Talk:Artificial consciousness: Difference between revisions

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	And I have a suspicion that this was also done against me before. Reading the archives I didn't find some posts what I remeber I wrote. But I have not all time in the world to search through history to confirm it. Is this an accepted behaviour by people who supposed to talk about science? ] 17:19, 3 May 2004 (UTC)		And I have a suspicion that this was also done against me before. Reading the archives I didn't find some posts what I remeber I wrote. But I have not all time in the world to search through history to confirm it. Is this an accepted behaviour by people who supposed to talk about science? ] 17:19, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

			The example you give in the 1st para is not evidence of what you allege. You follow this up with another allegation of which you present no evidence. You are a dishonest troll, tkorrovi. Please go away. ] 17:23, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Revision as of 17:23, 3 May 2004

Comment

The link to the Enticy Institute on the article page is a link to a patent nonsense site. Matt Stan 14:09, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Yep, don't appreciate it either. Is it really institute? Tkorrovi 16:22, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Archived Discussion

Real vs Genuine

This is where we are:

"Real AC" says that some AC can be real C.
"Not-real AC" says that AC can never be real C.

Some hold the first view, others the second. What view do you hold? Paul Beardsell 17:40, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I don't agree with your classification. "Not real" also means not existing, so by your classification there is nothing else to choose from than your view. Tkorrovi 17:49, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I think you are failing to see the distinction between "to be (something)" and "to exist". Some languages do not have separate verbs for this. Spanish does it even better than English. I hesitate to ask Matthew's question again! "Not to be something" does not call one's existence into question. Interestingly and perhaps this is apt I remember one of Plato's problems being explained away by my Philosophy I lecturer as being this preceisely. The lecturer said that if only Plato (or Socrates or whoever) had spoken English and not Greek he would have not had all the angst about existence! Paul Beardsell 18:10, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I wish you would look at the examples above. The point is that the "Not-real" does not refer to the AC but to the C that the AC is simulating. Paul Beardsell 18:18, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

It was your idea to introduce all these terms, but then you saw that they are not good enough and started to change them. I didn't want to name them at all, just list what different views there are. But if you insist that they must be named, then we supposed to change names again. My proposal is to use the word "genuine" instead of the word "real". Genuine means "really coming from its stated source" and "not sham", where "sham" also means "simulate" (Concise Oxford Dictionary). It is not exactly the most desirable, but it is better than "real", because "not genuine" does not mean "not existing", but it can be interpreted as "simulated" or "not equivalent to its source". So we may call the views even "not genuine AC", "objective less genuine AC" and "genuine AC". Tkorrovi 18:28, 5 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The whole Misplaced Pages idea is continual improvement. I am glad you are coming around to that view. Paul Beardsell 04:06, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I like that. I'll swap it all to "genuine" and "not genuine". Later today. Paul Beardsell 03:39, 6 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Real and genuine are distinct. (says Matt Stan)

Someone has to keep the non-native English language speakers happy. Paul Beardsell 10:06, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

"A new class of visuomotor neurons has been recently discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed." (Rizolatti et al) Maybe this also suggests that awareness is an awareness of the processes, not static objects or states. Or maybe this discovery is important for other reasons. Just put it here because there was recently a lot of discussion in the Internet about mirror neurons. Tkorrovi 22:24, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Awareness of processes

I digged it a bit more and found that some experiments indeed show that a process, not an object activates neurons. From a New Scientist article http://www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs182/readings/ns/article.html "So they presented monkeys with things like raisins, slices of apple, paper clips, cubes and spheres. It wasn't long before they noticed something odd. As the monkey watched the experimenter's hand pick up the object and bring it close, a group of the F5 neurons leaped into action. But when the monkey looked at the same object lying on the tray, nothing happened. When it picked up the object, the same neurons fired again. Clearly their job wasn't just to recognise a particular object." For such reaction there must be created a model of the process. Unless we suggest that human has models of all possible processes from birth, awareness of the processes likely includes creating a model of a process without having a prior knowledge of it, only based on the information received through the senses (ie only from the pulses coming from the receptors). To be able to create a model such way distinguish consciousness from other systems, and would be the biggest challenge for artificial consciousness. No conventional software can do that, as it needs too much flexibility. This is also why such proposed mechanisms as absolutely dynamic systems might be necessary. Tkorrovi 23:33, 17 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Should that go back to the pump?

Surely the point about deleting comments is that you can't. They always stay in the history of the file and anyone can find out what anyone else ever said. It's just a bit boring to have to go through old comparison files to find out. Therefore there is no point in deleting stuff from talk pages. If someone makes an insult there it's there forever, for everyone to see that such an insult was made. It can't be unsaid, which is why it's called a talk page. Matt Stan 00:39, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

If it's offensive, it can be removed to prevent people from being offended; those who are easily offended would, I believe, not hunt through talk pages to find deleted materials. Also, if there is a really good reason to, a developer can erase the discussion from the page's history, but that's happened very rarely. ugen64 01:36, Apr 21, 2004 (UTC)

That all trace of the comment cannot be removed is true but I do not think that is the point. The point is not what can be done but what should be done. It's a question of behaviour, not ability. Wikiquette seems to be that (within reason) you can say what you want on the Talk pages. And others should not delete those comments needlessly. Nor should they edit them. Paul Beardsell 09:48, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

But I am sorry Tkorrovi has not been welcomed. I was given a nice welcome when I joined and had a helpful daemon (a la Northern Lights) who tagged me for a bit. The obvious way for Tkorrovi to stop being persecuted would be to stop contributing to Misplaced Pages. So, though it's obviously rather late in the day to give a welcome, I would say that we'd be poorer without his contributions here. Paul is a remorseless tease who, I think must be taking a leaf out of Michael Moore's book. If you've seen Bowling for Columbine you'll remember how a group of Canadian teenagers was asked why Canadians had miniscule levels of gun abuse compared with Americans. One of them explained that when confronted with situations that would likely make Americans shoot each other Canadians would tend to tease each other. Matt Stan 01:02, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Thank you. Tkorrovi 19:15, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Where to discuss? What to write?

I especially wait you on AC forum as this is a silent place to discuss (AC) things. Did you also have problems with registering? Some said that they had, there's something wrong with that in proboards, but you can post without logging in. Tkorrovi 20:57, 22 Apr 2004 (UTC)

But we are allowed to discuss AC here. I prefer to post here, and wikipedia has my email address. One can post links to there from here when anything interesting turns up. Matt Stan 15:48, 24 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I agree so long as the idle speculation here does not find its way into the article unless it follows uncontroversially from the work of acknowledged experts. Paul Beardsell 11:01, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Thank you for deleting this link to this children's book, I looked at it before, and there was nothing bout children's stories about animals. But concerning the robots there's more problems, it's by far not sure that all these are AC. The only good example I think is Vanamonde, at least it's clearly shown that it is learning, is not smart but has great potential. In fact this was my reason once to start to think about AC, that it could instantly go from one place to another, it seemed to me that in these instant connections is something essential for consciousness, and I started to think about it. (Guess that Arthur C. Clarke could know something about EPR experiments when he wrote the book, otherwise he must been genius.) But concerning other robots it's not clear whether they even can learn, or that they are anything more than a simple chatbot. BTW, there is too much AI stuff, like Turing test, in AC article, to reduce redundancy, there should be no AI stuff, except perhaps links to AI article. Tkorrovi 19:50, 24 Apr 2004 (UTC)

"The richness or completeness of consciousness, degrees of consciousness, and many other related topics are under discussion, and will be so for some time (possibly forever). That one entity's consciousness is less "advanced" than another's does not prevent each from considering its own consciousness rich and complete. A work of popular children's fiction bears this out: The Discontented Pony."

How would this help to create AC? This sounds a bit like Dennett -- let just talk about whatever what is self-evident, that way we can be sure that we are not wrong, and don't care that there is not much use of it. Sure it explains consciousness, maybe could be added to consciousness article. Tkorrovi 03:26, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The Discontented Pony/Thermostat

The discontented pony argument is intended to show the "capabilities of the average human" argument is not useful. I think it does so rather well. Also: In deciding if AC can be real/genuine it is useful to consider if any animals other than humans are conscious. If we allow the dolphin, the pony, the rat or (and this is a Hofstadter/Dennett example) the termite nest consciousness then it becomes easier to allow an artifact real/genuine consciousness. Paul Beardsell 09:26, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Except that the link I deleted was to The Discontented Thermostat, not The Discontented Pony, and I couldn't find any Ladybird or other books with the former title. I think the story about a discontented thermostat is a very good idea however. "The thermostat had been made is a warm country where the hot dry winds swept over the svelt, but it was exported to Sweden where it had to endure cruel cold winters, until one day ... (more to follow). Matt Stan 00:15, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

...until one day it decided to stay OFF all night, and the family in the house where the thermostat lived all froze to death. Now the thermostat was a murderer and there were forensic experts creeping all over the place. So the discontented thermostat put in one last effort. As the emergency indicator on the main boiler reached danger level the thermostat kept the power on with an extra boost so that when ignition point was reached and meltdown occurred in the electrics there was a surge of power that made the methane generator below the house explode. All the experts were killed and the discontented thermostat was destroyed for ever. Matt Stan 00:15, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The deliberate mistitling of the book was (possibly inaccurately) calculated to amuse. The thermostat book would, by analogy with the pony story, have the thermostat initially unhappy with its supposed limited consciousness leaving to experience a wider world but returning to home and happiness. I was attempting to demonstrate that a limited consciousness might still experience a full and complete existence by its own measure. Pony or thermostat: No difference. Paul Beardsell 01:49, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

From the link I deleted: 'The Discontented Pony' This is a short stroy about "a pony called Merrylegs who leaves his home to seek the excitement of a life as a round-a-bout horse at a fair." Merrylegs finds a circus but is pressed into service as a cart horse by a man "dressed only in shirt and trousers and his hair stood on end". The poor pony has a bad trip one evening and haluciantes about becoming a horse on a roundabout. When he surfaces, home seems much more appealing, so he escapes back to Daisy and Squeaker at the farm. Matt Stan 08:34, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

What should be in the AC article?

If by "this sounds a bit like Dennett" you are suggesting either copyright infringement or plagiarism then just quote the name of the book and the page number. If, on the other hand, you are saying it is a restatement of something Dennett said then I am unaware of it (and in any event I am not responsible for all the text you quote) but that is not the point: If it sounds like Dennett then that is good. Misplaced Pages is supposed to contain the knowledge of the world, not merely the a priori, uneducated, ill-informed ramblings of ourselves. There are respected authorities in the field of AC and it is their views we should concentrate on representing here. Paul Beardsell 09:15, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I wish to make that last point even more explicit: If our purpose here is to create a worthwhile encyclopedia then the opinion of each of the contributors on Misplaced Pages is unimportant: What matters is that the current state of knowledge of the subject matters of the Misplaced Pages articles is properly represented. This is not happening here, in this article. If we are going to write our own opinions while failing to do the necessary reading and failing to represent the views of the real experts we do Misplaced Pages and the wider community a disservice. Paul Beardsell 09:42, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Somewhere in the Misplaced Pages documentation (I cannot remember where but we must all have read this, as good, little Wikipedians) it says Misplaced Pages is not a place to publish original work. Misplaced Pages is supposed to be an encyclopedia of established knowledge. If any of us has a blinding insight, a eureka moment, or writes an epic poem, Misplaced Pages is not the place to publish this. Get it published elsewhere, or at least externally reviewed by a respected authority, and then maybe it is worthy of inclusion in the encyclopedia. What we are is editors of this article, not AC researchers. Even if we were AC researchers the Misplaced Pages rules say no original work! First let's get the established views documented. I am particularly taken by the Dennett/Hofstadter view and I have read Penrose and others. I am prepared to contribute in those areas. And to attempt to criticise the new theories of the not-really expert here. By which I do not claim that they do not exist. Paul Beardsell 10:32, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

No, I didn't say that what you wrote was an original work of Dennett. A personification of a pony in a children's book does not show that pony thinks like a human. Misplaced Pages is secondary source, the one that "analyzes, assimilates, evaluates, interprets, and/or synthesizes primary sources", and that is exactly what this article does. Tkorrovi 12:31, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I do not think that a pony thinks like a human but I do think that a pony is conscious. Whether or not that is true is far from obvious: The possibility must be admitted unless consciousness is defined as something only humans have. Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes but personification of a pony does not show that pony is conscious. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

What this article far from always does is represent authoritative sources. We have the conclusions of an amateur chat room represented as fact together with original (i.e. bad) suppositions of us editors. Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I think this article focuses too strongly on defining consciousness, which would be better contained in the consciousness article. The debate on whether AC is possible should cite arguments in consciousness, not establish them here (assuming the arguments are related to the nature of consciousness and not practical concerns). In addition, I don't recall any mention in the movies that R2-D2 or C-3P0 or HAL were artificially conscious. Nuffle 13:50, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Most books about humans don't explicitly say that people mentioned are conscious. That wouldn't prevent me positing that someone mentioned in a book was conscious. Although Start Wars doesn't say that its robots are intended to be conscious I don't think many would say that they are not artificial and my observation was that they appeared to give a semplance of consciousness - hence their presence in the article. I have suggested elsewhere that the aim of producing a real R2-D2 (rather than to use the artifices of film production, i.e. using an actor) would be an AC project. I am puzzled about why anyone would think that these fictitious implementations are not AC. Matt Stan 07:21, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

The movie does not give any reason to consider R2-D2 an AC. What it did was repairing the spaceship and once acting as a simple alarm device, and even then failed when the enemy came. It could well be pre-programmed with no ability of learning and modelling the external processes by learning, no ability to imagine or making predictions of what the enemy might be or what it might do. So it clearly did not have any essential abilities of consciousness. The movie does not clearly show that C-3PO is AC either. In spite that it knew many languages and decrypted a warning message (for what it maybe only had to contain a dictionary), it could as well be a chatterbot what generates its responses by pre-defined rules, and it failed to react to unknown as machines making other machines, its reactions may well been pre-programmed. So there is no evidence that it is learning, or can anyhow pre-plan its actions. in the article you wrote "Artificial consciousness proponents therefore have loosened this constraint and allow that simulating or depicting a conscious machine, such as the robots in Star Wars, could count - not as examples of artificial consciousness, since their personalities are generated by actors, but as models. Hence, some consider that if someone were to produce an artificial C-3PO, which behaved just like the real one, but without needing to be controlled and animated by a human, then it could qualify as being artificially conscious." Who loosened the constraint and where? Tkorrovi 14:19, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

Evidently Tkorrovi hasn't seen the Star Wars movies, like some other wikipedia readers perhaps. But if you were to ask people who have seen these films whether these robot impersonations were real, I think most would agree that they are not, but are rather a creative film crew's representation of an idea - the idea being of robots that can interact meaningfully with the rest of the acting team in accordance with the script. But if you were to ask people who saw the film to imagine that these robots were real robots, and then ask whether they thought that these robots were artificially conscious, then I doubt if many would deny it. I have seen all the Star Wars films and can therefore report on their content for the benefit of readers of this encyclopedia, and in the context of what we are calling artificial consciousness. If the point I make is contentions, then perhaps someone could enlighten me and indicate in what way these fictitious creations are not conscious. Matt Stan 22:02, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

I have seen it, not all movies though, but I have read about it. For one who is not expert, chatbots also often leave impression that they are conscious, but programmers understand quite quickly how simple and pre-programmed their functions mostly are, nothing to do with AC. It's very unclear for me what *you* think AC is, is it any weak AI, or must it be certain kind of weak AI. At least weak AI should not considered to be AC, or anything else what is a subject of another field, it's already said by others that large part of AC article talks about what should be written in AI article. I explained what you asked, please read. I think you are wrong, these are not AC, but honestly I don't know what else I should explain to you. Tkorrovi 23:18, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

When Tkorrovi writes "I explained what you asked, please read." he doesn't give a link to what he is referring to. I was asking whether if fictitious representations of erstwhile conscious machines (such as those in Star Wars) were actual machine implementations rather than dramatic representations then why would he not consider them implementations of AC. (One can argue, incidentally, by Leibniz's law that the very fact that the representations are portrayed by conscious actors means that it necessarily is the case that an actualisation of these robots could not be construed as anything other than implementations of AC.) In terms of what I think AC is, and I might ask Tkorrovi the same question, I'm suggesting that anything that gives a convincing impression of consciousness to the average human must be deemed to be an implementation of same. All androids therefore possess AC. But there is still a gulf between idealised implementations (as evidenced in fiction) and practical implementations such as Kismet. As I've said before, I don't understand the weak/strong argument in relation to AC itself. Matt Stan 09:21, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

I don't think it's a question of whether we personally think that C3P0 and the other androids are AC, but whether there was explicit intention for them to be AC (in addition to AI). I personally believe they (if real) would meet any requirement of AC (but then, I also believe my microwave is AC). However, people are clearly not in agreement about what constitutes AC, so unless an example from literature/movies was specifically mentioned as AC, I don't think we should include it here. I think the book 2001 made a good case for saying HAL had consciousness. Also AM. But I don't believe there was any such mention of the Star Wars robots being anything other than AI. Your argument about them being portrayed by human actors is not valid, I believe. If a human makes a symbolic portraryal of a tree (as is cliche in bad performance art) that does not mean a tree is conscious. Nuffle 12:33, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

I don't think it is a question of whether we personally think that Luke Skywalker (and other characters in the films) are conscious, but whether there was explicit intention for them to be conscious (in addition to intelligent). I personally believe he (if a real person) would meet any requirements of consciousness (but then I also believe that President Bush is conscious, although I realise that might be contentions). However people are clearly not in agreement about what constitutes consciousness, so unless an example can be cited of an entity (human or otherwise) that is specifically mentioned as being conscious I don't think we should include them as examples here. But I don't believe there was any such mention of the characters in Star Wars as being even intelligent. My argument about the robots being artificially conscious, by reference to Leibniz's law and the fact that they are portrayed by actors doesn't seem to have been understood by Nuffle. If a human makes a symbolic representation of an unconscious tree (just like a real tree) then that does not mean that a tree is conscious. However if a human made a portrayal of a fictitious conscious tree then one could hypothesise meaningfully (and provide convincing argument as per Leibniz's law) that a complete implementation of that tree that did not employ an actor would be indistinguishable from the actor's representation and would therefore be an impelmentaion of artificial consciousness. Matt Stan 13:01, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Give a link to something what was behind your nose, in the post what you replied? Something what leaves impression of consciousness is not conscious because of that, at least not in scientific terms, and also not by Leibniz's law. Impression what is not based on scientific evidence is subjective. One may have impression that something is beautiful, while other may have impression that it is ugly, it's the same as people just believe that things are certain way, and belief, however strong it is, has nothing to do with science. Kismet is something what is called "artificial emotions". When it was a separate field, it should not be considered AC, it may be considered AC because it cannot be categorized anywhere else. You constantly mix up AC and AI, I did not talk about weak AC, but weak AI, and these are not the same things. I don't like what is called "not genuine AC", but if you like, Kismet may be categorized there, but it is not weak AI, because it is for simulating emotions, what are not intelligence, and so also not artificial intelligence. I don't know, maybe you are just joking, then your only good joke was talking here about Pony the Merrylegs (noted by someone else), but your last joke was probably not understood, and not good. Tkorrovi 12:07, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Something that leaves the impression of consciousness, leaves the impression of consciousness. Something that does not leave the impression of conscious does not leave the impression of consciousness. Can we assume that something that does not leave the impression of consciousness is therefore not conscious? Can we assume that something that leaves the impression of consciousness might be conscious? If we have something that leaves the impression of consciousness, how are we to discriminate whether or not it really is conscious? There is only one answer: ask Tkorrovi. If Tkorrovi says that the impression one has that the entity is conscious is valid, then it is; otherwise it is not. There is no other acceptable answer. If there is doubt then this is known as blasphemy. Matt Stan 15:20, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Impression what is not based on scientific evidence is subjective. One may have impression that something is beautiful, while other may have impression that it is ugly, it's the same as people just believe that things are certain way, and belief, however strong it is, has nothing to do with science. Kismet is something what is called "artificial emotions". When it was a separate field, it should not be considered AC, it may be considered AC because it cannot be categorized anywhere else. You constantly mix up AC and AI, I did not talk about weak AC, but weak AI, and these are not the same things. I don't like what is called "not genuine AC", but if you like, Kismet may be categorized there, but it is not weak AI, because it is for simulating emotions, what are not intelligence, and so also not artificial intelligence. I don't know, maybe you are just joking, then your only good joke was talking here about Pony the Merrylegs (noted by someone else), but your last joke was probably not understood, and not good. Tkorrovi 12:07, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Try emotional intelligence. Matt Stan 20:03, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

emotional intelligence is psychological term, "artificial emotions" is implementation of it by artificial means. Should be study of emotions or such instead, as in most dictionaries intelligence is defined as "The faculty of thought and reason" what excludes emotions. But unfortunately "artificial emotions" or such is not exactly a field yet, as much as I know. Tkorrovi 20:30, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

Then read the stuff about Kismet, which is an actual practical example of an implementaiton of artificial emotion coming close to Aleksander's own quite old theoretical work in this area. You may find that your browser can be unlocked to go to web pages apart form wikipedia's artificial intelligence page and your own page (together with its pornographic pop-ups). Try it. See if you can broaden your own consciousness of anything that does not fit your pre-existing ideas, which seem to be based on an incomplete survey of the existing lierature, including that of Aleksander himself. It's a broad subject and is not covered in any dictionary. I'm not what saying don't use a dictionary, though. We all need one sometimes what to ensure what we can be understood. Incidentally, all the books by Aleksander that I tried to find on amazon are out of print. Does that mean they are so popular that the publishers can't keep up, or that they are so unpopular that no one bothers to print them? Matt Stan 15:20, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Of course we should not use terms from related disciplines. Otherwise we'd get confused. I'm terribly sorry. Perhaps we should also avoid the use of the term intelligence, as that is used also by psychologists, and even educationalists - heaven forbid! It was the philospher Bertrand Russell who wrote: "A stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand." But Bertrand Russell wasn't a computer scientist, so his output must be discounted. Also he makes use of the term 'unconsciously', which obviously has nothing to do with consciousness. In fact is it the complete opposite. Sorry I mentioned Russell. No, I jest not, but I use irony and sarcasm - most awful things. Emotion is cited by Aleksander (Corollary 12) as one of the characteristics of artificial consciousness. So perhaps we should delete Aleksander from the list of AC exponents, as he must have got it wrong if Tkorrovi can't understand (or hasn't read) what he wrote. ;-) Matt Stan 12:45, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Let us become automata that simply plagiarise what is written in dictionaries and debate which dictionary has the most appeal. I'm all for that. Let's agree on using The Encyclopedia of Stupidity ISBN 1861891598 by Matthijs van Boxsel. Matt Stan 12:45, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

But then to think, pony is a very good symbol, maybe one day I would use it as a mascot for DI ;) Tkorrovi 13:35, 2 May 2004 (UTC)

This article doesn't suppose to focus on defining consciousness, it only supposed to describe the aspects of consciousness what are relevant for AC, and why they are relevant. I don't know whether AC would exactly be a superset, but I think that it would describe that what is objective, and therefore most likely common in different possible types of consciousness. I don't also see why R2-D2, C-3P0 and HAL are artificial consciousness, and don't see the reason why they were added. I added Vanamonde, what I think is a good example of AC, and Jane, what was mentioned to be artificial sentience. Who thinks R2-D2, C-3P0 and HAL should be there, may explain. Tkorrovi 10:10, 29 Apr 2004 (UTC)

They manifested many of the capabilitities of the average human. HAL suffered from paranoia. C-3PO verged on being camp. R2-D2 was a bit of a whinger. Millions of convinced movie goers were entertained by their personalities. It seems to me that even if you think they were not genuinely conscious each of them was a pretty convincing simulation of consciousness. Paul Beardsell 00:06, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I (and maybe all of us) don't know where we should take the article from here. But the consciousness article is mostly concerned with human consciousness. This is apt in that human consciousness is the only form which all agree exists. The focus here is different. To those who think AC devices can (one day) be genuinely conscious the subject matter of AC is perhaps even a superset because human consciousness is but one particular manifestation of consciousness. "What can be conscious?" does not seem to be of central import in consciousness. Perhaps we should migrate there and make it so! Paul Beardsell 15:00, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes, I'd agree that the discussion should be migrated. It seems before you discuss whether you can have artifical consciouness, you must know _at least_ the criteria (if not a definition) of consciousness. And the definition and/or criteria of consciousness belong in the consciousness article. Perhaps the consciousness article should consist of an "abstract" section and a more concrete section about consciousness in humans. Also, for the record, I'm not an Estonian, but I do live in Estonia. The people here are generally likeable. ;) Nuffle 09:57, 29 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes, we must know how consciousness is generally understood, we may take it from consciousness article, and from dictionary entry, what is even more general, and supposed to be commonly accepted. It seems to be some agreement here that the dictionary should be dictionary.com, what was used in the article also. We should look at consciousness article, and refer there if something is indeed redundancy to describe it in this article. AC cannot go under consciousness article the same way as AI cannot go under intelligence article, these are foremost a different methods of research. Different places were considered here under what to put AC, what clearly shows that it doesn't belong under none of these, and must be separate. (Nice to hear that you live in Estonia. I think the disputes are solved now. I think we should not emphasize at all where we live, or what is our nationality, scientists have no nationality, and this should also not be important here). Tkorrovi 10:48, 29 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Where are the logical flaws?

BTW, one question. Was the "Genuine AC" your own view, or was it based on Dennett or somebody else? I mean not the "Genuine AC" in general, because it is one possible view that AC is an exact copy of consciousness (or brain), but the way how you defend it in the article. I don't find it to be logical, and in that case it is important to know where it comes from. Tkorrovi 14:34, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I am not sure that any of what I have written in the article itself contains any central, insightful original ideas. Here, on the talk page I have had to construct original refutations of some of the obvious unfounded speculation represented here as fact but that wasn't difficult. It would be arrogant of me to think that I could do better than those who have spent a lifetime at the centre of the field. By and large I think that what I have written derives from the writings of Dennett and Hofstadter. I was able to see the flaws in Penrose without being told, however. This is all in contrast to others here who claim original and important insights every second day. And the term "Genuine AC" I will let you claim credit for: That Dennett and Hofstadter see no obstacle to Real AC must be plain to all and that Penrose's objections are plainly cranky also. Paul Beardsell 17:45, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I talked about the way how you defend the "Genuine AC" or "Real AC" view in the article. When it is not your own view and comes from writings of Dennett or Hofstadter, then you should say from what writing it comes from, and include a reference to that writing, unless Dennett or Hofstadter told you that personally. Otherwise it must be considered that your explanation only comes from your own view. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Are you saying that Dennett thinks real/genuine AC impossible? Paul Beardsell 22:28, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

When something is not logical the flaw is usually easy to point out using logic itself. Point out the flaw(s) and I will address them as best I can. Paul Beardsell 18:01, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I did, and you did not even reply. A strange policy of frequent archiving of this page doesn't also enable you to do that any more. But I shall certainly do it again. Tkorrovi 18:20, 25 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The "strange policy" is not the frequent archiving, which is standard policy. The strange policy is the selective archiving and the archiving under inappropriate page headings. I wonder who is doing that? (But this is a minor point and can be addressed after the logical flaws have been identified.) Paul Beardsell 14:45, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Can anyone remind us of an instance where Tkorrovi has used logic to point out a logical flaw in an argument? The statement, I did, and you did not even reply. does not support the argument; it is just an assertion that is not backed up with any substance. Tkorrovi, can't you be a bit more robust in your debate rather than reverting to an ad hominem stance? Matt Stan 08:56, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Put up or shut up. Paul Beardsell 01:34, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Why are you so mean to him? Wikiwikifast 02:41, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

By responding I do not admit to being mean. Tkorrovi is skilled at misrepresenting what was said in these discussions both by himself and others. He has done so again and again. A recent example was him calling me a racist without due cause which has forced me to defend myself thus. Once again he now misrepresents history: "I did ", he has just said. No, he did not: He said he did not agree with me but he never pointed out a logical flaw and he cannot do so now. He continues, "and you did not even reply." Well, I have invariably responded arguing any substantive points raised. On the contrary, he dodges arguments made by me which are inconvenient to his POV, and _he_ fails to respond. Where I have shown logical flaws in his arguments he takes personal offense and responds with ad hominem attacks. In the circumstances, he once again creating a false impression as to what has passed here, "put up or shut up" is about as reasonable as it is possible to be. What will happen now is that the issue of my being "mean" will be used as a diversion by Tkorrovi so he need not say what logical flaw(s) he has identified and so that he need not quote where he previously identified a logical flaw. Paul Beardsell 04:11, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

My comments in italics. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Tkorrovi made this assertion. He said he had previously identified a logical flaw in my argument and that he had previously brought it to my attention. This accusation was untrue. He still fails to point out where and when he did so. What follows is new. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

As it seems that I am critisized whenever I don't explain my opiniom quickly, in spite that I clearly said that I shall do that later, then here is my opinion. Please understand that this is not about "Genuine AC" view, but about your (Paul Beardsell) argument to substantiate it.

Your argument for Genuine AC was:

"If there is something which is not a machine about a human then it must be the soul or a magic spark and the Not-genuine AC argument must then be made in religious or metaphysical terms and science is bypassed."

The only machine we can talk about here is AC, so we may say:

"If there is something in human what AC cannot model, then it must be the soul or magic spark."

As one thing mentioned in papers what AC cannot model is subjective experience explained by Thomas Nagel, then it effectively means that:

The above assumes what you are trying to prove. You are assuming that AC has a limitation and using that "fact" to prove that AC has a limitation. This is called begging the question or circular argument. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

"subjective experience is magic spark"

If any of the premises of an argument is flawed then the conclusion cannot be relied upon. The circular argument invalidates the conclusion. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

But Thomas Nagel in his article "What is it like to be a bat" (from The Philosophical Review), what was about subjective experience, said that "It would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false". So he considers that everything is physical, no magic spark. Thomas Nagel knows the works of Dennett quite well, so if Dennett had a compelling argument that subjective experience is "magic spark", then Thomas Nagel certainly didn't say that. So it seems that this was not an argument of Dennett.

The above paragraph cannot be understood by me, at least. Nagel is comprehensively discussed, questioned and partially refuted in works by both Dennett and Hofstadter. But whether Nagel is right or Dennett is right is not the point: You were supposed to be demonstrating a "logical flaw" in my argument. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I asked you here recently for a reference to the source of your argument, but you didn't give that, so it must be concluded that it is only your own argument. There are no logical reasons provided by you why subjective experience must be "magic spark" or not physical, and this your personal opinion is in controversy with scientific papers. So unless you find an article what supports your argument, you wrote in the article as a fact something what was only your own opinion and what was not substantiated. Tkorrovi 17:40, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I have not given page numbers, true. But I have been regurgitating Dennett and Hofstadter as faithfully as I can. But this is merely a diversionary technique. Where are the logical flaws in my argument?Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The problem is this: You do not understand what a logic flaw in an argument is. A logic flaw is a conclusion which does not follow from the premises. You have presented fresh argument, not identified a logic flaw. I have identified a logic flaw in your new argument. Begging the question. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Put up or shut up: Identify where you have ever identified a logic flaw. Paul Beardsell 22:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The only thing I would say is that you cannot argue. And whenever you cannot argue, you rely on personal attacks. Who wants to blindly support Paul Beardsell, better don't read anything above. Tkorrovi 00:57, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

"Supposed Experts" in Artificial Consciousness

Let us attempt to reach consensus on who are the leading proponents of artificial consciousness and its relation to artificial intelligence. OK? Matt Stan 08:44, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Various suggestions (please add to list):

Douglas Hofstadter - consciousness is a central interest as is AC
Daniel Dennett - wrote Consciousness Explained and deals with AC
Roger Penrose - denies AC though most scientists dismiss his reasoning
Thomas Nagel - subjective experience
Igor Aleksander - AC
Owen Holland - AC
Rod Goodman - AC
Gerald Edelman - Nobel prize winner, respected ideas on the theory of mind
Cynthia Breazeal
Stephen Jones

But Hofstadter, Dennett, Penrose, and Nagel are philosophers of AI or philosophers of mind. They use the term "AI" or "consciousness", but not "artificial consciousness". I don't really have information on the others. Wikiwikifast 16:05, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

AC can perhaps be seen as a part of AI or as a part of Consciousness. Interestingly Misplaced Pages's article on Hofstadter says he is interested in consciousness not intelligence. Readers of his work will know, of course, that he is interested in both. But in his case it may be wrong to say that he is interested in AC only as a part of AI. I believe the same comments apply to Dennett who wrote a book entitled Consciousness Explained, not a book called Intelligence Explained. Penrose is a celebrated mathematical physicist, but a philosopher of dubious importance. Paul Beardsell 22:16, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I included Nagel only because his subjective experience concept has importance for AC. Dennett talked about of what should be considered AC, but the same thing (AC) is unfortunately often referred to under different names, what may not be proper. The only importance of Penrose is that he denies AC (but not all subfields of AI), Hofstadter writes a general philosophy similar to Dennett, what also touches AC. At present Igor Aleksander, Owen Holland and Rod Goodman work on big project to create a conscious robot http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1028776,00.html Tkorrovi 19:13, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

AC and Strong AI

How about moving 'artificial consciousness' over to strong AI instead? Wikiwikifast 16:19, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

There is no strong AI article, the link refers to AI article where strong AI is also mentioned. And there is no strong AI theory, also there are no strong AI projects, there are no strong AI programs, it is usually only mentioned in comparison to weak AI. As much as I know, so far only AC is something what supposed to theoretically perform of what strong AI supposed to, but it is not the same as strong AI, and likely more genuine compared to consciousness than strong AI. There is no place in AI article where information about AC can be written, also why this approach cannot be separate article when the subfields of AI are? If there was enough to say about strong AI, then it could be a separate article as well, the reason why it was not a separate article was just that probably nobody knew what to write about it, it is not determined at all what strong AI is. Tkorrovi 19:30, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Another tiresome set of assertions wrongly presented as hard fact. There is a strong AI theory, there are strong AI projects, the field of AI is vehemently split between believers of the weak and strong AI theories, strong AI is not only mentioned in contrast to weak AI. No one who has read widely could believe otherwise. Paul Beardsell 22:16, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Then say one strong AI theory, or one strong AI project, or even one good strong AI definition. I read AI forums and followed AI for a long time, and saw that it's not clear for almost anybody what it is. Tkorrovi 01:10, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Now you deny even a definition! If I provide an example will you admit you are wrong? Paul Beardsell 11:23, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I think the science is plain: AC can be real/genuine/true consciousness. This is a minority opinion on this talk page but is nevertheless a popular view among computer scientists and philosophers of mind. As such I think AC fits into the Strong AI section of the artificial intelligence article rather well but I think a separate article is a better idea. Those here who (in defiance of the Copernican principle and Occam's razor and the Church-Turing thesis) think that AC can only ever be a simulation of real/genuine/true consciousness can not, in my opinion, be happy with including AC into Strong AI because Strong AI is real/genuine/true intelligence - not a simulation of it. Paul Beardsell 22:16, 26 Apr 2004 (UTC)

It may be plain for you, but at least it's not that plain for Thomas Nagel, it's also that without understanding or considering everything, things look like much more simple. Tkorrovi 01:24, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Even if AC does turn out to be a branch of AI, I think there is still room for an article to clarify that point - separate from the AI article. If it does turn out that AC can be developed as an end in its own right, as I had always assumed, then even more point in it having a separate article. I have no great learning in this field, and I come here primarily to learn. Can we have summaries of the main proponents' arguments about consciousness (as distinct from intelligence) in the main article, please? My offerings, for what they are worth are as follows:

1) There isn't, from what I have gleaned, a project to pursue the development solely of a machine implementation of consciousness for its own sake, or even as part of some other purposeful endeavour;

I think for many researchers AC is the holy grail. Growing up with Lucy by Steve Grand is perhaps not an example with much promise but that is surely his goal? Paul Beardsell 09:45, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

"Non-disciplinary" philosophy of "general purpose building blocks," no software "yet". Like building a house from bricks. Tkorrovi 15:25, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

2) I do not agree that there should necessarily be a strict dichotomy between weak and strong consciousness - the distinction certainly doesn't arise with natural forms of consciousness, and therefore a coherent definition of AC per se is required before we can perhaps make distinctions that were developed for the AI Topic;

If by strong and weak you mean genuine/real/true and non-genuine/simulated/pretend then, of course, the distinction does not arise in natural consciousness. Except when we pretend to be asleep! Paul Beardsell 09:45, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

3) I can imagine implementations of AC in various contexts that might be considered just as art - if they have no obvious function - or as entertainment. Though I agree about Misplaced Pages not being primary research, it does have the propensity to make connections (links) between subject-matter that doesn't occur anywhere else. An article that bridges the gap between what SF writers imagine in their stories and what is both theoretically and practically possible from an engineering perspective is a useful endeavour and doesn't, I rhink, conflict with what Misplaced Pages is about. Matt Stan 00:41, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes! You can buy solar powered (non-flying) decorative butterflies using muscles wires on some robotics sites. I reckon with a bit of tweaking they could have a genuine consciousness in excess of the most advanced thermostat. Paul Beardsell 09:45, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC)

As much as I know no scientist ever argued that thermostat is conscious.Thermostat is a Chalmers example what he didn't provide because he himself thinks that thermostat is conscious, but for reductio ad absurdum the Lloyd's argument that the connectionist models might shed light to subjective aspects of consciousness described by Nagel. "On the face of it, this approach is put forward as a way of dealing with Nagel's worries about consciousness, where the central mystery is: why is there something it is like to be us at all? There is a huge prima facie mystery about how any sort of physical system could possess conscious experience. Lloyd holds out the promise that connectionist models might shed light on this question, but at the end of the day the models seem to leave the key explanatory question unanswered. Even if we were to go out on a limb and suppose that these simple systems are conscious, the question of explanation would still remain untouched." http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/notes/lloyd-comments.html (article by Chalmers). Tkorrovi 16:33, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

Even this selective quote does not say quite what Tkorrovi seems to think. See below discussion in Thermostat section. Paul Beardsell 12:15, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

The reason why there is no "strong AI project" in the way you think of it is because the real work done in "strong AI" is in philosophy. You can be an engineer and say, "Since no one is creating strong AI, I will do it!" But how do you start? What makes your project not weak AI? Obviously, we haven't figured out what is necessary or sufficient for consciousness.

Weak AI is important for strong AI because it serves as inductive evidence for consciousness/intelligence. That is, if we can make something that seems conscious/intelligent, there is a possibility that it is truly conscious. If we can't even make something that exhibits intelligent/conscious behaviour, then that it is truly conscious is out of the question. Hence, the idea behind the Turing Test is worth mentioning.

Lastly, Dennett, Nagel, etc. are not "experts" of AC/strong AI in that what they say must be true. Philosophy of mind and AI is an ongoing debate, and what they say is only one side of the picture. Characteristic of philosophy, there are many competing theories that exist.

--Wikiwikifast 10:33, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Whilst AI seems to have been dominated by philosphers and its theories disappearing up their own arse (i.e. not leading to particular progress in the engineering field), research into consciousness is focused in psychoneurology, in particular using scanners to correlate perceptual and cognitive activity with neural activity. There may one day be (if there isn't already) a mental map based on this research that equates to the human genome project (already completed). My suggestion is that artificial implementations that attempt to simulate the operation of conscious processes, as evinced from such neurological research, is the path towards AC actualisation. This will leave philosophy way behind. I am not concerned with the philosophers' views on what constitutes consciousness or not - they'll never reach a consensus, just as they've never reached consensus even on logic or ethics. However if I can produce and sell a machine whose advertising claims that that machine is conscious, or even artificially conscious -- and that claim isn't disallowed by the Advertising Standards Authority -- then I'll be able to claim strongly that my AC is real AC. Some implementations that I've considered as candidate AC products are:

A conscious bus stop that recognises the people who regularly stand next to it, welcomes them, tells then when their bus is due, introduces them to each other, shares in their complaints about the bus service, answers questions by sending voice-recognised text to Google, plays music, replays horrifying images of muggings that have taken place near it, etc, etc.
(Related to the previous) A conscious policeman on the beat that collects evidence, helps the public in simple ways like answering questions about the way to the nearest bus stop, and never wants promotion
A conscious sexual partner that never thinks, never complains, and whose heuristic is designed to ensure increasing satisfaction the more it is used. This is perhaps the most promising idea in that there is already a well-established market for sex toys
A conscious (and articulated) computer screen combined with webcam, upon which appears an animated representation of a human (which a camera on this or on other instances had previously observed and which uses morphing software to drive its images), which proactively interacts with its user (partner?) and takes on personae which are effectively caricatures of people with whom it has interacted previously. (Of course one could buy characters, much like people buy mobile phone ring tones, and people who had used the product to the extent required for the machine to build virtual representations of them could sell their characters. A useful pastime and money-spinner perhaps for old celebrities)
A conscious driving assistant (already marketed by BMW on its latest model) that keeps your car going in the right speed and direction even when the actual driver becomes inattentive
A conscious dinner party host that ensures quests' glasses are filled, coordinates the timing of the cooking, makes trivial conversation (AI component required here, perhaps), and interrogates bus stops across the internet to trace late-comers

If any of these ideas were freshly patentable then they aren't now! They are in the public domain on wikipedia. And I don't think you need a philosopher to tell you whether they are implementable. Matt Stan 08:06, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

As I said before, the results of scanning the neural activity http://www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs182/readings/ns/article.html suggest that awareness is awareness of processes. Human genome project is completed only in the sense that the DNA sequences are mapped, but only a function of a very few fragments of DNA are known. The complexity of that problem is so huge, that it's not feasible to understand everything that way. Neither probably by scanning the whole neural activity. In addition to that, such scanning only shows when neurons fire, but nothing about what happens inside the neuron, but neuron may be as complex as a computer. And even if we could do that, again just having a map would not by itself explain anything. There is also by far not enough information in DNA for all brain activity what even a child has, what shows again that the brain activity is not pre-programmed, but is a result of learning. What we must understand is how that happens, not what *exactly* is in the brain. AC is useful for providing an experimental method to test philosophy. I thought just about a regulator at first, what could model the processes based on the input and predict how they would develop. A natural processes, such as friction of the tyres of your car, what depends on so many things, and cannot be uniformly modelled. Tkorrovi 15:54, 1 May 2004 (UTC)

"What makes your project not weak AI?" "Objective Less Genuine AC" should do that. Well, "Genuine AC" should do that as well. Not sure though how Paul interprets it, and why he said that thermostat can considered to be "Genuine AC", concerning that you should ask him, I don't support "Genuine AC" because I don't think that it would be ever possible to model consciosness completely. Tkorrovi 09:40, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

You use project and expert in a restrictive way which suits your argument. Given that I agree with what you say. Please do not misunderstand me: I never said the problems are solved and now all we need is enough Meccano to construct Sentient Expert Mk 1. Paul Beardsell 11:13, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The 'you' in my first paragraph was directed at Tk, and my comments about projects and experts was directed more at him as well. I mostly agree with you (PB) when you said that there are strong AI projects, etc., but I was addressing the restrictive sense of project as in an engineering project, which was what I took Tk to mean. Wikiwikifast 00:35, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Obviously there isn't a Strong AI project like the Boeing 7E7 engineering project. How many research grants, how many funded scientists does there have to be before a project is admitted? There are, of course, many Strong AI research projects. And each computer scientist / philosopher of mind engaged in Strong AI has a theory, or pretends to have one, to get his/her funding. The theory is not established like, for example, Special Relativity but to say there is no theory (or rather no set of candidate theories) is just to redefine the word. Paul Beardsell 11:40, 27 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes, there are engineering projects that are created for a purpose other than making something useful for humans. But calling them 'strong AI' projects makes it sound like there are conscious robots out there. However, people have created robots that act like insects that can move around autonomously, etc. Wikiwikifast 00:35, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Upon reconsideration, I agree that AC should remain a separate article and should not be merged with AI nor moved to Strong AI. Wikiwikifast 03:20, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The concept of machine

Daniel Dennett compared mind to a machine, but the problem is that he never said what he means by machine (if you find where he did that, then please say). Machine is usually interpreted as something human-made or something what humans can make. Then there are virtual machines, like Turing machine, what are theoretical concepts, what cannot always be made, like Turing machine with endless tape. or we cannot implement them because it's impossible to obtain all necessary information to implement them. So machine and virtual machine are not the same. We can say that mind is equivalent to certain virtual machine what satisfies Church-Turing thesis, what it certainly is, but this is not the same as to say that mind is a machine. We may call such theoretical machine a Church-Turing machine, to name it somehow. Then we may say that mind is some kind of Church-Turing machine. We cannot follow the logic of Dennett until we don't know what Dennett meant by machine, especially when the question is exactly in the difference of consciousness and a machine. So this is a theoretical problem, I hope it's understood. Tkorrovi 11:41, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Fortunately for Dennett the Church-Turing thesis says that all machines are equivalent in computing ability except for speed and memory capacity. So Dennett does not have to say what type of machine he is talking about. One idealised computing machine, the Turing machine, is shown by Turing to be equal or superior in capability to other computing machines. A Turing machine is of course implementable (and there are examples on the web) except for the infinite memory size. But any program which runs in finite time can only access a finite amount of tape. The human being has a finite life time and so doesn't need an infinite tape. According to the Church-Turing thesis, any computer can mimic any other. The unavoidable conclusion is: If your Sinclair ZX-80 cannot mimic the human being replace the C30 cassette tape with a C60. Of course, there is also the problem of writing the software. Paul Beardsell 12:02, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

So, are you saying that humans are not machines? That there is something spiritual about them: a soul or a magic spark? Or are you questioning the Church-Turing thesis? Or are you questioning it's applicability to humans on the basis of new physics? Or are you saying that the software cannot be written? Paul Beardsell 11:46, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

All machines are equivalent in computing ability except for speed and memory, but there is a difference between virtual (theoretical) machine and man-made machine also in that it may not be possible to obtain all necessary information to make the machine, in spite that theoretically some type of virtual machine can implement it. Please read Thomas Nagel "What is it like to be a bat" to get an idea. Tkorrovi 12:19, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

I have read the book*. I have demonstrated the equivalence of the Sinclair ZX-80 and the human being (except for speed and memory capacity). Neither of these are theoretical machines. Trying my best to interpret what you have said I think you have chosen the last of the presented alternatives: You think the software cannot be written. Paul Beardsell 12:28, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

(*)I have read the book "The Mind's I" in which Nagel's ideas are quoted at length and the bat essay may appear in it's entirety. The critique of those ideas which appears in that book and especially how they are contrasted with other ideas is interesting and entertaining. But, I suggest, not entirely relevant to the narrow point we are trying to resolve here. Paul Beardsell 12:43, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes it may be not entirely relevant. It is said in the article Thomas Nagel that "While many philosophers of mind and cognitive neuroscientists accept the fundamental distinction between the subjective and the objective, they often have not accepted Nagel's dismal conclusions." This is almost that what is relevant for AC. But concerning dismal conclusions, maybe Nagel is not so well understood, he doesn't deny the reduction of that what is objective. Tkorrovi 12:56, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Whether written or taught, we cannot make sure that it can be developed so that it implements consciousness completely, but we can develop it so that it implements consciousness partly when we don't omit anything, except that what is not objective. Tkorrovi 12:39, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

OK, I cannot deny that view but that is just one way things might work out. At some point the built-consciousness might reach a critical mass, transfer itself to a local super-computer cluster of 100,000 Trituim 86666MHz processors running MacOS XII, attach several Terabytes of NAS memory and, changing gear, evolve a consciousness which is a superset of human consciousness. But, please, neglect this flight of fancy for the moment. I return to your view: Will your partially implemented consciousness be a genuine manifestation of consciousness or not? And, if not, why not? Paul Beardsell 12:52, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The problem is that whether it is genuine consciousness or not can never be found out. Because of that, as science must be objective, in scientific terms we must say no. But there is a possibility that it may seem one day very genuine, especially if maybe implemented on quantum computer, maybe even exceed some human abilities, in theory there seems to be nothing what restricts such system. And then one day we may believe that this is genuine consciousness, but there would be no scientific way to find out, all what we can test even in that case would be that it is artificial consciousness. Tkorrovi 13:13, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

But, as an aside, and this is another fact to trip up Penrose, the Church-Turing thesis still applies to the quantum computer. Paul Beardsell 13:47, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Sure, I also think that Church-Turing thesis apply, and I think it's not Gödel's theorem what is wrong, but rather the way how Penrose uses it. This question has been discussed endlessly in the Internet. Tkorrovi 20:59, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Dennett deals with this issue well in both The Intentional Stance and Consciousness Explained. Essentially, he denies the human any special place in the universe, he says we allow another human consciousness because he says he is, and says it is mere arrogance to deny something else consciousness if it acts as if it is conscious and if it claims it is conscious. He makes the point better than I do, doubtless. Paul Beardsell 13:24, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

As I understand it he is saying your use of subjective and objective you fail to apply to humans themselves. Subjectively you say you are conscious. Objectively, how do I know? Paul Beardsell 13:26, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Yes, the only reason why we can say that we are conscious is that we are humans, and capable humans are considered to be conscious when they don't happen to be in coma. We cannot even completely compare our consciousness to that of somebody else. This doesn't mean that we are better, this is just how we determine consciousness. Maybe dolphins are better than we are, but we can never know. Tkorrovi 13:40, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Except that dolphins act as if they are conscious, they do all but say they are conscious. I have seen a conscious dolphin, I am sure. Neither you nor I can be sure that the other is conscious: Indeed, for all you know I have tapped this out on a panel in my tank. ] Paul Beardsell 13:47, 28 Apr 2004 (UTC).

People

Thermostat

Any conscious entity which does not appreciate the thermostat argument must have a screw loose. I suggest that we return it to its manufacturer as fatally flawed and ask for our money back. I would not be happy with a repair. But I worry that anything which is as broken as that is bound to be well beyond its warranty period. Paul Beardsell 00:00, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

What argument? David Chalmers didn't argue that thermostat could be considered conscious, state clearly what argument you are talking about. Tkorrovi 01:18, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Once again you make a wild assertion stated as if it is bold fact and it is wrong. To do this again and again, as you do, is fundamentally a dishonest way to proceed. Paul Beardsell 12:05, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

And if you are not competent in AC or consciousness studies, then give up. Tkorrovi 01:28, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

Absolute competence in AC studies I am not claiming for myself: These things are relative, of course, so competence is what I seem to have in relation to some others. Competence in writing an encyclopaedia requires an interest in the truth, an ability to understand English, the willingness to read others' competent research, the willingness to maintain an open mind, to not press one's own view in defiance of the facts. People who live in glass houses. The task at hand here is to write an encyclopaedia. Paul Beardsell 12:05, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

A search at Google for "chalmers conscious thermostat" gives this result:

David J. Chalmers in The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. OUP,1997: Someone who finds it "crazy" to suppose that a thermostat might have (conscious) experiences at least owes us an account of just why it is crazy. Presumably this is because there is a property that thermostats lack that is obviously required for experience; but for my part no such property reveals itself as obvious. Perhaps there is a crucial ingredient in processing that the thermostat lacks that a mouse possesses, or that a mouse lacks and a human possesses, but I can see no such ingredient that is obviously required for experience, and indeed it is not obvious that such an ingredient must exist.

That Tkorrovi repeatedly misrepresents the facts is well established. What would now be interesting would be to review all his contributions as I think we might find they are equally questionable. Paul Beardsell 12:05, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

I don't know, maybe you are right. David chalmers wrote in the article referred above "A thermostat, or indeed a simple connectionist network, as a model of conscious experience? This is indeed very surprising. Either there is a deep insight somewhere within Lloyd's reasoning, or something has gone terribly wrong." And from the interview :

"TT: So you're talking about this double-aspect view of information, (the idea that all instances of information processing, even simple ones, give rise to some kind of subjective experience - a sort of panpsychism though Chalmers is wary of that term.) In your book this led to questions like "What is it like to be a thermostat?"

DC: (laughing) Right, yeah. This is all very speculative of course."

So his statements are indeed highly controversial. So it's not me who misrepresents the facts or lives in the glass house, if anybody then it's Davis Chalmers, and you included an argument by him in the article, I didn't refer to Davis Chalmers before. And all this panpsychism and pseudoscience has nothing to do with artificial consciousness, I don't know why you want to include it into article. We cannot artificially make the "fundamental" consciousness Chalmers talks about, what would be as fundamental as space and time and connot be explained by other physical processes. I deeply disagree with that. But I did like the way Chalmers argued against the connectionist view of consciousness in the article referred to above. Tkorrovi 16:46, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

What dictionary

If we want to use free dictionary what also remains free (is under GPL licence), then we should not use dictionary.com but GCIDE , it includes entries from both public domain 1913 Webster and 1997 WordNet. dictionary.com searches GCIDE and also some proprietary dictionaries. Tkorrovi 01:20, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

What and that

There is benefit in using a dictionary (any dicitonary, but a learner's dicitonary in particular) to discriminate between the usage of what and that. One of the benefits of humanity is that people (or at least some people) are able to learn languages. Some people, unfortunately, never master this art. Matt Stan 13:01, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

As I remember, you were the one who suggested to use free dictionary, and was so vehemently against using Concise Oxford Dictionary. Did your opinion change meanwhile? Why free dictionary is better than just any dictionary is that it is available to everyone, this avoids confusion of referring to different dictionaries. This is advised in Wiktionary as well. Tkorrovi 16:24, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

The problem is that we must be much more precise here than just what an that. Tkorrovi 16:49, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

My post was secretly changed

Matt Stan, with what right you deleted part of my post without even saying anything? Tkorrovi 17:09, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

And I have a suspicion that this was also done against me before. Reading the archives I didn't find some posts what I remeber I wrote. But I have not all time in the world to search through history to confirm it. Is this an accepted behaviour by people who supposed to talk about science? Tkorrovi 17:19, 3 May 2004 (UTC)

The example you give in the 1st para is not evidence of what you allege. You follow this up with another allegation of which you present no evidence. You are a dishonest troll, tkorrovi. Please go away. Paul Beardsell 17:23, 3 May 2004 (UTC)