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Military history: Asian / North America / Southeast Asia / United States C‑class

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Vietnam C‑class Mid‑importance

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Some minor edits

I'm a newbie at Misplaced Pages. I don't know if adding this to the talk page is necessary but I thought I would list some changes I made anyway. On 7/29/05 I edited lots of little things here and there. I'm pretty sure "battalion" and "regiment" should be capitalized when they refer to a specific unit. I retyped "1/7" as "1st Battalion, 7th Cav," and so forth. I rewrote several sentences which I thought confusing. Also, when listing casualties the original article called the US dead "soldiers" but the PAVN dead "fighters." If I understand correctly, the PAVN troops were regulars and therefore should also be considered soldiers. As it was I changed both to "killed." Good day and happy editing, -Schmitty3347

I suppose your decision to change 1/7 to "1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry" is justified given the fact that we are dealing with general readership, but allow me to say that soldiers would simply have said, "the first of the seventh" and let it go at that. That's the rationale for 1/7, I believe.

Terry J. Carter (talk) 04:45, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

Why isn't this article entitled the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley? I have been a student of the conflict since it was going on and I have never heard it refferred to as anything else (with the exception of Operation Silver Bayonet of which it was the major action). RM Gillespie 23:05, 3 November 2006 (UTC)

Hm... I'll poke around my book collection here and see what the consensus of my bookshelf is, but if you can find us some cites for that, it'd probably help too. Then it'd be as simple as renaming this article and dropping a redirect from the old title to the new one.--Raguleader 01:57, 4 November 2006 (UTC)

Info Box, Commanders

So, I went in to edit the info box entry to put in Colonel Brown's first name, and I noticed that the entry also included Lt. Colonel Moore and Lt. Colonel McDade as the commanders of their own Battalions. The thing is, these last two bits don't show up in the template. Does anyone know how to modify it so they fit?--Raguleader 13:28, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

OK, fixed the name formating in the info box, also fixed the name of the unit Colonel Brown commanded (the 7th Cavalry Division is part of the 3rd Brigade, not vice versa). Now the infobox looks cluttered with all the American officers on the side. Since Lt. Col. Moore and Lt. Col. McDade commanded their units in seperate actions in the battle, and Colonel Brown was in overall command, I'm not sure if we can remove any of them. Is there some standard for dealing with this, or are we just not worried?--Raguleader 13:39, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

Grr... OK, it's apparantly the 7th Cavalry Regiment, not Division. *slaps forehead* Since a Brigade is part of a Division, this is probably where the original confusion on whether the 7th was part of the 3rd to begin with. Fixed now. *goes to find coffee*--Raguleader 13:44, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

I went in and fixed all. Without going into a lot of detail, the hierarchy is as shown. Brown was the overall commander, Moore the on-scene commander, and McDade's battalion the one ambushed at Albany.--131.238.92.62 12:01, 18 April 2006 (UTC)

Is there any information available on the NVA/VC order of battle and their commanders? Does anyone want to add it in for the Infobox?--Raguleader 20:21, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

Difference Between Casualty Figures in Article and Side Box

The article states "The U.S. lost 234, with 242 wounded ... The PAVN lost 1,037 killed with an estimated 1,365 wounded."

However, the side box says 234/242 and 837/1365. Any reason for the discrepancy between 1037 and 837? Also, should the 1365 in the side-box read "1365 est." since it is an estimate, but the other figures (as far as I know) are not?

-Anonymous

Also, American strength is listed in the side box as 395 men but casualties are "239 dead, 242 wounded." Furthermore, "The PAVN forces had suffered thousands of casualties and were no longer capable of a fight" according to the article's text but the total North Vietnamese casualties are less than 1,000 in the side box. The information is wrong either in the text or the side box, or maybe both. -KS 1/6/07

Good grief, what happened to the numbers now? This is from the source it links to:

Overall, Kinnard's forces suffered 305 killed and 524 wounded during the campaign while killing, according to official records, 1,519 of the enemy by body count and another 2,042 by estimate. The figures for the enemy's losses... are open to doubt. At X-RAY Colonel Moore ... reduced the total of 834 killed submitted by his men to 634 because the former figure seemed too high.

The numbers in the info box don't seem to resemble that at all. Abeall (talk) 22:22, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

The figures of casualties in this article (particularly the side box) are atrociously incorrect. For both American and NVA troops. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.64.19.3 (talk) 18:47, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

Overhauling this Article

Hi,

I'm new to Misplaced Pages, but I did my university thesis on the Vietnam War and am really interested in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. I couldn't believe there was so little information in this article beyond the technical aspects of the battle. Therefore, I'm overhauling this article to provide a more human side to the battle. My primary source is Moore & Galloway's We Were Soldiers Once...And Young.

If I make any factual errors, please do not hesitate to correct me. Otherwise, please give me a few days to get everything in and the formatting right before making any significant changes.

Thanks!

James Cameron

March 6/06

Detail of Article

March 8/06

I realize that I have included a significant amount of detail in this article, including the names of many officers and enlisted personnel involved in the battle. I have not yet finished this page, so please bear with me a few more days.

The purpose of including this much detail is so that interested individuals who have had relatives or friends who were at the Ia Drang may know what their loved ones did and underwent in this battle. I have purposely avoided providing details that would be troubling for those who may have known the combatants (such as detailed causes of death, for example).

While all of this information and much more is available in Moore and Galloway's book (in fact, it's my primary source), my hope is to respectfully inform those who knew the combatants of the Ia Drang (or any veterans of the Ia Drang who may read this article). For those who have never known these men but wish to honour their experience (like myself), the purpose of this page is to provide information on what I believe is among the most interesting and tragic battles of the War.

For those who are interested in learning more, I highly recommend the LZ X-Ray site and We Were Soldiers Once...And Young - which, in my view, is one of the best war books ever written.

James Cameron

Canada

I found this article fascinating, it had excellent detail. Well done on researching the content. I did a little cleanup while I was here. ~ Flooch 13:17, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

Please Remove a Redirect, Thanks

Sometime ago I started a page called "Landing Zone X-Ray" to be about the place in present-day reality, not about the battle. Now I have all my research complete but the page redirects here. Would someone please detach or remove the redirect so I can just write the page out as I initally intended it to be? (I'm planning to use TerraServer or Google Earth to pinpoint the exact field or sunnink like that, but now I can't since the page is gone. Also I want a clear assurance that the embleer hraka rah who did this to me is stopped and will never do it again. Thank you all so much!) --Shenshuai 16:48, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

Force strength

Would the number given for American forces include both Colonel Moore's and Colonel McDade's men combined? I'm pretty sure that would be far more than 395, though any counts should take care to remember that Lieutenant "Hard Corps" Rescorla's platoon fought in both actions.--Raguleader 21:44, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

only 16 Americans not dead or wounded?

Come on.

Also, the second battle has only one paragraph (and should have even separate article). --HanzoHattori 06:02, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

This is probably related to the strangely low number of American soldiers listed as being present. 395 men would be a single battalion, while there were as many as three American battalions involved in the battle (only two involved in any major ways, with Colonel Moore's battalion fighting at X-Ray and Colonel McDade's battalion fighting at Albany.--Raguleader 10:23, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Agreed with the second point though BTW. The Albany fight really deserves its own article. But what to call it? In most histories it's covered under Ia Drang. Maury 13:51, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

LZ Albany ambush? --HanzoHattori 07:59, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

NVA losses

http://www.vietnampix.com/fire3.htm says "2500 dead". --HanzoHattori 07:57, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

The historical account of this battle in the book "We Were Soldiers Once... And Young" places the figure of NVA losses much higher than listed here as well. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.64.19.3 (talk) 18:45, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

In the book "We Were Soldiers Once... And Young" never mention 2500 casualities of NVA. Your link is not the book. In addition,"body count" is very untrusting. -jimmy — Preceding unsigned comment added by Yeumuvayeuem (talk • contribs) 12:54, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

references

Shouldn't the references section be "notes" and be formatted as "Moore p. 219" instead of numbingly listing the whole title, and ISBN number for each ref? You can put that once in a section called references and just keep the surname and page number in the renamed notes section can't you? SGGH 19:16, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

It should, but it's more difficult than you think because they might get moved around. This should really be automated in the CITE system, but don't hold your breath. Maury 19:47, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

I'm confused (Albany)

The Second Battalion, 7th Cavalry lost 155 men killed and suffered 124 wounded, while Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry both suffered only 2 wounded? --HanzoHattori 08:57, 29 May 2007 (UTC)

Battle of Ia Drang - French battle

If my memory is correct , there was a battle where the French were annihilated a few years before the American battle but on the same valley. Is this a fact?

--YoavD 06:19, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

You may be referring to the Battle of Mang Yang Pass which also took place in the Central Highlands. -- • Kurt Guirnela • ‡ 10:40, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

First Battle?

This was NOT the first major US combat operation in Vietnam. Operation Gibraltar involving the 2/502nd and 2/327th infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division took place two months prior in September 1965. There were significant American casualties in this engagement, and it involved at least two American battalions pitted against a well entrenched Main Force VC battalion--certainly criteria for a "major battle". I'm changing that line in the article, and added a reference to Operation Gibraltar. Don't know how to add a citation, but here are some references:

"In mid-September, elements of the 2nd of the 502nd won the honor of first defeating a Viet Cong main force unit, before any other U.S. unit." (http://bastogne.org/regiment_history/vietnam.html),

"...the battalion deployed to Vietnam in 1965 and fought the Division’s first engagement from the 18th to the 20th of September as part of Operation Gibraltar." (http://pao.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/units/2-12cav/history.htm). -- —Preceding unsigned comment added by 214.13.209.200 (talk • contribs)

You may have proven your point. The initial introductory paragraphs will be modified to remove references to Ia Drang being the first major battle of US forces. However, it will contain no references to Operation Gibraltar, as that deserves its own article. -- • Kurt Guirnela • ‡ 02:30, 29 July 2007 (UTC)

Btw, the article specifically points out the fact that Ia Drang is "the first major battle of the Vietnam War between the United States Army and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Operation Gibraltar involved US troops and Main Force VC; hence, some users might revert edits made concerning the introductory paragraph on the strength of that argument. -- • Kurt Guirnela • ‡ 02:39, 29 July 2007 (UTC)

It was PAVN not VC. LTG(Ret) Charles Dyke refers to "the ill-fated airlift of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry into a confined, narrow valley ringed by a battalion of well dug-in PAVN 95th Regiment" in a letter to the editor in September 1989 issue of Army Magazine in response to a book review of David Hackworth's book About Face. Then MAJ Dyke was the S3 (battalion operations officer) of 2/327th IN at the time of Operation Gibraltar.

Another perspective

I'm uncertain of the availability of PAVN accounts of this battle, but right now it reads as being very US-centric. Not that its bad...actually it's sort of a gripping narrative account, but it would add some colour and improve the historical context to provide at least part of the North Vietnamese side in this engagement. if a reliable source could be found, that would really improve this article. Antimatter---talk--- 22:08, 7 August 2007 (UTC)

Yes, Vietnam should talks.

Here is the PAVN take "We sent our men into the field and they were turned into ground beef by accurate and sustained US artillery." No sarcasm intended, but how could it NOT be US centric when the battle under Moore's command (that is, the initial engagement at the LZ but not including the idiotic orders to march and then be ambushed subsequently) achieved better than 8:1 casualties against the NVA. Insofar as the strategic purpose of the battle from the US side was to test the utility of air cavalry mobilized warfare, it was a stellar success and showed the NVA that they were NOT fighting the French any more. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.137.139.119 (talk) 04:04, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

See description of "Talk" pages at the top - this is not a discussion board for the article's topic, and your comment has no relevance to Misplaced Pages:POV. Universaladdress (talk) 05:13, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

I fully agree with the unsigned opinion that opens this thread. For example, article accounts for heroisms by U.S. soldiers, but it's possible that there are heroism acts also on the other side this article doesn't tell of. As it is, IMHO the article seems to be a little too U.S.-centric (POV?). To obtain the netrality wikipedia should have, the Vietnamese point of view should be considered. If information for the Vietnamese side are not alvailble, IMHO such thing should be stressed at the beginning of the article. Thank you for your attention. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.40.190.21 (talk) 20:26, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

You must remember that Vietnamese speakers are rare, and most of Vietnam War sources are from U.S "researchers". It's easier to seek for chinese sources, or any american recent revisionist research material. It's hard... Also, how could they have such precise estimatives (americans) about enemy casualties if they (U.S troops) left the battlefield and had no precise idea about enemy strenght at and after the Battle? This is a bit of a nonsense IMO. — Preceding unsigned comment added by RdClZn (talk • contribs) 20:31, 24 February 2012 (UTC)

Hal Moore's book does include quite a bit of input from some senior PAVN officers concerning their perspective on the battles - very interesting on many levels. 62.196.17.197 (talk) 11:31, 4 November 2013 (UTC)

With Gibson movies?

What's the accuracy when this battle is compared to We were soldiers? There are many differences execpt the Alabny ambush?--Stefanomencarelli 00:13, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

The bulk of this article is sourced from Col. Moore's and Galloway's book. The movie took much artistic license and should not be treated as a "factual" account of the battle, although there are similarities. -- • Kurt Guirnela • ‡ 04:07, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

Battle outcome

Rather than starting an edit war in the infobox about the outcome, may I suggest that editors working on this article ensure that the outcome is properly referenced and that consensus is reached here. Socrates2008 (Talk) 09:32, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Accuracy of the term Viet Cong as used in this article

In September 13th 2007 editor Civil Engineer III, in an attempt to reduce POV, changed nearly every mention of the words enemy and communist to Viet Cong, even though in many instances the words enemy and communist probably did not refer to NLF or PLAF but to PAVN. Perhaps Civil Engineer III was not well informed of the differences between People's Liberation Armed Forces a.k.a. Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam, and, hence, was prone to confusing the two. Could someone more knowledgeable please go through the article and change these possibly incorrect references to something more appropriate? Thank you. --130.234.5.137 (talk) 14:49, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Changed to "Vietnamese" or "enemy" when in context. --RamboKadyrov (talk) 12:39, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

Just for the sake of discussion I am wondering at the classification of this battle as a "draw."

Is this for political correctness, because it seems to me that around 1,500 enemy dead vs. around 500 U.S. dead is a victory. Is it because the U.S. forces left the field of battle? I could understand this although because of the unconventional nature of the war, gaining and holding territory had little if no meaning. Just wondering.

By the way, I did a search of other source material on Ia Drang Valley and couldn't find anything on amazon.com anyway. I certainly would very much like to have the other sides views, comments and any heroism on their part. As a vet of Nam yet after 40 years even I have some sense of reconciliation and can recognize that in their view the enemy then were fighting a war of liberation and many men and women on their side have very interesting and important stories to tell.

98.165.79.166 (talk) 15:06, 13 April 2010 (UTC)TDurden1937

Again, this is not a discussion board to debate the merits of "political correctness" or your point of view on the subject. Please keep such comments to other websites where they will be more appropriate. Universaladdress (talk) 05:16, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

Hal Moore's book indicates that there was a VC unit involved in the fighting at X-ray ... and possibly at Albany as well given that the PAVN apparently fed in all sorts of auxilaries once the hairball got started, but this was indeed mainly a PAVN performance. 62.196.17.197 (talk) 11:39, 4 November 2013 (UTC)

The result?

It was a US victory. Vietnamese forces were in retreat when US troops left the valley.

Actually the most fair result is a N. Vietnam Strategic victory and a US Tactical victory.

Retreat? According to who? The NVA owned the valley!

Yes the NVA did own the valley however both sides got what they wanted, the US wanted to destroy the NVA that was in the valley but had no desire to control it thus making a tactical move. The NVA controlling the valley once US forced arrived wanted to remove the US so they could still control that valley thus making it a strategic move. The US got what they wanted of destroying the NVA division while the NVA got what they wanted by having US forced leave. Thus not making it a draw because if it was a draw then both forced would not of gained their over all goal.

US Victory?

North vietnam also revendicated that battle as a victory for them.

Also, other languages for this wikipedia page state that there is no victor: italian deutsh french polski etc etc. If the English page is the only one to state that battle as a victory for USA then we can doubt about the partiality of wikipedia. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.86.32.36 (talk) 21:47, 9 October 2010 (UTC)

Unfortunately Misplaced Pages is full of one-sided American propaganda, mate. According to Hal Moore himself, there was no winner in this battle.Canpark (talk) 14:52, 7 December 2010 (UTC)

This battle can be seen as a victory for the US in regards to the aggressive search and destroy strategy employed by General William Westmoreland. The US was actively seeking out large VPA and Vietcong units which they could engage in a set piece battle. This was just that. Although it may appear to be a loss from Colonel Moore's point of view, in the perspective of grand strategy at the time it was seen as a victory. Whether history determines this to be a victory or not is irrelevant here. It should be noted that it was seen as a victory with respect to grand strategy in the US high command. However, this did overshadowed the defeat of LZ Albany. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91killer (talk • contribs) 17:48, 5 April 2011 (UTC) Be careful, this war hasn't just about casualties. McNamara's encounter with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach was clear: "'You're totally wrong. We were fighting for our independence. You were fighting to enslave us.'

'Do you mean to say it was not a tragedy for you, when you lost 3 million 4 hundred thousand Vietnamese killed, which on our population base is the equivalent of 27 million Americans? What did you accomplish? You didn't get any more than we were willing to give you at the beginning of the war. You could have had the whole damn thing: independence, unification.'

'Mr. McNamara, You must never have read a history book. If you'd had, you'd know we weren't pawns of the Chinese or the Russians. McNamara, didn't you know that? Don't you understand that we have been fighting the Chinese for 1000 years? We were fighting for our independence. And we would fight to the last man. And we were determined to do so. And no amount of bombing, no amount of U.S. pressure would ever have stopped us.'" (I'm new to wikipedia, I don't know how can i "hide" part of this quote)

Thus, vietnamese morale and will could sustain much more casualties than U.S.A. It's correct to classify this battle's result as "controversial". U.S accomplished the goal of weaken VC/VPLA forces, and they denied important position to U.S troops and gradualy damaged U.S morale. RdClZn (talk) 20:46, 24 February 2012 (UTC)

Units involved (cleanup)

Now as "strenght" in the infobox, but should be in the order of battle section in the main body of the article. --94.246.150.68 (talk) 05:23, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

Weird losses

Also figures for US casualties in the infobox are vastly different than in the text. --94.246.150.68 (talk) 05:51, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

I attempted to reconcile the body text and infobox casualties. The text refers to casualties in varying ways, making it difficult to resolve. Casualty figures refer to totals and then to numbers killed during "this battle." Since the sources are not online, I can't figure out which apply to this engagement specifically. — btphelps 19:01, 17 September 2011 (UTC)

Article title spelling

The name of the location is Ia Drang (with a capital i), but the article's title is la Drang (with a lowercase l). 97.102.194.244 (talk) 18:04, 13 November 2011 (UTC)

Fixed it. Don't know why someone didn't do it earlier. — jwillbur 00:30, 24 February 2012 (UTC)

Body count

"body count" is very untrusting. NVA claims that they just suffer 208 killed 146 wounded at Xray and Albany in Ladrang. Totally 554 killed and 669 wounded in the campaign. In my opinion, the figure of NVA casualities may be higher, however it cannot reach more than 500 death for the following reasons: first, NVA just got 66th PAVN Regiment with totally 2000 troops in La drang and after that their still be capable of participating PleiMe campaign. Second, American merely hold their position at X ray and call the support of artillery and air forces before retreating quickly by choppers. Albany they were ambushed by NVA and beaten heavily, losing their and position and retreat. It is difficult to belive they still are in mood to collect and count enemy bodies. - Jim- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Yeumuvayeuem (talk • contribs) 13:15, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

"PleiMe campaign": The Siege of Plei Me was just the initial part the Pleiku Campaign. It was not in the aftermath and it was the 33rd NVA that besieged the Plei Me SF-Monty camp and ambushed the Arvin relief column. Operation Silver Bayonet, that led to the NVA counterattacks at/near the landing zones X-Ray and Albany, the subject of this article, was the U.S. Air Cavalry response to Plei Me, and the 66th NVA was not "totally 2000".

In October, the 33rd Regt attacks Plei Me Special Forces Camp approximately 40 miles south of Pleiku City in the Pleiku Province. Plei Me is garrisoned with a 12 man US Special Forces Team and 350 Montagnard mercenaries. The siege continues for several days. An Army of Vietnam relief force is sent out from Pleiku and is ambushed enroute by the PAVN 32nd Regt. 1st CAV Artillery supports the ARVN column and the ambushers are beaten off, and the siege is lifted. The 1st CAV Division is then committed in late October to find and destroy the defeated enemy. The 1st Brigade pursues the withdrawing enemy force over a very large area south and west of Pleiku City and west of Plei Me. It harasses and hounds the 33rd into the eastern area of the Ia Drang Valley. The two most significant events are the capture of a PAVN Field Hospital on Nov 1st along with numerous troops, weapons, and enemy documents; and the ambush of a unit of the fresh 66th Regt along the Ia Drang River in the western area of the Valley. On 10 Nov, the 3rd Brigade relieves the 1st Brigade and moves into the area to the east and west of Plei Me and conducts patrolling actions. No enemy contact. UPI reporter Joe Galloway accompanied 1/7 CAV units on these patrols. Late in the afternoon of Saturday, 13 Nov, the 3rd Brigade Commander, COL Thomas Brown, gave the 1st Bn, 7th Cavalry commander, Lt. Col Hal Moore orders to move his battalion on 14 Nov into the Ia Drang Valley with the mission: "Find and kill the enemy". Moore would have 16 Huey helicopters to move his unit. Two 105 mm Howitzer batteries (12 tubes) to render fire support. Three battalions of PAVN were reported to be in the Valley. Moore put out a warning order to his staff and 5 company commanders, made a map study, formed a tentative plan, arranged for supplies, and set up an air recon for early 14 Nov to select a landing zone to be followed by the operations order to the staff and commanders. The air recon goes as planned and at 8:50 AM, 14 Nov Moore issued his operations plan of maneuver and plan of fire support. All companies were to land in one clearing dubbed landing zone X-Ray. --Niemti (talk) 15:07, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

Maybe there should be articles about Operation Silver Bayonet and/or Pleiku Campaign (it is currently just a redirect to Pleiku) to dispel such a confusion. --Niemti (talk) 15:20, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

As of bodycount itself, at LZ X-Ray the Americans seized and policied the battlefield following the NVA retreat and didn't really "quickly evacuated". It's debatable if the body count can be really trusted, but it's the official minimum number (of course many bodies would be either taken by the retreating NVA or just not found or destroyed such is in napalm strikes). Moore: At approximately 1330 hours all companies on the perimeter screened out for 300 meters and policed the battlefield. Dead PAVN, PAVN body fragments, and PAVN weapons and equipment were littered in profusion around the edge and forward of the perimeter. Numerous body fragments were seen. There was massive evidence e.g. bloody trails, bandages, etc, of many other PAVN being dragged away from the area. Some of the enemy dead were found stacked behind anthills. Artillery and TAC Air was placed on all wooded areas nearby into which trails disappeared. Numerous enemy weapons were collected along with other armament. Two prisoners were taken and evacuated. Friendly dead and wounded were also collected. Some friendly were killed and wounded in this screening. Total estimated number was 1215. Also, many sources say 634, but it was really 834 claimed by bodycount (Moore's after-action report). --Niemti (talk) 15:50, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

I'm looking for the names of the other Vietnamese commanders

The actual commander of the 66th is irrevelant because he was not there, so I instead inserted the political officer Ngoc Chau who actually commanded the regiment during the battle. --Niemti (talk) 17:58, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

Vietnamese sources

It seems to me this article's most serious shortcoming is that no Vietnamese sources have been used in writing it. Much the same can be said about most articles on en.WP covering this conflict - the sourcing is unfortunately biased. Roger (talk) 12:37, 12 October 2012 (UTC)

Casualties

I don't understand the casualty figures in the slightest. Can someone explain to me what's what? 24.212.137.195 (talk) 05:13, 31 December 2012 (UTC)

How many NVA troops fought in Ia Drang?

Most popular sources counted the NVA forces in Ia Drang around 3000 and 4000 troops. However, both the NVA's 33rd and 66th and other forces together only commited 5 battalions worth of troops, which according to VPA's official document, only about 300-500 men each. There's also the harsh condition of their operating ground, previous combat losses... should reduce the active combatant even more. So in this sense, should we stick to the famous 4000, or the logical 1800?--Zeraful (talk) 15:30, 15 February 2013 (UTC)

I share your concern. If the NVA forces numbered around 2,000, the US estimates in the info box of 1,064 (body count) and 1,645 (estimated) NVA battle deaths seem seriously inflated. I've read one account of NVA casualties at Landing Zone Albany which expressed doubt that NVA battle deaths in that battle totaled 200 -- less than one half the 403 claimed by the U.S. Col. Moore's body count estimate of 634 NVA dead at LZ X-Ray seem a little closer to realistic, although not supported by the small number of NVA arms captured, nor by the fact that the NVA battalion (33rd) that Moore appears to have nearly destroyed at LZ X-Ray was in fact operational and fighting only a day or two later at LZ Albany.

Perhaps more doubt about the estimates of NVA casualties by the US should be expressed in the info box? Smallchief (talk 15:47, 16 November 2014 (UTC)

POV in the Info Box, "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed"

An editor has inserted the phrase "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed" into the info box for this article. This is not in accord with Misplaced Pages's usual practice for info boxes. The info box for the Battle of the Little Big Horn states only that it was a Native American victory; it does not say "Custer's command mostly destroyed" or anything similar. The info box for the Battle of Iwo Jima states only that it was an American victory. It does not say "Japanese defenders destroyed"

Thus, inserting the comment "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed" into the info box of this article is not consistent with other articles and is, in fact, a point of view that is more appropriately discussed in the text of the article.

Moreover, the phrase is misleading. One might with accuracy say in the info box that 2 American battalions suffered nearly 50 percent casualties. Why don't we also say that in the info box? Saying that would be just as relevant as saying that the "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed." The answer is that it's best to leave judgmental POV arguments out of the info box. Let's just say "Both sides claimed victory" and leave the argument about who did what to whom for the text of the article.

The phrase "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed" was added to the info box only on 20 October 2015. It is a recent and questionable addition to a long-existing article and should be discussed thoroughly before being inserted. It appears to be a latter-day sleight of hand effort to claim American victory in a battle in which both sides claimed victory.

Thus, I have reverted the phrase "Majority of PAVN battalions destroyed." Smallchief (talk 10:55, 11 November 2015 (UTC)

Well first of all it's a pleasure to meet you all. Jumping right in, I don't believe mentioning the 50% casualties would be just as relevant at all. Despite the high casualty rate, the battalions remained in tact and ultimately held the field while 6 out of 9 (the majority) communist battalions were entirely wiped out. I apologize for seeing that as significant. No sleight of hand attempt, just trying to add a bit more detail to the vague "Both sides claim victory." But I'm clearly outnumbered and the consensus is against me, so I'll leave the page as it is. Cheers. Amerijuanican (talk) 02:50, 15 November 2015 (UTC)

Thank you for your gracious comment. My opinion is that, while the action at the famous LZ X-Ray, might appropriately be called a U.S. victory, the action at the nearby, but much-less famous LZ Albany, was one of the worst military disasters the U.S. suffered in Vietnam. Moreover, the body count is not always the best way of determining who won a battle. Given the monopoly the U.S. had on airpower and the superiority we had in artillery, it would be rare indeed if Viet Cong and NVA casualties did not exceed U.S. casualties in a battle. As the Battle of Ia Drang resolved nothing in favor of either side (although influential on both sides for lessons learned), I agree with those who call it a draw. Smallchief (talk 01:14, 17 November 2015 (UTC)

Fair enough, and well put. Although, despite the LZ Albany ambush being one of the most successful against U.S. forces during the war, the Vietnamese ultimately retreated from there as well and casualties were once again significantly higher. Wouldn't the retreat of the Vietnamese force alone, regardless of casualties, make the battle a tactical victory for the Americans? Even if an enemy fires successful volleys, inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing opposition, they've still lost the battlefield and tactical glory. What do you think? Amerijuanican (talk) 22:10, 21 November 2015 (UTC)

Battle of Ia Drang citations

(copy from HowCheng's talk page)

You recently put up a sign "needs additional citations" at the top of the article. Do you care to point out specifically which statements or sentences or parts or sections need additional citations?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 19:04, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

@Tnguyen4321: There are a lot of paragraphs and even some entire sections that have no citations at all (mostly in the "1st/7th Cav and the battle for LZ X-Ray" section, which happens to be the bulk of the article). I figured one tag at the top was better than lots of tags throughout the article. Thanks. —howcheng {chat} 19:20, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

Re: the topic 'Overhauling this Article' of the talk page of the Battle of Ia Drang article, it was said: ... I'm overhauling this article to provide a more human side to the battle. My primary source is Moore & Galloway's We Were Soldiers Once...And Young. Thanks! James Cameron March 6/06. Therefore, I deem your tag is not relevant.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:08, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

Listing the source on the talk page (or even in the "References" section by itself) does nothing. You still need the WP:inline citations. —howcheng {chat} 21:26, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

If a 'general reference' does nothing to you, then it is preferable to put a tag 'citation needed' at each end of sentence or paragraph where needed; that is if you want to induce people to action and add citations.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:42, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

By the way, is it that James Cameron of the 'Terminator'?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:45, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

Haha, I doubt it. Anyway, I was trying not to be a jerk about it, but I certainly can if you prefer. —howcheng {chat} 22:20, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

If you can, then you can keep that 'general tag' while inserting the individual tags.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 22:35, 13 November 2015 (UTC)

• Put it as a general reference. And then, for specific statements, use <ref>Moore & Galloway p. 123</ref>. Oiyarbepsy (talk) 03:37, 14 November 2015 (UTC)

References

1. http://www.errolmorris.com/film/fow_transcript.html. Retrieved 24 February 2012. {{cite web}}: |first= missing |last= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)

ARVN involvement

The information from the book Why Pleime was misinterpreted. In the preface, Gen. Westmoreland meant that the ARVN had contributed mainly to the "final phase" of the battle, which was Operation Than Phong 7, carried out from 18 November 1965, after the Battle of Ia Drang was over. In fact, almost no info about the involvement of the ARVN is found in Chapter V of the book. 113.190.172.153 (talk) 16:54, 8 February 2016 (UTC)D. Nam

You are quite wrong. Firstly, let me point out that you mix up the use of "battle" and "operation", which causes confusion (by the way even Westmoreland used indiscriminately the two words) . The Pleime campaign comprised three phases: 1. Pleime, the preparatory phase; 2. Chupong, the main phase; and 3. Iadrang, the final phase. The Pleime phase was assumed by the ARVN 3rd Armored Relief Task Force ̣(operation Dan Thang 21). The Chupong phase was assumed by the US 1st Air Cavalry Division (Long Reach operation, which comprised All the Way operation conducted by 1st Air Cavalry Brigade and Silver Bayonet I conducted by 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade). The Iadrang phase was assumed by ARVN Airborne Brigade (operation Than Phong 7 supported by operation Silver Bayonet II conducted by 2nd Air Cavalry Brigade). Let me quote Gen. Westmoreland: "From the standpoint of employment of joint forces, the Plei Me battle was a classic. The signal successes of the latter phases could, perhaps, never have been realized had it not been for the judgment and foresight of Vietnamese leadership. The initial preparatory effort on the ground, paving the way for the introduction of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, was accomplished by Vietnamese forces. Similarly the very successful final phase exploitation was accomplished largely by the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade. The effectiveness of this highly organized, closely integrated, cooperative effort has not often been emulated in modern warfare."

The reason you don't see "info about the involvement of the ARVN is found in Chapter V of the book", which is the Chupong phase, is that the ARVN and US forces took turn in the performance of" this highly organized, closely integrated, cooperative effort has not often been emulated in modern warfare."Tnguyen4321 (talk) 11:56, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

One more clarification your "The Battle of Ia Drang" is actually the battles at LZ X-Ray (Nov 14-16) and LZ Albany (Nov 17) combined, which happened within the Chupong phase (Oct 27-Nov 17) part of Silver Bayonet I (Nov 10-17). Your "Battle of Ia Drang" should be called "Battle of Chu Pong" because it occurred at the footstep of Chu Pong Massif; and that appellation should be reserved to indicate the two battles (Nov 20 and 24) combined, performed by the ARVN Airborne Brigade in the Ia Drang Valley during the course of operation Than Phong 7. Confused enough, huh?! Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:56, 17 February 2016 (UTC)

Furthermore, to add more to the confusion: the same campaign has been called differently by different people: Pleime (Vinh Loc), Plâyme (Viet Cong), Pleiku (Kinnard), Pleime-Chupong (McChristian), Ia Drang (general public). It should be called the Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang campaign.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:47, 20 February 2016 (UTC)

• I think you are misunderstanding about the difference between the battle and the name of the location itself. The term "Battle of Ia Drang" has for long been commonly used to refer to the combined battles at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany from 14-18 November 1965, and that's all. This indication is used in most American accounts, including We Were Soldiers Once...and Young by Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway.. Wherever the location is, "Battle of Ia Drang" is the most common name.
• About Gen. Westmoreland's statement in Why Pleime, you also missed certain points. He mentioned about the ARVN involvement in "initial preparatory effort" (Siege of Plei Me) and the "final phase exploitation" (Operation Than Phong 7) of the Pleime Campaign, non of which was about the period of 14-18 November. Based on the content of Chapter V, we can conclude that the ARVN involvement in the second phase of the Pleime Campaign was strictly limited to non-combat roles, if there had been any. I think the only appropriate case to state South Vietnam as a belligerent is in a new article named "Pleime Campaign", or another new article named either "Second Battle of Ia Drang" or "Operation Than Phong 7". 117.6.88.137 (talk) 10:28, 28 March 2016 (UTC) D. Nam

• No, I am not misunderstanding about 'the difference between the battle and the name of the location itself'. I just try to clarify the confusion caused by different and imprecise appellations found in 'most American accounts', in particular We Were Soldiers Once...and Young: Ia Drang Valley battle, Ia Drang Valley campaign, Ia Drang Valley operation, Ia Drang battle, Ia Drang campaign, Ia Drang operation, Pleiku campaign, Pleime campaign, Long Reach operation, All the Way operation, Silver Bayonet I operation, Silver Bayonet II operation, etc.; LZ X-Ray battle and LZ Albany battle were within Silver Bayonet I operation.
• The ARVN was involvement in the second phase of the Pleime Campaign although in a - you are right - 'strictly limited to non-combat roles'; however it was involved nevertheless in an operational control capacity, providing operational concepts and real time intelligence. The three battles at Pleime, Chupong and Iadrang were parts of a seamless and inseparable strings of operations of the Pleime campaign. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:30, 2 April 2016 (UTC)
• By the way, I have submitted an article named 'Pleime campaign'. It was rejected and redirected to this page.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:43, 2 April 2016 (UTC)
• Furthermore, the Pleime (Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang) campaign was a joint ARVN-US effort from beginning to end. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:35, 2 April 2016 (UTC)

Then I think there should be no more discussion. If its role is limited to non-combatant, then it should not be stated as a belligerent, otherwise we could state anything as a belligerent in a battle. And whatever the role of the battle in the campaign was, this article talks about the battle, not the campaign.113.190.176.36 (talk) 17:50, 3 April 2016 (UTC)

• Agree with IP's comment directly above. This article is about the battle, not the campaign in general. David J Johnson (talk) 18:05, 3 April 2016 (UTC)

How do you resolve the redirect issue of 'Pleime campaign' to 'Battle of Ia Drang' then? Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:58, 3 April 2016 (UTC)

Battle or campaign, the ARVN was a belligerent (opponent) involved in the conflict with the NVA.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:39, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

Personally I think creating a new article about the campaign is OK. But even in case you can't, you can still have a page for Operation Than Phong 7 (we've already have one for the Siege of Plei Me).117.6.88.137 (talk) 01:16, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

The Battle of Ia Drang is the extension of the Siege of Pleime. Initially, upon learning that the NVA B3 Field Front (first belligerent)was staging for an attack of the Pleime camp with its three 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments from their bases established in the Chu Pong Massif areas by December 1965, the ARVN II Corps (second belligerent) made plan to destroy the three regiments at their assembly areas with B-52 strike as early as September 1965. When the NVA decided to attack earlier on 19 October with only two readied 32nd and 33rd Regiment, the ARVN employed a delay tactic in repulsing the attacking regiments back to Chu Pong where they would join force with the 66th Regiment to attempt for a second attack of the camp. The ARVN requested the help of the 1st Air Cavalry Division with their airmobility capacity - with the ARVN Airborne as reserved force on standby - to round up the three enemy regiments into suitable targets for B-52 strike with the insertion of the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion in a blocking position at LZ X-Ray. This insertion enabled the 5 consecutive days of B-52 strikes all over the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex from 15 to 20 November, including the LZ X-Ray on 17 November. (See McChristian, Intelligence Aspect of Plei me/Chu Pong campaign from 20 October to 20 November 1965, http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_intel_J2-2.htm). The ARVN II Corps Command had the operational control of the Battle of Ia Drang, providing the operational concept and the intelligence to the Air Cavalry. After the LZ X-Ray battle, the ARVN II Corps Command acknowledged 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion’s heroism with VN Gallantry Cross with Palm, because LTC Hal Moore’s battalion was attached to II Corps Forces in that battle (see http://www.generalhieu.com/vinhloc-moore.jpg). My conclusion is that the ARVN should be included in the in-box of belligerents.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 04:46, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

Sorry but the whole thing you're talking about is the relation between the battle and other battles in the campaign, not the content of the battle itself. Such relation can be drawn from any combination of two or more battles together. I still don't see how the insertion of South Vietnam into the box is reasonable.117.6.88.137 (talk) 10:08, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

Firstly, I don't think you can draw up casual relationship between two or more battles if they are not planned as such in a campaign. All the operations in the Pleime (Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang) were performed to facilitate the 5 day B-52 strike operation (Dan Thang 21, Trường Chinh, Than Phong 7). Within Trường Chinh (Long Reach in English) operation are All The Way (rounding up), Silver Bayonet I (fixing with LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany), and Silver Bayonet II in conjunction with Than Phong 7 (finishing off). Secondly, the ARVN still maintained an active participation during the Battle of Ia Drang; and therefore should be inserted as a belligerent in the box. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 10:42, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

Furthermore, the NVA as a belligerent chose to attack at Pleime, while the ARVN as a belligerent chose to counter attack at the Chupong-Iadrang complex. And the main action in the Battle of Ia Drang was the B-52 strike operation, not the air assault of the Air Cav at the LZ X-Ray. In comparison to the main action conducted by the Arc Light operation, the secondary action of Air Cavalry operation weighed much less in time (2 days –November 14-15 versus five days – November 15-19), space (LZ X-Ray versus the entire Chupong-Iadrang complex areas), units committed (1/7, 2/7 and 2/5 Air Cavalry Battalions versus the 3AC's B-52 fleet stationed at Guam), enemy forces engaged (2 NVA battalions versus 3 NVA Regiments). The main role played by the ARVN in the battle should not be ignored and go undetected, as it is currently.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:03, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

After the relief of the siege of the Pleime camp, on 27 October 1965, the ARVN II Corps Command made plan for a counter attack at the footstep of the Chupong Massif where the enemy had staged its attack. The counter attack will be called by the popular name 'The Battle of Ia Drang'. A joint ARVN-US Command Task Force was created which comprised the II Corps Command and the 1st Air Cavalry Forward Command Post and co-located in the compound of the ARVN II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku). The pursuit operation that lead to the Battle of Ia Drang was named Operation Trường Chinh ̣(Long Reach in English) conducted by an Allied Task Force composed of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division as the main force and the ARVN Airborne Brigade as the reserve force). The Battle of Ia Drang was conducted with a close ARVN-US modus operandi.

The Battle of Ia Drang did not end at the footstep of Chu Pong massif when the US Air Cavalry troops abandoned the LZ X-Ray. It ended further west of the Ia Drang Valley toward the Duc Co camp near the Cambodian border, after the US 2nd Air Cavalry established a second blocking position at LZ Crooks and after the ARVN Airborne Brigade annihiliated the two remnant battalions of the NVA battalions on 20 and 24 November.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:28, 7 April 2016 (UTC)

Therefore, it is reasonable that the ARVN be entered in the belligerent in box as a component of the Allied Task Force. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 20:21, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

It is noteworthy to point out that the appellation of 'Battle of Ia Drang' leads to a lot of imprecision. Even within the military people, it can be loosely substituted by 'Operation of Ia Drang' or 'Campaign of Ia Drang'. Our IP 117.6.88.137 editor, for example writes, The term "Battle of Ia Drang" has for long been commonly used to refer to the combined battles at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany from 14-18 November 1965. I have corrected with, LZ X-Ray battle and LZ Albany battle were within Silver Bayonet I operation. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 15:43, 7 April 2016 (UTC)

• Whatever you've said, you still fail to point out that the ARVN took a combat role instead of a non-combat role in the battle, or can't point out that not only the campaign but also the battle involved its combat forces. Therefore it still should be that the ARVN cannot be listed as a belligerent of this battle but of the campaign only.
• Your point that there are various way of reference to the battle, and that the appellation of "battle" can be substitute by "operation" or "campaign" does not go with any reliable source, which means it violates the WP:NOR rule. In fact, the book Why Pleime also clearly stated that Operation Silver Bayonet I (which is congruent to the Battle of Ia Drang) was only part of the second phase of the Pleime Campaign, not the campaign itself. Even if you could provide a few reliable sources, you still couldn't deny that such reference was not prominent enough, and your allegation could violate the WP:FRINGE rule.117.6.88.137 (talk) 04:50, 14 April 2016 (UTC)

Let me offer you some quotations from the G3 Journal/IFFV (http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_arclite_g3-2.htm) that show the ARVN were actively present at the Ia Drang Valley during the so called Battle of Ia Drang:

• "11/14/65 at 18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area “X” Gen Larsen was in favor of this."
• "1/15/65 at 10:30H: MAVC J3 (Gen DePuy) Gen DePuy called Col Barrow and asked if Arc Light had been cleared with Commanding General II Corps. Col Barrow replied yes, Commanding General II Corps has approved Arc Light."
• "at 19:00H: 1st Cav (L/C Buchan) Cav plans to request another strike, will call info to FFV by 2000. Not an immediate, Commanding General II Corps will make similar request for same area."
• "11/16/65 at 15:35H: MACV Maj Oneil – What is the status of arclight #1745 Sphinx 160325Z. Ans: Currently being staffed at MACJ 237. II Corps Commanding General concurs with msg number 1745."
• " at 18:50H: II Corp (Capt McConnell) Commanding General II Corps does concur with Arclite."
• "at 23:10H: II Corps (Maj Sanabria) Maj Sanabria call to pass concurrence of Commanding General ARVN II Corps on B-52 targets 34, 35, and 36 for 17 Nov.

I think your criteria of 'combatant' and 'non-combatant' role (boots on the ground) is irrelevant in determining the qualification of being a belligerent.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 19:43, 14 April 2016 (UTC)

• What you've given is not a reliable source in accordance with WP:RS. What you've just said about the qualification of the state of belligerence is also an OR, not supported by any RS. If you find any RS that states a belligerent does not have to be combatant, state it. In fact, as we've pointed out, all RS (included Why Pleime) did not say anything about the ARVN participation in the battle, so your edit is not acceptable.
• Even if we somehow considered this an RS, it could not point out that the ARVN had done anything but receiving and approving info from the US during the battle, thus clearly not an active role in the battle.113.190.165.78 (talk) 06:41, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

• Pleiku campaign and Why Pleime did say about the ARVN participation in the battle: Kinnard, page ii says that the battle was commanded and executed by the joint ARVN-US task force co-located at the II Corps Command headquarters; Vinh Loc, chapter V says that during the Battle of Ia Drang, the ARVN Airborne Brigade was on standby, ready to act when needed, as reserved force; Vinh Loc, chapter VIII explains why there was no ARVN 'boots on the ground' with the special ARVN-US modus operandi of separate deployment of force.
• In the joint ARVN-US operations, the II Corps Commanding General was coordinating actions between Gen DePuy/MACV and Gen Knowles/1ACDF in the capacity of OPCON, not just 'receiving and approving info from the US'.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:41, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

• You still need to use any RS to explain how a party may be a belligerent in a battle with only a reserve force with no participation in the battle. We need explanation about that, not about why it happened.
• You still need to give any RS to prove that the ARVN commanders had given orders that influenced the course or the outcome of the battle, instead of keep vaguely saying they are "coordinating actions". 113.190.165.78 (talk) 17:40, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

• If you object to consider the ARVN as belligerent in the conflict, then you should also take out the NFL flag, whose troops were at the scene. Or better: you should take out the NVA flag, since the North Vietnamese Communist Government have always denied having its troops fighting in the South, and claiming the troops were NFL troops fighting under the NFL flage. Furthermore, you should also take out the names of Chu Huy Man, Nguyen Huu An, Kinnard, Knowles, DePuy, Larsen, Brown, Lynch, etc. who were did not set foot on the battlefield ground.
• "Operational control, joint command task force, co-located command posts" are not vaguely sayings, I think.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 18:52, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

• You are wrong about the NLF participation. Moore clearly stated that the NLF H-15 Battalion was involved in the attack on Nov 15 (p. 13). You point that North Vietnam denied its participation or whatsoever related was not supported by any RS. I agree that some of those commanders should be removed (except Nguyen Huu An for sure) because it seemed that they did not directly influence the battle; however it's up to you because I can't find any documents that can prove such point.
• You can't say you think. It must be prove by RS. We don't need something like "operational control, joint command task force, co-located command posts" because that's only about the campaign, that doesn't help much in this battle. It doesn't show the degree of involvement of the ARVN commanders in this battle. What we need, as stated above, are orders that influenced the course or the outcome of the battle.
• You did not answer my questions directly, but just keep giving derivation of your own instead of proving your point by RS. That's a clear violation of the WP:NOR rule. I don't think there's any reason to keep your editing on the article now. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 03:47, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

• Let's put aside the issue of the VC H-15 Battalion in particular and the NLF/NVA in general aside for the moment because it carries away from the discussion core topic.
• When I say 'I think', I am referring to the 'vaguely sayings', not the terms 'operational control, joint command task force, co-located command posts' which are not vague in any sense. Those are quotes from RS which indicate a direct involvement and participation of the ARVN. The ARVN CG II Corps maintained the operational control when he assigned to the Air Cavalry the conduct of the Trường Chinh/Long Read operation which encompassed the Battle of Ia Drang. He gave the green light for the Trường Chinh operation to start with All the Way operation on October 27, the Silver Bayonet I operation on November 9, the LZ X-Ray on November 14, the B-52 strike operation on November 15, the Thần Phong/Silver Bayonet II on November 17. Is this participation direct enough? The ARVN had control during the entire campaign, including during the Battle of Ia Drang. Please keep in mind that the Battle of Ia Drang was not a stand-alone military action; its very existence depended on the operations that preceded and followed it.
• I gave you direct answer, but you do not seem to understand me clearly. Nevertheless, let's wait for comments that you have requested from other wiki members.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:42, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

That's what I think is the problem: you've misinterpreted the source, as well as my question. What I want to know is that your general definition of military involvement comes from which RS, but you have not said anything about it. Why Pleime said that he "gave the green light" for the action, that didn't mean he gave orders that materially influenced the battle, or exercised a direct and ultimate commanding power over the combat units. In fact, your definition (as I understand) is contradicted by most academic definition about a commanding officer, because the ARVN general was neither the commander of the units that participated the battle, nor of the direct commanders of themselves. Anyway I agree that we should wait for the comments. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 15:35, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

I see that the whole point resides in that you don't understand the meaning of "operational control", "joint ARVN=US command task force", "US command post co-located with ARVN II Corps command at the Pleiku II Corps compound headquareters", etc.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 22:01, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

I've given some RS to define the term "commanding officer" and they all contradict your derivations. I don't think we should care for what it means, the only thing we need to know is what it says. The source neither says that the ARVN commander exercising commanding power over the American units, nor that the American field commanders were responsible to him for the battle. Therefore, in accordance to the WP:NOR rule, it's not appropriate to consider the South Vietnamese general as a commander of the battle, and whatever you say, without any identical statement from the source, is simply an OR. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 16:37, 18 April 2016 (UTC)

We have said enough. Let's wait and see comments from other members.71.183.238.53 (talk) 18:03, 18 April 2016 (UTC)Tnguyen4321 (talk) 22:12, 18 April 2016 (UTC)

I have elaborated my point exactly on the talk page, so I have nothing left to say. I don't think a tag is something that affects the content of the page, so an OR tag is appropriate, unless you can explain otherwise. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 15:19, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

Through some studies I've just realized that the what the ARVN exercised in this battle is not even OPCON. The reasons are:

• There's no mention about the terminology in any of the sources you've given. It has been all made up by you yourself (OR).
• The U.S. D.o.D. has given a definition of OPCON in a 2005 military dictionary . In this OPCON was defined as following: "Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides 'full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training." So it's very clear. The American units in the battle are no "subordinate forces" of the ARVN commanders, so there are no "commanders of subordinate organizations" for the ARVN commanders to exercise the OPCON power through (if someone had put them under the authority of the ARVN even for an instance, it would have been okay, but unfortunately such case had never existed). The ARVN commanders also did not give any particular "authoritative direction" to the American units or their direct field commanders on how to conduct this battle, which is also an important aspect of this campaign. Therefore the conclusion that the ARVN commander exercised OPCON role in this battle (or even in this whole campaign) is totally a fallacy. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 17:10, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

Request for comments

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Please comment about whether South Vietnam should be included in the infobox as a belligerent. 113.190.165.78 (talk) 17:34, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

Various ways of spelling names of battles and of identifying locations

Battle, operation, campaign: Ia Drang, Ia Drăng, Ia Drang Valley, Plei Mei, Plei Me, Pleime, Plây Me, Plâyme, Long Reach, Trường Chinh, Pleiku, LZ X-Ray, etc.

Locations: Plei Me/Pleime, Chu Pong/Chupong, Chu Pong Massif/Chupong Massif,Ia Drang/Iadrang, Ia Drang Valley/Iadrang Valley, Chupong-Iadrang complex, etc. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tnguyen4321 (talk • contribs) 15:35, 15 April 2016 (UTC)

Precisely:

• The Battle of Ia Drang happened in the Chupong Iadrang complex: the LZ X-Ray battle at the eastern foot of the Chupong Massif and the LZ Albany battle northward away from the Chupong massif, in the Iadrang Valley, at the southeastern side of the Iadrang river.
• The 5-day B-52 strike happened all over the Chupong Iadrang complex.
• The ARVN Airborne Brigade executed two ambush sites in the Ia Drang Valley: one on the northern side of the Ia Drang river on November 20; another one on the southern side of the Ia Drang river on November 24.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:05, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

Dispute Resolution and the Participation of the ARVN

There have been two requests for moderated dispute resolution at the dispute resolution noticeboard concerning whether the ARVN should be listed as a participant. Both have been declined because one of the editors has declined to participate, and moderated dispute resolution is voluntary. At this point, there are two possible steps forward. The first is further discussion here. However, discussion at this talk page is also voluntary. The other possibility is a Request for Comments. A Request for Comments appears to be the most likely way forward. Robert McClenon (talk) 16:41, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

Main Action and Secondary Action of the Battle of Ia Drang/Two Battlefronts

The general public fails to notice that the main military action of the Battle of Ia Drang was performed by the 5-day B-52 strike from November 15 to 19. The military action performed by the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion at the LZ X-Ray was only a secondary action, in support of the B-52 strike operation.

The B-52 strike at the Battle of Ia Drang is code-named "Plei Me/Chu Pong Campaign (20 October - November 20 1965)" http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_intel_J2-2.htm .

In comparison, the main action conducted by the Arc Light operation, was much more significant than the secondary action of Air Cavalry operation in terms of time (5 days – November 15–19 versus 2 days – November 14–15), of space (the entire Chupong-Iadrang complex areas versus the LZ X-Ray), of units committed (the 3AC's B-52 fleet stationed at Guam versus the 1/7, 2/7 and 2/5 Air Cavalry Battalions), and of enemy forces attacked (3 NVA 32nd, 33rd and 66th Regiments versus 2 NVA 7th and 9th battalions).Tnguyen4321 (talk) 14:05, 18 April 2016 (UTC)

1. Kinnard, page ii: Our ablility to work closely with the ARVN was enhanced by establishing a division tactical C-F, co-located with the ARVN II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku
2. Vĩnh Lộc, page 101: Therefore the decision to organize an enemy pursuit of II Corps Command, in which 1st Air Cavalry Division is the main effort and ARVN Airborne Group is the reserved force ready to intervene when necessary, was wholeheartedly accepted by the entire division, because rarely an unit got the chance to open its first history pages with a trường chinh (Long Reach) operation.
3. Vinh Loc, chapter V: The decision made by II Corps Command to exploit the results of the first phase and to pursue the enemy was fully concurred by the US military authorities and agreement was reached to establish a close cooperation in operational activities. The 1st US Air Cavalry Division made the main effort with the Long Reach Operations and the ARVN Airborne Brigade acted as reserve, ready to participate on Corps order.
4. Vinh Loc, chapter VIII: the operations had been conducted through a close cooperation between ARVN and US Forces: that was the latest procedure ever put into application since the second World War. It is characterized by: - Joint intelligence and support activities. - Commonly-shared concept of operations and results. - Separate TAOR. - Separate command. - Separate deployment of forces. - Separate conduct of activities. - Separate reserve.
5. Kinnard, page 88: The 15th also marked the introduction of a new weapon by the American forces and one which struck terror in the hearts of even the most hardened enemy soldier. Shortly after noon a large area in the vicinity of YA8702 suddenly erupted with hundreds of thunderous explosions that moved across the ground like a giant carpet being unrolled. The B-52 bombers had struck. For the next five days the big bombers systematically worked over large areas of the Chu Pong Massif. The NVA soldiers lived in fear of these attacks because they believed each raid covered a 20 kilometer area and they were told that ordinary trenches and foxholes were of no protection.

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