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The main Polish resistance organization was the ] (''Armia Krajowa'', or ''AK''), numbering some 400,000 Poles, including ].<ref name="Piotrowski 1998" />{{page needed|date=April 2018}} The Home Army actively fought the Germans through out the war. In one instance however, in 1944, the Germans clandestinely armed a few ''AK'' units operating in the ] area in the hope that they would act against local ]; soon, during ], the ''AK'' turned these weapons against the Germans.<ref name="bubnys">{{cite book|last=Bubnys|first=Arūnas|authorlink=Arūnas Bubnys|title=Vokiečių okupuota Lietuva (1941-1944)|publisher=]|year=1998| location=Vilnius|pages=|isbn=9986-757-12-6}}</ref><ref name="zizas19421944">{{lt icon}} Rimantas Zizas. ''Armijos Krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944 metais'' (Acitivies of Armia Krajowa in Lithuania in 1942–1944). Armija Krajova Lietuvoje, pp. 14–39. A. Bubnys, K. Garšva, E. Gečiauskas, J. Lebionka, J. Saudargienė, R. Zizas (editors). Vilnius – Kaunas, 1995.</ref> Such arrangements were purely tactical and did not evince the kind of ideological collaboration shown by France's ] or Norway's ].{{citation needed|date=April 2018}} The Poles' main motive was to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and to acquire much-needed equipment.<ref name="Radzilowski">Review by ] of ]'s '']'', '']'', vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1999), City University of New York.</ref> Further, most such collaboration by local commanders with the Germans was condemned by ''AK'' headquarters. There were no known joint German-''AK'' operations, and the Germans were unsuccessful in getting the Poles to exclusively fight the Soviet partisans. In his book sociologist and historian ] quoted ] as saying that "The Polish Home Army was, by and large, untainted by collaboration" and adds that "the honor of the AK as a whole beyond reproach."{{r|Piotrowski 1998|p=90}} The main Polish resistance organization was the ] (''Armia Krajowa'', or ''AK''), numbering some 400,000 Poles, including ].<ref name="Piotrowski 1998" />{{page needed|date=April 2018}} The Home Army actively fought the Germans through out the war. In one instance however, in 1944, the Germans clandestinely armed a few ''AK'' units operating in the ] area in the hope that they would act against local ]; soon, during ], the ''AK'' turned these weapons against the Germans.<ref name="bubnys">{{cite book|last=Bubnys|first=Arūnas|authorlink=Arūnas Bubnys|title=Vokiečių okupuota Lietuva (1941-1944)|publisher=]|year=1998| location=Vilnius|pages=|isbn=9986-757-12-6}}</ref><ref name="zizas19421944">{{lt icon}} Rimantas Zizas. ''Armijos Krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944 metais'' (Acitivies of Armia Krajowa in Lithuania in 1942–1944). Armija Krajova Lietuvoje, pp. 14–39. A. Bubnys, K. Garšva, E. Gečiauskas, J. Lebionka, J. Saudargienė, R. Zizas (editors). Vilnius – Kaunas, 1995.</ref> Such arrangements were purely tactical and did not evince the kind of ideological collaboration shown by France's ] or Norway's ].{{citation needed|date=April 2018}} The Poles' main motive was to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and to acquire much-needed equipment.<ref name="Radzilowski">Review by ] of ]'s '']'', '']'', vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1999), City University of New York.</ref> Further, most such collaboration by local commanders with the Germans was condemned by ''AK'' headquarters. There were no known joint German-''AK'' operations, and the Germans were unsuccessful in getting the Poles to exclusively fight the Soviet partisans. In his book sociologist and historian ] quoted ] as saying that "The Polish Home Army was, by and large, untainted by collaboration" and adds that "the honor of the AK as a whole beyond reproach."{{r|Piotrowski 1998|p=90}}


A single partisan unit of the Polish right-wing ] (''Narodowe Siły Zbrojne'', or ''NSZ''), the ], numbering between 800 and 1,500 resistance fighter, decided to tacitly cooperate with the Germans in late 1944.<ref name="Publicznej 2007">{{cite book|author=Instytut Pamięci Narodowej--Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Biuro Edukacji Publicznej|title=Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U4gjAQAAIAAJ|year=2007|publisher=Instytut|page=73}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=LPYnAQAAIAAJ&q=brygada+swietokrzyska |title=The Polish Studies Newsletter|last=Wozniak|first=Albion|date=2003|publisher=Albin Wozniak|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=QHk7HAAACAAJ |title=Brygada Świętokrzyska NSZ|last=Żebrowski|first=Leszek|date=1994|publisher=Gazeta Handlowa|language=pl}}</ref> It ceased hostile operations against the Germans for a few months, accepted logistical help, and—late in the war, with German approval, to avoid capture by the Soviets—withdrew from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the ] concentration camp.<ref name="underground">Stefan Korbonski, "The Polish Underground State", pg. 7</ref> The brigade did not accept Jews, and on occasion killed or captured ] and denounced them to the Germans.{{r|Cooper 2000|p=149|q=The NSZ did not accept Jews into its ranks, and units of the NSZ were constantly on the lookout for Jews hiding in the forests. The NSZ was also responsible for the killing in Warsaw of two officers of the High Command of the AK – Jerzy Makowiecki and Professor Ludwik Widerszal – both of Jewish origin. On 14 July 1944, two other members of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda of the High Command of the Home Army – Professor Marceli Handelsman and a well-known writer, Halina Krahelska – were abducted from their offices by the NSZ and delivered to the Germans.}} The Polish right-wing ] (''Narodowe Siły Zbrojne'', or ''NSZ'') did not accept Jews, and from time attacked or kidnapped ].{{r|Cooper 2000|p=149|q=The NSZ did not accept Jews into its ranks, and units of the NSZ were constantly on the lookout for Jews hiding in the forests. The NSZ was also responsible for the killing in Warsaw of two officers of the High Command of the AK – Jerzy Makowiecki and Professor Ludwik Widerszal – both of Jewish origin. On 14 July 1944, two other members of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda of the High Command of the Home Army – Professor Marceli Handelsman and a well-known writer, Halina Krahelska – were abducted from their offices by the NSZ and delivered to the Germans.}} The NSZ operated with the approval and occasional cooperation of the Germans.{{r|Cooper 2000|p=149|q=The operations of the NSZ had the tacit approval of the German military authorities and in many cases their full cooperation. There was in fact a silent understanding that as long as the NSZ did not engage in any acts of sabotage against the Germans, it would be allowed to operate against Jewish partisans. The area of operation of the NSZ was the district of Radom controlled by the Holy Cross Brigade. The operations by the NSZ were to be conducted under the old slogan of Judaeo-communism, which meant that every Jewish partisan was a communist and should be liquidated. It was in fact part of a war against the Jews who escaped death by the Germans. The collaboration of the NSZ with the Germans is confirmed by documents kept in German archives.}} The "]" of the NSZ, numbering 800-1,500 fighters, decided to cooperate with the Germans in late 1944.<ref name="Publicznej 2007">{{cite book|author=Instytut Pamięci Narodowej--Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Biuro Edukacji Publicznej|title=Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U4gjAQAAIAAJ|year=2007|publisher=Instytut|page=73}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=LPYnAQAAIAAJ&q=brygada+swietokrzyska |title=The Polish Studies Newsletter|last=Wozniak|first=Albion|date=2003|publisher=Albin Wozniak|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=QHk7HAAACAAJ |title=Brygada Świętokrzyska NSZ|last=Żebrowski|first=Leszek|date=1994|publisher=Gazeta Handlowa|language=pl}}</ref> It ceased hostile operations against the Germans for a few months, accepted logistical help, and—late in the war, with German approval, to avoid capture by the Soviets—withdrew from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the ] concentration camp.<ref name="underground">Stefan Korbonski, "The Polish Underground State", pg. 7</ref>


The Home Army did not consider Jews part of the "Polish nation",{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=This document brings out the fact that to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of "our nation" and that action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered its other objectives.}} and was reluctant to accept them to its ranks,{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Jews were not only not accepted in AK ranks but a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews... As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=Certainly the Home Army was not willing to absorb the Jewish partisan groups formed in the forests by fugitives from the ghettos, regarding them as unreliable and potentially communist in sympathy (there was one exception. In Volhynia, which was wracked by a brutal ethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, it was eager to cooperate with Jewish partisans to defend Polish villages.) The Home Army was also not very willing to accept Jews as individuals, though here too there were exceptions, such as the propaganda and information bureau of the High Command. It should also be emphasized that the Home Army, like the civilian underground, was made up of adherents of different political orientations, some of them sympathetic and others hostile to the Jews. In general, though, the Home Army tended to see individual Jewish fugitives as security risks that were likely to endanger its own position.}} or assist in preventing their genocide.{{r|Bauer 1989|q=As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|pp=65-66|q=The attitude of the military underground to the genocide is both more complex and more controversial... Its position was clearly set out on November 10, 1942, in an order of its commander-in-chief, General Stefan Rowecki: The Home Army did not consider Jews part of the "Polish nation",{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=This document brings out the fact that to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of "our nation" and that action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered its other objectives.}} and was reluctant to accept them to its ranks,{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Jews were not only not accepted in AK ranks but a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews... As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=Certainly the Home Army was not willing to absorb the Jewish partisan groups formed in the forests by fugitives from the ghettos, regarding them as unreliable and potentially communist in sympathy (there was one exception. In Volhynia, which was wracked by a brutal ethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, it was eager to cooperate with Jewish partisans to defend Polish villages.) The Home Army was also not very willing to accept Jews as individuals, though here too there were exceptions, such as the propaganda and information bureau of the High Command. It should also be emphasized that the Home Army, like the civilian underground, was made up of adherents of different political orientations, some of them sympathetic and others hostile to the Jews. In general, though, the Home Army tended to see individual Jewish fugitives as security risks that were likely to endanger its own position.}} or assist in preventing their genocide.{{r|Bauer 1989|q=As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|pp=65-66|q=The attitude of the military underground to the genocide is both more complex and more controversial... Its position was clearly set out on November 10, 1942, in an order of its commander-in-chief, General Stefan Rowecki:
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2. In the event that the Germans do indeed undertake such attempts, they will encounter our resistance. Irrespective of the scheduled timing of our uprising, the units under my command must proceed to armed struggle in defense of the life of the nation. In the course of this struggle, we shall switch from defense to attack, with the aim of undercutting the entire network of enemy lines to the Eastern front. This decision is mine and will be communicated to all ranks of the clandestine forces." 2. In the event that the Germans do indeed undertake such attempts, they will encounter our resistance. Irrespective of the scheduled timing of our uprising, the units under my command must proceed to armed struggle in defense of the life of the nation. In the course of this struggle, we shall switch from defense to attack, with the aim of undercutting the entire network of enemy lines to the Eastern front. This decision is mine and will be communicated to all ranks of the clandestine forces."


This document makes clear the principal lines of the Home Army's strategy. It also brings out the fact that to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of "our nation" and that action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered its other objectives.}} In addition, "a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews."{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Jews were not only not accepted in AK ranks but a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews... As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}} This was sometimes enabled by labeling them as "bandits".{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Orders were issued in 1943 by the AK to kill Jewish "bandits," who were supposedly robbing and otherwise endangering the Polish population.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=Local commanders and the High Command often referred to these people (and also to Communist partisans) as "bandits," an echo of the language used by the Nazis themselves.}}{{r|Connelly 2012|p=quote|q=Though she has not read recent studies of the fate of Jewish refugees, Kochanski does respond to earlier work by the Israeli historian Shmuel Krakowski on the Polish Home Army’s hunting down of Jewish partisans hiding in the forests. In tune with nationalist writers, she calls these partisans “Jewish bandits” and asserts that, by executing such alleged marauders, the AK “protected” the Polish population. And yet, if it had included Jews as part of the population to protect, the Polish underground would have fed those in hiding rather than hunt them down. In a sense, members of the AK were also bandits, dependent on the local population for provisions, taking by force what they could not obtain by consent. Why does Kochanski think that Polish Jewish partisans were a menace whereas Polish Christian partisans were not?}} This document makes clear the principal lines of the Home Army's strategy. It also brings out the fact that to the Home Army, the Jews were not a part of "our nation" and that action to defend them was not to be taken if it endangered its other objectives.}} In addition, "a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews."{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Jews were not only not accepted in AK ranks but a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews... As late as November 10, 1942 the AK command issued an order that "the time of our uprising has not yet come." It added that "the occupant is exterminating the Jews" and warned Poles not to be drawn into "premature" action against the Germans.|p=238}} This was sometimes enabled by labeling them as "bandits".{{r|Bauer 1989|q=Orders were issued in 1943 by the AK to kill Jewish "bandits," who were supposedly robbing and otherwise endangering the Polish population.|p=238}}{{r|Cesarani & Kavanaugh|p=66|q=Local commanders and the High Command often referred to these people (and also to Communist partisans) as "bandits," an echo of the language used by the Nazis themselves.}}{{r|Connelly 2012|p=quote|q=Though she has not read recent studies of the fate of Jewish refugees, Kochanski does respond to earlier work by the Israeli historian Shmuel Krakowski on the Polish Home Army’s hunting down of Jewish partisans hiding in the forests. In tune with nationalist writers, she calls these partisans “Jewish bandits” and asserts that, by executing such alleged marauders, the AK “protected” the Polish population. And yet, if it had included Jews as part of the population to protect, the Polish underground would have fed those in hiding rather than hunt them down. In a sense, members of the AK were also bandits, dependent on the local population for provisions, taking by force what they could not obtain by consent. Why does Kochanski think that Polish Jewish partisans were a menace whereas Polish Christian partisans were not?}} "In certain areas the AK posed a greater threat to Jewish partisans than the Nazis, as the AK’s familiarity with the local terrain and populace put their units in a better position to track down Jews."<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia| title = Jewish partisan| encyclopedia = Encyclopedia Britannica| accessdate = 2018-03-12| url = https://www.britannica.com/topic/Jewish-partisan}}</ref>


==The Holocaust== ==The Holocaust==

Revision as of 12:03, 22 April 2018

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Throughout World War II, from the first day of hostilities, Poland was an active member of the Allied coalition that fought Nazi Germany.

During the German occupation of Poland, some Polish citizens of diverse ethnicities collaborated with the Germans. Estimates of the number of collaborators vary considerably. The main collaborators were members of Poland's German minority. During and after the war, the Polish State and the Resistance movement executed collaborators.

Due to differences in Nazi Germany's aims in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, and due to Germany's historical Drang nach Osten ("Drive to the East") and lebensraum ("living space") policies, collaboration in Poland was much less widespread and institutionalized than in Western Europe. Compared to the situations in other German-occupied countries, collaboration in Poland was marginal. c

Background

Main articles: History of Poland (1939–1945) and Invasion of Poland

Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler sought to establish Poland as a client state, proposing a multilateral territorial exchange and an extension of the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Polish government, fearing subjugation to Nazi Germany, instead chose to form an alliance with Britain (and later with France). In response, Germany withdrew from the non-aggression pact and, shortly before invading Poland, signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Soviet Union, safeguarding Germany against Soviet retaliation if it invaded Poland, and prospectively dividing Poland between the two Totalitarian powers.

On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The German army quickly overran Polish defenses while inflicting heavy civilian losses, and by 13 September had conquered most of western Poland. On 17 September the Soviet Union invaded the country from the east, conquering most of eastern Poland, along with the Baltic states and parts of Finland. Some 140,000 Polish soldiers and airmen escaped to Romania and Hungary, and later many soon joining the Polish Armed Forces in France. Poland's government crossed over into Romania, later forming a government-in-exile in France and then in London, following the French capitulation. Poland as a polity never surrendered to the Germans.

Nazi authorities annexed the westernmost parts of Poland and the former Free City of Danzig, incorporating it directly to Nazi Germany, and placed the remaining German-occupied territory under the administration of the newly formed General Government. The Soviet Union annexed the rest of Poland, incorporating its territories into the Belorussian and Ukrainian republics. Germany’s primary aim in Eastern Europe was the expansion of the German "lebensraum" which necessitated according to Nazi views the elimination or deportation of all non-Germanic ethnicities, including Poles; the areas controlled by the General Government were to become "free" of Poles within 15–20 years. This resulted in harsh policies which targeted the Polish population, in addition to the explicit goal of exterminating the Jewish people, which was carried out by Nazi Germany in the occupied Polish territories.

Individual collaboration

German recruitment poster—"Let's do agricultural work in Germany: report immediately to your Vogt"

Estimates regarding the number of Polish collaborators vary from several thousand to about a million, depending on the one's definition of "collaboration". The main group of Polish citizens who activley collaborated with Nazi Germany were members of the German minority living in Poland, which before the war numbered approximately 741,000.

Historian Leszek Gondek estimates the number of Polish collaborators at about 17,000, relying on the number of death sentences for treason issued by Special Courts of the Polish Underground State, and describes the phenomena as "marginal". Also, historian John Connelly writes that "only a relatively small percentage of the Polish population engaged in activities that may be described as collaboration, when seen against the backdrop of European and world history." According to Gondek, the courts heard at least 5,000 collaboration cases and sentenced 3,500 (according to historian Czesław Madajczyk over 10,000) people to death for collaboration.

Prewar Poland had a population of over 35 million inhabitants, including over 3 million Polish Jews. Postwar statistics of the Israeli War Crimes Commission gave the number of Polish collaborators at around 7,000.

Varying interpretations of what constitutes collaboration account for the broad range of estimates of Poles' collaboration with the Germans in World War II. The higher collaboration estimates can include workers in slave-labor camps (Baudienst), low-ranking Polish bureaucrats, the Polish Blue Police, Poland's prewar German minority (former Polish citizens who declared themselves to be Volksdeutsche, and even all of Poland's peasants, whose agricultural produce fed the German military and administration. Polish labor-camp workers were sometimes used in rounding up Jews for transportation to ghettos, or to dig graves for massacre victims; evasion of such service was punishable by death, and the individual's family could suffer reprisals.

Ethnographic groups

Wacław Krzeptowski, prominent Goralenvolk collaborator, visiting German governor Hans Frank during a celebration held in honor of Hitler's birthday

The Germans also singled out, as potential collaborators, two ethnographic groups in Poland which had some limited separatist interests. The scheme was directed at the Kashubians in the north and the Gorals in the south. The German attempt to reach out to the Kashubians proved a "complete failure", but in the south the Germans met with limited success, and Katarzyna Szurmiak has called the resulting Goralenvolk movement "the most extensive case of collaboration in Poland during the Second World War." Still, Szurmiak writes, "when talking about numbers, the attempt to create Goralenvolk was a failure... a mere 18 percent of the population took up Goralian IDs... Goralian schools consistently boycotted, and... attempts to create Goralian police or a Goralian Waffen-SS Legion... failed miserably."

Political collaboration

Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborationist governments, in occupied Poland such efforts failed. The Germans had initially contemplated the creation of a collaborationist Polish cabinet to administer as a protectorate the German-occupied Polish territories that Germany did not annex outright. At the beginning of the war, German officials contacted several Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration, but the Poles refused the offers. A prominent peasant-party leader and former Prime Minister of Poland, Wincenty Witos, rejected several German offers to lead a puppet government, as did Janusz Radziwiłł and Stanisław Estreicher. The pro-German right-wing politician, Andrzej Świetlicki, formed a National Revolutionary Camp and approached the Germans with a collaboration offer but was ignored. Władysław Studnicki, an anti-Soviet publicist, and Leon Kozłowski, a prominent scholar and former Prime Minister, each favored Polish-German cooperation against the Soviet Union but was rejected by the Germans. Nazi racial policies and German plans for the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, militated against any Polish-German political collaboration. Further German efforts in that direction were precluded after April 1940, when Hitler banned negotiations concerning any degree of Polish autonomy. German plans envisioned the eventual complete disappearance of the Polish nation, which was to be replaced by German settlers.

During the 1940 German invasion of France, the French government suggested that Polish politicians in France negotiate an accommodation with Germany; and in Paris the prominent journalist Stanislaw Mackiewicz tried to get the Polish President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz to negotiate with the Germans, just as the France defenses were collapsing and German victory seemed inevitable. Three days later the Polish Government and the Polish National Council rejected discussing capitulation and declared that they would fight until full victory over Nazi Germany. A group of eight low-ranking Polish politicians and officers broke with the Polish Government and in Lisbon, Portugal addressed a memorandum to Germany, asking for discussions about restoring a Polish state under German occupation, which was rejected by the Germans. According to Czeslaw Madajczyk, in view of the low profile of the Poles involved and of Berlin's rejection of the memorandum, no political collaboration can be said to have taken place.. For his efforts, Mackiewicz was sentenced to death by the Polish resistance (but survived to return to Poland after the war).

Security forces

A German General Government poster requiring former Polish Police officers (Blue Police) to report for duty under the German Ordnungspolizei, or face "severe" punishment.

In October 1939, the Nazi authorities ordered the mobilization of pre-war Polish police, to serve under the command of the German Ordnungspolizei, thus creating the "Blue Police". The policemen were to report for duty by 10 November 1939 or face the death penalty. At its peak in May 1944, the Blue Police numbered some 17,000 men. Their primary task was to act as a regular police force dealing with criminal activities, but they were also used by the Germans in combating smuggling and resistance, rounding up random civilians (łapanka) for forced labor or for execution in reprisal for Polish resistance activities (e.g., the Polish underground's execution of Polish traitors or egregiously brutal Germans), patrolling for Jewish ghetto escapees, and in support of military operations against the Polish resistance.

The German General Government also tried to create additional Polish auxiliary police—Schutzmannschaft Battalion 202 in 1942 and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 in 1943. Very few people volunteered and the Germans were forced to forcefully conscript them to fill up the ranks. Subsequently, most of the men deserted, and the two units were disbanded. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 mutinied against its German officers, disarmed them, and joined the Home Army resistance.

In 1944 the General Government tried to recruit 12,000 Polish volunteers to "join the fight against Bolshevism". The campaign failed and only 699 men were recruited, 209 of whom either deserted or were disqualified for health reasons.

Poles in the Wehrmacht

Main article: Poles in the Wehrmacht

Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, many former citizens of the Second Polish Republic from across the Polish territories annexed by Nazi Germany were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht in Upper Silesia and in Pomerania. They were declared citizens of the Third Reich by law and therefore subject to drumhead court-martial in case of draft evasion. Professor Ryszard Kaczmarek of the University of Silesia in Katowice, author of a monograph, Polacy w Wehrmachcie (Poles in the Wehrmacht), noted that the scale of this phenomenon was much larger than previously assumed, because 90% of the inhabitants of these two westernmost regions of prewar Poland were ordered to register on the German People's List (Volksliste), regardless of their wishes. The exact number of these conscripts is not known; no data exist beyond 1943.

In June 1946, the British Secretary of State for War reported to Parliament that, of the pre-war Polish citizens who had involuntarily signed the Volksliste and subsequently served in the German Wehrmacht, 68,693 men were captured or surrendered to the Allies in northwest Europe. The overwhelming majority, 53,630, subsequently enlisted in the Polish Army in the West and fought against Germany to the end of World War II.

Collaboration and the resistance

See also: Polish resistance in World War II

The main Polish resistance organization was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), numbering some 400,000 Poles, including Polish Jews. The Home Army actively fought the Germans through out the war. In one instance however, in 1944, the Germans clandestinely armed a few AK units operating in the Wilno area in the hope that they would act against local Soviet partisans; soon, during Operation Ostra Brama, the AK turned these weapons against the Germans. Such arrangements were purely tactical and did not evince the kind of ideological collaboration shown by France's Vichy regime or Norway's Quisling regime. The Poles' main motive was to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and to acquire much-needed equipment. Further, most such collaboration by local commanders with the Germans was condemned by AK headquarters. There were no known joint German-AK operations, and the Germans were unsuccessful in getting the Poles to exclusively fight the Soviet partisans. In his book sociologist and historian Tadeusz Piotrowski quoted Joseph Rothschild as saying that "The Polish Home Army was, by and large, untainted by collaboration" and adds that "the honor of the AK as a whole beyond reproach."

The Polish right-wing National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, or NSZ) did not accept Jews, and from time attacked or kidnapped Jewish partisans. The NSZ operated with the approval and occasional cooperation of the Germans. The "Holy Cross Mountains Brigade" of the NSZ, numbering 800-1,500 fighters, decided to cooperate with the Germans in late 1944. It ceased hostile operations against the Germans for a few months, accepted logistical help, and—late in the war, with German approval, to avoid capture by the Soviets—withdrew from Poland into Czechoslovakia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the Holýšov concentration camp.

The Home Army did not consider Jews part of the "Polish nation", and was reluctant to accept them to its ranks, or assist in preventing their genocide. In addition, "a number of AK detachments were actively engaged in hunting down and murdering Jews." This was sometimes enabled by labeling them as "bandits". "In certain areas the AK posed a greater threat to Jewish partisans than the Nazis, as the AK’s familiarity with the local terrain and populace put their units in a better position to track down Jews."

The Holocaust

This section possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. (April 2018) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
See also: The Holocaust in Poland and Rescue of Jews by Poles in World War II
Part of the core exhibition dedicated to Jedwabne pogrom at the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw.

Thousands of Jews who were in hiding received organized or individual help from the Poles, despite the fact that it was dangerous for any one Polish to even to talk to a Jew. Help from ethnic Poles ranged from acts of heroism to minor acts of kindness, involving hundreds of thousands of Polish helpers, often acting anonymously. This rescue effort occurred even though ethnic Poles were, from October 1941, subject to execution by the Germans if found offering help to a person of Jewish background. Poland was the only German-occupied European country where the death penalty was imposed as punishment. On 10 November 1941 Hans Frank expanded the death penalty to apply to Poles who helped Jews "in any way: by taking them in for a night, giving them a lift in a vehicle of any sort" or "feeding runaway Jews or selling them foodstuffs." The law was publicized with posters in all major cities. Capital punishment, meted out to the entire family of any Pole who helped a Jew, was the most draconian penalty ever imposed anywhere in Europe by the Germans. Up to 50,000 ethnic Poles were executed by the Nazis for hiding Jews.

Poster issued by the General Government announcing the implementation of the death penalty for Jews captured outside the ghettos, and for any Poles helping Jews.

Szymon Datner estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 Jews were saved from the Holocaust thanks to help from "hundreds of thousands" of Poles who "risked their lives". Other estimates of Poles who helped Jews range between 160,000 to 360,000 and between 80,000 to 120,000 Jews. Wartime historian Emanuel Ringelblum, in his 1944 diary, estimated that, in Warsaw alone, 40,000 to 60,000 Poles were responsible for saving up to 15,000 Jews.

According to historian Gunnar S. Paulsson, in occupied Warsaw (a city of 1.3 million, including 350,000 Jews before the war), some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers (szmalcownik), exploiting Jews and their Polish rescuers, or denouncing both to the Germans. On the other hand, in Warsaw alone the Żegota organization saved some 20,000 Jews from certain death, and scores of individual rescuers across the city also helped Jews survive. About 2,000 Poles who paid with their lives for saving Jews are known by their full names and their cases documented by Warsaw's Jewish Historical Institute and Poland's Institute of National Memory. The number of individual rescuers, who saved around 15,000 Jews in Warsaw, has been estimated at between 40,000-60,000 Poles.

According to historian Jan Grabowski in his 2013 book "Hunt for the Jews", 200,000 Jews "were killed directly or indirectly by the Poles". The book was awarded the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize. However, the book sparked a controversy and the estimate has been criticized, notably by fellow historians and by the Polish League Against Defamation. Grabowski, writing in 2013, arrived at this number in reliance on Saul Friedländer, who in turn, according to Polish newspaper wPolityce, misquoted a 2004 paper by Antony Polonsky. Polonsky had limited his estimate to Jewish survivors registered as of June 1945, while many more survivors were still registering with the Central Committee of Polish Jews—or were not registering at all. Grabowski, in arriving at his number, also failed to acknowledge the time frame and erred by implying that the low estimate included all the survivors; whereas, by mid-1946, the registered number had risen to some 205,000 or 210,000 survivors (240,000 registrations, including over 30,000 duplicates). In a March 2018 interview in Gazeta Wyborcza, Grabowski said he had never claimed that 200,000 Jews had been killed directly by Poles, but that Poles were responsible or co-responsible for the deaths of "the majority of these people", even if "part of them were killed by the Germans".. In response, the Polish Center for Holocaust Research scholars published statements in defense of Grabowski.

Historian John Connelly writes that the vast majority of ethnic Poles showed indifference to the fate of the Jews; and that "Polish historiography has hesitated to view as collaboration." On the other hand, Klaus-Peter Friedrich writes that "most adopted a policy of wait-and-see... In the eyes of the Jewish population, almost inevitably had to appear as silent approval of the occupier's actions."

Collaboration by ethnic minorities

Germans used the divide and rule method to create tensions within the Polish society, by targeting several non-Polish ethnic groups for preferential treatment or the opposite, in the case of the Jewish minority.

Ethnic Germans

Meeting of the German minority (Volksdeutsche) in occupied Warsaw, 1940

During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, members of the ethnic German minority in Poland assisted Nazi Germany in its war effort. They committed sabotage, diverted regular forces and committed numerous atrocities against civilian population.

Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, an armed ethnic-German militia, called the Selbstschutz, numbering around 100,000 members, was formed. It organized the Operation Tannenberg mass murder of Polish elites. At the beginning of 1940, the Selbstschutz was disbanded, and its members transferred to various units of SS, Gestapo, and German police. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle organized large-scale looting of property, and redistributed goods to Volksdeutsche. They were given apartments, workshops, farms, furniture, and clothing confiscated from Jewish Poles and ethnic Poles.

During the German occupation of Poland, Nazi authorities established the German People's List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), whereby former Polish citizens of German ethnicity were registered as Volksdeutsche. The German authorities encouraged registration of ethnic Germans, and in many cases made it mandatory. Those who joined were given benefits, including better food and better social status. However, Volksdeutsche were required to perform military service for the Third Reich, and hundreds of thousands joined the German military, either willingly or under compulsion. People who became Volksdeutsche were treated by Poles with special contempt, and their having signed the Volksliste constituted high treason according to Polish underground law.

Parade of Ukrainian recruits form Galicia joining the SS-Galizien division in Lwów (Lviv), 18 July 1943

Collaboration by Ukrainians and Belorussians

Main articles: Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany and Byelorussian collaboration with Nazi Germany

Before the war, Poland had a substantial population of Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities living in her eastern, Kresy regions. After the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, those territories were annexed by the USSR. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German authorities recruited Ukrainians and Belorussians who had been citizens of Poland before September 1939 for service in Waffen-SS and auxiliary-police units. In District Galicia, the SS Galicia division and Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, made up of ethnic-Ukrainian volunteers, took part in widespread massacres and persecution of Poles and Jews.

Collaboration by Polish Jews

Two members of the Jewish Ghetto Police guarding the gates of the Warsaw Ghetto, June 1942

During the September 1939 invasion of Poland, Jews in some areas welcomed German Wehrmacht soldiers, presenting them with traditional welcome gifts of bread and salt, and setting up makeshift triumphal arches in the city Łódź and town of Pabianice.

The Judenrat (Jewish council) was a Jewish-run governing body set up by the Nazi authorities in Jewish ghettos across German-occupied Poland. The Judenrat functioned as a self-enforcing intermediary, and was used by the Germans to control the Jewish population and to manage the ghetto's day-to-day administration. Also, the Judenrat collected information on the Jewish population and supervised the Jewish policemen in the ghettos in helping the Germans load Jews onto transport trains bound for concentration camps. In some cases, Judenrat members exploited their positions to engage in bribery and other abuses. In the Łódź Ghetto, the reign of Judenrat head Chaim Rumkowski was particularly inhumane, as he was known to get rid of his political opponents by submitting their names for deportation to concentration camps, hoard food rations, and sexually abuse Jewish girls. Political theorist Hannah Arendt stated that without the assistance of the Judenrat, the German authorities would have encountered considerable difficulties in drawing up detailed lists of the Jewish population, thus allowing for at least some Jews to avoid deportation.

The Jewish Ghetto Police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst) were volunteers recruited from among Jews living in the ghettos who could be relied on to follow German orders. They were issued batons, official armbands, caps, and badges, and were responsible for public order in the ghetto. Also, the policemen were used by the Germans for securing the deportation of other Jews to concentration camps. The numbers of Jewish police varied greatly depending on the location, with the Warsaw Ghetto numbering about 2,500, Łódź Ghetto 1,200 and smaller ghettos such as that at Lwów about 500. The Jewish ghetto police distinguished themselves by their shocking corruption and immorality. Historian and Warsaw Ghetto archivist Emanuel Ringelblum described the cruelty of the ghetto police as "at times greater than that of the Germans."

Group 13, a Jewish collaborationist organization in the Warsaw Ghetto, which reported directly to the German Gestapo, 1941

Some Polish Jews, belonging to the collaborationist groups Żagiew and "Group 13", also colloquially known as the "Jewish Gestapo", inflicted considerable damage on both Jewish and Polish underground resistance movements. Over a thousand these Jewish Nazi collaborators, some armed with firearms, served under the direction of the German Gestapo as informers on Polish resistance efforts to hide Jews, and engaged in racketeering, blackmail, and extortion in the Warsaw Ghetto. Similar Jewish groups and individual collaborators of the Gestapo operated in other cities and towns across German-occupied Poland — Abraham Gancwajch and Alfred Nossig in Warsaw, Józef Diamand in Kraków, and Szama Grajer in Lublin. One of the Jewish collaborationist groups' baiting techniques was to send agents out as supposed ghetto escapees who would ask Polish families for help; if a family agreed to help, it was reported on to the Germans, who (as a matter of announced policy) executed the entire family.

Another Jewish group that collaborated with the Nazi authorities was the Jewish Social Self-Help (Template:Lang-de), also known as the Jewish Social Assistance Society. It was funded by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which also supplied it with legal cover. The group was authorized to function in the territories under the administration of the German General Government. Some members of the Jewish Social Self-Help took part in the deportation of Warsaw Jews to death camps. Both members of the Jewish and Polish underground resistance movements actively resisted the Jewish Social Self Help organization.

See also

References

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  97. Woydak, Mark. "Jak Żydzi Kolaborowali z Niemcami" Money.pl. Retrieved 2018-02-19.
  98. Bodakowski, Jan, "Żydowscy kolaboranci Hitlera" "Żydowscy agenci gestapo z Żagwi udawali poza gettem żydowskich uciekinierów, by wydawać Niemcom Polaków pomagających Żydom, partyzantów i autentycznych uciekinierów żydowskich", Salon24. Retrieved 2018-02-19.
  99. Alexandra Garbarini, Jewish Responses to Persecution: 1938–1940, p. 198.
  100. "In Warsaw, participants in the organization of deportations to the death camps included not only Jewish policemen, but also members of the Żydowska służba ratunkowa (Jewish medical service), part of the Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Social Self-Help." ("Do zachowań jednoznacznie kolaboracyjnych ze strony przedstawicieli żydowskich instytucji "samorządowych" dochodziło podczas wysiedleń do obozów zagłady w ramach "akcji Reinhard", gdy niemieckie oddziały wysied­leńcze wymagały od żydowskich funkcyjnych czynnego wspomagania akcji. W Warszawie przy organizowaniu deportacji do obozu zagłady uczestniczyli nie tylko żydowscy policjanci, lecz także członkowie żydowskiej służby ratun­ kowej, część judenratu, a nawet niektórzy członkowie Żydowskiej Samopomocy Społecznej" Unambigious acts of collaboration from the side of Jewish "self-rule" institutions happened during deportations to extermination camps in "Reinhard action" when German units involved in expulsions demanded from Jewish functionaries active support. In Warsaw deporations to extermination camp were organized not only by Jewish police, but also Jewish rescue service, part of Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Self-Help" )
  101. http://www.jhi.pl/psj/Zydowski_Urzad_Samopomocy_(ZUS)
Collaboration with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan
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