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The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, is a politico-military organization that has been waging a secessionist campaign against the Sri Lankan government since the 1970s in order to secure a separate state for the Tamil majority regions in the north and east of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). The LTTE is headed by its founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

History

Beginnings

Until the 1970s, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had largely taken the form of a demand for autonomy for the Tamil-speaking regions under an overall federal framework. The lack of results after twenty-five years of negotiations, and the perception amongst Tamils that the Sinhalese dominated government was unwilling to grant their wishes, led to a significant section of young Tamils, particularly in Jaffna, adopting a more radical position. They now favoured the use of violent means. A large number of militant organisations were set up, one of which was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), formed in 1972 by a small group of young Tamils and university students led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. Many students joined the TNT thereafter because they believed that they were not given equality in the grading systems and admission to post-graduate schools.

The TNT's first military operation was the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the SLFP mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, followed by a few successful bank robberies to fund their activities and the assassination of a number of minor police officials. The success of these early acts gave them confidence, and in 1976 they teamed up with the militants headed by S. Subramanian to form the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In 1979, Anton Balasingham joined the LTTE as their main ideologue. Balasingham added depth to the LTTE's politics. Whereas they had earlier been committed to the single idea of Tamil independence, Balasingham added a new layer of social policies, inspired by Marxism and anti-casteism, which profoundly shaped the LTTE's worldview.

The LTTE continued the TNT's campaign of low-intensity violence against state agents, particularly policemen, and quickly became the most efficient and ruthless of the many Tamil militant groups. In 1978, they wiped out a police patrol that had discovered one of their training camps, the first major military victory for a separatist Tamil group. After martial law was imposed in Jaffna in 1979, the LTTE began targeting the military. After one such attack in July 1983, which killed 16 army soldiers, Sinhalese mobs took revenge in the event now called Black July, which saw the death of thousands of Tamil civilians. Following this angry Tamil youths swelled the ranks of the LTTE seeking retribution for the violence. The government's crackdown on Tamil separatism, and the large number of Tamil civilians killed as a result, produced a steady stream of volunteers for the LTTE, which they shaped into a militia. In 1984, they began launching higher intensity attacks against Sri Lankan troops. The same year they also formed a naval unit, the Sea Tigers.

Rise to dominance

The LTTE's discipline and efficiency, coupled with Prabhakaran's leadership and its strong ideological base, made the group much more effective than the other Tamil militant groups. As a result, for the next three years the LTTE was the main Tamil force in the civil war. The LTTE was militarily very successful against the Sri Lankan Army. In 1987, the Black Tigers was established; an elite unit of LTTE members responsible for conducting suicide attacks against political, economic and military targets.

Initially, the LTTE's operations were carried on in cooperation with other militant groups. In April 1984, it had formally joined a common militant front, the Eelam National Liberation Front, or ENLF, which had been formed by the TELO, the EROS and the EPRLF.

In 1986, the LTTE launched a military attack on the TELO, the largest of the other Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. Over the next few months, the entire TELO leadership and several hundred volunteers were hunted down, and the group ceased to be a potent force. A few months later, they attacked training camps of the EPRLF, forcing it to withdraw entirely from the Jaffna peninsula.

The reasons for the LTTE's internecine attacks on other Tamil groups are much debated. The reason they themselves gave at the time was the other groups' connection with India. All the Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had received varying degrees of support from India. However, while other groups such as the TELO wholeheartedly embraced Indian support, the LTTE remained wary of India particularly after Rajiv Gandhi came to power, fearing that India was seeking primarily to advance its own interests, which were not the same as those of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and would therefore force the Tamils to accept an unfavourable settlement. They were particularly suspicious of the Indian intelligence agency, the RAW, which they said had completely infiltrated the TELO and EPRLF, and was using them to eliminate the LTTE. Some commentators have suggested that the LTTE were also unhappy that the most of the funding from expatriates went to the TELO, rather than to them. It has also been suggested that they believed the struggle would only be effective if the other groups, who were much more willing to compromise, were not around The effect of the attacks was that the LTTE consolidated the position their successful attacks had already established, as the main military group fighting for the cause of Tamil Eelam, with no credible rivals.

The IPKF period

In 1987, the Sri Lankan Army launched a new assault to recapture Jaffna. In the Indian press, the attack was depicted as being brutal and leading to disproportionately large civilian casualties. Faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, India intervened directly in the conflict by airdropping food parcels on Jaffna in what was interpreted as a show of strength. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement whereby Sri Lanka agreed to a federal structure, which would grant autonomy to the Tamils. India was to send a peacekeeping force, the IPKF, to Sri Lanka to enforce the agreement.

Although most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE only did so very grudgingly and very soon rejected it on the grounds that the reforms were only illusory. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict against the Indian army. The army fought a bitter month-long campaign to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. This campaign and the army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations were ruthless, and made it extremely unpopular amongst the Tamils. The LTTE exploited this sentiment and, by painting themselves as the only group opposing the IPKF's "anti-Tamil aggression", as they termed it, they became increasingly popular. In addition, the implementation of the autonomy provisions under the agreement was perceived by the LTTE as giving them little or nothing, and the entire structure collapsed very quickly. As the only group to have held itself aloof from this process, the LTTE was able to portray this development as a vindication of their stance.

The post-IPKF LTTE

The IPKF's intervention was also unpopular amongst Sinhalese Buddhists, and the last IPKF members left the country 1990 upon request of the Sri Lankan government. During this period, the LTTE absorbed the remnants of the other rival militant groups, including the TELO and EPRLF, which had tried to regroup with the help of the IPKF and RAW. In a series of military operations in 1995 and 1996, the army re-captured the Jaffna peninsula and the town of Kilinochchi from the LTTE leaving the LTTE resources crippled and manpower depleted. The LTTE proposed peace talks in 1996, which the government rejected. Starting from 1997, the LTTE suffered a number of reverses, and lost control of large portions of the Vanni, the town of Kilinochchi and many smaller towns. However, from 1998 onward the LTTE reversed these losses, culminating in the capture of the strategically vital Elephant Pass base complex in 2000 after hard and long fighting against the Sri Lankan army.

The 2001 ceasefire

In 2001, the LTTE unexpectedly dropped its demand for a separate state, which had never been accepted by the government or the island's Sinhala majority. Instead, they stated a form of regional autonomy would meet their demands. The government invited Norway to mediate in the dispute. Norway brokered a ceasefire agreement, which remains precariously in effect.

Norway and the other Nordic countries jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers, the Tigers have carried out more than 3,100 reported violations compared to about 140 by the government forces.

Talks on an interim solution have currently stalled through political uncertainty. The President Chandrika Kumaratunga suspended the government of the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe in 2004, accusing him of being too soft on the LTTE. Kumaratunga herself then took a more conciliatory line towards the LTTE, but the current president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who took office in November 2005, campaigned on a plank of being tougher on the LTTE. His prime minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake has also previously advocated a tougher line. The LTTE has recently stated that the gap between its position and the position of the new Sri Lankan government is vast. It has threatened to "intensify" its campaign if the government does not soon propose a reasonable political framework. The LTTE ordered a boycott of the 2005 presidential elections, which was won by Mahinda Rajapakse, amongst Tamil voters in the East and North of Sri Lanka. This action was condemned by the United States, who cited that "a significant portion of Sri Lanka's people were unable to express their views", and by opponents of Rajapakse who claim that the boycott played an important role in his victory.

Negotiations resumed briefly in February 2006, but were indefinitely postponed again in April after the parties were unable to agree on a mode of transport for LTTE commanders from the east of Sri Lanka to travel to the LTTE headquarters. Violent incidents increased, and by summer 2006 there was growing talk of a "Final War" for Tamil Eelam independence.

Organisation and activities

Military

In the LTTE recruits are instructed to be prepared to die for the cause, and are issued with a cyanide capsule to be swallowed in the case of capture. The LTTE also has a special squad of suicide troops, called the Black Tigers, which it deploys for critical missions.

The LTTE gets its main funding from contributions by Tamils residing in Western countries, although there is controversy about the extent to which such contributions are voluntary rather than the result of extortion .

Governmental

Even though the LTTE was formed as a military group, it also carries out a number of civilian duties. The LTTE controls sections in the north and east of the island, especially the regions lying outside the major cities. It runs a de facto government and provides public services in these areas, including schools, hospitals, police stations, courts and municipal administration. However, it still uses the Sri Lanka rupee and many civil servants are paid by the Sri Lankan government, even in areas controlled by the LTTE.

Most of the structures supporting these functions developed during the period immediately after the IPKF's withdrawal, when the LTTE controlled Jaffna without significant opposition. During this period, it transformed itself from a purely military body to a quasi-government, complete with administrative organs. Among these are:

• Tamil Eelam Police Force (including traffic police)
• Education Development Board of Tamil Eelam
• Tamil Eelam Military Academy
• a broadcasting authority called the Voice of Tigers
• National Television of Tamil Eelam (NTT) -- a satellite TV station
• Law College of Tamil Eelam
• Tamil Eelam Judicial Department including a court service and a public prosecution system.
• Central bank
• Customs agency

Although it no longer controls Jaffna, these structures continue to form the basis on which it runs the areas it does control. The LTTE's administrative agencies are integrated into the organisation's overall chain of command. It claims that this makes them better equipped to respond to emergencies.

The LTTE's quasi-government is run on socialist principles. For example, all litigants before a civil court are required to pay a fine for failing to settle their dispute amicably. Police and other employees of the administrative agencies are paid according to the number of dependents they have, rather than their position.

In recent years, the LTTE has sought wider recognition for its administrative organs. After the Boxing Day tsunami, it has sought to ensure that aid to the areas under its control is routed through its own administrative agencies. It entered into an agreement, called the P-TOMS, with the government of Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga that recognised this principle to some extent. The agreement was bitterly opposed by hardliners in the Sri Lankan government and never saw implementation. The present administration of Mahinda Rajapaksa has announced that it will not be considering it anew.

Political

The LTTE also has a political wing, but despite the ceasefire it has not tried to formally create a political party. Instead, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, it openly supported the Tamil National Alliance (also called Thamizh Arasu Katchi or Federal Party), which won over 90% of votes in the electoral district of Jaffna, in the Northern Province.

The LTTE's commitment to multi-party democracy has also been questioned. In an interview in 1986, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, said that Tamil Eelam would be a one-party state rather than a multi-party democracy, because that would help it develop faster (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994, 183). He has not repeated this proposal, and the LTTE's main ideologue, Anton Balasingham, publicly repudiated this position in 1992, stating that it was irrelevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the LTTE's critics state that it indicates their way of thinking, and point out that it has not organised, and shows no signs of organising, local elections in the areas it controls. The LTTE's supporters say that conditions make elections impossible, but that they will be held once Tamil Eelam is fully independent.

Dissension

An LTTE commander named Colonel Karuna (nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan) broke away from the LTTE in March 2004 and formed the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal amid allegations that the northern commanders were overlooking the needs of the eastern Tamils. The LTTE leadership had accused him of mishandling of funds and questioned him about his recent personal behaviour. He tried to take control of the eastern province from the LTTE, which caused clashes between the LTTE and TEMVP. The LTTE has suggested that TEMVP is backed by the government. The Nordic SLMM monitors have corroborated this The TEMVP like the LTTE, has been accused of using child soldiers.

Status of women

The LTTE advocates equality for women, and has a large number of female recruits. The Women's Wing of the LTTE is known as Suthanthirap Paravaikal (or Freedom Birds). The first woman combatant to die was 2nd Lt. Malathi, on 10 October 1987, in an encounter with the IPKF at Kopai in Jaffna peninsula. Women have also been part of the 'Black Tiger' squads. The assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the attempt on President Chandrika Kumaranatunga and the latest attempt by a female suicide bomber on the Sri Lankan Army commander are notable instances.

Human rights and terrorism issues

Template:Campaignbox State terrorism in Sri Lanka The LTTE is sometimes labelled "terrorist" as part of a broader allegation that it does not have respect for human rights, and does not adhere to the standards of conduct expected of a resistance movement or what might be called "freedom fighters".

The accusation of terrorism is based in part on claims that the LTTE recruits child soldiers, has been responsible for targeted assassination of political figures and non-military officials, and uses suicide bombers.

Assassinations

The LTTE has long been accused of carrying assassinations of political rivals and opponents. These include:

• Alfred Duraiyappah, Mayor of Jaffna
• Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India
• Ranjan Wijeratne, Sri Lankan cabinet minister and former general
• Lalith Athulathmudali, Sri Lankan cabinet minister
• Ranasinghe Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka
• Gamini Dissanayake, Sri Lankan presidential candidate
• Chandrika Kumaratunga, President of Sri Lanka (failed attempt)
• Major Gen Parami Kulatunga, third-highest ranking officer in Sri Lanka Army
• Sarath Fonseka, Sri Lankan army chief of staff (failed attempt)

Indian courts have issued an international warrant to arrest both Velupillai Prabhakaran and its intelligence chief Pottu Amman in connection with the Rajiv Gandhi killing. The LTTE at first denied any involvement, but later issued a statement in June of 2006 calling the event a "monumental tragedy."

A presidential commission later concluded that the LTTE was not responsible for the death of Athulathmudali.

The LTTE has also been accused of killing moderate Tamils and other Tamils with whom it disagrees, such as:

• Appapillai Amirthalingam, leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)
• Vettivelu Yogeswaran, TULF politician
• Sarojini Yogeswaran, mayor of Jaffna
• Pon Sivapalan, mayor of Jaffna
• Neelan Thiruchelvam, academic and TULF politician
• Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lankan Foreign minister
• Kethesh Loganathan, political activist & Second chief of Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat

The LTTE has vehemently denied involvement in several of these incidents. Others argue these are tit-for-tat killings conducted by elements of both sides of the conflict. The LTTE argues the Sri Lankan government and government-aided paramilitaries have also targeted the following high profile supporters of the LTTE:

• Kumar Ponnambalam, politician and philantrophist, Head of ACTC
• Joseph Pararajasingham, human rights worker, TNA politician, former journalist
• Vanniasingham Vigneswaran, politician and head of Trincomalee District Tamil Peoples' Forum
• Dharmaratnam Sivaram, journalist, human rights worker and news editor for Tamilnet
• Sinnathamby Sivamaharasa, Namathu Elanadu journalist, former TULF politician
• Pon. Ganeshamoorthy Literary Figure, Poet, General Manager People's Bank, KKS
• Ariyanayagam Chandra Nehru, NESOHR human rights worker, former TNA politician

In addition, Sri Lankan army operated Deep Penetration Units and death squads are alleged to have killed or attempted to have killed the following LTTE officials through clandestine operations:

• Colonel Shankar, Head of Air Tigers
• E. Kousalyan, LTTE Political Head for Batticalao and Amparai
• Colonel Kandiah Ulaganathan (Ramanan), LTTE Military Deputy Head for Batticalao and Amparai
• S.P. Thamilchelvan, LTTE Political Head (failed attempt)
• Colonel Bahnu, LTTE Military Head for Batticalao and Amparai (failed attempt)

The LTTE's supporters justify some of the targeted assassinations by arguing that the people assassinated were combatants or persons closely associated with Sri Lankan military intelligence. Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to perform preemptive self-defence because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India. They also draw comparisons between the casualties caused by the LTTE's actions and the actions of European resistance forces against Nazi occupation during the Second World War. However, the LTTE's alleged victims have included unarmed Tamil politicians and civilians moderates who sought a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan crisis. LTTE supporters in turn argue the purge of Tamil moderates has been done as part of a calculated strategy by successive Sinhala governments to eliminate Tamil intellectuals and hamstring efforts to create a viable independent state.

Attacks on civilians

The Sri Lankan government, Amnesty International and the BBC have reported that the LTTE has targeted non-military targets including the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, the Dehiwala train , Central Bank, farming villages, temples and mosques resulting in large numbers of civilian deaths. The LTTE claims that its attacks on purely civilian targets are collateral damage. In many of these instances, the culprits have not been arrested due to the failure of the Sri Lankan police and judiciary to arrest LTTE cadres residing in LTTE dominated areas. The militarisation of society, general lawlessness and the operation of multiple paramilitary organisations have made the situation complicated.

Child soldiers

The LTTE has been accused of knowingly recruiting and using child soldiers as front-line troops. Amid international pressure, LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but both UNICEF and HRW have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the tsunami. Civilians have also complained that the LTTE is continuing to abduct children, including some in their early teens, for use as soldiers.

The LTTE, however, strongly denies any responsibility for recruitment of child soldiers. It argues that instances of child recruitment occurred mostly in the east, under the purview of former LTTE regional commander Colonel Karuna. After leaving the LTTE and forming the TMVP, it is alleged Karuna continues to forcibly kidnap and induct child soldiers. The LTTE claims that Karuna, with backing from the Sri Lankan government (as confirmed by the SLMM), is intent on tarnishing the LTTE's image internationally. Its official position is that earlier, some of its cadres erroneously recruited volunteers in their late teens. It says that its official policy is now that it will not accept child soldiers. It also says that some underage youth lie about their age and are therefore allowed to join, but are sent back home to their parents as soon as they are discovered to be underaged. In many instances, there is a lack proper records such as birth certificates in the North East due to the breakdown of government services.

Suicide bombers

The LTTE has frequently used suicide bombers as a tactic. They pioneered the use of concealed suicide bomb vests, which are now used by many other organisations worldwide. The tactic of deploying suicide bombers was used to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi, who was killed in 1991 using a prototype suicide vest, and Ranasinghe Premadasa, assassinated in 1993.

Ethnic cleansing

The LTTE has been blamed for forcibly removing (or "ethnically cleansing") Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control, including the use of violence against those who refuse to leave. Most notably, the LTTE forcibly expelled the entire Muslim population of Jaffna on two hours notice in 1990. The LTTE are also accused of organising massacres of Sinhala villagers who settled in the Northeast under the dry lands policy.

The LTTE has apologized for the expulsion of Muslims and has blamed this event on the misconduct of one of its regional commanders. The LTTE has taken the added step of encouraging Muslim civilians to return their homes and livelihoods and providing compensation. The LTTE feels the expulsion of 'Sinhala colonizers' and unwanted common criminals from 'illegal' settlement schemes as a necessary step to safeguard the rights of the Tamil minority. Most of these lands were originally owned by Tamils, who were forcibly evicted to make way for government aided Sinhala colonization schemes. These schemes, they argue were created with the sole intent on making Tamil civilians a minority in their traditional homelands (something successive Sinhala governments never recognized) and hence a means to further deprive their rights under the present district based unitary political system.

Extortion

There are also charges that the LTTE coerces Tamil expatriates to give it money, by threatening the safety of their relatives or property in areas of Sri Lanka under its control. This involves pressuring them to directly give it money, or to indirectly fund its activities by patronising businesses connected with it (La 2004). Although intelligence services have raised concerns about such activities, which are particularly controversial in Canada, few formal complaints have been made. During raids by the RCMP World Tamil Movement, (an LTTE front organisation) was found coordinating a number of illegal activities in order to control the Tamil diaspora in Canada. A report by Human Rights Watch outlines the intimidation and extortion Tamil expatriates experience from the LTTE.

However, several Tamil associations, from various countries mentioned in the report, have called into question the veracity and accuracy of the HRW report.

Proscription as a terrorist group

At least 29 countries have listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. As of July 2006, these include:

• India (since 1992)
• United States of America (since 1997)
• Malaysia
• United Kingdom (since 2000)
• Canada (since 2006)
• European Union (since 2006)

Another 161 countries (which constitute a majority in the UN General Assembly) have not proscribed the LTTE. However, the only terrorist list the UN maintains is devoted solely to individuals and organisations believed by the UN to be connected to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, mandated by Resolution 1267. The UN has no other mandate to list any organisation as being terrorist. The UN has also passed Resolution 1373, asking member countries to identify and limit activities of any organisation that carries out terrorist activities. The UN has not published its own list of terrorist groups, leaving their identification to the discretion of member countries.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also suggested that the LTTE should face travel curbs and other penalties if they keep using children as soldiers. As well as travel bans, his report to the Security Council also recommended other sanctions such as arms embargoes and financial restrictions against the LTTE, Though Kofi Annan has gone as far as to requesting a visit Tamil Tiger held areas and meeting with key Tamil officials, a request that was promptly denied by the Sri Lankan Government.

Australia and other countries have listed the LTTE as a terrorist group in accordance with Resolution 1373.

Canada does not grant residency to LTTE members on the grounds that they have participated in crimes against humanity.

The first country to ban the LTTE was its early ally, India. The Indian change of policy came gradually, starting with the IPKF-LTTE conflict, and culminating with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In the following years a number of other countries also listed the LTTE as a terror organisation after lobbying from the Sri Lankan diplomatic service under Lakshman Kadirgamar, the former Sri Lankan foreign minister who was allegedly assassinated by the LTTE in 2005. The EU with its 25 member nations is the most recent entity to ban the LTTE. This was done explicitly to encourage them to renounce violence and terrorism and participate in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, under threat of having their international assets seized and other repercussions if they did not.

Sri Lanka itself lifted the ban on the LTTE before signing the ceasefire agreement in 2002. This was a prerequisite set by the LTTE for signing of the CFA.

Recent events

The Sri lankan Government accused the LTTE of executing 13 laborers on May 29 2006. A claymore mine attack on 15 June 2006 on a bus carrying 140 civilians killed 68 (icluding 15 children),and injured 60.The US state department and the SLMM have named LTTE as culprits for this attack..On August 14, 2006, a convoy carrying the Pakistani High Commissioner was attacked by a claymore fragmentation mine concealed within a rickshaw, killing seven and injuring seventeen. The blast was near the office of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Sri Lankan government accused the LTTE of responsibility. Pakistan has accused the Indian intelligence agency, RAW, for the attack.

The attack coincided with a series of battles between LTTE guerrillas and Sri Lankan security forces around eastern Sri Lanka and the Jaffna peninsula, including a Sri Lankan military airstrike on a building which killed a number of school children. The LTTE claimed it was an orphanage, while the government maintains the target was a child soldier training camp. UTHR(J) notes 51 school children (based on list by local principals were killed due to the bombing. UTHR also notes that this installation was previously used by LTTE for training militia. UTHR reports that LTTE had organised this residential camp against the parents wishes with the aim of recruiting some of these school children. .

UNICEF and the SLMM truce monitors saw only 19 bodies of young men and women but agree there was no evidence to support government claims that the installation was a military training camp. On September 1st, Sri Lankan police arrested three of the young women - aged 18, 19 and 20 - who were injured in the airstrike and were susequently brought to a to a hospital in central Sri Lanka for treatment. Inspector General of Police Chandra Fernando said the three young women all claimed that they were taken by a member of the Tamil Tigers to a camp deep within rebel territory for first aid training but when they reached the camp, they were forced to undergo weapons training. The Defense Ministry also released a video of the 3 women confessing that they were taken by the LTTE for forced training sessions. (Link to Video) Although a human rights group, Asian Human Rights Commission had previously complained in 2005 that the Sri Lankan police is known to obtain confessions through torture, duress and other inhumane activities, neither they, nor anyone else, stated that these young women made their confessions under duress.

See also

• Notable attacks by the LTTE
• Terrorist attacks carried out by LTTE
• Sri Lankan civil war
• Black July anti-Tamil pogrom
• State terrorism in Sri Lanka
• Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups
• Upsurging Peoples Force
• Sea Tigers - LTTE naval wing
• Tamils assasinated by the LTTE
• Assasination of Rajiv Gandhi
• Military use of children in Sri Lanka

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56. "Ceasefire Agreement". SLMM.
57. Rica Roy & Anisa Khan (August 14, 2006). "Lanka blast: Pak envoy safe, 7 killed". NDTV.
58. "Pak sees RAW hand behind Colombo attack on Pak HC". New Kerala.
59. "Lanka bombs Tigers in Jaffna". The Peninsular. August 19, 2006.
60. "Police in Sri Lanka arrest 3 suspected female rebels at hospital". International Herald Tribune. 1 September 2006. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
61. Asian Human Rights Commission - Press Release

Further reading

• Balasingham, Adele. (2003) The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance, Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN 1-903679-03-6
• Balasingham, Anton. (2004) War and Peace - Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers, Fairmax Publishing Ltd, ISBN 1-903679-05-2
• de Votta, Neil. (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford University Press, ISBN 0-8047-4924-8
• Gamage, Siri and I.B. Watson (Editors). (1999) Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka - 'Pearl of the East' or 'Island of Tears'?, Sage Publications Ltd, ISBN 0-7619-9393-2
• Hansard Australia (2006), Senate Transcript for 16 June 2006
• Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994) "The Groups and the rise of Militant Secessions". in Manogaram, C. and Pfaffenberger, B. (editors). The Sri Lankan Tamils. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-8133-8845-7
• Human Rights Watch (2003) Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict
• La, J.. 2004. "Forced remittances in Canada's Tamil enclaves". Peace Review 16:3. September 2004. pp. 379-385.
• Narayan Swamy, M. R. (2002) Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas, Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. ISBN 81-220-0631-0
• Pratap, Anita. (2001) Island of Blood: Frontline Reports From Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Other South Asian Flashpoints. Penguin Books, ISBN 0-14-200366-2
• Sri Kantha, Sachi.(2005) Pirabhakaran Phenomenon, Lively COMET Imprint, ISBN 1-57087-671-1
• Wilson, Jeyaratnam (1999) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, University of British Columbia Press, ISBN 0-7748-0760-1

External links

Oficial LTTE websites

• Tamil Eelam
• LTTE PS

Sri Lanka Government Website

• Sri Lankan Defence Ministry

Norwegian Mediators

• Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

Human Rights

• University Teachers for Human Rights

News websites

• TamilNet pro LTTE
• Tamil Editors pro-LTTE
• Lanka Web anti-LTTE

Tamil Eelam and LTTE related

• Sangam
• Tamil Nation
• Tamil Tigers

• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
• Sri Lankan Tamil politics
• Secessionist organizations
• Terrorism
• Irregular military
• Suicide bombing
• Designated terrorist organizations
• 1976 establishments