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| ]The '''South Thailand insurgency''' is a ] campaign centered in the ], three southern provinces of ], with violence increasingly spilling over into neighbouring provinces and threatening to extend up to the national capital in ]. A long series of conflicts has resulted in over 1200 deaths in the past decade, with more than 1000 occurring since an escalation of violence in January of 2004. In July of 2005 the ], ], assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the insurgency. In September 2006, Army Commander ] was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat the unrest.<ref> China Economic Net</ref> | |||
| ==Background== | |||
| The Kingdom of ] exercised a loose sovereignty over the northern part of the ], including the Malay Sultanates of ], ], ], ] and ], from the 16th century (see ]). In 1902, Pattani was formally annexed by Siam. Seven years later, under the ], the ] colonial administration in ] forced the King of Siam to cede sovereignty over all of these except Pattani to Britain, while the British recognized Siamese sovereignty over Pattani, which became a ] (region) of Siam. In 1933 the monthon was divided into the provinces of ], ] and ]. | |||
| During the 20th century the area was, to some extent, assimilated into Thai society. Most people acquired Thai names, and there was substantial Thai Buddhist settlement in the area. Today Thai is the language of the government and of business; most southerners speak and understand Thai. But some 2.6 million people in the three provinces, as well as some districts in ] province, still speak Malay as their first language, and have remained ]s despite considerable Buddhist missionary efforts. Over 80% of the population in ], ] and ] continue to adhere to ]. However, the Pattani Malays have little sense of connection with the Malays of modern ], and they speak a distinct local version of the language known as ]. | |||
| There has been a separatist movement in Pattani since at least the 1930s, but under successive Thai military regimes it was firmly suppressed. During ], when Thailand under the nationalist regime of Field Marshal ] was an ally of Japan, ], a prominent Pattani leader who was the son of the last Raja of Pattani, allied himself with the British in the hopes that should the allies win, Pattani would be granted independence after the war. After the war, there was an attempt to establish a "Greater Malay Pattani State" (Negara Melayu Patani Raya), but the British gave this movement no support and hopes of an independent Pattani were shattered. | |||
| In the late 1940s when the Phibun regime tried to impose Thai-language education on the area the Pattani leader ] (who had supported the Japanese during the war as a rival to the pro-British Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin), wanted cultural autonomy but not independence. He was imprisoned in 1948 and killed by the police shortly after his release in 1952. There was then little overt secessionist agitation until the ] of Thai politics in the 1980s, but separatist groups such as the ] (Barasan Revolusi Nasional, BRN) survived and maintained a base of support. | |||
| Renewed agitation began in the 1990s, led by Malay intellectuals influenced by revolutionary and ] ideas from the ]. The BRN split into three rival factions, of which the most militant were the BRN Coordinate and the BRN Congress. The BRN Congress is now regarded as the most active group, but there are several others, and competition between these militant groups has helped fuel the insurgency. It is believed that there is now a co-ordinating body called the ] (Dewan Pembabasan Pattani or PULO), although little is known about the composition or leadership of the various groups. | |||
| PULO's platform is highlighted by its Islamic nationalist goals, calling the Thai presence in Pattani "a ]" and an "illegal occupation." Its stated aims are to secede from Thailand through military and political means, and to create a state named Patani Darul Makrif (Pattani, Land of Good deeds). The PULO flag has four red and white stripes and a blue rectangle on the upper left with a crescent and a star similar to other Malaysian Malay states | |||
| ==The current insurgency== | |||
| ===Causes of the insurgency=== | |||
| ] | |||
| A resurgence in violence by Pattani separatist groups began in 2001. Some experts have suggested this occurred under the influence of foreign Islamist groups such as ] and ], though such connections have never been fully substantiated and remain highly contentious. Some reports suggest that a number of Pattani Muslims have received training at al-Qaida centres in ], though many experts believe, to the contrary, that the Pattani separatism has little or nothing to do with global jihadism. Others have claimed that the Pattani insurgents have forged links with groups such as the religious-nationalist ] in the ] and the quasi-secular ] (GAM) in ]. | |||
| At first the government blamed the attacks on "bandits," and indeed many outside observers believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries do play some part in the violence in the region. As recently as July of 2002 in the wake of over 14 policemen dying in separate attacks since the beginning of the year, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra publicly denied the role of religion in the attacks, when quoted as saying he did not ''"think religion was the cause of the problems down there because several of the policemen killed were Muslim"'' . Interior Minister ] attributed the attacks on the police to the issue of drug control, as the ''"police are making serious efforts to make arrests over drugs trafficking."'' | |||
| In 2002, Shinawatra stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits." By 2004 he had reversed his position, and has come to regard the insurgency as the local front in the global ]. ] was instituted in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in January of 2004], and violence increased, with 200 Muslims killed by troops during the year. In April, troops killed over 100 Muslim men in Yala province who attacked well-defended police stations with only light weapons, in what police described as "suicidal" attacks. | |||
| In 2005, Bangkok Senator ] accused the ] of being the mastermind behind bombings in Hat Yai. His accusation was supported by Perayot Rahimmula, Democrat MP and professor at Prince of Songkhla University (Pattani campus).<ref>{{th icon}} Matichon, , 7 April 2005</ref><!--This reference is in Thai. Please replace it with an English reference when one becomes available--> | |||
| In 2006, Thai Army chief ] suggested that former ] might be playing a role in the unrest.<ref></ref> Governors of the southern provinces showed some skepticism over his suggestion, but investigated the connection. | |||
| A striking aspect of the South Thailand insurgency is the anonymity of the people behind it and the absence of concrete demands. Thailand had held relatively free elections in February of 2005, and no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. Although requests of cultural and religious freedom and the right to use the Yawi language has been presented numerous times. In July, the chairman of the ] was quoted as saying, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them." | |||
| ===Escalation of violence=== | |||
| Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military, schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region were burned. Local ] of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 insurgency-related incidents in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat . | |||
| While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, this quickly escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups who subsequently flee with stolen arms and ammunition. In 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel. In 2003, officials counted 119 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces. | |||
| On ], ], unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in ] in the early morning, and made off with over 100 rifles and other ammunition. In the midst of doing so, all four senior-ranking soldiers guarding the installation were murdered. This incident quickly escalated into large scale violence, with insurgents killing 600 people in a series of bombings and shootings aimed mainly at the police and the military, but also many civilians. Some bombings were directed at non-Muslim Thai residents of the area, leading to an exodus which has damaged the regional economy and increased its isolation from the rest of Thailand. | |||
| The Thai response to the insurgency was hampered by a lack of training in counter-insurgency methods, lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local police are involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. The army responded to insurgent attacks with heavy-handed raids on Muslim villages, which only resulted in reprisals. Insurgents provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace. | |||
| Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 ] said that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Some Thai analysts believe that foreign Islamist groups are infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims are balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict. | |||
| The insurgency escalated, with a ] in ] on ], ], and a major attack being launched on the provincial capital of ] in July. In response, Thaksin issued a decree giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend ], and ] the press. This action sparked protests from liberal sections of the Thai media and opposition parties. | |||
| In 2005, 131 civilians from the south fled to neighbouring Malaysia seeking refuge from the Thai authorities. Thailand immediatly accused the refugees of being insurgents (even though women and children were in the group) and demanded that they be returned, sparking a diplomatic spat. Currently, the people are still in Malaysia. | |||
| On June 15, 2006, during the ] to the Thai throne, well coordinated bomb-attacks against at least 40 government and official buildings occurred. Two police officials died and 11 others were injured. Experts say that the bomb attacks were a message to the Thai authorities, rather than an attempt to do real damage, as the bombs were loaded with small amounts of explosives. Had the devices been larger, the casualties and injuries would have been notably greater. The Thai media was late in reporting the incident, and only did so after the ] and other international broadcasters announced it. | |||
| ==Massacre at Krue Sae Mosque== | |||
| On ] ], more than 100 militants carried out attacks against 10 police outposts across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces in southern Thailand.<ref></ref> 32 insurgents retreated to the ], the holiest ] in Pattani. | |||
| General ], commander of the ] and Deputy Director of the ] was the most senior Army commander on the scene. After a tense seven hour stand-off, Pallop Pinmanee, the most senior Army commander on the scene, ordered an all out assault on the mosque. All the insurgents were killed. He later noted that "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them."<ref></ref> | |||
| It was later revealed that Pallop's order to storm the mosque contravened a direct order by Defense Minister ] to seek a peaceful resolution to the stand-off no matter how long it took.<ref></ref> Pallop was immediately ordered out of the area, and later tendered his resignation as commander of the ]. The forward command of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which Pallop headed, was also dissolved. A government investigative commission later found that the security forces had over-reacted. The ] questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. In 3 May 2004 during a Senate hearing, Senator ], noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque were shot in the head and there were traces that rope had been tied around their wrists. | |||
| The incident resulted in a personal conflict between Pallop and Defense Minister ], who was also director of the ISOC.<ref></ref> Pallop later demanded that the Defense Minister stop any involvement in the management of the southern insurgency.<ref></ref> | |||
| ==The Tak Bai incident== | |||
| In October of 2004 the town of ] in ] province saw the most publicized incident of the ]. Six local men were arrested of having supplied weapons to ]. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used ] and ]s on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed. | |||
| Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to an army camp in the next province of ]. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination three hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had suffocated to death. | |||
| This incident sparked widespread protests across the south, and indeed across ], since many non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army's behaviour. ], however, gave the army his full support, and no-one has been charged with any offence in relation to the Tak Bai incident. His first response was to defend the army's actions, saying that the 78 men died "because they were already weak from fasting during the month of ]." | |||
| ==National Reconciliation Commission== | |||
| On March 2005, respected former Prime Minister ] was appointed as chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, tasked with overseeing that peace is brought back to the South. A fierce critic of the ]-government, Anand frequently criticized the handling of the southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis." Unfortunately, the situation to deteriorated from 2005 to 2006, with escalating violence, especially among teachers and civilians. Despite much criticism of the Thaksin-government's policies, Anand refused to submit the NRC's final report, choosing instead to wait for the results of the 2006 legislative election . | |||
| Anand finally submitted the NRC's recommendations on 5 June 2006 . Among them were | |||
| *Introducing ] | |||
| *Making ethnic ] as a working language in the region | |||
| *Establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force | |||
| *Establishing a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern Border Provinces | |||
| The Thaksin government vowed to implement the recommendations. However, the recommendations were vigorously opposed by ], the President of King ]'s Privy Council, who stated "We cannot accept that as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai... We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language" . | |||
| ==Negotiation attempts== | |||
| Attempts to negotiate with insurgents were hampered by the anonymity of the insurgency's leaders. | |||
| In May 2004, ], exiled leader of ] (an umbrella organization for the PULO, New PULO, and the BRN) and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the separatist movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the Government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state.<ref>DPA, , 25 May 2006</ref><ref name="Overplayed">The Nation, , 26 May 2004</ref> | |||
| The government initially welcomed the request to negotiate. However, the government response was severely criticized as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points."<ref name="Overplayed" /> But when it became apparent that, despite his softened demand for limited autonomy, ] had no influence over the the violence, the negotiations were cancelled.<ref name="Overplayed" /> The government then began a policy of not attempting to officially negotiate with the insurgents.<ref name="PraiseNegotiation">The Nation, , 7 September 2006</ref> | |||
| After being appointed Army Commander in 2005, General ] expressed confidence that he could resolve the insurgency. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed and will carry out their duties."<ref name=INFORM> SOBAKA</ref> | |||
| On 1 September 2006, a day after 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in ], Sonthi announced that he would break with the government no-negotiation policy. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."<ref name=NEGOTIATE> The Nation</ref> In a press conference the next day, he attacked the government for criticizing him for trying to negotiate with the anonymous insurgents, and demanded that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."<ref>The Bangkok Post, </ref><!--Specifically, he appeared to be responding to Interior Minister Kongsak, who "said those who have responded to Sonthi's idea (meaning PULO) have nothing to do with the situation in the South but are only seeking to raise their status.", source: --> His confrontation with the government made his call for negotiation extremely popular with the media.<ref name="PraiseNegotiation" /> Afterwards, insurgents bombed ] in ] city, which up until then had been free of insurgent activities. As always, the identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far South.<ref> China Economic Net</ref> By 19 September 2006 (after Sonthi overthrew the Thai government), the Army admitted that it was still unsure who to negotiate with.<ref name="NoIdea19Sep">The Bangkok Post, "Deep South: Army wants peace talks but unsure who with", 19 September 2006</ref> <!-- Specifically, the Post article says Army intel units "still know nothing much about the southern separatist movements and their members."--> | |||
| ==Recent attacks and responses== | |||
| A massive security presence in the region has failed to stem almost daily violence, usually involving drive-by shootings or small bombings. When the insurgents make a show of strength — generally at least every few months — they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces. | |||
| * On ], ], the ] of Thailand said that there had been more than 700 casualties in south Thailand since the unrest began in January. Many murders involved shooting and ]. | |||
| * During ] there were at least 15 cases where ] have been beheaded. , , | |||
| * ]. A series of three bombings on April 3, 2005 kill two people leave 66 injured. | |||
| * On ], 2005, the Thai Prime Minister enacted the "emergency powers law" in order to manage the three troubled states. Several human rights organizations and local press have expressed their concerns that these new powers might be used to violate civil liberty rights. However, the emergency decree was highly popular, with 72% of Bangkok residents and 86% of people in the three southern provinces supporting it. | |||
| * On ] 2005, three bombs exploded almost simultaneously. Subsequently, as many as 131 Thais crossed into Malaysia to seek refuge. Thailand, suspecting that insurgents may also have fled with the refugees, has asked Malaysia to return these Thai citizens but Malaysia has refused on humanitarian grounds. | |||
| * On ] ], four suspected militants fatally shoot two border-]men in the back at a crowded weekend market in ]. Three others were also killed in separate attacks on the same day . | |||
| * On ] ], mass graves were found in southern Thailand | |||
| * On ] ], 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in ] province, killing a retired military officer and wounding 24 people. Afterwards, Army chief ] announced that he would break with government policy and negotiate with the leaders of the insurgency. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with." In a press conference the next day, he slammed the government for political interference, and asked that the government "Free the military and let it do the job." By 16 September 2006, the Army admitted that it still wasn't sure who to negotiate with.<ref>The Bangkok Post, , 19 September 2006</ref> | |||
| * ]. On ] ], six remotely detonated motorcycle bombs simultaneously exploded in the city of ], killing four people and wounding more than sixty. A Canadian and a Malaysian were among the dead. | |||
| As of ] ], more than 1,400 people have died in less than three years of southern violence. Most have been innocent bystanders; the majority have been Muslim. | |||
| ===After the September 2006 coup=== | |||
| A brief lull in the insurgency followed the ] that overthrew the government of Premier ]. As Army Commander ] settled into his role as head of the junta, violence resumed. | |||
| * On 21 September, 2 villagers were shot in Yala, killing one and wounding another.<ref>{{th icon}} Thai Rath, , 21 September 2006</ref> | |||
| * On 23 September, 4 policemen were injured in a bus stop explosion in Pattani. The bus stop was on a road that would be passed by the motorcade of Crown Prince ] later that afternoon.<ref>Thai Public Relations Department, , 23 September 2006</ref><!--Try to double check that date--><ref>The Nation, </ref> | |||
| * On 25 September, 2 police stations and a military outpost were attacked by 30 gunmen in a coordinated series of attacks in Yala, leaving 2 dead and 1 injured.<ref>The Nation, , 27 September 2006</ref> | |||
| * On 27 September, gunmen killed a grocer and two of his customers in Muang district of Yala and a traveller on the bus from Panare district to Mayo district of Pattani.<ref>The Bangkok Post, , 28 September 2006</ref> | |||
| * On 28 September. A teacher protection unit in Sungai Padi district of Narathiwat province was ambushed by a bomb attack, causing 5 soldiers to be seriously injured. One soldier was reported by MCOT Channel 3 television to have died at the district hospital.<ref>http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/read.php?newsid=30014867 </ref> | |||
| {{wikinewscat|South Thailand insurgency}} | |||
| ==Notes== | |||
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| == See also == | |||
| *] | |||
| *] | |||
| == Sources == | |||
| *David K Wyatt, ''Thailand: A Short History'' (Yale University Press, 2003) | |||
| *Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, ''Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand'' (Silkworm Books, 2004) | |||
| *Nirmal Ghosh, "Mystery group runs insurgency in Thai south," ''Straits Times'', 25 July 2005 | |||
| * "Tak Bai victims and relatives file lawsuits" ''The Bangkok Post'', 23 October 2005 | |||
| == External links == | |||
| Note: Some of these websites have been censored for Thailand internet users by ], under orders from the Thailand Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) . | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| * - A page dedicated to collect news about the conflict | |||
| * Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 14 September 2006 | |||
| *"Thailand: Another Official Slain as Souther Violence Continues." Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, November 25, 2005. | |||
| {{Thailand crisis 2005-2006}} | |||
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