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Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician and member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and subsequently the Governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as the Minister of Commerce, and in 2007 he was appointed as the Communist Party of China (CPC) Chongqing Committee Secretary, first-in-charge of the Western interior municipality. He was removed from that position in March 2012.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified with the "princeling" faction in Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media—a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

During his tenure in Chongqing, Bo became known for a distinct style of heavy-handed populism. He initiated an ambitious campaign against organized crime, reinstated egalitarian welfare programs for the city's working class, maintained consistent double-digit GDP growth, and initiated campaigns to revive a Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market economic reforms and increasing wealth disparities. However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end with the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief allegedly sought asylum at a U.S. consulate. In the fallout, Bo was removed from his Chongqing party post in March 2012.

Early life

Bo Xilai was born in Shanxi in 1949, the fourth son of prominent Communist Party member, Bo Yibo. The elder Bo served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China, but fell from favor in 1965 for supporting open trade with the West. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from the party. He spent the ensuing twelve years imprisoned, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was beaten to death. The couple's children were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai spent five year imprisoned.

According to some sources, Bo joined the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, and may have at one point denounced his father. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau. He was admitted to the Peking University by examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history. He later graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree, and joined the Communist Party in October 1980. In 1982, Bo graduated from the Postgraduate Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with a Master's degree in journalism.

Early political career

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence with Bo Yibo serving as vice premier. Yibo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party, and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic and trade policies, the elder Bo was also politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against student demonstrators in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. In the wake of the 1989 crackdown, Yibo held secure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as Communist Party leader and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s

Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007, and was influential in shaping the political career and alignments of his son Bo Xilai.

Following Bo Xilai’s graduation from university, he was assigned to Zhongnanhai, the central government compound in Beijing. There, he worked with the Research Office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office. However, he soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy Party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning. In an interview with the state-run People’s Daily, Bo recalled later that his family name created obstacles to his work in this era. “For quite a long time people had reservations about me,” he said.

He subsequently became Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Party Committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone, and Secretary of the Jinzhou Prefectural Party Committee in Liaoning.

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990. . In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.

Work in Liaoning

Bo took up the post of acting Mayor of Dalian in 1992, and served as mayor from 1993 to 2000. The modern city was built upon the colony of Port Arthur during the late Qing Dynasty. He was elected as deputy secretary of CPC Dalian Municipal Committee in June 1995, the city's second-in-command. Bo also served as secretary of the Communist Party for Dalian from 1999 to 2000, becoming the city's top political figure.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation into a modern metropolis, representative of China's economic growth. The Shenyang-Dalian Expressway was built in the early 1990s, becoming China's first expressway. Dalian has since then been known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award. Despite the accompanying economic growth and increase in GDP per capita, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects.

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, thus serving the longest time in a single region among the officials of China.

In 2001, Bo was chosen by then-President Jiang Zemin to become governor of Liaoning province, and held that position until 2004. In January 2003, Bo was elected as Governor of Liaoning at the first session of the tenth Liaoning People's Congress. However, during the same year Bo failed to get elected to the Communist Party Central Committee, ostensibly because of a backlash amongst grassroots party members against perceived unfair privileges of the "princelings." During his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province. His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, which also resulted in his failure to get elected to the Liaoning provincial delegation to the 15th Party Congress.

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning, has was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping. Jiang wrote that while Bo was not himself corrupt per se, he was actively covering up the corruption of his friends and relatives. Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison for publishing the reports, but was released after five years under international pressure.

Bo has been subject to accusations of torture by Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters, and some party members were reportedly "dismayed" by the readiness with which he carried out the suppression of the group while he was governor of Liaoning. Falun Gong adherents have filed lawsuits against Bo in Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries.

Minister of Commerce

Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as President in late 2003. Both leaders ended Bo's career as a local official by appointing him Minister of Commerce in Wen's cabinet; Bo replaced Lü Fuyuan, who had health problems and was unable to fulfill his duties. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems, Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy. He became a darling of the media both in China and abroad.

Bo's term as Minister of Commerce saw a continued rise in foreign investment. His daily schedule was dominated with receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he held the position of Minister of Commerce, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English, much to the delight of his guests, who were accustomed to dealing with interpreters. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few hand-picked Ministers to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe. The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy, during which Bo kept a cool head as he attended talks in Washington. On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services industry, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, whose formation was the result of the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies. He drew out plans to protect Chinese industries so they would not lose their place inside the Chinese market.

Party chief of Chongqing

It was widely speculated following the 17th Party Congress in November 2007 that Bo would take over as party chief in Chongqing. Bo took over the position on 30 November, replacing Wang Yang, who was transferred to lead the party in Guangdong. Bo was also elevated to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Bo's move from the Northeast to the Southwest was another dramatic change in his political career, and media reports indicated that Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was 'bargaining' for a higher position. Some saw is transfer as a 'demotion' from the central government to the hinterlands, others saw it as a 'lateral' move since he gained an ex officio seat on the Politburo for being the party chief in one of the four municipalities.

Organized crime

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against the city's organized crime scene. Since June 2009, some 2,000 people were detained in a sweeping campaign against gangsters in the city. In marked departure from other anti-mafia campaigns in China, Bo cracked down on the government officials who served as political back-up to gangsters, not just the gangsters themselves – some of the detained were officials in Bo's own administration, others were from the city's police force. Wen Qiang (文强), one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been at the top echelons of municipal power since the days of party secretaries He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. Reports from the Jamestown Foundation suggest that the final decision for such a large-scale crackdown originated from the central authorities and CPC General Secretary, President Hu Jintao, and Bo has been careful to not make the case look as though Chongqing is "trying to set an example" for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.

Bo's anti-crime measures were criticized for neglecting due process and for the alleged use of torture to extract confessions, but Bo's apparent willingness to combat crime in a city often seen as center for organized crime earned Bo national recognition. The apparent success of Bo's campaign has led to Bo's "rock star status", and have led to calls from the public for an anti-crime campaign on the model of Bo's anti-crime campaign in Chongqing. Lawyers in Chongqing became afraid to defend those accused of crimes after one lawyer, Li Zhuang, was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for perjury after representing a triad boss who testified that he was tortured by police. Some observers in Beijing have interpreted Bo's anti-mafia campaign as an insult to Bo's predecessors in Chongqing, Wang Yang, who can now be criticized for his tolerance towards organized crime. In order to reform the local police service, whose police chief was arrested for mafia connections, Bo brought in a police chief that he had employed as governor of Liaoning, Wang Lijun. The appointment of a police chief seen as a Bo loyalist led to rumors that Bo was intent on importing more of his old colleagues from Liaoning to run Chongqing.

Red culture movement

During his tenure in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive "red culture," including through the promotion of Maoist quotes, "red" songs, revolutionary television programing, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, just as Chinese students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, Bo sent out "red text messages" to the city's 13 million cellphone users. According to Xinhua News Agency, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together", and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities." Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's needy. Willy Lam of the Jamestown Foundation characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.

In 2011, Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai and the city's Media Department initiated a 'Red Songs campaign' that demanded every district, government departments and commercial corporations, universities and schools, state radio and TV stations to begin singing "red songs", praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China and PRC. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals of his father's comrade-in-arms Mao Zedong; although academic Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.

Political ambitions

Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012, when current General Secretary Hu Jintao was expected to be replaced by Xi Jinping, and Premier Wen Jiabao expected to be replaced by Vice Premier Li Keqiang. Seven of the nine members of the PSC were expected to retire, and the shift in power will leave room for the ambitious Bo to re-enter a position in the national leadership. Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral system of politics, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a political campaign for the top leadership.

Bo's political ambitions were underscored by his pioneering of a new style of governance focused on a new brand of statism and populism, dubbed the "Chongqing Model," which commentators have labeled the modern 'left' of the Chinese political spectrum.

Wary of the potential for social chaos similar to that created during the Cultural Revolution, attributed partially to Mao's personality cult, the public images of modern Chinese leaders tend towards stoic reserve. In spite of Bo's popularity among the public, and the "fawning" attention of the international media, both President Hu and Premier Wen have were reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, perhaps due to a discomfort over Bo's leadership style. The Irish Independent said he was a "divisive figure, creating enemies by riding roughshod, at times, over the hierarchy of the party and by his unwavering support for Mr Jiang." According to leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, in 2007 Premier Wen Jiabao stated his belief that the international lawsuits filed against Bo by Falun Gong made it "inappropriate" for him to hold higher national office. However, Bo gained support from powerful members of the elitist faction, including Wu Bangguo, Xi Jinping, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.

Bo's efforts to combat crime has been interpreted as an implicit attack against his populist faction predecessors, He Guoqiang (now a PSC member) and Wang Yang (now the Party chief of Guangdong), who failed to adopt an comparably aggressive stance against corruption and organized crime. Bo's ability to advance within the Party hierarchy may be challenged to the degree that other senior members of the CCP interpret Bo's ambitions as being potentially threatening to their own.

Downfall

On 8 February 2012, Wang Lijun, Bo's lieutenant who presided over the Chongqing gang trials, was unexpectedly reported to be on leave due to a "health concern." In fact, Wang had visited the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu shortly prior to 'health leave.' It was speculated that Wang was attempting to seek political asylum and was attempting to offload 'evidence' of Bo's alleged crimes during his Chongqing tenure. One day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption. Observers remarked that the political fallout from the unprecedented incident would end Bo's chances at a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee. Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him. In an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, Bo directly fielded questions about the incident, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "trusted the wrong person."

On 15 March, Bo was sacked as Chongqing Communist Party Secretary and its related municipal posts, while retaining a seat on the Politburo. He was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the latter's press conference with foreign and domestic press. Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture" in Chongqing. Addressing the issue of political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented, highlighting the gravity of the situation. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.

On 20 March, reports emerged that Bo's firing was related to allegations that he sought to interfere with a corruption investigation against one of his family members.

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions on both sides of the political spectrum. Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were swept with angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after. Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo. Peking University professor Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state,' while pundit Sima Nan's pro-Bo microblogs were censored. Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor. The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively to Bo's downfall, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive. Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development. Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution. Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively to Bo's dismissal.

Political alignment and affiliations

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin, and is associated with Jiang’s faction. This faction, sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique." The elitist coalition was contrasted with the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, which advocated more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net. The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth. Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups. Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth. He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists, and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives. Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment. Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform. To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.

Personal life

Bo's first wife is Li Danyu, with whom he had a son, Li Wangzhi, who attended Columbia University. Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986, a prominent lawyer who was the first Chinese lawyer to have won a public case in the United States. She gave up her legal career when the couple was still in Dalian. Gu Kailai's father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary and General who led the 12.9 Movement that propelled China to unite against Japanese invasion of Manchuria in World War II. She is also a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.

They have one son, Bo Guagua. He attended the Harrow School for boys in the UK, and was later accepted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Bo Guagua was reportedly seen driving a red Ferrari in early 2011 at the residence of U.S. ambassador Jon Huntsman, Jr.; his father later denied this. Bo also said that his son's costs for college were paid for by "full scholarship" by the respective institutions that the younger Bo attended.

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External links

• News about Bo Xilai at China Digital Times.
• Biography and recent career data at China Vitae, an online biographical database of Chinese VIPs
• Template:Zh icon Alibaba details Bo's charisma
• Bo Xilai in TIME magazine's 2010 Top 100 Influential People.

Template:Persondata

• Use dmy dates from March 2012
• 1949 births
• Living people
• Mayors of Dalian
• Peking University alumni
• Politicians from Beijing
• Politicians of the People's Republic of China
• Crown Prince Party
• Red Guards
• Bo Xilai
• Chinese communists
• Government ministers of the People's Republic of China