" is not obviously derivable from physical law, because it is a perceptual property, not a physical property. It is obviously related to entropy production, but exactly how is hard to say. Similarly, the feeling of "probabilistic measurements" is a subjective feeling in many-worlds, and an additional axiom associated with observers in standard Copenhagen style interpretations.Likebox (talk) 01:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

For the hypothetical question its not good enough to say the philosophy is out there in papers for the 70's and 80's. Please cite and attribute the hypothetical question plainly so that I and other editors can verify that it isn't a hypothetical of your own creation. Its troubling that "The wording needs to be clear that it is exactly one bit that is not present in the atoms." Does it need to be so exact because its quoted or does it need to be so exact because its your personal idea that needs to be protected. The idea that there is one bit connected to: "world selection", "results of past measurements", "outcome of the consciousness collapse", and "actually realized histories" needs to attributed and cited as well as the idea that those are equivalent concepts . This is not a forum for individuals to present their own thoughts stick to what can be cited. For now the offending section has been deleted.--OMCV (talk) 05:05, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

This hypothetical question is the SUBJECT of the book, "The Minds' I". It is also the subject of the articles I quoted here, and Hofstadter, who is an author on The Mind's I, makes no bones about the link to many-worlds.Likebox (talk) 05:13, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

(moved from OMCV's talk page)::: About "Citing a whole book" please look at it: the book contains a lot of articles that discuss thought experiments like the copying of an observer. The articles are very long-winded, because they are written to convince a skeptic, but you can just skim them (although they are pleasant to read). The original article is (I think--- I haven't read this in years) "where am I" by Dennett, and "Who am I?" (a sequel). I think they are both reprinted there, with extra commentary. The many-worlds article by Hofstadter is reprinted in "Metamagical Themas" (I am pretty sure). I didn't cite a particular page, because the thought experiment I wrote about is a very condensed summary of "Where am I". That is written as a fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuits (if my memory serves me right). I really don't mind if you change stuff here, but please read this literature first. Dennett is a very non-mystical philosopher of consciousness.Likebox (talk) 22:07, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

First this talk page is the place to respond to my specific concerns about the article. Second this clearly demonstrates that the "hypothetical question" is of Likeboxes' own invention. If it was adapted from a "fable about someone whose consciousness is copied into circuit" than there has been significant WP:Synth since at no point does it mention circuitry. His ownership issues over the language are also disconcerting. If the "hypothetical question" needs to be deleted until it can be specifically cited and attributed and Likebox's personal thoughts don't qualify as "WP:RS".--OMCV (talk) 12:59, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

I just looked at where am i very briefly and you might as well be citing the gholas of the Dune series or something by Williams Gibson. I understand that Dennett is a prominent philosopher and I'll look at the piece and see if it can be paraphrased and attributed. This is generous of me since the burden of citation is not on the editor you challenges the material but the editor that adds it. I expect the hypothetical question to remain deleted until it is correctly cited.--OMCV (talk) 14:39, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

You are supposed to use your common sense. There is an entire book devoted to copying consciousness, an article about copying consciousness, a decade of philosophical discourse about the copying of consciousness, and I paraphrase this old 80s discussion here. I do NOT say that Dennett is the only source, there are others, the particular example might not occur in the exact same words, but that's not the point. Anyone can see that its the exact same idea, perhaps illustrated differently (although I think the duplication example is given too in "Where am I" or one of the later articles in the book).Likebox (talk) 17:09, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) About "ownership": the reason I object to the rewrite is because the rewrite suggested in the subtext that there is a deterministic point of view, where quantum mechanics is just an uncertainty, or ignorance, on top of what is basically classical mechanics. This makes quantum mysticism into gibberish, because the mysticism comes out of realizing that the quantum uncertainty is not like a classical probability. If it's not a probability, how come if "FEELS" like one? There's the mysticism.

This type of mistake made me queasy about the rest of the rewrite. It wasn't terrible, though.Likebox (talk) 17:13, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Clean up refs from above

1. Wilber Ken A Brief History of Everything, 1st ed. 1996, 2nd ed. 2001: ISBN 1-57062-740-1
2. Wilber, Ken Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists (editor), 1984, rev. ed. 2001: ISBN 1-57062-768-1
3. For example, Wigner states in "Remarks on the mind body question":"Until not many years ago, the "existence" of a mind or soul would have been passionately denied by most physical scientists. The brilliant successes of mechanistic and, more generally, macroscopic physics and of chemistry overshadowed the obvious fact that thoughts, desires, and emotions are not made of matter, and it was nearly universally accepted among physical scientists that there is nothing beside matter. The epistome of this belief was the conviction that, if we knew the positions and velocities of all atoms at one instant of time, we could compute the fate of the universe for all future"
4. Dennett, Daniel C. (2001-01). The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul. Basic Books. ISBN 0465030912. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

Picking apart this rewrite

What's wrong with this rewrite (in addition to the obvious fact that it deleted Dennett/Hofstadter, which was the only point of the section)

Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics

Newtonian mechanics has historically been associated with the assumption that the world could be observed consistently from any vantage point, a strong concept of determinism, reductionism, and positivism. These philosophies, in their most extreme form, lead to the belief that given the positions and velocities of all atoms at one instant of time, we could compute the fate of the universe for all future times. When various forms of these beliefs are applied to consciousness and the mind-body problem the result is physicalistic monisms such as eliminative materialism.

The development of quantum mechanics and relativistic physics both elevated and limited the role of the "observer" in philosophically significant ways. The uncertainty principle relationship to the observer also placed theoretical limits on what could potentially be "known" about physical matter. The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted. This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context. The role and importance of determinism differed greatly between the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. This diverse environment provided fertile ground for the development of mystical interpretations and mystical extensions to the material interpretation of quantum mechanics both by professional scientists and mystics.

1. ^ Wigner, Eugene (1967-12). "Symmetries and Reflections, Scientific Essays". American Journal of Physics. 35 (12): 1169–1170. doi:10.1119/1.1973829. Retrieved 2009-07-30. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
2. Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich Philip (1992). The Riddle of the Universe. Prometheus Books. ISBN 0879757469, 9780879757465. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
3. Zukav, Gary (2001-08-01). Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics. HarperOne. ISBN 0060959681.

What's wrong with this paragraph: a bunch of things.

1. Logical positivism is NOT associated with Newtonian mechanics, and never was. It is associated with relativity and quantum mechanics. It was developed partly as a challenge to the metaphysical concept of absolute space and time which underly Newton's mechanics.
2. "These philosophies, in their most extreme form... (lead to determinism)" That's absolutely false. Newton's mechanics in its most obvious form leads to the theorem that if you know the present position and momentum (and if the force law is sufficiently regular) then you know the future. This was said explicitly in a famous quote by Laplace, and was echoed for 300 years. It is also mathematically true. The previous text just takes it for granted (and assumes you understand it).
3. "Relativity and quantum mechanics ... elevated the observer..." this is bullshit. Relativity did not elevate the observer much more than Newtonian mechanics. In the final reckoning, the theory of relativity describes a reality which is independent of the observer just like any other classical theory, but whose most natural description in terms of time-slices depends on the observer's state of motion. Quantum mechanics was always completely different. It requires the act of observation even to define the primitive concepts in the theory, like the wavefunction. This distinction is absolutely essential. Nobody would ever talk about "Relativistic mysticism", and relativity is not a particularly positivist theory.
4. "The uncertainty principle placed a limit on what could be known..." This statement shows profound ignorance of quantum mechanics. The uncertainty principle is not a limit on what "can be known", it is a limit on simultaneous measurement of position and momentum, for the simple reason that a quantum description does not have a simultaneous position and momentum. It is misleading to state it as a limitation on our knowledge, because it is not clear "knowledge of what, exactly?"
5. This sentence "The development of these theories lead to a critical reevaluation of the beliefs through which physics is contextualized and experimental results are interpreted. This reevaluation ultimately lead to the destabilization and speciation of physic's dominant philosophical context." sounds like it was written by an illiterate. Do not use big words for no reason: you could say the exact same thing like this "When these theories came along, they turned physical philosophy upside down", which is much more readable. Big words == Dumb people.

I restored the previous text. If you are going to change the text, at least make a minor effort to write readably, without pompous big words.Likebox (talk) 18:24, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

Ok, aside from the relatively trivial style issues (that's a pet peeve, sorry), the rest of the points I made above are not very convincing:

1. I understand why you said positivism now--- you mean predicting the behavior of a mind is the same as understanding consciousness. This also takes care of point 2. I put that back in the merge.
2. I fixed the Dennett stuff to be clearer.
3. The relativity business, while not mystical, did involve one point which was positivist. Time seems to "go forward" in Newtonian mechanics, but not in relativity. This point was lost on me when I wrote the above comment. Go figure. I still think it's a little out of the way to mention it.
4. The uncertainty principle is certainly not the right way to say it--- I stand by this one.
5. I also stand by the style issue, but it's not very important.

Hopefully the merge made it clearer. Perhaps it is also possible to ease your doubts about the Dennett stuff (he really does discuss copying consciousness in the Mind's I--- it's in there. Two minds (one a backup copy) diverge after a glitch, and then the backup copy becomes hopelessly unhappy).Likebox (talk) 07:10, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

Sticking to the subject

This is getting ridiculous. Please read WP:synth. The section on Dennett/Hofstadter contains substantial synth and there has been no compelling argument to the contrary.

1. The section on Dennett/Hofstadter is connected to Dennett/Hofstadter perspective on the Mind/Body problem but nothing directly connects it to the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
2. There is a huge amount of work associated with the Mind/Body that could be connected to "Newtonian mechanics". Focusing on the work of Dennett/Hofstadter in detail is disproportionate.
3. As it stand this Dennett/Hofstadter section does not fairly represent what could be described as the "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" but rather provides a venue to for an editor to imply that aspects of Newtonian mechanics foreshadowed quantum mysticism.
4. This is not the section to discuss the many-worlds interpretation or Copenhagen interpretation as it doesn't relate to "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics".
5. "The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms." This statement is just poorly thought out. Its meaning is entirely unclear as is its connection to Newtonian mechanics. I expect that this is inspired form the transcript of Feynman's speech the "Value of Science". This idea was presented well after well after the introduction of quantum mechanics and Feynman clearly explains how he relates consciousness to the fact that "The radioactive phosphorus content of the cerebrum of a the rate decreases to one-half in a period of two weeks." . (Still Feynman was some what misrepresenting the study since it was probably concerned with the uses and exchanges ATP, the brains fuel and not its structure. Its akin to saying the fuel I have in my car today is not the same as the fuel I had in my car yesterday yet it is still my car.)

Of these concerns I'm most worried about (3) and (1) their relationship to WP:synth and the possibility that these are not unique edits but indicative of a more pervasive misrepresentation of material. I've attempted to offer reasonable arguments and they seem to have failed. As I see it the next step is some form of arbitration. I've never initiated arbitration and have no desire to do so but it seems this situation may demand a third party, I hope you see share my views on this Likebox.--OMCV (talk) 03:23, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I don't think I read that Feynman thing, but I may have. It certainly isn't the inspiration for the changing atoms. That's just to make sure that people understand that copying the information in the brain to new atoms is a normal thing, because that's the only process that Dennett uses to make the intuitive paradoxes in his fables.

While I agree that there is a huge literature on consciousness in philosophy, all of it is useless for this article, because it is not informed by the quantum thinking. Dennett's paradoxes are essentially the same type of effects which are naturally suggested by the many-worlds interpretation, and so they help explain the relationship of consciousness and intepretation of QM. It is possible that Dennett was directly inspired by many-worlds (although there is no source for this assertion).

There is no synth. The ideas stated in this article are those of Dennett and Hofstadter, with next to no alteration. I used my own language, but the ideas are not original. These ideas are not quantum mechanical, they are classical by default (the machines which Dennett refers to never involve any quantum mechanics). In this article, that fact needs to be emphasized. That's why I wrote in "Newtonian" mechanics. It really doesn't have to be newtonian, you could retitle the section "Mind/Body problem with a deterministic brain".

The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer. There is no other work in philosophy of mind that I know of which is at all related to quantum mechanical perspectives. While I agree that some editorial judgement has been used to select which philosophy and physics articles are relevant, that is not SYNTH, that's writing an article. If you have other sources you think should be added, there's plenty of room.Likebox (talk) 04:26, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

The section titled "Mind/Body problem in Newtonian mechanics" should not be informed by quantum thinking.

Dennett's story deals with the speed of light, electronics, radio waves, and many other things which are not described by any "Newtonian" model. Newtonian physics (classical physics) is a model of reality whose relevance is limited to the translational motion of large objects (generally atoms or bigger) moving slowly (well below the speed of light) in the observers frame of reference. There is the cultural concept of "Newtonian Physics" which is tied to the philosophical idea of a clock-work universe, the idea of a perfectly accessible determinism. This idea should be described in its own terms and not through a quantum thinking informed filter.

The ideas of Dennett are distinctly different from the thought experiment in the article. The concept of "consciousness stream" and a "single bit of information" is not contained in DENNETT's Where Am I?, these two ideas need to be cited and attributed if they are going to be included without dispute.

"The classical problem (informed by Dennett) makes the quantum paradoxes clearer." The classical system presented authentically had no use or knowledge of quantum paradoxes. Researchers ignored any philosophical concern that could resemble a quantum paradox until the discovery of specific phenomenon such as spectral lines. As it stands now the section should be titled "Mind/Body problem as perceived by physicalist in the opinion of Dennet". But then again, Dennet's work came well after the development of quantum mechanics and as its written now the article doesn't represent Dennet's ideas.--OMCV (talk) 05:17, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for the link to the Mind's I website. The original "Where Am I" contains the copying procedure, "Hubert" is the computational copy. The idea that there is a way for a consciousness to go when it is duplicated is contained in this work. The stuff you are complaining about, the "bit of information", etc, is so trivial and obvious, I think it is silly to argue about.Likebox (talk) 04:34, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) To respond to your comment: by the phrase "Newtonian mechanics" I did not mean just Newtonian mechanics, I meant Maxwell's equations too and even special relativity, since they are all pretty much identical as far as mind issues are concerned.Likebox (talk) 21:48, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Accusations of SYNTH

I think all of these accusations are caused by not reading "The Mind's I". The relevant article is a sequel to "Where Am I?" where there is a copy of the consciousness, and the copy diverges from the original because of a computer glitch. From this point on, the copy and the original are two separate consciousnesses, but there was only one before. This leads to trouble, because only one of them can control Dennett's body, and neither consciousness want its body to be passively controlled by the other.Likebox (talk) 04:33, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I just read Where was I? and it doesn't help your case. The "diverging copy" is actually from the end of "The Mind's I" by Dennett , I recommend you reread the article. As I stated above the thought experiment now in the article is SYNTH.--OMCV (talk) 05:41, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I quickly skimmed it--- you are right. The diverging copy has a "switch" (one bit of information) which is useless at first, but then diverges. This is the mysterious "bit" that you complain about. Dennett says explicitly "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert", which is paraphrased into "this bit is blah blah blah" in the article. Really, there is no new idea here. Honest.Likebox (talk) 04:46, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

The differences between Yorick and Hubert is far more than a "bit". Dennett never offers a theory as to why they diverge only that they do. The switch is used to move between two different systems that started indistinguishable from each other but have many unobserved differences and thus diverge to observably different states. This is very much synth.--OMCV (talk) 13:43, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Its akin to saying that I have two painted balls of the exact same size, elasticity, and density, they behave the same in almost every situation except a when placed in magnetic fields. The difference is because one ball is a metal and the other is wood. This isn't one "bit" of information from a physics point of view even if it is from a linguistic point of view. Every atom in the two balls is different. The same is true for "Yorick" and "Hubert" and concluding the switch to be one "bit" of different between the two systems is just absurd.--OMCV (talk) 14:18, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

You are right after they diverge, but before they diverge the difference is exactly one bit: which way the switch is set. This is the single bit I was talking about. I agree it can be confusing, and probably can be reworded better.Likebox (talk) 20:13, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Summary of Complaints about Mind/Body Section

Perhaps the title of the section should be "Mind body problem disregarding quantum mechanics" instead of "Mind body problem in Newtonian mechanics. But since "Newtonian mechanics" is just a stand-in for "what people normally think of as physical law", the change would only be slight.

The point of the Dennett experiments is to show how different the mind can be from the material property of the brain. This discussion came after the analogous discussion in quantum mechanics, so you can't say it's not derived from this.Likebox (talk) 04:11, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

The section is now titled Classical Mind/Body problem. Hopefully that will get rid of the specious arguments about classical theories other than Newtonian mechanics.Likebox (talk) 21:49, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Form a "proper" classical perspective there is only measurable "body" and unmeasurable "mind" is not addressed, thus the mind/body problem does not exist in a classical framework that deals only with body. The invented content must go no matter what title it is given.--OMCV (talk) 02:32, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

The title is not invented. It just means "what people called the mind/body problem for 300 years before QM". If you don't like it, please suggest an alternative. Do you like "Non quantum Mind/Body problem?".Likebox (talk) 07:16, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

In re third opinion

For whoever provides a third opinion here, the current dispute seems to be about the inclusion or removal of the following two paragraphs:

"But even for these hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, this type of copying leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and duplicate all the information in the brain, by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains. The two brains start out exactly the same, but diverge afterwards, since they will have different experiences from this point on. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience for the observer will go. If the copy is not a philosophical zombie, the consciousness had better go both ways. But each copy feels to have gone only one way.

"So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way thier consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms. These types of thought experiments were widely discussed in philosophy in the 1980s , but similar ideas appeared earlier as part of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics."

^

(Diffs of removal and re-addition from article history.) — Athaenara ✉ 18:40, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

That's is correct from my perspective, I deleted the text on the grounds that it is synth. Less importantly this text does not address the issue of "Mind/body problem in Newtonian mechanics" for which the section is titled. A more detailed presentation of both sides of the argument are located in the preceding text of this talk page.--OMCV (talk) 19:35, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Yes, that's correct from my perspective too. This type of discussion, outside of quantum mechanics, is useful for a person who is unfamiliar with philosophy of mind. It explains why the question of consciousness has been considered somewhat slippery, and it is the same sort of slipperiness that is involved in the stranger case of quantum mechanics. It might be badly titled: "Classical Mind/Body problem" might be better.

The reason I think this belongs in an article on quantum mysticism is because the discussion of observer splitting/copying as far as I know first appeared in the quantum literature. These questions about consciousness were then reexamined in the non-quantum context in the 1980s by Dennett and Hofstadter. So I think that the link to the Dennett things is informative and relevant.Likebox (talk) 20:20, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Third Opinion So the main reason being given for the deletion of this material is that it is SYNTH? If so, it should be possible to point to specific parts that appear in none of the sources quoted. Perhaps then, we can find a form of words that avoids those specific claims. I'll note, as an aside, that "some philosophers have raised doubts" should be accompanied by a citation stating who at least some of those philosophers are, and where they published their doubts.

As to the lesser problem (if I'm reading you both correctly) of the section not belonging here, perhaps the section could be re-titled, and re-phrased to say something like "in his book on quantum mysticism argues that...", thus clearly indicating that somebody, at least, thinks the subjects are relevant to each other? Anaxial (talk) 12:54, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

The following is adapted from my talk page: You can't paraphrase something as original as Dennett's work to the point that you can't attribute it to Dennett or some one else.

1. Dennett never supposed that consciousness would "stream" to only one of the copies he describes in his scenario, he never even suggested it. The concept consciousness "stream" and the two split alternatives are currently full inventions.
2. In fact Dennett points out that each copy is fully conscious and indistinguishable untill they split for undisclosed reasons.
3. In the current form Dennett's scenario is contradicted by saying the experiment is "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains". What Dennett actually described was two copies of physical minds tied to the same body through some form of radio transmission.
4. Furthermore its a major omission to ignore that the minds presented by Dennett are made up of vastly different material one an uploaded mind and the other a Brain in a vat far more than one "bit" of difference by any reasonable interpretation an diffidently not "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains".
5. Dennett never said the two copies differed by only one bit, that claim is based on an unusual interpretation of the "switch".
6. The part on "atoms which make up the brain get replaced" is not sourced (nor explained/described in a reasonable way).
7. At no point does Dennett claim to be addressing the mind/body problem from the perspective of Newtonian or classical mechanics nor does he claim to exclude quantum mechanics. Rather he addressing classic philosophical questions like demonic deceiver and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde scenarios in a modern yet still unrealistic context.
8. Philosophical zombies are not discussed in any cited source.

Basically the entire section and hypothetical as presented right now is a very original piece of work. I could come up with more details but that's the bulk of it.--OMCV (talk) 16:27, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

1. Dennett did too talk about "streams", except perhaps not in that language. You can substitute "train of thought" or "sequence of memories" or diverging experience.
2. YES, that's the whole point--- they are indistinguishable, except for hardware, until they split. So which way do you go? He adresses this too--- he says "I don't know which one I am, Yorick or Hubert".
3. NO NO NO. The case is YORICK/HUBERT, as I explained before. TWO BRAINS, SAME MIND, and they diverge. The radio stuff is just a red herring. Stop bringing it up.
4. That's a part of the essay I wished to ignore, because it is irrelevant for the present discussion.
5. It's obvious. Don't force people to source the obvious.
6. Ditto. It would be better if you only bring up stuff you are sincere about.
7. "Newtonian/Classical" just means "Not quantum", or if you like "Capable of being simulated on a deterministic computer", which is true of Yorick.
8. Philosophical Zombie is a link to an introductory article here on philosophy of mind.

It's a hypothetical, but it's not my hypothetical, it's Dennetts. You are annoying. You ask for a source, you get a perfect source, and you are still not satisfied.Likebox (talk) 14:22, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Let me be more explicit with points 3 and 4. The statement "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is not related to the idea producing two copies of a consciousness in two different forms, one a brain in a vat and the other an uploaded mind. This idea of "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is central to the entire hypothetical and is not supported by any reference.--OMCV (talk) 17:04, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Please, less of the accusations of bad faith; they are unlikely to help resolve the issue. With regard to points 5 and 6, I would suggest that in this case, we should, indeed, cite the obvious, since it's clear that at least one party doesn't find it "obvious" - and, if its obvious to you, a cite won't be hard to find. It also seems clear to me that, if you're copying a brain in a vat into an uploaded mind then, no matter what else you may be doing, you're "copying all the relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" (arguably you might be if you were copying one uploaded mind into another, but I gather that's not the case here). So I would suggest altering that phrasing, and perhaps some explanation as to why this would be relevant, since, if you're not copying the particles, it's not obvious to me what it has to do with quantum physics. Perhaps you can clarify for me? Anaxial (talk) 17:16, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Copying positions and relative velocities, as far as I see it, is exactly the same as two copies in two different forms. I didn't remember the precise details of Dennett's example when I wrote it, and I wrote something which seemed equivalent to me. What's the difference exactly? If you don't like it, I can replace it with copying into a computer. You still can't tell which copy you "are" until the glitch. The glitch still reveals an extra bit of information to you, an extra bit which wasn't there before the split.Likebox (talk) 17:14, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Hmm... it seems to me that it's actually very different. If all the positions and velocities were the same, what you would have would look the same to an outside observer as well as being the same from an internal perspective; a brain in the vat does not look the same as an uploaded mind, and the "mind" itself is running on completely different hardware, so the positions and velocities would, ipso facto have to be different, wouldn't they?. Anaxial (talk) 17:19, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

All of this discussion is predicated on Dennett's philosophy of mind, where the mind can be identified with the information content in the brain. The information content in the vat-brain and the computer-program brain is identical--- they will answer the same to any question. So it is effectively the same as any other copy. I melded the two examples in my mind (uploading and copying atoms), because I agree with Dennett. But I don't know. Why is this difference essential? Also, I replaced the one I wrote with Dennett's below.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Now that we have established the brain in a vat and the uploaded mind are different I think we can also conclude that there is more than one "bit" of difference between the two (point 5). Since there are substantial differences, as usually assumed with uploaded minds, I don't think anyone would debate there are potentially strange outcomes when people theorize about uploaded minds, be it within the framework of classical mechanics or informed by quantum mechanics.

Points 6 and 7 still stand. There is no citation or explanation of 6. For point 7 there is no reason to assume that Dennett isn't considering quantum mechanics, after all to create his story he also had to abandon aspects of known technology and classical mechanics. All we know is the first person account of the story not the theoretical frame work.--OMCV (talk) 17:41, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

The statement in the article is "by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This is, it seems, not part of the argument made in Dennett's book, since clearly the atoms in a brain and in an uploaded system are not going to be the same. Therefore, this does, in my view, constitute synthesis, and does not belong on WP - unless, of course, there is some other book that does make this exact argument, in which case we need to cite that. Anaxial (talk) 20:13, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

We are most definitely NOT in agreement. There just is no substantive difference between copying consciousness into AI and copying consciousness by duplicating atoms for the purpose of this discussion. The notion is identical in this case. The only reason I am giving an alternative is to make the issue go away, not because I agree with OMCV's interpretation of OR.

OR is here to keep the encyclopedia free from people's editorializing, and from misinformation. It is NOT to prevent examples which illustrate the idea in a slightly different language than the source. For the purpose of this particular discussion (which is about duplicating minds--- what does it feel like from the inside), there is not a shred of difference between copying to AI and copying to a set of atoms.Likebox (talk) 21:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Except that copying to AI leads to a slightly clunkier discussion (it makes it seem that copying to AI is essential here, but only the duplication is used). Still, it's not a huge difference.Likebox (talk) 21:34, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Regarding Dennett and Classical mechanics: It is impossible for Dennett to have been considering quantum mechanics, because it is well known that a computer cannot simulate a quantum mechanical system and stay parallel for any length of time. He was considering the traditional mind/body problem within the good old classical/deterministic computational model of the physical world. There's nothing wrong with that, just his thought experiment doesn't work at all in quantum mechanics. In quantum mechanics the computer, even with perfect information, would have no idea what the brain in the vat is going to do after about a fraction of a second, because different paths diverge quickly. That's the whole point. Quantum mechanics is probabalistic and diverging. In the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the diverging paths of observers in quantum mechanics are thought of as exactly analogous to Yorick/Hubert.Likebox (talk) 21:34, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Would this be better?

But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, one could imagine moving all the information into a computer. This leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and simulate all the information in the brain, by simuating all the atoms relative positions and velocities in a computer program. If the two brains get identical experiences, they stay exactly the same. But if there is a different experience for one of the two copies, the copies diverge afterwards. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience inside the system will go. Both you and the program should have a consciousness in this scenario, to avoid making one of you a philosophical zombie. But it is impossible for each copy to be aware of the other.

So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms.Likebox (talk) 17:24, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

I think this is slightly muddier, since the type of duplication in Dennett's article is irrelevant, but it is equivalent as far as the content is concerned.Likebox (talk) 21:36, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Explaining this one-bit business

The point of the part of Dennett's article dealing with Yorick/Hubert is that you can't tell which one you are Yorick or Hubert, until the divergence occurs. If someone told you that they were going to simulate the painful experience of smashing a hammer into Hubert's skull, and they asked the shared body "are you going to feel pain", there would be no way for either Yorick or Hubert to answer. The answer to the question: "who am I? Yorick or Hubert?" is not answerable by either. Even if you gave both Hubert and Yorick full knowledge of the position and momentum of all the atoms in all the world, neither one would be able to tell which one they are. The quantum mechanical analog of this bit is what has been called the mystical observer-dependent part of quantum mechanics, at least this is what it is called in the many worlds interpretation. In other interpretations, the same bits are called other things.Likebox (talk) 22:05, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Policy Interpretation

The goal of policies like OR or SYNTH is to keep the encyclopedia accurate, and free from people's personal crackpot theories. They are not designed to make Misplaced Pages writing enslaved to the particular illustrations or phrases used in the sources. To decide when two ideas are "basically the same", a lot of common sense judgement needs to be employed. You should always be asking yourself--- is this basically the same idea?

In this case, the thought experiment in question is duplicating a brain. The type of duplication is irrelevant, but in order to illustrate this concept, I said "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This was then attacked as OR. GIVE ME A BREAK. This is so obviously the same as any other form of copying, that to challenge it as OR shows a myopic and dangerously lawyerly approach to content on the encyclopedia. This type of editing can easily delete valuable information, which is well sourced, but not plagiarized from the source. I have removed the phrase for now, but I still believe that this is a dangerous interpretation of policy.Likebox (talk) 20:29, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

The "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities" was central to the OR text but it is not the entirety of the OR text. The text still needs to go. I've explained the reasoning as plainly as I can and in multiple ways; this isn't a matter to debate this is a matter of policy. If you can attribute the hypothetical and surrounding statements to an WP:RS they can stay if you can't they must go. This has been the case since the beginning of the discussion. Once this section is cleaned up we will move on to the rest of the article.

What has slowed things down is the arguments you have provided thus far have been exceedingly specious. Likebox, it seems the things you choose to understand and remember is extremely selective and convenient. This makes discussions and ultimately researching a consensus extremely difficult. In addition to all this you are still displaying ownership of the text reverting content of User:Michael C Price, who was willing to defend you at Misplaced Pages:Wikiquette alerts. Your brash language and needling may have been tolerated in the past but this sort of approach to discussions is not whats best for Misplaced Pages.--OMCV (talk) 00:36, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

There is no OR, and if you think the arguments I gave are specious, I beg you to read them again and reconsider. I give them sincerely. I do not agree with you, and I think your approach is destructive to all good encyclopedic content.

In compliance with the third opinion suggestion, I removed "copy all the atoms relative positions and velocities" and replaced it with the more neutral "copy the information in the brain", which is equivalent, and is what Dennett uses. If you want this gone, please wait to see what consensus is around the new phrase. I didn't like being forced to do this, because the examples are effectively identical, but since the third opinion suggested this compromise, I complied.

You are wrong about "matter of debate/matter of policy". All policy implementation is subject to debate, and this debate is useful for defining what policy means. Any literature has a certain scope of ideas which all people who are familiar with the literature know about. When you write sometimes you use one or another of these ideas to illustrate the whole circle of ideas, and that should be OK so long as each idea can be sourced. If a person who is unfamiliar with the ideas involved reads about a subject they don't know about (like quantum mysticism), they might think "Oh, this is all OR" because the ideas are unfamiliar. If you read the sources, and internalize the arguments, and you still think the ideas are OR, then maybe you are right. But I see no evidence that you have done so.

You have read the Dennett part, on the classical mind body problem, but that's the preamble. The main part of the article is about the analogous thing in quantum mechanics, which starts with Wigner's paper and Everett's. These are essential for the quantum part. You also have to be familiar with observation in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the nature of wavefunctions. Please read these sources, because they are what the article is based on.Likebox (talk) 12:05, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

The third opinion also suggested that you cite "But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts." to the specific philosophers. It appears you either failed to read this or willfully ignored it. There is nothing that says Dennett is discussion a Newtonian observer. Likebox, You say its impossible that its a quantum mechanics informed observer so it must be a Newtonian observer but its also impossible for it to be a Newtonian observer thanks to problems like the "three body problem" among others. Dennett is never explicit with his philosophical of scientific frame work in this piece which is written as fiction. Dennett's piece is a hypothetical dealing with different philosophical content than what you are attributing to the piece. Its clear and disturbing that you are using this content as a preamble for the rest of the quantum mysticism page. You want to be able to say that a classical approach had "doubts" which foretold the coming of quantum mechanics and quantum mysticism. Neither Wigner or Everett bothered to make this claim in the papers you cite and to my knowledge there is no WP:RS that makes this claim.--OMCV (talk) 21:44, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

I suggest we use these guidlines to settle disputes here. So, assuming that everyone here is familiar with QM, we can forget sources for the moment and discuss any issues from first principles. Count Iblis (talk) 01:16, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

To OMCV, I see the problem you are raising--- thank you for stating it clearly. That section most definitely should not imply that the classical doubts "foretold" the coming of quantum mechanics, because that would be a bald-faced lie. The reason I wrote it this way is just because I really think it makes it pedagogically easier to understand the quantum part (especially many-worlds, which has a notoriously history of being philosophically confusing), after you think about the easier non-quantum stuff a little bit first. It's not historical, history was actually the reverse, the copying of observers in classical context was an issue that was only raised well after the many-worlds interpretation raised the same issue in the quantum context.

For the "philosophers raised doubts" part, I agree that it should be sourced to individuals. I just didn't notice that part of the third opinion (my reading and paying-attention skills are deteriorating, sorry). But do we really need to have a discussion of the substance dualists? They wouldn't care if it was quantum or classical mechanics anyway (I think, I don't know their position very well). People like Dennett pretty much identify mind with "software" and brain with "hardware", which is a very mild sort of dualism. But it's still a little dualistic because of Hubert/Yorick, and that's what that Dennett story is about.

Four Count Iblis, I agree that those guidelines should be adhered to. It seems that part of the issue that OMCV is raising here is that there is unintended subtext in the structure of the current text which is implying all sorts of things that should not be implied.Likebox (talk) 02:03, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Step Outside the Box

Grant a newbie a bit of leeway here for a moment...sometimes stepping out of the off-topic limitation might lighten the conflict... how I picked this site as my intro I don't know but I found you first. I'm a former chemist not as versed in QM or philosophy as others, but finding myself with numerous years of "mystical" explorations with holistic practitioners -- I'm a scientist-observer to experiential events beyond my comprehension but observed with a critical eye. I'm going to quote from Dr. William Tiller's foreword to Matrix Energetics by Richard Bartlett, D.C., N.D. and expect to be ignored or used as food for thought by those more QM math-inclined:

" adopts the quantum mechanics metaphor that there is a virtual sea of possible solutions; there, you are free to use your imagination and pick one that you like. He recognizes that even when a metaphor is not factually correct as stated, the concept you visualize can have significant power to drive an action from an entirely different level of reality than you anticipate....The term "Matrix Energetics" comes from books on energy medicine by James Oschman, who in turn was inspired by the work of Alfred Pischinger, author of Matrix and Matrix Regulation: Basis for a Holistic Theory in Medicine. In both Pischinger and Oschman's work, the term deals only with our normal, electric atom/molecule level of physical reality. Dr. Bartlett, on the other hand, thinks that we are basically constructed from light and information and are thus malleable to focused intent. Under this rubric, Matrix Energetics is an archetype; practitioners maintain a state of awareness and enter into a kind of energetic rapport with clients... so that they can have the freedom to express a different outcome for their physical states.... a second, unique level of physical reality that may or may not be strongly coupled with our normal particulate electric atom/molecule level of physical reality, that which we are all cognitively aware of at the conscious level. At present, only our unconscious is aware of this new magnetic information wave level of physical reality that functions at superluminal velocities in the physical vacuum-level space between the fundamental electric particles that comprise our atoms and molecules..."

I'm out of practice with editing equations so I will describe the sole equation Tiller uses here: a sum of the electric atom/molecule level contribution and the magnetic information wave level contribution with coupling coefficient, the coefficient disappearing when conventional Maxwellian equations apply. When the coupling is significant the electromagnetic gauge symmetry state of the space is raised, with higher thermodynamic free energy per unit volume state, enabling useful work to be done on a system of lower-EM gauge symmetry state. Tiller claims human intention can strongly influence the physics of this duplex space.

So perhaps thought experiments are metaphorical as well as undemonstrable, and metaphor is appropriate even in QM, and also there potentially are factors beyond physical reality impacting this discussion -- our understanding of QM is limited to our current understanding of it -- we have further to go to have the tools and language to describe what we don't yet know. So allow that possibility into your disagreement.Chempst (talk) 04:08, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Pedagogy and Clarity

Articles absolutely need to be comprehensible to the non-specialist. The discussion of the classical mind body problem is designed to by a warm-up for the nonspecialist reader to understand the quantum case. It is especially important for understanding many-worlds/decoherence interpretations. This is very important for clarity, and clarity should not be sacrificed. But it is not intended to imply that this is the historical order in which the ideas developed. In fact, at the end of the section, the article says "Similar ideas were developed earlier in the context of the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics".Likebox (talk) 02:57, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

I can't budge on it, that hypothetical is un-sourced OR and must go. By my count three editors have identified it as OR. As you have discussed on my talk page regarding what you call class 3 QM "Class 3 is not mystical, but is also not-not mystical." The same applies to everything in classical mechanics. I oppose the hypothetical on content terms since its an overly contextualized leading question tied to assumption limited outcomes. The part concerning one bit is tied to some seriously unsourced assumptions. Hypotheticals always have more than two potential out comes. Here is how this hypothetical would read form a proper classical perspective: "An observers who consist of matter (body and mind are not distinguished) is copied resulting in two observers with identical internally states. The internal states of these observers subsequently diverge because of their different relative relationship to the external environment." The reason I didn't challenge the content based on what I just wrote, claiming my idea as correct is that that content is my own OR. As OR that content can never be added to the article just as the current OR must now be removed. I think Wigner treatment of classical mechanics is far better.(Wigner, Eugene (1967-12). "Symmetries and Reflections, Scientific Essays". American Journal of Physics. 35 (12): 1169–1170. doi:10.1119/1.1973829. Retrieved 2009-07-30. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)) --OMCV (talk) 03:37, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

You persist in maintaining that a perfectly well sourced thought experiment is OR. Please give it a rest. Classical mechanics is not the focus--- the focus is on a materialist model of the mind, like Dennett, with a computater-program dualism. It is not my fault if an editor or two (only two by my count) have considered it dubious--- it looks dubious until you read the soure. Me and Michael Price think it is well sourced. The reason for the disagreement is because the other editors are not familiar with the ideas. If they spent some time reading the literature, they would also agree its not OR.Likebox (talk) 04:05, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

You have already waved your hands in this way before. If you want to describe Dennett's work your welcome to. As it stands now the text does not describe Dennett's work. Furthermore I appear to be more familiar with Dennett's text than you at the moment. In your future edits please respond to the discussion at hand.--OMCV (talk) 04:44, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

You have read the Dennett essay more recently than the last time I reread it, I admit, but I have long-term familiarity with the ideas, and that makes it easier to paraphrase as opposed to copy. I also read other Dennett works (he has a short new book which is illuminating), and I basically have a little "Dennett module" that lets me know when I am faithful to Dennett and when I am doing OR. Since the ideas are new to you: let it sit in your mind for a few weeks and see if you still think it's OR.Likebox (talk) 19:54, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

CCC comment

Someone added this to CCC:

Quantum decoherence does not apply to systems governed by a quantum control such as the Schrödinger's cat experiment, or as proponents of CCC postulate, the human brain.

That's completely not true, because it misunderstands decoherence. Decoherence applies to the cat, because there will be no interference effects between the live cat and the dead cat. Interference only happens when a quantum system evolves to the exact same state by two different paths. The probability amplitude that a dead cat will spontaneously evolve to the exact same state as an alive cat is for all intents and purposes equal to the probability amplitude that either of them turning into a frog. Since the two options never interfere, the relative phase of the wavefunction is not effectively measurable, so the two options are "decohered". Does that mean that they are "collapsed"? Absolutely not. It just means that they can be treated as if they are collapsed for all intents and purposes. But mysticism and philosophy are not about all intents and purposes, even the smallest chance of an alive and dead cat interfering needs to be taken into account.

The second misinterpretation in this sentence is that CCC has something to say about the operation of the brain. That is completely false. The consciousness is tied up with the brain in CCC in the same way as in classical mechanics. It's just that whenever the brain is in a superposition, consciousness does not superpose, but forces a choice between the options. This is pretty much the same idea as in many-worlds, except without the realism, so Wigner might be engaged in "rip off the academic corpse" here.Likebox (talk) 03:21, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, but I think you're wrong. The classic demonstration of interference is the two-slit experiment. Interference doesn't require that the two paths lead to the same quantum state, only to the same position. In the two-slit experiment, the two paths lead to the same position, but different momentum, hence different quantum states. In other words, interference applies to the measurement of a specified variable, not to the entire quantum state. Looie496 (talk) 17:21, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Two states with the same position are the exact same state in qantum mechanics. Interference only happens when two paths lead to the same position for a particle (and also for all the other particles in the universe). This is a well known fact.Likebox (talk) 19:56, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Hubert/Yorick is NOT OR

It is in the Dennett article. Please stop saying that it is OR. I can see that you get the main points about the measurement problem. But if you leave out the question of copying consciousness, which is explicitly adressed by Dennett, also explicitly adressed by Everett, and less explicitly adressed by Wigner, then you leave out the way in which a good part of physicists reconcile themselves to the difference between the way the world is described and the way the world is experienced.Likebox (talk) 05:04, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Hubbert/Yorick are not represented by the text you have provided. Dennett is not addressing classical or quantum mechanics he's addressing philosophical problems with an undisclosed physics model. Three editors including myself have identified this as OR.--OMCV (talk) 15:10, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

I ask to get those mystry editors to identify themselves. Stop making things up. The text has changed to remove the "by duplicating the atoms positions and velocities", which was the only thing ONE person tentatively agreed with you was OR. Even then, that person is probably ignorant of the literature, because that opinion is dead wrong.Likebox (talk) 16:36, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

I realize that you have missed opinions before so here's & for one editor and for a second editor and I summed it all up here a while ago . I wish the other editors were stubborn enough to argue with you Likebox, but like you said sometimes brashness and needling does work. As it stand sooner or latter another editor will join the conversation and either you or I will be taken to WP:RFC and this situation will be resolved.--OMCV (talk) 03:08, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Or perhaps the reason that they aren't arguing is because they were satisfied with the minor cosmetic change, or perhaps they realized that they were wrong and changed their mind. How should I know? The stopped talking. That's why we have talk pages with long-ranging conversations, as opposed to one-time voting.Likebox (talk) 18:44, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

I think is bad form to assume your fellow editor wouldn't be a big enough person to admit when they are wrong. Their was never even a slight suggestion that they considered the Synth a cosmetic issue. This is an exceedingly long conversation for such small bit of text. But as you say the conversation goes on.--OMCV (talk) 12:16, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

That's normal--- you need this long conversation, because, in some sense, it's also part of the article. This type of thing allows readers to figure out exactly how reliable the information in the article is.Likebox (talk) 13:50, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

The statement "This type of thing allows readers to figure out exactly how reliable the information in the article is." is especially troubling.--OMCV (talk) 01:40, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

You have a too-limited view of Misplaced Pages! It is 'not a summary of sources. It is written by people with strong POVs and special knowledge, battling it out with some political rules. The rule is that anyone is allowed to say "oh yeah? Prove it!" for any statement. Then the sources have to come out, and the information checked for accuracy. The sources + the debate + common sense lets people see what the neutral version should be.

These rules are not how content is originally written. Not a single decent article on Misplaced Pages (with the exception of first-edition Brittanica copying) was written by taking a source and summarizing the information. It was written after a long political debate, by big POV pushers, until consensus on a neutral version

The nature and quality of the debate, along with the cited sources, allows readers to appreciate exactly how accurate the information is. This is especially true of science articles. I was involved in a year long debate with another user on radiation hormesis regarding undue-weight issues. The debate clarified the literature, and allowed an informative balanced article to get written.Likebox (talk) 18:33, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

...but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms...

Why not? Are we talking about the entire system comprising of the two brains here? Count Iblis (talk) 13:33, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Its questionable what Likebox is talking about here. The biggest problem is that it appears to be OR. Your opinion would be most welcome. I think the best way to get caught up with the debate is to look over Talk:Quantum mysticism#In re third opinion. Regardless I'm willing to start the debate from your fresh perspective.--OMCV (talk) 15:06, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

If it's confusing, I can explain, but please understand it before accusing OR. I assume you already know that Yorick is Dennett's brain-in-a-vat, while Hubert is a computer simulating the brain. Either one can control the body. There is a switch that says which is controlling the body. This is all classical physics (despite what OMCV says).

If you are Yorick/Hubert, before the divergence, and somebody asks you "which one are you, Hubert or Yorick" that's a bit of information. It will be revealed to you after the divergence, but you can't know it in advance. There is nothing in the position of any of the atoms of Hubert or Yorick that will help to answer that question for you.Likebox (talk) 16:40, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

I see. But then that's also true if you had only one brain, because the information about how that would evolve will then also depend on the information present in the outside world. Replacing your sentence: "nothing in the position of any of the atoms of Hubert or Yorick" by "nothing in the position of any of the atoms in the universe" would make sense to me. Because if I'm Yorick or Hubert, whatever I'm aware of is encoded by the velocities and the relative positions of the atoms w.r.t. each other in my brain. If I had access to the data about all the atoms in the universe, I could still not decide which of the two copies I am. Count Iblis (talk) 18:00, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Right, that's what I meant. Some people would interpret that bit of information as "mystical" knowledge associated with the observer's experience, not with the atoms from which the observer is built. The point is that this idea, which only shows up in really contrived circumstances (Hubert/Yorick) in classical systems, is very natural in quantum mechanics.Likebox (talk) 03:42, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Is this a problem of a classical system or a problem of Dennett's contrived system that not related to classical or quantum mechanics in any clear way. Furthermore Dennett never explains why the divergence occurs in his hurried conclusion to his story. The switch represents a bit of information but nothing that indicates the switch is the cause of the divergence.--OMCV (talk) 11:36, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

It has nothing to do with "classical" or "quantum" mechanics per se, this is just a philosophical issue with consciousness that people in philosophy brought up (after people in QM brought it up) and people should know about so that they understand what Everett is talking about. Dennett's story is classical by default, it just doesn't deal with quantum mechanics. It talks about computers and brains without dealing with quantum superpositions of computers and brains. That makes it a good warm-up for the analogous issues in quantum mechanics, so that people understand what kind of strangeness you can have with conscious experience before they deal with quantum strangeness.

It doesn't matter why the divergence occurs, and of course it's not the switch. Why would you say that?

Within many-worlds, Dennett's divergence is why observers see a probablistic world, when the wavefunction evolves linearly and deterministically. The idea is that wavefunctions with weight on different histories are splitting observers. This idea can be done forward in time, in which case the consciousness splits, or it can be done backwards in time, in which case an observer has a "consistent history" which is reconstructed from future observations. Modulo philosophy, these are the same. If you pick one particular observer, then the collapse occurs relative to their "consciousness basis", so that consciousness causes collapse, a-la Wigner. If you don't, then it's standard many worlds (also known as many-minds, where the emphasis is on what Everett brought up: the minds keep splitting into seperate futures).Likebox (talk) 15:31, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

What do you mean by one bit? Dennett's story never discusses one bit, I guess you're insisting its that mystical something, but I just can't believe that you would be so blatant about pushing OR. In the above comment I reverted to the assumption that the bit must be discussed in Dennett's text and the only thing in Dennett's text that represents a single bit is the switch. Dennett's story is not classical by default, its a philosophical independent of a distinct physical model. To quote WP:Synth "that precise analysis must have been published by a reliable source in relation to the topic before it can be published in Misplaced Pages by a contributor."--OMCV (talk) 02:30, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

(to count Iblis) I wasn't sure what you are talking about when you said something like "That would be true if there was only one brain". The whole point is that when there is a duplication of a mind, and if you are this mind, then you don't know which duplicate you "are" really. This information is not available to either Hubert or Yorick.

This type of information is exactly analogous to the random results of observations in some interpretations of quantum mechanics, and in all interpretions, the information about observations is what is considered "mystical".Likebox (talk) 19:26, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

I agree, but I think one has to consider also the information outside of the brains and then argue that even that is not enough for either brain to make a prediction of its future. Otherwise there is no difference with the more trivial case of a single brain. Because a single brain interacting with the environment will have different possible futures depending on the information that resides outside the brain that has yet to influence the brain.

You could also say that whatever information is stored in the brain is present in the velocities and relative positions of the atoms. If you are inside a closed spaceship in deep space, you cannot experience your absolute position. You can then identify the center of mass position with the extra bit you wrote about. Suppose that there is only one brain and the future of that brain depends on the value of that bit, revealing that bit would allow it to know its future.

If we have two identical brains in two closed spaceships, you could make available to both brains all the information present in the universe, and they still won't be able to tell in which spaceship they are located. Both the brains would know that one brain will evolve one way and another will evolve another way, but they don't know which one they are, because they can't know their absolute position.

So, I think this missing bit is connected to translational invariance, or more generally, a symmetry which you can exploit to create two identical brains which are in different physical states (e.g. one is obtained from the other by applying a symmetry operation like translating the whole brain which doesn't affect the internal state). Count Iblis (talk) 20:50, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Wouldn't a center of mass be at least 3 bits of information in three dimensional space? I think you are demonstrating a very good point this thought experiments can be interpreted many different ways. The text contains two possibilities, I've presented a third in my original edit of the section, and here Count Iblis is presenting yet another (unless Iblis is shoe-horning theirs into one of Likebox's two possibilities). Lastly Count Iblis, I was also wondering if you had a chance to read Where was I? where am i putting aside all musings the contended text is OR, at least from my superposition.--OMCV (talk) 02:46, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

What Count Iblis is doing, OMCV, is trying to understand all the issues first, with honest conversation about different situations, before taking a firm stand on the nature of material. Sources don't discuss all hypotheticals, and sometimes, when you go far enough away from the ideas, it does become OR. But you need to explore the territory first before making that decision.

That's a point I didn't think about. If you have unknown information of another sort, like where you are in a translationally invariant system, and then you "find out", you have reduced your unknown bits. This is though obviously not mystical information, because you are learning something about data that was "already there". The thing that made copying different, as I saw it, is that you can create new data for the observer which was not already there. Before copying, you can have full information, know everything. The copying machine could be fully determinstic, so you would think you would have full information at all times. But then, once the copy is made, you have one new uncertain bit, which popped out of nowhere.

This new uncertain bit is only present after the split. You could have full information about everything before the split. So the new bit can be generated within experience without any uncertainty generated in the physical world.

I suppose you could say that's analogous to putting me in a spaceship and let random effects make the spaceship have a random center of mass. That's true, but then you could attribute the randoness to external variables. With the duplicating brain, all the atoms are deterministic, and the probability comes "out of nowhere", in a sort of mystical way.Likebox (talk) 18:54, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

After thinking a bit, I remembered why this is different. The information about where I am in the translationally invariant case most certainly is in the position and velocities of the atoms--- it's in the position information of my atoms. But the information about where I "go" when I get duplicated is not in the position and velocities of the atoms before, during, or after the duplication. It just "emerges" out of nowhere.Likebox (talk) 19:20, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

You have supposed that the the copying was flawless while I would contend that the story was presented in just such a way to encourage the reader to doubt the expectations of the "scientists". For example the contrived radiation wasn't supposed to damage the first body but none the less it did. The scientists are very self congratulatory and secretive. If they got the radiation wrong and display other personality flaws why are we to suppose Hubert/Yorick are a perfect pair that ultimately deviated. In addition they deviated with only a three paragraphs of first person account before the story closes that amounts to " Oh my, something went wrong". We as readers don't know why Hubert/Yorick deviated, it could be a quantum difference(s) between the copies, an aspect of their physical minds position in reality that was super-sensory, or the possibility that the copy process wasn't perfect, or perhaps the computer couldn't perfectly model a brain indefinitely. These all staying within the bounds of the text that doesn't limit itself to a specific "hypothetical" physics system. Impressing limits on the story is invention that is usually called Synth on Misplaced Pages.--OMCV (talk) 12:11, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

I agree that it depends on what Dennett meant exactly. The essential point is that there is a period of identity after the copying, and then a divergence during which neither copy knows which way it will go. This introduces exactly one "mystical bit" for either copy, while Quantum mechanics introduces lots and lots of mystical bits for any one observer.Likebox (talk) 13:48, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

Only the stuff in the article needs to be free of OR

In my opinion, the Hubert/Yorick thing belongs in the article, to clarify what is the issue with conscious experience when it is thought of as embedded inside a physical description. On the other hand, any interpretation of Hubert/Yorick that links it directly to quantum mechanics might be considered OR, and is not in the article as written. The article is careful to avoid any interpretation or synthesis. It simply states some classical mind/body issues, then states some analogous quantum mechanical issues, without drawing the parallels.

The discussion above explicitly draws those parallels, so as to clarify the issue for editors. It is not meant to be included in the article, because, for all I know, this might be OR. So just because an editor might think that some aspects of the discussion above go beyond what is stated in Dennett or Everett or Wigner, that's doesn't imply that the article has gone beyond what is stated in Dennett or Everett or Wigner.Likebox (talk) 01:42, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Protected

Rather than block a couple of editors for edit warring I've locked the page for a week. Work it out here. Vsmith (talk) 02:05, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

We were in a friendly revert cycle, communicating in a friendly way and waiting for a third party to help make a decision between the two versions.Likebox (talk) 03:30, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

A third opinion on the current dispute would really help.Likebox (talk) 03:32, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Although scientifically savvy, my QM background is insufficient to help resolve the specific dispute. Sorry.

However, I have hovered on the fringes of the conversation and agree with the assessment that this dispute, although possibly not friendly, remained reasonably contained. This was the longest and largest and most divergent revert-festival I have witnessed which did not explode into all-out warfare. It was more like two, old cantankerous curmudgeons arguing with each other.

My only contribution to resolution is this. To my eyes, the current article contains 764 words on Quantum Mysticism (more or less), 727 words critical of the concept, and 1772 words on Quantum Mechanics. The current dispute seems more about the scientific interpretation of what QM says about the nature of reality rather than the application of QM as a model for mystical experience. --Mbilitatu (talk) 19:28, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

All the science became necessary because somebody merged a serious scientific concept: Consciousness Causes Collapse into this article. That forced this article to go beyond "What the bleep do we know" and "Learn how to change your own psi-function by meditating!" into partly an article on the very serious mind/body issues raised by quantum mechanics. There's no other place in Misplaced Pages that's appropriate, and forking off an article on "mind/body problem in quantum mechanics" seems unnecessary considering that this is here.Likebox (talk) 01:46, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

First off the current debate concerns text that titled "Classical Mind/body problem" so there is no need for expertise in quantum mechanics. In fact the debate is over whether what this content is SYNTH which means you need only to read where am i. Your opinion would be welcome. I also think you have a good point that this article should reflect quantum mysticism as its authentically appears in society especially if it can be properly cited. Misplaced Pages is not the place to go beyond well documented sources or elevate a conversation on a subject. If "What the bleep do we know" is the most significant mainstream presentation of quantum mysticism followed by "The Dancing Wu Li Masters" and "The Tao of Physics" than the most of the text should focus on the presentation and reception of the content of those sources.--OMCV (talk) 01:34, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

except that the sources you mention are popularizations of serious physics discussions that have been ongoing in the literature for 80 years now. You need the primary sources first, then the popularizations. This is especially true because "What the bleep do we know" is trying to appeal to change-your-own-reality type fantasy, and "dancing Wu Li masters" has an agenda of meshing with baby-boomer drug induced mystical experiences. The scientific literature on the subject is generally clearer, because it is mostly free from these marketing biases.Likebox (talk) 18:13, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Your distinction between the popularizations and historic perspectives sounds much like some one claiming 1990s punk doesn't hold a candle to 1980s punk. It appears that quantum mysticism is one part "baby-boomer drug induced mystical experience" and one part "Nobel laureates from from the Manhattan project". Both are part of the story and need to represented fairly. We don't get to pick the true or right faction of a well documented movement. That likes to think their moods influence the growth of snow flakes.--OMCV (talk) 01:47, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

I didn't say that "What the Bleep" and "Wu Li" should be excluded from the article, it's just that I have absolutely no interest in writing about them. If you want to write details of this, feel free. The only thing I have read is a good portion of the scientific literature on the subject, and I am confident that the scientific ideas are sourced to the proper original papers.Likebox (talk) 14:15, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Section on the observer in classical mechanics

I think the edits made by Likebox in the previous version of the article about copying thought experiments should be included. Clearly there are similar issues in determinstic theories too and it is helpful to readers to mention these.

I think one can also mention some other issues raised by philosophers and other scientists about deterministic theories and also quantum mechanics. E.g. in a purely determinstic theory where some brain evolves through a sequence of states, you can map these states to the states of a clock and vice versa. In fact, you can map the entire set of states the whole universe will evolve through to those of a trival model describing a single counter that starts at state 1 and then evolves to state 2, etc. etc. One can then take different views. E.g. one can say that conscious observers cannot exist in determinsitic theories.Such views have been expressed, but I don't have the time right now to study the literature to digg up the different views on this.

One view that I know about is that what matters is that counterfactuals must be implemented in the correct way. So, if you list the states of my brain and call the state on time zero 1, the next state 2, etc. and then argue that I'm nothing more than a clock, then I could argue that the mapping doesn't capture what I am. Had I been subjected to a different envoronment, I would ave reacted in some other way, but thatinformation is not captured by the clock model. A problem for the deterministic model is then that while that may be true, counterfactuals still do not exist, so how can I exist, if my existence depends on existence of such counterfactuals?

This is just one additional issue that could be added, I'm sure there are more... Count Iblis (talk) 16:22, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

Someone pointed out a source for this type of argument, it's Ned Block's analysis which was brought up on the chinese room talk page. It's the same argument in slightly different language. You are talking about deterministic models of mind, while Block is talking about computational models of mind, but that's essentially equivalent.

Block points out in the computational that you can take a Turing-test algorithm which is purportedly conscious and turn the computer program into a simple clock model, where each input takes you to another state in an enormously long cycle. This is called "refactoring" in Block's language, and the refactored program is called the "blockhead", because intuition suggests that it is not intelligent in any way. This argument made it seem to Block that the computational model of consciousness is false, for essentially the reason you describe above.

My unsourced opinion (but it might have been expressed by Dennett at some point) is that this type of Block argument is not convincing. The reason is that the clock model has hidden away the information containing the conscious experience in a place where you don't expect to find it, in the "instruction pointer" of the computer program. Usually the information in conscious experience is contained in RAM, so that you can identify the conscious experience. But for the refactored program, the data has been shunted to what is usually a small irrelevant pointer.

You can think of the blockhead model as follows: as the program recieves input, all it does is do a "goto" statement to another state based on the input. The program at the "goto" position then keeps recieving more data, and then does another goto. In this way, all the inputs to the consciousness simply serve to move the instruction pointer, and this looks like a simple clock model.

But in order to do this practically, the program has to be enormous, exponentially huge, with a number of goto locations which is roughly equal to the number of different states that the mind can have. This number is 2^B where B is the number of bits in the mind. So this program length is so huge, that the information content of the mind is hidden in the instruction pointer.

Because the instruction pointer is usually a small integer, the usual intuition fails completely. But the essential point is that there is a law of conservation of information in a computer program. The information content of a computation is independent of the form in which it is refactored. It is this Shannon information that forms the content of the mind in computational views.

Thank you for your comment. I agree that these type of things would make valuable additions, but it requires even more mucking around in the philosophy of mind literature.Likebox (talk) 18:18, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

Sorry for my absence but back to the question at hand. "Clearly there are similar issues in determinstic theories too and it is helpful to readers to mention these." The issue is not whether it would be nice to include the content, WP:ILIKEIT is not a valid reason. I would have no problem with the content if it was sourced and attributed. The debate is over whether the content is WP:SYNTH. If there are "similar issues" they should be cited directly. Please address these concerns Count Iblis. Thank you for your participation.--OMCV (talk) 00:11, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Please don't pretend that issues of OR can be settled objectively. They are settled by exercizing judgement and common sense. This idea is definitely "out there", and I found a source of reasonable quality. There are other sources which can be added, probably of equal or comparable quality (Hofstadter's many-worlds article is probably a good place to start, along with random philosophy of mind articles). The question of inclusion is therefore "is this expressed clearly?" "Is it out there?" (meaning, is it not OR), and "is the source provided adequate for a reader who wants to know more?".Likebox (talk) 18:09, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Please cite which Hofstadter article you would like me to look at and name any one of the random philosophy of mind articles. Such references is exactly what I'm looking for. I'm more than happy to insure that they are fairly represented. You are right that this isn't OR as soon as you cite the material you allude to. The fact you have declined to cit this material and thus a forced such a tedious debate is a violation of wiki etiquette.--OMCV (talk) 01:40, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

The material is not OR as it stands. The further sources would be to clarify undue weight, to see that the discussion is common in the literature. I did not provide them because no one has suggested that undue weight is violated (it isn't). The random philosophy of mind articles establish that philosophy debates mind/body issues all the time, but frankly, this is so well known that I don't know which source to specifically cite. I suppose Descartes was the first.Likebox (talk) 14:10, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

The Hofstadter article is called "The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" or something like that, and it appears in Metamagical Themas, a collection of articles from Scientific American with commentary. I don't know for sure if he talks about copying consciousness in this article, but if my memory serves me right, he does.Likebox (talk) 14:19, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Third opinion

RobinK (talk · contribs) wants to offer a third opinion. To assist with the process, editors are requested to summarize the dispute in a short sentence below.

Viewpoint by User:Likebox

Since we already have a third opinion (that of Count Iblis), there might no longer be a dispute. The main issue was whether it was OK to include a discussion of copying minds in the section called "classical mind body problem", and whether the source provided for this discussion was good enough. Count Iblis has said yes, while another editor (who has left) said no before.

If you wish to offer an opinion, there is additional discussion on OMCV's talk page.Likebox (talk) 20:58, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

Since OMCV is asking for an opinion, I will quickly state the other side. The issue of mind/body problem in quantum mechanics is philosophically slightly subtle, and some of the discussion is related to pure philosophy discussions that have nothing to do with quantum mechanics. In the article, I started out with these discussions, because I think they help the reader understand the quantum issues.

In order to avoid any OR or SYNTH, I put all the classical philosphy in one section, and called it "Mind Body Problem in Newtonian Mechanics". The reason is because this stuff does not have anything directly to do with quantum mechanics by itself, it's just mind/body philosophy. This title was challenged, so I changed it to "Classical Mind/Body Problem", and now to "Deterministic Mind/Body Problem". I can't think of a great title. It just means "No QM". But you shouldn't say "Mind Body problem before QM", because these issues were only thought of after analogous problems were raised within QM in the 1950s.

The source I chose for this material (because I think it is well known) is Dennett's essay in The Mind's I, which explores what happens when an observer brain-in-a-vat named "Yorick" is copied into a computer named "Hubert". The two copies diverge at some point, and there is confusion about which way the conscious experience for the single unsplit observer will go after the split.

This is exactly like the observer mind splitting in the many-worlds (or many-minds) interpretation of quantum mechanics, and I am sure that having the non-quantum example clarifies the issue for many readers. The mind-splitting is the form that the measurement problem takes in the many-worlds interpretation. Including the notion of "mind" in the formulation of physical law is considered mystical by some.

I tried very hard to avoid SYNTH and OR, but OMCV insists that the results are not satisfactory. Another editor gave an opinion that the "copying atoms positions and velocities" is synth, because Hubert/Yorick copied a brain-in-a-vat into a computer, which is not exactly the same. I changed the article accordingly, but this editor dropped out of the conversation, so I don't know if the change was satisfactory. It was not satisfactory for OMCV.

Count Iblis supports including the Dennett material, as do I, and OMCV still opposes. Perhaps he can be convinced with further discussion, or perhaps a second source can be found. This stuff is not obscure.Likebox (talk) 20:42, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Viewpoint by (User:OMCV)

First I'll quote my earlier text:

You can't paraphrase something as original as Dennett's work (where am i)to the point that you can't attribute it to Dennett or some one else.

1. Dennett never supposed that consciousness would "stream" to only one of the copies he describes in his scenario, he never even suggested it. The concept consciousness "stream" and the two split alternatives are currently full inventions.
2. In fact Dennett points out that each copy is fully conscious and indistinguishable untill they split for undisclosed reasons.
3. In the current form Dennett's scenario is contradicted by saying the experiment is "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains". What Dennett actually described was two copies of physical minds tied to the same body through some form of radio transmission.
4. Furthermore its a major omission to ignore that the minds presented by Dennett are made up of vastly different material one an uploaded mind and the other a Brain in a vat far more than one "bit" of difference by any reasonable interpretation an diffidently not "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains".
5. Dennett never said the two copies differed by only one bit, that claim is based on an unusual interpretation of the "switch". (according to more recent conversations like box isn't referring to the switch but that doesn't make it clear what the one bite of information is or how it can be cited.)
6. The part on "atoms which make up the brain get replaced" is not sourced (nor explained/described in a reasonable way).
7. At no point does Dennett claim to be addressing the mind/body problem from the perspective of Newtonian or classical mechanics nor does he claim to exclude quantum mechanics. Rather he addressing classic philosophical questions like demonic deceiver and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde scenarios in a modern yet still unrealistic context.
8. Philosophical zombies are not discussed in any cited source.

More explicitly with points 3 and 4. The statement "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is not related to the idea producing two copies of a consciousness in two different forms, one a brain in a vat and the other an uploaded mind. This idea of "copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities into two separate brains" is central to the entire hypothetical and is not supported by any reference.

To quote the first third-opinion from Anaxial:

"The statement in the article is "by copying all the atoms relative positions and velocities". This is, it seems, not part of the argument made in Dennett's book, since clearly the atoms in a brain and in an uploaded system are not going to be the same. Therefore, this does, in my view, constitute synthesis, and does not belong on WP - unless, of course, there is some other book that does make this exact argument, in which case we need to cite that. Anaxial (talk) 20:13, 25 August 2009 (UTC)"

Likeboxe's response to Anaxial opinion was to mildly modify his text that in no way alleviates the WP:SYNTH. The text still does not reflect Dennett's text or any other known source.

To quote myself again:

You have supposed that the the copying (in Dennett's story) was flawless while I would contend that the story was presented in just such a way to encourage the reader to doubt the expectations of the "scientists". For example the contrived radiation wasn't supposed to damage the first body but none the less it did. The scientists are very self congratulatory and secretive. If they got the radiation wrong and display other personality flaws why are we to suppose Hubert/Yorick (uploaded mind and Brain in a vat)are a perfect pair that ultimately deviated. In addition they deviated with only a three paragraphs of first person account before the story closes that amounts to " Oh my, something went wrong". We as readers don't know why Hubert/Yorick deviated, it could be a quantum difference(s) between the copies, an aspect of their physical minds position in reality that was super-sensory, or the possibility that the copy process wasn't perfect, or perhaps the computer couldn't perfectly model a brain indefinitely. These all staying within the bounds of the text that doesn't limit itself to a specific "hypothetical" physics system. Impressing limits on the story is invention that is usually called Synth on Misplaced Pages.

More recently Count Iblis has offered a third-opinion. To quote a portion of that opinion "Clearly there are similar issues in determinstic theories too and it is helpful to readers to mention these." The issue is not whether it would be nice to include the content, WP:ILIKEIT is not a valid reason to include contended text. I would have no problem with the content if it was sourced and attributed. The debate is over whether the content is WP:SYNTH. I'm aware that Count Iblis is a well established editor but its unclear how much experience he has with WP:Fringe and specific policies related to the issue at hand.

Sorry for the long post but this has been an extended debate and its difficult to be concise. Thank so much for your help.--OMCV (talk) 00:39, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Third opinion by RobinK

It seems I can't offer a good third opinion. We need a more experienced Wikipedian for this. Now that both the viewpoints are summarized well, it should be easier for the next person to come in and offer a third opinion.

Thank you for your consideration. Even if you don't feel comfortable offering a third opinion (something that isn't formally binding) you can still become a direct participant in the conversation. In many ways this would be even more valuable. Regardless thanks again for taking a moment to look over the conflict.--OMCV (talk) 13:05, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

Another third opinion by (...)

...

Still WP:SYNTH

1. "But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, philosophers have raised doubts." Cite them and fiction doesn't count.
2. "If the copy is not a philosophical zombie," This unimpressive idea needs to be cited.
3. "subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone" A statement of such specificity needs to be cited. Why one bit, why not a collection of many bits related to the copies relative position? What is the point of "owning" this text.
4. "The two observers start out exactly the same, but diverge afterwards" this is not represented by the Dennett text find a source for it or leave it out.

You have yet to supply a compelling argument for this text. Superficial changes won't make a difference. Please go back to the library and do some research to see if you can legitimately make the points you want to make.--OMCV (talk) 01:33, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

The reason I am arguing hard is because your interpretation of policies like "SYNTH" is wrong and dangerous to the project. SYNTH is designed to exclude original thought, meaning somebody's personal theories. It is not designed to exclude clear explanations of ideas that already exist and are talked about.

Because of this fundamental misinterpretation of policy, the arguments you give are unpersuasive:

1. I will NOT cite this, because everybody knows this. Most of philosophy is devoted to debating the nature of consciousness and its relation to material world.
2. This unimpressive idea does NOT need to be cited. It's the definition of "philosophical zombie". While I agree with you that the concept is fundamentally incoherent, it is an important concept in this field, and it is the only way I could think of to link to a proper philosophy of mind article.
3. A statement of such specificity needs to be understood in context, evaluated for accuracy, and sourced to a philosopher who made the same argument. That is what I did. I explained it to you, and you understand it now. It is properly sourced to Dennett.
4. The two observers are indistinguishable at first, as stated by Dennett.

We have a third opinion that the material should be included.Likebox (talk) 13:43, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

1. The dualistic questions you describe after this isn't a doubt "for" Newtonian observers but a doubt "in" a the monistic Newtonian observers. This is a wrong statement that needs to be modified, removed, or attributed.
2. How can you say "...it is the only way I could think of to link to a proper philosophy of mind article." and not realize that you are not conducting WP:SYNTH. Second after reading some of what Dennett has written about philosophical zombie's there is no way he would use them as a strawman is such a silly thought experiment.
3. Please cite the difference where you explained or I understand this statement. Just making statements is not part of a proper conversation.
4. The observers are indistinguishable from the observer's perspective that doesn't mean they are the "same". They are very different from a third perspective.

Please reconsider your position. This is not the place for you own musings.--OMCV (talk) 13:01, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

To reply:

1. I can't figure out how what you are saying is different from what I said.
2. The statement that you are objecting to is vacuous, it doesn't say anything. It says "If the consciousness doesn't go both ways, one of the copies is left a philosophical zombie". This is only repeating the definition of philosophical zombie, and I only included this empty statement in order to link to a proper philosophy of mind article. This statement does not convey any information. It cannot be synth, because it does not synthesize anything.
3. The extra bit of information is the position of the switch in Dennett's story. I explained it already.
4. I am only talking about the observer's perspective. Remember also that the consciousness is copied. There is only one observer before Hubert is turned on. So "which way did you go" is a very important question from the observer's point of view.

It is my opinion that you have understood everything, and you understand the attribution to Dennett, and still you persist in maintaining that itis SYNTH. These musings are not original to me. If they were original, I could publish them without a reviewer saying "But Dennett said this 20 years ago". Your interpretation of SYNTH policy is all too common, and deleterious to the entire project. It must be resisted, and you should change your mind.Likebox (talk) 15:55, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

1. The subject of the doubts can be can be the deterministic materialistic perspective (hypothetical Newtonian observers) or the doubts can be a component of that perspective. As it stand it sounds as if the doubts are a component of the deterministic materialistic perspective and than you proceed to discuss a dualist perspective.
2. How can you say that one of two possible out comes you present for your thought experiment says nothing? You claim in the text there are only two possible out comes and one is meaningless?
3. I asked for the difference here, I expect you aren't referencing it because it does not exist. Then again this isn't the first instant Likebox has evaded a straight forward request for a reference.
4. The reference does not limit itself to the observers perspective. In contrast your thought experiment does, this is one of its original aspects. This originality also includes "which way did you go". This statement implicitly includes continuity of consciousness that is not implicit in the concept of hypothetical Newtonian observer. A Newtonian observer can be fabricated in an instant with no history or even a fabricated history. Continuity of consciousness used here is Likebox's invention not discussed in any referenced sources. I understand that this is an idea that is common to popular culture but not all pop culture ideas are consistent with the philosophical ideas you are playing with in this synth.

I'm sorry to say that you have demonstrated that you have no idea what Dennett did and didn't say. Please drop this ownership or request some form of arbitration. I have done my best to attract administrators to offer their opinion.--OMCV (talk) 20:46, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) We are getting somewhere now: I understand most of your points.

1. I understand the confusion. I didn't mean to imply that philosophers raised doubts about whether the deterministic materialistic perspective can predict the future behavior of the observer as a material system (although they have raised doubts about that too sometimes). What I meant to say is that within the deterministic materialistic perspective, they doubt whether the entire internal experience of consciousness is represented faithfully. This is just a mild version of dualism, which is indeed a respected philosophical position. But if you want to clarify the statement, we can do so. Perhaps it should read "philosophers have doubted whether the internal experience of the mind is accurately included in the material description of the observer".
2. What I was saying was that "either the consciousness goes both ways, or one way is a philosophical zombie". That's the philosophical definition of zombie, and there is no content to this statement. It does not say which of the two outcomes occur, it just says "either you have two conscious observers, or you have one conscious observer and one zombie". I don't understand why this statement is not immediately identified as vacuous. It only serves the purpose of linking to the article on zombies.
3. I see what you are after. The reason it's "one bit" is because I was only interested in the answer to one yes/no question, the one posed by Dennett: "Which am I? Hubert or Yorick?". This is the interesting question from the internal perspective.
4. I did exercise editorial judgement in only focusing on the internal perspective, because that's the interesting part of the essay for this article. I didn't use all the ideas in the text, because most of them are irrelevant. That's normal. It's not synth, it's just choosing what to include.

But if you have ideas on how to present things differently, please say.Likebox (talk) 21:34, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

On a side note: I am not OWNing this text, I am trying to prevent it from getting watered down or deleted. The sections presented here allow a reader to easily learn what exactly it is that is considered mystical about quantum mechanics. This is something that improves the encyclopedia, and it required work to write and get accepted. You are intent on deleting it, without any consideration to its value.

If you were adding material, or rephrasing material keeping the meaning, I would be OK with it. But your modifications have been deletion-leaning.Likebox (talk) 00:36, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

1. Your new language is better. But it is extremely bad form to be vague when attributing an idea common to a group. If its a common belief it should be extremely easy to cite. If we agree on this one we can move on the the changing of atoms in the brain idea which is full of problems.
2. Yes I agree this section is a strawman and all strawmen have owner and you are the owner of this one. I feel that if we keep it we are going to have to cite USER:Likebox.
3. From the page: "So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms." vs. from the talk page "The reason it's "one bit" is because I was only interested in the answer to one yes/no question, the one posed by Dennett: "Which am I? Hubert or Yorick?". This is the interesting question from the internal perspective." Stating that this bit off information exists is poorly extrapolated from the Dennett text and there is really no other way to describe this extrapolation than invention. There is no way to know the if this bit, or just as likely bits, of information lies in the "positions and velocities of the atoms" or not that is never described in Dennett's mad cap first person conclusion. This is your own invention, your synth. I easily conclude that the difference is in the "positions and velocities of the atoms" of the brain in the vat versus the one on the computer. There is nothing in the story to contradict this idea. This makes your statement in the text false.
4. "I did exercise editorial judgement..." At times such action don't represent synth and at times they do. In this situation it a blatant example of synth. It was remarkable your effort to hang onto saying the two copies were atom for atom. Now you fight for every other detail. (owning.)

The text I have offered covers the same ideas (with the exception of providing synth) is more clearly stated and better cited. Again its amazing that Wigner could his predecessors ideas fairly while you do not.--OMCV (talk) 02:41, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

You can keep saying synth, and I keep saying "not synth". We have to follow the 3rd opinion of Count Iblis. The statement that you say is synth is the statement that the bit that tells you which you are is not physical.

I want you to imagine the following. You are Yorick, and there is no Hubert. Tomorrow Hubert will be built, and switched on. Then Hubert will be made to feel that a hammer has hit it on the head, and that's going to be very painful for Hubert. Are you nervous?

Ok, now it's 1:00PM the next day. Hubert has been running for a while, and you fiddle with the switch. Nothing happens. Are you nervous now?

Ok, it's 3:59PM, the hammer blow is about to come at 4:00. Are you nervous now? Since both Hubert and Yorick have exactly the same feelings, but different futures, how can you tell which one you are?

Your friend breathlessly rushed to your house at 3:30 to give you some shocking news: he has a readout of all the positions of all the atoms in Yorick's brain, and a complete source code listing and all the data running in Hubert! He can rummage through the data and answer any question about the atoms that you have. Can your friend tell you find out whether you should be nervous?

How many bits of information are you lacking about your circumstances?

This point, which I have had to belabor, is the only content of the paragraph you want to delete. It is not synth, because essentially the same story was told by Dennett. You should learn to be less literal minded when evaluating ideas.Likebox (talk) 04:58, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) About 1, we agree. About point 2: it is not a strawman, because some dualist philosopher will say that Hubert won't work, because it doesn't have a soul. About point 4, I still maintain that the atom-by-atom copy is not different enough to constitute synth, since it is essentially the same idea. I only dropped it to satisfy the first 3rd opinion. Now please respect the second 3rd opinion and stop attacking this section.Likebox (talk) 05:04, 13 September 2009 (UTC)

1. We agree about the proposed replacement text for 1 since its very similar to the text I have replaced the entire section with.
2. Is 2 meaningless or a very important to argument you have made to dualists? Because a proper Newtonian system feels no need to acknowledge or explain itself to dualists.
3. You still have not addressed where the one bit idea comes from. Understandable since its clearly synth.
4. You might not understand the physical world well enough to understand that a uploaded mind and brain in a vat differ atom-by-atom. Its clear there is little I can do to fix that failing.

Its not worth anyone's time to respond to the scenario you just posted. But I will take the time to point out one fact Likebox says "Your friend breathlessly rushed to your house at 3:30 to give you some shocking news: he has a readout of all the positions of all the atoms in Yorick's brain, and a complete source code listing and all the data running in Hubert! He can rummage through the data and answer any question about the atoms that you have. Can your friend tell you find out whether you should be nervous?" Well here is the rub because that the this information isn't in Dennett's work in fact. Let me quote one of my earlier responses to this type of argument:

"You have supposed that the the copying was flawless while I would contend that the story was presented in just such a way to encourage the reader to doubt the expectations of the "scientists". For example the contrived radiation wasn't supposed to damage the first body but none the less it did. The scientists are very self congratulatory and secretive. If they got the radiation wrong and display other personality flaws why are we to suppose Hubert/Yorick are a perfect pair that ultimately deviated. In addition they deviated with only a three paragraphs of first person account before the story closes that amounts to " Oh my, something went wrong". We as readers don't know why Hubert/Yorick deviated, it could be a quantum difference(s) between the copies, an aspect of their physical minds position in reality that was super-sensory, or the possibility that the copy process wasn't perfect, or perhaps the computer couldn't perfectly model a brain indefinitely. These all staying within the bounds of the text that doesn't limit itself to a specific "hypothetical" physics system. Impressing limits on the story is invention that is usually called Synth on Misplaced Pages."

You would like to force the system to differ by one-bit but that just doesn't reflect the content of the source.

But we don't have to speculate about everything Dennett thought about his work since he wrote a a "relections" for this piece:

"The story you have just read not only isn't true (in case you wondered) but couldn't be true. The technological feats described are impossible now, and some may remain forever outside our ability, but that is not what matters to us. What matters is whether there is something in principle impossible -- something incoherent -- about the whole tale. When philosophical fantasies become too outlandish -- involving time machines, say, or duplicate universes or infinitely powerful deceiving demons -- we may wisely decline to conclude anything from them. Our conviction that we understand the issues involved may be unreliable, an illusion produced by the vividness of the fantasy.

....

Since several of the most remarkable features of "Where am I?" hinge on the supposition of independent synchronic processing in Yorick and Hubert, it is important to note that this supposition is truly outrageous -- in the same league as the supposition that somewhere there is another planet just like Earth, with an atom-for-atom duplicate of you and all your friends and surroundings,* or the supposition that the universe is only five days old (it only seems to be much older because when God made it five days ago, He made lots of instant "memory"-laden adults, libraries full of apparently ancient books, mountains full of brand-new fossils, and so forth)."

That's more than enough for now it seems that I'll mostly be recycling previous arguments from here on out since Likebox is avoiding a discussion of content with continuity in favor of a rhetoric with convenient inability to understand or remember key piece of information or discussion. I must assume at this point of the argument Likebox is arguing solely to defend their synth or perhaps they are simply trying to "win" at the expense of the encyclopedia.--OMCV (talk) 12:20, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

The statements Dennett are obviously true, but irrelevant. He is considering the copying of observers in principle, not in practice, and it would be completely impossible in practice of course. The observation you are making is so specious, I don't understand why you make it. Dennett most certainly does not think his story is like demons physically existing, or even time machines. He explicitly says that the story is possible in principle, unlike the other two. This is why I cite him, because he is asking the question seriously.

"You would like to force the system to differ by one bit", is inaccurate. The system has one missing subjective bit of information, which tells you the answer to "which one am I? Hubert or Yorick?" That's explicitly stated by Dennett, in terms of the position of a single switch, which is subjectively unpercievable. I said it as "one bit", he says it as "one switch". They are the same. Your idea that using different language for the same concept is somehow original thought devalues original thought.

I believe you understand the issues now, and you persist in deleting Dennett. We have a third opinion, and that should be enough to make you stop.Likebox (talk) 17:08, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

2 3rd Opinions?

I don't think so. People who left weeks ago don't count. This debate should be closed.Likebox (talk) 15:56, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

Request for Comments Regarding SYNTH

Please consider joining the feedback request service. An editor has requested comments from other editors for this discussion. Within 24 hours, this page will be added to the following list: Religion and philosophy When discussion has ended, remove this tag and it will be removed from the list. If this page is on additional lists, they will be noted below.

Please look to Talk:Quantum mysticism#Third opinion. This discussion has been shifted to absurd rhetoric and I can't start a user RFC until there is more than one party involved. Thanks to anyone willing to deal with all the parties involved.--OMCV (talk) 22:40, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

(PS: Removed from "policy" RfC where it seems inappropriate, will add to Misplaced Pages:Fringe theories/Noticeboard#Quantum mysticism instead. --Francis Schonken (talk) 16:01, 16 September 2009 (UTC))

I agree that the discussion has reached a natural endpoint, since we both know the contents of all the sources. An RFC is a reasonable approach. However, I would ask that OMCV respect the 3rd opinion of Count Iblis, and allow the disputed text to remain for now.Likebox (talk) 22:58, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I thank Count Iblis his opinion and wished he had taken a greater part in the conversation. He never responded to my concerns about his opinion so it seems incomplete. Furthermore more there was another 3O that believes the text in question is synth; this opinion had to be explained to Likebox at least twice. Finally there is is a third editor who quickly and easily saw this material as synth.--OMCV (talk) 23:37, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

You are right that this material seems to be synth for many editors, because they are ignorant of the literature. The editors here who have read the relevant literature understand that there is no synth at all. Both Michael Price and Count Iblis are familiar with the quantum mechanics and classical philosophy literature to the point where they can identify this material as standard. Misplaced Pages does not balance the opinion of the knowledgable against the opinions of the ignorant. It just asks people who are ignorant to edit elsewhere.Likebox (talk) 17:35, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

To quote the Micheal Price opinion to which you are referring: "I can't comment on whether Dennett's views are portrayed accurately or not, since I've never read any of his stuff." I can't speak for Price but if a collaborator misrepresented me this badly I would be very angry with them. Strange to suggest that I'm ignorant when I've taken the time to read the Dennett piece as well as a number of others.--OMCV (talk) 22:46, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

I can't comment on whether Dennett's views are portrayed accurately or not, since I've never read any of his stuff. Assuming that they are, can't we just incorporate Dennett's views into a new (sub) section? OMCV's section treats the history by looking at individual contributions; Dennett would seem to merit inclusion alongside the others (e.g. Wigner). Just make Dennett's views another (sub) section. And if the material needs better sourcing, just tag the dubious material. Deleting Dennett's POV due to lack of sourcing does not seem fair -- fact tag it and let the community supply the citations. Same goes for OMCV's material -- deletion does not seem reasonable; it's informative and should be kept.

The more interesting question is whether the zombie argument is correct. I thought it was, but now I'm not so sure. But I'm, too tired to think it through at the moment. --Michael C. Price 01:02, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Removing text was not my original concern. My first edit as well as my others edits around that time were slight modification of the language and tagging for sources. These edits were challenged (reverted) in an unreasonable way and so I demanded sources on the talk page. Finally I was told the section was based exclusively on where am i after reading this text it was clear there was significant invention between the source and the text of the article. Nor was Likebox currently familiar with the relevant sources and . Dennett's text which I recommend checking for your self speaks to philosophical questions like the location of identity "is it in the body or the brain or someplace eles" as well as pondering the fundamental coherency of such questions. Dennett cites the "Rational Homunculi" by Ronald de Sousa (1976) as inspiration. Never does he address the physics framework in which his story is set. This is the over arching view of the problem, examining the details of what Likebox has added is really where the synth emerges, every sentence of the hypothetical question based attributed to Dennett is disputable. I'm more than happy to accept anything that reflects the text but I don't see the point since in this paper Dennett isn't addressing classical or quantum mechanics. I hate to cite policy but the impetus to supply citation is on the editor that supplies the text and earlier I was generous enough to look for myself the material myself (This diff. contains a typos and should read "This is generous of me since the burden of citation is not on the editor who challenges the material but the editor that adds it.") Let me emphasize if any of the contentious text was representative of Dennett's material I would leave it be. Thank you very much for your opinion Michael, I hope you have time to follow up on the concerns I've added here. (I think you'll find if you pull on the zombie thread all this Dennett Synth will unravel.)--OMCV (talk) 02:32, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Listen, OMCV, this is a place for OTHERS to say what they have to say, not for you to repeat yourself. Everyone knows your position. Do not harass others. Michael Price believes that this text should be included, as do I, and as does Count Iblis.Likebox (talk) 17:31, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Neither version of the disputed text is well referenced. I suggest scratching section or moving to pre-edit war version of text and re-doing with an eye to referencing.Simonm223 (talk) 18:22, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Pre-edit war text would essentially be Likebox text pre-synth challenge. Redoing that text with an eye to referencing is what I've been pushing over this entire talk page. I see the text I'm backing as a synth free compromise free that makes Likebox's point. Thus if the choice was between pre-challenge section and scratching the section my preference would be to scratch the section.--OMCV (talk) 22:47, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Talk of Dennett's zombie's exists out there. It should be reported here as well. --Michael C. Price 20:17, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

I completely agree that Dennett has opinions about Philosophical Zombies as it turns out he is heavily referenced in our own article on Philosophical Zombies. But he never mentions Philosophical Zombies in where am i. So where is the pertinent reference? The next question is why would we mention philisophical zombies here? To my knowledge there is no known WP:RS that connects Philosophical Zombies to quantum mysticism/mechanics.--OMCV (talk) 22:46, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

I have already expressed my opinion on what I would like to see discussed in the article. Now, I don't think one can resolve the content dispute by focussing first on how to avoid OR or SYNTH by trying to find some suitable source. I think one has to attempt to discuss this from first principles first, and stop arguing about what some source does or doesn't say.

One question that has to be addressed is if some proposed text for the article would be in conflict with what most experts would support. E.g. if you were to write this up for a peer reviewed article, and I'm the Referee, would it be reasonable for me to write in my Referee Report that I have problems with this reasoning, that I would want to see a citation for this statement?

To see if it is reasonable to consider the text to be OR, consider again this to be part of a peer reviewed article. If it is now assumed to be the main subject of the article, would the Referee be justified to reject the article for publication based on lack of originality?

Example. Some time ago I wrote down the the derivation of the formula

${\displaystyle {\frac {C_{P}}{C_{V}}}={\frac {\beta _{T}}{\beta _{S}}}\,}$

But I don't have a source for this. Very likely a source does exist, but I think it is completely irrelevant. Everything follows straightforwardly from first principles. The argument/derivation itself makes the statement far more verifiable than giving a reference to some textbook that most people cannot easily access anyway. Count Iblis (talk) 20:46, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

And that would be great if Misplaced Pages were a referreed journal. But it's not. It's an open-source encyclopaedia and referencing is necessary; even when something follows logically from first principles.Simonm223 (talk) 20:50, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

When I asked about this loophole on the OR policy page, I was told that you could justifiably invoke WP:IAR to include first principles mathematical derivations that do not exist in suitable form in textbooks. Count Iblis (talk) 21:17, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

WP:IAR is fine until there is a dispute at which point we use rules to resolve the dispute. Count Iblis it would also be worth looking at WP:NOT PAPER. I'll contact you on your talk page to discuss these policies in more detail.--OMCV (talk) 22:56, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

• I have difficulties with these two sentences: So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms. I don't think it is possible to interpret them in any way that Dennett would agree with -- I think he would say that they contain an implicit dualism. Looie496 (talk) 22:18, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

2 quick comments (sorry for butting in): What you are point out is what OMCV disputed too. I am aware of the difficulty, and I think there is legitimacy to the critique, OMCV does have a point here. But I ask you to try to review the arguments here and on OMCV's talk page before coming to a definitive conclusion, because Dennett's position on "dualism" is subtle and I took pains to stay faithful to it.

A second comment is that I agree with Michael price that if something would be rejected as unoriginal by a referee, then it would be appropriate for Misplaced Pages. Otherwise, you would create a middle ground between Original Research (which is publishable in a journal) and Unoriginal Rehashing (which is good for Misplaced Pages). If you create this middle ground, there would be information which has no home either in journals or on Misplaced Pages, and that would be bad.Likebox (talk) 22:33, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

Please keep up with the conversation it was Count Iblis (not "Michael price") who made the comments regarding unoriginal ideas discarded by referees. The main problem with this idea is that we can never deffer to expert opinion on Misplaced Pages since its fundamentally impossible to obtain, we can only deffer to WP:RS. When I am challenged on a subject that I'm an expert on is challenged I must argue it with sources as any other editor even if I have first hand experience.--OMCV (talk) 23:04, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

I can't get anywhere reviewing the earlier arguments, I'm sorry, they are too long for my brain capacity. But I don't think Dennett's position on dualism is subtle. His position is simple: he's against it. He thinks the biggest problem with the philosophy of consciousness is that dualism keeps creeping in, and he thinks that is purely bad. Looie496 (talk) 00:14, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Of course, you are right that you can't defer to experts, but that is not what I am suggesting. The literature on this stuff is well known and online, and anyone can read it and become an expert in short order. The point is that claims of OR or SYNTH need to be evaluated with a background knowledge of what people in the field know. If you take a little time to familiarize yourself with the literature, then some things that look like OR or SYNTH stop looking like OR. I think it isn't too much to ask that people who come to an article familiarize themselves with the literature during their time spent editing.

I agree that Dennett is against any forms of substance dualism, or anything which denies that the mind can be identified in a one-to-one way with the activity of the brain. But the one example he brings up is the case that two separate brains (two different information processing devices) have the exact same activity. This is one of the situations he explores in the essay "Where am I".

In this essay, he has a brain-in-a-vat named Yorick be simulated by a computer named Hubert, so faithfully that they are indistinguishable (at least for a little while). Either Yorick or Hubert can controll Dennett's body, and he does not know which one is controlling the body (most importantly, he does not acknowledge a difference). After the brain Yorick and the computer Hubert diverge, he then notes that you can tell the two apart. The important thing here is that the information about "which one he is" is unavailable to him, even if all the material information is known. This is an example of Dennett identifying mind with activity, not with material substance. For Dennett, mind is software, and software can run on different hardware.Likebox (talk) 01:51, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Discreet Opinions

The following text has been challenged as WP:SYNTH. It would be helpful if editors could offer their opinion in a sentence (or two) starting with SYNTH or NOT SYNTH and then signing the opinion. It would also be appreciated if editors would refrain from commenting on other's opinions within this section.

But even for hypothetical Newtonian observers, many philosophers doubt that the material description is the only thing you need in order to understand internal experience. The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, this type of copying leads to strange outcomes. For example, take a conscious Newtonian observer and duplicate all the information in the brain, making two separate observers. The two observers start out exactly the same, but diverge afterwards, since they will have different experiences from this point on. In this situation, it is not obvious which way the subjective stream of conscious experience for the observer will go. If the copy is not a philosophical zombie, the consciousness had better go both ways. But each copy feels to have gone only one way.

So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms. These types of thought experiments were widely discussed in philosophy in the 1980s, but similar ideas appeared earlier as part of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.

• SYNTH Per my comments on this talk page.--OMCV (talk) 03:33, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
• Misplaced Pages is not a democracy stop holding votes.Likebox (talk) 16:57, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
• Abstain (And only that because I've been canvassed for my opinion as a past contributor to the discussion). There is already an RfC going; I think developing a consensus through that medium would be more useful than holding a vote.Anaxial (talk) 17:11, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
• Irrelevant See WP:ESCA. First we need to establish scientific veracity, then decide on sourcing. --Michael C. Price 18:00, 17 September 2009 (UTC)
• Partly synth The first paragraph accurately describes Dennett's argument. The second one does not, and should not be referenced to him. Looie496 (talk) 00:29, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

scientific discussion

Ok "scientific discussion", lets start with "The atoms which make up the brain get replaced, but the information gets copied into new atoms. In certain contrived thought experiments, this type of copying leads to strange outcomes." In this statement its not clear what is meant by information, is it memories or some more physical description about the information content of the system. If its only memories we should just say memories and cite a source for it since its popular statement thats not strictly true or fully understood. We know that there is a great deal material passing across the blood brain barrier all the time. But we don't know if all the atoms are being changed. After all whether or not its true its conventionally assumed that new neural cells are not produced which means atom of nuclear DNA might rarely be replaced. If I look to verified sources on this subject the first thing I think of is Feynman's speech the "Value of Science". Feynman cites a paper that states "The radioactive phosphorus content of the cerebrum of a the rate decreases to one-half in a period of two weeks." . Still Feynman in his popular presentation some what misrepresenting the study as dealing with the whole brain. Since the study measured phosphorus it was mostly measuring the uses and exchanges ATP, the brains fuel and not the brains structure and in turn memories. Its akin to saying the fuel I have in my car today is not the same as the fuel I had in my car yesterday yet it is still my car. So perhaps very little of this information is being "copied" what is sure is that the nature of memories and the structural system through which they store memories is still poorly understood. About a year ago I saw a talk on the "math" though which neurons work. The question was whether neurons function through discrete quanta of information like a PN junction or spectral build-up of input. As you might expect the speaker suggested something in between that was nuanced and specific that we don't yet understand. Lets just say this "atom exchange" statement is scientifically debatable.

Next we get to "this type of copying" which would suggest we are talking about maintaining memories/consciousness in an individual but instead we break into something inspired by Dennett's story "take a conscious Newtonian observer and duplicate all the information in the brain, making two separate observers" the leap from maintaining a the continuity of a mind to producing copies is a leap. Ignoring the source issues there are number of outcomes/interpretation you could expect for "two observers start out exactly the same" First I would expect the author is referring to two observers who are internally identical but exist in different locations this is the most obvious interpretation and if something else is meant it should be explained in the text. My expectation for such individuals is that they would start to diverge due to their respective relationship to external environment under both Newtonian and quantum models.

The more esoteric interpretation that the clone pair have the same relationship to the outside world I would have discarded according to my understanding of the Pauli exclusion principle. But if we assume clone pair have the same relationship to the outside world my expectations would be that they would not diverge under a classical model and that they would diverge statically under a quantum mechanical model. The content concerning philosophical zombies is addressed to dualist philosophers and I have no scientific interest in the concept or conversations related to such an incoherent and unmeasurable concept. I don't consider consciousness a stream with continuity such an idea is unmeasurable and outside the scope of science (I understand that this is debatable but its my honest opinion and I can support it by quoting philosophy of science). I do believe in a temporal pattern existing in the interactions of atoms with no intrinsic "stream" continuity. If any of this valid it means there are more possibilities than represented by the statement: "So the subjective experience after the split requires an extra bit of information to describe--- the bit which tells the observer which way their consciousness has gone. The value of this bit is subjectively very important for the duplicated--- it predicts the future--- but this bit is not in the positions and velocities of the atoms." This statement is especially wrong if I'm allowed to assume the clone pair does not diverge. I already offered the non-divergent possibility but reiterate here just to emphasize that there is no reason as to why I wouldn't be able to postulate such an outcome. All it take is assuming consciousness lies "in the positions and velocities of the atoms." On top of all this it easily cited that this is the opinion Wigner would have expected for a classical minded person.

If we ignore WP:SYNTH and the misrepresentation of Dennett's beliefs this section is just bad text and the only reason to keep it would be if it was possible to attribute it to a WP:VS. I reverted to arguing through policy due to my difficult in reaching even a very basic level of consensus and discourse with Likebox. For the sake of the discussion I'm going to ask Likebox to allow at least few other other editors to respond to this commentary before altering the flow of the conversation. I will make similar concession to him where appropriate.--OMCV (talk) 21:07, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

I read it, but beware of WP:TLDR. I agree that the wording can be greatly improved, but the idea seems clear and valid: deterministic (e.g. Newtonian) observers will experience subjective randomness when they are duplicated, either by some imaginary star-trek style duplicator, by a split brain experiment or by quantum effects in a MWI scenariao. Can we agree on this, before we move onto clarifying the language and finally sorting out sources? --Michael C. Price 21:25, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

You are right about WP:TLDR my apologies. I agree a imaginary star-trek style duplicator copies would diverge "due to their respective relationship to external environment under both Newtonian and quantum models." But I don't agree all methods of duplication (imaginary star-trek style duplicator, by a split brain experiment, or by quantum effects in a MWI scenariao) are the same, each scenario is nested in different models and assumptions.--OMCV (talk) 21:38, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

They are not the same, but the effect of subjective randomness is common to all scenarios.... agreed? --Michael C. Price 21:43, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

I would agree in all but one situation. Under a strict deterministic classical model identical observers within identical environments would have the same experiences and would not deviate. This sort of position was readily acknowledged if not respected by Wigner in his paper "Remarks on the mind-body question".--OMCV (talk) 00:26, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

True, I was implicitly assuming different environments. --Michael C. Price 07:19, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

Strangely enough this identical environment is one of the possible interpretations of Dennett's text (I think this is the interpretations that Likebox prefers) but in Dennett text the twins eventually diverge for unexplained reasons. It also appears that "Rational Homunculi" by Ronald de Sousa (1976) reference as inspiration in Dennett's reflections on "where am I" might also discuss something like this. It get blurrier for me but I think the MWI can be taken as the same situation minus the classical determinism.--OMCV (talk) 11:39, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

(deindent) Sorry for kibitzing, but I wanted to be fair to all points of view, even those of the dualists. so I tried to stick to presenting the thought experiments without drawing conclusions.

The thought experiment is this:

1. you have one observer
2. The observer gets cloned into copy 1 and copy 2 (either Hubert/Yorick or star-trek style)
3. The copies diverge, either because of internal noise, or because of the environment

From a third person point of view, this is an objective description of the evolution of a physical system, there is absolutely no ambiguity about what is going on--- one observer becomes two. If probed, each copy would say that they were the initial observer before the cloning event. But viewed from the inside, if you are the observer getting cloned, there is a very natural question you can ask: Am I going to end up being copy 1 or am I going to be copy 2? This question cannot even be formulated from the outside, so it has no objective answer, but it is subjectively very important if you are the observer.

This scenario is Dennett's (and to some extent Everett's). Since the question doesn't even make sense when formulated in the third person perspective, the answer to this question does not lie in the position and velocities of any atoms. You might conclude that this question doesn't make any sense. But, in any case, the answer to this question is 1 bit of subjective information which both copy 1 and copy 2 know, and which the original observer does not. In the objective third person view, there is no information gained--- you know that copy 1 will say "I am copy 1" and copy 2 will say "I am copy 2".

To give an example of actual OR and SYNTH, I'll go beyond Dennett's example: suppose that the copying goes on indefinitely, so that the cloning keeps happening again and again. Then it is very difficult to say what it feels like for the observer, from the first person perspective. For example, take a star-trek duplicator, and duplicate the observer, and then duplicate each duplicate, but add a twist: the duplicator keeps the data from the first duplication event in its memory banks, and makes a third copy in the exact same state twenty years later, and starts duplicating that observer too in the same way. And then it does so again forty years later, then sixty years later. What is the subjective experience? From a naive counting perspective, I should predict that I would be nearly certainly teleported in time to some distant future point, because the number of future copies of my present state is vastly greater than the two present copies. On the other hand, the total number of observers descended from the current duplicates will always outnumber the observers descended from the future duplicates. So perhaps the right counting is by the number of descendents at each time slice, rather than by the total number of descendents of my present state. Even worse, how can my subjective experience change depending on whether somebody millions of years in the future turns off the darned duplicator? (Boltzmann's brain is a similar idea).Likebox (talk) 23:20, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Thus apparent paradox used to bother me, until I realised that this probabilistic weighting is unobservable by both the external and the internal observers. Ergo, metaphysical in Ayer's terminology and hence meaningless.

The surprise is that subjective probabilities are analysable in Everett's model. But that's because he's dealing with a specific physical model, not some idealised thought experiment. --Michael C. Price 07:19, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

How about approaching this from a different angle?

It seems odd to me to base the motivation for this on Dennett's arguments, when Dennett has really no sympathy whatsoever for quantum mysticism. The argument that is used by every proponent article I've looked at is basically that classical physics is incapable of solving what Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness -- that explaining what is special about phenomenal experience requires adding some extra "voodoo juice" which can only come from quantum mechanics. Dennett, as our article points out, thinks that the "hard problem" is a pseudoproblem, an artifact of covert dualism. Looie496 (talk) 00:41, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

I completely agree and if you know a citation for one of these articles about "voodoo juice" I think it would be the perfect sort of content to replace Dennett.--OMCV (talk) 02:54, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

I would like to note that the entire lengthy "history" section, short of the brief "mystical interpretations" section at the end, is completely offtopic to this article and only rehashes material covered elsewhere that may simply be referenced by a wikilink (see mind-body problem, decoherence, etc.). Yes, people have no chance of understanding this without reading up these topics first, but no, this doesn't mean you need to dump this background knowledge in the article. You can only point people to the material, you cannot make them absorb it, and people aren't going to read it just because you dump the text in front of them. --dab (𒁳) 18:34, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

I believe that you are confusing quantum consciousness with quantum mysticism. Quantum consciousness is the claim made by Penrose and others that quantum mechanics has something to do with the working of the brain, and some quantum effect is responsible for consciousness. This has absolutely nothing to do with quantum mysticism, which is based on the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, and does not involve any new undiscovered physics or biology.

The Dennett part does not claim that Dennett supports quantum mysticism, it doesn't talk about quantum mysticism at all. It only talks about the mind/body problem, which is the issue that is being addressed in quantum mysticism. I exercised editorial judgement that mind/body issues are important to discuss here, because that is the central issue with quantum mysticism. I began to edit when the article on the mind/body article by Wigner was merged into this article.Likebox (talk) 19:40, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

To be blunter, in case I wasn't understood: "Voodoo juice" is quantum consciousness, not quantum mysticism. Quantum mysticism is just the name people give to the resolution of the measurement problem in QM by identifying it with the mind/body problem.Likebox (talk) 19:42, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

I am responding from the science hub, where I found this troubled article at the call of wikipedian, OMCV. This is my attempt to answer that call. I'll approach this from a very different angle: I think the entire article needs to be condensed, written in an encyclopedic prose, and either (a) merged inside a larger article on the subject of metaphysics or (b) re-written in the form of a factual argument on a scientific and philosophical subject. Right away this article is in serious need of help, notwithstanding its subject matter. The introduction is way too involved and, in its attempt at neutrality, we end up creating a dialog of opinions and despite the sources, that is not very informative to the subject itself. Coming fresh to this page, and being a proponent of physics and mathematics, I find the introduction to severely fragment the article's thesis, to the point of vertigo. The body of the article follows only the weakness of this article's thesis, which, despite being concretley stated at the beginning first sentence of the article, lacks substance for factual introspection. This article ends up looking like a place for an argument on a metaphysical concept. If it is indeed that, and argument articles do exist, as they are a cornerstone of scientific debate and reason, this article should concretely state that, and be formatted as such. This would alleviate your problem of conflicting views and competing ideologies immediately whilst giving everyone a space to breathe and voice their respective sides, of course, highly cited and properly written under our watchful eyes. I hope to be of service here. Let me know what you all think about this change. I formally recommend the option B. Cheers. --☯Lightbound☯ 16:01, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

I don't like your proposed changes, and I think the current prose is "encyclopedic" enough.

Why? Because this is not an article on philosophy. It is an article on "quantum mysticism", the idea that quantum mechanics involves substantial modifications to the observer/system (or mind/body) relationship. Philosophers (with the exception of Dennett who contributed a tiny amount) have contributed absolutely nothing to this discussion, which was conducted by physicists alone, so they don't get to keep this material. So option a, merging into a philosophy article, is, in my opinion unacceptable.

Option "b" is no good either, because the article is not an argument. The article is a condensed summary of arguments that others have made, with citations, written in plain language. Without plain language, the writing of plain-spoken physicists is made to look like the pompous jargon of many philosophers.

So I propose option "c", leave the article as it is!Likebox (talk) 16:35, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

I tend to agree with Lightbound on this one. I was also brought to this article (from either the NPOV or the Fringe noticeboard, I don't recall which) because of a content dispute and found basically the same problem you mentioned. Simonm223 (talk) 15:26, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

I am afraid that you are wrong by about twenty policies that this article does not need changes. And, unfortunately for you (but fortunately for people seeking truth), editors have the ability to change this article regardless of your opinion, which is closed to debate, as it seems. If the article, in your own words, is a "condensed summary of arguments" then you have just agreed with me and contradicted yourself. How can it be "not an argument" and both a "condensed summary of arguments"? I am dissapointed, but not surprised. Typically when an article looks this terrible, from a writing standpoint, it is being guarded by people that have made it that way and/or prevented it from evolving. You do not own the article. It is not "your" or "my" idea or concept. It is freely open to be changed and I came here to open an intelligent and rational discourse on how we aught to go about making this article look better.

• No one requires your permission to change this article.
• You do not have to agree with policy, but only accept it, or work to change it.
• The article can (and will) be modified and still convey its information without any loss or sacrifice to its content; it's called English composition and Misplaced Pages standards.
• You did not propose any changes. In fact, you requested it remain the same. Now since we already know it needs to be edited for voice, tone, and structure, you have already closed yourself out of any rational debate on how we should go about that. And, if I find that you begin reverting good faith edits, we will have unnecessary drama and time wasting to contend with. Let us put all that aside and not waste each other's time.
• Rest assured, your resistance to change on this article, and your unilateral view towards change and disregard for quality aritcles has ensured I will be a lasting presence to make sure as many Wiki policies for this article are adhered to.

Cheers. :) --☯Lightbound☯ 13:06, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

Your "voice" and "tone" changes need to be debated, because your prose sounds illiterate to my ears. It is full of words that have no meaning, and wrong links to philosophical topics which did not involve themselves in this conversation.

If you are claiming that this article runs afoul of "twenty policies", you better name them. The intro was written by many people, and their work should be respected.

The article is not an argument, meaning it does not represent one point of view. It is a condensed summary of arguments, for different points of view with their weight distributed as required by undue weight. Your changes so far did not impact any content (thank god), but they did impact the intro, which was fine as it was.Likebox (talk) 23:13, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

Copy-edits and Wikification Has Begun

I have begun the initial task of copy-edits and wikification. I only got as far as the introduction. It is much better than it was and objectively defines what this elusive topic is. I am exhausted though, and will need to return later on. All the tags should remain, as this article has a lot of dust and quirks to iron out. The background section will be next and is written in a pedagogical tone that is too active-voice and needs more of a Wiki voice. That will be a tough section to fix, but fix it, we must. I also had to spend a lot of time figuring out what these people had written here. I take no stance on the subject itself, and I know both sides of the house: science and metaphysical, but I had to figure out what this article meant by quantum mysticism. Coming fresh to the article, it looks like a rats nest of conflicting points and frankly, I am trying to save it from being merged into the interpretation of quantum mechanics, by broadening it into a collection of the present day practices, ideologies, and distinct metaphysical philosophies that differ from the general humanities itself, which it does; because many of the thinkers and players in that field are metaphysical practitioners, sometimes known as "gurus." Any help with copy-editing and filtering for essay-voice and tone would be greatly appreciated. --☯Lightbound☯ 15:07, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

The text you replaced the intro with is illiterate, and inappropriately places this subject within the field of philosophy. This is derived from physics.

If you want to edit the article, please discuss your changes first.Likebox (talk) 23:09, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

1. Dennett, Daniel C. (2001-01). The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul. Basic Books. ISBN 0465030912. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

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