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End of the Greek recession in Q4-2013 ?

This is just to bump a note slightly in advance. In Europe recessions per definition ends, whenever the country's seasonally adjusted real GDP no longer contracts quarter-on-quarter. The challenge for our Misplaced Pages article however is, that ELSTAT currently is unable to calculate accurate quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted real GDP figures, and thus only publish unadjusted quarterly data displaying the relative changes of "quarters compared with same quarter of last year" for the Greek real GDP. Due to the delayed accumulation effect of the "quarter compared with same quarter of last year" figure, this figure however normally stays negative for 2 additional quarters after the real end of any recession.

ELSTAT announced in May 2014, that they are still not able to calculate accurate qoq seasonally adjusted real GDP figures, but I think we can expect them to start doing it, when they launch their new updated calculation method in September 2014. Only at that point of time, it will be known when exactly the Greek recession ended. So I ask all editors to avoid adding premature speculation lines into the article, claiming that the Greek recession has ended, until we at least can proof it with the soon to be released seasonally adjusted qoq real GDP data from ELSTAT. Until we have this data in our hands, nobody really knows for sure. We can only guess if it ended already by the end of Q4-2013 - or perhaps only will end a few quarters later. The latest EC spring forecast 2014 published in May 2014, suggest Greece will experience a positive 0.6% year-on-year real GDP growth in 2014, which under the assumption of gradually arriving improvements of the growth climate, imply that a seasonally adjusted real GDP growth indeed could have arrived as early as Q1-2014. But if the improvements are sudden rather than gradual, or if the forecast is wrong, then the end of the recession could arrive a little later. Personally I speculate the Greek recession indeed already ended by the end of Q4-2013. But we have to wait for the first hard data to arrive in September 2014, before we can check if my speculation is correct, and report anything about it in the Misplaced Pages article. Danish Expert (talk) 12:35, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

For those who excited wait for the first seasonally corrected quarterly real GDP data, I will -as a first prognosis- share that my own simplified calculation show that the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP started to rise already in Q1-2014:

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2013: €37,281 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,841 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2013: €40,788 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,441 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q3-2013: €42,905 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,046 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q4-2013: €40,008 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €39,654 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2014: €36,934 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,069 million.

To arrive at the above "simplified seaonsally adjusted real GDP for Q1-2014", I first calculated the adjusted forecasted quarterly GDP share for the four quarters in 2014 under the assumption the growth is evenly distributed throughout the year. If this is true - under the forcast that GDP will grow 0.6% in 2014, then we can expect this following seasonally adjusted percentage share between the four quarters in 2014: Q1share=24.944%, Q2share=24.981%, Q3share=25.019%, Q4share=25.056%. My formula for the "simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP" for Q1 then is:
Q1share / (unadjusted Q1GDP/(unadjusted Q2GDP+Q3GDP+Q4GDP+Q1GDP)) * unadjusted Q1GDP.
The simplified seasonally adjusted real GDPs for 2013 of course were calculated based on the same formula, with the only change that the "seasonally adjusted quarterly percentage shares" now were calculated based on the recorded final 2013 GDP growth rate (resulting in: Q1share=25.370%, Q2share=25.122%, Q3share=24.876%, Q4share=24.633%). Of course it is only a simplified prognosis model, so we still need to wait for the September data to arrive, before concluding for sure that the adjusted quarterly real GDP started to grow in Q1-2014. Based on my model it indeed did, already starting from Q1-2014, at least we can be almost certain about this conclusion, if the unadjusted Q2-2014 real GDP is reported to be above €40,550 million; because if this happen it will mean the "simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP" will be above €40,069 million in Q2-2014. We shall see. Danish Expert (talk) 09:06, 8 June 2014 (UTC)

According to a Greek statistical note, the long awaited seasonal adjusted quarterly GDP figures will be published on 10 October 2014. In the mean time, ELSTAT now released their 2nd quarter provisional figures, which confirmed (when being subject to my homemade very simple seasonal adjustment) that the Greek economy indeed left its long recession as of 31 December 2013 - and now delivered positive growth for 2 consequtive "seasonally adjusted" quarters.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2013: €37,281 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,841 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2013: €40,788 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,441 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q3-2013: €42,905 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,046 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q4-2013: €40,008 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €39,654 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q1-2014: €36,866 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,052 million.

GDP at constant 2005 prices in Q2-2014: €40,667 million. <=> Simplified seasonally adjusted real GDP: €40,081 million.

Again this finding of course still needs first to be confirmed by the official seasonally adjusted figures before we report anything, but so far the outlook looks positive. Danish Expert (talk) 15:00, 9 September 2014 (UTC)

Elstat has now finally released the long awaited seasonal adjusted quarterly GDP figures for the period Q1-1995 until Q3-2014. As expected, the latest recession indeed ended in Q4-2013. The new much more trustworthy data also show, that the Greek economy in the turmoil of the Financial Crisis was hit by a total of 3 separate recessions (and not one long):

• Q3-2007 until Q4-2007 (duration = 2 quarters)
• Q2-2008 until Q1-2009 (duration = 4 quarters)
• Q3-2009 until Q4-2013 (duration = 18 quarters)

Today I have updated the article with the above data. Danish Expert (talk) 07:49, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

Greece hit by a 4th recession (+ ESA2010 figures for 1995-2005 will soon become available)

This is just a reminder for some future update work to be conducted. First of all, it is evident Greece risk (as soon as 13 May 2015) to be officially declared being hit by a new 4th recession starting in Q4-2014, as a result of the renewed political uncertainty about its will/intention to stay on the outlined path of the current bailout-programme (which is the premise for ensuring continued flow of the much needed financial Troika support). On 13 May 2015, ELSTAT will publish data for the seasonally adjusted real GDP in Q1-2015, and if it is negative again (as it was in Q4-2014), the appearance of two consecutive quarters with negative seasonally-adjusted growth satisfy the European definition for when states are declared to be "in recession".

Another development to keep an eye with, which will require us to update all 1995-2005 data in the wikitable about Greek financial accounts, is when ELSTAT release its ESA2010 transmission figures for those years. ELSTAT last year informed, they expected to have those data available already in April 2015, but they have not been released as of 8 May 2015. According to their latest schedule, it is a bit unclear when it will happen exactly, and could happen as late as October 2015 (as part of the ordinary revision of annual national account data being reported to Eurostat). Currently the wikitable lack references for the old ESA-1995 data, as I due to time constraints had to skip the part of digging up references for the old data (no longer available at AMECO). The problem with the missing ESA-1995 references will be resolved, once the ESA-2010 updated figures gets released, as they will replace all ESA-1995 figures. If I have failed to remember update the wikitable in October 2015, then please remind me of doing it, by posting a reminder at my talkpage. :-) Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 12:38, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

Greece indeed back in recession, with a seasonally adjusted (constant price) GDP shrinking by -0.4% in Q4-2014 and -0.2% in Q1-2015. I will update the article with this sad info, within one hour from this post. Of course it was kind of expected this would happen, when the new-elect Greek government chose a path to refuse complying with the terms of its current bailout programme along with enforcing a prolonged negotiation phase without any movement (which triggered its current harmful liquidity crisis). But still a very sad story, for me to see this play out in real life. I sincerely hope for Greece, that this current self-imposed fourth recession will be short. For this new fourth recession to be short (i.e. ending by the end of Q2-2015), it will require the immediate signing by Greece of a new agreement with its creditors - so that the liquidity crisis vanish again - while investors return as part of being calmed to learn what path Greece now opt to walk on in the future. Danish Expert (talk) 17:24, 13 May 2015 (UTC)

Notability of non-events (the waiting game)

This is just to bump a short note, explaining why no detailed news is reported in the article about the current negotiations between Greece and the Troika in 2015. The simple reason is, that nothing notable really happened since the Syriza-government won the election. A lot of posturing and comments were made by the new Greek government, but no notable movement/action took place. Hopefully we can soon write a subchapter explaining the contents of some new re-negotiated and implemented terms for the current Troika bailout programme, but until that happens everything is pretty much up in the air.

After having followed the topic quiet intense, I am a bit concerned about the recent political statements made by various Greek government spokesmen, as it appear they either "say something which they know is not possible/true" (as part of attempting to score easy political points and/or appear more responsible than they actually are)" or suffer from a complete unawareness of the fundamental rules of the eurozone. In example, Varoufakis continue to suggest, as of 14 May 2015, that ECB through a debt-swap should reschedule the Greek government repayments of earlier issued ECB-bonds (suggesting Draghi is willing to do it - if the Bundesbank did not restrain his maneuver options) - although all of us having passed the basic course in EU politics know that both the letter of the founding Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union and the ECB statute strictly prohibit ECB from conducting fiscal policy and/or offer debt-finance or debt-relief to some of its members (which is something that only the Eurogroup can make political decisions about). Asking ECB to unease liquidity constraints and/or reschedule debt repayments is simply equal to ask for something which is not an available tool in the tool box (they can not do something which the treaty prohibit them to do - and therefor solely base their liquidity offers to the Greek financial system based on observations for their specific needs - and not the potential need for funds subsequently to get transferred from the Greek banks to the Greek government - and if the Greek government at some point of time is incapable of repaying what they owe to ECB then ECB will keep their repayment claims unaltered - leaving a scenario of either a sovereign default or the Eurogroup+IMF to come to the rescue by offering a new third bailout programme so that Greece can honor its repayment commitments). Likewise, it is pretty clear that all locked bailout funds in the current bailout programme, can only be unlocked the moment the Troika review find that Greece actually has implemented all of the original payment terms - or alternatively some mutually agreed substituting terms - before this happen the Eurogroup (which it made absolutely clear through various statements issued since February 2015), will not approve the unlocking of any remaining frozen bailout pledges in the current programme - and they even clarified that before the current programme had been successfully completed by Greece "no negotiations would start about a potential third follow-up programmme for covering the Greek needs after 1 July 2015". Despite of this very clear fact, the Greek government repeatedly suggest towards the media, that an extraordinary Eurogroup will soon be called to approve a new deal, which is direct (intended/unintended) misinformation, as we all know (except apparently the Greek government) that the Troika needs both: (1) First to strike a mutually agreed deal with the Greek government about some renewed payment terms and (2) then publish an updated review-report concluding such terms have actually been implemented by the Greek government (through laws in parliament), before (3) The Eurogroup then finally can approve releasing the remaining funds in the current bailout-programme (which in best case - because of all the work before then still needed to be done - now only is possible at the earliest in the second half of June 2015). To conclude, this extra topic about potential "unawareness of fundamental rules of the eurozone", is also something I currently hesitate to write a sub-chapter about, at least for the moment, as it might too be a temporary non-notable event and/or just a "political game".

As we are all right now in a waiting game to learn what exactly happens, this is also the explanation why no specific "negotiation news" so far has been added to the article. We are all waiting for specific substantial news, which hopefully soon will arrive. Danish Expert (talk) 11:48, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

Please abstain from such commentaries and stick to the facts as much as possible; let me just say that your views on the EU/€Ζ Power Game - cause that's what it is in short - are not universally accepted... ;-)
PS1. It would be fun to a have a fightconversation with you here on the issue at hand but others might not approve; these talk pages are not supposed to be a forum.
PS2. Describing the present state of affairs though, is indeed hard because among other things it's hard to write about leaks and counterleaks, about statements, counterstatements and denials thereof without knowing exactly what's going on behind the curtain... Thanatos|talk|contributions 14:34, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

@Thanatos: Sorry if my post above developed into being a bit too long and forum-style commentarish. It started out as an attempt to figure out, when it would be appropriate to add a sub-chapter about the current negotiations. My own conclusion after elaborating a bit on the topic, was the same as yours, that we have to wait until the negotiations have ended, and then report the results by a fact-styled manor. Perhaps my post just in the process got a bit polluted by my personal growing frustration, that even the negotiation process itself (and what role ECB can possibly play), is something the current Greek government fails to understand (or at least spin false tales about to the media).

For sure I do not claim to know the outcome of negotiations, but the negotiation framework and ECB's role, were both matters being fixed before negotiations started (regulated by treaty agreements, ECB statue, ESM statute, and the Eurogroup decision issued "Feb.20" not to start negotiations about a follow-up programme before negotiations and implementation of the current programme had been completed successfully), and this negotiation framework can not be changed in any possible way - meaning the process is limited to be all about whether or not a mutual agreement about adjusted payment terms can be settled between the Greek government at one side and with IMF and the Commission's working staff group at the other (and if this is achieved, the process will then move to the next step, being the "implementation of terms by passing laws in the greek parliament", and then thirdly the final review report will be published by the Commission's working staff group, and fourthly the Eurogroup will then convene and approve the transfer(s) of bailout funds to Greece, and fifthly the Eurogroup at the same time will start a negotiation process for starting up a follow-up programme supposed to cover the time period after the current programme end on 30 June). This outlined process is a fact, which already now can be sourced by various previous statements issued by the Eurogroup, and will at least be clear to all of us when (and if) the negotiations someday will complete successfully. I send my apology for posting such a long comment about it though, my bad. I agree with you, it is appropriate in all circumstances, now to await the final outcome of negotiations before we add a subchapter about it in the article. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 18:29, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

1. Rules, deals, agreements, laws and treaties are commonly interpreted at will and/or bypassed/bent and/or broken outright, e.g. 1, 2. Especially by those who have the power to do so and who are often the ones who set the rules in the first place. This is hardly a novel phaenomenon...
2. Sure, let's take something that at the very least isn't working (need I say that this is a huge understatement?) and most probably isn't supposed to work in the way it's been declared to do so (or equivalently it's working fine, perfectly, but not in the stated manner; 3), and let's extend and pretend (after all these Greek guys are relatively far far away at a place few people see and for those who do see it, it's when they are on summer holidays partying); pretend it's working then when fail, goto start. Because after all rules are rules...
PS In short, it's probably meaningless to argue over this, however fun it would be were it not for the problem that this is not a forum; our view on the...universe is a bit different... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions

@Thanatos: Yes, some of the operating rules can be interpreted to a certain degree by the political institutions (i.e. the Eurogroup). But nobody has the power to change the fundamental rules and procedures. In example, ECB can never accept writing-off debt that a Member State directly owe to ECB (as such a thing would be equal to a breach of the fundamental "no government financing"-rule). Just like it is written in stone in a similar way, how the negotiation process is conducted for Accession of new EU Member States, where the candidates always are required first to complete a specific outlined process of having 36 chapters opened and successfully closed before an accession treaty subsequently can be signed to let them into the club as a new EU member. Your referral to the example of slack historic governance of the Stability and Growth Pact (which is something the Eurogroup solely was responsible for), can not be used to conclude its now possible for ECB freely to interpret and change its "fundamental rules" of operating. It is a complete no-go if ECB breaches its fundamental mandate and start acting politically, as such a move would inevitably shortly afterwards end up in constitutional courts and be declared illegal. By the way the European institutions are constructed, no political negotiation (or rule bending) is allowed in ECB, which is required to operate strictly within its inflation-mandate, while all sorts of "political negotiation" and/or approval of new negotiated bailout deals is a matter solely for the Eurogroup to approve (because they have the democratic mandate of actually representing the political will and judgement of voters in the eurozone member states, which is something the central bank governors never can do).

When the current Greek government point a blaming finger towards ECB, this can either be because they lack understanding of how the "fundamental rules" work or some political spin fired-off for the sole purpose of running a political game of "lets blame the institutions for something which they are not responsible for - just to alleviate the political pressure/opposition that we otherwise would face on home soil from Greek voters - because of our poor way of running the negotiations".

All this fuss put aside, I think we (at least for now) should avoid to debate this issue further. We both agree on the conclusion, namely that it is now appropriate to await conclusion of the negotiations before writing a subchapter about it. When the dust settles, everything will be much more clear. I can guarantee you in advance, that none of the fundamental rules will be broken (i.e. ECB will keep playing a political neutral game and not in any way directly interfere in the political process). Perhaps the Eurogroup might reverse their "Feb.20-decision" about keeping negotiations separate for respectively "completion of the current programme" and the expected "follow-up programme starting on 1 July" (because they have the political power to do so if they find it appropriate), but it would be very irresponsible for the Greek government to cling its hope and negotiation position at such a dangerous bet.

In any case, the only story the wikipedia article currently can depict (to avoid speculative content and crystal balling), is the one describing the negotiation timeline and negotiation process approved by the Eurogroup on 20 February. I also think, you agree with me on this strictly limited editorial point, which btw imply no need for changes to the current content of the article. Danish Expert (talk) 05:33, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

1. I won't comment on the views you've again expressed so that we stop debating this as we both evidently agree we should. This doesn't mean I agree with what you've said; it just means I'm stopping and I'm expecting from you to stop too. OK? ;-) 2. Yes as I've said in my first reply it's hard to present in a reasonable fashion what's going on; therefore it'd probably be better to wait for actual clear changes and events; minor edits would be fine but for drastic ones my view is that it'd be better to wait. I don't know whether third parties will agree though... Thanatos|talk|contributions 16:29, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

Glad that we fully agree about the proposed editorial line - to await commenting the negotiations before they conclude. This has now indeed been established, by the posts by all three of us. :-) All that we have up until now, is only secondary reports, of what the central negotiators allegedly said/proposed/compromised:

• IMF negotiation chief informed on 14 May: IMF wont pay any of its remaining frozen bailout transfers (initially scheduled for transfer in 2015 and 2016) before Greece both (1) Sign a new bailout agreement for the follow-up period stretching from July 2015 until March 2016 with the Eurogroup to ensure this period is fully funded, and (2) IMF's upcoming review report shall on that basis at the same time conclude that Greece implemented all of the agreed conditional terms while the IMF debt-sustainability analysis at the same time conclude existence of debt-sustainability in the medium-term.

• Eurogroup President clarified in a Q/A on 11 May (watch from the 18 min mark and forward): The Eurogroup can not (which was repeatedly communicated to Greece since Feb.20) release any of the remaining frozen bailout tranches of its current programme to Greece, on the same day a potential renegotiated agreement is signed between the Troika and Greece. The unlocking of frozen transfers require in addition to the signing of a mutual agreement for some renegotiated terms, that a review report subsequently gets published by the Commission's technical staff team which shall find the agreed renegotiated terms actually have been implemented by the Greek government (i.e. through passing of specific legislation in the Greek parliament). Only when such a thing happen, then the Eurogroup will finally approve payment of the remaining tranche, but this being said - the final tranche might be divided into several smaller tranches (to ensure Greece receive a constant flow of transfers for the remaining period until 30 June, based on a splitting up of conditional terms into smaller packages, rather than having to await complying with all terms before a single penny is paid). Finally, negotiations for establishment of a follow-up programme being envisaged for the period following the end of the current programme on 30 June, is something the Eurogroup agreed should not begin (which was repeatedly communicated to Greece since Feb.20) before the "current programme has been successfully completed" (which is something the Eurogroup first await receiving a finding of - by its "5th programme review report", effectively meaning negotiations for a potential 3rd programme will only begin, once the final transfer of the remaining conditional bailout tranche of the 2nd programme has been conducted).

• Tsipras wrote a letter to the Troika on 8 May: Informing them he had ran out of liquidity to pay his scheduled debt-tranche to IMF on 12 May - suggesting them to approve one of four proposed initiatives to solve his problem - which subsequently caused the IMF to approve a 5th solution which was that Greece instead could pay with money from its "IMF reserve fund" (feeding the dog by its own tale - as a temporary solution).

• Negotiation status as of 16 May was: (1) Agreement to introduce a new VAT-rate (increasing revenues) in form of a high (18%-20%) standard rate and a low (8%-9%) rate for "special categories", (2) Agreement to lower the previous requirement for a 3.0% primary surplus in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016 - now to be only 1.0%-1.5% in 2015 rising to 1.5%-2.0% in 2016 and 3.5% for all following years (for the purpose to avoid excessive austerity), (3) Disagreement about "pension reforms" and "labor market reforms".

• Varoufakis outlined his five-point proposal for a new 3rd-programme on 18 May:
  (1) A proposed debt-restructuring. After finally realizing ECB-debt can not be rescheduled, he now propose Greece instead should be allowed to conduct all scheduled ECB-debt repayments through establishment of a new ESM-funded 3rd bailout agreement (entering into force starting from 1 July). Moreover, he clarified Greece does not call for "implementation of haircuts or dramatic changes" towards the amount of debt it is obliged someday to repay to the Troika, but simply propose the timing for repayment of all the bailout funds Greece receive(d) from IMF and ESM+EFSF, now instead should be decided by a variable fluctuating maturity date depending on the observed real GDP growth rate in Greece.
  (2) Privatization of public assets (partly for the reason to cover the government's liquidity needs and partly to ensure an increased private investment takes place in the country), but only to the extent that the government retain a significant owner-share, because those remaining public assets could then subsequently be used as "government guaranteed assets" to raise additional private liquidity as part of funding upcoming growth initiative projects launched under the auspices of the new EBRD development bank and the Commission's new multi-billion "European Fund for Strategic Investments".
  (3) Establishment of a Non-Performing-Loan (NPL) public management company funded directly by ESM, to which Greek banks are allowed to transfer all their existing toxic NPLs, for the purpose of freeing up liquidity otherwise needed to cover their losses - so this liquidity instead can be lend-out again to private projects which will help boost economic growth. (if using the ESM-language, such an initiative would equal a new second "bank recapitalization and restructuring package", which would be transferred to the already existing HFSF under the same strict conditionality as written for its first bank recapitalisation package - that such funds can only be used for bank recapitalization or liquidation of created "bad banks" ~ i.e. a NPL public management company).
  (4) Program to combat poverty.
  (5) The new third programme agreement should move away from using the "language and logic of the IMF" being used when formulating the conditionality in its expiring second bailout programme, so that the language become more reminiscent of a "World Bank development type program", which require all negotiating parties to agree on a joint conditionality - meaning a new package of reforms which effectively will close the previous second bailout programme and start the new Metamnimoniaki era.

• Negotiation strategy of the Greek government, revealed on 20 May: Despite repetitive messages issued by the Eurogroup at its monthly meetings since Feb.20, that "negotiations for some updated conditional terms ensuring a full conclusion of the 2nd programme - needs first successfully to conclude - before negotiations for a potential follow-up 3rd bailout programme can begin", the Greek government still as late as 20 May has opted to refuse accepting this negotiation framework! So they will not strive towards completing negotiations with the Troika by the end of May 2015, if this is understood to mean a final agreement introducing a complete update of all terms in the remaining part of the second bailout programme. They claim this is impossible for them now to do (either for political reasons or time constraints), and will on the "EU partnership (enlargement) summit" in Riga (scheduled to take place 20-21 May), now ask for the Eurogroup to be reconvened for an extraordinary meeting in early next week, with the sole agenda of approving Greece can receive half of their remaining frozen bailout tranche (€3.9bn) in return of Greece then signing an "interim agreement", in which only half of the terms in the remaining part of the 2nd bailout programme is being updated and agreed upon, while the Eurogroup at the same time will be asked to accept negotiations for the 3rd bailout programme now can be allowed to begin (dealing with the continued disagreement about the remaining old batch of "non-complied terms", along with setting up extended additional financial support for Greece throughout at least the period from July 2015 to March 2016). The Greek hope is, that if this special revised negotiation framework will be accepted by the Eurogroup, then this will lead ECB subseqently to accept at the same time allowing Greek banks to increase their holdings of short-term government T-bills, to an extend making it possibile for the Greek state to uphold its financial obligations towards all parties also in June 2015, so that one extra month of precious time can be bought for completing negotiations for a new 3rd (more permanent) bailout programme - of which the first conditional tranche is envisaged then ultimately can be received by the Greek state in early July 2015.

The above secondary sources are - as we seem to agree about - not good/important enough in an encyclopedic context (because they are either based solely on secondary sources or might reflect an intermediate not final negotiation result, remembering that Misplaced Pages is not a newspaper). This is the argument, why we now need to await primary sources about the final negotiation deal, before writing something which is notable, official and accurate. Danish Expert (talk) 11:30, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

Summary of reached consensus in the above debate

There is no way to follow this with any reasonable effort. Clear example of WP:TLDNR Arnoutf (talk) 20:09, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

People, talk pages are about discussing concrete proposals for page improvement. Unless someone can make such a proposal in less than 400 characters (so that people may actually read it), I suggest we stop this as it seems more an opinion piece than anything else right now. Arnoutf (talk) 17:13, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

I agree with Arnoutf. The sheer volume of text, in the article and on the talkpage, is making it very difficult for others to resolve problems and suggest improvements. bobrayner (talk) 17:20, 20 May 2015 (UTC)

I already posted my unconditional apology, for having written the initial long post in this debate. My last reply (updated 20 May), summarize the debate and conclusion of it (and featured six sourced bullet point examples - which if we utilized as material in the article in my opinion only would generate non-notable content). My proposal was, to formulate it more short and clearly, that we right now shall refrain to create a subchapter describing the "negotiation process on updated terms for conclusion of the 2nd programme", actually so we avoid walls of text in the article describing non-notable events. My argument is, the outcome of the negotiations posses encyclopedic value (so eventually we can create a subchapter under the 2nd programme entitled "Agreement on updated terms for conclusion of the programme"), but featuring a chapter about the negotiation process itself (describing its present current state) in my opinion conflict with WP:NOTABLE and WP:NOTNEWS - and therefor should be avoided. Thanatos replied above, that he agreed with me on this proposed editorial line, to await the final outcome of negotiations before creating a subchapter about it. Other editors are of course welcome to chime in, if they have any arguments against this proposed "wait and see - only report conclusive final facts" editorial line. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 06:25, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

Simply providing endless rambling texts to which nobody responds does not constitute any kind of consensus. To be more clear, I object all suggestions in this post until the proposal including the proposed line for the text (verbatim) is presented in less than 1,000 characters. For comparison, your above post is over 1,500 characters long. Arnoutf (talk) 17:08, 21 May 2015 (UTC)

Bulletpoints in my Feb.20 post only added as examples of what shall NOT be added and explaining WHY. The proposal which Thanatos and I reached agreement on:

1. NOT to add text about "current ongoing negotiations", due to concerns it would conflict WP:NOTABLE and WP:NOTNEWS.
2. Only when negotiations conclude, we agreed to describe their outcome in this 3.4.4 subchapter: Agreement on updated terms.

If nobody disagree, this consensus will stand. Danish Expert (talk) 07:20, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Cross Currency Swap is not the same as Credit Default Swap

Article says " a cross currency swap, " and links it to CDS article. This is wrong. 46.186.80.192 (talk) 11:34, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for reporting the error. I have now corrected the link to the correct cross currency swap article. Danish Expert (talk) 13:16, 22 May 2015 (UTC)

>100 pages, but still main points missing?100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?-2015-05-25T15:51:00.000Z">

This articles has more than 100 pages on a PC (good work; as to my opinion we should keep most of it). Still one has problems finding all the main causes and measures of this debt crisis. Instead of increasing the article to 150 pages in the short-term, why don't we have 1 page with the main points (that have been extensively been covered in the press) comprehensively in the introduction:

MAIN CAUSES

-- joining the Euro without sufficient financial convergence and competitiveness

(tweaking the statistics, window dressing, not adhering to the Maastricht treaty criteria)

-- further deterioration of competitiveness through

• above-average wage and costs increases after joining the Euro
• strong increase of public expenses after joining the Euro
• continuation of above-average tax evasion led to public income problems
• poor (fin.sector) supervision led to ballooning financing of unhealthy projects
• above-average corruption led to mismanagement/misallocation of the ballooning financing

-- supported by

• using derivatives/low transparency to hide ever-increasing debts and problems
• not managing hidden problems (expenses, debt, corruption, tax evasion) until 2010
• low interest and low collateral lending conditions in capital markets

MAIN COUNTERMEASURES

• fight against corruption (not really implemented; estimation of fin.effects?)
• fight against tax evasion (not really implemented; estim. of fin.effects?)
• raise funds through privatizations (not really implemented; estim. of fin.effects?)
• save money through cutbacks on former wage/expense increases (partly impl.; fin.eff.?)
• structural reforms (unlocking protected markets etc.) (partly implemented)
• debt-cut from intl. creditors (100 bil. Euros)(direct cuts/interest rate supports)
• bail-out money from intl. institutions/states (>200 bil. Euros) (EU/IMF/ECB)

Thank you for considering.--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 15:51, 25 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

I agree with the general thrust of your argument; this article has reams of technical detail, but it's not serving readers until somebody with an average attention span can read about the topic and get a general view. Even the lede fails to summarise, right now (the lede on its own would be in the top 0.1% of articles by length). bobrayner (talk) 15:57, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

I think the length of the lead is appropriate, when considering it summarizes a complicated crisis spanning six years in duration. Also think its appropriate (being requested by most readers), that the lead as it stands now, focus to explain a short summary of the causes, followed by a summary of how the crisis evolved, and ending with a short summary of its present state. As for the proposal by Economics for us to let the article feature a summary of "main causes" and "main countermeasures", I agree on that. However, it can as I see it, be done in three different ways:

1. Spin-off the content of the main chapters of the article into sub-articles, and then rewrite the chapters into summaries of the sub-articles.
2. Begin the "Causes" chapter and "Countermeasures" chapter with a short summary section, before letting them go into further details below.
3. Expand the current "Overview" chapter, so that it not only provide an "Overview of Evolution", but also provide an "Overview of Causes" and "Overview of countermeasures".

Not sure which of the above three structures would be best to implement. In any case, writing the summary text about "Overview of Causes" and "Overview of Countermeasures", should in my point of view only be done after a careful read of the Troika's latest Review report (last edition was published in April 2014, and we currently await the fifth by the end of June 2015), as this document is the best scientific source to decide "the perceived causes Greece initially faced and needed to combat" and takes stock "what has been done so far to what extend - and what remains to be done". Danish Expert (talk) 16:55, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

I'll have to de facto disagree and oppose such a drastic change cause while such a let's say bullet list and a more spartan form or look would prima facie be very welcome (lakonizein esti philosophein), deciding for example and among other things what and where to put in said list would be, to say the least, very hard; for example some - need I say which? - of the countermeasures you've listed belong according to some people, including editors (need I say who?), to the causes and not to the countermeasures or at least both to the causes and countermeasures; so having them being presented in such a definitive way as a countermeasure, i.e. as a solution, would be very misleading or one-sided.
PS

• 1. I will partially agree with Danish Expert one this. This is a complex, multifaceted, long and ongoing event, issue. It's hard to keep it short and simple without sacrificing essence. I had once for example shortened the lead; well, it somehow - what kind of sorcery is this? - simply grew back... :)
• 2. I will also have to remind you that this article is already a child split from among other things the European sovereign debt crisis article and also that it already has its own split-off children articles.
• 3. Put in another way:
  OK, if you or some other editor(s) have so much free time to waste (need I add that it seems like such a change would need a gargantuan effort? unless that is, you'll simply and mercilessly chop off parts and refs), let him/her/them try doing at your/his/her/their sandboxes everything that has been proposed and then let's have him/her/them present to us the result; we'll then decide whether such a change would be acceptable, warranted.

Thanatos|talk|contributions

I started summarising and trying to make things clearer, but Danish Expert steamrollered over my changes. I would happily finish the job if there were some assurance that the summary would not be submerged in another 100k of new text. It's not impossible to summarise; there are plenty of reliable sources that do so. (In fact, it's very hard to find sources that are longer than our article). bobrayner (talk) 19:16, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

I would applaud that the lead be shortened. It has too many paragraphs WP:LEADLENGTH and on top of it the paragraphs are very long. In my view the lead section should be shortened by at least half. Summarizing complex issues into short accessible texts is in my view evidence of good editing, leaving it long and technical is lazy or incompetent writing.

For example I think the first paragraph can be shortened with only losing details (that should be picked up in the main text) to:The Greek government-debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) is part of the ongoing European debt crisis. It is believed to have been caused locally in Greece by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy and pre-existing high structural deficits and debt-to-GDP levels. In late 2009 reported strong increase in government debt levels along with continued existence of high structural deficits. led to fears of a sovereign debt crisis among investors. This resulted in wide bond yield spreads and high cost of risk insurance on Greek credit default swaps compared to the other countries in the Eurozone. Arnoutf (talk) 19:27, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

It is believed to have been caused locally in Greece... This statement completely ignores the faults and effects of the imposed austerity and the widespread criticism of many reliable sources against the austerity imposed on the Greek economy. Δρ.Κ.  21:24, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

Rhetoric about "imposed austerity" might play well to Greek voters, but would fail WP:NPOV. The Greek government overspent and undertaxed; it maxed out the credit cards; consequently, it faced very high borrowing costs on the open market; so it sought out soft funding elsewhere, which came with a condition attached - that Greek government actually make some reforms that would improve its position in the longer term.

Outsiders didn't force Greece to run years of budget defecits or dysfunctional fiscal policy. Outsiders didn't even force Greece to take these particular bailout terms. bobrayner (talk) 22:23, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

Rhetoric about "imposed austerity" might play well to Greek voters,... Please dispense with nonsense comments. This is an encyclopedia and not your personal blog. There are a myriad of specialist reliable sources which analyse technically the effects of austerity and its detrimental effects on the Greek economy. That you seem not to accept or understand that is your problem and the problem of your POV. Your problem becomes even more pronounced when you start your clueless rhetoric about how this plays to Greek voters. This is as bad as it gets in terms of lack of NPOV from an editor. Δρ.Κ.  23:12, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

Of course I am open to alternatives. However note that the current text "believed to have been started locally in Greece by a combination of structural weaknesses of the Greek economy along with a decade long pre-existence of overly high structural deficits and debt-to-GDP levels on public accounts"is very similar to my proposed shortening So please don't blame it on the proposed shortened version. But do we at least agree the summary and the article need to be drastically shortened? Arnoutf (talk) 17:05, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

@all: Is this article not about the Greek „ government debt crisis“?

One can understand the emotional frustration about the fact that various Greek population groups are suffering now, and everyone knows how the political LEFT STORY goes: it is unfair that international investors and foreign states stopped to (unconditionally) finance the increased Greek spending level and deficits (as they also financed it in the preceding years). Those international parties now even “force” austerity on the Greeks (by not continuing to pay for the Greek deficits) even though the Greek population has voted against it (which implies that non-Greeks should continue paying for the deficits). There are poll results in Greece that 80% of the population support an austerity stop (but foreign voters have not been asked in those polls even though their countries should foot the bill with their tax money).

One can also understand the emotional frustration of the tax payers in the other countries, and everyone knows how the political LIBERAL/RIGHT STORY goes: the Greeks themselves elected those governments that spent much more than they earned and only the Greek themselves consumed it (and foreigners have nothing to do with their decisions, the responsibility principle must not be diluted). The Greek themselves voted in free elections not to pay taxes like others do and not to finish corruption and favoritism like others did and they don’t work so hard as others do (even though not all groups outside Greece work hard). The Greeks even drew 100+ bn Euros from their bank accounts only in the last months alone instead of having learned to pay taxes and helping themselves (neglecting that the Greeks were afraid of sudden capital controls or a currency change). Also, the Greeks cheated their way into and through the Euro, why should the deceived foreign populations now be responsible (neglecting that Greeks were consulted by international investment banks)?

Or one can stick to the major FACTS of this „Greek government debt crisis“ omitting less important details (it is a 100s of bn Euro crisis!) and omitting the 100s of possible and conflicting emotional/political/moral views in the intro. They can be covered in special passages in the depth of the 100+ pages or even in sub articles.

That is all I tried to propose when distilling the most important facts concerning a 100s of bn Euro crisis, as it is all covered in the press. Distilling for an introduction should mean leaving details and pure political sources out, and then being able to summarize the important and undeniable stuff (or should we leave the 100+ pages as is even though a elementary school teacher would ask why nobody is able to make a simple summary)?

--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 08:58, 26 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

Simply put, one cannot "stick to the major facts" when many people disagree over what's major and what's a fact... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 14:23, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

I read your comments, thank you. Still, there will never be a summary if we are not specific. So, for a one page short summary of main causes and measures, which of the proposed bullets would you kick out, change, or add?--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 15:06, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

In short, all of them; explaining in a substantiated manner why or what exactly I mean by this would need an essay-sized reply. So no thanx. As I've said, as far as I am concerned (my objection could obviously be outvoted, bypassed) you're free to do all the work on your sandbox and then have it presented for comments, a vote etc..
PS Just to be clear, my objection to such a drastic change does not mean that I'm really satisfied with the present state of the article. Hell, imo even the title thereof is wrong; I'd prefer something much more poetic, something like Greek post 2007 external debt crisis within the confines of the madhouse named EU/€Ζ... ;-)
Thanatos|talk|contributions 15:57, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Just to be clear, imho, a summary of a "government debt crisis" should not be blocked or enlarged because there are different political/moral/emotional views on what measures are good or bad or should be enforced or stopped; or if some measures might lead to further problems what you indicated if I can interpret your comments correctly. But a good summary should contain the main points that caused the debt crisis and the main measures that have been taken so far for more than five years to solve it (which are facts, even if measures don't work). Reading the current article summary, and the answers to my proposal, it becomes clear that over the five years of the crisis the authors have lost their energy to focus. If you allow me to say: my children would not even pass elementary school exams with those summarizing approaches or skills.--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 16:32, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Even the nature of the crisis is not commonly agreed upon for god's sake!!! Is it a government debt crisis, an external debt crisis, a balance of payments crisis, ...? And no, it's not a commonly accepted fact that for 5 years or so parties or at least all of them are really trying to solve the crisis unless one goes by a very loose definition of the word "solution"; it could be easily argued -and indeed it has already been argued, manyatime - that some of the major players or actors in the game have just been kicking the can down the road firewalling themselves in the meantime against the actual crisis, making it thus even harder for some other here-to-remain-nameless actors of this drama. Or should I say farce?
This is a long and complex, an extremely power and value laden issue within an extremely power and value laden field or rather array of fields of inquiry and of reality and you are going ex cathedra ultra-positivist and supposedly power and value neutral on me?!?!?
I've said what I've said. I'll stop here, because as I've said elsewhere this is not a forum, by also repeating to you and to others: outvote me if you will or if you must but I simply have to object due to reasons already stated. Thanatos|talk|contributions 17:19, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

I fully agree with EconomicsEconomics here. I would fail any of my students writing such an article / article summary because it does not take into account the reader. Arnoutf (talk) 17:05, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

I fully agree with Thanatos666 here. This is a very complex sociopoliticoeconomic issue on a Global scale which has no clear answers. Any attempt to simplify it is an attempt at pushing one's favourite POV and it is unacceptable and unencyclopedic. Remember we are supposed to be descriptive not prescriptive in writing about this crisis. Trying to diagnose it is like trying to push our POV into the reader's mind. We should only describe what happened and let the readers make up their minds instead of trying to blame one side of this global, multifaceted economic phenomenon which happens to have a Greek component to it. Δρ.Κ.  17:34, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Shortening is not the same as simplifying or putting in a specific POV. Stating that trying to shorten it, without willing to seriously consider the suggestions to do so is at best a sign of laziness and incompetence (if not outright claims to ownership of the article. Please keep in mind that Misplaced Pages is an encyclopedia aimed at readers with no in depth knowledge on the topic; and not a comprehensive report of a topic. The current length (about 35,000 words - about the size of a small novel) is prohibitive for novice readers and for that reason alone this article in its current state is a very poor article. And THAT has nothing to do with POV pushing but with a basic level of respect for our readers. Arnoutf (talk) 17:54, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Quoting competence and ownership to me is a failure on your part regarding keeping this discussion civil and refraining from personal attacks per NPA. It also indicates an inability or unwillingness to understand what I wrote in my previous reply. Also please don't capitalise words. Being loud does not help your case and makes you look out of control. Δρ.Κ.  18:37, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

@Thanatos @DrK: you both seem to agree that the current article "summary" does a bad job summarizing at all; you both say it is too complex for you to write a good or at least mediocre summary; you both cannot specify if you would add/change/subtract specific points from a proposed clear-cut bullet summary I presented as a preparation; you both say you prefer to block other authors to write a clear cut summary ("accusing" them of POV without specifically saying what you specifically identified as POV). After 5 years of a very bad summary in this article, what is the risk here? afraid that you cannot tweak a short and understandable summary so easy later-on (to reflect your personal wishes you cannot really explain here)? Is this culture of "preserving chaos" and slowing down any progress to the "speed of the slowest" a typical element of a national culture? At least I start understanding why Greece is in trouble apart from what one can read in the press... --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 18:23, 26 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

Please don't put words in my mouth. I never wrote we cannot write a good summary of the article. I simply think your points do not begin to describe the contents of a good summary and are POV and one-sided. And refrain from nationality-based personal attacks and crass innuendo. They just demonstrate the background and nature of your POV and also discredit you. I ask you to stop these attacks and also retract the attacks you have made. Δρ.Κ.  18:37, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

So EconomicsEconomics you've just, among other things, casually repeated the usual racist accusations against Greece and Greeks in general and I'm supposed to simply agree and trust you rewrite the whole article and/or summarise the causes of and countermeasures-solutions to the Greek crisis? Like hell I will! Thanatos|talk|contributions 19:04, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Ok let's put it down plain and simple. The article is currently unreadable because of length (this is my professional opinion as a publishing academic). Both the lead and the article should be cut down by about 70% (ie leaving it to about 30% of current length) to make it just a very long article (at about 10000 words this is longer than the vast majority of scientific publishers accept for an article or book chapter, let alone an encyclopedia lemma). Where can you see the content wise POV in that.
I have seen no signs of deliberate POV pushing in this discussion, and I have explicitly stated above that I am willing to collaborate to avoid unintentional non neutral POV. The current battlefield attitude and unwillingness to cooperate the article is opposite to the spirit of Misplaced Pages. If you are not willing to collaborate, perhaps it is time to leave Misplaced Pages and start your own blog. Arnoutf (talk) 19:10, 26 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

Why do you think Thanatos shows a battleground mentality and you choose to disregard your comments or the ethnicity-based taunts of the other editor to whom I just replied? Δρ.Κ.  19:15, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Actually I was also referring to you. I do agree the recent remark of EconomicsEconomics are not very helpful either. Arnoutf (talk) 19:18, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

That still does not answer my question regarding your comments. Do you think your comments are civil, AGF, BATTLE compliant? As far as my comments provide a diff where I exhibit battleground mentality, otherwise retract your uncivil remarks about BATTLE and NOTBLOG. Δρ.Κ.  19:23, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Easy "Any attempt to simplify it is an attempt at pushing one's favourite POV"

Not helping though.

But still my earlier questions remains unanswered. Do we agree the article should be shortened. Possibly by splitting off sections into new articles giving more in depth background. Or do we think it is ok as is (ie easily readable for novice readers)? Arnoutf (talk) 19:27, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

Why do you think that my reply "Any attempt to simplify it is an attempt at pushing one's favourite POV" shows a battleground mentality? This is a complete failure on your part of assuming AGF or even understanding what my comment actually means. Your AGF failure extends also to your uncivil warnings about NOTBLOG. But you still have not answered my question regarding your comments. Δρ.Κ.  19:34, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

To answer your question. No less than yours or anyone elses here.

I would, however, like to stop discussing editor behavior and get answer to my content/article relevant question whether we can come to an agreement that the article in its current form is too long and detailed to read for a reader with little expertise on the topic. Arnoutf (talk) 19:39, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

To answer your question. No less than yours or anyone elses here. This reply shows some sign of realisation on your part that you have violated a few policies. However it is disappointing to see you do not take responsibility for your crass and uncivil warnings to other editors. In any case, I would also like to stop analysing the behaviour of other editors as long as said behaviour does not involve personal attacks against me or crass and unjustified warnings. And yes, to answer your question I would not mind if we apply WP:SUMMARY to this article. Δρ.Κ.  19:50, 26 May 2015 (UTC)

@EconomicsEconomics: As for your proposal for the article to feature a better summary of the implemented counter measures, I can see this section a year ago already was spun off into a subarticle, and that no summary of this subarticle have been ridden yet. This in my point of view settles the question for now, that the first point of the articles to-do list should be to write a summary of the implemented counter measures first in this specific section. I oppose that the lead of the article should feature such details, as the lead section is only supposed to provide a first hand overview of what the topic is about, meaning it is good enough simply to let it cover what it already covers right now, that the bailout programme was conditional on implementation of "fiscal consolidation", "privatization", "structural reforms" and "debt restructuring". Danish Expert (talk) 00:13, 27 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

@Arnoutf: I disagree with your opinion, that the article needs to be redesigned and drastically shortened, solely to suit the purpose of better informing novice readers about the topic. Misplaced Pages allow (and actually rate it to be "high quality") for articles to be comprehensive and cover all notable aspects of a topic. If we compare the article with the comparable European debt crisis article, our articles length is 315KB versus 277KB, and both articles feature an identical length for their lead. I think the lead length of our article is appropriate, when considering it summarizes a complicated crisis spanning six years in duration. Also think its appropriate (being requested by most readers), that the lead as it stands now, focus to explain a short summary of the causes, followed by a summary of how the crisis evolved, and ending with a short summary of its present state. Because of being a six-year long event with multiple phases, it is justified for the lead shortly to mention each of these phases, which it does as it stands right now. In this way, readers to begin with, are presented to a summary of all main phases of the crisis, which they then can read more about (following the same structure) below in the article. In this way it makes perfect sense, and should not be shortened further. Danish Expert (talk) 00:13, 27 May 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?-1"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?-1">

For readability it is recommended articles are not longers than 50,000 characters long (sse WP:Article size). This article is over 345,000 characters long. The lead is also longer than recommended in WP:LEAD. That other articles out there are too long to be readable is a problem (of those articles). It is not an excuse for this article. By the way I do agree that we should probably not split off sections without immediately writing a summary to replace them to avoid empty sections Arnoutf (talk) 12:03, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

As for the summary, is everyone prepared just to have the main causes, main measures, main main points of crisis evolvement in it? But leaving out lengthy detailing like one possible view that "three" distinct recessions hit Greece in a deliberately chosen time window (and not five recessions in another deliberately chosen view and time window) ?

(And a sentence in the summary that there are 100s conflicting views on guilt, moral, possible and better alternatives, wishes of involved parties and so on) (?)--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 07:43, 1 June 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?">

and maybe that also WP:CONFLICT authors "allow" a summary (see next para)? --EconomicsEconomics (talk) 07:43, 1 June 2015 (UTC)100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?-1"> 100_pages,_but_still_main_points_missing?-1">

I would not add a sentence in the lead saying "100s conflicting views exist", as such line can not be related to be an essential summary part of one of the main chapters in the article. I personally support a status qou of the current lead structure, which currently briefly mention "main causes" and briefly "main measures" (but only by stating headlines for the content of implemented bailout programmes - which can be understood to be the "main measures"), and then finally several paragraphs providing a chronological summary of "crisis evolvement".

My argument why its preferred for the lead, to keep featuring several paragraphs about "crisis evolvement", is because the crisis spanned 6 year in duration, during which the crisis can be said to have been in at least 5 different phases (i.e. the 4th paragraph represent the phase where Greece for 3 quarters in 2014 had regained access to private financial markets; with its crisis being millimeters away to end for good, if the Greek Government had just completed its programme as initially scheduled in Q4-2014 and not flushed its positive prospects away due to eruption of political caos). Casual readers having a first time look into this crisis topic, benefit from shortly getting presented to an overview of each of these key phases by the lead (the chronological crisis evolvement), before continuing reading the following more detailed article content. So it kind of summarizes the crisis and what it was about, and within this context, it is very helpful with the line stating that Greece actually suffered from four distinct time-stamped recessions (so that readers initially get acquainted to how the pre-crisis and crisis situation was). In a couple of months, the 6th paragraph can be rewritten to a much shorter one, only presenting key features of the upcomming third bailout programme. Danish Expert (talk) 11:29, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

Why did Greece need fiscal austerity in the midst of its crisis?

The article already briefly mention the reason, why "fiscal austerity" was a necessary evil to implement in the midst of the Greek government-debt crisis:

• The initial position of the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio and structural balance being in unsafe territory, thus leaving no room for utilizing traditional Keynesian policy, where government's traditionally combat an economic crisis by increasing its public investment spending during such times (the opposite of austerity).

My proposal is, that we create a technical subchapter dedicated to highlight this issue more in-depth, as it seems to be a subtopic of the crisis with high media notability (but often suffering from a pure technical understanding amongst non-experts).

In the first early part of the crisis (2009), the Greek government apparently (despite of its initially screwed fiscal position), attempted to utilize Keynesian policy to combat the Great Recession while hiding its true fiscal problems by publishing false statistics. The attempt was only partly successful, as this move indeed succeeded to put a brief end to its second recession in Q2-2009, but at the same time the statistical fraud (serving the purpose for the government to keep the private lending market alive as a cheap refinancing source by telling them the incorrect fiscal figures) was discovered. When the statistical fraud had been revealed, it caused a double penalty for Greece: (1) Financial market trust fell deeply into negative territory (twice as deep as if the Government only had reported correct statistics straight from the start), (2) Economic sentiments in Greece (both among consumers and companies) were nuked deep down into negative territory, which caused the third Greek recession to start already in Q3-2009, as everybody suddenly realized how bad a state the current Greek economy actually was in.

This early 2009-context is important to note, as it represent the explanation why "implementation of austerity" subsequently was needed for the Greek government to implement (as a main condition when the Troika arrived to rescue Greece in May 2010). In a perfect theoretical world, where both the private lending market and public creditors still possessed 100% fiscal trust, that it was possible to continue unconditional lending to Greece of cheap (low-interest-rate) money during a long lasting Greek government debt-crisis, and then be certain the Greek government subsequently - when strong growth had been revived - then by-it-self at this later point of time then would start to implement heavy doses of needed austerity to fix the problem of still having operated a screwed "structural balance and debt-to-GDP ratio", then YES all experts agree this path would have been far better for Greece (compared to implementing fiscal austerity straight away). As Greece had a ten-year historic record, of not being able to implement the needed austerity to fix its existing "fiscal sustainability issues" during the good times with strong economic growth from 1999-2008, it was however evident (and not a surprise), that such trust had evaporated from both the private lending market and public creditors. Only way to rebuild this trust - and ensure continued flow of cheap lending money to Greece in this situation, was for the public creditors to attach the conditionality for Greece straight away to implement fiscal austerity, despite that all economic experts perfectly were aware this by-itself in the short-term would deepen and prolong the Greek crisis. If money had been offered at first for free, without this austerity condition being attached, it was a historical proven fact, that Greece subsequently would not honor this trust by subsequently implementing the needed austerity by-itself once strong economic growth had re-emerged.

The subchapter dealing with this issue, would also benefit, if it made a context comparison of how the UK opted to combat its country-specific Great Recession, as they because of having a healthy strong initial fiscal position, actually had maneuver room enough to implement Keynesian policies (active fiscal loosening) for many years in a row, resulting in the UK structural balance and debt-to-GDP ratio deteriorating to the extend that its debt-ratio now only will start to decline again in 2016 (after having risen from 44% in 2007 to 90% in 2016). This implementation of Keynesian policy (fiscal support during bad times followed by austerity implementation in good times) was only possible in the UK, because it possessed both a positive structural balance track record and a healthy debt-to-GDP ratio ahead of eruption of its Great Recession. Most economic experts agree, that what UK did was the best thing to do, but this said, it was at the same time not a viable thing for Greece to do, because it did not benefit from the same strong fiscal position and trust level at financial markets that the UK benefited from before the Great Recession erupted.

A final point (perhaps being the most important) also to mention, is that the Stability and Growth Pact required Greece not only to ensure respect of the rule about a maximum 3% actual deficit, but also required straight since its entry into force in 1999, that the Greek government should strive towards ensuring its structural budget was in "balance or positive". When the pact was reformed, also to take country-specific implicit liabilities of debt (long-term sustainability issues related to ageing costs and heavy debt service costs) into account, the SGP's calculation of the Minimum MTO in 2009 even revealed that the MTO-target for the Greek structural balance should be improved to be minimum +2.75% (because of the heavy future costs associated by its pension and health care system, along with increasing costs generated by its high amount of debt). Reason why the MTO details are also important to highlight, is because they help explain why financial creditors also lost trust (or interest) to continue lending cheap money to Greece - without at the same time requiring heavy doses of austerity to be implemented. These austerity doses were objectively needed (a necessary evil), simply to restore the long-term fiscal sustainability of Greece. Moreover they were unfortunately needed to be implemented immediately, because of the Greek government's poor track record with "no structural balance improvements being achieved across 1999-2008", meaning that nobody trusted such improvements could be achieved by the Greek government without the creditors forcing them to do it as conditions to be met before their lending payments were made. If the S2-LTC value was still unchanged at +11.4% in 2012, the Calculated Min.MTO show that Greece now needed a structural balance of +4.75% to be achieved in average over its current medium-term, to ensure presence of long-term fiscal sustainability of the government's budget balance. This high structural balance requirement can only be lowered, if the "costs of ageing" and "costs of debt" are lowered by the Greek government, which also helps explain why Greece needed to accept such radical reforms to their pension system (extended retirement age + lower benefits). In relation to this, its important to stress that any positive S2-LTC value is only related to presence of too heavy long-term ageing costs (not to debt), and that this figure should be lowered towards 0.0% (to ensure inter-generational equal treatment) even if Greece had absolutely no debt at all. So this need for pension reform, would have been there to ensure long-term sustainability of the public finances, even in the absence of the current heavy debt load for the Greek government.

These above additional technical facts and fundamental reasons explaining why, despite that economic experts were aware each 1% GDP of austerity would cause economic growth to be between 0.5-0.8% lower, that this fiscal austerity was a necessary evil to implement as a pre-condition to be met for delivering financial rescue help. Finally, the call for implementation of structural reforms (pension-reforms and labor-market reforms) to solve problems the Greek economy actually suffered from before its economic crisis erupted in 2009, actually helped to lower the demand for implementation of otherwise needed additional austerity. While its save to say from a scientific point of view, that the reluctancy of the Greek government to pass such structural reforms rapidly during its crisis, only made its crisis more severe and prolonged, not only because of the additional liquidity crisis erupting each time its bailout programme got frozen because of non-compliance, but also because the earlier implementation of these needed reforms would have ensured the reaping much earlier of positive fiscal results stemming from these reforms (i.e. its an academic view shared by most experts that implementing reform changes fast - rather the slowly drip by drip - is much better not only because direct positive results will arrive faster - but also as it will help indirectly to restore consumer+company confidence much faster if they facing all negative changes straight from day one so that they subsequently can start look forward only to positive things happening in the following bright future). So the "austerity trap" (each year bringing demands for a new extra austerity effort to be implemented during the bailout programme), was also heavily related to the delayed implementation by the Greek government of the much needed structural reforms. When Greece achieved a government structural budget balance surplus in 2013 (for the first time since 1973), it was actually out of the woods, in regards of the need to implement austerity demands (if everything else had been equal and implementation of the required structural reforms had followed the initial plan), a fact that has been confirmed by official statements made by IMF's chief negotiator Poul Thomsen.

All in all, it can be a quiet complex technical issue to explain "why austerity was needed straight away" and "why Greece kept falling into extra new unexpected austerity demands - when each fiscal year of its crisis had passed". By this post, I have attempted to explain it in short. I do not have time during the next six months to write this technical "austerity chapter". If somebody else has time to do it, I think the article would be heavily improved by adding such a chapter (presuming of course it is build upon an appropriate amount of technical references - of which the Troika's review reports are a great starting point). Danish Expert (talk) 08:06, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

If you want to add such a lengthy section, please cut down the article by more than 300,000 characters first to make it readable. Arnoutf (talk) 12:04, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

I said I wouldn't but you keep writing lengthy essays so...

Your analyses keep missing

• that Greece does not have its own currency, unlike e.g. the UK
• that the Greek debt problem is predominantly of an external nature, unlike e.g. the one of the UK, having been financed through capital inflows from abroad which stopped and/or reversed after a major recent global event
• that a very common step, if not the historical norm, in such cases is simply to default, i.e. that sovereign defaults are very common historically, that they aren't a negligible exception
• that there is also the other historical precedent and analogue of countries exiting currency unions (and/or pegs, i.e. currency nions of whichever form, e.g. the Gold Standard).

Your analyses keep assuming

• that the Greek crisis is just a severe case of liquidity problem/crisis and not of an insolvency one
• that other countries or organisations actually tried to help save Greece and not just themselves and/or the system (they're not oblided to do so but let's say that lying about it is also not obligatory)
• that many austerity policies taken by the Greek Governments during the crisis were taken in order to indeed save Greece and not the interests of the people in power.

Your analyses keep presenting

• the actions taken by other countries and/or international organisations as having been indeed taken indeed in order to save Greece and as being indeed objectively necessary for Greece, i.e. that TINA

misrepreseting thus major steps or order of events that took place and ommitting the advice of

• many economomists, analysts,... who've claimed that other steps should have be taken instead of or in a different order than the ones actually taken

and also misrepresenting actual beliefs of many people and/or groups of power

• e.g. that in the broader context beyond Greeece, the confidence fairy and expansionary austerity in a time of crisis was/is thought to actually be a law of nature (e.g. in the aforementioned UK),
• e.g. that many people and organisations actually believe(d), focusing this time in the narrower context, that Greece would actually be saved if only it did austerity and/or structural reforms.

A very clear example of this is that

• even if we assume Greece remaining in the EZ as being objectivelly necessary, which we shouldn't, and
• even if we assume that Greece not defaulting unilaterally as being a necessary fact of live/history, which we shouldn't, and
• even if we assume that structural reforms an/or austerity would indeed be a solution and/or necessary and/or not actually bad, counterproductive for the actual economy and interests of Greece, of the Greek people, which we shouldn't

that there are tons of people that have claimed that the commonly, mutually agreed upon haircut should have come first (and be of a major magnitude) when in reality it came much later (twice or 1 point something times) and either by itself and/or as a consequence of the delay it was of an inadequate magnitude worsening thus even more, much more, the already unbelievable mess and conundrum. And it has also been claimed thus, that this happened in order to save the foreign banks etc. and/or countries, NOT @#%@% Greece, that in reality other countries were extending and pretending, kicking the can down the road so that they could firewall and ringfence themselves and their banks, saving the lenders that shouldn't have lent Greece such huge loans in the first place. It has also been claimed that the politicians of these countries sold, presented, portrayed saving these banks, funds etc. to their citizens as a magnanimous and benevolent action, solution, as saving (unworthy) Greece and Greeks from destruction because otherwise they couldn't have persuaded their taxpayers/citizens (or anyway would have a very difficult task before them trying to do this) to save the banks and the rest of the financial system one/two... more time(s) after the global crisis.

Thanatos|talk|contributions 13:11, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

If you want my personal opinion on the causes. I think there are three parties to blame for the initial mess. Goldman Sachs for its amoral trick (and grabbed payment) to present Greece's situation as better than it was. The European (especially North Western European) banks for loaning Greece for interest rates not taking account of the actual risks (which they knew - and considered secured by their too big too fail status ). And the 2000-2008 Greek governments that showed lack of self control in borrowing far too much, for unrealistic interest rates. The first two agents being amoral, the third being mainly naïve the response from many European governments utterly fits the current dominance of the "objective" neoliberal view that naivety is a sin and amorality a virtue. Hence we save the banks and sacrifice the Greeks.

My ironic view on neoliberalism here is probably not the most neutral point of view but not intended for article space anyway ;-) Arnoutf (talk) 18:32, 29 May 2015 (UTC)

@Thanatos: Perhaps to your surprise, I can agree with you on your point, that we also had presence of most of your objectionable points. Although only to the extend, that they exist as supplementary (less important) points/views in addition to the ones reflected by my initial post. Here you have my reply in short:

• Greece had its maneuver room restricted by being a eurozone-member: Yes of course - saying goodbye to the devaluation tool and default option, is the price you pay for receiving lower interest rates, ECB liquidity support and become a member of financial support mechanisms. Still the EU+Eurogroup in fact issued a common response when the Great Recession had erupted, allowing all its members (who could afford it) to respond with supportive Keynesian economics during the first two years of the Great Recession (2008+2009) - due to the severity of this global recession, so that active fiscal support initially was injected into all healthy economies. My point was, that UK could afford it and actually did it (as stated in their 2008-09 Convergence report). While Greece could not afford it, but despite of this did it anyway in 2009, while pretending it could afford it by hiding its correct statistical figures for its true fiscal position. Of course this "hiding the truth" was only possible for a limited amount of time, and it only made the subsequent Greek crisis much more worse. A display of correct figures from the start, could have triggered a much more rapid bailout support package already in early 2009, and if the needed structural reforms had been implemented already in the first crisis year rather than 3-6 years later - this would also have been very helpful for Greece.
• UK as a non-eurozone state can not be used as a 1:1 crisis-combat example to Greece: Of course not, this was never my point. If you want a more direct 1:1 example for other eurozone-states performing a similar "internal devaluation" as Greece did, then you can however compare with Estonia+Latvia+Lithuania. They actually implemented the same package of "internal devaluation" structural reforms and "fiscal austerity" in 2009, while operating a fixed euro peg. The common point for all these 3 Baltic states, was that they did all their needed tough and hurtful reforms rapidly, and subsequently also reaped all the positive fruits from their reforms rapidly, to the extend they since 2011 were the states in EU with biggest economic growth. If Greece had implemented its needed reforms in a similar fast and committed way already by-itself in 2009 (and in addition avoided additional liquidity crisis erupting from the freeze of subsequently established bailout transfers), most experts agree this could have shortened its crisis only to have had a 3-year duration in total (meaning the bailout programme - envisaged to have started one year earlier in 2009 - could have expired by the end of 2011 - followed by strong levels of positive economic growth for all subsequent years in 2012-2020). It is evident the slow crisis response and political opposition to implement needed countermeasures rapidly, also prolonged the Greek sovereign-debt crisis.
• A market failure by "external lenders" to price country-specific risks correctly, existed ahead of the crisis eruption: Yes I agree. But only to the extend, that half of the problem was due to incorrect credit ratings, while the other half of the problem for Greece was the failure to submit correct statistics revealing the true extend of fundamental economic challenges that the Greek government faced during 1999-2008. The true challenges only became revealed in late 2009 and early 2010.
• Organisations only helped Greece for the purpose of helping themselves, and when they did, the debt-haircut arrived much to late: Yes, I agree with you the initial crisis response in May 2010 apparently got "polluted" by some "mixed intentions" also reflecting external worries about adverse contagion spreading to other southern European states and the eurozone could have broken down into multiple pieces. I also agree with you, that from a technical point of view the most appropriate thing to do by the "international organisations" would have been to require the debt-haircut should have been done already in May 2010 rather than in March 2012. However, such simple thing, could not have prevented the Greek sovereign debt-crisis to erupt. Needs to implement austerity and structural reforms would still have co-existed. Only difference would have been, that the debt-pile for Greece could have been somewhat lower, while the fundamental problems would still have needed a fix. Unfortunately its impossible to rewrite history, and impossible to predict if private creditors would have accepted their haircut two years earlier in May 2010 (we can only speculate, as arguments can also be made that the outlook needed first to be as bad as it became in 2012, before they finally would accept a haircut). Anyway, the argument can also be listed, that the public creditors (tax payers in other eurozone states) are now paying the price for this "delayed haircut" mistake and not Greece, as the bailout-loans in return now are given to Greece with a 0% interest rate from 2010-2020 (with all interest rate payments being reimbursed) to make up for this mistake.
• Alternative options like "sovereign default" and "leaving the currency union" were also available to Greece: Yes, but only in theory. Most experts agree the costs of such things (devaluation which initially will cause a huge decline of GDP, losing financial stability support mechanisms like ECB liquidity + ESM support, and losing "trust of financial markets" because you failed to qualify for continued membership of a strong euro club) would far exceed the short-term benefits for doing such a thing, and moreover it would not have served to solve the deeper economic problems Greece suffered from (Balance of Payments, Competitiveness issues, too high public structural deficits, and finally also a long-term unsustainable health care system and pension system). Once again, the long-term sustainability challenges for the Greek economy, were already revealed by the 2009 Fiscal Sustainability Report, and needed a solid response anyway, even before the Greek sovereign-debt crisis erupted in May 2010.

In other words, if we pretend Greece tomorrow defaults and return to use a devalued Drachma instead of the euro, this would not at all solve any fundamental economic problems, but only make the situation much more worse for Greece. Main point is, that Greece currently service its debt pile to public creditors almost at a 0% interest rate, but despite of this huge help, still has problems both with its daily liquidity situation and continued presence of a remaining need still to reform its pension and health care system, so that it finally become long-term sustainable.

The main point of my initial post, was to explain why austerity and structural reforms were needed as a crisis response. Both instruments help to restore "fiscal long-term sustainability", and due to "political concerns" the creditors asked for an immediate "austerity implementation", as they did not trust this needed additional "austerity requirement" could be delivered by the Greek government post-crisis (but only could be delivered if it was forced to happen as a condition of transferring bailout funds). I think its evident to say, that all 5 elements of the Troika's programme (austerity + structural reforms + bank recapitalization + debt restructuring + privatization programme) are/were needed. Elements of "bank recapitalization" and "privatization programme" were both important to spur a subsequent "private investment" to boost/ignite economic growth. The condition to implement structural reforms, actually helped to lower the amount of "austerity" otherwise needed to implement, while also solving those fundamental fiscal long-term sustainability problems that Greece already suffered from before her debt-level spiked in 2009.

To summarize, I still think the article would benefit from featuring a short subchapter providing info about these technical economic details (i.e. the Greek S2-LTC value called for reforms of the pension system and health care system already in 2009, that the structural balance in the medium-term needed to respect the country-specific calculated "minimum MTO" - which had been calculated to a whopping min. +2.75% requirement already back in 2009, and that creditors lost trust Greece would correct such issues by itself - therefor setting them up as attached conditions to be met in order for Greece to receive bailout help), to explain why implementation of painful fiscal austerity was needed as a crisis response straight from the start. Danish Expert (talk) 12:22, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

It's not a simply an also thing, it's a proper context thing, among many other things. It's also not simply only about a possible future henceforth; it's also retrospective; i.e. setting yourself on a course of trying to explain - or to claim - why Greece 'couldn't go countercyclical/keynesian in the midst of its crisis', you should have either explored as many alternatives (at least the major ones), by now counterfactual, possible strategies, steps or routes Greece and other players could have taken or at least stated explicitly your assumptions, the framing you're using. You've e.g. done, all these years, great work presenting the structural deficit etc. story or side thereof; as I've frankly told you before I personally think that this kind of story, of causation, is BS (cause, to say the least, it's of secondary or tertiary importance), nevertheless it's a very popular story, so congrats and many thanx! What I can't congratulate you on or thank you about though is the fact that you've flooded the article and/or its talk pages with that story without having made explicitly clear to the layperson, the one coming here to educate oneself on the subject, the context, the framing and the hidden assumptions and hypotheses you've been using.... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 13:43, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

I got your point. But politely disagree. The article is the result of many editor contributions, and not the result of a single editor's personal view. As for the articles so-called choice of "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", it is clear it opted to reflect the same view as presented by the objective Troika review reports. Adopting an alternative "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", i.e. present the Greek crisis from a Marxist perspective based on another set of strange assumptions, would not be appropriate, as it would not represent the objective main view shared by the technical expert working groups of IMF and the European Union. It is clear and evident even to casual readers, and not something that need a flashing alert box in the article, that the article's presentation of the crisis facts, mainly is based on sources agreeing with the "cause interpretation and analysis" made by the objective Troika review reports.

Using the Troika review reports as framework for a fundamental understanding of the crisis, is the only sober objective thing to do. Likewise, my request here in this talkpage debate, for the article also to present extracted "S2-LTC" and "calculated minimum MTO" data from the European Commission's 2009 Fiscal Sustainability Report, should not be refuted as something being "not relevant" to feature. Perhaps I went a bit too far with my analysis here at the talkpage, about the appropriateness/availability of utilizing "Keynesian economics" for Greece, but so far, it was only mend to be a first hand invitation for other editors to dive into this additional topic and find sources about, so that a special subchapter explaining this difficult "austerity discussion" can be crafted down the road. When that day comes, I wont object that we also add a single line to mention that the magnitude of "austerity need" most likely could have been less in case the debt-haircut had happened early in May 2010 rather than late in May 2012 (as I am positively certain we can find a valid notable source backing up such view). This said, it is evident (and can be backed by multiple sources), that an early debt-haircut could not have solved all the fundamental economic problems Greece faced in early 2010. The Greek sovereign-debt crisis would still have erupted, and the medicine would still have been a mix of austerity + structural reforms + privatization + bank recapitalization. ;-) Danish Expert (talk) 18:21, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

"Adopting an alternative "context, framing and hidden assumptions and hypotheses", i.e. present the Greek crisis from a Marxist perspective based on another set of strange assumptions, would not be appropriate, as it would not represent the objective main view shared by the technical expert working groups of IMF and the European Union".

Marxist...objective... For fuck's sake!! Read for example, the CIGI paper I've pointed you to elsewhere; it includes and mentions among many other things, WSJ articles that first broke various stories relating to various interesting stuff about the Greek program, shedding light upon what was actually going on inside the IMF at that time (and dare I say by extension also later, hitherto; both per se and vis-à-vis the two other parts of the Troika). Or have a long, careful reading of a Krugman quotation from the NYT, included in this wiki-article:

Ever since Greece hit the skids, we’ve heard a lot about what’s wrong with everything Greek. Some of the accusations are true, some are false — but all of them are beside the point. Yes, there are big failings in Greece’s economy, its politics and no doubt its society. But those failings aren’t what caused the crisis that is tearing Greece apart, and threatens to spread across Europe.

PS This is a fantastic, a prime example of what I've already said, about us two discussing the issue being potentially fun but pointless, about us having a different take on reality itself... Thanatos|talk|contributions 20:01, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

I had a full read of your CIGI paper and the Krugman article ahead of starting this debate, and it did not change a single point/argument in my above posts. From a technical point of view, I agreed with the CIGI paper's finding, that if anything else had been equal (which unfortunately it was not), then IMF should have insisted for the debt-haircut to take place in May 2010 rather than in March 2012. What the CIGI paper fails to do (which is perfectly normal when writing a scientific article based on a narrow "research question"), is that it does not perform a deeper analysis of: technical economic factors + political context factors + market functionality context factors, that all affected the Troika's decision how to design the first bailout programme (being reluctant to require early debt-haircut - masked by adoption of unrealistic best case scenario forecasts - due to concern of major contagion risks that potentially could have blown the eurozone into pieces if this debt-haircut had been required to take place already in May 2010).

This said, it seems like you falsely believe the Greek sovereign-debt crisis could have been totally avoided, if the debt-haircut had just arrived two years earlier than it did, which is a great illusion. As stated above, Greece needed in any-case bailout help accompanied by implementation of austerity to fix its "structural budget balance problem", structural reforms to fix its "competitiveness problem and long-term sustainability problem of its pension system and health care system", and privatization + bank recapitalization to help "boost healthy economic growth". The debt-restructuring (and long-term debt sustainability) was a separate issue that co-existed among the other issues. This a scientific fact, at least for as long one make use of the sane status quo assumption, that Greece would continue to be a eurozone member under the same fiscal sustainability rules applying towards all other eurozone states. Krugman does not represent the general viewpoint among economic experts about the challenges the Greek society faced in its crisis, and he tend to simplify his argumentation under certain special assumptions, which the majority of experts disagree with him about.

My focus in this talkpage debate, is not to attempt convincing you/Krugman to adopt certian crisis analysis assumptions. My focus was just to propose how an add of additional technical economic info to the article (i.e. the S2-LTC value and "calculated min.MTO" value in 2009), would be appreciated, as this technical insight would help answer the difficult question "why austerity + structural reforms were needed under the Troika's utilized technical assumptions". Your counter-proposal was then (apparently), that you wanted the article to descripe the entire Greek sovereign-debt crisis not from an objective factual point of view (reflected by technical facts and figures printed in Troika review reports), but from a subjective alternative Krugman set of special assumptions only made by him. I now rebuffed this proposal and took much time to explain why. Thanks for the debate. But lets stop debating now. ;-) Danish Expert (talk) 07:50, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

I had a full read of your ...May 2010).

It doesn't because it doesn't need to. Let's say that the point thereof is to show that program was really awful, a miserable failure again and again, and the reason for this is that the real purpose or primary priority thereof was not to save Greece. The technical details you're invoking are not sacrosanct or a necessity of the laws of nature, they're assumptions etc. of the said miserably failed program/model itself. The ideological, political, socioeconomic, geopolitical etc issues, parameters, constraints etc. are essential parts of the equation of the Game and cannot be simply waved off as secondary issues or minor details as you have done. THE IMF is not God, neither is the ECB or the EU; their views, predictions, policies, programs etc. (which by the way and inter alia disagree with one another) are not scientific facts or simply direct consquequences or results of strict, formal scientific laws and reasoning, of a value-neutral analysis, at least not necessarily or in their totality.

This said, it seems like you falsely believe the Greek sovereign-debt crisis could have been totally avoided, if the debt-haircut had just arrived two years earlier than it did, which is a great illusion

.

No I don't and that's a huge strawman. Did you miss for example the part in which I'm claiming (repeating other people's claims), that the Greek (in)solvency problem/crisis has been treated as if it were an (il)liquidity problem/crisis?

As stated above, Greece needed in any-case bailout help accompanied by implementation of austerity to fix its "structural budget balance problem", structural reforms to fix its "competitiveness problem and long-term sustainability problem of its pension system and health care system", and privatization + bank recapitalization to help "boost healthy economic growth".

This is a fantastic exemplar of a petitio principii...

The debt-restructuring (and long-term debt sustainability) was a separate issue that co-existed among the other issues.

No it was/is not simply a separate issue; it's of !@$!$!%$ central, paramount importance.

This a scientific fact, at least for as long one make use of the sane status quo assumption, that Greece would continue to be a eurozone member under the same fiscal sustainability rules applying towards all other eurozone states.

No it's certainly not a scientific fact /facepalm/, either assuming Greece remaining in the EZ or not. Moreover the very fact that Greece (and/or others) is in the EZ has been argued by many that it is in essence the real cause of the crisis (see the refs).

My focus in this talkpage debate...Thanks for the debate. But lets stop debating now. ;-)

If you want us to stop debating (need I repeat that I've regarded this as being futile?) then please stop flooding the article and its talk page with a view portayed as a scientific fact or as the scientific consensus view when to say the least, it's not, it's neither... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 12:33, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Please stop flooding the talkpage by multiple futile replies, which now more and more clearly fail to focus on how the content of the existing article can be improved. All posts from me in this debate, was a genuine attempt to open a thread leading to content improvements for the article - calling for other editors to help create a subchapter featuring additional technical details helping readers to understand "why austerity was needed immediately as part of the bailout-programme in the eyes of the Troika?" (I am not going to repeat anything now, but just refer to my previous reply). You managed sole-handedly to derail this debate with futile replies, and now excuse your futile behavior by saying that you warned me from the start, that this debate in your point of view would lead to nothing. Yet, I still WP:AGF on your behalf, and just politely ask you to stop flooding this talkpage debate with futile replies. Danish Expert (talk) 14:17, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

One of the reasons why no other editors get involved is the lengthy communication (ie flooding). If you truly want to involve others you should make the things you are saying easily accessible (ie short). This thread alone is now already 6000 words long, which is on the long side for a full article. Arnoutf (talk) 15:02, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

"why austerity was needed immediately as part of the bailout-programme in the eyes of the Troika?" (emphasis mine)

Although that's hardly the full or an accurate picture, it's certainly an improvement!!! Now if you could only have explicitly said/written this from the beginning, you could or might have saved so much of my time, time spent arguing against multiple essay-long supposedly "scientific facts"... ;-) Thanatos|talk|contributions 15:55, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

The Troika were hardly alone in pointing out that Greece had severe economic problems, or in arguing that Greek government spending should be reduced to sustainable levels. bobrayner (talk) 18:29, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Did Greece need austerity? The "fact-based answer" can only be "yes"

If an author does not arrive at an "yes", it would by a try to redefine history for Misplaced Pages.

• Borrower perspective: Greek government needed to limit spending to the fiscal income level (="austerity") because Greece was not able anymore to borrow money without certain conditions attached to the borrowing contract, one condition being a certain degree of "austerity". Even Greece itself did not try to reduce the "austerity" burden with its internal fund raising possibilities like significant privatizations. Historic fact.

• Lender perspective: Neither Greek investors nor international investors/states/organizations did lend significant money to Greece without "austerity" conditions attached to it. Historic fact.

• Why not stopping irrelevant perspectives: it would help improving the article. Ideas like "the real purpose of the bail-out was not to save Greece but the lenders" can not be proved as there have been 100s of Greek and international decision makers involved and if it were so, it wouldn't change the Greek debt crisis for Misplaced Pages, it would not change the causes, not the measures and not the evolvement of this Greek debt crisis (as those are facts); what the authors of those sentences really want to say (but somehow put it as a conspiracy) is that they don't like the fact that 100s of decision makers also tried to stabilize the banking and financial system.

• The term "austerity" is a theoretical (POV) conception. It assumes that the natural state for a country is to have an automatic financing of deficits and there needs to be a political effort/action to stop this automatic source of government income. But the reality is clearly much more the contrary: the natural state is that a government can spend its income and its reserves. To spend more it needs to keep up creditworthiness and can then decide to borrow (which typically reduces further creditworthiness). It is the same as with credit cards: if the average creditworthy citizen has one credit card and you have already three credit cards and all maxed out and lost your creditworthiness, nobody would say further banks are forcing you into anything (like austerity) because they are not providing a debt laden citizen with a fourth and fifth credit card.

Danish Expert's reasoning on why there were no real alternatives (without "austerity") to Greece sounds very structured, logical, and reasonable to me, it is in line what you can read in the mainstream press, as it is based on average understanding and assumptions how economies work.

May be those authors having a WP:CONFLICT (conflict of interests; COI; here persons that have a special interest in Greece) should stop editing this article and stop blocking everything (COI editing is strongly discouraged in Misplaced Pages). It is obvious that they contribute nothing here to improve the article. It it very hard to understand what they really want to say in these discussions. Everything from them sounds more or less like the world is having a conspiracy against Greece they need to block here in Misplaced Pages to fight for Greece.

--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 07:13, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

The 2010 rescue enabled Greece to avoid default at that point, which might well have sparked a global conflagration akin to the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. European banks holding Greek bonds continued receiving payments of interest and principal for quite a long time thereafter, from the money lent by the Troika. But the interests of the Greek people were arguably sacrificed, and among economists there is widespread agreement that the country’s debt should have been restructured much sooner.

— Blustein, Paul (7 April 2015), Laid Low: The IMF, the Euro Zone and the First Rescue of Greece (PDF), CIGI Papers Series, page 6

I guess we Greeks must have paid this and many other guys to advance a story of a conspiracy theory against us because of our inferior, our decadent national character...
PS This is the second time you've attacked Greeks and Greek wikieditors with your proofs. Furthermore you've now added among other things an accusation of WP:CONFLICT arguing in essence for Greek editors to be prohibited from editing the article, the topic!!!!
I'm briefly replying to you and I'm remaining reasonably polite only because third parties may read this and I don't want people to think that I/"we" can't respond; next time I assure you, I won't be so polite...
Thanatos|talk|contributions 20:24, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

You are exactly confirming what I said: With a mainstream understanding how economies work it is easy to understand that BOTH happened - Greece got a debt cut worth 100 bn, bailout loans >200 bn, various other supports AND there was a firewalling and support of the international financial and banking system, too (no conspiracy thoughts needed, just common sense). With common sense it is also easy to understand that a 10 mil population with >300 bn debt and a high debt/GDP ratio and >10% annual deficit has to execute a lot of hard changes to arrive again at a sustainable state.

To comment the measures in the debt crisis with a phrase like "the interests of the Greek people were arguably sacrificed" seems to be as POV as to reducing it to a sentence like "the interests of the Eurozone tax payers have been sacrificed because Greece circumvented the Euro treaties and now wants the other people to pay for it". But even if you prefer one-sided sources like Paul Blustein to comment or "better understand" the debt crisis, it does not change the way Misplaced Pages should describe the crisis in a summary, i.e. the main causes, main measures, and main evolvement points. So, why still block a transparent summary of the debt crisis?

--EconomicsEconomics (talk) 22:50, 1 June 2015 (UTC)

• You fucking racist idiot, the very fact that it was only ~100bn and that had been so delayed and it had been given under such conditions is the very point of it being negative for the interests of Greek people, tipping the scale enomoursly for the interests of the creditors, even that is, if one limits oneself to a framework of a supposedly, a so called mutually agreed upon, amicable agreement and exclude a Grexit etc..
  Has for example the Greek debt become sustainable after and because of the program? Fuck no! It's even worse! (It's e.g. more or less the same in absolute terms and has skyrocketed in relative ones.) Have the consecutive DSAs (and assumptions thereof etc.) been reasonable or even sincere? Fuck no! (Even the supposedly achievable end-result of the program(s) would be e.g. a debt level equal to the one Greece entered the crisis with in the first place!) And so on and so forth.

Note: the interests of the European taxpayers have indeed been sacrificed, be they Greeks only if one refers to them only, cause Greek taxpayers belong to the set of the European taxpayers, or Greeks and Germans and..., cause among things European (or rather EZ) taxpayers in general have been lending Greece more and more, again and again money to pay the banks etc., kicking the can of the Greek insolvency further down the road and making thus things worse.
Note: I won't even bother to comment on the Greek entry into the EZ. There are plenty of arguments, facts and citations available at the relevant section you have to deal with and argue against if you could...

• With common sense it is also easy to understand that a 10 mil population with >300 bn debt and a high debt/GDP ratio and >10% annual deficit has to execute a lot of hard changes to arrive again at a sustainable state.

Even if common sense sided with you, which it doesn't, it very often sucks in economics, especially during macroeconomic crises; watching someone supposedly teaching ex cathedra others economics by invoking "common sense" is very commonly guaranteed to be ludicrous. The conditions for example you've stated are not necessarily unsustainable by themselves for a country nor do they necessarily require the changes you're alluding to; they're missing for example the context of the debt being mostly external, for all practical purposes in a foreign currency because of the monetary union, and that they've followed a global crisis which caused a sudden stop to the capital inflows to this country (and to other countries of said monetary union); capital flows and stops/flights in a very flawed monetary union that have in fact been repeatedly regarded by many scholars, economists, analysts,... as the very cause of the problem/crisis itself in the first place.
That means even if common sense dictates something true, it does not follow that it dictates what you're claiming it does.
Greece for example could have unilaterally defaulted and exited the EZ and then dealt with a different set of consequences and problems. Or Germany and the rest of the surplus North could have reflated or differentially inflated in relation, with respect to the South/Periphery making the adjustments needed by or the austerity demands on Greece and the rest of the South/Periphery much softer, much milder. Or the austerity dictated on Greece could have been much less or much more frontloaded. And so on and so forth.
The relevant decision tree or game has thus many (more) branches, nodes, paths etc., the possible worlds, the alternative possibilities are virtually endless compared to the specific and supposedly necessary story and sequence of events you're advocating.

• The very reason I've been arguing for a proper context and/or against a simplistic and misleading definitive bullet list or summary of causes etc. or ... (against which I have to remind you, cause for some strange reason it seems that you've forgotten, others have argued too) is exactly because Misplaced Pages is supposed to present a NPOV, to present the scientific, scholarly, etc. consensus view or as many views as possible, if there is no consensus on the subject at hand. I've cited and quoted e.g. at least one such respectable source that argues that Greek interests have been sacrificed in favour of the one of the creditors. That means that this has to be included. If other such sources disagree on this or even claim that e.g. it was not the Greek but rather the German or the Danish or... the Martian interests that have been sacrificed, or that ..., that's fine, let them be included too, as some of them , for that matter, presently are, and as and about which for example I've have congratulated and thanked Danish Expert, inspite of, that is, my different view on the subject.
  There are many POVs in such a complex, multifaceted and long issue, that's what I've saying from the beginning. So what I can't allow you to do, be it as an interested Greek or as a thoughtful wikipedian, what YOU MAY NOT do, you ignorant and racist piece of shit, is to have the article portay a single false or one-sided supposedly definitive and simplistic picture of the crisis as the scientific consensus, as a scientific fact!
  Now I have spent more than enough time dealing with you; feel free to fuck off!!!

PS Preemptively to any wikipedia admin(s) who might read this:
Punish me if you must for my language, I don't care, I don't mind; in fact I understand and accept the consequences of my choice of words.
What I do strongly care about, what I do strongly demand from you though is

• • 1. to see and acknowledge the racist slurs this editor has used against me and more importantly against Greek editors and Greeks in general, and to act on them,
  • 2. not to delete this discussion or any choice of words/expression used herein, so that people, interested readers or editors, could judge for themselves, and
  • 3. to prevent this or any other editor from turning (arguably even more) this article into a simple-minded POV article, greatly misleading and misinforming (or should I say disinforming?) the readers who might come here to educate themselves on the subject.

Thanatos|talk|contributions 02:00, 2 June 2015 (UTC)

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