Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 14:51, 12 April 2010

This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these messages) No issues specified. Please specify issues, or remove this template. (Learn how and when to remove this message)

1953 Iranian coup d’état
File:Mohammad Mosaddeq.jpg Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, deposed by coup
Date 15–20 August 1953 Location Iran Result The overthrow by the U.S. administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, and replacement by Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi on 19 August 1953.
Belligerents
Supporters of Shāh  United States  United Kingdom	Supporters of Mosaddegh National Front
Commanders and leaders
Fazlollah Zahedi

The 1953 Iranian coup d’état, on August 19, 1953 (and called the 28 Mordad coup d'état in Iran), was the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh by the United States Central Intelligence Agency; The crushing of Iran's first democratic government launched 25 years of dictatorship under Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, who relied heavily on U.S. weapons to hold on to power until he was overthrown in February 1979. "For many Iranians, the coup demonstrated duplicity by the United States, which presented itself as a defender of freedom but did not hesitate to use underhanded methods to overthrow a democratically elected government to suit its own economic and strategic interests," the Agence France-Presse reported.

In 1951 with near unanimous support of Iran’s parliament, Mosaddegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)."The 1933 agreement under which it was operating was widely regarded as exploitative and an infringement on Iran's sovereignty. Iran's oil was the British government's single largest overseas investment. Moreover, the AIOC had consistently violated the terms of the 1933 agreement and was reluctant to renegotiate, even as Iran's movement for nationalization grew in the late 1940s. Even though AIOC was "highly profitable," historian Mark Gasiorowski wrote that "its Iranian workers were poorly paid and lived in squalid conditions." Meanwhile, Gasiorowski said, the AIOC, which was 51 percent owned by the British government, bankrolled disruptive tribal elements in Iran and some politicians with the purpose of causing intrigue. Iranians blamed Britain for most of its problems and public support for nationalization was very strong. Despite Mosaddegh’s popular support, Britain was unwilling to negotiate its single most valuable foreign asset, and instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to pressure Iran economically. Initially, Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the Abadan oil refinery, the world’s largest, but Prime Minister Attlee opted instead to tighten the economic boycott. With a change to more conservative governments in both Britain and the United States, Churchill and the U.S. administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to overthrow Iran's government though the predecessor U.S. Truman administration had opposed a coup.

The U.S. spy agency tried to persuade Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to dismiss Mosaddegh, and at first he refused. The Central Intelligence Agency pressured the weak monarch while bribing street thugs, clergy, politicians and Iranian army officers to take part in a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh and his government. At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence. Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. On December 21, 1953, he was sentenced to solitary confinement in a jail cell in Central Teheran for three years, then placed under house arrest for the remainder of his life. Mosaddegh's supporters were rounded up, imprisoned, tortured or executed. The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh, Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court. The order was carried out by firing squad on Oct. 29, 1953. "The triumphant Shah (Pahlavi) ordered the execution of several dozen military officers and student leaders who had been closely associated with Mohammad Mossadegh... Soon afterward and with help from the CIA and the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, the shah created a secret police force called Savak, which became infamous for its brutality."

In the wake of the coup, Britain and the U.S. selected Fazlollah Zahedi to be the next prime minister of a military government, and Shah Pahlevi made the appointment but dismissed him two years later. Pahlevi ruled as an authoritarian monarch for the next 26 years, until he was overthrown in a popular revolt in 1979. The tangible benefits the United States reaped from overthrowing Iran's elected government was a share of Iran's oil wealth. Washington supplied arms to the unpopular ruler, Pahlavi, and the CIA trained SAVAK, his repressive police. In Foreign Policy magazine, former CIA agent Richard Cottam wrote that "The shah's defense program, his industrial and economic transactions, and his oil policy were all considered by most Iranians to be faithful executions of American instructions." The coup is widely believed to have significantly contributed to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which deposed the Shah and replaced the pro-Western royal dictatorship with the anti-Western Islamic Republic of Iran.

Background

Early petroleum development

In 1901, Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia, granted a 60-year petroleum search concession to William Knox D'Arcy. D'Arcy paid £20,000 and promised equal ownership shares, with %16 of any future profit. The exploration took seven years and was almost canceled, but ultimately yielded an enormous petroleum field discovery. Calculating net profits was left to the company, and later became a source of serious conflict.

The company grew slowly until World War I, when Persia's strategic importance led the British government to buy a controlling share in the company, essentially nationalizing British oil production in Iran. It became the Royal Navy's chief fuel source during the war.

The British angered Iranians by intervening in Iranian domestic affairs including in the Persian Constitutional Revolution (the transition from dynastic to parliamentary government).

Post-World War I

The Persians were dissatisfied with the royalty terms of the British petroleum concession, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), whereby Persia received 16 per cent of net profits.

In 1921, a military coup d’état—"widely believed to be a British attempt to enforce, at least, the spirit of the Anglo-Persian agreement" effected with the "financial and logistical support of British military personnel"—permitted the political emergence of Reza Pahlavi, whom they enthroned as the "Shah of Iran" in 1925. The Shah modernized Persia to the advantage of the British; one result was the Persian Corridor railroad for British military and civil transport during World War II.

In the 1930s, the Shah tried to terminate the APOC concession, but Britain would not allow it. The concession was renegotiated on terms again favorable to the British. On 21 March 1935, Pahlavi changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was then re-named the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

World War II

In 1941, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the British and Commonwealth of Nations forces and the Red Army invaded Iran, to secure petroleum (cf. Persian Corridor) for the Soviet Union's effort against the Nazis on the Eastern Front and for the British elsewhere. Britain and the USSR deposed and exiled the pro-Nazi Shah Reza, and enthroned his 22-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the Shah of Iran.

The British secured the oilfields and seaports.

By June 1941 the British had reasserted their influence in Iraq and planned to protect their interests more effectively. This decision was made more pertinent when Germany invaded the USSR (now Russia) on 22 June 1941. The Royal Engineers were given the task of executing and supervising a series of large works projects to secure the RAF stations at Habbaniya and Shaiba, the Kirkuk oilfields, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's installations in south-west Iran, as well as the development of ports and communication infrastructure in both Iran and Iraq.

Post-World War II

After the war, nationalist leaders in Iran became influential by seeking a reduction in long-term foreign interventions in their country—especially the oil concession which was very profitable for Britain and not very profitable to Iran. The British-controlled AIOC refused to allow its books to be audited to determine whether the Iranian government was being paid what had beden promised. British intransigence irked the Iranian population.

U.S. objectives in the Middle East remained the same between 1947 and 1952 but its strategy changed. Washington remained "publicly in solidarity and privately at odds" with Britain, its WWII ally. Britain's empire was steadily weakening, and with an eye on international crises, the U.S. re-appraised its interests and the risks of being identified with British colonial interests. "In Saudi Arabia, to Britain's extreme disapproval, Washington endorsed the arrangement between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia in the 50/50 accord that had reverberations throughout the region."

Britain faced the newly elected nationalist government in Iran where Mossadegh, with strong backing of the Iranian parliament, demanded more favorable concessionary arrangements, which Britain vigorously opposed.

The U.S. State Department not only rejected Britain's demand that it continue to be the primary beneficiary of Iranian oil reserves but "U.S. international oil interests were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization."

U.S. reluctance to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1951, when he was elected, faded 28 months later when Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House and John Foster Dulles took the helm at the State Department. "Anglo-American cooperation on that occasion brought down the Iranian prime minister and reinstated a U.S.-backed shah."

1950s

In 1951, the AIOC's resistance to re-negotiating their petroleum concession—and increasing the royalty paid to Iran—created popular support for nationalizing the company. In March, the pro-Western PM Ali Razmara was assassinated; the next month, the parliament legislated the petroleum industry's nationalization, by creating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This legislation was guided by the Western-educated Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, then a member of the Iranian parliament and leader of the nationalization movement; by May, the Shah had appointed Mosaddegh Prime Minister.

Mohammad Mosaddegh attempted to negotiate with the AIOC, but the company rejected his proposed compromise. Mosaddegh's plan, based on the 1948 compromise between the Venezuelan Government of Romulo Gallegos and Creole Petroleum, would divide the profits from oil 50/50 between Iran and Britain. This proved unacceptable to Britain and the Foreign Office began planning for his overthrow.

That summer, American diplomat Averell Harriman went to Iran to negotiate an Anglo-Iranian compromise, asking the Shah's help; his reply was that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he could say a word against nationalization". Harriman held a press conference in Tehran, calling for reason and enthusiasm in confronting the "nationalization crisis". As soon as he spoke, a journalist rose and shouted: "We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mosaddegh and oil nationalization!" Everyone present began cheering and then marched out of the room; the abandoned Harriman shook his head in dismay.

The National Iranian Oil Company suffered decreased production, because of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC's orders that British technicians not work with them, thus provoking the Abadan Crisis that was aggravated by the Royal Navy's blockading its export markets to pressure Iran to not nationalize its petroleum. The Iranian revenues were greater, because the profits went to Iran's national treasury rather than to private, foreign oil companies. By September 1951, the British had virtually ceased Abadan oil field production, forbidden British export to Iran of key British commodities (including sugar and steel), and had frozen Iran's hard currency accounts in British banks.

The United Kingdom took its anti-nationalization case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague; PM Mosaddegh said the world would learn of a "cruel and imperialistic country" stealing from a "needy and naked people". Representing the AIOC, the UK lost its case. In August 1952, Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh invited an American oil executive to visit Iran and the Truman administration welcomed the invitation. However, the suggestion upset British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who insisted that the U.S. not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh: "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect Anglo-American unity on Iran."

In late 1951 Prime Minister Mosaddegh held a parliamentary election. Told by aides that British agents were bribing rural candidates and and political bosses, and realizing that "the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats", Mossadegh halted the election as soon as enough deputies (79 or 80) had been elected "to form a parliamentary quorum". This was interpreted variously as a defensive action against subversive British agents by Mosaddegh supporters, and "as undemocratic and grasping for personal power" by his opponents.

Emergency powers

In the Consultative Assembly of Iran (Majlis, or parliament) election in the spring of 1952, Mosaddegh "had little to fear from a free vote", since he knew many admired him as a hero. British agents, however, had been bribing candidates, especially rural ones, and the regional bosses who controlled them.

In July 1952 Mosaddegh resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister, a position traditionally filled by the Shah. Mosaddegh appealed to the general public for support and received an overwhelmingly positive response. After five days of mass demonstrations, 29 killed in Tehran, and "signs of dissension in the army," the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddegh to form a new government. This was an enormous personal triumph for Mosaddegh over the Shah, and Mosaddegh capitalized on it by asking the majlis for "emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms." In this way, Mosaddegh dealt his opponents the Shah, the military, "the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament ... a rapid succession of blows."

In early 1953 Mosaddegh successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months. With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased peasants' shares of production.

Mosaddegh's assumption of emergency powers changed his image from that of a constitutional lawyer who challenged the shah along fundamental lines, holding to the letter of the law, to that of abandonment of those laws in favor of the theory of the will of the people. Significant elements of the population began to lose faith in his leadership—his steps toward dictatorship distressed many. When Mosaddegh's ministers proposed nationalizing Tehran's bus companies and Iran's telephone systems, business interests warned against ending up "like the Soviet Union where the state owns everything and citizens nothing". His advisers proposed giving women the right to vote, reasoning that the spirit of Iran's constitution treated all citizens as equals, but religious leaders protested any such change to existing laws and social roles. Traditional clerics who had been supporters of Mosaddegh—Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani along with the three groups representing the bazaar: the Society of Muslim Warriors, the Toilers Party, and the Fadayan-e Islam—turned against him. Kashani denounced the emergency powers as "dictatorial" and said to journalists that "true democracy in Iran needs a faithful implementation of shari'a". Kashani's colleague Qonatabadi said that the "government's dictatorial methods were transforming Iran into a vast prison" and that Muslim government workers were being replaced with "Kremlin-controlled atheists".

By mid-1953 Mosaddegh's struggle with Parliament had resulted in a mass of resignation of his parliamentary supporters reducing parliament below its quorum, and a referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister powers to legislate law. The referendum passed with 99% approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against, but was criticized by opponents for its use of separately placed ballot boxes for yes or no ballots and a requirement that "each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card."

While Mosaddegh attempted to cope with interest groups shifting against him, Britain's boycott had cut off revenue to the Iranian government and devastated Iran's economy. Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day".

Worried about the UK's other interests in Iran, and believing that Iran's nationalism was Soviet-backed, the UK persuaded Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Iran was falling to the Soviets—effectively exploiting the American Cold War mindset. While President Harry S. Truman was busy fighting a war with in Korea, he did not agree to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. However, in January 1953 when Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, the UK convinced Eisenhower to a joint coup d'état.

U.S. role

Execution of Operation Ajax

Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, the CIA team headed by Roosevelt executed the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi were drawn up by the by the coup plotters and signed by the Shah. On Saturday August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered to Mosaddegh a firman from the shah dismissing him. Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot (probably by the Tudeh party) rejected the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested. In the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minster's dismissal without Parliament's consent. The action was publicized and the Shah, fearing a popular backlash, fled to Rome, Italy. After a short exile in Italy, the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh, and returned Shah to Iran. Alan Dulles, then the director of the CIA, personally flew back with the Shah from Rome to Teheran. Gen. Zahedi replaced the deposed Prime Minister Mosaddegh, who was arrested, tried, and originally sentenced to death. Mosaddegh's sentence was commuted to three years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by house arrest until his death.

As a condition for restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the US required collapsing the AIOC's monopoly; five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were to draw Iran's petroleum after the successful coup d'état—Operation Ajax.

As part of that, the CIA organized anti-Communist guerrillas to fight the Tudeh Party if they seized power in the chaos of Operation Ajax. Per released National Security Archive documents, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the CIA had agreed with Qashqai tribal leaders, in south Iran, to establish a clandestine safe haven from which US-funded guerrillas and spies could operate.

Operation Ajax's formal leader was senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., while career agent Donald Wilber was the operational leader, planner, and executor of the deposition of PM Mosaddegh. The coup d'état depended on the impotent Shah's dismissing the popular and powerful Prime Minister and replacing him with Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, with help from Col. Abbas Farzanegan—a man agreed by the British and Americans after determining his anti-Soviet politics.

The CIA sent Major general Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr. to persuade the exiled Shah to return to rule Iran. Schwarzkopf trained the security forces that would become known as SAVAK to secure the shah's hold on power.

The coup and CIA records

The coup was carried out by the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower in a covert action advocated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and implemented under the supervision of his brother Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence. The coup was organized by the United States' CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6, two spy agencies that aided royalists and royalist elements of the Iranian army.

According to a heavily redacted CIA document released to the National Security Archive in response to a Freedom of Information request, "Available documents do not indicate who authorized CIA to begin planning the operation, but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the President's style."

The CIA document then quotes from the Ambrose biography of Eisenhower:

Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the President. Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC. Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.

CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., the grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, carried out the operation planned by CIA agent Donald Wilber. One version of the CIA history, written by Wilber, referred to the operation as TPAJAX.

During the coup, Roosevelt and Wilber, representatives of the Eisenhower administration, bribed Iranian government officials, reporters, and businessmen. They also bribed street thugs to support the Shah and oppose Mosaddegh. The deposed Iranian leader, Mosaddegh, was taken to jail and Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi named himself prime minister in the new, pro-western government.

Iranian fascists and Nazis played prominent roles in the coup regime. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who had been arrested and imprisoned by the British during World War II for his attempt to establish a pro-Nazi government, was made Prime Minister on August 19, 1953. The CIA gave Zahedi about $100,000 before the coup and an additional $5 million the day after the coup to help consolidate support for the coup.

Bahram Shahrokh, a trainee of Joseph Goebbels and Berlin Radio's Persian-language program announcer during the Nazi rule, became director of propaganda. Mr. Sharif-Emami, who also had spent some time in jail for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1940s, assumed several positions after 1953 coup, including Secretary General of the Oil Industry, President of the Senate, and Prime Minister (twice).

The British and American spy agencies returned the monarchy to Iran by installing the pro-western Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the throne where his rule lasted 26 years. Pahlavi was overthrown in 1979. Masoud Kazemzadeh, associate professor of political science at the University of Southern California, wrote that Pahlavi was directed by the CIA and MI6, and assisted by high-ranking Shia clerics. He wrote that the coup employed mercenaries including "prostitutes and thugs" from Tehran's red light district.

The overthrow of Iran's elected government in 1953 ensured Western control of Iran's petroleum resources and prevented the Soviet Union from competing for Iranian oil. Some Iranian clerics cooperated with the western spy agencies because they were dissatisfied with Mosaddegh's secular government.

While the broad outlines of the Iran operation are known: the agency led a coup in 1953 that re-installed the pro-American Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the throne, where he remained until overthrown in 1979. "But the C.I.A.'s records were widely thought by historians to have the potential to add depth and clarity to a famous but little-documented intelligence operation," reporter Tim Weiner wrote in The New York Times May 29, 1997

"The Central Intelligence Agency, which has repeatedly pledged for more than five years to make public the files from its secret mission to overthrow the government of Iran in 1953, said today that it had destroyed or lost almost all the documents decades ago."

"A historian who was a member of the C.I.A. staff in 1992 and 1993 said in an interview today that the records were obliterated by a culture of destruction at the agency. The historian, Nick Cullather, said he believed that records on other major cold war covert operations had been burned, including those on secret missions in Indonesia in the 1950s and a successful C.I.A.-sponsored coup in Guyana in the early 1960s. Iran—there's nothing, Mr. Cullather said. Indonesia—very little. Guyana—that was burned.

According to Donald Wilber one of the CIA officers who planned the 1953 coup in Iran wrote an account titled, Clandestine Service History Overthrow Of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 – August 1953. Wilber said one goal of the coup was to strengthen the Shah.

In 2000, James Risen at The New York Times obtained the previously secret CIA version of the coup written by Wilber and summarized its contents, which includes the following.

In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim leaders with savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh, seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious community.

In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists. It does not say whether anyone was hurt in this attack.

The agency was also intensifying its propaganda campaign. A leading newspaper owner was granted a personal loan of about $45,000, in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes.

But the shah remained intransigent. In an Aug. 1 meeting with General Norman Schwarzkopf, he refused to sign the C.I.A.-written decrees firing Mr. Mossadegh and appointing General Zahedi. He said he doubted that the army would support him in a showdown.

The National Security Archive at George Mason University contains the full account by Wilber along with many other coup-related documents and analysis.

U.S. motives

Historians disagree on what motivated the United States to change its policy towards Iran and stage the coup. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian identified the coup d'état as "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". He states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "`Communist threat` was a smokescreen" in responding to Pres. Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.

Throughout the crisis, the "communist danger" was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue—i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse ...The Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mosaddegh was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.

Abrahmian states that Iran's oil was the central focus of the coup, for both the British and the Americans, though "much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War". Abrahamian wrote, "If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same." Mosaddegh did not want any compromise solution that allowed a degree of foreign control. Abrahamian said that Mosaddegh "wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice".

Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran, well into the 1960s and the monarch, Reza Pahlevi's aggressive land expropriation policies—to the benefit of himself and his supporters—resulted in the Iranian government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran. The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil." The belief that oil was the central motivator behind the coup has been echoed in the popular media by authors such as Robert Byrd, Alan Greenspan, and Ted Koppel.

However, Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski states that while, on the face of it, there is considerable merit to the argument that U.S. policymakers helped U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production after the coup, "it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having "lost China." Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice."

Gasiorowski further states "the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared Truman's views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved."

In 2004, Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup arguing that "the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands." While "these concerns seem vastly overblown today" the pattern of "the 1945-46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War - and with the Red Scare at its height in the United States" would not allow U.S. officials to risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran. Furthermore, "U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq." He concludes "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup."

Faced with choosing between British interests and Iran, the U.S. chose Britain, Gasiorowski said. "Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and the two countries were working as partners on a wide range of vitally important matters throughout the world at this time. Preserving this close relationship was more important to U.S. officials than saving Mosaddeq's tottering regime." A year earilier, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect `Anglo-American unity` on Iran."

The two main winners of World War II who had been Allies during the war became superpowers and competitors as soon as the war ended, each with their own spheres of influence and client states. After the 1953 coup, Iran became one of the client states of the United States. In his earlier book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran Gasiorowski identifies the client states of the United States and of the Soviet Union between 1954-1977. Gasiorowski identified Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Cambodia, Iran, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan as strong client states of the United States and identified those that were moderately important to the U.S. as Greece, Turkey, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, Liberia, Zaire, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Pakistan and Thailand. He identified Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ethiopia and Japan as "weak" client states of the United States.

Gasiorowski identified Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Cuba, Mongolia and North Vietnam as "strong client states" of the Soviet Union, and he identified Guinea, Somalia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan and North Korea as moderately important client states. Mali and South Yemen were classified as weak client states of the Soviet Union.

According to journalist and author Steven Kinzer, for most Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world." "A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their civil war to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere." Consequently, "the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge." Some historians including Douglas Little, Abbas Milani and George Lenczowski have echoed the view that fears of a communist takeover or Soviet influence motivated the US to intervene.

Blowback

According to the history based on documents released to the National Security Archive and reflected in the book Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, the coup caused long-lasting damage to the U.S. reputation.

"The '28 Mordad' coup, as it is known by its Persian date, was a watershed for Iran, for the Middle East and for the standing of the United States in the region. The joint U.S.-British operation ended Iran's drive to assert sovereign control over its own resources and helped put an end to a vibrant chapter in the history of the country's nationalist and democratic movements. These consequences resonated with dramatic effect in later years. When the Shah finally fell in 1979, memories of the U.S. intervention in 1953, which made possible the monarch's subsequent, and increasingly unpopular, 25-year reign intensified the anti-American character of the revolution in the minds of many Iranians."

The authoritarian monarch installed in the coup appreciated the coup, Kermit Roosevelt wrote in his account of the affair. "'I owe my throne to God, my people, my army and to you!' By 'you' he meant me and the two countries—Great Britain and the United States—I was representing. We were all heroes."

On June 16, 2000, The New York Times published the secret CIA report, "Clandestine Service History, Overthrow Of Premier Mossadeq Of Iran, November 1952 – August 1953," partly explaining the coup from CIA agent Wilber's perspective. In a related story, The New York Times reporter James Risen penned a story revealing that Wilber's report, hidden for nearly five decades, had recently come to light.

In the summer of 2001, Ervand Abrahamian wrote in the journal Science & Society that Wilber's version of the coup was missing key information some of which was available elsewhere.

The New York Times recently leaked a CIA report on the 1953 American-British overthrow of Mosaddeq, Iran’s Prime Minister. It billed the report as a secret history of the secret coup, and treated it as an invaluable substitute for the U. S. files that remain inaccessible. But a reconstruction of the coup from other sources, especially from the archives of the British Foreign Office, indicates that this report is highly sanitized. It glosses over such sensitive issues as the crucial participation of the U. S. ambassador in the actual overthrow; the role of U. S. military advisers; the harnessing of local Nazis and Muslim terrorists; and the use of assassinations to destabilize the government. What is more, it places the coup in the context the Cold War rather than that of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis—a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World.

In a review of Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes, historian Michael Beschloss wrote, "Mr. Weiner argues that a bad C.I.A. track record has encouraged many of our gravest contemporary problems... A generation of Iranians grew up knowing that the C.I.A. had installed the shah," Mr. Weiner notes. "In time, the chaos that the agency had created in the streets of Tehran would return to haunt the United States."

The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower considered the coup a success, but, given its blowback, that opinion is no longer generally held, because of its "haunting and terrible legacy". In 2000, Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, said that intervention by the U.S. in the internal affairs of Iran was a setback for democratic government. The coup d’état was "a critical event in post-war world history" that destroyed Iran’s secular parliamentary democracy, by re-installing the monarchy of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as an authoritarian ruler. The coup is widely believed to have significantly contributed to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which deposed the pro-Western Shah and replaced the monarchy with an anti-Western Islamic Republic.

"The world has paid a heavy price for the lack of democracy in most of the Middle East. Operation Ajax taught tyrants and aspiring tyrants that the world's most powerful governments were willing to tolerate limitless oppression as long as oppressive regimes were friendly to the West and to Western oil companies. That helped tilt the political balance in a vast region away from freedom and toward dictatorship." The United States initially considered the coup to be a triumph of Cold War covert action, but given its blowback, Kinzer wrote that it is difficult to imagine an outcome "that would have produced as much pain and horror over the next half century as that produced by Operation Ajax" had "American and British intelligence officers not meddled so shamelessly in (Iran"s) domestic affairs."

United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who visited Iran both before and after the coup, wrote that "When Mossadegh and Persia started basic reforms, we became alarmed. We united with the British to destroy him; we succeeded; and ever since, our name has not been an honored one in the Middle East."

In 2000, the U.S. Secretary of State called the coup a "setback for democratic government" in Iran, saying "It is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."

On June 4, 2009, in a major keynote speech in Cairo, President Barack Obama admitted U.S. involvement in the coup; the first time a sitting U.S. president had done so.

Aftermath

Iran

An immediate consequence of the coup d'état was the repression of all political dissent, specially the liberal and nationalist opposition umbrella group National Front as well as the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in the Shah and his courtiers.

As part of the post-coup d'état political repression between 1953–1958, the Shah outlawed the National Front, and arrested most of its leaders. The Tudeh, however, bore the main brunt of the repression. Shah's security forces arrested 4121 Tudeh political activists including 386 civil servants, 201 collage students, 165 teachers, 125 skilled workers, 80 textile workers, 60 cobblers, and 11 housewives. 40 were executed, another 14 died under torture and over 200 were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Shah's post-coup dragnet also captured 477 Tudeh members (22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets) who were in the Iranian armed forces. After their presence was revealed, some National Front supporters complained that this Tudeh military network could have saved Mosaddegh. However, few Tudeh officers commanded powerful field units, especially tank divisions that might have countered the coup. Most of the captured Tudeh officers came from the military academies, police and medical corps. At least eleven of the captured army officers, were tortured to death.

After the 1953 coup, the Shah's government formed the SAVAK (secret police), many of whose agents were trained in the United States. The SAVAK was given a “loose leash” to torture suspected dissidents with “brute force” that, over the years, “increased dramatically".

Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium—British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued increasing, and the United States sent development aid and advisors.

In the 1970s the Shah's government increased taxes that foreign companies were obliged to pay from 50% to 80% and royalty payments from 12.5% to 20%. At the same time the price of oil reverted to Iranian control. Oil companies now only earned 22 cents per barrel of oil.

Jacob G. Hornberger, founder and president, of The Future of Freedom Foundation, said, "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes—until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979". According to him, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond".

Internationally

The 1953 coup d'état was the first time the US had openly overthrown an elected, civil government. The Eisenhower administration viewed Operation Ajax as a success, with "immediate and far-reaching effect. Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert action came to be regarded as a cheap and effective way to shape the course of world events"—a coup engineered by the CIA called Operation PBSUCCESS toppling the duly elected Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, which had nationalised farm land owned by the United Fruit Company, followed the next year.

A pro-American government in Iran doubled the United States' geographic and strategic advantage in the Middle East, as Turkey, also bordering the USSR, was part of NATO.

In 2000 US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and "came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before".

The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. ... But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.

In June 2009, the US President Barack Obama in a speech in Cairo, Egypt, talked about the United States' relationship with Iran, mentioning the role of the US in 1953 Iranian coup saying, "This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years, Iran has defined itself in part by its opposition to my country, and there is indeed a tumultuous history between us. In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and civilians. This history is well known. Rather than remain trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran's leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward."

Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic

In the Islamic Republic, remembrance of the coup is quite different than that of history books published in the West, and follows the precepts of Ayatollah Khomeini that Islamic jurists must guide the country to prevent "the influence of foreign powers". According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, the government tries to ignore Mosaddegh as much as possible and allocates him only two pages in "high school textbooks." "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddegh as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." This is despite the fact that Kashani came out against Mosaddegh by mid-1953 and "told a foreign correspondent that Mosaddegh had fallen because he had forgotten that the shah enjoyed extensive popular support." A month later, Kashani "went even further and declared that Mosaddegh deserved to be executed because he had committed the ultimate offense: rebelling against the shah, 'betraying' the country, and repeatedly violating the sacred law."

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main exposé of the 1953 coup d'état, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror by Stephen Kinzer, has been censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'état. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling élite" whom the Iranian Council of Guardians has twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'état in 1953, saying Mosaddegh, himself, was obeying British plans:

In my opinion, Mosaddegh was the director of the British plans and implemented them ... Without a doubt Mosaddegh had the primary and essential role

in the August 1953 coup. Kashani says Mosaddegh, the British and the Americans worked against the Ayatollah Kashani to undermine the role of Shia clerics. According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, this theory is contradicted by the fact that "the second person who spoke on Radio Tehran announcing and celebrating the overthrow of Mosaddegh was Ayatollah Kashani’s son, who was hand-picked by Kermit Roosevelt".

This allegation also is posited in the book Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust), published in the Islamic Republic and allegedly written by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer. It claims that Mohammad Mosaddegh was not a mortal enemy of the British, but had always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves". Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the Islamic Republican authorities may have had Fardoust tortured, and the fact that his death was announced before publication of the book may be significant.

See also

• Abadan Crisis
• Abadan Crisis timeline
• Iran crisis of 1946
• Anglo Iranian Oil Company
• Asadollah Rashidian
• CIA sponsored regime change
• Divide and rule
• False flag operations
• Hossein Fatemi
• United States and state terrorism
• Iran and state terrorism
• Special Activities Division

Footnotes

1. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p.166
2. Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran,(Harvard University Press, 2005) ISBN 978-0674018433 p.122
3. "Obama admits US involvement in 1953 Iran coup" June 4, 2009, Agence France-Presse
4. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran by Mark J. Gasiorowski (Cornell University Press: 1991) p. 59. ISBN 978-0801424120
5. The spectre of Operation Ajax by Guardian Unlimited
6. "The Company File—From Anglo-Persian Oil to BP Amoco"
7. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran by Mark J. Gasiorowski (Cornell University Press: 1991) p. 59
8. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Poltics by L.P. Elwell-Sutton. 1955. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London. p. 259.
9. Mary Ann Heiss in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p.178-200
10. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
11. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran by Mark J. Gasiorowski (Cornell University Press: 1991) p. 74. ISBN 978-0801424120
12. Gasiorowski, p.237-9, 243
13. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
14. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p.280
15. Mossadegh – A Medical Biography by Ebrahim Norouzi
16. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Poltics by L.P. Elwell-Sutton. 1955. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London
17. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics by L.P. Elwell-Sutton. 1955. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London. p. 315.
18. Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq by Stephen Kinzer (Henry Holt and Company 2006). p. 200. ISBN /9780805082401
19. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
20. Kinzer, Stephen, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (Henry Holt and Company 2006). p. 200-201
21. "Goodbye to America's Shah," by former CIA agent Richard Cottam in Foreign Policy 34 (Spring 1979) and quoted by Mark J. Gasiorowski at the beginning of his U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell University Press: 1991). ISBN 978-0801424120
22. ^ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19, 1987, p.261
23. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 33
24. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, p. 48
25. Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909, Studies in Middle Eastern History, 336 p. (Oxford University Press, 1991). ISBN 019506822X.
26. Browne, Edward G., "The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909", Mage Publishers (July 1995). ISBN 0-934211-45-0
27. Afary, Janet, "The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911", Columbia University Press. 1996. ISBN 0-231-10351-4
28. ^ Stephen Kinzer: "All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror", John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
29. Coup d'Etat 1299/1921 in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, retrieved 8 July 2008.
30. Mackey, Iranians, Plume, (1998), p.178
31. (U.K.) Royal Engineers Museum history.
32. Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 by Boston University political science Professor Irene L. Gendzier, (Westview Press, 1999) ISBN 9780813366890 p. 34-35
33. Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 by Boston University political science Professor Irene L. Gendzier, (Westview Press, 1999) ISBN 9780813366890 p. 34-35
34. Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 by Boston University political science Professor Irene L. Gendzier, (Westview Press, 1999) ISBN 9780813366890 p. 35
35. Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 by Boston University political science Professor Irene L. Gendzier, (Westview Press, 1999) ISBN 9780813366890 p. 35
36. Chatfield, Wayne, The Creole Petroleum Corporation in Venezuela Ayer Publishing 1976 p. 29
37. ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J (August 1987). "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 19 (3). Cambridge University Press: pp. 261–286. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help) A version is available for public access at Web publication accessed from Document Revision: 1.4 Last Updated: 1998/08/23. Its is archived at Archived 2009-06-19.
38. ^ Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.106
39. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003) p.110
40. Abrahamian, (1982) p.268
41. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.145
42. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2008) p.136-7
43. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p.268-9
44. All the Shah's Men p. 135, 2008 edition ISBN 9780470185490
45. Abrahamian p.270
46. Mackey p.187-210
47. Abrahamian, 1982, p.273
48. Abrahamian, 1982, p.272
49. Abrahamian p.273
50. Abrahamian p.274
51. Shiels, Frederick L. (1991). Preventable disasters: why governments fail. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 88. ISBN 0847676234. Retrieved April 9, 2010. Regardless of foreign participation, Mossadegh could not have been overthrown if significant elements of the population had not lost faith in his leadership.—Quoting Richard Cottam, PhD.
52. Abrahamian, 1982, p.275
53. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.276
54. Abrahamian, 1982, p.278
55. Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
56. New York Times, July 28, 1953, p.6, "Mossadegh Voids Secret Balloting : Decrees `Yes` and `No` Booths for Iranian Plebiscite on Dissolution of Majlis" by Kennett Love
57. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.135-6
58. Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 17. ISBN 0801424127, 9780801424120. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
59. Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
60. What's Behind the Crises in Iran and Afghanistan by E Ahmed - 1980
61. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Iran: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987.
62. The formerly secret story of the CIA overthrow in 1953 of Iran's democratically elected government written by the agent who said he planned the coup.
63. Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq: Symbol of Iranian Nationalism and Struggle Against Imperialism by the Iran Chamber Society
64. ^ "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran". Archived from the original on 2009-06-08. Retrieved 2009-06-06. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
65. ^ "CIA Historical Paper No. 208 Clandestine Service History: Overthrow Of Premier Mossadeq Of Iran November 1952 – August 1953 by Donald N. Wilber". Archived from the original on 2009-06-08. Retrieved 2009-06-06. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
66. "Norman Schwarzkopf Sr". Archived from the original on 2009-08-14. Retrieved 2009-08-11. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
67. N. R. Keddie and M. J. Gasiorowski, eds., Neither East Nor West. Iran, the United States, and the Soviet Union, New Haven, 1990, 154–55; personal interviews
68. "Review of All the Shah's Men by CIA staff historian David S. Robarge". Archived from the original on 2009-06-22. Retrieved 2009-06-21. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
69. p.15, "Targeting Iran", by David Barsamian, Noam Chomsky, Ervand Abrahamian, and Nahid Mozaffari
70. CIA document mentions who ordered the 1953 coup
71. Eisenhower, vol.2, The President by Stephen E. Ambrose,(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 111. "Ambrose repeats this paragraph" in Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 333, according to the note by a CIA staff member in the same document.
72. Michael Evans. "Secret Notes by CIA agent Donald Wilber on the overthrow of Premier Mossadegh of Iran (PDF)".
73. Notes, formerly classified as "Secret" by CIA agent Donald Wilber on the overthrow of Premier Mossadegh of Iran (plain text). Accessed 2009-06-06. 2009-06-08.
74. ^ How to Overthrow A Government Pt. 1 on March 5, 2004
75. " The Day Democracy Died: The 50th Anniversary of the CIA Coup in Iran by historian Masoud Kazemzadeh".
76. Kinzer, pp. 6, 13. In addition to the secret $5 million dollars CIA delivered to Zahedi, the US government sent another $28 million in September 1953 to assist Zahedi in consolidating the coup regime. Another $40 million was delivered in 1954 as soon as the regime signed the oil consortium deal giving Iranian oil to American and British oil companies. See Ervand Abrahamian, "The 1953 Coup in Iran," in Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 211. See also Habib Ladjevardi, "The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1983).
77. "Foucault and the Iranian Revolution" By Janet Afary, Kevin Anderson, Michel Foucault. University of Chicago Press: June 2005 ISBN 9780226007861 "protesters killed by the Shah's brutal repression"
78. ^ ""The Day Democracy Died: The 50th Anniversary of the CIA Coup in Iran" by Masoud Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Department of History and Political Science at Utah Valley State College". Retrieved 2009-06-18.
79. Nasr, Vali, "The Shia Revival", Norton, (2006), p.124
80. Review by Jonathan Schanzer of "All the Shah's Men" by Stephen Kinzer
81. Mackay, Sandra, "The Iranians", Plume (1997), p.203, 4
82. Nikki Keddie: "Roots of Revolution", Yale University Press, 1981, p.140
83. ^ "C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup" May 29, 1997 The New York Times
84. C.I.A. Is Slow to Tell Early Cold War Secrets by Tim Weiner April 8, 1996
85. "C.I.A., Breaking Promises, Puts Off Release of Cold War Files" by Tim Weiner July 15, 1998 The New York Times
86. "Secrets Of History: The C.I.A. in Iran -- A special report. How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)" April 16, 2000. The New York Times
87. ^ "The 1953 Coup in Iran, Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp.182–215". Archived from the original on 2009-10-20. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
88. ^ Democracy Now. Goodman-Abrahamian interview.
89. Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade by John Tirman (Free Press 1997) P. 30 ISBN 978-0684827261
90. Byrd, Robert (2004). Losing America: confronting a reckless and arrogant presidency. W. W. Norton & Company,. p. 132. ISBN 0393059421, 9780393059427. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
91. Greenspan, Alan (2008). The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (reprint, illustrated ed.). Penguin Group. p. 463. ISBN 0143114166, 9780143114161. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
92. Koppel, Ted (February 24, 2006). "Will Fight for Oil". Op-Ed. New York Times. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
93. ^ Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.274
94. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.145
95. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran by Mark J. Gasiorowski (Cornell University Press: 1991) p. 27.
96. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.84
97. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.205
98. Little, Douglas (2003). American orientalism: the United States and the Middle East since 1945. I.B.Tauris. p. 216. ISBN 1860648894, 9781860648892. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
99. Milani, Abbas (2008). Eminent Persians: the men and women who made modern Iran, 1941-1979 :. Vol. Volume 1. Syracuse University Press,. ISBN 0815609078, 9780815609070. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
100. Lenczowski,, George (1990). American Presidents and the Middle East,. Duke University Press,. p. 36. ISBN 0822309726, 9780822309727. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
101. Dowlin, Joan E. (June 17, 2009). "America's Role in Iran's Unrest". Huffington Post. Retrieved 2009-06-21.
     Quoting from Gasiorowski and Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran.
102. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, Kermit Roosevelt, (New York: McGraw Hill) 1979
103. "The 1953 Coup in Iran by Ervand Abrahamian. Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, 182–215". Archived from the original on 2009-10-20. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
104. "The C.I.A.'s Missteps, From Past to Present" The New York Times, July 12, 2007
105. Stephen Kinzer: "All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror", John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.215
106. "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, April 19, 2000.
107. The comments were not an apology.
     • "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, April 19, 2000 mentions apology in four places: "apology", "guarded apology", "semi-apology" and "close to apology"
     • " medger USA:s roll i störtande av Mossadeq 1953, men ger ingen ursäkt." " acknowledges America's role in the coup, but does not offer an apology." "Rapport om Irans kärnprogram försvagar Bushs argumentation", Sveriges radio
     • "While Mrs. Albright did not actually apologize" "U.S. Offers Olive Branch to Iran". Accessed 2009-06-06. Archived 2009-06-09.
108. "The Lessons of History: "All The Shah's Men"". Archived from the original on 2009-06-19. Retrieved 2009-06-17. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
109. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men 2003, p.204
110. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men 2003, p.215
111. Kinzer, Stephen, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (Henry Holt and Company 2006). p. 200
112. "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, 04-19-2000.
113. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j8-a9Bpq471PDjYA2z6WazPmIZqw "In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government," President Obama said in a keynote speech to the Muslim world in Cairo.
114. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California 1999)
115. ^ Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces by E Abrahamian - MERIP Reports
116. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California), 1999, p.89
117. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.92
118. Abrahamian, Ervand (1999). Tortured Confessions. University of California Press. p. 92.
119. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California), 1999, p.105
120. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.419–20
121. Oil company history
122. ^ Washington's wise advice. Ralph R. Reiland. Pittsburgh Tribune Review July 30, 2007.
123. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.x
124. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.209
125. Turkey joined NATO in 1952.
126. A short account of 1953 Coup
127. "Barack Obama's Cairo speech". Guardian.co.uk. Retrieved 2009-06-05.
128. Hamid Algar's book, Islam and Revolution, Writings and Declarations Of Imam Khomeini, ed by Hamid Algar, Mizan, 1981, p.54
129. Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic, (University of California Press, c1993). p.109
130. p. 109
131. ^ Review Essay of Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men, By: Masoud Kazemzadeh, PhD, Middle East Policy, VOL. XI, NO. 4, winter 2004
132. ISNA (Iranian Students News Agency) November 2003 interview in Persian with Mahmood Kashani
133. See page 71 at: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm Cryptome was unable to recover the redactions in the section that deals with the religious leaders. The following is page 20 of the secret history that can be found at: http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html. Accessed 2009-06-06. Archived 2009-06-08.
134. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California Press, 1999), pp.160–61

Books

• Dorril, Stephen, Mi6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service ISBN 9780743203791 (paperback is separately titled: MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations Fourth Estate: London, a division of HarperCollins ISBN 1857027019)
• Dreyfuss, Robert, Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (Henry Holt and Company: 2005)
• Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath.(Syracuse University Press, 1994) ISBN 9780815626428 Documents competition between Britain and the United States for Iranian oil, both before and after the coup. Publishers Weekly summary: "an impressive work of scholarship by an Iranian economist and former diplomat the CIA-orchestrated coup, followed by U.S. backing of the dictatorial Shah, planted
• Elwell-Sutton, L. P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.: London) 1955. Reprinted by Greenwood Press 1976. 978-0837171227
• Farmanfarmaiyan, Manuchihr, Roxane Farmanfarmaian Blood and Oil: A Prince's Memoir of Iran, from the Shah to the Ayatollah (Random House 2005.). A cousin of Mosaddeq, Farmanfarmaiyan was the Shah's oil adviser. Sympathetic to the Shah and antagonistic to Khomeini, Farmanfarmaiyan offers many insider details of the epic battle for Iranian oil, both in Iran's historic relationship with Britain and then, after the coup, with the United States.
• Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell University Press: 1991). Traces the exact changes in U.S. foreign policy that led to the coup in Iran soon after the inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower; describes "the consequences of the coup for Iran's domestic politics" including "an extensive series of arrests and installation of a rigid authoritarian regime under which all forms of opposition political activity were prohibited." Documents how U.S. oil industry benefited from the coup with, for the first time, 40 percent post-coup share in Iran's oil revenue.
• Gasiorowski, Mark J., Editor (2004). Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0815630180. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1987). "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 10 (3): 261–286. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Gendzier, Irene. Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 Westview Press, 1999. ISBN 9780813366890
• Heiss, Mary Ann, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954, Columbia University Press,1997. ISBN 0231108192
• Kapuscinski, Ryszard (1982). Shah of Shahs. Vintage. ISBN 0-679-73801-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-26517-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Kinzer, Stephen, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (Henry Holt and Company 2006). ISBN /9780805082401 Assesses the influence of John Foster Dulles on U.S. foreign policy. "Dulles was tragically mistaken in his view that the Kremlin lay behind the emergence of nationalism in the developing world. He could... claim consistency in his uncompromising opposition to every nationalist, leftist, or Marxist regime on earth."
• McCoy, Alfred, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Metropolitan Books 2006)
• Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press 2010) ISBN 9780300163681
• Roosevelt, Kermit, Jr. (1979). Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0070535909. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (Doubleday 2007) ISBN 9780307389008
• Wilber "Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, Nov. 1952-1953" CS Historial Paper no. 208. March 1954.
• Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Simon & Schuster 1991) ISBN 9780671502485

Articles

• Behrooz, Maziar (2001). "Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 33 (3): 363–382. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)

External links

• Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq: Symbol of Iranian Nationalism and Struggle Against Imperialism by the Iran Chamber Society
• "Clandestine Service History—Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran—November 1952 – August 1953". Archived from the original on 2009-06-08. Retrieved 2009-06-06. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)</ref>
• History Channel film footage from Iran, the coup and its aftermath.
• The 1953 Coup in Iran by Professor Ervand Abrahamnian (Archived 2009-10-20) Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, 182–215
• 50 Years Later—a look back at the 1953 US-backed coup in Iran
• The C.I.A. in Iran—The New York Times report based on uncovered CIA documents
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953—Provided by the National Security Archive
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran—new book from the National Security Archive reexamines the coup
• How to Overthrow a Government—interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
• US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror—Interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men
• All The Shah’s Men—interview with Steven Kinzer
• Review of All the Shah's Men by CIA staff historian David S. Robarge
• A Very Elegant Coup—critique of All the Shah’s Men
• The spectre of Operation Ajax by Guardian Unlimited

• CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia
• United Kingdom intelligence operations
• Conflicts in 1953
• 1953 in Iran
• 1953 in the United Kingdom
• 1953 in the United States
• History of the foreign relations of the United States
• History of the United States (1945–1964)
• Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
• Battles involving Iran
• BP
• Coups
• Iran – United States relations