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| |isbn = 978-81-7212-001-6}}</ref> | |isbn = 978-81-7212-001-6}}</ref> | ||
| |place=], ] | |place=], ] | ||
| |result= |
|result= *Pakistan halts Indian advance.<ref name="Allan">{{cite book|last=Fricker|first=John|title=Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965|year=1979|publisher=I. Allan|location=University of Michigan|pages=128|ISBN=978-0-71-100929-5}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Amin|first=Shahid M.|title=Pakistan's foreign policy: a reappraisal|year=2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Northwestern University|isbn=978-0-19-547912-6|pages=54}}</ref> | ||
| *Pakistan halts Indian invasion. | |||
| <ref name="Allan"/><ref name="Amin 2010 54">{{cite book|last=Amin|first=Shahid M.|title=Pakistan's foreign policy: a reappraisal|year=2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Northwestern University|isbn=978-0-19-547912-6|pages=54}}</ref> | |||
| *].<ref name="security_1965"/><ref name=Midlarsky/><ref name=Pradhan>{{cite book | *].<ref name="security_1965"/><ref name=Midlarsky/><ref name=Pradhan>{{cite book | ||
| |last = Pradhan | |last = Pradhan | ||
| Line 29: | Line 26: | ||
| |combatant1=<center>] ] | |combatant1=<center>] ] | ||
| |combatant2=<center>] ] | |combatant2=<center>] ] | ||
| ⚫ | |commander1={{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] ]<ref group="note">"He had fought in the World War II and won the ] due to his bravery as a young army lieutenant. Later in the 1965 War, he was awarded the gallantry award, ], for leading an infantry brigade as part of the 6th Armoured Division that fought the famous tank battle with the Indian Army at Chawinda in Sialkot and halted the advance of the invading Indian troops in Pakistan’s territory."</ref><br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Nisar Ahmed Khan<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. Sardar M.Ismail Khan<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. S. M. Hussain <br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. Abdul Ali Malik <br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. Muzzafaruddin<br />'''Later:'''<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] ]<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Bakhtiyar M.Rana<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brg. Amjad Chaudhry | ||
| |commander1={{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. ]<ref group="note">{{Quote|text=There was a solitary infantry brigade at Chawinda, bolstered by an armoured regiment. The man in charge was Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik...He ordered his staff officer to break communications with the higher headquarters and ordered the brigade straight to Chawinda... No one would have blamed him if he had put all available troops in defensive positions around Chawinda. But he did not do this. He ordered Nisar to put his two squadron in extended line and go over to the offensive...two squadrons of tanks and one infantry company had blunted and then beaten back what was one armoured division and three of infantry! The sheer momentum of such a massive Indian force should have allowed them to do better. But then who could have predicted that an infantry Brigadier would react in quite the manner that Brigadier Ali had done under the circumstances?|The News February 11, 1992 By Farouk Adam SJ}}</ref><br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Nisar Ahmed Khan<br /> | |||
| '''Later:'''<br /> | |||
| ⚫ | {{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] ]<ref group="note">"He had fought in the World War II and won the ] due to his bravery as a young army lieutenant. Later in the 1965 War, he was awarded the gallantry award, ], for leading an infantry brigade as part of the 6th Armoured Division that fought the famous tank battle with the Indian Army at Chawinda in Sialkot and halted the advance of the invading Indian troops in Pakistan’s territory."</ref><br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. Sardar M.Ismail Khan<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. S. M. Hussain <br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brig. Muzzafaruddin<br />'<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] ]<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Bakhtiyar M.Rana<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} ] Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan<br />{{flagicon|Pakistan|army}} Brg. Amjad Chaudhry | ||
| |commander2={{flagicon|India|army}} P.O. Dunn<br>{{flagicon|India|army}} ] ]{{KIA}} | |commander2={{flagicon|India|army}} P.O. Dunn<br>{{flagicon|India|army}} ] ]{{KIA}} | ||
| |strength1=30,000+50,000 infantry<br> 22 cavalry (44xM48), | |strength1=30,000+50,000 infantry<br> 22 cavalry (44xM48), | ||
| Line 60: | Line 55: | ||
| Total 225 tanks<ref name="MajorAH"/> | Total 225 tanks<ref name="MajorAH"/> | ||
| |casualties1= | |casualties1= | ||
| 44 tanks |
44 tanks<ref name="Steve Zaloga">''The M47 and M48 Patton tanks'' By Steve Zaloga, Jim Laurier ISBN 1-85532-825-9, ISBN 978-1-85532-825-9 pg.35.</ref> | ||
| <br /> | |||
| Over 518 km<sup>2</sup> (218 mi<sup>2</sup>) of territory lost<ref name=RakshakTashkent>{{cite web|last=Rakshak|first=Bharat|title=War diplomacy,ceasefire,Tashkent|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter11.pdf|work=Official History|publisher=Times of India|accessdate=12 July 2011| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20110609073753/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter11.pdf| archivedate= 9 June 2011 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref><ref name=Harbaksh>{{cite book|last=Singh|first=Lt. Gen.Harbaksh|title=War Despatches|year=1991|publisher=Lancer International|location=New Delhi|isbn=81-7062-117-8|pages=159}}</ref> | Over 518 km<sup>2</sup> (218 mi<sup>2</sup>) of territory lost<ref name=RakshakTashkent>{{cite web|last=Rakshak|first=Bharat|title=War diplomacy,ceasefire,Tashkent|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter11.pdf|work=Official History|publisher=Times of India|accessdate=12 July 2011| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20110609073753/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter11.pdf| archivedate= 9 June 2011 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref><ref name=Harbaksh>{{cite book|last=Singh|first=Lt. Gen.Harbaksh|title=War Despatches|year=1991|publisher=Lancer International|location=New Delhi|isbn=81-7062-117-8|pages=159}}</ref> | ||
| |casualties2=120 tanks ( |
|casualties2=120 tanks (Pakistani claim)<ref name="Steve Zaloga"/> | ||
| 29 tanks lost (Indian claim)<ref name="Harbaksh"/><ref>{{cite web|last=Rakshak|first=Bharat|title=Operations in Sialkot Sector pg32|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf|work=Official History|publisher=Times of India|accessdate=12 July 2011| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20110609073555/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf| archivedate= 9 June 2011 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> | 29 tanks lost (Indian claim)<ref name="Harbaksh"/><ref>{{cite web|last=Rakshak|first=Bharat|title=Operations in Sialkot Sector pg32|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf|work=Official History|publisher=Times of India|accessdate=12 July 2011| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20110609073555/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf| archivedate= 9 June 2011 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> | ||
| Line 70: | Line 64: | ||
| {{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}} | {{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}} | ||
| The '''Battle of Chawinda''' was a part of the ] Campaign in the ]. It was one of the largest ] battles since the ] in ]. | The '''Battle of Chawinda''' was a part of the ] Campaign in the ]. It was one of the largest ] battles in history since the ] in ]. | ||
| The initial clashes at Chawinda coincided with the ] and the fighting intensified once the Pakistani forces at Phillora retreated. However, the advancing Indian 1st Armored Division was stopped at Chawinda. The battle finally ended due to the ].<ref name="Pradhan"/> | The initial clashes at Chawinda coincided with the ] and the fighting intensified once the Pakistani forces at Phillora retreated. However, the advancing Indian 1st Armored Division was stopped at Chawinda. The battle finally ended due to the ].<ref name="Pradhan"/> | ||
| Line 84: | Line 78: | ||
| |publisher = Hariyana Prakashan, 1967 | |publisher = Hariyana Prakashan, 1967 | ||
| |pages = 181–182 | |pages = 181–182 | ||
| |isbn = }}</ref> The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6th Mountain divisions and Indian infantry seized the border area on 7 September. This was followed by a short engagement at Jassoran in which Pakistan lost 10 tanks and ensured complete Indian domination of Sialkot-Pasrur railway.<ref name="Gupta_1965"/> Realising the threat, the Pakistani |
|isbn = }}</ref> The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6th Mountain divisions and Indian infantry seized the border area on 7 September. This was followed by a short engagement at Jassoran in which Pakistan lost 10 tanks and ensured complete Indian domination of Sialkot-Pasrur railway.<ref name="Gupta_1965"/> Realising the threat, the Pakistani rushed two regiments of their 6th Armoured Division from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to support the Pakistani 7th Infantry Division there. These units, plus an independent tank destroyer squadron, amounted to 135 tanks; 24 ] and ]s, about 15 M36B1s and the remainder ]. The majority of the Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Nisar, which was sent to the Chawinda area. Fighting around the Gadgor village between the Indian 1 Armoured division and the Pakistani 25th Cavalry Regiment resulted in the Indian advance being stopped. | ||
| The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the 6th Armoured Division. In fact there was only a single regiment there at the time. The Indian 1st Armoured Division's drive quickly divided, with the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade supported by a tank regiment attacking Gat, while the main blow of the 1st Armoured Brigade was ]. Pakistani air attacks caused moderate damage to the tank columns, but exacted a heavier toll on the truck columns and infantry. The terrain features of the area were very different from those around Lahore, being quite dusty, and the approach of the Indian attack was evident to the 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillaura road. | |||
| {{Quotation|“He ordered his staff officer to break communications with the higher headquarters, lest they sow any more confusion in the already confused state of affairs, and ordered the brigade straight to Chawinda...And then Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik took his second, the most extraordinary, the most audacious decision of this, or any war. He could have been prudent, careful and conventional. No one would have blamed him if he had put all available troops in defensive positions around Chawinda. But he did not do this. He ordered Nisar to put his two squadron in extended line and go over to the offensive, 2 Punjab he was informed, would join him as soon as it reached there. And for the first time in the history of tank warfare two squadrons were about to take on an armoured division. This momentous decision, not recommended in any text book, was to save Pakistan from total defeat. | |||
| The Indians resumed their attacks on 10 September with multiple corps sized assaults and succeeded in pushing the Pakistani forces back to their base at Chawinda, where they were stopped. A Pakistani counterattack at Phillorah was repulsed with heavy damage, and the Pakistanis settled in defensive positions. The Pakistani position at this point was highly perilous, the Indians outnumbered them by ten to one. | |||
| We advanced all day in short bursts, from cover to cover. The Indians were retreating by the afternoon. We reoccupied Phillaurah, then Godgore, then Chobara. But then it was dusk, and the tanks withdrew to leaguer for the night. We were overextended and so had to abandon Chobara and take up defence around Godgore. The next morning we discovered a marked map in an abandoned Indian jeep. This showed their entire order of battle... We were stunned by our achievements of the previous day, and also made urgently conscious of how pitifully thin we were not the ground. The Indians broke through the position that we had taken back from them and routed our replacement. The signs of defeat were all over—stragglers moving back, some without weapons, some without their helmets and web equipment, without a resemblance of discipline or any sign of cohesion – demoralized troops, defeated. We dug in around Chawinda. Brigadier Ali had his headquarters in the village itself...he assessed that by this time the Indians had come to know exactly what stood against them. They threw everything at us. They often came close to success. Many times it seemed that our defense had disintegrated, only to be rallied round again...The Pakistani position at this point was highly perilous, the Indians outnumbered them by ten to one....We held on to Chawinda till the guns fell silent.”|The News February 11, 1992 By Farouk Adam SJ}} | |||
| However, the Pakistani situation improved as reinforcements arrived, consisting of two independent brigades from Kashmir, 8 Infantry Division, and most crucially, their 1 Armoured Division. For the next several days, Pakistani forces repulsed Indian attacks on Chawinda. A large Indian assault on 18 September involving India's 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain Divisions was repelled, with the Indian 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain divisions taking heavy losses. On 21 September the Indians withdrew to a defensive position near their original bridgehead, with the retreat of Indian first armoured division, all their offensives were ceased on that front.<ref>Barua, Pradeep (2005) ''The state at war in South Asia'' ISBN 0-8032-1344-1 pg.192.</ref> | However, the Pakistani situation improved as reinforcements arrived, consisting of two independent brigades from Kashmir, 8 Infantry Division, and most crucially, their 1 Armoured Division. For the next several days, Pakistani forces repulsed Indian attacks on Chawinda. A large Indian assault on 18 September involving India's 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain Divisions was repelled, with the Indian 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain divisions taking heavy losses. On 21 September the Indians withdrew to a defensive position near their original bridgehead, with the retreat of Indian first armoured division, all their offensives were ceased on that front.<ref>Barua, Pradeep (2005) ''The state at war in South Asia'' ISBN 0-8032-1344-1 pg.192.</ref> | ||
| Line 94: | Line 88: | ||
| ==Result== | ==Result== | ||
| Amidst the operation, on 22 September, the ] unanimously passed a resolution that called for an ].<ref name=Midlarsky>{{cite book|last=Midlarsky|first=Manus I.|title=Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0521700719|edition=1st|page=256}}</ref><ref name="Pradhan"/> The war ended the following day. The military and economic assistance to both the countries had been stopped when the war started. Pakistan had suffered attrition to its military might and serious reverses in the ] and Chawinda which made way for the acceptance |
Amidst the operation, on 22 September, the ] unanimously passed a resolution that called for an ].<ref name=Midlarsky>{{cite book|last=Midlarsky|first=Manus I.|title=Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0521700719|edition=1st|page=256}}</ref><ref name="Pradhan"/> The war ended the following day. The military and economic assistance to both the countries had been stopped when the war started. Pakistan had suffered attrition to its military might and serious reverses in the ] and Chawinda which made way for the acceptance the UN Resoltion.<ref name="security_1965"/> | ||
| According to Indian claims, at the end of hostilities on 23 September 1965, India held about 200 square miles (518 square kilometres)of Pakistani territory in the Sialkot sector including the towns and villages of ], Deoli, Bajragarhi, Suchetgarh, Pagowal, Chaprar, Muhadpur, Tilakpur |
According to Indian claims, at the end of hostilities on 23 September 1965, India held about 200 square miles (518 square kilometres)of Pakistani territory in the Sialkot sector including the towns and villages of ], Deoli, Bajragarhi, Suchetgarh, Pagowal, Chaprar, Muhadpur, Tilakpur south east and east of Sialkot city, which were returned to Pakistan after the ] in January 1966.<ref name="RakshakTashkent"/><ref name="Harbaksh"/><ref>{{cite web|last=History|first=Official|title=Operations in Sialkot sector|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf|work=Official history|publisher=Bharat-Rakshak.com|accessdate=11 July 2011| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20110609073555/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter07.pdf| archivedate= 9 June 2011 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> Likewise, by the end of the hostilities, Pakistan held up to 1,600 square miles of Indian territory, of which 1,300 square miles included ] sectors.<ref>{{cite book|last=Midlarsky|first=Manus I.|title=Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-52-170071-9|pages=256}}</ref> | ||
| ==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
| {{reflist|group=note}} | {{reflist|group=note}} | ||
| == |
==Notes== | ||
| {{reflist|group=note}} | {{reflist|group=note}} | ||
| ==References== | |||
| {{Reflist|2}} | {{Reflist|2}} | ||
Revision as of 05:49, 11 December 2014
| Battle of Chawinda | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Pakistan |
 India | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 Maj Gen Abrar Hussain Lt Col Nisar Ahmed Khan Brig. Sardar M.Ismail Khan Brig. S. M. Hussain Brig. Abdul Ali Malik Brig. MuzzafaruddinLater: Maj Gen Tikka Khan Lt Gen Bakhtiyar M.Rana Maj Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan Brg. Amjad Chaudhry |
 P.O. Dunn Lt Col Ardeshir Tarapore † | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
30,000+50,000 infantry 25 Cavalry (44x Patton) 33 TDU sqn (15x Shermans) 19 Lancers (44x Patton) 11 Cavalry (44x Patton) Total: 132 +150 (tank reinforcements) |
80,000–150,000 infantry 4 Horse (45x Centurion) 16 Cavalry (45x Centurions 17 Poona (45x Centurion) 2 Lancers (45x Sherman) 62 Cavalry (45x sherman) Total 225 tanks | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
44 tanks Over 518 km (218 mi) of territory lost |
120 tanks (Pakistani claim) 29 tanks lost (Indian claim) | ||||||
| Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |||||||||||
| Indo-Pakistani conflicts | |
|---|---|
| Kashmir conflict
Other conflicts Border skirmishes Strikes |
The Battle of Chawinda was a part of the Sialkot Campaign in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. It was one of the largest tank battles in history since the Battle of Kursk in World War II.
The initial clashes at Chawinda coincided with the tank battle near Phillora and the fighting intensified once the Pakistani forces at Phillora retreated. However, the advancing Indian 1st Armored Division was stopped at Chawinda. The battle finally ended due to the UN ceasefire.
The forces
General Dunn, the commander of I Corps Indian Army was given an assortment of units: 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Division and 26 Division. The Pakistani force expected to oppose the Indian thrust consisted of 15 Division, 6 Armoured Division (equivalent to armoured brigade group) and 4 Corps Artillery. Later reinforcements included 8 Infantry Division and 1 Armoured Division.
The battle
The aim of the attack was to seize the key Grand Trunk Road around Wazirabad and the capture of Jassoran which would enable domination of Sialkot-Pasrur railway, thus completely cutting off Pakistani supply line. The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6th Mountain divisions and Indian infantry seized the border area on 7 September. This was followed by a short engagement at Jassoran in which Pakistan lost 10 tanks and ensured complete Indian domination of Sialkot-Pasrur railway. Realising the threat, the Pakistani rushed two regiments of their 6th Armoured Division from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to support the Pakistani 7th Infantry Division there. These units, plus an independent tank destroyer squadron, amounted to 135 tanks; 24 M47 and M48 Pattons, about 15 M36B1s and the remainder Shermans. The majority of the Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Nisar, which was sent to the Chawinda area. Fighting around the Gadgor village between the Indian 1 Armoured division and the Pakistani 25th Cavalry Regiment resulted in the Indian advance being stopped.
The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the 6th Armoured Division. In fact there was only a single regiment there at the time. The Indian 1st Armoured Division's drive quickly divided, with the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade supported by a tank regiment attacking Gat, while the main blow of the 1st Armoured Brigade was hurled against Phillaura. Pakistani air attacks caused moderate damage to the tank columns, but exacted a heavier toll on the truck columns and infantry. The terrain features of the area were very different from those around Lahore, being quite dusty, and the approach of the Indian attack was evident to the 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillaura road.
The Indians resumed their attacks on 10 September with multiple corps sized assaults and succeeded in pushing the Pakistani forces back to their base at Chawinda, where they were stopped. A Pakistani counterattack at Phillorah was repulsed with heavy damage, and the Pakistanis settled in defensive positions. The Pakistani position at this point was highly perilous, the Indians outnumbered them by ten to one.
However, the Pakistani situation improved as reinforcements arrived, consisting of two independent brigades from Kashmir, 8 Infantry Division, and most crucially, their 1 Armoured Division. For the next several days, Pakistani forces repulsed Indian attacks on Chawinda. A large Indian assault on 18 September involving India's 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain Divisions was repelled, with the Indian 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain divisions taking heavy losses. On 21 September the Indians withdrew to a defensive position near their original bridgehead, with the retreat of Indian first armoured division, all their offensives were ceased on that front. Pakistani General vetoed the proposed counterattack "Operation Windup", According to the Pakistani C in C the operation was cancelled since ‘both sides had suffered heavy tank losses......would have been of no strategic importance....’ and above all ‘the decision...was politically motivated as by then the Government of Pakistan had made up their mind to accept cease fire and foreign sponsored proposals’.
Result
Amidst the operation, on 22 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The military and economic assistance to both the countries had been stopped when the war started. Pakistan had suffered attrition to its military might and serious reverses in the battle at Khemkaran and Chawinda which made way for the acceptance the UN Resoltion.
According to Indian claims, at the end of hostilities on 23 September 1965, India held about 200 square miles (518 square kilometres)of Pakistani territory in the Sialkot sector including the towns and villages of Phillora, Deoli, Bajragarhi, Suchetgarh, Pagowal, Chaprar, Muhadpur, Tilakpur south east and east of Sialkot city, which were returned to Pakistan after the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966. Likewise, by the end of the hostilities, Pakistan held up to 1,600 square miles of Indian territory, of which 1,300 square miles included desert sectors.
Notes
- "He had fought in the World War II and won the MBE due to his bravery as a young army lieutenant. Later in the 1965 War, he was awarded the gallantry award, Hilal-i-Jurat, for leading an infantry brigade as part of the 6th Armoured Division that fought the famous tank battle with the Indian Army at Chawinda in Sialkot and halted the advance of the invading Indian troops in Pakistan’s territory."
Notes
References
- ^ Rao, K. V. Krishna. Prepare or perish: a study of national security. Lancers Publishers, 1991. ISBN 978-81-7212-001-6.
- Fricker, John (1979). Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965. University of Michigan: I. Allan. p. 128. ISBN 978-0-71-100929-5.
- Amin, Shahid M. (2010). Pakistan's foreign policy: a reappraisal. Northwestern University: Oxford University Press. p. 54. ISBN 978-0-19-547912-6.
- ^ Midlarsky, Manus I. (2011). Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 256. ISBN 978-0521700719.
- ^ Pradhan, R.D. 1965 war, the inside story. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 2007. ISBN 978-81-269-0762-5.
- "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2 June 2012.
- ^ Amin, Major A.H. "Battle of Chawinda Comedy of Higher Command Errors". Military historian. Defence journal(pakistan). Archived from the original on 19 July 2011. Retrieved 12 July 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) Cite error: The named reference "MajorAH" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page). - ^ The M47 and M48 Patton tanks By Steve Zaloga, Jim Laurier ISBN 1-85532-825-9, ISBN 978-1-85532-825-9 pg.35.
- ^ Rakshak, Bharat. "War diplomacy,ceasefire,Tashkent" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 12 July 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Singh, Lt. Gen.Harbaksh (1991). War Despatches. New Delhi: Lancer International. p. 159. ISBN 81-7062-117-8.
- Rakshak, Bharat. "Operations in Sialkot Sector pg32" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 12 July 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. India-Pakistan war, 1965, Volume 1. Hariyana Prakashan, 1967. pp. 181–182.
- Barua, Pradeep (2005) The state at war in South Asia ISBN 0-8032-1344-1 pg.192.
- History, Official. "Operations in Sialkot sector" (PDF). Official history. Bharat-Rakshak.com. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 11 July 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - Midlarsky, Manus I. (2011). Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. p. 256. ISBN 978-0-52-170071-9.
External links
- Battle of Chawinda – Comedy of Higher Command Errors
- In Memory of Martyrs (first-hand account of the battle)
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