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| ==Early Islamic metaphysics== | |||
| {{see also|Early Islamic philosophy|Avicennism|Averroism}} | |||
| ===Cosmological and ontological arguments=== | |||
| ]'s proof for the ] was the first ], which he proposed in the ''Metaphysics'' section of '']''.<ref name=Johnson>Steve A. Johnson (1984), "Ibn Sina's Fourth Ontological Argument for God's Existence", ''The Muslim World'' '''74''' (3-4), 161–171.</ref><ref name=Morewedge>{{citation|last=Morewedge|first=P.|title=Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Malcolm and the Ontological Argument|journal=Monist|volume=54|pages=234-49}}</ref> This was the first attempt at using the method of ], which utilizes ] and ] alone. Avicenna's proof of God's existence is unique in that it can be classified as both a ] and an ontological argument. "It is ontological insofar as ‘necessary existence’ in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent". The proof is also "cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."<ref>{{citation|first=Toby|last=Mayer|title=Ibn Sina’s ‘Burhan Al-Siddiqin’|year=2001|journal=Journal of Islamic Studies|publisher=], Oxford Journals, ]|volume=12|issue=1|pages=18-39}}</ref> | |||
| ===Distinction between essence and existence=== | |||
| Islamic philosophy, imbued as it is with ], distinguishes more clearly than ] the difference between ] and ]. Whereas existence is the domain of the ] and the ]al, essence endures within a ] beyond the accidental. This was first described by ]'s works on ], who was himself influenced by ]. | |||
| Some ''orientalists'' (or those particularly influenced by Thomist scholarship) argued that Avicenna was the first to view existence (''wujud'') as an accident that happens to the essence (''mahiyya''). However, this aspect of ontology is not the most central to the distinction that Avicenna established between essence and existence. One cannot therefore make the claim that Avicenna was the proponent of the concept of ] ''per se'', given that existence (''al-wujud'') when thought of in terms of necessity would ontologically translate into a notion of the ''Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself'' (''wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi''), which is without description or definition, and particularly without quiddity or essence (''la mahiyya lahu''). Consequently, Avicenna's ontology is ']' when accounting for being qua existence in terms of necessity (''wujub''), while it is ']' in terms of thinking about being qua existence (''wujud'') in terms of contingency qua possibility (''imkan''; or ''mumkin al-wujud'': contingent being).<ref> For recent discussions of this question see: Nader El-Bizri, "Avicenna and Essentialism", ''The Review of Metaphysics'', Vol. 54 (June 2001), pp. 753-778.</ref> | |||
| Some argue that Avicenna anticipated ] and ] in "holding that existence is an accident of accidents" and also anticipated ]'s "view about nonexistent objects."<ref>{{citation|first=Herrera Ibáñez|last=Alejandro|title=La distinción entre esencia y existencia en Avicena|journal=Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía|volume=16|pages=183-195|year=1990 |url=http://www.formalontology.it/avicenna-biblio.htm|accessdate=2008-01-29}}</ref> He also provided early arguments for "a '] being' as cause of all other existents."<ref>{{citation|first=Hourani George|last=Fadlo|title=Ibn Sina on necessary and possible existence|journal=Philosophical Forum|volume=4|pages=74-86|year=1972 |url=http://www.formalontology.it/avicenna-biblio.htm|accessdate=2008-01-29}}</ref> | |||
| The idea of "essence precedes existence" is a concept which dates back to ]<ref name=Irwin>{{citation|first=Jones|last=Irwin|title=Averroes' Reason: A Medieval Tale of Christianity and Islam|date=Autumn 2002|journal=The Philosopher|volume=LXXXX|issue=2}}</ref> and his school of ] as well as ]<ref>{{Harv|Razavi|1997|p=129}}</ref> and his ]. The opposite idea of "]" was thus developed in the works of ]<ref name=Irwin/> | |||
| More careful approaches are needed in terms of thinking about philosophers (and theologians) in Islam in terms of phenomenological methods of investigation in ] (or onto-theology), or by way of comparisons that are made with ]'s thought and his critique of the history of metaphysics.<ref> For recent studies that engage in this line of research with care and thoughtful deliberation, see: Nader El-Bizri, ''The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger'' (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000)</ref> | |||
| ===Resurrection=== | |||
| Ibn al-Nafis wrote the ''Theologus Autodidactus'' as a defense of "the system of Islam and the Muslims' doctrines on the missions of Prophets, the religious laws, the resurrection of the body, and the transitoriness of the world." The book presents rational arguments for bodily ] and the ] of the human ], using both demonstrative ] and material from the hadith corpus as forms of ]. Later Islamic scholars viewed this work as a response to ]'s ] argument on ]ual resurrection (as opposed to bodily resurrection), which was earlier criticized by ].<ref>Fancy, p. 42 & 60</ref> | |||
| ===Soul and spirit=== | |||
| The ]-philosophers, ] and ], developed their own theories on the ]. They both made a distinction between the soul and the ], and in particular, the ] doctrine on the nature of the soul was influential among the ]. Some of Avicenna's views on the soul included the idea that the ] of the soul is a consequence of its nature, and not a purpose for it to fulfill. In his theory of "The Ten Intellects", he viewed the human soul as the tenth and final ]. | |||
| Avicenna generally supported ]'s idea of the soul originating from the ], whereas Ibn al-Nafis on the other hand rejected this idea and instead argued that the soul "is related to the entirety and not to one or a few ]s." He further criticized Aristotle's idea that every unique soul requires the existence of a unique source, in this case the heart. Ibn al-Nafis concluded that "the soul is related primarily neither to the spirit nor to any organ, but rather to the entire matter whose temperament is prepared to receive that soul" and he defined the soul as nothing other than "what a human indicates by saying ‘]’."<ref>Nahyan A. G. Fancy (2006), "Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection: The Interaction of Medicine, Philosophy and Religion in the Works of Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288)", p. 209-210, ''Electronic Theses and Dissertations'', ].</ref> | |||
| ===Thought experiments=== | |||
| While he was imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan near ], ] wrote his famous "Floating Man" ] to demonstrate human ] and the substantiality of the ]. He referred to the living human ], particularly the ], which he believed to be the ] by which God communicates ] to the human ] and imparts order and ] to ]. His "Floating Man" thought experiment tells its readers to imagine themselves suspended in the air, isolated from all ]s, which includes no ] contact with even their own bodies. He argues that, in this scenario, one would still have ]. He thus concludes that the idea of the ] is not logically dependent on any physical ], and that the soul should not be seen in ]s, but as a primary ], a ].<ref name=Leaman>Seyyed ] and ] (1996), ''History of Islamic Philosophy'', p. 315, ], ISBN 0415131596.</ref> | |||
| This argument was later refined and simplified by ] in ] terms when he stated: "I can abstract from the supposition of all external things, but not from the supposition of my own consciousness."<ref name=Leaman/> | |||
| ===Time=== | |||
| In contrast to ancient Greek philosophers who believed that the universe had an infinite past with no beginning, ] and ] developed the concept of the universe having a ] with a beginning. This view was inspired by the doctrine of creation shared by the three ]: ], ] and ]. The ], ], presented the first such argument against the ancient Greek notion of an infinite past. However, the most sophisticated medieval arguments against an infinite past were developed by the Islamic philosopher, ] (Alkindus); the ], ] (Saadia ben Joseph); and the ], ] (Algazel). They developed two logical arguments against an infinite past, the first being the "argument from the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite", which states:<ref name=Craig>{{citation|title=Whitrow and Popper on the Impossibility of an Infinite Past|first=William Lane|last=Craig|journal=The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science|volume=30|issue=2|date=June 1979|pages=165-170 }}</ref> | |||
| :"An actual infinite cannot exist." | |||
| :"An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite." | |||
| :"{{Unicode|∴}} An infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist." | |||
| The second argument, the "argument from the impossibility of completing an actual infinite by successive addition", states:<ref name=Craig/> | |||
| :"An actual infinite cannot be completed by successive addition." | |||
| :"The temporal series of past events has been completed by successive addition." | |||
| :"{{Unicode|∴}} The temporal series of past events cannot be an actual infinite." | |||
| Both arguments were adopted by later Christian philosophers and theologians, and the second argument in particular became more famous after it was adopted by ] in his thesis of the first antimony concerning ].<ref name=Craig/> | |||
| ===Truth=== | |||
| In ], ] (Ibn Sina) defined ] as: | |||
| {{quote|"What corresponds in the mind to what is outside it."<ref>Osman Amin (2007), "Influence of Muslim Philosophy on the West", ''Monthly Renaissance'' '''17''' (11).</ref>}} | |||
| Avicenna elaborated on his definition of truth in his '']'': | |||
| {{quote|"The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing which has been established in it."<ref name=Aertsen>Jan A. Aertsen (1988), ''Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought'', p. 152. BRILL, ISBN 9004084517.</ref>}} | |||
| In his ''Quodlibeta'', ] wrote a commentary on Avicenna's definition of truth in his ''Metaphysics'' and explained it as follows: | |||
| {{quote|"The truth of each thing, as Avicenna says in his ''Metaphysica'', is nothing else than the property of its being which has been established in it. So that is called true gold which has properly the being of gold and attains to the established determinations of the nature of gold. Now, each thing has properly being in some nature because it stands under the complete form proper to that nature, whereby being and species in that nature is."<ref name=Aertsen/>}} | |||
| Early ] emphasized an inexorable link between ] and ] and emphsized the process of ] to find truth. | |||
| ] (Alhacen) ]ed that to discover the truth about ], it is necessary to eliminate human ] and ], and allow the ] to speak for itself.<ref name=Ezine/> In his ''Aporias against Ptolemy'', Ibn al-Haytham further wrote the following comments on truth: | |||
| {{quote|"Truth is sought for itself the truths, are immersed in uncertainties not immune from error..."<ref name=Sabra/>}} | |||
| {{quote|"Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deficiency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself an enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency."<ref name=Sabra/>}} | |||
| {{quote|"I constantly sought knowledge and truth, and it became my belief that for gaining access to the ] and closeness to God, there is no better way than that of searching for truth and knowledge."<ref name=Plott/>}} | |||
| ==Modern Islamic metaphysics== | |||
| ===Transcendent theosophy=== | |||
| {{main|Transcendent theosophy}} | |||
| ] is the school of Islamic philosophy founded by ] in the 17th century. His philosophy and ] is considered to be just as important to Islamic philosophy as ]'s philosophy later was to ] in the 20th century. Mulla Sadra bought "a new philosophical insight in dealing with the nature of ]" and created "a major transition from ] to ]" in Islamic philosophy, several centuries before this occurred in Western philosophy.<ref name=Kamal>{{citation|title=Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy|first=Muhammad|last=Kamal|year=2006|publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.|isbn=0754652718|pages=9 & 39}}</ref> | |||
| The idea of "essence precedes existence" is a concept which dates back to ]<ref name=Irwin>{{citation|first=Jones|last=Irwin|title=Averroes' Reason: A Medieval Tale of Christianity and Islam|date=Autumn 2002|journal=The Philosopher|volume=LXXXX|issue=2}}</ref> and his school of ] as well as ]<ref>{{Harv|Razavi|1997|p=129}}</ref> and his ]. The opposite idea of "]" was thus developed in the works of ]<ref name=Irwin/> and ]<ref>{{Harv|Razavi|1997|p=130}}</ref> as a reaction to this idea and is a key foundational concept of ]. | |||
| For Mulla Sadra, "existence precedes the essence and is thus principle since something has to exist first and then have an essence." This is primarily the argument that lies at the heart of Mulla Sadra's ]. Sayyid Jalal Ashtiyani later summarized Mulla Sadra's concept as follows:<ref>{{Harv|Razavi|1997|pp=129-30}}</ref> | |||
| {{quote|"The existent being that has an essence must then be caused and existence that is pure existence ... is therefore a Necessary Being."}} | |||
| More careful approaches are needed in terms of thinking about philosophers (and theologians) in Islam in terms of phenomenological methods of investigation in ] (or onto-theology), or by way of comparisons that are made with ]'s thought and his critique of the history of metaphysics.<ref> For recent studies that engage in this line of research with care and thoughtful deliberation, see: Nader El-Bizri, ''The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger'' (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000)</ref> | |||
| ===Sufi metaphysics=== | |||
| {{main|Sufi metaphysics}} | |||
| Major ideas in Sufi metaphysics have surrounded the concept of Wahdat or "Unity". Two main ] ] prevail on this controversial topic. '''Wahdat-ul-Wujood''' (Unity of Being) essentially states that in ] lies everything and God lies in everything. '''Wahdat-ul-Shuhud''' ('''Apparentism''', or Unity of Witness), on the other hand, holds that God and his creation are entirely separate. Some Islamic reformers have claimed that the difference between the two philosophies differ only in ] and that the entire debate is merely a collection of "verbal controversies" which have come about because of ambiguous ]. However, the concept of the relationship between God and the universe is still actively debated both among Sufis and between Sufis and non-Sufi ]s. | |||
| ===Contemporary Islamic metaphysics=== | |||
| {{see also|Contemporary Islamic philosophy}} | |||
| The ]n Islamic philosopher ] maintains that modern science sees things as mere things, and that it has reduced the study of the phenomenal world to an end in itself. Certainly this has brought material benefits, however it is accompanied by an uncontrollable and insatiable propensity to destroy nature itself. Al-Attas maintains a firm critique that to study and use nature without a higher spiritual end has brought mankind to the state of thinking that men are gods or His co-partners. "Devoid of real purpose, the pursuit of knowledge becomes a deviation from the truth, which necessarily puts into question the validity of such knowledge." | |||
| Al-Attas views Western civilization as constantly changing and ‘becoming’ without ever achieving 'being'. He analyzes that many institutions and nations are influenced by this spirit of the West and they continually revise and change their basic developmental goals and educational objectives to follow the trends from the West. He points to Islamic metaphysics which shows that Reality is composed of both permanence and change; the underlying permanent aspects of the external world are perpetually undergoing change | |||
| For al-Attas, Islamic metaphysics is a unified system that discloses the ultimate nature of Reality in positive terms, integrating reason and experience with other higher orders in the suprarational and transempirical levels of human consciousness. He sees this from the perspective of philosophical Sufism. Al-Attas also says that the Essentialist and the Existentialists schools of the Islamic tradition address the nature of reality. The first is represented by philosophers and theologians, and the latter by ]. The Essentialists cling to the principle of mahiyyah (]), whereas the Existentialists are rooted in wujud (the fundamental reality of existence) which is direct intuitive experience, not merely based on rational analysis or discursive reasoning. This has undoubtedly led philosophical and scientific speculations to be preoccupied with things and their essences at the expense of existence itself, thereby making the study of nature an end in itself. Al-Attas maintains that in the extra-mental reality, it is ] (Existence) that is the real "essences" of things and that what is conceptually posited as mahiyyah ("essences" or "quiddities") are in reality accidents of existence. | |||
| The process of creation or bringing into existence and annihilation or returning to non-existence, and recreation of similars is a dynamic existential movement. There is a principle of unity and a principle of diversity in creation. "The multiplicity of existents that results is not in the one reality of existence, but in the manifold aspects of the recipients of existence in the various degrees, each according to its strength or weakness, perfection or imperfection, and priority or posteriority. Thus the multiplicity of existents does not impair the unity of existence, for each existent is a mode of existence and does not have a separate ] status". He clarifies that the Essence of God is absolutely transcendent and is unknown and unknowable, except to Himself, whereas the essence or reality of a thing consists of a mode of existence providing the permanent aspect of the thing, and its quiddity, endowing it with its changing qualities. | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| *] | |||
| {{Philosophy topics}} | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
| ] | |||
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