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The Srebrenica massacre was the July 1995 killing of at least 8,000 Bosniak males, ranging in age from teenagers to the elderly, in the region of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Army of Republika Srpska under the command of general Ratko Mladić. In addition to the Army of Republika Srpska, special state security forces of Serbia known as the "Scorpions" participated in the massacre. The United Nations had previously declared Srebrenica a UN protected "safe area" and 400 armed Dutch peacekeepers were present at the time, but they did not prevent the massacre. The massacre included several instances where preteen children and women were also killed. While the exact number killed will never be known, the list of people missing or killed in Srebrenica compiled by the Federal Commission of Missing Persons so far includes 8,373 names.

Background

The conflict in eastern Bosnia

See also Bosnian War

Bosnia began its journey to independence with a parliamentary declaration of sovereignty on October 15, 1991. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the European Community on April 6, 1992, and by the United States the following day. International recognition did not end the matter, however, and a fierce struggle for territorial control ensued among the three major groups in Bosnia: Bosniak, Serb and Croat. The international community made various attempts to establish peace, but their success was very limited. In the Eastern part of Bosnia, close to Serbia, the conflict was particularly fierce between the Serbs and the Bosniaks.

1992 ethnic cleansing campaign

Serbs intended to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a component part of the former state. They believed that the area of Central Podrinje (Srebrenica region) had a primary strategic importance for them. Without the area of Central Podrinje, which was predominantly Bosniak ethnic territory, there would be no territorial integrity within their new political entity of Republika Srpska. The Serbs did not want to accept the Bosniak enclave within their planned territories, because the territory would be split in two and it would be separated from Serbia proper and from areas in eastern Herzegovina which were primarily inhabited by Serb population.

To achieve this aim, they proceeded with ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks from Bosniak ethnic territories in Eastern Bosnia and Central Podrinje with the aim of linking it to Serbian territory. In the neighbouring Bratunac, for example, the Bosniaks were either killed or forced to flee to Srebrenica. According to Bosnian government data, 1,156 Bosniaks were killed in these attacks (3,156 total during the entire war).

About 762 Bosniaks had been killed in Zvornik on 1 June 1992. A similar massacre had taken place in Cerska on 9 September 1992, when a group of 6,000 refugees from Konjevic Polje, Cerska and Kamenica tried to reach Tuzla -- the VRS had laid ambushes and opened fire on the column, killing many and taking hundreds of prisoners, who then "disappeared". Some 500 people were killed close to Snagovo, as the moving column came under fire from artillery and aircraft. Human remains were still to be seen as the column of July 1995 passed on its way to Tuzla.

Surrounding Serb villages were used as bases to attack Srebrenica on a daily basis from day one, as concluded by ICTY.

Struggle for Srebrenica

In spite of Srebrenica’s predominantly Bosniak population, Serb military and paramilitary forces from the area and neighboring parts of eastern Bosnia gained control of the town for several weeks, killing and expelling Bosniaks civilians, early in 1992. In May 1992, however, Bosnian government forces under the leadership of Naser Orić managed to recapture Srebrenica.

Over the next several months, Orić and his men pressed outward in a series of guerilla-style counter-offensives and raids in an attempt to break siege of Srebrenica. By September 1992, Bosnian forces from Srebrenica had linked up with those in Žepa, a Bosniak-held town to the south of Srebrenica. By January 1993, the enclave had been further expanded to include the Bosnian-held enclave of Cerska located to the west of Srebrenica. At this time the Srebrenica enclave reached its peak size of 900 square kilometres, although it was never linked to the main area of Bosnian-held land in the west and remained a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled territory.

In January 1993, Bosnian forces captured a strategically important VRS base in the village of Kravica, killing several dozen Serb soldiers and some civilians, and directly threatened Bratunac. Over the next few months, however, the reorganized Serb military launched another large-scale offensive, eventually capturing the villages of Konjević Polje and Cerska, severing the link between Srebrenica and Žepa and reducing the size of the Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometres. Bosniak residents of the outlying areas converged on Srebrenica town and its population swelled to between 50,000 and 60,000 people.

General Philippe Morillon of France, the Commander of the United Nations (UN) Protection Force (UNPROFOR) visited Srebrenica in March 1993. By then the town was overcrowded and siege conditions prevailed. There was almost no running water as the advancing Serb forces had destroyed the town’s water supplies. People relied on makeshift generators for electricity. Food, medicine and other essentials were extremely scarce. Before leaving, General Morillon told the panicked residents of Srebrenica at a public gathering that the town was under the protection of the UN and that he would never abandon them.

Between March and April 1993 several thousand Bosniaks were evacuated from Srebrenica under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The evacuations were opposed by the Bosnian government in Sarajevo as contributing to the ethnic cleansing of predominantly Bosniak territory.

The Serb authorities remained intent on capturing the enclave, which, because of its proximity to the Serbian border and because it was entirely surrounded by Serb-controlled territory, was both strategically important and vulnerable to capture. On April 13, 1993, the Serbs told the UNHCR representatives that they would attack the town within two days unless the Bosniaks surrendered. Bosniaks refused to surrender.

"Srebrenica safe area"

April 1993: the Security Council declares Srebrenica a “safe area”

On April 16, 1993, the United Nations Security Council responded by passing resolution 819, declaring that: all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act".

The Security Council created two other UN protected enclaves at the same time: Žepa and Goražde. On April 18, 1993, the first group of UNPROFOR troops arrived in Srebrenica.

Serb forces from surrounding Serb villages continued to attack Srebrenica even after Srebrenica became a "Safe Haven", as concluded by ICTY.

While the Bosnian defenders of Srebrenica largely demilitarized, as confirmed by UN conclusions, the Serb forces surrounding the enclave were well armed and refused to honor their part of the demilitarization agreement. The Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) was organized on a geographic basis and Srebrenica fell within the domain of the Drina Corps. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave. These Serb forces were equipped with tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and mortars. The unit of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) that remained in the enclave – the 28th Mountain Division - was neither well organised nor equipped. A firm command structure and communications system was lacking, some ARBiH soldiers carried old hunting rifles or no weapons at all and few had proper uniforms.

From the outset, both parties to the conflict violated the “safe area” agreement. The ICTY Trial Chamber heard evidence of a deliberate Serb strategy of preventing access by international aid convoys into the enclave. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Karremans (the Dutchbat Commander) testified that his personnel were prevented from returning to the enclave by Serb forces and that equipment and ammunition were also prevented from getting in. Essentials, like food, medicine and fuel, became increasingly scarce. Bosniaks in Srebrenica complained of attacks by Serb soldiers. Insofar as the ARBiH is concerned, General Halilović testified that, immediately after signing the “safe area” agreement, he ordered members of the ARBiH in Srebrenica to pull all armed personnel and military equipment out of the newly established demilitarized zone, which they largely did. Although Serbs were attacking and killing Bosniak civilians in and around Srebrenica daily, to the Serbs it appeared that Bosnian forces in Srebrenica were using the “safe area” as a convenient base from which to launch counter-offensives against the VRS and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it. General Halilovic admitted that Bosnian helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a violation of the “safe area” agreement given that the Bosniaks were so poorly armed to begin with.

Early 1995: the situation in the Srebrenica “safe area” deteriorates

By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave. The Dutchbat soldiers who had arrived in January 1995 watched the situation deteriorate rapidly in the months after their arrival. The already meagre resources of the civilian population dwindled further and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, fuel and ammunition. Eventually, the UN peacekeepers had so little fuel that they were forced to start patrolling the enclave on foot; Dutchbat soldiers who went out of the area on leave were not allowed to return and their number dropped from 600 to 400 men. In March and April, the Dutch soldiers noticed a build-up of Serb forces near two of the observation posts, "OP Romeo" and "OP Quebec".

Spring 1995: Prelude to the VRS attack on the Srebrenica “safe area”

In March 1995, Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska (“RS”), in spite of pressure from the international community to end the war and ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, issued a directive to the VRS concerning the long-term strategy of the VRS forces in the enclave. The directive, known as “Directive 7”, specified that the VRS was to:

Complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Žepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.

Just as envisaged in this decree, by mid 1995, the humanitarian situation of the Bosniak civilians and military personnel in the enclave was catastrophic. In May, following orders, Naser Oric and his staff left the enclave by helicopter to Tuzla, leaving ranking officers in command of the 28th Division. In late June and early July 1995, the 28th Division issued a series of reports including urgent pleas for the humanitarian corridor to the enclave to be reopened. When this failed, the tragedy of Bosniak civilians dying from starvation began. On Friday, July 7, in one of his last communications, the mayor of Srebrenica reported 8 residents had died of starvation.

6-11 July 1995: the take-over of Srebrenica

Serbs entered the UN Safe Area in July 1995. By the evening of July 9, 1995, the VRS Drina Corps entered four kilometres deep into the enclave, halting just one kilometre short of Srebrenica town. Late on 9 July 1995, emboldened by this success and by little resistance from largely demilitarized Bosniaks as well as the absence of any significant reaction from the international community, President Karadžić issued a new order authorising the VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica.

On the morning of July 10, 1995, the situation in Srebrenica town was tense. Residents crowded the streets. Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans sent urgent requests for NATO air support to defend the town, but no assistance was forthcoming until around 2:30PM on July 11, 1995, when NATO bombed VRS tanks advancing towards the town. NATO planes also attempted to bomb VRS artillery positions overlooking the town, but had to abort the operation due to poor visibility. NATO plans to continue the air strikes were abandoned following Serb Army's threats to kill Dutch troops being held in the custody of the VRS, as well as threats to shell the UN Potočari compound on the outside of the town, and surrounding areas, where 20,000 to 30,000 civilians had fled.

The Dutch soldiers operating under the auspices of the UN have been described as "cowards" for their part in failing to protect the Bosniak refugees, with some soldiers reportedly sharing "cups of coffee" with Serb troops. Commander Thomas Karremans, who was in charge of Dutch troops in Srebrenica at the time, was filmed drinking a toast with war-crimes suspect and Serb general Ratko Mladic, during the bungled negotiations on the fate of civilian population grouped in Potočari. On the other hand hand, the UN soldiers felt abandoned by their command in Sarajevo, and they were already taken virtual or even actual hostage by Serb troops. One Dutchbat soldier was killed by a grenade lobbed from a column of retreating Bosniak soldiers; he was the only fatal Dutch casualty in Srebrenica.

The massacre

The crowd at Potočari

The UN neglected to protect the Bosniak civilians in Srebrenica as mandated in the UN resolution. One hundred lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers were denied repeated requests for reinforcements and consequently sidelined to witness what was to follow. Faced with the reality that Srebrenica had fallen under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, thousands of Bosniak residents from Srebrenica fled to the nearby hamlet of Potočari seeking protection within the UN compound.

11–13 July 1995: the humanitarian crisis in Potočari

By the evening of July 11, 1995, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Bosniak refugees were gathered in Potočari. Several thousand had pressed inside the UN compound itself, while the rest were spread throughout the neighboring factories and fields. Though the vast majority were women, children, elderly or disabled, 63 witnesses estimated that there were at least 300 men inside the perimeter of the UN compound and between 600 and 900 men in the crowd outside; the Dutch claimed their base is full.

Conditions in Potočari were deplorable. There was very little food or water available and the July heat was stifling. One of the Dutchbat officers described the scene as follows:

They were panicked, they were scared, and they were pressing each other against the soldiers, my soldiers, the UN soldiers that tried to calm them. People that fell were trampled on. It was a chaotic situation.

12–13 July: crimes committed in Potočari

On July 12, 1995, as the day wore on, the already miserable physical conditions were compounded by an active Serb campaign of terror, which increased the panic of the residents, making them frantic to leave. The refugees in the compound could see VRS soldiers setting houses and haystacks on fire. Throughout the afternoon, Serb soldiers mingled in the crowd. Summary executions of men and women occurred.

In the late morning of 12 July, a witness saw a pile of 20 to 30 bodies heaped up behind the Transport Building in Potočari, alongside a tractor-like machine. Another testified that, at around 12:00 hours, he saw a soldier slay a child with a knife in the middle of a crowd of expellees. He also said that he saw Serb soldiers execute more than a hundred Bosniak men in the area behind the Zinc Factory and then load their bodies onto a truck, although the number and methodical nature of the murders attested to by this witness stand in contrast to other evidence on the Trial Record that indicates that the killings in Potočari were sporadic in nature.

That night, a Dutchbat medical orderly witnessed a rape:

We saw two Serb soldiers, one of them was standing guard and the other one was lying on the girl, with his pants off. And we saw a girl lying on the ground, on some kind of mattress. There was blood on the mattress, even she was covered with blood. She had bruises on her legs. There was even blood coming down her legs. She was in total shock. She went totally crazy."

Throughout the night and early the next morning, stories about the rapes and killings spread through the crowd and the terror in the camp escalated.

The separation of the Bosniak men in Potočari

From the morning of 12 July, Serb forces began gathering men from the refugee population in Potočari and holding them in separate locations. Further, as the Bosniak refugees began boarding the buses, Serb soldiers systematically separated out men of military age who were trying to clamber aboard. Occasionally, younger and older men were stopped as well. These men were taken to a building in Potočari referred to as the “White House”. As the buses carrying the women, children and elderly headed north towards Bosnian-held territory, they were stopped along the way and again screened for men. As early as the evening of 12 July 1995, Major Franken of the Dutchbat heard that no men were arriving with the women and children at their destination in Kladanj.

On 13 July 1995, the Dutchbat troops witnessed definite signs that the Serbs were executing some of the Bosniak men who had been separated. For example, Corporal Vaasen saw two soldiers take a man behind the "White House". He then heard a shot and the two soldiers reappeared alone. Another Dutchbat officer saw Serb soldiers execute an unarmed man with a single gunshot to the head. He also heard gunshots 20–40 times an hour throughout the afternoon. When the Dutchbat soldiers told Colonel Koseph Kingori, a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) in the Srebrenica area, that men were being taken behind the "White House" and not coming back, Colonel Kingori went to investigate. He heard gunshots as he approached, but was stopped by Serb soldiers before he could find out what was going on.

The deportations

Serbian TV footage shows women and children being separated from the men and put on buses. As a show of reassurance then Serb commander-in-chief General Ratko Mladic told the women everyone would be taken by bus out and safely reunited with the men later

However, when the cameras were turned off the men were deported and killed at the hands of the Serb army. More than 60 truckloads were taken from Srebrenica to execution sites where they were bound, blindfolded, and shot with automatic rifles. Some of the executions were carried out at night under arc lights. Industrial bulldozers then pushed the bodies into mass graves. Some were buried alive - Jean-Rene Ruez, a French policeman who collected evidence from Bosniaks, told The Hague tribunal in 1996. He gave evidence that Serb forces had killed and tortured refugees at will. Streets were littered with corpses, he said, and rivers were red with blood. Many people committed suicide to avoid having their noses, lips and ears chopped off, he said. Among other lurid accounts of mass murder, Ruez cited cases of adults being forced to kill their children or watching as soldiers ended the young lives. "One soldier approached a woman in the middle of a crowd," he said. "Her child was crying. The soldier asked why the child was crying and she explained that he was hungry. The soldier made a comment like, 'He won't be hungry anymore.' He slit the child's throat in front of everybody."

As a result of exhaustive UN negotiations with Serb troops, Srebrenica women were forcibly transferred to the Government-controlled territory (around 25,000 women - as stated by ICTY prosecutors).

Some buses never reached the safety. For example, according to the witness accounts given by Srebrenica massacre survivor - Kadir Habibović - who hid himself on one of the first buses taking women and children from the Dutch UN base in Potočari to Kladanj, "Habibović saw at least one vehicle full of Bosniak women being driven away from Bosnian government-held territory." One of his captors at one point complained that they were not getting a good choice of the Bosniak women from Srebrenica . Habibović said the men were taken to a remote location near Rasica Gai late in the evening. When the first group was taken from the truck and shot, he said he leapt from the truck and tumbled down a nearby slope; gunfire from the soldiers missed him and he escaped. He reached government-held territory on August 20, 1995.

Hague officials say that the tribunal's progress in dealing with rape has come from three factors - the courage of the victims and witnesses who testified, the tenacity of the prosecuting lawyers, and the years of tireless lobbying by pressure groups. The breakthrough came when prosecutors established that these rapes were entirely foreseeable. Judges agreed that the generals in charge should have reasonably predicted that, under these conditions, the sexual assaults were likely. It was concluded that any rapes that took place in Srebrenica were therefore the fault of the commanders.

The column of Bosniak men

As the situation in Potočari escalated towards crisis on the evening of 11 July 1995, word spread through the Bosniak community that the able-bodied men should take to the woods, form a column together with members of the 28th Division of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian-held territory in the north.

At around 2200 hours on the evening of 11 July 1995, the division command, together with the Bosniak municipal authorities of Srebrenica, made the decision to form the column. The young men were afraid they would be killed if they fell into Serb hands in Potočari and believed that they stood a better chance of surviving by trying to escape through the woods to Tuzla. The column gathered near the villages of Jaglici and Šušnjari and began to trek north. Witnesses estimated that there were between 10,000 and 15,000 men in the retreating column. Around 5,000 of the men in the column were active military personnel from the 28th Division, although not all of the soldiers were armed; others included able-bodied men of military age, the political leaders of the enclave, the medical staff of the local hospital and family members of those who had played some prominent part in life within the enclave.

A second and somewhat smaller group of refugees attempted to escape into Serbia via Mount Kvarac via Bratunac, or across the River Drina and via Bajina Basta. According to the Humanitarian Law Centre in Belgrade, this group numbered some 700, although the organization Women of Srebrenica estimated that approximately 800 men had crossed the Drina on the way to Serbia. It is not known how many were intercepted, arrested and killed on the way.

A third group headed for Žepa, possibly having first tried to reach Tuzla. The size of this group is not known. Furthermore, not all the names of those who actually reached Žepa were recorded. The estimates of the numbers involved therefore vary widely, from 300 to around 850. The only firm figures in existence are provided by a report stating that 25 civilians arrived in Žepa on 16 July along with 82 soldiers of the 28th Division.

Apparently, small pockets of resistance had also remained behind in the former enclave. On 13 July ABiH source learned this from communications made by a VRS officer in the enclave and intercepted by the ABiH. There was still some shooting going on there, but the ABiH within the enclave had no lines of defense left. They had been chased into one small area comprising two or three mountain tops. The VRS officer then instructed these remaining resistance fighters to reveal themselves and surrender.

The Tuzla column departs

By far the largest group was that which followed the notorious route towards Tuzla through the forests and mountains. The journey to Tuzla - a distance of 55 kilometres as the crow flies-entailed crossing extremely hilly terrain in the height of the summer heat. In general, each individual had started out with enough rations for only two days, everyone having a just little bread and sugar; shortages began to become apparent on the third day, whereupon the people had to turn to leaves, grass and snails for sustenance. Alongside under-nourishment, the high summer temperatures caused dehydration; finding sources of drinking water or moisture became a major problem. The enormous difficulties caused by hunger and thirst were further compounded by lack of sleep and the sheer effort required. Soon after setting out, the men faced a choice between acceding to the VRS call to give themselves up or carrying on. The latter option would inevitably entail ongoing armed conflict with the VRS which would in turn bring much death and destruction. As a result of genocidal actions by Serb Army, some people began to show symptoms of severe mental distress. Some turned on others, killing them outright. Others committed suicide.

There was little cohesion or sense of common purpose in the column. This would have been difficult to achieve given that the string of people stretched back several kilometres. Depending on the situation at any given moment, the column could be anything between five and ten kilometres in length. This made it a particularly easy target for the VRS and contributed much to a gnawing sense of uncertainty regarding the fate of friends and family elsewhere in the column. Many people in the column had been exhausted even before setting out on the march, following the siege of Srebrenica, the fighting with the VRS, the lack of food and the arduous conditions in general. The vast majority of the people from Srebrenica later reported as missing were among the 10,000 to 15,000 people who undertook this perilous journey.

An advance reconnaissance party went on ahead of the column proper; this group comprised four guides who set out one hour before the column and maintained a lead of approximately five kilometres throughout the journey. Next, there was a group comprising 50 to 100 of the best soldiers from each brigade, each carrying the best available equipment. Next in line was the 281st Brigade; all these men were originally from Cerska, Konjevic Polje and Kamenica, they knew the terrain. The rest of the column followed at some distance. In order, there was the reconnaissance unit of the 28th Division, the 280th Brigade from Gornji Potocari, the division command, the wounded, the medical staff, the 281st Brigade, the 283rd Brigade, the Glogova independent battalion, and at the rear was the weakest and least heavily armed Brigade, the 282nd. Each brigade took a group of refugees under its wing. Notably, the best troops were all at the front of the column; here too were the elite of the enclave, including the mother and sister of Naser Orić and other prominent persons. Many civilians joined the military units spontaneously and acquaintances went along with the troops, and there were many shifts and changes of allegiance as the journey got under way.

The men's breakout from the enclave and their attempts to reach Tuzla came as a surprise to the VRS and caused considerable confusion, as the VRS had expected the men to go to Potočari. Serb general and indicted war-criminal Milan Gvero in a briefing described the column as "hardened and violent criminals who will stop at nothing to prevent being taken prisoner and to enable their escape into Bosnian territory." The Drina Corps and the various brigades were ordered to devote all available manpower to the task of finding, stopping, disarming and taking prisoner the men of the column.

At around midnight on 11 July 1995, the main column started moving along the axis between Konjević Polje and Bratunac. On 12 July 1995, Serb forces launched an artillery fire on the column that was crossing an asphalt road between the area of Konjević Polje and Nova Kasaba on route to Tuzla. Only about one third of the men successfully made it across the asphalt road and the column was split in two parts. Heavy shooting and shelling continued against the remainder of the column throughout the day and during the night. Men from the rear of the column who survived this ordeal described it as a "man hunt". Witnesses have since stated that the shooting began as one group of refugees entered a minefield.

Ambush at Kamenica Hill

Around 8 p.m., when most of the marchers had finally reached the hilly area around Kamenica and the front of the column had already begun to move on, those still at Kamenica Hill were ambushed by Serb forces, who started shelling and firing from all directions. As many of the marchers had been shelled en route to Kamenica Hill and as a result were very nervous, the ambush caused great panic and chaos. Those who were armed returned fire, apparently at random. All scattered.

Survivors recalled that a group of at least a thousand Bosniaks were engaged at close range by small arms. Hundreds appear to have been killed as they fled the clearing. The skeletalized remains of some of those killed in this ambush remained clearly visible to ICTY investigators and United Nations staff members passing through in 1996. Survivors recalled how many wounded were left behind, some of whom shot themselves or detonated grenades in order to escape capture. Some of the wounded were carried on with the survivors, later surrendering. As the foremost group of the column continued on its way, the rear lost contact and panic broke out once more.

Many people remained in the Kamenica Hill area for a number of days, unable to move on, the column having been cut in two where it crossed an asphalt road, with the remaining part’s escape route blocked by Serb forces. Thousands of Bosniaks were captured by or surrendered to Serb forces. In many instances, assurances of safety were provided to the refugees by Serb military personnel wearing stolen UN uniforms and by Bosniaks who had been captured and ordered to summon their friends and family members from the woods. There are also reports that Serb forces used megaphones to call on the marchers to surrender, telling them that they would be exchanged for Serb soldiers held captive by Bosniak forces. Furthermore, there were rumours that VRS personnel in civilian dress had infiltrated the column at Kamenica. Human Rights Watch reported that the use of mind-altering chemical weapons like BZ "cannot be ruled out" (HRW, 1998). On the other hand, the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) concluded that "here are no indications that the Serbs had combat gasses" (NIOD, 2002, App. III.3). However, NIOD Report's credibility is still questionable.

Sandici massacre

Close to Sandici, on the main road from Bratunac to Konjević Polje, one witness recalls seeing the scene with which the rest of the world was later to become familiar from Zoran Petrović's video footage: the Serbs were forcing a Bosniak man to call others down from the mountains. Some 200 to 300 men followed his instructions and descended to meet the waiting VRS. The brother of the witness was among those who gave themselves up expecting that some exchange of prisoners would take place. The witness himself was more cautious and hid behind a tree to see what would happen next. He watched as the two to three hundred men below were lined up in seven ranks, each some forty metres in length, with their hands behind their heads. Then, they were mown down by machine gun fire. His own brother was among the victims, shot while he looked on.

During the search, the Bratunac Brigade discovered four children aged between 8 and 14 among the prisoners they took. They were taken to the barracks in Bratunac where they were placed in confinement; when one of them had described seeing a large number of ABiH soldiers committing suicide and shooting at each other, Brigade Commander Blagojević suggested that the Drina Corps' press unit should record this testimony on video. It is possible that children's testimonies were forced for the purpose of spreading propaganda in the Serbian media. The fate of the boys remains uncertain. The VRS sent one of the civilians who wished to surrender back towards the column: one of his eyes had been gouged out, his ears had been cut off and a cross carved into his forehead. A small number of women and children, and a few elderly people who had been part of the column and who fell into Serb hands were allowed to join the buses which evacuated the women and children out of Potočari. Among them was Alma Delimustafić, a woman soldier of the 28th Brigade; at this time, Delimustafić was in civilian clothes and was released.

The central section of the column managed to escape the shooting and reached Kamenica at about 11.00 hours and waited there for the wounded. Captain Ejub Golić and the Independent Battalion turned back towards Hajdučko Groblje to help the casualties. A number of survivors from the rear, who managed to escape crossed the asphalt roads to the north or the west of the area, had joined those in the central section of the column.

The long trek to safety

The front of the column had already left Kamenica Hill by the time the ambush occurred. On July 12, its leaders sent out reconnaissance groups to scout out the route toward Burnice and then began to move. Heading for Mount Udrc, the marchers crossed the main asphalt road and subsequently forded the river Jadar. They reached the base of the mountain early on the morning of Thursday, July 13. Only an estimated about 5,000 people of the original group that had left Srebrenica arrived in Udrc. Here, the column regrouped. At first, it was decided to send 300 ABiH soldiers back in an attempt to break through the blockades. When reports came in that the central section of the column had nevertheless succeeded in crossing the road at Konjevic Polje, this plan was abandoned. Approximately 1000 men managed to reach Udrc that night.

From Udrc the marchers moved toward the River Drinjaka and on to Mount Velja Glava, continuing as darkness fell and through the night. Finding a Serb presence at Mount Velja Glava, where they arrived on Friday, July 14, the column was forced to skirt the mountain and wait on its slopes before it was able to move on toward Liplje and Marcici. Arriving at Marcici in the evening of July 14, the marchers were again ambushed near Snagovo by Serb forces equipped with anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and tanks. According to Lieutenant Džemail Bećirović, the column managed to break through the ambush and, in so doing, capture a VRS officer, Major Zoran Janković - providing the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a significant bargaining counter. This prompted an attempt at negotiating a cessation in the fighting, but negotiations with local Serb forces failed. Nevertheless, the act of repulsing the ambush had a positive effect on morale of the marchers, who also captured an amount of weapons and supplies.

The evening of 15 July saw the first radio contact between the 2nd Corps and the 28th Division, established using a Motorola walkie-talkie taken from the VRS. After initial distrust on the part of the 28th Division, the brothers Šabić were able to identify each other as they stood on either side of the VRS lines. Early on the morning, the column crossed the asphalt road linking Zvornik with Caparde and headed in the direction of Planinci, leaving a unit of some 100 to 200 armed marchers behind to wait for stragglers. It reached Krizevici later that day, and remained there while an attempt was made to negotiate with local Serb forces for safe passage through the Serb lines into Bosnian government controlled territory. The members of the column were advised to stay where they were, and to allow the Serb forces time to arrange for safe passage. It soon became apparent, though, that the small Serb force deployed in the area was only trying to gain time to organize a further attack on the marchers. In the area of Marcici-Crni the RS armed forces deployed 500 soldiers and policemen in order to stop the split part of column (about 2,500 people), which was moving from Glodi towards Marcici.

At this point, the column’s leaders decided to form several small groups of between 100 and 200 persons and send these to reconnoiter the way ahead. Early in the afternoon, the 2nd Corps and the 28th Division of the ABiH met each other in the village of Potocani. The presidium of Srebrenica were the first to reach Bosnian terrain.

The breakthrough at Baljkovica

The hillside at Baljkovica formed the last VRS line separating the column from Bosnian-held territory. The VRS cordon actually consisted of two lines, the first of which presented a front on the Tuzla side against the 2nd Corps and the other a front against the approaching 28th Division. At approximately 05.00 hours on 16 July, the 2nd Corps made its first attempt to break through the VRS cordon from the Bosnian side. The objective was to force a breakthrough close to the hamlets of Parlog and Resnik. They were joined by Naser Orić and a number of his men.

On the evening of July 15, a heavy hailstorm caused the Serb forces to take cover. The column’s advance group took advantage of this to attack the Serb rear lines at Baljkovica. During the fighting, the main body of what remained of the column began to move from Krizevici. It reached the area of fighting at about 3 a.m. on Sunday, July 16, just as the forward groups managed to breach the line of the Zvornik Brigade's 4th Infantry Battalion. Unable to move several captured heavy arms including two Praga self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, they used them to fire into the Serb front line. Thus the column finally succeeded in breaking through to Bosnian government controlled territory and linked up with BiH units which had assaulted the 4th Battalion's front in order to meet the column at between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. on July 16.

Arrival at Tuzla and closure of the corridor

Only a few journalists were present to witness the arrival of the column in Bosnian-held territory after its eventful march across country, as most attention was being devoted to the reception of the women and children at the airbase in Tuzla. The few items that appeared in the press and on television described the arrival of 'an army of ghosts': men clad in rags, totally exhausted and emaciated by hunger. Some had no more than underwear, some were walking on bleeding feet wrapped in rags or plastic, and some were being carried on makeshift stretchers. There were men walking hand in hand with children. Many were still visibly frightened. Some were delirious and hallucinating as a result of the immense stress and privations they had endured. One soldier began to fire on his own unit as they arrived in Baljkovica; he had to be killed to prevent further bloodshed. The medical station set up by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Međeđa handed out large quantities of tranquillizers. As one survivor said, anyone who had not been on the march could not possibly begin to imagine what it had been like.

The men who had managed to reach safety spoke of little else besides the atrocities they had seen, the fighting they had endured and the fact that many of their comrades had been killed. The survivors felt a certain bitterness towards the UN because it had not been able to protect the "Safe Area." That bitterness and resentment was also directed towards the 2nd Corps of the ABiH. The column's arrival on Bosnian soil was marked by a number of incidents. In one, a member of the 28th Division opened fire at his own Corps Commander, Sead Delić. A Military Police bodyguard was killed, while another returned fire and killed the sniper. The tensions were so great following the crossing of the line of engagement that staff officers of 2nd Corps removed their insignia so that they could not be recognized as staff officers at all. According to the Deputy Corps Commander, the division had turned against the 2nd Corps; in fact, the lack of confidence in the 2nd Corps was nothing new, as the 28th Division had felt abandoned already in Srebrenica. On 4 August 1995, a parade was held in Banovica, involving the 3,651 remaining soldiers of the 28th Division (of the original 6,500). The division was then disbanded.

Only some 3,000 to 4,000 of the marchers who had left Srebrenica four days earlier arrived safely in Tuzla on July 16. Approximately one-third of the column, mostly composed of military personnel, crossed the Bratunac-Milići road near Nova Kasaba and reached safety in Tuzla. The remaining Bosniaks were trapped behind the Serb lines.

As the march progressed, many people fell behind, lost the way or decided to turn back into more familiar territory in the Srebrenica region and to attempt to reach Žepa from there. Others tried to push onwards in the wake of the vanguard of the column, following the signs that people had passed here, which included corpses -- as the fighting between the VRS and ABiH, ambushes, fighting among factions within the column, suicide, exhaustion and the rigours of the journey would have claimed an unknown number of lives and the bodies of these people remained unburied in the woods. The groups who managed to complete the journey to Tuzla took widely varying times to do so; in a few extreme cases, people reached Bosnian territory only after several months.

Once the armed portion of the column had passed through, the Serbs closed the corridor and recommenced hunting down parts of the column which were still in areas under their control. On 16 July 1995, there were around 2,000 refugees hiding in the woods in the area of Pobudje, with many more scattered elsewhere.

A plan to execute the Bosniaks of Srebrenica

Although Serbs have long been blamed for the massacre, it was not until June 2004 — following the Srebrenica commission's preliminary report — that Serb officials acknowledged that their security forces planned and carried out the slaughter. A Serb commission's final report on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre acknowledged that the mass murder of more than 7,800 Bosniak men and boys was planned. The commission found that more than 7,800 were killed after it compiled thirty-four lists of victims.

The question of why the executions took place at all is not easy to answer. During the Radislav Krstić's trial before the ICTY, the prosecution's military advisor, Richard Butler, pointed out in taking this course of action, the Serbs deprived themselves of an extremely valuable bargaining counter. Butler suggested that the Serbs would have had far more to gain had they taken the men in Potočari as prisoners of war, under the supervision of the International Red Cross (IRC) and the UN troops still in the area. It might then have been possible to enter into some sort of exchange deal or they might have been able to force political concessions. Based on this reasoning, the ensuing mass murder defied rational explanation.

The ICTY was of the opinion that the Serbs eventually intended to kill as many men of combatant age as possible. Although a number of women and children were murdered, together with a relatively large number of older men, the main focus of the VRS was on able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60. The buses which transported the women and children were systematically searched for men. Some, although very few, exceptions were made; they included the casualties in Bratunac hospital who had previously been treated in the Dutchbat compound at Potočari. Thus, a concerted effort was made to capture all Bosniak men of military age. In fact, those captured included many boys well below military age and elderly men several years above that age that remained in the enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica. These men and boys were targeted regardless of whether they chose to flee to Potočari or to join the Bosniak column.

The mass executions

The vast amount of planning and high-level coordination that had to be invested in killing thousands of men in a few days is apparent from even the briefest description of the scale and the methodical nature in which the executions were carried out.

The VRS took the largest number of prisoners on 13 July, along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. It remains impossible to cite a precise figure, but witness statements describe the assembly points such as the field at Sandici, the agricultural warehouses in Kravica, the school in Konjevic Polje, the football field in Nova Kasaba, the village of Lolici and the village school of Luke. Several thousands of people were herded together in the field near Sandici and on the Nova Kasaba football pitch, where they were searched and put into smaller groups. In a video tape made by journalist Zoran Petrovic, a VRS soldier states that at least 3,000 to 4,000 men had given themselves up on the road. By the late afternoon of 13 July, the total had risen to some 6,000, according to the intercepted radio communication; the following day, Major Franken of Dutchbat was given the same figure by Colonel Radislav Jankovic of the VRS. Many of the prisoners had been seen in the locations described by passing convoys taking the women and children to Kladanj by bus, while various aerial photographs have since provided evidence to confirm this version of events.

One hour after the evacuation of the women from Potocari was completed, the Drina Corps staff diverted the buses to the areas in which the men were being held. Colonel Krsmanovic, who on 12 July had arranged the buses for the evacuation, ordered the 700 men in Sandici to be collected, and the soldiers guarding them made them throw their possessions on a large heap and hand over anything of value. During the afternoon, the group in Sandici was visited by Mladic who told them that they would come to no harm, that they would be treated as prisoners of war, that they would be exchanged for other prisoners and that their families had been escorted to Tuzla in safety. Some of these men were placed on the transport to Bratunac and other locations, while some were marched on foot to the warehouses in Kravica. The men gathered on the football ground at Nova Kasaba were forced to hand over their personal belongings. They too received a personal visit from Mladic during the afternoon of 13 July; on this occasion, he announced that the Bosnian authorities in Tuzla did not want the men and that they were therefore to be taken to other locations. The men in Nova Kasaba were loaded onto buses and trucks and were taken to Bratunac or the other locations.

The Bosniak men who had been separated from the women, children and elderly in Potočari numbering approximately 1,000, were transported to Bratunac and subsequently joined by Bosniak men captured from the column. Almost to a man, the thousands of Bosniak prisoners captured, following the take-over of Srebrenica, were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the region just north of Srebrenica.

The mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimize resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer for a time.

The progress of finding victim bodies in the Srebrenica region, often in mass graves, exhuming them and finally identifying them was relatively slow. By 2002, 5,000 bodies were exhumed but only 200 were identified. However, since then the exhumed body count has risen to 6,000 and the identification has been completed for over 2,000, as of 2005.

The morning of 13 July 1995: Jadar River executions

A small-scale execution took place prior to midday at the Jadar River on 13 July 1995. Seventeen men were transported by bus a short distance to a spot on the banks of the Jadar River. The men were then lined up and shot. One man, after being hit in the hip by a bullet, jumped into the river and managed to escape.

The afternoon of 13 July 1995: Cerska Valley executions

The first large-scale mass executions began on the afternoon of 13 July 1995 in the valley of the River Cerska, to the west of Konjevic Polje. One witness, hidden among trees, saw two or three trucks, followed by an armoured vehicle and an earthmoving machine proceeding towards Cerska. After that, he heard gunshots for half an hour and then saw the armoured vehicle going in the opposite direction, but not the earthmoving machine. Other witnesses report seeing a pool of blood alongside the road to Cerska that day. Muhamed Durakovic, a UN translator, probably passed this execution site later that day. He reports seeing bodies tossed into a ditch alongside the road, with some men still alive.

Aerial photos and excavations later confirmed the presence of a mass grave near this location. Ammunition cartridges found at the scene reveal that the victims were lined up on one side of the road, whereupon their executioners opened fire from the other. The bodies - 150 in number - were covered with earth where they lay. It could later be established that they had been killed by rifle fire. All were males, between the ages of 14 and 50. All but three of the 150 were wearing civilian clothes. Many had their hands tied behind their backs. Nine could later be identified and were indeed on the list of missing persons from Srebrenica.

The late afternoon of 13 July: executions in the warehouse at Kravica

Later that same afternoon, 13 July 1995, executions were also conducted in the largest of four warehouses (farm sheds) owned by the Agricultural Cooperative in Kravica. Between 1,000 and 1,500 men had been captured in fields near Sandici and detained in Sandici Meadow. They were brought to Kravica, either by bus or on foot, the distance being approximately one kilometre. A witness recalls seeing around 200 men, stripped to the waist and with their hands in the air, being forced to run in the direction of Kravica. An aerial photograph taken at 14.00 hours that afternoon shows two buses standing in front of the sheds.

At around 18.00 hours, when the men were all being held in the warehouse, VRS soldiers threw in hand grenades and opened fire with various weapons, including an anti-tank gun. In the local area it is said that the mass murder in Kravica was unplanned and started quite spontaneously when one of the warehouse doors suddenly swung open.

Supposedly, there was more killing in and around Kravica and Sandici. Even before the murders in the warehouse, some 200 or 300 men were formed up in ranks near Sandici and then mown down with machine guns. At Kravica, it seems that the local population had a hand in the killings. Some victims were mutilated and killed with knives. The bodies were taken to Bratunac or simply dumped in the river that runs alongside the road. One witness states that this all took place on the 14 July. There were three survivors of the slaughter in the farm sheds at Kravica.

Armed guards shot at the men who tried to climb out the windows to escape the massacre. When the shooting stopped, the shed was full of bodies. Another survivor, who was only slightly wounded, reports:

I was not even able to touch the floor, the concrete floor of the building (…) After the shooting, I felt a strange kind of heat, warmth, which was actually coming from the blood that covered the concrete floor, and I was stepping on the dead people who were lying around. But there were even people who were still alive, who were only wounded, and as soon as I would step on one, I would hear him cry, moan, because I was trying to move as fast as I could. I could tell that people had been completely disembodied, and I could feel bones of the people that had been hit by those bursts of gunfire or shells, I could feel their ribs crushing. And then I would get up again and continue.

When this witness climbed out of a window, he was seen by a guard who shot at him. He then pretended to be dead and managed to escape the following morning. The other witness quoted above spent the night under a heap of bodies. The next morning, he watched as the soldiers examined the corpses for signs of life. The few survivors were forced to sing Serbian songs, and were then shot. Once the final victim had been killed, an excavator was driven in to shunt the bodies out of the shed. The asphalt outside was then hosed down with water. In September 1996, it was still possible to find hair, blood, human tissue and traces of explosives on the walls to be used in evidence. Some remnants of bones were discovered near one of the outer walls.

Analyses of hair, blood and explosives residue collected at the Kravica Warehouse provide strong evidence of the killings. Experts determined the presence of bullet strikes, explosives residue, bullets and shell cases, as well as human blood, bones and tissue adhering to the walls and floors of the building. Forensic evidence presented by the ICTY Prosecutor a link between the executions in Kravica and the 'primary' mass grave known as Glogova 2, in which the remains of 139 people were found. No blindfolds or restraints were found. In the 'secondary' grave known as Zeleni Jadar 5 there were 145 bodies, a number of which were charred. Pieces of brick and window frame which were found in the Glogova 1 grave that was opened later also established a link with Kravica. Here the remains of 191 victims were found.

13–14 July 1995: Tišca

As the buses crowded with Bosniak women, children and elderly made their way from Potočari to Kladanj, they were stopped at Tišca, searched, and the Bosniak men and boys found on board were removed from the bus. The evidence reveals a well-organised operation in Tišca.

From the checkpoint, an officer directed the soldier escorting the witness towards a nearby school where many other prisoners were being held. At the school, a soldier on a field telephone appeared to be transmitting and receiving orders. Sometime around midnight, the witness was loaded onto a truck with 22 other men with their hands tied behind their backs. At one point the truck stopped and a soldier on the scene said: "Not here. Take them up there, where they took people before." The truck reached another stopping point where the soldiers came around to the back of the truck and started shooting the prisoners.

14 July 1995: Grbavci school detention site and Orahovac execution site

A large group of the prisoners who had been held overnight in Bratunac were bussed in a convoy of 30 vehicles to the Grbavci school in Orahovac early in the morning of 14 July 1995. When they got there, the school gym was already half-filled with prisoners who had been arriving since the early morning hours and, within a few hours, the building was completely full. Survivors estimated that there were 2,000 to 2,500 men there, some of them very young and some quite elderly, although the ICTY Prosecution suggested this may have been an over-estimation and that the number of prisoners at this site was probably closer to 1,000. Some prisoners were taken outside and killed. At some point, a witness recalled, General Mladić arrived and told the men: "Well, your government does not want you, and I have to take care of you."

After being held in the gym for several hours, the men were led out in small groups to the execution fields that afternoon. Each prisoner was blindfolded and given a drink of water as he left the gym. The prisoners were then taken in trucks to the execution fields less than one kilometre away. The men were lined up and shot in the back; those who survived the initial gunfire were killed with an extra shot. Two adjacent meadows were used; once one was full of bodies, the executioners moved to the other. While the executions were in progress, the survivors said, earth-moving equipment was digging the graves. A witness who survived the shootings by pretending to be dead, reported that General Mladić drove up in a red car and watched some of the executions.

The forensic evidence supports crucial aspects of the survivors’ testimony. Both, aerial and satellite photos show that the ground in Orahovac was disturbed between 5 July and 27 July 1995 and again between 7 September and 27 September 1995. Two primary mass graves were uncovered in the area, and were named "Lazete-1" and "Lazete-2" by investigators. The "Lazete-1" gravesite was exhumed by the ICTY Prosecution between 13 July and 3 August 2000. All of the 130 individuals uncovered, for whom sex could be determined, were male. One hundred and thirty eight blindfolds were uncovered in the grave. Identification material for twenty-three individuals, listed as missing following the fall of Srebrenica, was located during the exhumations at this site. The gravesite "Lazete-2" was partly exhumed by a joint team from the Office of the Prosecutor and Physicians for Human Rights between 19 August and 9 September 1996 and completed in 2000. All of the 243 victims associated with "Lazete-2" were male and the experts determined that the vast majority died of gunshot injuries. In addition, 147 blindfolds were located. One victim also had his legs bound with a cloth sack.

Forensic analysis of soil/pollen samples, blindfolds, ligatures, shell cases and aerial images of creation/disturbance dates, further revealed that bodies from the "Lazete-1" and "Lazete-2" graves were removed and reburied at secondary graves named Hodžići Road 3, 4 and 5. Aerial images show that these secondary gravesites were created between 7 September and 2 October 1995, and all of them were exhumed in 1998.

14th-15th of July 1995: executions at the school and the dam in Petkovici

On the 14 July and 15 July 1995, another large group of prisoners numbering some 1,500 to 2,000 were taken from Bratunac to the school in Petkovici. The conditions under which these men were held at the Petkovici school were even worse than those in Grabavci. It was hot, overcrowded and there was no food or water. In the absence of anything else, some prisoners chose to drink their own urine. Every now and then, soldiers would enter the room and physically abuse prisoners, or would call them outside. A few of the prisoners contemplated an escape attempt, but others said it would be better to stay since the International Red Cross would be sure to monitor the situation and they could not all be killed.

The men were called outside in small groups. They were ordered to strip to the waist and to remove their shoes, whereupon their hands were tied behind their backs. During the night of 14th of July, the men were taken by truck to the dam at Petkovici. Those who arrived later could see immediately what was going on there. A large number of bodies were strewn on the ground, their hands tied behind their backs. Small groups of five to ten men were taken out of the trucks, lined up and shot. Some begged for water but their pleas were ignored. A survivor described his feelings of fear combined with thirst thus:

I was really sorry that I would die of thirst, and I was trying to hide among the people for as long as I could, like everybody else. I just wanted to live for another second or two. And when it was my turn, I jumped out with what I believe were four other people. I could feel the gravel beneath my feet. It hurt. (…) I was walking with my head bent down and I wasn't feeling anything. (…) And then I thought that I would die very fast, that I would not suffer. And I just thought that my mother would never know where I had ended up. This is what I was thinking as I was getting out of the truck. (…) I was still very thirsty. But it was sort of between life and death. I didn't know whether I wanted to live or to die anymore. I decided not to call out for them to shoot and kill me, but I was sort of praying to God that they'd come and kill me.

After the soldiers had left, two survivors helped each other to untie their hands, and then crawled over the heap of bodies towards the woods, where they intended to hide. As dawn arrived, they could see the execution site where bulldozers were collecting the bodies. On the way to the execution site, one of the survivors had peeked out from under his blindfold and had seen that Mladic was also on his way to the scene.

Aerial photos confirmed that the earth near the Petkovici dam had been disturbed, and that it was disturbed yet again some time between 7 September and 27 September 1995. When the grave here was opened in April 1998, many bodies appeared to have disappeared. Their removal had been accomplished with mechanical apparatus, causing considerable disturbance to the grave and its contents. At this time, the grave contained the remains of no more than 43 persons. Other bodies had been removed to a secondary grave, 'Liplje 2', prior to 2 October 1995. Here, the remains of at least 191 individuals were discovered.

14–16 July 1995: Branjevo military farm execution site and the Dom Kultura

On 14 July 1995, more prisoners from Bratunac were bussed northward to a school in the village of Pilica, north of Zvornik. As at other detention facilities, there was no food or water and several men died in the school gym from heat and dehydration. The men were held at the Pilica school for two nights. On 16 July 1995, following a now familiar pattern, the men were called out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm, where groups of 10 were lined up and shot.

Dražen Erdemović - who confessed killing at least 70 Bosniaks - was a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment (a Main Staff subordinate unit) and participated in the mass execution. Erdemović appeared as a prosecution witness and testified: "The men in front of us were ordered to turn their backs. When those men turned their backs to us, we shot at them. We were given orders to shoot."

On this point, one of the survivors recalls:

When they opened fire, I threw myself on the ground. (…) And one man fell on my head. I think that he was killed on the spot. And I could feel the hot blood pouring over me. (…) I could hear one man crying for help. He was begging them to kill him. And they simply said “Let him suffer. We'll kill him later."

Erdemović said that all but one of the victims wore civilian clothes and that, except for one person who tried to escape, they offered no resistance before being shot. Sometimes the executioners were particularly cruel. When some of the soldiers recognised acquaintances from Srebrenica, they beat and humiliated them before killing them. Erdemovic had to persuade his fellow soldiers to stop using a machine gun for the killings; while it mortally wounded the prisoners it did not cause death immediately and prolonged their suffering.

Between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of that day at this execution site.

Aerial photographs, taken on 17 July 1995, of an area around the Branjevo Military Farm, show a large number of bodies lying in the field near the farm, as well as traces of the excavator that collected the bodies from the field.

Erdemović testified that, at around 15:00 hours on 16 July 1995, after he and his fellow soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment had finished executing the prisoners at the Branjevo Military Farm, they were told that there was a group of 500 Bosniak prisoners from Srebrenica trying to break out of a nearby Dom Kultura club. Erdemović and the other members of his unit refused to carry out any more killings. They were then told to attend a meeting with the Lieutenant Colonel at a café in Pilica. Erdemović and his fellow-soldiers travelled to the café as requested and, as they waited, they could hear shots and grenades being detonated. The sounds lasted for approximately 15–20 minutes after which a soldier from Bratunac entered the café to inform those present that "everything was over".

It is noteworthy that two of the three survivors of the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm were arrested by local Bosnian Serb police on 25 July and sent to the prisoner of war compound at Batkovici. One had been a member of the group separated from the women in Potočari on 13 July. The prisoners who were taken to Batkovici survived the ordeal and were later able to testify before the Tribunal.

There were no survivors to explain exactly what had happened in the Dom Kultura. However, it is remarkable that this was no execution at some remote spot, but one in the centre of town on the main road from Zvornik to Bijeljina. Over a year later, it was still possible to find physical evidence of this atrocity. As in Kravica, many traces of blood, hair and body tissue were found in the building, with cartridges and shells littered throughout the two storeys. It could also be established that explosives and machine guns had been used. Human remains and personal possessions were found under the stage, where blood had dripped down through the floorboards.

14-17 July 1995: Kozluk

The exact date of the executions at Kozluk is not known, although it can be narrowed down to the period of 14 July to 17 July 1995. The most probable dates are the 15 July and 16 July, not least due to the geographic location of Kozluk, between Petkovici Dam and the Branjevo Military Farm. It therefore falls within the pattern of ever more northerly execution sites: Orahovac on 14 July, Petkovci Dam on 15 July, the Branjevo Military Farm and the Pilica Dom Kultura on 16 July. Another indication is that a Zvornik Brigade excavator spent eight hours in Kozluk on 16 July, and a truck belonging to same brigade made two journeys between Orahovac and Kozluk that day. A bulldozer is known to have been active in Kozluv on 18 July and 19 July.

Among Bosnian refugees in Germany, there were rumours of executions in Kozluk, during which the five hundred or so prisoners were forced to sing Serbian songs as they were being transported to the executions site. Although no survivors have since come forward, investigations in 1999 led to the discovery of a mass grave near Kozluk. This proved to be the actual location of an execution as well, and lay alongside the Drina accessible only by driving through the barracks occupied by the Drina Wolves, a regular police unit of Republika Srpska. The grave was not dug specifically for the purpose: it had previously been a quarry and a landfill site. Investigators found many shards of green glass which the nearby 'Vitinka' bottling plant had dumped there. This facilitated the process of establishing links with the secondary graves along Cancari Road.

The grave at Kozluk had been partly cleared some time prior to 27 September 1995, but no fewer than 340 bodies were found there nonetheless. In 292 cases, it was clear that they had died as the result of rifle fire: 83 by a single shot to the head, 76 by one shot through the torso region, 72 by multiple gunfire wounds, five by wounds to the legs and one person by gunfire wounds to the arm. The ages of the victims were estimated as between 8 and 85 years old. Some had been physically disabled, occasionally as the result of amputation. Many had clearly been tied and bound using strips of clothing or nylon thread.

Along the Cancari Road are twelve known mass graves, of which only two - Cancari Road 3 and 12 - have been investigated in detail by 2001. Cancari Road 3 is known to have been a secondary grave linked to Kozluk, as shown by the glass fragments and labels from the Vitinka factory. The remains of 158 victims were found here, of which 35 bodies were still more or intact and indicated that most had been killed by gunfire. Cancari Road 12 was the site of the re-interment of at least 174 bodies, moved here from the mass grave at the Branjevo Military Farm. Only 43 were complete sets of remains, most of which established that death had taken place as there result of rifle fire. Of the 313 various body parts found, 145 displayed gunshot wounds of a severity likely to prove fatal.

13–18 July 1995: Brutanac-Konjevic Polje road

On 13 July 1995, in the vicinity of Konjevic Polje, Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily executed hundreds of Bosniaks, including women and children.

The men who were found attempting to escape by the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road were told that the Geneva Convention would be observed if they gave themselves up. In Bratunac, men were told that there were Serbian personnel standing by to escort them to Zagreb for an exchange of prisoners. The visible presence of UN uniforms and UN vehicles, stolen from Dutchbat, were intended to contribute to the feeling of reassurance. On 17 July 1995 to 18 July 1995, Serb soldiers captured about 150-200 Bosniaks and summarily executed about one-half of them.

18-19 July 1995: Nezuk-Baljkovica frontline

After the closure to the corridor at Baljkovica, several groups of stragglers nevertheless attempted to escape into Bosnian territory. Most were captured by VRS troops in the Nezuk - Baljkovica area and killed on the spot. In the vicinity of Nezuk, about 20 small groups surrendered to Bosnian Serb military forces. After the men surrendered, Bosnian Serb soldiers ordered them to line up and summarily executed them.

On 19 July, for example, a group of approximately 11 men were killed at Nezuk itself by units of the 16th Krajina Brigade, then operating under the direct command of the Zvornik Brigade. Reports reveal that a further 13 men, all ABiH soldiers, were killed at Nezuk on 19 July. The report of the march to Tuzla includes the account of an ABiH soldier who witnessed several executions carried out by police that day. He survived because 30 ABiH soldiers were needed for an exchange of prisoners following the ABiH's capture of an VRS officer at Baljkovica. The soldier was himself exchanged late 1995; at that time, there were still 229 men from Srebrenica in the Batkovici prisoner of war camp, including two men who had been taken prisoner in 1994.

At the same time, there were around 200 ABiH soldiers armed with automatic and hunting rifles hiding close to the old road near Snagovo. On morning, about 50 Bosniaks attacked the Zvornik Brigade line in the area of Pandurica in order to break through to the Bosnian-government territory. The Zvornik Public Security Centre planned to surround and destroy on the following day both mentioned groups with all available forces.

20-22 July 1995: Meces area

On 20 July to 21 July 1995, near the village of Meces, Bosnian Serb military personnel, using megaphones, urged Bosniak men who had fled Srebrenica to surrender and assured them that they would be safe. Approximately 350 men responded to these entreaties and surrendered. Serb soldiers then took approximately 150 of them, instructed them to dig their own graves and then summarily executed them.

On 22 July 1995 an excavator dug a large pit and Bosnian Serb soldiers ordered approximately 260 Bosniak men who had been captured to stand around the hole. The men were then surrounded by armed Bosnian Serb soldiers and ordered not to move or they would be shot. Some of the men moved and were shot. The remaining men were pushed into the hole and buried alive.

After the massacre

On 22 July, the commanding officer of the Zvornik Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, requested the Drina Corps to set up a committee to oversee the exchange of prisoners. He also asked for instructions with regard to the prisoners of war his unit had already taken: where they should be handed over and to whom. A number of wounded captives (approximately 50) were taken to the Bratunac hospital. Another group of prisoners was taken the Batkovici camp (near Bijeljina), and these were mostly exchanged later. On 25 July, the Zvornik Brigade took a further 25 ABiH soldiers captive; they were taken directly to the camp at Batkovici. The same fate befell another 34 ABiH men the following day. The Zvornik Brigade reports until 31 July continue to describe the search for refugees and the capture of small groups of Bosniaks.

A number of Bosniaks managed to get across to Serbia in Ljubovija and Bajina Basta. From where 38 of them were returned to RS. Some of them were taken to the Batkovici camp, where they were exchanged. The fate of the majority of those returned has not been established to date.

By 17 July 1995, 201 Bosniak soldiers came to Žepa; they are very exhausted and many of them with light wounds. Another 500 people arrived to Žepa from Srebrenica by 28 July, 1995.

After 19 July 1995, small Bosniak groups were hiding in the woods for days and months, trying to reach Tuzla. Numerous refugees found themselves cut off for some time in the area around Mount Udrc. They did not know what to do next or where to go; they managed to stay alive by eating snails, leaves and mushrooms. The atmosphere was one of tension, hunger and desperation. On or about 23 July, the Bosnian Serbs swept through this area too, and according to one survivor they killed many people as they did so.

Meanwhile, the VRS had commenced the process of clearing the bodies from around Srebrenica, Žepa, Kamenica and Snagovo. Work parties and municipal services were deployed to help. In Srebrenica, the refuse that had littered the streets since the departure of the people was collected and burnt, the town disinfected and deloused.

The wanderers

Many people in the part of the column which had not succeeded in passing Kamenica did not wish to give themselves up and decided to turn back towards Žepa. Others remained where they were, splitting up into smaller groups of no more than ten. Some wandered around for months, either alone or groups of two, four or six men. Few knew the way and attempted to navigate by following overhead power cables. They often found corpses, by now in a state of decomposition. Sometimes one group met another group from Srebrenica who knew of a deserted Bosniak village in the region; they would then proceed there together.

To feed themselves, the men took potatoes and other vegetables from the fields around the Serbian villages at night. The local Bosnian Serb population therefore began to mount patrols around their villages. The Bosniaks would generally sleep by day and wait for the cover of darkness before moving on. This continued for a long time; for example, the people of Milici, a village on the route to Tuzla, discovered the disappearance of livestock in November 1995. A group of some ten to twenty of them went in search of stragglers from the column, armed with shotguns.

Some of the Bosniak men decided to retrace their steps towards the Srebrenica region, since this was familiar territory and they knew where to find food. From here, they would once again set out towards Žepa or attempt to reach Tuzla. Some arrived in Tuzla after many months, having been wandering around the area between Srebrenica and Udrc with absolutely no sense of direction. A few hundred managed to reach Žepa just before the VRS occupied the enclave on 25 July. Once Žepa had succumbed to the Bosnian Serb pressure, they had to move on once more, either trying to reach Tuzla or crossing the River Drina into Serbia.

There are countless stories recalling the experiences of those who lost contact with the column, their wanderings and the horrors they saw. They include the account of a 54-year-old engineer who lost touch with his group near to Kravica and who was attacked by a Bosnian Serb civilian wielding a metal pipe. The engineer was beaten unconscious and left for dead. When he came round, he went into hiding for a day before meeting a group of 6 other men from Srebrenica. Together, they lay low for another two days, living on mushrooms and the few rations they had remaining. During the next few days, this group grew to include approximately 50 men. They were surrounded by VRS troops who demanded that they should give themselves up. Most did so immediately, but the engineer and seven others managed to remain hidden. This group split up, later met yet another VRS patrol and once again managed to escape capture. Hunger forced them to turn back to Srebrenica in the hope of finding something to eat in one of the abandoned villages. Eventually, the engineer reached Žepa where he managed to find a place on the last bus to transport the evacuees out of the town. Mladic was there to bid a personal farewell to the passengers, assuring them that no harm would come to them on the way for a CNN camera team.

A particularly memorable story is that of three young men aged 17, 18 and 19. On several occasions they attempted to cross the main Konjevic Polje to Nova Kasaba road but were unsuccessful in doing so each time. They eventually managed to reach Žepa only after the enclave had fallen. They had set up camp in a couple of deserted Bosniak villages where they managed to hide out for several months without attracting attention. Sometimes the teenagers would escort groups of other refugees as far as the next obstacle before eventually returning to their base. Finally, on 26 April 1996, a full six months after the signing of the Dayton Accord, they crossed the Drina into Serbia.

Another group of seven men wandered about in occupied territory for the entire winter. On 10 May 1996, after nine months on the run, they were discovered in a quarry by American IFOR soldiers; the men immediately surrendered to the Americans. They were searched and their weapons - two pistols and three hand grenades - were confiscated. The men said that they had been in hiding in the immediate vicinity of Srebrenica since the fall of the enclave. They did not look like soldiers and the Americans decided that this was a matter for the police. The operations officer of this American unit ordered that a VRS patrol should be escorted into the quarry whereupon the men would be handed over; unit of the International Police Task Force which happened to be in the area would supervise this operation. A Bosnian Serb court convicted the group - known as the Zvornik 7 - for illegal possession of firearms and the murder of four Serbian woodsmen. This conviction was later quashed (for 'procedural reasons') following pressure from the international community.

The reburials

The forensic evidence presented to the Trial Chamber of ICTY suggests that, commencing in the early autumn of 1995, the Serbs engaged in a concerted effort to conceal the mass killings by relocating the primary graves to remote secondary gravesites. All of the primary and secondary mass gravesites associated with the take-over of Srebrenica located by the Office of the Prosecutor were within the Drina Corps area of responsibility.

Most significantly, the forensic evidence also demonstrates that, during a period of several weeks in September and early October 1995, Serb forces dug up many of the primary mass gravesites and reburied the bodies in still more remote locations. Forensic tests have linked certain primary gravesites and certain secondary gravesites, namely: Branjevo Military Farm and Cancari Road 12; Petkovći Dam and Liplje 2; Orahovac (Lazete 2) and Hodžići Road 5; Orahovac (Lazete 1) and Hodžići Road 3 and 4; Glogova and Zeleni Jadar 5; and Kozluk and Cancari Road 3. The reburial evidence demonstrates a concerted campaign to conceal the bodies of the men in these primary gravesites, which was undoubtedly prompted by increasing international scrutiny of the events following the take-over of Srebrenica. Such extreme measures would not have been necessary had the majority of the bodies in these primary graves been combat victims.

Non-Serb participants in the killings

According to the report by Agence France Presse (AFP), a dozen Greek volunteers took part in the massacre of Srebrenica. These persons belonged to the Greek Volunteer Guard (ΕΕΦ), an integral part of the Drina Corps and were either members of the Golden Dawn, a Greek neo-Nazi group, or mercenaries. According to a book by Takis Michas, a Greek flag was raised in Srebrenica following the fall of the city while Radovan Karadžić had honored the volunteers. The pretense of involvement of Greek citizens in the massacre was to support their "Orthodox brothers" in battle.

The whole issue was forgotten for years until the Greek deputy Andreas Andrianopoulos broached the subject in 2005 and the Minister of Justice Anastasios Papaligouras committed an investigation, which is still underway.

Recent developments

On August 24 2006, The Oslobodjenje Daily started releasing secret list of over 800 Bosnian Serbs who participated in the Srebrenica massacre and are still believed to be in a position of power. The list was compiled by the Bosnian Serb government.

In April 2002, after a long-running discussion about the event in the Netherlands, the Dutch second cabinet of Wim Kok chose to resign in result of the official inquiry and report by the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie. The government of Netherlands refused to apologize for their failure to protect Srebrenica civilians and their collaboration with Serb forces. Netherland's NIOD Report has remained a matter of controversy and criticism.

On September 30, 2003, US President Bill Clinton officially opened Srebrenica Genocide Memorial. Total cost of the project was around $6 million, of which the United States government provided $1 million. Clinton said: We remember this terrible crime because we dare not forget, because we must pay tribute to the innocent lives, many of them children who were snuffed out in what must be called genocidal madness.

In 2004, the international community's High Representative Paddy Ashdown had the Government of Republika Srpska form a committee to investigate the events. The committee released a report in October 2004 with 8,731 confirmed names of missing and dead persons from Srebrenica: 7,793 between 10 July and 19 July 1995 and further 938 people afterwards.

Findings of the committee remain generally disputed by the Serb nationalists, as they claim it was heavily pressured by the High Representative. Nevertheless, Dragan Čavić, the president of Republika Srpska, acknowledged in a televised address that Serb forces killed several thousand civilians in violation of the international law, and asserted that Srebrenica was a dark chapter in Serb history. In his statement he used the word 'massacre' instead of 'genocide'.

On November 10, 2004, the government of Republika Srpska issued an official apology. The statement came after government review of the Srebrenica committee's report. "The report makes it clear that enormous crimes were committed in the area of Srebrenica in July 1995," the Bosnian Serb government said.

On June 2, 2005 video evidence emerged. It was introduced at the Milošević trial to testify the involvement of members of police units from Serbia in Srebrenica Massacre. The video footage starts about 2hr 35 min. into the proceedings. The footage shows an orthodox priest blessing several soldiers. Later these soldiers are shown with tied up captives, dressed in civilian clothing and visibly physically abused. They were later identified as four minors as young as 16 and two men in their early twenties. The footage then shows the execution of four of the civilians and shows them lying dead in the field. At this point the cameraman expresses disappointment that the camera's battery is almost out. The soldiers then ordered the two remaining captives to take the four dead bodies into a nearby barn, where they were also killed upon completing this task.

The video has caused a public outrage in Serbia. In the days following its showing, the Serbian government quickly arrested some of the former soldiers identified on the video. The event has most extensively been covered by the newspaper Danas and radio and television station B92. As was reported by Bosnian media, at least one mother of a filmed captive saw the execution of her son on television. She claimed she was already aware of her son's death, and said she had been told that his body was burned following the execution. His remains were among those buried in Potočari in 2003.

On June 27, 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution (H. Res. 199 sponsored by Congressman Christopher Smith and Congressman Benjamin Cardin) commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. The resolution was passed with overwhelming majority of 370 - YES votes, 1 - NO vote, and 62 - ABSENT . The resolution states that:

...the policies of aggression and ethnic cleansing as implemented by Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 and 1995 with the direct support of Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević and its followers ultimately led to the displacement of more than 2,000,000 people, an estimated 200,000 killed, tens of thousands raped or otherwise tortured and abused, and the innocent civilians of Sarajevo and other urban centers repeatedly subjected to shelling and sniper attacks; meet the terms defining the crime of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, created in Paris on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951."

On October 4, 2005, the Special Bosnian Serb Government Working Group said that 25,083 people were involved in the massacre including 19,473 members of various Bosnian Serb armed forces that actively gave orders or directly took part in the massacre. They have identified 17,074 by name. It has also been reported that some 892 of those suspects still hold positions at or a employed by the government of Republika Srpska. The names are still held secreet.

By 2006, 42 mass graves have been uncovered around Srebrenica and the specialists believe there are 22 more mass graves. The victims identified number 2,070 while body parts in more than 7,000 bags still await identification. On August 11, 2006 over 1,000 body parts were exhumed from one of Srebrenica mass graves located in Kamenica.

Legal Proceedings

On September 26 1997, Germany handed down first Genocide conviction to Serb soldier Nikola Jorgic for crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ratko Mladić and other Serb officers in the Army of Republika Srpska have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes committed during the Srebrenica genocide.

Two Serb officers have been convicted for their involvement in the Srebrenica genocide, Radislav Krstić and Vidoje Blagojević. General Radislav Krstić, who led the assault on Srebrenica alongside Ratko Mladić, was convicted by the tribunal of aiding and abetting genocide and received a sentence of 35 years imprisonment. Colonel Vidoje Blagojević received a sentence of 18 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity. Krstić was the first European to be convicted on a charge of genocide and only the third person ever to have been convicted under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The ICTY's final ruling was that the Srebrenica massacre was indeed an act of genocide.

At the ICTY, the trial of seven senior Serb military and police officers facing charges ranging from genocide to murder and deportation for the crimes committed in Srebrenica began July 14, 2006. Their names are: Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Vinko Pandurevic, Radivoje Miletic and Milan Gvero; Zdravko Tolimir is still at large. Eleven more individuals are on trial in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, and they are: Milos Stupar, Milenko Trifunovic, Petar Mitrovic, Aleksandar Radovanovic, Miladin Stevanovic, Brano Dzinic, Slobodan Jakovljevic, Branislav Medan, Dragisa Zivanovica, Velibor Maksimovic, and Milovan Matic.

In addition, the Srebrenica massacre is the core issue of the landmark court case Bosnian genocide case at the International Court of Justice through which Bosnia and Herzegovina has accused Serbia and Montenegro of genocide and aggression. The ruling on that case is expected towards the end of 2006 or early 2007. ICTY has already ruled, at least five times, that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an international conflict between Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia.

Analyses

Role of Bosniak forces on the ground (UN conclusions)

On a 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly held in December 1999 the Assembly rendered their position regarding the role of Bosniak forces on the ground around events that took place in Srebrenica in 1995.

Criticisms have also been leveled at the Bosniaks in Srebrenica, among them that they did not fully demilitarize and that they did not do enough to defend the enclave. To a degree, these criticisms appear to be contradictory. Concerning the first criticism, it is right to note that the Bosnian Government had entered into demilitarization agreements with the Bosnian Serbs. They did this with the encouragement of the United Nations. While it is also true that the Bosnian fighters in Srebrenica did not fully demilitarize, they did demilitarize enough for UNPROFOR to issue a press release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had been a success. Specific instructions from United Nations Headquarters in New York stated that UNPROFOF should not be too zealous in searching for Bosniak weapons and, later, that the Serbs should withdraw their heavy weapons before the Bosniaks gave up their weapons. The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.

Concerning the accusation that the Bosniaks did not do enough to defend Srebrenica, military experts consulted in connection with this report were largely in agreement that the Bosniaks could not have defended Srebrenica for long in the face of a concerted attack supported by armour and artillery. The defenders were undisciplined, untrained, poorly armed, totally isolated force, lying prone in the crowded valley of Srebrenica. They were ill-equipped even to train themselves in the use of the few heavier weapons that had been smuggled to them by their authorities. After over three years of siege, the population was demoralized, afraid and often hungry. The only leader of stature was absent when the attack occurred. Surrounding them, controlling all the high ground, handsomely equipped with the heavy weapons and logistical train of the Yugoslav army, were the Bosnian Serbs. There was no contest.

Despite the odds against them, the Bosniaks requested UNPROFOR to return to them the weapons they had surrendered under the demilitarization agreements of 1993. They requested those weapons at the beginning of the Serb offensive, but the request was rejected by the UNPROFOR because, as one commander explained, “it was our responsibility to defend thce enclave, not theirs.” Given the limited number and poor quality of Bosniak weapons held by UNPROFOR, it seems unlikely that releasing those weapons to the Bosniaks would have made a significant difference to the outcome of the battle; but the Bosniaks were under attack at that time, they wanted to resist with whatever means they could muster, and UNPROFOR denied them access to some of their own weapons. With the benefit of hindsight, this decision seems to be particularly ill-advised, given UNPROFOR’s own unwillingness consistently to advocate force as a means deterring attacks on the enclave.

Many have accused the Bosniak forces of withdrawing from the enclave as the Serb forces advanced on the day of its fall. However, it must be remembered that on the eve of the final Serb assault the Dutchbat commander urged the Bosniaks to withdraw from defensive positions south of Srebrenica town – the direction from which the Serbs were advancing. He did so because he believed that NATO aircraft would soon be launching widespread air strikes against the advancing Serbs.

A third accusation leveled at the Bosniak defenders of Srebrenica is that they provoked the Serb offensive by attacking out of that safe area. Even though this accusation is often repeated by international sources, there is no credible evidence to support it. Dutchbat personnel on the ground at the time assessed that the few “raids” the Bosniaks mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or no military significance. These raids were often organized in order to gather food, as the Serbs had refused access for humanitarian convoys into the enclave. Even Serb sources approached in the context of this report acknowledged that the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica posed no significant military threat to them. The biggest attack the Bosniaks launched out of Srebrenica during the more than two years which is was designated a safe area appears to have been the raid on the village of Visnjica, on 26 June 1995, in which several houses were burned, up to four Serbs were killed and approximately 100 sheep were stolen. In contrast, the Serbs overran the enclave two weeks later, driving tens of thousands from their homes, and summarily executing thousands of men and boys. The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the raids out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina, while freeing their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The extent to which this pretext was accepted at face value by international actors and observers reflected the prism of “moral equivalency” through which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too many for too long.

Serb casualties around Srebrenica

State-sponsored Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo, which includes joint Bosniak, Serb and Croat investigators, recently investigated number of alleged Serb casualties around Srebrenica and concluded that the alleged number of 3,287 Serb casualties in Central Podrinje is actually incorrect and nine to ten times lower than reported by the Serbian media.

The allegations that Serb casualties in Bratunac, between April 1992 and December 1995 amount to over three thousand is an evident falsification of facts. The RDC research of the actual number of Serb victims in Bratunac has been the most extensive carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina and proves that the overall number of victims is three to nine times smaller than indicated by Serbia and Montenegro. Perhaps the clearest illustration of gross exaggeration is that of Kravica, a Serb village near Bratunac attacked by the Bosnian Army on the morning of Orthodox Christmas, January 7, 1993 . The allegations that the attack resulted in hundreds of civilian victims have been shown to be false. Insight into the original documentation of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) clearly shows that in fact military victims highly outnumber the civilian ones. The document entitled “Warpath of the Bratunac brigade”, puts the military victims at 35 killed and 36 wounded; the number of civilian victims of the attack is eleven. .

Denial of the massacre, revisionism and scepticism

The Bosnian Serb side has, under the pressure of the authority of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown, officially admitted the number of killed Bosniaks and expressed regrets for the massacre in 2004 (Comm. Inv. Ev. Srebrenica, 2004). Although the International Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ruled that the Srebrenica massacre was an act of Genocide, the number of casualties is still disputed by left-apologist revisionists and Serbian and Serbian nationalists. The government of the Republika Srpska has officially condemned the atrocity.

While Serbia, officially, has condemned the massacre from the very beginning , some Serbs from Serbia had reservations about the number of people killed for some time. Among Western observers, the radicals on both sides of the political spectrum have disputed the original accounts of the massacre for different reasons. Some radical liberals view the Srebrenica massacre as being another case of government propaganda in an unnecessary war.

Still, many Serb groups espouse denial of massacre, claiming that the intentional figure of nearly 8,000 deaths is grossly exaggerated and that Republika Srpska government had no extermination policy. Some others, who do not deny mass killings by the Republika Srpska, have engaged in pointing out "immoral equivalencies" (e.g. the killing and ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Croatian forces) and/or justifications for the executions (e.g. retaliation or punishment for sabotage, terrorism, or subversion). Others have claimed that the fact that only men were killed means that the massacre was not an act of genocide although the veracity of this assumption has been shown to be inaccurate. It should also be noted that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the crime as "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" - emphasis added).

Many Serbs distrusted the western explanation of the events due to the long delays in proving that there were mass graves in the area, and that people in them were indeed Bosniaks (it took almost a decade for a notable percentage of bodies to be identified). In their eyes, further doubt was cast on the mainstream story when the UN High Representative Paddy Ashdown relieved and replaced the examining commission of Republika Srpska which supported the republic's initial self-exoneration. This only exacerbated the concern that there was bias among the westerners resulting in focusing on the wartime acts of Serbs and neglecting those of Bosniaks and Croats.

Some Western observers also doubt the official figure of 8,000 killed. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, the former commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, stated that:

Evidence given at The Hague war crimes tribunal casts serious doubt on the figure of "up to" 8,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred. That figure includes "up to" 5,000 who have been classified as missing. More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn't support the scale of 8,000 killed.

He also disputes the categorization of the massacre as genocide by saying:

It's a distasteful point, but it has to be said that, if you're committing genocide, you don't let the women go since they are key to perpetuating the very group you are trying to eliminate. Many of the men and boys were executed and buried in mass graves.

Srebrenica genocide denial and revisionism

Srebrenica genocide denial or Srebrenica genocide revisionism, is the belief that the Srebrenica genocide did not occur, or that far fewer than around 8,000 Bosniaks were killed by the Bosnian Serb Army (numbers below 5,000, most often around 2,000 are typically cited); that there never was a centrally-planned Bosnian Serb Army's attempt to exterminate the Bosniaks of Srebrenica; and/or that there were not mass killings at the extermination sites. Those who hold this position often further claim that Bosniaks and/or Western media know that the Srebrenica genocide never occurred, yet that they are engaged in a massive conspiracy to maintain the illusion of a Srebrenica genocide to further their political agenda. These views are not accepted as credible by objective historians.

Srebrenica genocide deniers almost always prefer to be called Srebrenica genocide revisionists However, most scholars contend that the latter term is misleading. Historical revisionism is a well-accepted part of the study of history; it is the reexamination of historical facts, with an eye towards updating histories with newly discovered, more accurate, or less biased information. The implication is that history as it has been traditionally told may not be entirely accurate. The term historical revisionism has a second meaning, the illegitimate manipulation of history for political purposes. For example, many scholars allege that Srebrenica genocide deniers willfully misuse or ignore historical records in order to attempt to prove their conclusions.

Notes

1. By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper name: genocide." (ICTY 2004, para. 37)

References

1. Federal Commission for Missing Persons; "Preliminary List of Missing and Killed in Srebrenica"; 2005
2. Tribunal Update #444, "Stanisic and Simatovic Pleas". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 17 March 2006.
3. ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement "Prosecutor vs Krstic", Findings of Fact, paragraphs 18 and 26
4. ICTY, Prosecutor vs Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-98-33-T, paras 43–46.
5. Federal Commission for Missing Persons; "Preliminary List of Missing and Killed in Srebrenica"; 2005
6. ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 12
7. Bratunac Municipality Officials, "Truth about Bratunac (Istina o Bratuncu)". 1995
8. NIOD Report, Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3.
9. ^ ICTY. "Prosecutor vs Naser Oric, Judgement". United Nations. 30 June 2006. pg. 43-51
10. ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Radislav Krstic Judgement; United Nations; para. #13
11. ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Krstic; Trial Chamber Judgement; United Nations; para. 13–17.
12. Security Council. "Resolution 819". United Nations. 16 April 1993. para. #1
13. U.N. Report, The Fall of Srebrenica - Role of Bosniak Forces on the Ground.
14. ^ ICTY. "Prosecutor vs Krstic, First Judgement". United Nations. 2 August 2001. Cite error: The named reference "ICTY3" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
15. Secretary General. "The Fall of Srebrenica". United Nations. 15 November 1999.
16. ICTY. "Prosecutor vs Krstic, Appeals Chamber Judgement". United Nations. 19 April 2004.
17. BALKAN WATCH The Balkan Institute July 10, 1995 A Weekly Review of Current Events Volume 2.26 Week in Review July 3-9, 1995
18. Daruvalla, Abi. (21 April 2002). "Anatomy of a Massacre". TIME Magazine. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
19. ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Krstic Judgement, Parts I and II
20. ^ CNN, Srebrenica: A Triumph of Evil, May 3, 2006 .
21. Del Ponte, Carla. "“Statement: Srebrenica Massacre Orchestrators Must Be Caught”. ICTY Prosecutor's Chamber. 7 June 2006 ".
22. ^ Rohde,David; "Account of Women Taken", Columbia University; October 2 1995
23. ^ Institute for War and Peace Reporting; "Prosecuting Rape Cases;
24. Controversial Srebrenica Report Back on Table by Institute for War and Peace Reporting and Thoughts on NIOD Report
25. AFP; "Greek Volunteers Fought Alongside Bosnian Serbs." 13 July 1995;
26. Michas, Takis;"Unholy Alliance", Texas A&M University Press: Eastern European Studies (College Station, Tex.) pp. 22
27. Michas, Takis "Unholy Alliance", Texas A&M University Press: Eastern European Studies (College Station, Tex.) pp. 17-41.
28. Grohmann, Karolos; "Greece starts probe into Srebrenica massacre"; Reuters, 27 June 2006
29. Smith, Helena; "Helena Smith@Athens"; Guardian Unlimited; 1 August 2005
30. The list of over 800 Bosnian Serbs who allegedly participated in the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, and are still believed to be in positions of power. First 69 names were published on Aug 24, 2006.
31. United States Embassy in Sarajevo Press Release, Sept 20, 2003
32. Washington Post. "Votes Database: Bill: H RES 199" 27 June 2005
33. US House of Representatives, "Resolution 199 (H. Res. 199): Srebrenica Genocide". 27 June 2005.
34. Alic, Anes. "25,000 participated in Srebrenica massacre". ISN. 5 October 2005.
35. Amnesty International, AI Index: EUR 63/003/2005, "Bosnia-Herzgovina:Srebrenica: Still Waiting for the Truth", 1 April 2005
36. Weinberg, Bill; "Srebrenica:11 years later, still no justice"; World War 4 Report; 11 July 2006
37. Mass Grave Yields over 1,000 Body Parts, Reuters Aug 11, 2006
38. ICTY. "Prosecutor vs Krstic,Appeals Chamber Judgement". United Nations. 19 April 2004. para. #37.
39. ICTY; "Press Release:Popovic Et Al. Srebrenica Trial to Begin 14 July 2006"; United Nations;
40. Balkan Investigative Network, "Justice Report. Kravica: Stupar Linked to Crime Scene"
41. Human Rights Watch: Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity
42. Statement by the Tribunal's Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to the Security Council 7 June 2006
43. UN General Assembly; "Fifty-fourth session, Agenda item 42: The Fall of Srebrenica - Role of Bosniak Forces on the Ground; United Nations; para 475 - 479
44. RDC. The Myth Of Bratunac: A Blatant Numbers Game
45. "The real story behind Srebrenica" by Lewis MacKenzie, The Globe and Mail (Canada), July 14, 2005
46. "The real story behind Srebrenica" by Lewis MacKenzie, The Globe and Mail (Canada), July 14, 2005
47. Balkan Witness Staff; Edward Herman on The Lists of Missing at Srebrenica; August 2005
48. Hoare, Marko Attila; Chomsky's Genocidal Denial; 23 November 2005
49. The Left Revisionists, by Marko Attila Hoare
50. Srebrenica - defending the truth (Twenty-four scholarly signatories)

Further reading

• David Rohde. 1997. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst massacre Since World War II. WestviewPress. ISBN 0-8133-3533-7.
• Van Gennep, 1999. Srebrenica: Het Verhaal van de Overlevenden . Van Gennep, Amsterdam. ISBN 90-5515-224-2. (translation of: Samrtno Srebrenicko Ijeto '95, Udruzenje gradana 'Zene Srebrenice', Tuzla, 1998).
• Postcards from the Grave - by Emir Suljagic. ISBN 0-86356-519-0. In July of 1995, the Bosnian Serb army destroyed Srebrenica and massacred over eight thousand men, elderly, and boys (minors). Against all odds, Emir Suljagic survived. This is his moving testimony, dedicated to the memory of the victims of the genocide.
• Netherland's NIOD Report, 2002. Srebrenica, een 'veilig' gebied. Boom, Amsterdam. ISBN 90-5352-716-8. Dutch troops failed to protect Srebrenica and even collaborated with Serb forces, which is the focus of upcoming lawsuit by Srebrenica massacre survivors. English translation of this controversial and widely criticised report is available at the NIOD Srebrenica website, plus Criticisms of NIOD Report.

See also

• Srebrenica Genocide Memorial
• History of Bosnia and Herzegovina
• History of Yugoslavia
• Bosnian Genocide
• Srebrenica
• Naser Oric
• The Enclave

External links

• The Commission for the Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995, published 2004. The Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995, available from Domovina net.
• preliminary list - Issued by Federal Commission for Missing Persons of 8,106 Bosniaks killed or missing from Srebrenica
• updated list Issued by Federal Commission for Missing Persons of 8,373 Bosniaks killed or missing from Srebrenica
• Initial indictment at the ICTY against Karadžić and Mladić for Srebrenica.
• Initial Indictment at the ICTY against Popovic et al. (7 accussed)
• The uncensored version of the Bosnian execution video Warning: shocking content!
• Genocide and Aftermath: Rationalizing the Process of Truth and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Museum of Jewish Heritage in New York
• July 12, 1995 Through My Eyes, the Fall of Srebrenica account of a Bosniak soldier in Tuzla
• Bosnian Genocide - Independent Web Site
• Myth about Serb Civilian Casualties Around Srebrenica study by the Sarajevo-based Research & Documentation Center on Serbian casualties in Bratunac municipality, near Srebrenica
• Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebrenica Survivors a Human Rights Watch report
• BOSFAM - Non-Governmental group supporting displaced women in Bosnia
• The Association Women of Srebrenica - Official Website
• A Toast to the Dead: Srebrenica Widows Sue U.N., Dutch Government - Der Spiegel, July 4th, 2006.
• There was a Genocide in Srebrenica: Part I, Part II, and Part III .
• U.S. Holocause Memorial Museums Committee on Conscience - Balkans Section.
• Srebrenica Genocide Blog - blog about Srebrenica massacre

Video

• Documentary: SREBRENICA, AN ORCHESTRATED TRAGEDY

Genocide denial and revisionism

• The Guardian, Noam Chomsky and the Milosevic Lobby from the Henry Jackson Society, article describes Noam Chomsky and Diana Johnstone's revisionism and the connection between the International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic and the Srebrenica Research Group.
• Report of Srebrenica Research Group, concludes that "the contention that as many as 8,000 Muslims were killed has no basis in available evidence and is essentially a political construct" and includes articles questioning if the Srebenica massacre was actually a "hoax".
• Report of International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), says that the "alleged casualty number of 7,000 victims vastly inflated and unsupported by evidence" and that the account of the Srebrenica massacre substantiated by the ICTY is actually a "radical Islamists’ version of the Srebrenica affair".
• The real story behind Srebrenica by the controversial former commander of UNPROFOR, Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, who makes the unsubstantiated claim that as many Bosnian Serbs in the Srebrenica area were massacred by Bosniaks and therefore both sides are essentially equal. (Canadian The Globe and Mail, 14 July 2005),
• "The Forbidden Srebrenica report", report denying the Srebrenica massacre issued by the Republika Srpska Bureau for Cooperation with the ICTY in September 2002.
• Chomsky's Genocidal Denial - Frontpage Magazine, article highlights Noam Chomsky and Diana Johstone's denial of the Srebrenica massacre or of the extent of the executions.
• The Politics of the Srebrenica Massacre article argues that only some Bosniaks were executed, most died in battle, many of the bodies in mass graves are actually Serbs, and that what is presented in mainstream media is actually propaganda to support the colonization of the Balkans by western powers, by Edward S. Herman, 7 July 2005
• Genocide deniers - 22 March 2006
• Thoughts on Niod Report, Chomsky, UN, Dutch government and Dead Horses from the Srebrenica Genocide Blog, 8 July 2006

• 1995
• Bosnian genocide
• Genocide
• History of Bosnia and Herzegovina
• War crimes in former Yugoslavia
• Mass casualty atrocities