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Battle of Bint Jbeil
Part of 2006 Lebanon War
Map of South Lebanon showing location of Bint Jbeil
Date July 24 – August 11, 2006 Location Bint Jbeil, Southern Lebanon Result Hezbollah victory Israel failed to conquer the town
Belligerents
Israel	Hezbollah
Strength
Paratroopers (101st, 890th and the Recon battalion) Golani (51st, the Recon battalion and the Egoz unit) Two armored brigades	100-150 fighters, incl. 40 Special Force (IDF estimate)
Casualties and losses
15 dead	34 local fighters killed in war
Dozens of civilians killed

The Battle of Bint Jbeil was one of the main battles of the 2006 Lebanon War. Bint Jbeil (Template:Lang-ar, Bint Jubayl) is a major town of some 40 000, mainly Shiite Muslim, inhabitants in Southern Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces launched two sustained attempts to conquer the town, but failed to occupy it. The town was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war, with both sides taking heavy losses. Two senior Israeli officers were killed in the battle. Hezbollah similarly lost several commanders, most notably Khalid Bazzi, the Hezbollah commander of the Bint Jbeil area.

Background

Bint Jbeil was a major center for the Lebanese resistance during the 18 years of Israeli occupation. After the liberation in 2000 it became an important base for Hezbollah. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah held his victory speech in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal, in front of a joyful audience of more than 100 000 people, Muslims and Christians, where he belittled Israeli power:

"Barak is today calling on Lebanon to consider the withdrawal as a token of peace. This is treachery. He left having no other option... Barak still holds our prisoners in his jails, occupies territory dear to us - namely the Shebaa Farms... every prisoner in Israeli jails will soon, God willing, be back home among you. Barak and his government have no choice: I advice him to leave the Shebaa farms... he has no other choice... I tell you: the Israel that owns nuclear weapons and has the strongest air force in the region is weaker than a spider's web."

According to Israeli journalist Amir Rapaport this speech infuriated the IDF Command which over time developed a "cobwebs complex". The 2006 Lebanon war finally presented an opportunity to get even. Senior IDF officers, such as Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Chief of Operations Gadi Eisenkot claimed that Bint Jbeil was an important "symbol". They hoped to capture the town and bring an Israeli leader to hold a victory speech at the same place where Nasrallah held his speech in 2000. Instead Bint Jbeil would once again become a symbol of an Israeli failure.

Capturing Bint Jbeil would not have changed the outcome of the war. It was not essential for Hezbollah’s capability to fire rockets at Israel. Most of its rocket firing capabilities was located outside built-up areas, in so-called "Nature Reserves". An Israeli elite unit stumbled into one such facility near the village Maroun ar-Ras and suffered high casualties. After this encounter the head of IDF Northern Command Maj.-Gen. Udi Adam forbade any further attacks on Nature Reserves, fearing it would lead to high casualties. "A nature reserve can swallow an entire battalion," he said. This prohibition would remain in force throughout the war.

According to IDF estimates Bint Jbeil and the nearby village of Aynata was defended by 100-140 fighters, about 60 of whom belonged to the local garrison and around 40 belonged to the Hezbollah Special Force. The primary aim of the Hezbollah forces in the string of positions along the border was not to hold territory but to bleed the Israelis and slow down their advance.

First round (July 24–29)

The Israeli political and military leadership were frustrated with the progress of the war. Despite the claims of success there was "nothing tangible to put on display" to show for it. A clear victory at Bint Jbeil could well be the watershed in the war. A Hezbollah surrender here could create a "ripple effect" on the other strongholds in South Lebanon.

The IDF, however, was divided over exactly how to deal with the town. Some proposed an outright occupation of the town while others a more subtle approach, surrounding it and raiding Hezbollah positions in it. Brigadier General Gal Hirsch of the 91st Division wanted to conquer Bint Jbeil, not just to raid it. It was his division headquarters that came up with the name "Operation Web of Steel" (Template:Lang-he).

The operation was planned as a pincer movement with the Golani Brigade approaching the town from the east and the Paratroopers Brigade from the west. Unfortunately the paratroopers set out too late and were ordered to halt before reaching their designated positions. Since the painful experiences of the Egoz unit at Maroun ar-Ras, Israeli forces were not allowed to advance in daylight. The northern side of the town was intentionally left open, maybe to provide an escape route for the town's defenders. Instead Hezbollah used the opportunity to send in reinforcements to the town.

The Israeli advance was preceded by a massive artillery bombardment. An IDF artillery officer, Lt.-Col. Avi Mano, claimed that Bint Jbeil had been hit by 3,000 shells by July 25. According to the officer, IDF cannons could make direct hit on houses and caused "more damage" than Katyusha rockets.

The battle started on July 24. On that day, five Golani soldiers were wounded by friendly fire, and two tanks were sent to evacuate them. The first was hit by a missile, killing the platoon commander and wounding two of the crewmen. The second tank, a Merkava IV, ran over a powerful remote-controlled mine and rolled over from the blast. One of the crew was killed and the battalion commander, Lt.-Col. Guy Kabili, was wounded. An armor-plated D-9 bulldozer that attempted to rescue the casualties was forced to retreat after being hit by a missile. The wounded were finally evacuated under the cover of a smoke-screen. Another 13 soldiers were wounded in clashes with Hezbollah. Hezbollah claimed that three of its fighters were killed that day, while Israel claimed that the toll was higher. By the end of the day, the IDF controlled a hilltop in the area.

By the next day the IDF had taken up positions outside Bint Jbeil and the nearby village of Aynata but had not yet entered the built-up areas. In spite of this Gen. Hirsch declared victory to the press. "The town is in our control," he declared on July 25. "The work is almost completed and the terrorists are fleeing." The statement would quickly prove disastrously wrong. An Israeli soldier would later describe his feelings when hearing Hirsch's words over the radio, while being under Sagger missile attack "from every direction" in the town: "you realize something is wrong."

In the early hours of the morning on July 26, the Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion was finally given the go-ahead to advance into the outskirts of town. After sifting through a dozen buildings, an Israeli force consisting of two companies walked into a well-prepared ambush. Lebanese accounts of this battle refer to it as "the battle of Aynata" as the Israeli forces had not yet entered Bint Jbeil proper. The olive grove has been renamed "Liberation square" (Template:Lang-ar). Several Hezbollah fighters positioned in the upper stories of buildings opened fire with small arms and anti-tank rockets and the two companies quickly suffered heavy casualties. The battalion's deputy commander, Major Roi Klein was among the dead, having been killed when he covered a grenade with his body to save his troops. The only soldier who witnessed the episode, Sgt. Shimon Adega, was killed shortly afterward. A third of the soldiers from one company were wounded. The IDF troops returned fire and fought to regain control of the situation. The fighting then changed from an offensive military operation to a rescue mission. The IDF sent in reinforcements to provide covering fire while the casualties were evacuated. The troops that arrived as reinforcements suffered low casualties compared to the first wave, and most of their casualties were light injuries. Soldiers often risked their lives not only to save the wounded, but to recover the dead and prevent Hezbollah fighters from reaching their bodies. Combat continued for several hours, and was often conducted at point-blank range. The wounded were carried three kilometers to a place where helicopters could land under the protection of smoke grenades and heavy artillery fire, and soldiers often simultaneously shot at enemy fighters while carrying stretchers. Finally, Israeli Air Force Blackhawk helicopters managed to land under heavy fire and fly the wounded to Rambam Medical Center in Haifa. The commanders decided not to risk pilots to evacuate the dead; they were carried out under cover of darkness by a company from the Golani Brigade's 12th Battalion."

IDF suffered 8 dead, including three officers, and 24 wounded in the fighting in Bint Jbeil. On the same day an anti-tank missile fired from Bint Jbeil, hit a paratrooper position in nearby Maroun ar-Ras and one officer was killed and three soldiers were wounded. Hezbollah also suffered heavy casualties in the battle. The IDF initially said that 15 Hezbollah fighters were killed. Later, the IDF revised this claim and said that it killed 40 fighters, a figure denied by Hezbollah. The Lebanese daily as-Safir claimed that four Hezbollah fighters died in the clash, and provided the names of four dead Hezbollah fighters it said were killed there. One of them, Atif al-Mousawi, is not counted among Aynata's "14 martyrs" and was therefore probably from outside the town.

Sporadic clashes continued over the next days. On July 29, a major engagement took place between Israeli paratroopers operating in the town's western neighborhoods and elite fighters from Hezbollah's special force. According to the Israeli commander, the clashes started when two Hezbollah fighters were killed while approaching a building occupied by the paratroopers. Then, at least seven Hezbollah cells attacked the soldiers, employing anti-tank rockets and RPGs. The commander claimed that "our forces were well prepared and gunned down cell after cell. We saw them falling". The paratroopers received air support during the battle. The IDF claimed that 26 Hezbollah fighters were killed, and put its own casualties at 6 wounded, one of them seriously (possibly by one of his own rockets after it malfunctioned). Hezbollah denied losing 26 of its fighters. On the same day, two high-ranking Hezbollah commanders were killed in an Israeli air strike in the Old City of Bint Jbeil. Khalid Bazzi (Qasim) was chief of operations in the Bint Jbeil area, including Maroun al-Ras, Aynata, Aytaroun and Bint Jbeil, while Muhammad Abu Ta'am was responsible for the town itself. Both had taken part in the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers that had started the war. A Hezbollah battlefield commander was expected to be with his troops during battle. Abu Ta'am's presence at Bazzi's side, however, was subsequently criticized, as two commanders were not supposed to have been in the same place during a battle. The IDF had earlier claimed that Bazzi was killed in Maroun ar-Ras several days earlier. Bazzi was succeeded by Muhammad Qansuh (Sajid), a special force commander who in turn would be killed 10 days later.

On the same day, the IDF pulled its troops from Bint Jbeil, but armored units continued to operate around the town.

Respite

After the airstrike on Qana on July 30, in which 28 Lebanese civilians were killed, Israel declared a two day suspension of air strikes. Hezbollah reciprocated and suspended its rocket attacks on northern Israel.

Teams from the Red Cross and United Nations arrived in Bint Jbeil to survey the damage and evacuate residents, a day after heavy fighting reduced much of the area to rubble. Many of the remaining civilians took the opportunity to leave the town.

Second round (August 6–9)

In the beginning of August discussions were held at IDF command about what to do about Bint Jbeil. Chief of Staff Halutz decided to occupy the remaining pockets of resistance close to the border; Bint Jbeil, Ayta ash-Sha’b and Mays al-Jabal. This time Bint Jbeil would be effectively surrounded and attacked simultaneously from all sides. The operation was to be completed by August 8.

On the evening of August 6, the battle began again. The Israeli advance into Bint Jbeil was slow. The following day a paratrooper was killed and four others were wounded in a clash that lasted several hours. Two Israeli tank crews, including a senior officer, were killed and two others injured when their tank was hit by an anti-tank missile. The IDF claimed that 5 Hezbollah fighters were also killed during the clash.

A column of tanks was ordered to occupy the former Israeli headquarters building in the northern outskirts of the town, close to the place where Nasrallah held his "cobweb" speech in 2000. Paratrooper Brigade commander Hagai Mordechai was commissioned the task of hoisting the Israeli flag on this building. Thus began the so-called "Battle of the Flag".

At the entrance to Bint Jbeil stood a large ten-story building, later nicknamed "the Monster" by Israeli soldiers, where about ten Hezbollah fighters had taken up positions, preventing further Israeli advance. The Israeli army was reluctant to call in an airstrike because of its proximity to a hospital. Although it was assumed to be vacant, Israel did not want to repeat the disastrous mistake in Qana. While advancing on the building an Israeli soldier was critically wounded in a suspected friendly fire incident. It was clear that the soldier would not survive unless he could be taken to hospital. The wounded soldier was evacuated in a dramatic rescue operation but died in the helicopter before reaching the hospital. Another soldier was killed in the rescue operation. The Israeli Air Force eventually bombed the building, causing it to collapse.

After the losses sustained, the paratroopers lost the will to continue the fight. Mordechai told his deputy to "take the flag, put it on the building where forces are, take pictures and leave. No one should die for this picture.” The flag was raised on a different building than intended and a photograph taken (reproduced here). In the end IDF decided not to publish the picture. By the time it was ready to be distributed it had become irrelevant. The IDF had already withdrawn from the town.

On the same day Chief of Operation Gadi Eisenkot had to inform the Israeli cabinet that the army had not occupied Bint Jbeil and some other localities close to the border. According to Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, Hezbollah managed to hold its positions in the town throughout the war. In the last days of the war the fighting was concentrated to areas north of the town and there were no reports of heavy fighting in the town itself.

On the last hours before the cease-fire came into effect Lieutenant Adam Kima was ordered to clear a road going westward out of Bint Jbeil. Kima refused to obey orders, claiming a high risk of being exposed to Hezbollah ambushes. The officer and five of his soldiers were arrested and sentenced to prison for 2–3 weeks (though released early).

By the beginning of September Israeli forces had withdrawn from the area of Bint Jbeil and control was transferred to the Lebanese army and United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Some have commented that this battle had a psychological component outweighing its military significance. Uri Bar-Joseph wrote about Dan Halutz in Haaretz "He pushed for ineffectual military initiatives with a high casualty toll, like the conquest of Bint Jbail, which was meant to create a spectacle of victory in the place where Nasrallah delivered his "spider web" speech following the IDF pullout in May 2000."

The battle of the bodies

IDF has a long standing policy of not leaving wounded or dead soldiers on the battle field and would at times go to great lengths to retrieve them. At the same time Israel has maintained a policy of not returning to families for burial the remains of killed militants that had engaged in "hostile terrorist activity". Instead they are buried in fenced-off so called "cemeteries for enemy dead", maintained by IDF military rabbinate, in what the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem considers a "demeaning and shameful manner".

This policy was particularly pronounced in the 2006 Lebanon war and would have a profound effect on the conduct of the war. IDF Chief of Staff Halutz repeatedly ordered Israeli troops during the war to capture the bodies of slain Hezbollah militants to "to show to the media". During the war Israel also released footage to FOX news of the slain Hezbollah fighter Hadi Hasrallah, the 18-year old son of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, killed in a clash in south Lebanon 1997 and whose body was retained by Israel. His remains were returned to Lebanon in an exchange in 1998.

Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsh, commander of Division 91, declared on July 25 that IDF "planned to take several bodies of dead guerrillas captive" in the battle of Bint Jbeil. The bodies of at least three Hezbollah fighters, who were killed in the battle of Bint Jbeil were captured by IDF and brought to Israel. The remains of Mousa Khanafir, Zayd Haydar and Marwan Samahat were returned to Lebanon in the prisoner exchange on 15 July 2008.

Veteran Israeli war correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai claimed that "in almost any ground battle, the moment our troops encountered resistance, the force's progress stopped, commanders demanded assistance, and the fighting focused on evacuating casualties from the battlefield… you will not find even one story about a force that fought until it completed its mission or a Hizbullah force that was defeated."

Aftermath

The Israeli army's failure in the war in general and especially its inability to conquer Bint Jbeil generated bitterness in Israel. The war had not ended before the recriminations inside the IDF Command started flying. The commander of the 7th Brigade, Col. Amnon Eshel was caught by a TV camera saying that his superior officer Brig. Gen. Gal Hirsh "does not understand what is going on on the battlefield", a statement that probably ended his military career. Hirsch shot back, accusing Eshel of never once entering Lebanon himself, only watching the war from his “plasma screen” in his HQ in Israel.

Former Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon's criticism of the Israeli conduct of the war was scathing, calling it a "catastrophe". Aware of the seriousness of the antitank threat, he says that the IDF should have left the vulnerable tanks at home and stayed away from built-up areas – "no tanks and no houses" – and to operate in a more guerrilla like type of warfare. He was especially critical of the attempted occupation of Bint Jbeil.

Commander of Northern Command Udi Adam was practically dismissed on 8 August 2006 - after his failure to capture Bint Jbeil - when the Chief of Staff Dan Halutz sent his deputy, Moshe Kaplinsky, to serve as a "coordinator" at Northern Command. Adam resigned from the army a month after the war. The Chief of Staff himself resigned from his post in January 2007 and his deputy Kaplinsky retired from the army in late 2007. Gen. Hirsch became the prime target for the widespread frustration in Israel after the war, having direct responsibility both for the abduction affair and the failures at Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash-Sha'b. He was forced to resign a few months after the war.

After his resignation, former Chief of Staff Halutz said that "the most blatant non-achievement or failure" of the war was allowing it to continue for so long. If the initial battles at Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbeil had been more successful the final ground operation could have been avoided. "We could have achieved a lot more if we had been more determined,” he said.

Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was very disappointed at the army's lack of "results" in Bint Jbeil but did not question the courage of the Israeli soldiers. "If Maroun al-Ras had looked different, if Bint Jbail had looked different, it could be that we would not have reached the point we reached."

Veteran Israeli war correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai however points out that despite the many Israeli failures, the main reason why the IDF was defeated in the war was "because Hizbullah was more effective and determined". A survey conducted with 24 high-ranking Israeli officers and published in the IDF journal Ma'arahot, showed that they considered Hezbollah a superior military force to the IDF. Hezbollah had better intelligence, military doctrine and strategy, tactical command, training and organization and above all motivation. Only in terms of technology did Israel score better than Hezbollah.

Hezbollah considered the battle of Bint Jbeil a remarkable victory, after holding several IDF brigades at bay. The IDF forces participating in the battle were vastly superior, both in terms of numbers and of firepower. According to Hezbollah the Lebanese fighters were outnumbered 10 or 20 to one in the battle. Hezbollah has yet to publish official casualty statistics from the battle or indeed from the war itself. It is clear however that dozens of Hezbollah fighters died in the battle. Many municipalities in South Lebanon have published lists of the "martyrs" of their local communities. According to these sources Bint Jbeil lost 20 fighters while Aynata lost 14 in the war. Among those killed were several "commanders", including Khalid Bazzi, the overall Hezbollah commander of the Bint Jbeil area. A Hezbollah commander told as-Safir that most of the fighters who died in the battle were killed by the shelling while only a “small number” died in the clashes with Israeli troops. Hezbollah usually dominated the battle field "because of the courage of the fighters, their steadfastness and knowledge of the terrain".

Not all of the 34 Bint Jbeil and Aynata fighters necessarily died in this particular battle. For example, Hezbollah commander Rani Bazzi participated in the battle (and was interviewed in Bint Jbeil by foreign press during the pause in the fighting) but moved to the north when IDF withdrew from the area. He was killed in the final days of the war in Ghandouriyah in the Battle of Wadi Saluki. Fighter Ali al-Wizwaz died in Maroun ar-Ras. But the total number of fatalities in the battles in the Bint Jbeil area could well be higher than 34. Hezbollah sent reinforcements to the town during the war, including 40 members of the elite Special Force unit. The unit's commander, Muhammad Qansuh (Sajid ad-Duwayr), from the village of ad-Duwayr was killed in the last day of the war.

According to Human Rights Watch, several Lebanese civilians were also killed during this battle including a Lebanese citizen who also had US citizenship. The man was killed while trying to tend to civilians who were hit by Israeli fire and when there were no Hezbollah fighters in the area, or any fighting at the time.

Israeli fatalities

July 24, 2006

• 2nd Lt. Lotan Slavin, 21, of Hatzeva (Battalion 52)
• St.-Sgt. Kobi Smileg, 20, of Rehovot

July 26, 2006

• Maj. Ro'i Klein, 31, of Eli (Battalion 51)
• Lt. Amihai Merhavia, 24, of Eli (Battalion 51)
• Lt. Alexander Shwartzman, 24, of Akko (Battalion 51)
• Sgt. Shimon Adega, 21, of Kiryat Gat (Battalion 51)
• St.-Sgt. Edan Cohen, 21, of Tel Aviv (Battalion 51)
• St.-Sgt. Shimon Dahan, 20, of Ashdod (Battalion 51)
• Cpl. Ohad Klausner, 20, of Bet Horon (Battalion 51)
• Cpl. Assaf Namer, 27, of Kiryat Yam (Battalion 51)

Aug 7, 2006

• Maj.(res.) Yotam Lotan, 33, of Beit Hashita
• St.-Sgt. Moshe (Malko) Ambao, 22, of Lod (paratroopers)
• St.-Sgt.(res.) Noam Meirson, 23, of Jerusalem

Aug 8, 2006

• St.-Sgt. Oren Lifschitz, 21, of Gazit (paratroopers)
• St.-Sgt. Moran Cohen, 21, of Ashdot Ya'akov (paratroopers)

Hezbollah fatalities

Bint Jbeil

• Muhammad Abu Ta'am (commander)
• Kifah Mahmoud Asaili
• Ali Abu Aliwi
• Rani Adnan Bazzi (commander)
• Hisham Muhammad Bazzi
• Khalid Ahmad Bazzi (regional commander)
• Qasim Muhammad Baydoun
• Nidal Mahmoud Dahir
• Hassan Qasim Hamid
• Ahmad Qasim Hamid
• Bilal Ali Harish
• Mahmoud Ahmad Khazim
• as-Sayid Husein Imad Jum'ah
• as-Sayid Ali Jum'ah
• Ali Adil as-Saghir
• Hasan Fayiz as-Saghir
• as-Sayid Mahmoud as-Sayid Ahmad
• Muhammad Hani Shararah
• Kifah Fayiz Shararah
• Ali Husein al-Wizwaz

Aynata

• Mousa Yousuf Khanafir
• Amir Ibrahim Fadlallah
• Jamil Mahmoud an-Nimr
• Ali Muhammad as-Sayyid Ali
• Mahir Muhammad Sayf ad-Din
• Zayd Mahmoud Haydar
• Muhammad Dheeb Khanafir
• Kazim Ali Khanafir
• Ammar Habib Qawsan
• Nazim Abdan-Nabi Nasrallah
• Marwan Husayn Samahat
• Muhammad Hassan Samahat
• Hassan Ismail Mustafa
• Shakir Najib Ghanam

The body of the fighter was captured by IDF and removed to Israel but was returned to Lebanon in the prisoner exchanges in 2007-08.

Note: the above lists refer to Bint Jbeil and Aynata locals who died as fighters in the 2006 Lebanon war, not to those who died in the battle of Bint Jbeil, although there is probably a substantial overlap between the two categories. An unknown fraction of those who fought and died in the battle where non-locals. Several of people on the list did not die in Bint Jbeil or Aynata. Also note that in addition to the names listed here, additional Hezbollah fighters might have been killed during the battle.

See also

• Roi Klein

Sources

• Cambanis, Thanassis, A Privilege to Die, Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel, Free Press, New York, 2010
• Crooke, Alastair and Mark Perry, HOW HEZBOLLAH DEFEATED ISRAEL, Asia Times

PART 1: Winning the intelligence war, Oct 12, 2006

PART 2: Winning the ground war, Oct 13, 2006

PART 3: The political war, Oct 14, 2006

• Erlich, Dr. Reuven (Col. Ret.), "Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians as human shields", Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), November 2006.
• Harel, Amos and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008
• Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Why They Died", Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, September 2007
• Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Flooding South Lebanon", Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006, February 2008
• Noe, Nicholas, Voice of Hezbollah, the statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, Verso, London and New York, 2007.
• Rapaport, Amir: Friendly Fire, How We Failed Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War (עמיר רפפורט, "אש על כוחותינו: כך הכשלנו את עצמנו במלחמת לבנון השנייה"), Sifriya Ma'ariv (2007).

Chapter 1: We have to stop this, (English)

Chapter 15: Go in, Kill Some Terrorists, Get out, (English)

Chapter 23: The battle of the flag (הקרב על הדגל), (Hebrew)

External links

• Documentary from al-Manar about the Martyr and Commander Khalid Bazzi (Arabic) on YouTube

References

1. ^ Rapaport, ch. 15
2. ^ Ehrich, p. 77
3. Harel, p. 139
4. Victory speech, May 26, 2000, Noe, pp. 232-43
5. Yaakov Katz (07/25/2006). "IDF looks to reclaim the Bint Jbail symbol". Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
6. Harel and Issacharoff, p. 137
7. Harel and Issacharoff, p. 139
8. Yaakov Katz (07/26/2006). "Analysis: The need to show a victory". Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
9. ^ yaakov katz (Jul. 25, 2006). "Army seals off Hizbullah stronghold of Bint Jbail". THE JERUSALEM POST. Retrieved Jan 6 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
10. Officer, soldier killed in Lebanon battle, Ynetnews, 25 July 2006
11. Tal Rabinovsky (07.12.2007). "'Who could believe we'd ever come back here? It is madness'". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
12. ^ Sa’da Alwah (10/07-2007). "معركـة عينـاثـا: ليـأت حالوتـس ويقـد المعركـة هنـا (The battle of Aynatha: Let Halutz come and lead the battle here)". as-Safir. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
13. Ilan Kfir (25/11/2006). "קליין הפיל עצמו קדימה וזעק שמע ישרא (Klein threw himself forward and shouted Hear O Israel)". Maariv. Retrieved Feb 25, 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
14. http://www.haaretz.com/news/wounded-troops-describe-bint-jbail-battle-as-hell-on-earth-1.193907
15. "'It was all so very fast - the shooting, the shouting'". Jerusalem Post. 2006-07-28.
16. ^ Yaakov Katz (07/26/2006). "8 soldiers killed in Battle of Bint Jbail". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
17. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3281856,00.html
18. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3283076,00.html
19. ^ "IAF hits road on Lebanon-Syria border". Haaretz. 2006-07-28.
20. ^ Zaynab Yaghi (09/07/2007). "معركـة بنـت جبيـل: يوم ظنّ الإسرائيليون أن الزيتون يطلق النار عليهم (The battle of Bint Jbeil: A day when the Israelis thought the olive trees opened fire at them)". as-Safir. Retrieved Jan 6 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
21. Kamil Jabir (29/07/2007). "خالد بزي (قاسم) يكتب ملحمة بنت جبيل (Khalid Bazzi (Qasim) writes the Bint Jbeil epic)". al-Akhbar. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
22. yaakov katz (Jul. 25, 2006). "Army seals off Hizbullah stronghold of Bint Jbail". THE JERUSALEM POST. Retrieved Jan 6 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
23. "Israel OKs expansion of Lebanon campaign". CNN. 2006-07-31.
24. Efrat Weiss (08.07.2006). "2 more troops killed in Bint Jbeil". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
25. ^ Rapaport, ch. 23
26. Hanan Greenberg (08.09.06). "Lebanon: Soldier rescues friend, both die of wounds". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
27. Harel and Issacharoff, p. 195
28. Crooke and Perry, part 2
29. Goel Beno (Aug. 16, 2006). "An officer who objected to a mission on the cease-fire eve released from detention (translation from Hebrew)". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
30. LARRY DERFNER (22/11/2011). "Lambs to the slaughter?". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
31. THE DAILY STAR: UNIFIL offers beacon of security in South
32. Haaretz Their most humiliating hour
33. Uzi Mahnaimi (August 27, 2006). "Humbling of the supertroops shatters Israeli army morale". The Sunday Times. Retrieved Dec 4 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) Original link inaccessible, alternative link "here" (PDF).
34. "CAPTIVE CORPSES" (PDF). B'tselem Information Sheet. : March 1999. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
35. Harel and Issacharoff, p.270
36. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah's son on YouTube
37. "تراب عيناتا ومارون الرّاس وميس الجبل يحتضن شهداءه (The soil of Aynata, Maroun ar-Ras and Mays al-Jabal embraces its martyrs)". al-Akhbar. Retrieved Jan. 3, 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
38. Ron Ben-Yishai (07.21.2007). "Crybabies don't win wars". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved 2011-11-20. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
39. Yaakov Katz (09/17/2006). "Ex-general to Halutz: You're last IAF chief of staff". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
40. Yuval Dror (Oct.05.2006). "IDF plasma screens in limbo". Yediot Ahronoth. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
41. Ari Shavit (14.09.2006). "No way to go to war". Haaretz. Retrieved Jun 4 2010. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
42. Harel and Issacharoff, pp. 242-243
43. Moriah Bar-Yousef (07/11/2011). "הרמטכ"ל שהתפטר, האלוף שהמשיך הלאה והקמ"ן שהתאבד (The Chief of Staff who resigned, the General who moved on and the Intelligence Officer who committed suicide)". Israel Defence. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
44. Amos Harel (11.05.2007). "Halutz: IDF's greatest failure was inability to end war quickly, stop Katyusha rockets". Haaretz. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
45. Aluf Benn (11.05.2007). "Olmert: Israel can be proud of Peretz, but IDF let itself down during the war". Haaretz. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
46. Ron Ben-Yishai (Aug 22 2006). "Hizbullah was better". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
47. Yaakov Katz (09/29/2009). "'Hizbullah had better intel than Israel in 2006'". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
48. During the war Hezbollah only occasionally admitted its losses. A tally made by AP counted to 70 by the end of the war. After the war Hezbollah leader Mahmoud Komati admitted that 250 Hezbollah fighters had been killed in the war. That number was also confirmed by an investigation by Human Rights Watch (HRW (2007), p. 79). Israeli spokespersons still insist that 600 died.
    Sam Ghattas (28-Dec-2006). "Lebanon Sees More Than 1,000 War Deaths". The Associated Press. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
49. Cambanis, p.159
50. Nisreen Idrees. "ساجد الدوير في بنت جبيل ساحة النزال الأخيرة ("Sajid ad-Duwayr" the last battlefield in Bint Jbeil)". bintjbeil.org. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |date02/09/2008= (help)
51. The Associated Press and Gideon Alon (16.08.2006). "IDF: Troops killed top Hezbollah man minutes before cease-fire". Haaretz. Retrieved Jan 3 2012. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
52. Fatal Strikes: Israel’s Indiscriminate Attacks Against Civilians in Lebanon: Attacks on Civilian Homes
53. ^ Israel Ministry of foreign affairs. "Israel-Hizbullah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties". Retrieved 2011-11-10.
54. "شهداء بنت جبيل (Bint Jubayl martyrs)". Municipality of Bint Jbeil. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
55. "شهداء عيناثا الابرار (The noble martyrs of Aynatha)". Municipality of Aynata. Retrieved Dec 28 2011. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

• Conflicts in 2006
• 2006 in Lebanon
• 2006 Lebanon War
• Battles involving Israel
• Battles of the 2006 Lebanon War