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The '''Mass Line''' (from the Chinese '']'') is the political, organizational or leadership method developed by ] and the ] (CCP) during the ]. Mao developed it into a coherent organizing methodology that encompasses ], ], ]s, ] and ] that has been applied by many ] subsequent to the Chinese revolution. Chinese communist leaders generally attribute their conquest of power to the faithful pursuit of effective "mass line" tactics, and a "correct" mass line is supposed to be the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power.<ref name=steiner>Steiner, Arthur H. "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 422-436</ref> The '''Mass Line''' (from the Chinese '']'') is the political, organizational or leadership method developed by ] and the ] (CPC) during the ]. Mao developed it into a coherent organizing methodology that encompasses ], ], ]s, ] and ] that has been applied by many ] subsequent to the Chinese revolution.<ref name=steiner>Steiner, Arthur H. "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 422-436</ref>


According to Frederick Teiwes, Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney, the "mass line" was related to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) mass organizations. "Fundamentally, for all the CCP rhetoric concerning the 'mass line,' the unions and other mass organizations functioned more as Stalinist "transmission belts" in laying down the party line and extending the reach of the state," he wrote.<ref name=teiwes /> According to Frederick Teiwes, Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney, the "mass line" was related to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) mass organizations. "Fundamentally, for all the CCP rhetoric concerning the 'mass line,' the unions and other mass organizations functioned more as Stalinist "transmission belts" in laying down the party line and extending the reach of the state," he wrote.<ref name=teiwes />


==History== ==History==
After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were critically needed for the CCP's building of a "complete socialist order," it intensified its cadre training program in 1950-1951 to ensure that all cadres and other works would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist-Leninist mass line theory and practice."<ref name=steiner/> After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were critically needed for the CPC's building of a "complete socialist order," it intensified its cadre training program in 1950-1951 to ensure that all cadres and other works would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist-Leninist mass line theory and practice."<ref name=steiner/>


Arthur Steiner, a professor of international relations and political science at UCLA, writes that Mao rose to pre-eminence in the CCP because he understood the requirements for effecting the strongest possible organization of the Chinese masses in unstable political circumstances.<ref name=steiner/> Since the days of his early activity among the peasantry of Hunan Province, he preached the doctrine that the Party must rely on the masses for its strength, that it must serve their needs, “draw inspiration” from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness.<ref name=steiner/> Arthur Steiner, a professor of international relations and political science at UCLA, writes that Mao rose to pre-eminence in the CCP because he understood the requirements for effecting the strongest possible organization of the Chinese masses in unstable political circumstances.<ref name=steiner/> Since the days of his early activity among the peasantry of Hunan Province, he preached the doctrine that the Party must rely on the masses for its strength, that it must serve their needs, “draw inspiration” from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness.<ref name=steiner/> Steiner claims that the "correct" mass line is supposed to be the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power.


Training in mass line tactics ranges in scope from propaganda to public administration, Steiner writes. Its principal focus, however, is in the "delicate area" of the CCP's dealings with the masses of Chinese people who have yet bought into the communist program.<ref name=steiner/> In the early 1950s, the problem was sufficiently serious and urgent that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.<ref name=steiner/> Training in mass line tactics ranges in scope from propaganda to public administration, Steiner writes. Its principal focus, however, is in the "delicate area" of the CCP's dealings with the masses of Chinese people who have yet bought into the communist program.<ref name=steiner/> In the early 1950s, the problem was sufficiently serious and urgent that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.<ref name=steiner/>


According to Steiner, the mass line is thought to be closely related to the CPC’s propaganda apparatus.<ref name=steiner/> Despite the vast output from the CPC’s propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a “principal weakness of the Party's propaganda” a failure to effectively give “systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations.”<ref name=steiner/>
Mao criticized ] for having no faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism.


The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. Party members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses."<ref name=steiner/>
==Connection with propaganda==
The mass line is closely related to the CCP’s propaganda apparatus.<ref name=steiner/> Despite the vast output from the CCP’s propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a “principal weakness of the Party's propaganda” a failure to effectively give “systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations.”<ref name=steiner/>


Mao criticized ] for having no faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism.
The directive said that “One of the inborn duties of a Communist lies in the incessant effort to carry out propaganda among the people so as to educate them, to wage relentless war against all reactionary and mistaken conceptions and principles, and to promote as well as raise the political consciousness of the masses.”<ref name=steiner/>


"'Politics in command' and the 'mass line' are not stressed. There is no discussion of 'walking on two legs,' and individual material interest is onesidedly emphasized. Material incentives are proclaimed and individualism is far too prominent," Mao wrote of Stalin in 1961.<ref name=mao1961>Mao, Tsetung, , Translated by Moss Roberts, Annotated by Richard Levy, With an Introduction by James Peck, Monthly Review Press New York and London:1977</ref> The Mass Line is a method of leadership that seeks ostensibly to "learn from the peasants."<ref name=mao1961 />
The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs."<ref name=steiner/> Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time."<ref name=steiner/>


Mao's slogan was "From the masses, to the masses." The process is said to include investigating the conditions of people, learning about and participating in their struggles, gathering ideas from them, and creating a plan of action based on these ideas and concerns of the people, and also based on an analysis of the objective conditions and in light of the revolutionary goal.{{Maoism sidebar}} ] hold that the mass line method of leadership is the only way to truly connect up with the people and to serve them, and is supposed to be democratic. Some critics of Maoism consider the mass line to be a form of ], or a way of "tailing after the masses" or bowing down to the "spontaneity" of the masses, a criticism that Lenin had leveled against the reformists in the ] in ]. The mass line, though based in the first part on the ideas and desires of the masses, is also supposed to be based on a concrete analysis and determination to transform society through social revolution.
Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. Party members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses."<ref name=steiner/>


==Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party== ==Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party==
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==References== ==References==

Revision as of 13:53, 1 March 2010

The Mass Line (from the Chinese qunzhong luxian) is the political, organizational or leadership method developed by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the Chinese revolution. Mao developed it into a coherent organizing methodology that encompasses philosophy, strategy, tactics, leadership and organizational theory that has been applied by many Communists subsequent to the Chinese revolution.

According to Frederick Teiwes, Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney, the "mass line" was related to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) mass organizations. "Fundamentally, for all the CCP rhetoric concerning the 'mass line,' the unions and other mass organizations functioned more as Stalinist "transmission belts" in laying down the party line and extending the reach of the state," he wrote.

History

After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were critically needed for the CPC's building of a "complete socialist order," it intensified its cadre training program in 1950-1951 to ensure that all cadres and other works would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist-Leninist mass line theory and practice."

Arthur Steiner, a professor of international relations and political science at UCLA, writes that Mao rose to pre-eminence in the CCP because he understood the requirements for effecting the strongest possible organization of the Chinese masses in unstable political circumstances. Since the days of his early activity among the peasantry of Hunan Province, he preached the doctrine that the Party must rely on the masses for its strength, that it must serve their needs, “draw inspiration” from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness. Steiner claims that the "correct" mass line is supposed to be the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power.

Training in mass line tactics ranges in scope from propaganda to public administration, Steiner writes. Its principal focus, however, is in the "delicate area" of the CCP's dealings with the masses of Chinese people who have yet bought into the communist program. In the early 1950s, the problem was sufficiently serious and urgent that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.

According to Steiner, the mass line is thought to be closely related to the CPC’s propaganda apparatus. Despite the vast output from the CPC’s propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a “principal weakness of the Party's propaganda” a failure to effectively give “systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations.”

The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. Party members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses."

Mao criticized Stalin for having no faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism.

"'Politics in command' and the 'mass line' are not stressed. There is no discussion of 'walking on two legs,' and individual material interest is onesidedly emphasized. Material incentives are proclaimed and individualism is far too prominent," Mao wrote of Stalin in 1961. The Mass Line is a method of leadership that seeks ostensibly to "learn from the peasants."

Mao's slogan was "From the masses, to the masses." The process is said to include investigating the conditions of people, learning about and participating in their struggles, gathering ideas from them, and creating a plan of action based on these ideas and concerns of the people, and also based on an analysis of the objective conditions and in light of the revolutionary goal.

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Maoists hold that the mass line method of leadership is the only way to truly connect up with the people and to serve them, and is supposed to be democratic. Some critics of Maoism consider the mass line to be a form of populism, or a way of "tailing after the masses" or bowing down to the "spontaneity" of the masses, a criticism that Lenin had leveled against the reformists in the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in What Is To Be Done?. The mass line, though based in the first part on the ideas and desires of the masses, is also supposed to be based on a concrete analysis and determination to transform society through social revolution.

Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party

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Paulo Freire's work on education, specifically his work Pedagogy of the Oppressed has been called by groups such as Freedom Road Socialist Organization and by other academics theoretically akin to the mass line. Both emphasize the pedagogical task of "raising the consciousness of people." The primary thrust of the mass line method is in the "revolutionary leadership of the masses in action," not simply in educational work.

The Black Panther Party which sold the Red Book (a collection of quotations from Mao's writings) and organized serve-the-people programs, another important aspect of Mao's method, first popularized something like the mass line in the United States. In the early 1970s, organizations like the Young Lords, the Bay Area Revolutionary Union and a large section of the student and youth movements in the US formed specifically Maoist-identified communist organizations.

Historically, the largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the USA, Revolutionary Communist Party has taken criticisms from other Maoists or Mao influenced organizations. These organizations include Freedom Road Socialist Organization, Single Spark Collective, and some other New Communist Movement organizations which are now defunct. Instead they say they have taken on "commandism" as a methodology of leadership and promoting a Cult of Personality around their chairman Bob Avakian.

In some other countries, such as India, the term "the mass line" is used somewhat differently, to indicate a revolutionary strategy based on mobilizing the broad masses rather than on small-scale guerrilla warfare by armed party units. The explicit leadership method of "From the masses, to the masses" is not so strongly stressed. Thus in India the term "mass line" is now more often associated with the middle group of CPI(M-L) forces than with the CPI(Maoist) due to their emphasis on mass organizations.

Mass organizations

During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through the united front system. The most significant of the mass organizations encompassed large numbers of people from major social groups, including workers through trade unions, students, youth, and women. Their purpose was to "penetrate society, to bring vast sections of the population further into the party's net" Teiwes writes. CThe effort was skewed, however, and coverage was far more extensive in urban areas, with peasant associations existing only sporadically.

External links

References

  1. ^ Steiner, Arthur H. "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1951), pp. 422-436
  2. ^ Teiwes, Frederick C. 'The Chinese State During the Maoist Era' in The Modern Chinese State, ed. David Shambaugh, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000) pp. 105-160
  3. ^ Mao, Tsetung, "A Critique of Soviet Economics", Translated by Moss Roberts, Annotated by Richard Levy, With an Introduction by James Peck, Monthly Review Press New York and London:1977
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