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In the ]s, '''modernization''' or '''modernisation''' refers to a model of an evolutionary transition from a 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' to a 'modern' society. The teleology of modernization is described in ] theories, existing as a template that has been generally followed by societies that have achieved modernity.<ref name="brugger 1-3">Brugger and Hannan, p. 1–3.</ref><ref name="dixon 1-4">Dixon, p. 1–4</ref> While it may theoretically be possible for some societies to make the transition in entirely different ways, there have been no counterexamples provided by reliable sources. |
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Historians link modernization to the processes of ] and ], as well as to the spread of education. As Kendall (2007) notes, "Urbanization accompanied modernization and the rapid process of industrialization.<ref> Diana Kendall, ''Sociology in Our Times'' (2007) p. 11</ref> In ] ], modernization is linked to an overarching process of ]. When modernization increases within a society, the individual becomes that much more important, eventually replacing the family or community as the fundamental unit of society.<ref name="HttpwwwbritannicacomEBcheckedtopicmodernization">http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/387301/modernization</ref> |
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Modernization theory and history have been explicitly used as guides for countries eager to develop rapidly, such as China. Indeed, modernization has been proposed as the most useful framework for ] in China, because as one of the developing countries that started late, "China's modernization has to be based on the experiences and lessons of other countries."<ref>Qian Chengdan, "Constructing a New Disciplinary Framework of Modern World History Around the Theme of Modernization," ''Chinese Studies in History'' Spring 2009, Vol. 42#3 pp 7-24; in ]</ref>. |
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Instead of being dominated by tradition, societies undergoing the process of modernization typically arrive at governance dictated by abstract principles. Traditional religious beliefs and cultural traits usually becomes less important as modernization takes hold.<ref name="HttpwwwbritannicacomEBcheckedtopicmodernization" /> |
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==Theory== |
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According to theories of modernization, each society can develop from traditionalism to modernity, and that those that make this transition follow similar paths. More modern states are wealthier and more powerful, and their citizens freer, with a higher standard of living. According to the ] ], modernization can be seen as processes, and as offensives. The former view is commonly projected by politicians and the media, and suggests that it is developments, such as new data technology or need to update traditional methods, which make modernization necessary or preferable.<ref name="khan 162-164">Khan, p. 162–164.</ref> This view makes critique of modernization difficult, since it implies these developments control the limits of human interaction, and not vice versa. |
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The view of modernization as offensives argues that both the developments and the altered opportunities made available by these developments are shaped and controlled by human agents. The view of modernization as offensives therefore sees it as a product of human planning and action, an active process capable of being both changed and criticized.<ref name="khan 162-164" /> |
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Modernization emerged in the late 19th century and was especially popular among scholars in the mid-20th century. One foremost advocate was Harvard sociologist ].<ref>Gilman, ''Mandarins of the Future'' (2003) </ref> The theory stressed the importance of societies being open to change and saw reactionary forces as restricting development. Maintaining tradition for tradition's sake was thought to be harmful to progress and development.<ref name="khan 162-164" /> Proponents of modernization lie in two camps, optimists and pessimist. The former view holds that what a modernizer sees as a setback to the theory (events such as the ] or the troubles in ]) are invariably temporary setbacks,<ref>Brugger and Hannan, p. 43.</ref> with the ability to attain "modernism" still existing. Pessimists argue that such non-modern areas are incapable of becoming modern.<ref name="Macionis 953">Macionis, p. 953.</ref> |
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==Practice== |
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===United States=== |
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The ] were avid modernizers. They believed in science, technology, expertise—and especially education—as the grand solution to society's weaknesses. Characteristics of progressivism included a favorable attitude toward urban-industrial society, belief in mankind's ability to improve the environment and conditions of life, belief in obligation to intervene in economic and social affairs, and a belief in the ability of experts and in efficiency of government intervention.<ref>John D. Buenker, and Robert M. Crunden. ''Progressivism'' (1986); Maureen Flanagan, ''America Reformed: Progressives and Progressivisms, 1890s-1920s'' (2007); Modernization theory exerts a "powerful influence" on historians dealing with the 1896-1916 era, asserts Martin J. Sklar, ''The United States as a developing country'' (1992) p. 54 </ref> |
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Paul Monroe, a professor of history at Columbia University, was a member of ]--a team of American experts at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He drew on his experience in the Philippines to assess the educational needs of developing areas such as Albania, Turkey and central Africa. Presenting educational development as instrumental to nation-building and socioeconomic development, Monroe recommended the implementation of a progressive curriculum - with an emphasis on practical, adult, and teacher training - in a national system of education, as a basis for self-development, except in Africa. His approach shaped American cooperation with developing countries in the 1920s and modernization efforts during the 1920s-1930s.<ref>David M. Ment, "Education, nation‐building and modernization after World War I: American ideas for the Peace Conference," ''Paedagogica Historica,'' Feb 2005, Vol. 41 Issue 1/2, pp 159-177 </ref> |
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===Germany's "Sonderweg"=== |
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{{main|Sonderweg}} |
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Many historians have emphasized the central importance of a German ] or "special path" (or "exceptionalism") as the root of Nazism and the German catastrophe in the 20th century. According to the historiography by Kocka (1988), the process of nation-building from above especially during the period of the ] (1871-1918), in the following Weimar era, had very grievous long-term implications, historians have argued. In terms of parliamentary democracy, Parliament was kept week, the parties were fragmented, and there was a row file level of mutual distrust. The Nazis built on the illiberal, anti-pluralist elements of Weimar's political culture. The Junker elites (the large landowners in the east) and senior civil servants, used their great power and influence well into the twentieth century to frustrate any movement toward democracy. They played an especially negative role in the crisis of 1930-1933. The emphasis by ] on military force amplified the voice of the officer corps, which combined advanced modernization of military technology with reactionary politics. The rising upper-middle-class elites, in the business, financial, and professional worlds, tended to accept the values of the old traditional elites. The German Empire was for Hans-Ulrich Wehler a strange mixture of highly successful capitalist industrialization and socio-economic modernization on the one hand, and of surviving pre-industrial institutions, power relations and traditional cultures on the other. Wehler argues that it produced a high degree of internal tension, which led on the one hand to the suppression of socialists, Catholics, and reformers, and on the other hand to a highly aggressive foreign policy. For these reasons ] and his students emphasized Germany’s primary guilt for causing World War I.<ref>Jürgen Kocka, "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German 'Sonderweg.'" ''Journal of Contemporary History,'' Jan 1988, Vol. 23#1, pp 3-16 </ref>. |
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], a leader of the ] of social history, places the origins of Germany's path to disaster in the 1860s-1870s, when economic modernization took place, but political modernization did not happen and the old Prussian rural elite remained in firm control of the army, diplomacy and the civil service. Traditional, aristocratic, premodern society battled an emerging capitalist, bourgeois, modernizing society. Recognizing the importance of modernizing forces in industry and the economy and in the cultural realm, Wehler argues that reactionary traditionalism dominated the political hierarchy of power in Germany, as well as social mentalities and in class relations (Klassenhabitus). The catastrophic German politics between 1914 and 1945 are interpreted in terms of a delayed modernization of its political structures. At the core of Wehler's interpretation is his treatment of "the middle class" and "revolution," each of which was instrumental in shaping the 20th century. Wehler's examination of Nazi rule is shaped by his concept of "charismatic domination," which focuses heavily on Adolf Hitler.<ref>Wehler, ''Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Gründung der Beiden Deutschen Staaten 1914-1949'' (2003) is the fourth volume of his monumental history of German society. None of the series has yet been translated into English. A partial summary appears in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ''The German Empire, 1871-1918'' (1997)</ref> |
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The historiographical concept of a German Sonderweg has had a turbulent history. Nineteenth century scholars who emphasized a separate German path to modernity saw it as a positive factor that differentiated Germany from the "western path" typified by Great Britain. The stressed the strong bureaucratic state, reforms initiated by Bismarck and other strong leaders, the Prussian service ethos, the high culture of philosophy and music, and Germany's pioneering of a social welfare state. In the 1950s, historians in West German argued that the Sonderweg lead Germany to the disaster of 1933-1945. The special circumstances of German historical structures and experiences, were interpreted as preconditions that, while not directly causing National Socialism, did hamper the development of a liberal democracy and facilitate the rise of fascism. The Sonderweg paradigm has provided the impetus for at least three strands of research in German historiography: the "long nineteenth century", the history of the bourgeoisie, and comparisons with the West. After 1990, increased attention to cultural dimensions and to comparative and relational history moved German historiography to different topics, with much less attention paid to the Sonderweg. While some historians have abandoned the Sonderweg thesis, they have not provided a generally accepted alternative interpretation.<ref>Helmut Walser Smith, "When the Sonderweg Debate Left Us," ''German Studies Review,'' May 2008, Vol. 31#2 pp 225-240</ref> |
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===19th century France=== |
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In his seminal book ''Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1880–1914'' (1976), historian ] traced the modernization of French villages and argued that rural France went from backward and isolated to modern and possessing a sense of French nationhood during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<ref>Joseph A. Amato, "Eugen Weber's France" ''Journal of Social History,'' Volume 25, 1992 pp 879–882.</ref> He emphasized the roles of railroads, republican schools, and universal military conscription. He based his findings on school records, migration patterns, military service documents and economic trends. Weber argued that until 1900 or so a sense of French nationhood was weak in the provinces. Weber then looked at how the policies of the Third Republic created a sense of French nationality in rural areas.<ref>Eugen Weber, "The Second Republic, Politics, and the Peasant," ''French Historical Studies'' Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 521-550 </ref> The book was widely praised, but was criticized by some<ref>Ted W. Margadant, "French Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: A Review Essay," ''Agricultural History,'' Summer 1979, Vol. 53 Issue 3, pp 644-651 </ref> who argued that a sense of Frenchness existed in the provinces before 1870. |
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===Asia=== |
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Many studies of modernization have focused on the history of Japan in the late 19th century<ref> Shuzo Teruoka, ed. ''Agriculture in the Modernization of Japan, 1850-2000'' (2008); Cyril Black, ''The Modernization of Japan and Russia'' (1975) </ref>, and China and India in the late 20th century<ref>Russell H. Jeffries, ''China's Agricultural Modernization'' (2009); June Grasso, Jay Cornin, and Michael Kort, ''Modernization and Revolution in China: From the Opium Wars to the Olympics'' (2009) </ref>. For example, the process of borrowing science and technology from the West has been explored. |
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====Korea==== |
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Modernizers in Korea in the late 19th century were torn between the American and the Japanese models. Most of the Koreans involved were educated Christians who saw America as their ideal model of civilization. However, most used Japan as a practical model - as an example of how a fellow East Asian country, which 30 years before was also backward, could succeed in civilizing itself. At the same time, reformists' nationalist reaction against the domineering, colonial behavior of the Japanese in Korea often took the form of an appeal to international (Western) standards of civilization. The Western-oriented worldview of the early Christian nationalist reformers was complex, multilayered, and often self-contradictory - with 'oppressive' features not easily distinguishable from 'liberational' ones. Their idealized image of the West as the only true, ideal civilization relegated much of Korea's traditional culture to a position of 'barbarism'.<ref>Vladimir Tikhonov, "The 1890s Korean Reformers' View of Japan - a Menacing Model?" ''International Journal of Asian Studies'' 2005 2(1): 57-81. </ref> |
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The self-image of Koreans was formed through complex relationships with modernity, colonialism, Christianity, and nationalism. This formation was initiated by a change in the notion of 'civilization' due to the transformation of 'international society' and thereafter was affected by the trauma of Japanese colonization. Through the process of transition from a traditional Confucian notion of civilization to a Western notion of acceptance and resistance, Koreans shaped their civilization as well as their notions of the racial, cultural, and individual modern self. Western Orientalism, in particular, accompanied the introduction of the Western notion of civilization, which served as the background for forming the self-identity of Koreans. The fact that the Japanese version of ] emerged from the domination of Korea by Japan played a critical role in shaping the self-identity of Koreans. Consequently, Korea still maintains an inferiority complex toward Western culture, ambivalent feelings toward Japanese culture, and biased - positive or negative - views of their own cultural traditions. Thus both modernization and colonization have shaped the formation or distortion of self-consciousness of non-Western peoples.<ref>Yong-hwa Chung, "The Modern Transformation of Korean Identity: Enlightenment and Orientalism," ''Korea Journal'' 2006 46(1): 109-138 </ref> |
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The US launched a decades-long intensive development starting in 1945 to modernize South Korea, with the goal of helping it become a model nation-state and an economic success. Agents of modernization at work in Korea included the US Army, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency, and a number of nongovernmental organizations, among them the Presbyterian Church, the ], Boy Scouts and the ]. Many Koreans migrated to California and Hawaii, and brought back firsthand accounts of modern business and governmental practices that they sought to adapt to Korean conditions.<ref> David Ekbladh, "How to Build a Nation," ''Wilson Quarterly'' 2004 28(1): 12-20.</ref> |
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===Middle East=== |
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====Turkey==== |
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Turkey, under ] in the 1920s and 1930s, engaged in a systematic modernization program ]. Hundreds of European scholars came to help. Together with Turkish intellectuals they developed a successful model of development.<ref>Craig C. Hansen, "Are We Doing Theory Ethnocentrically? A Comparison of Modernization Theory and Kemalism," ''Journal of Developing Societies'' (0169796X), 1989, Vol. 5 Issue 2, pp 175-187</ref><ref> Murat Ergin, "Cultural encounters in the social sciences and humanities: western émigré scholars in Turkey," ''History of the Human Sciences,'' Feb 2009, Vol. 22 Issue 1, pp 105-130</ref><ref> Arnold Reisman, ''Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision'' (2006)</ref><ref> Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds. ''Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey'' (1964).</ref> |
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===Latin America=== |
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Since independence, modernization has been a driving force for Chile's political elites. Ree (2007) analyzes projects of modernization that have been implemented from above since 1964. Despite their ideological differences and very different understandings of what modernity is, these projects shared key characteristics in their construction and implementation, such as the use of developmental theories, their state-orientation, the prominent role of technocrats and state-planning, and the capacity of adaptation in sight of civil unrest. These projects have produced patterns of modernity that have proven to be particularly stable.<ref>Gerard Van Der Ree, "Modernisation in Chile: from the 'Revolution in Liberty' to 'Growth with Equity'," ''Bicentenario: Revista De Historia De Chile Y America'' 2007 6(2): 39-69 </ref> |
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==Democracy== |
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Scholars have long argued that democracy follows modernization, perhaps with a time lag. As ] put it, "All the various aspects of economic development--industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education--are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy.<ref>Seymour Martin Lipset, ''Political Man'' (1963), p. 41. The argument also appears in Walt W. Rostow, ''Politics and the Stages of Growth'' (1971); A. F. K. Organski, ''The Stages of Political Development'' (1965); and David Apter, ''The Politics of Modernization'' (1965)</ref> In the 1960s some critics said the link each was too much based on European history, neglecting the Third World.<ref> Andre Gunder Frank, ''Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution'' (1969)</ref> Recent demonstrations of the emergency the emergence of democracy in South Korea, Taiwan and South Africa have tended to bolster the thesis. |
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The historical problem case has always been ], in which economic modernization in the 19th century came long before the move to democracy after 1918. Berman, however, concludes that a process of democratization was underway in Imperial Germany, for "during these years Germans developed many of the habits and mores that are now thought by political scientists to augur healthy political development."<ref>Sheri E. Berman, "Modernization in Historical Perspective: The Case of Imperial Germany," ''World Politics'' v.53#3 (2001) 431-462 quote at p 456</ref>. |
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Inglehart, and Welzel (2009) contend that the realization of democracy is not based solely on an expressed desire for that form of government, but that democracies are born as a result of the admixture of certain social and cultural factors. They argue the ideal social and cultural conditions for the foundation of a democracy are born of significant modernization and economic development that result in mass political participation.<ref> Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "How Development Leads to Democracy," ''Foreign Affairs'' Mar/Apr2009, Vol. 88 Issue 2, pp 33-48</ref> |
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Peerenboom (2008) explores the relationships among democracy, the rule of law and their relationship to wealth by pointing to |
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examples of Asian countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, that have successfully democratized only after economic growth reached relatively high levels and to examples of countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and India that sought to democratize at lower levels of wealth but have not done as well. <ref>Randall Peerenboom, ''China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?'' (2008) p, 63. He suggests China will grant democracy human rights when it is as modern and as rich as the West per capita.</ref> |
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] and others have challenged Lipset argument. They say political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of gross domestic product per capita remain democratic. Epstein et al. (2006) retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way, rather than dichotomous, classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski, this study finds that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. Partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.<ref>David L. Epstein, et al., "Democratic Transitions," ''American Journal of Political Science'' 2006 50(3): 551-569 </ref> |
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Highly contentious is the idea that modernization implies more human rights, with China in the 21st century being a major test case. |
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==Criticism== |
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Modernization theory has been criticized, mainly because it conflated modernization with ].<ref name="brugger 1-3" /> In this model, the modernization of a society required the destruction of the indigenous ] and its replacement by a more Westernized one. Technically ''modernity'' simply refers to the present, and any society still in existence is therefore modern. Proponents of modernization typically view only Western society as being truly modern arguing that others are primitive or unevolved by comparison. This view sees unmodernized societies as inferior even if they have the same standard of living as western societies. Opponents of this view argue that modernity is independent of culture and can be adapted to any society. Japan is cited as an example by both sides. Some see it as proof that a thoroughly modern way of life can exist in a non-western society. Others argue that ] has become distinctly more western as a result of its modernization. In addition, this view is accused of being ],<ref name="brugger 1-3" /><ref name="dixon 1-4" /> as modernization began in Europe with the ], the ] and the ],<ref name="dixon 1-4" /><ref name="Macionis 953" /> and has long been regarded as reaching its most advanced stage in Europe (by Europeans), and in Europe overseas (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc).<ref name="dixon 1-4" /> Anthropologists typically make their criticism one step further generalized and say that this view is ], not being specific to Europe, but Western culture in general.<ref name="brugger 1-3" /> |
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==See also== |
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* ], on German history |
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* ] |
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* ] |
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* ] |
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* ] |
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* ], on U.S. in early 20th century |
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* ] |
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==Bibliography== |
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* {{cite journal|last=Bernstein|first=H.|date=1971|title=Modernization theory and the sociological study of development|journal=Journal of Development Studies}} |
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* ], ed. ''Islam in China, Hui and Uyghurs: between modernization and sinicization'' (Bangkok, White Lotus Press, 2004) ISBN 9744800623 |
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* Black, Cyril. ''The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History'' (1966) |
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* Black, Cyril. ''The Modernization of Japan and Russia'' (1975) |
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* Blokland, Hans, and Nancy Smyth Van Weesep, eds. ''Modernization and Its Political Consequences: Weber, Mannheim, and Schumpeter'' (2006) |
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* Brown, Richard D. ''Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600-1865'' (1976) |
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* Brown, Richard D. "Modernization and the Modern Personality in Early America, 1600-1865: A Sketch of a Synthesis" ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History'' (1972 Win) 2:201-28 |
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* {{cite book|last=Brugger|first=Bill|coauthors=Kate Hannan|title=Modernization and revolution|publisher=Routledge|date=1983|isbn=0709906951}} |
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* Chin, Carol C. ''Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919'' (Kent State University Press; 2011) 160 pages; An intellectual history of American, Chinese, and Japanese views of modernity. |
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* {{cite book|last=Dixon|first=Simon M.|title=The modernisation of Russia, 1676-1825|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=1999|isbn=052137961X}} |
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* Eisenstadt, S. N. ed. ''The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View'' (1968) |
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* {{cite journal|last=Gavrov|first=Sergey|date=2005|title=The phenomenon of modernization|journal=Filozofia bliższa życiu: Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania in Warsaw|isbn=8388953761}} |
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* Gilman, Nils. ''Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America'' (2003). 329 pp |
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* Hua, Shiping, and Yang Zhong, eds. ''Political Civilization And Modernization in China: The Poltical Context of China's Transformation'' (2006) |
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* Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. ''Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence'' (2005) , euses comparative political science; emphasizes importance of having a modern personality |
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* Jensen, Richard. ''Illinois: A History'' (2001), modernizers, traditionalists and post-moderns make state history |
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* Jensen, Richard. "On Modernizing Frederick Jackson Turner: The Historiography of Regionalism" ''Western History Quarterly'' (1980) 11:307-22 |
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* {{cite book|last=Khan|first=Joel S.|title=Modernity and exclusion|publisher=SAGE|date=2001|isbn=0761966579}} |
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* {{cite journal|last=Leroy|first=Peter|coauthors=Jan van Tatenhove|date=2000|title=Political modernization theory and environmental politics|journal=Environment and Global Modernity}} |
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* Lipsett, Seymour Martin, ed. ''The Encyclopedia of Democracy'' (4 vol. 1996) |
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* {{cite book|last=Macionis|first=John J.|coauthors=Ken Plummer|title=Sociology|publisher=Pearson Education|date=2008|edition=4th|isbn=0132051583}} |
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* McGuigan, Jim. ''Modernity and postmodern culture'' (2006) 200 pages |
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* Marshall, T.H., and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. ''Class, Citizenship, and Social Development'' (1965) |
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* Mazlish, Bruce. ''Conceptualizing Global History.'' Westview Press, 1993. |
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* Misa, Thomas J., Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, eds. ''Modernity and Technology'' (MIT 2004) interdisciplary approaches |
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* Rodgers, Daniel T. "Tradition, Modernity, and the American Industrial Worker: Reflections and Critique," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History'' 1977 Spring 7:655-81 |
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* So, Alvin Y. ''Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories'' (1990) 288pp textbook |
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* Tipps, Dean C. "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective" ''Comparative Studies in Society and History'' (1973) 15:199-226 influential criticism |
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==Notes== |
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