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{{Short description|Device used to gain access to restricted resource}} | ||
| {{Disputed|date=November 2024|details=Review the definitions of "Security Token" and "Security Token Generator".}} | |||
| ] | ] | ||
| A '''security token''' is a ] used to gain access to an electronically restricted resource. The token is used in addition to or in place of a ]. It acts like an electronic key to access something. Examples include a wireless ] opening a locked door, or in the case of a customer trying to access their bank account online, the use of a bank-provided token can prove that the customer is who they claim to be. | |||
| A '''security token''' is a ] used to gain access to an electronically restricted resource. The token is used in addition to, or in place of, a ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Schink |first1=Marc |last2=Wagner |first2=Alexander |last3=Unterstein |first3=Florian |last4=Heyszl |first4=Johann |date=2021-07-09 |title=Security and Trust in Open Source Security Tokens |url=https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8972 |journal=IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |pages=176–201 |doi=10.46586/tches.v2021.i3.176-201 |s2cid=235349083 |issn=2569-2925|doi-access=free }}</ref> Examples of security tokens include wireless ]s used to open locked doors, a banking token used as a digital authenticator for signing in to ], or signing transactions such as ]. | |||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | Security tokens can be used to store information such as ], ]s used to generate ], or ] data (such as ]). Some designs incorporate ] packaging, while others may include small ]s to allow entry of a ] or a simple button to start a generation routine with some display capability to show a generated key number. Connected tokens utilize a variety of interfaces including ], ] (NFC), ] (RFID), or ]. Some tokens have audio capabilities designed for those who are vision-impaired. | ||
| == Password types == | == Password types == | ||
| All tokens contain some secret information |
All tokens contain some secret information used to prove identity. There are four different ways in which this information can be used: | ||
| ] | ] | ||
| ; Static password token:The device contains a password |
; Static password token: The device contains a password that is physically hidden (not visible to the possessor), but is transmitted for each authentication. This type is vulnerable to ]s. | ||
| ; Synchronous dynamic password token:A timer is used to rotate through various combinations produced by a ]. The token and the authentication server must have synchronized clocks. | ; Synchronous dynamic password token: A timer is used to rotate through various combinations produced by a ]. The token and the authentication server must have synchronized clocks. | ||
| ⚫ | ;Asynchronous password token: A ] is generated without the use of a clock, either from a ] or cryptographic algorithm. | ||
| ⚫ | ; ] token: Using ], it is possible to prove possession of a private key without revealing that key. The authentication server encrypts a challenge (typically a random number, or at least data with some random parts) with a public key; the device proves it possesses a copy of the matching private key by providing the decrypted challenge. | ||
| ⚫ | ; Asynchronous password token: A ] is generated without the use of a clock, either from a ] or cryptographic algorithm. | ||
| ⚫ | ; ] token: Using ], it is possible to prove possession of a private key without revealing that key. The authentication server encrypts a challenge (typically a random number, or at least data with some random parts) with a public key; the device proves it possesses a copy of the matching private key by providing the decrypted challenge. | ||
| ⚫ | Time-synchronized one-time passwords change constantly at a set time interval; e.g., once per minute. To do this some sort of synchronization must exist between the ]'s token and the authentication ]. For disconnected tokens, this time-synchronization is done before the token is distributed to the ]. Other token types do the synchronization when the token is inserted into an ]. The main problem with time-synchronized tokens is that they can, over time, become unsynchronized.<ref>{{Cite web|last=RD|first=Token2|date=2019-01-07|title=Time drift: a major downside of TOTP hardware tokens|url=https://token2.medium.com/time-drift-a-major-downside-of-totp-hardware-tokens-c164c2ec9252|access-date=2020-11-21|website=Medium|language=en}}</ref> However, some such systems, such as RSA's |
||
| ⚫ | Time-synchronized, one-time passwords change constantly at a set time interval; e.g., once per minute. To do this, some sort of synchronization must exist between the ]'s token and the authentication ]. For disconnected tokens, this time-synchronization is done before the token is distributed to the ]. Other token types do the synchronization when the token is inserted into an ]. The main problem with time-synchronized tokens is that they can, over time, become unsynchronized.<ref>{{Cite web|last=RD|first=Token2|date=2019-01-07|title=Time drift: a major downside of TOTP hardware tokens|url=https://token2.medium.com/time-drift-a-major-downside-of-totp-hardware-tokens-c164c2ec9252|access-date=2020-11-21|website=Medium|language=en}}</ref> However, some such systems, such as ], allow the user to re-synchronize the server with the token, sometimes by entering several consecutive passcodes. Most also cannot have replaceable batteries and only last up to 5 years before having to be replaced – so there is an additional cost.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-06-03|title=Time Drift in TOTP Hardware Tokens Explained and Solved - Protectimus Solutions|url=https://www.protectimus.com/blog/time-drift-in-totp-hardware-tokens/|access-date=2020-11-21|website=Protectimus|language=en-GB}}</ref> | ||
| Another type of one-time password uses a complex mathematical algorithm, such as a ], to generate a series of one-time passwords from a secret shared key. Each password is |
Another type of one-time password uses a complex mathematical algorithm, such as a ], to generate a series of one-time passwords from a secret shared key. Each password is unique, even when previous passwords are known. The open-source ] algorithm is standardized;{{Citation needed |date=March 2023 |reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} other algorithms are covered by US ]s. Each password is observably unpredictable and independent of previous ones, whereby an adversary would be unable to guess what the next password may be, even with knowledge of all previous passwords. | ||
| ==Physical types== | ==Physical types== | ||
| {{More citations needed section|date=March 2023}} | |||
| Tokens can contain ] with functions varying from very simple to very complex, including multiple authentication methods. | Tokens can contain ] with functions varying from very simple to very complex, including multiple authentication methods. | ||
| The simplest security tokens do not need any connection to a ]. The tokens have a physical display; the authenticating user simply enters the displayed number to log in. Other tokens connect to the computer using wireless techniques, such as ]. These tokens transfer a key sequence to the local client or to a nearby access point. | The simplest security tokens do not need any connection to a ]. The tokens have a physical display; the authenticating user simply enters the displayed number to log in. Other tokens connect to the computer using wireless techniques, such as ]. These tokens transfer a key sequence to the local client or to a nearby access point.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-01-15 |title=2.3.3: Authentication Methods - Security Tokens |url=https://eng.libretexts.org/Courses/Delta_College/Information_Security/02%3A_Authenticate_and_Identify/2.3%3A_Authentication_Methods_-_Password/2.3.3%3A_Authentication_Methods_-_Security_Tokens |access-date=2023-05-08 |website=Engineering LibreTexts |language=en}}</ref> | ||
| Alternatively, another form of token that has been widely available for many years is a mobile device which communicates using an out-of-band channel (like voice, ], or ]). | Alternatively, another form of token that has been widely available for many years is a mobile device which communicates using an out-of-band channel (like voice, ], or ]). | ||
| Still other tokens plug into the computer |
Still other tokens plug into the computer and may require a PIN. Depending on the type of the token, the ] ] will then either read the key from the token and perform a cryptographic operation on it, or ask the token's firmware to perform this operation.{{Citation needed |date=March 2023 |reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} | ||
| A related application is the hardware ] required by some computer programs to prove ownership of the ]. The dongle is placed in an ] and the ] accesses the ] in question to ] the use of the ] in question. | A related application is the hardware ] required by some computer programs to prove ownership of the ]. The dongle is placed in an ] and the ] accesses the ] in question to ] the use of the ] in question. | ||
| Commercial solutions are provided by a variety of vendors, each with their own proprietary (and often patented) implementation of variously used security features. Token designs meeting certain security standards are certified in the United States as compliant with ], a federal security standard. Tokens without any kind of certification are sometimes viewed as suspect, as they often do not meet accepted government or industry security standards, have not been put through rigorous testing, and likely cannot provide the same level of cryptographic security as token solutions which have had their designs independently audited by third-party agencies.{{citation needed|date=April 2013}} | Commercial solutions are provided by a variety of vendors, each with their own proprietary (and often patented) implementation of variously used security features. Token designs meeting certain security standards are certified in the ] as compliant with ], a federal security standard.<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf |title=Security requirements for cryptographic modules |last=National Institute of Standards and Technology |date=April 2019 |publisher=National Institute of Standards and Technology |issue=NIST FIPS 140-3 |doi=10.6028/nist.fips.140-3 |location=Gaithersburg, MD}}</ref> Tokens without any kind of certification are sometimes viewed as suspect, as they often do not meet accepted government or industry security standards, have not been put through rigorous testing, and likely cannot provide the same level of cryptographic security as token solutions which have had their designs independently audited by third-party agencies.{{citation needed|date=April 2013}} | ||
| === Disconnected tokens === | === Disconnected tokens === | ||
| ] field by hand.]] | ] field by hand.]] | ||
| Disconnected tokens have neither a physical nor logical connection to the client computer. They typically do not require a special input device, and instead use a built-in screen to display the generated authentication data, which the user enters manually themselves via a keyboard or keypad. Disconnected tokens are the most common type of security token used (usually in combination with a password) in two-factor authentication for online identification.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.insight.co.uk/files/whitepapers/Two-factor%20authentication%20(White%20paper).pdf|title=Two-factor authentication|last=de Borde|first=Duncan|publisher=Siemens Insight Consulting|access-date=2009-01-14|date=2007-06-28|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112172841/http://www.insight.co.uk/files/whitepapers/Two-factor%20authentication%20(White%20paper).pdf|archive-date=2012-01-12}}</ref> | Disconnected tokens have neither a physical nor logical connection to the client computer. They typically do not require a special input device, and instead use a built-in screen to display the generated authentication data, which the user enters manually themselves via a ] or ]. Disconnected tokens are the most common type of security token used (usually in combination with a password) in two-factor authentication for online identification.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.insight.co.uk/files/whitepapers/Two-factor%20authentication%20(White%20paper).pdf|title=Two-factor authentication|last=de Borde|first=Duncan|publisher=Siemens Insight Consulting|access-date=2009-01-14|date=2007-06-28|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112172841/http://www.insight.co.uk/files/whitepapers/Two-factor%20authentication%20(White%20paper).pdf|archive-date=2012-01-12}}</ref> | ||
| === Connected tokens === | === Connected tokens === | ||
| Connected tokens are tokens that must be physically connected to the computer with which the user is authenticating. Tokens in this category automatically transmit the authentication information to the client computer once a physical connection is made, eliminating the need for the user to manually enter the authentication information. However, in order to use a connected token, the appropriate input device must be installed. The most common types of physical tokens are ]s and USB tokens, which require a smart card reader and a USB port respectively. Increasingly, ] tokens, supported by the open specification group ] have become popular for consumers with mainstream browser support beginning in 2015 and supported by popular websites and social media sites. | Connected tokens are tokens that must be physically connected to the computer with which the user is authenticating. Tokens in this category automatically transmit the authentication information to the client computer once a physical connection is made, eliminating the need for the user to manually enter the authentication information. However, in order to use a connected token, the appropriate input device must be installed. The most common types of physical tokens are ]s and USB tokens (also called ''security keys''), which require a smart card reader and a USB port respectively. Increasingly, ] tokens, supported by the open specification group ] have become popular for consumers with mainstream browser support beginning in 2015 and supported by popular websites and social media sites.{{Citation needed|date=March 2023|reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} | ||
| Older ] tokens are made to work primarily with ]s. Type II PC Cards are preferred as a token as they are half as thick as Type III. | Older ] tokens are made to work primarily with ]s. Type II PC Cards are preferred as a token as they are half as thick as Type III. | ||
| The audio jack port is a relatively practical method to establish connection between mobile devices, such as iPhone, iPad and Android, and other accessories. The most well known device is called ], a credit card reader for iOS and Android devices. | The audio jack port is a relatively practical method to establish connection between mobile devices, such as ], ] and ], and other accessories.{{Citation needed|date=March 2023|reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} The most well known device is called ], a credit card reader for ] and Android devices. | ||
| Some use a special purpose interface (e.g. the ] deployed by the United States ]). Tokens can also be used as a photo ]. ] and ] can also serve as security tokens with proper programming. | Some use a special purpose interface (e.g. the ] deployed by the United States ]). Tokens can also be used as a photo ]. ] and ] can also serve as security tokens with proper programming. | ||
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| === Contactless tokens === | === Contactless tokens === | ||
| Unlike connected tokens, contactless tokens form a logical connection to the client computer but do not require a physical connection. The absence of the need for physical contact makes them more convenient than both connected and disconnected tokens. As a result, contactless tokens are a popular choice for ] systems and electronic payment solutions such as ] ], which uses ] to transmit authentication info from a keychain token. However, there have been various security concerns raised about RFID tokens after researchers at ] and ] discovered that RFID tags could be easily cracked and cloned.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/119661/does_your_car_key_pose_a_security_risk.html|title=Does Your Car Key Pose a Security Risk?|first=Erin|last=Biba|date=2005-02-14|access-date=2009-01-14|publisher=PC World}}</ref> | Unlike connected tokens, contactless tokens form a logical connection to the client computer but do not require a physical connection. The absence of the need for physical contact makes them more convenient than both connected and disconnected tokens. As a result, contactless tokens are a popular choice for ] systems and electronic payment solutions such as ] ], which uses ] to transmit authentication info from a keychain token.{{Citation needed|date=March 2023|reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} However, there have been various security concerns raised about RFID tokens after researchers at ] and ] discovered that RFID tags could be easily cracked and cloned.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/119661/does_your_car_key_pose_a_security_risk.html|title=Does Your Car Key Pose a Security Risk?|first=Erin|last=Biba|date=2005-02-14|access-date=2009-01-14|publisher=PC World|archive-date=2011-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605231530/http://www.pcworld.com/article/119661/does_your_car_key_pose_a_security_risk.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
| Another downside is that contactless tokens have relatively short battery lives; usually only 5–6 years, which is low compared to ] tokens which may last more than 10 years.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} Some tokens however do allow the batteries to be changed, thus reducing costs. | Another downside is that contactless tokens have relatively short battery lives; usually only 5–6 years, which is low compared to ] tokens which may last more than 10 years.{{Citation needed|date=June 2008}} Some tokens however do allow the batteries to be changed, thus reducing costs. | ||
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| {{tone|section|date=September 2016}} | {{tone|section|date=September 2016}} | ||
| The ] Low Energy protocols |
The ] protocols provide long lasting battery lifecycle of wireless transmission. | ||
| * The transmission of inherent Bluetooth identity data is the lowest quality for supporting authentication. | * The transmission of inherent Bluetooth identity data is the lowest quality for supporting authentication. | ||
| * A bidirectional connection for transactional data interchange serves for the most sophisticated authentication procedures. | * A bidirectional connection for transactional data interchange serves for the most sophisticated authentication procedures. | ||
| Although, the automatic transmission power control attempts for radial distance estimates. The escape is available apart from the standardised Bluetooth power control algorithm to provide a calibration on minimally required transmission power.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://depatisnet.dpma.de/DepatisNet/depatisnet?action=bibdat&docid=DE102009039879B9|title=Verfahren zum Steuern der Freigabe einer Einrichtung oder eines Dienstes, als Master ausgebildete Sendeempfangseinrichtung sowie System mit derartiger Einrichtung|website=dpma.de|access-date=16 April 2018}}</ref> | |||
| Bluetooth tokens are often combined with a USB token, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. Bluetooth authentication works when closer than 32 |
Bluetooth tokens are often combined with a USB token, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. Bluetooth authentication works when closer than {{convert|32|ft|m|abbr=off|sp=us}}. When the Bluetooth link is not properly operable, the token may be inserted into a ] ] to function. | ||
| Another combination is with ] to store locally larger amounts of identity data and process information as well.<ref> |
Another combination is with a ] to store locally larger amounts of identity data and process information as well.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.certgate.com/de/produkte/cgtoken |title=cgToken {{!}} certgate |website=www.certgate.com |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131009094610/http://www.certgate.com/de/produkte/cgtoken/ |archive-date=2013-10-09}}</ref> Another is a contactless BLE token that combines secure storage and tokenized release of fingerprint credentials.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hypr.com/biometric-token/|title=Biometric U2F OTP Token - HYPR|website=HYPR Corp|access-date=16 April 2018}}</ref> | ||
| In the USB mode of operation sign-off requires care for the token while mechanically coupled to the USB plug. The advantage with the Bluetooth mode of operation is the option of combining sign-off with distance metrics. Respective products are in preparation, following the concepts of electronic leash. | In the USB mode of operation sign-off requires care for the token while mechanically coupled to the USB plug. The advantage with the Bluetooth mode of operation is the option of combining sign-off with distance metrics. Respective products are in preparation, following the concepts of electronic leash. | ||
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| ==== NFC tokens ==== | ==== NFC tokens ==== | ||
| ] (NFC) tokens combined with a Bluetooth token may operate in several modes, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. NFC authentication works when closer than 1 |
] (NFC) tokens combined with a Bluetooth token may operate in several modes, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. NFC authentication works when closer than {{convert|1|ft|m|1|abbr=off|sp=us}}.{{Citation needed|date=March 2023|reason=This claim needs references to reliable sources.}} The NFC protocol bridges short distances to the reader while the Bluetooth connection serves for data provision with the token to enable authentication. Also when the Bluetooth link is not connected, the token may serve the locally stored authentication information in coarse positioning to the NFC reader and relieves from exact positioning to a connector.{{citation needed|date=October 2016}} | ||
| === Single sign-on software tokens === | === Single sign-on software tokens === | ||
| Some types of ] (SSO) solutions, like ], use the token to store software that allows for seamless authentication and password filling. As the passwords are stored on the token, users need not remember their passwords and therefore can select more secure passwords, or have more secure passwords assigned. Usually most tokens store a cryptographic hash of the password so that if the token is compromised, the password is still protected.{{ |
Some types of ] (SSO) solutions, like ], use the token to store software that allows for seamless authentication and password filling. As the passwords are stored on the token, users need not remember their passwords and therefore can select more secure passwords, or have more secure passwords assigned. Usually most tokens store a cryptographic hash of the password so that if the token is compromised, the password is still protected.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-01-15 |title=2.3.3: Authentication Methods - Security Tokens |url=https://eng.libretexts.org/Courses/Delta_College/Information_Security/02:_Authenticate_and_Identify/2.3:_Authentication_Methods_-_Password/2.3.3:_Authentication_Methods_-_Security_Tokens |access-date=2024-11-21 |website=Engineering LibreTexts |language=en}}</ref> | ||
| === Programmable tokens === | === Programmable tokens === | ||
| Programmable tokens are marketed as "drop-in" replacement of mobile applications such as Google Authenticator |
Programmable tokens are marketed as "drop-in" replacement of mobile applications such as ] (miniOTP<ref></ref>). They can be used as mobile app replacement, as well as in parallel as a backup. | ||
| == Vulnerabilities == | == Vulnerabilities == | ||
| Line 86: | Line 91: | ||
| === Loss and theft === | === Loss and theft === | ||
| The simplest vulnerability with any password container is theft or loss of the device. The chances of this happening, or happening |
The simplest vulnerability with any password container is theft or loss of the device. The chances of this happening, or happening unaware, can be reduced with physical security measures such as locks, electronic leash, or body sensor and alarm. Stolen tokens can be made useless by using ]. Commonly, in order to authenticate, a ] (PIN) must be entered along with the information provided by the token the same time as the output of the token. | ||
| === Attacking === | === Attacking === | ||
| Any system which allows users to authenticate via an untrusted network (such as the Internet) is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle |
Any system which allows users to authenticate via an untrusted network (such as ]) is vulnerable to ]s. In this type of attack, an attacker acts as the "go-between" of the user and the legitimate system, soliciting the token output from the legitimate user and then supplying it to the authentication system themselves. Since the token value is mathematically correct, the authentication succeeds and the fraudster is granted access. In 2006, ] was the victim of an attack when its hardware-token-equipped business users became the victims of a large Ukrainian-based man-in-the-middle ] operation.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/07/13/2-factor_phishing_attack/|title=Phishers rip into two-factor authentication |work=The Register |date=2006-07-13 |first=John |last=Leyden |access-date=2018-09-25|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url=http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/07/citibank_phish_spoofs_2factor_1.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110703141728/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/07/citibank_phish_spoofs_2factor_1.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=July 3, 2011|title=Citibank Phish Spoofs 2-Factor Authentication|first=Brian |last=Krebs |author-link=Brian Krebs|date=July 10, 2006|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=2018-09-25}}</ref> | ||
| === Breach of codes === | === Breach of codes === | ||
| In 2012, the Prosecco research team at INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt developed an efficient method of extracting the secret key from several ] cryptographic devices |
In 2012, the Prosecco research team at INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt developed an efficient method of extracting the secret key from several ] cryptographic devices.<ref> | ||
| {{cite news | {{cite news | ||
| | first = Somini | | first = Somini | ||
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| == Digital signature == | == Digital signature == | ||
| Trusted as a regular hand-written signature, the digital signature must be made with a private key known only to the person authorized to make the signature. Tokens that allow secure on-board generation and storage of private keys enable secure digital signatures, and can also be used for user authentication, as the private key also serves as a proof of the |
Trusted as a regular hand-written signature, the ] must be made with a private key known only to the person authorized to make the signature. Tokens that allow secure on-board generation and storage of private keys enable secure digital signatures, and can also be used for user authentication, as the private key also serves as a proof of the user's identity. | ||
| For tokens to identify the user, all tokens must have some kind of number that is unique. Not all approaches fully qualify as ]s according to some national laws.{{Citation needed|date=February 2007}} Tokens with no on-board keyboard or another ] cannot be used in some ] scenarios, such as confirming a bank transaction based on the bank account number that the funds are to be transferred to. | For tokens to identify the user, all tokens must have some kind of number that is unique. Not all approaches fully qualify as ]s according to some national laws.{{Citation needed|date=February 2007}} Tokens with no on-board keyboard or another ] cannot be used in some ] scenarios, such as confirming a bank transaction based on the bank account number that the funds are to be transferred to. | ||
| == See also == | == See also == | ||
| <!---♦♦♦ Please keep the list in alphabetical order ♦♦♦---> | |||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| ⚫ | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| Line 140: | Line 147: | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| * ] | * ] | ||
| ⚫ | * ] | ||
| == References == | == References == | ||
| Line 150: | Line 156: | ||
| == External links == | == External links == | ||
| {{Commons category |
* {{Commons category-inline}} | ||
| * | * {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424203824/http://www.openauthentication.org/ |date=2019-04-24 }} | ||
| {{DEFAULTSORT:Security Token}} | {{DEFAULTSORT:Security Token}} | ||
Latest revision as of 01:19, 8 December 2024
Device used to gain access to restricted resource | This article's factual accuracy is disputed. Review the definitions of "Security Token" and "Security Token Generator". Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably sourced. (November 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
A security token is a peripheral device used to gain access to an electronically restricted resource. The token is used in addition to, or in place of, a password. Examples of security tokens include wireless key cards used to open locked doors, a banking token used as a digital authenticator for signing in to online banking, or signing transactions such as wire transfers.
Security tokens can be used to store information such as passwords, cryptographic keys used to generate digital signatures, or biometric data (such as fingerprints). Some designs incorporate tamper resistant packaging, while others may include small keypads to allow entry of a PIN or a simple button to start a generation routine with some display capability to show a generated key number. Connected tokens utilize a variety of interfaces including USB, near-field communication (NFC), radio-frequency identification (RFID), or Bluetooth. Some tokens have audio capabilities designed for those who are vision-impaired.
Password types
All tokens contain some secret information used to prove identity. There are four different ways in which this information can be used:
- Static password token
- The device contains a password that is physically hidden (not visible to the possessor), but is transmitted for each authentication. This type is vulnerable to replay attacks.
- Synchronous dynamic password token
- A timer is used to rotate through various combinations produced by a cryptographic algorithm. The token and the authentication server must have synchronized clocks.
- Asynchronous password token
- A one-time password is generated without the use of a clock, either from a one-time pad or cryptographic algorithm.
- Challenge–response token
- Using public key cryptography, it is possible to prove possession of a private key without revealing that key. The authentication server encrypts a challenge (typically a random number, or at least data with some random parts) with a public key; the device proves it possesses a copy of the matching private key by providing the decrypted challenge.
Time-synchronized, one-time passwords change constantly at a set time interval; e.g., once per minute. To do this, some sort of synchronization must exist between the client's token and the authentication server. For disconnected tokens, this time-synchronization is done before the token is distributed to the client. Other token types do the synchronization when the token is inserted into an input device. The main problem with time-synchronized tokens is that they can, over time, become unsynchronized. However, some such systems, such as RSA's SecurID, allow the user to re-synchronize the server with the token, sometimes by entering several consecutive passcodes. Most also cannot have replaceable batteries and only last up to 5 years before having to be replaced – so there is an additional cost. Another type of one-time password uses a complex mathematical algorithm, such as a hash chain, to generate a series of one-time passwords from a secret shared key. Each password is unique, even when previous passwords are known. The open-source OATH algorithm is standardized; other algorithms are covered by US patents. Each password is observably unpredictable and independent of previous ones, whereby an adversary would be unable to guess what the next password may be, even with knowledge of all previous passwords.
Physical types
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Tokens can contain chips with functions varying from very simple to very complex, including multiple authentication methods.
The simplest security tokens do not need any connection to a computer. The tokens have a physical display; the authenticating user simply enters the displayed number to log in. Other tokens connect to the computer using wireless techniques, such as Bluetooth. These tokens transfer a key sequence to the local client or to a nearby access point.
Alternatively, another form of token that has been widely available for many years is a mobile device which communicates using an out-of-band channel (like voice, SMS, or USSD).
Still other tokens plug into the computer and may require a PIN. Depending on the type of the token, the computer OS will then either read the key from the token and perform a cryptographic operation on it, or ask the token's firmware to perform this operation.
A related application is the hardware dongle required by some computer programs to prove ownership of the software. The dongle is placed in an input device and the software accesses the I/O device in question to authorize the use of the software in question.
Commercial solutions are provided by a variety of vendors, each with their own proprietary (and often patented) implementation of variously used security features. Token designs meeting certain security standards are certified in the United States as compliant with FIPS 140, a federal security standard. Tokens without any kind of certification are sometimes viewed as suspect, as they often do not meet accepted government or industry security standards, have not been put through rigorous testing, and likely cannot provide the same level of cryptographic security as token solutions which have had their designs independently audited by third-party agencies.
Disconnected tokens
Disconnected tokens have neither a physical nor logical connection to the client computer. They typically do not require a special input device, and instead use a built-in screen to display the generated authentication data, which the user enters manually themselves via a keyboard or keypad. Disconnected tokens are the most common type of security token used (usually in combination with a password) in two-factor authentication for online identification.
Connected tokens
Connected tokens are tokens that must be physically connected to the computer with which the user is authenticating. Tokens in this category automatically transmit the authentication information to the client computer once a physical connection is made, eliminating the need for the user to manually enter the authentication information. However, in order to use a connected token, the appropriate input device must be installed. The most common types of physical tokens are smart cards and USB tokens (also called security keys), which require a smart card reader and a USB port respectively. Increasingly, FIDO2 tokens, supported by the open specification group FIDO Alliance have become popular for consumers with mainstream browser support beginning in 2015 and supported by popular websites and social media sites.
Older PC card tokens are made to work primarily with laptops. Type II PC Cards are preferred as a token as they are half as thick as Type III.
The audio jack port is a relatively practical method to establish connection between mobile devices, such as iPhone, iPad and Android, and other accessories. The most well known device is called Square, a credit card reader for iOS and Android devices.
Some use a special purpose interface (e.g. the crypto ignition key deployed by the United States National Security Agency). Tokens can also be used as a photo ID card. Cell phones and PDAs can also serve as security tokens with proper programming.
Smart cards
Main article: Smart cardMany connected tokens use smart card technology. Smart cards can be very cheap (around ten cents) and contain proven security mechanisms (as used by financial institutions, like cash cards). However, computational performance of smart cards is often rather limited because of extreme low power consumption and ultra-thin form-factor requirements.
Smart-card-based USB tokens which contain a smart card chip inside provide the functionality of both USB tokens and smart cards. They enable a broad range of security solutions and provide the abilities and security of a traditional smart card without requiring a unique input device. From the computer operating system's point of view such a token is a USB-connected smart card reader with one non-removable smart card present.
Contactless tokens
Unlike connected tokens, contactless tokens form a logical connection to the client computer but do not require a physical connection. The absence of the need for physical contact makes them more convenient than both connected and disconnected tokens. As a result, contactless tokens are a popular choice for keyless entry systems and electronic payment solutions such as Mobil Speedpass, which uses RFID to transmit authentication info from a keychain token. However, there have been various security concerns raised about RFID tokens after researchers at Johns Hopkins University and RSA Laboratories discovered that RFID tags could be easily cracked and cloned.
Another downside is that contactless tokens have relatively short battery lives; usually only 5–6 years, which is low compared to USB tokens which may last more than 10 years. Some tokens however do allow the batteries to be changed, thus reducing costs.
Bluetooth tokens
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The Bluetooth Low Energy protocols provide long lasting battery lifecycle of wireless transmission.
- The transmission of inherent Bluetooth identity data is the lowest quality for supporting authentication.
- A bidirectional connection for transactional data interchange serves for the most sophisticated authentication procedures.
Although, the automatic transmission power control attempts for radial distance estimates. The escape is available apart from the standardised Bluetooth power control algorithm to provide a calibration on minimally required transmission power.
Bluetooth tokens are often combined with a USB token, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. Bluetooth authentication works when closer than 32 feet (9.8 meters). When the Bluetooth link is not properly operable, the token may be inserted into a USB input device to function.
Another combination is with a smart card to store locally larger amounts of identity data and process information as well. Another is a contactless BLE token that combines secure storage and tokenized release of fingerprint credentials.
In the USB mode of operation sign-off requires care for the token while mechanically coupled to the USB plug. The advantage with the Bluetooth mode of operation is the option of combining sign-off with distance metrics. Respective products are in preparation, following the concepts of electronic leash.
NFC tokens
Near-field communication (NFC) tokens combined with a Bluetooth token may operate in several modes, thus working in both a connected and a disconnected state. NFC authentication works when closer than 1 foot (0.3 meters). The NFC protocol bridges short distances to the reader while the Bluetooth connection serves for data provision with the token to enable authentication. Also when the Bluetooth link is not connected, the token may serve the locally stored authentication information in coarse positioning to the NFC reader and relieves from exact positioning to a connector.
Single sign-on software tokens
Some types of single sign-on (SSO) solutions, like enterprise single sign-on, use the token to store software that allows for seamless authentication and password filling. As the passwords are stored on the token, users need not remember their passwords and therefore can select more secure passwords, or have more secure passwords assigned. Usually most tokens store a cryptographic hash of the password so that if the token is compromised, the password is still protected.
Programmable tokens
Programmable tokens are marketed as "drop-in" replacement of mobile applications such as Google Authenticator (miniOTP). They can be used as mobile app replacement, as well as in parallel as a backup.
Vulnerabilities
Loss and theft
The simplest vulnerability with any password container is theft or loss of the device. The chances of this happening, or happening unaware, can be reduced with physical security measures such as locks, electronic leash, or body sensor and alarm. Stolen tokens can be made useless by using two factor authentication. Commonly, in order to authenticate, a personal identification number (PIN) must be entered along with the information provided by the token the same time as the output of the token.
Attacking
Any system which allows users to authenticate via an untrusted network (such as the Internet) is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. In this type of attack, an attacker acts as the "go-between" of the user and the legitimate system, soliciting the token output from the legitimate user and then supplying it to the authentication system themselves. Since the token value is mathematically correct, the authentication succeeds and the fraudster is granted access. In 2006, Citibank was the victim of an attack when its hardware-token-equipped business users became the victims of a large Ukrainian-based man-in-the-middle phishing operation.
Breach of codes
In 2012, the Prosecco research team at INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt developed an efficient method of extracting the secret key from several PKCS #11 cryptographic devices. These findings were documented in INRIA Technical Report RR-7944, ID hal-00691958, and published at CRYPTO 2012.
Digital signature
Trusted as a regular hand-written signature, the digital signature must be made with a private key known only to the person authorized to make the signature. Tokens that allow secure on-board generation and storage of private keys enable secure digital signatures, and can also be used for user authentication, as the private key also serves as a proof of the user's identity.
For tokens to identify the user, all tokens must have some kind of number that is unique. Not all approaches fully qualify as digital signatures according to some national laws. Tokens with no on-board keyboard or another user interface cannot be used in some signing scenarios, such as confirming a bank transaction based on the bank account number that the funds are to be transferred to.
See also
- Authentication
- Authenticator
- Hardware security module
- Identity management
- Initiative for Open Authentication
- Mobile signature
- Multi-factor authentication
- Mutual authentication
- One-time pad
- Single sign-on
- Software token
References
- Schink, Marc; Wagner, Alexander; Unterstein, Florian; Heyszl, Johann (2021-07-09). "Security and Trust in Open Source Security Tokens". IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems: 176–201. doi:10.46586/tches.v2021.i3.176-201. ISSN 2569-2925. S2CID 235349083.
- RD, Token2 (2019-01-07). "Time drift: a major downside of TOTP hardware tokens". Medium. Retrieved 2020-11-21.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - "Time Drift in TOTP Hardware Tokens Explained and Solved - Protectimus Solutions". Protectimus. 2019-06-03. Retrieved 2020-11-21.
- "2.3.3: Authentication Methods - Security Tokens". Engineering LibreTexts. 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2023-05-08.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (April 2019). Security requirements for cryptographic modules (PDF) (Report). Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology. doi:10.6028/nist.fips.140-3.
- de Borde, Duncan (2007-06-28). "Two-factor authentication" (PDF). Siemens Insight Consulting. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-01-12. Retrieved 2009-01-14.
- Specification for Integrated Circuit(s) Cards Interface Devices Archived 2005-12-29 at the Wayback Machine, usb.org
- Biba, Erin (2005-02-14). "Does Your Car Key Pose a Security Risk?". PC World. Archived from the original on 2011-06-05. Retrieved 2009-01-14.
- "Verfahren zum Steuern der Freigabe einer Einrichtung oder eines Dienstes, als Master ausgebildete Sendeempfangseinrichtung sowie System mit derartiger Einrichtung". dpma.de. Retrieved 16 April 2018.
- "cgToken | certgate". www.certgate.com. Archived from the original on 2013-10-09.
- "Biometric U2F OTP Token - HYPR". HYPR Corp. Retrieved 16 April 2018.
- "2.3.3: Authentication Methods - Security Tokens". Engineering LibreTexts. 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2024-11-21.
- Programmable hardware tokens Token2 miniOTP
- Leyden, John (2006-07-13). "Phishers rip into two-factor authentication". The Register. Retrieved 2018-09-25.
- Krebs, Brian (July 10, 2006). "Citibank Phish Spoofs 2-Factor Authentication". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on July 3, 2011. Retrieved 2018-09-25.
- Sengupta, Somini (2012-06-25). "Computer Scientists Break Security Token Key in Record Time". New York Times. Retrieved 2012-06-25.
- Owano, Nancy (2012-06-27). "Team Prosecco dismantles security tokens". Phys.org. Retrieved 2014-03-29.
- "Prosecco :: Publications". Retrieved 2014-03-29.
- "Accepted Papers CRYPTO 2012". Retrieved 2014-03-29.
- General references
External links
Media related to OTP tokens at Wikimedia Commons- OATH Initiative for open authentication Archived 2019-04-24 at the Wayback Machine
