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{{about|a military unit|the data structure and algorithm|Rapidly exploring random tree}}
:{{redirect3|Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel|}}
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]
{{more citations needed|date=April 2024}}
The '''Radio Reconnaissance Platoon''' is the special operations element of the ] ]. In addition, a Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is the tactical ] collection element of the ].

], Tunisia, 1997]]
The '''Radio Reconnaissance Platoon''' is a specially trained ] element of a ] ]. A Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) was assigned as the tactical ] collection element for the ].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/mar_03_45.php |title=The USMC-SOCOM Connection |first=Otto |last=Kreisher |agency=Copley News Service |publisher=] |date=March 2003 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20100305112731/http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/mar_03_45.php |archivedate=5 March 2010}}</ref> Regular RRTs also participate in SOC operations during ], or MEU(SOC), deployments.


==Mission== ==Mission==
The mission of the Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is to conduct tactical signals intelligence/electronic warfare operations in support of the ] (MAGTF) commander during advance force, pre-assault, and deep post-assault operations, as well as maritime special purpose operations. The mission of the Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is to conduct tactical ] and ] operations in support of the ] (MAGTF) commander during advance force, pre-assault, and deep post-assault operations, as well as maritime special purpose operations.


The Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is used when the use of conventionally trained Radio Battalion elements is inappropriate or not feasible. The RRT is used when the use of conventionally-trained ] elements is inappropriate or not feasible.


While deployed with a ] (Special Operations Capable), or MEU(SOC), the Radio Reconnaissance Team is also a part of the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) as a unit of the Reconnaissance & Surveillance Element. The MSPF is a sub-element of the MEU(SOC), as a whole, and is responsible for performing specialized maritime missions. These missions include, but are not limited to: While deployed with a ] ], the Radio Reconnaissance Team is also a part of the ] (MSPF) as a unit of the ] (MSPF). The MSPF is a sub-element of the ], as a whole, and is responsible for performing specialized maritime missions. These missions include, but are not limited to:
* ] Missions
* Gas and Oil Platform Operations (GOPLAT)
* ] Operations (MIO)
* Direct Action Missions
* ]
* Demolitions
* Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
* Deep Reconnaissance
* In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR)
* Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)


==Capabilities== ==Capabilities==
* Indications and Warnings * Indications and warnings
* Limited ]
* ] (RDF)
* Communications support
* Limited ]
* ] and surveillance via ] format
* ] Database Development
* Communications Support
* ] and Surveillance via ] format
* Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)


===Insertion/Extraction Techniques=== ===Insertion/Extraction Techniques===
] ]]]
* Patrolling * Patrolling
* Helicopter Touchdown * Helicopter Touchdown
* ] * ]
** Personnel
** Small Boat (Hard Duck, Soft Duck, Rolled Duck) ** Small Boat (Hard Duck, Soft Duck, Rolled Duck)
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ] (SPIE) * ] (SPIE)
** Wet ** Wet
** Dry ** Dry
* ] ** ]
** Static-Line
** HALO/HAHO
* Over-the-Horizon ] (CRRC) * Over-the-Horizon ] (CRRC)
* ]


==Team Skills and Training==
===SIGINT=== ===SIGINT===
* Foreign Language * Foreign languages
** ]
** Arabic
** ]
** Russian
** ]
** Korean
** ]
** Spanish
** ]
** Persian
** ]
** Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian
** ]
* ] Intercept (>20 GPM)
** ]/]/]
* Analysis and Reporting
* ] intercept (>20 GPM)
* Analysis and reporting


===Reconnaissance Training=== ==Training==
RRP begins with completion of ], which is followed by the ], ] (SERE), and the Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program.<ref name="RadRecComp">{{cite journal |url=http://www.specialoperations.com/USMC/Radio_Recon/rrt.ppt |format=] |title=Radio Reconnaissance Company |author=1st Radio Battalion, Marine Forces Pacific |publisher=United States Marine Corps}}</ref>
* ]
]
* Amphibious Reconnaissance/BRC
* Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (])
* Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST)
* ]
* Mountain Survival/Mountain Leader
* Jumpmaster
* ]
* High Risk Personnel (HRP)


===Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program (RRIP)=== ===Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program===
The Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program (RRIP) is the in-house technical training tool used by the RRP to ensure that its Marines are not only tactically proficient in basic reconnaissance skills but technically adept in their respective areas of expertise. The RRIP has a duration of several days that can be dynamically determined to suit the needs of the ] and its deployment tempo. During the RRIP, an RRP candidate can expect very long and strenuous days. The RRIP culminates in a series of ]s (FTX's) from 24 to 72 hours in length.
]

The Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program is the in-house technical training tool used by the Radio Reconnaissance Platoons to ensure that its operators are not only tactically proficient in reconnaissance skills but technically adept in their respective areas of expertise. The RRIP has a duration of several weeks that can be dynamically determined to suit the needs of the platoon and its deployment tempo. During the RRIP, an RRP candidate can expect very long and strenuous days. The RRIP culminates in a series of field training exercises (FTX's) from 72-96 hours in length.
===Advanced training===
Advanced training may include:
* ] ]
* ] ]
* ] ] Course
* ] ] Course
* ] ] (])
* ]
* Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST) Masters Course
* ] Course
* Maritime Navigator Course


==Organization== ==Organization==
There are currently three Radio Battalions, two with their own Radio Reconnaissance Platoons. 1st Radio Battalion, ], is located at ]. 2nd Radio Battalion, ], is located at ]. There are currently three ]s, two with their own RRPs. 1st Radio Battalion, ] (MEF), is located at ], ]. 2nd Radio Battalion, ], is located at ], ].<ref>https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/Docs/MCISRE_Final_Sept2014.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref>


Owing to a restructuring of the entire Radio Battalion organization, the former 1st Radio Battalion, with its Radio Reconnaissance Platoon, moved from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii to Camp Pendleton, California in October of 2004. To date, there has been no establishment of a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon at the new 3rd Radio Battalion at Kaneohe Bay. The Radio Reconnaissance Teams of 1st Radio Battalion still deploy in support of III MEF's 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Alpha and Bravo cycles based in Okinawa. 1st Radio Battalion also deploys RRT's in support of I MEF's rotating 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units. Owing to a restructuring of the entire Radio Battalion organization, the former 1st Radio Battalion, with its RRP, moved from ] in ] to ] in October 2004. The RRP has since been reestablished in 3rd Radio Battalion, Kaneohe HI. The RRTs of 1st and 3rd Radio Battalions still deploy in support of ] ] Alpha and Bravo cycles based in ]. 1st Radio Battalion also deploys RRT's in support of I MEF's rotating ], ] and ]s.


A six-man Radio Reconnaissance Team is typically composed of a Team Leader (Staff Sergeant or Sergeant), Assistant Team Leader (Sergeant or Corporal), Point Man, Navigator, Radio-Telegraph Operator (RTO), and Assistant RTO. A six-man Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is typically composed of a Team Leader (] or ]), Assistant Team Leader (Sergeant or ]), ], ], ] Operator (RTO), and Assistant RTO.


==History== ==History==
<!-- Unsourced image removed: ] --> <!-- Unsourced image removed: ] -->
], Commanding General of FMFLant and future ], and LtCol Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2d Radio Battalion, FMFLant, met at ] in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2d ] Detachment from Beirut, Lebanon. The Marines of 2d Radio Battalion had conducted tactical ] operations in support of the entire deployment of the US peacekeeping force in Beirut since the initial landings at ]. ], Commanding General of ] (FMFLant) and future ], and Lt. Col. Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2nd ], ], met at ] in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2nd ] Detachment from ], ]. The ] of 2nd] had conducted tactical ] operations in support of the entire deployment of the ] in ] since the initial landings at ].


During the wait, Gray and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the Radio Battalion detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical ] database available from national and theater assets prior to the Marines' landing in Beirut. Equally significant were the unconventional aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in Beirut. Those that posed the greatest threat to the Marines did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or callsigns. During the wait, Gray and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the ] detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical ] database available from national and theater assets prior to the ]' landing in ]. Equally significant were the unconventional aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in ]. Those that posed the greatest threat to the ] did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or ]s.


Since the detachment had received no intelligence from the ] before arriving in Beirut, they were forced to start with nothing. General Gray wanted to try to integrate a ] with attached Radio Battalion ], selected and trained for ground reconnaissance and special operations. He directed LtCol. Keller to coordinate with 2d Force Reconnaissance Company to test this idea. Because the detachment had received no intelligence from the ] prior to deployment, they were forced to start from scratch upon arrival in ]. General Gray wanted to integrate a ] team with attached ] ], selected and trained for ] and special operations. He directed Lt. Col. Keller to coordinate with ] to test this idea.


Keller coordinated with the Commanding Officer of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, Maj. Joe Crockett. Their initial step was to attach a Radio Battalion Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a Force Recon Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. The experiment did not go well, and the concept was tabled until that summer, when Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Gallina became CO of 2d Radio Bn. General Gray discussed the idea with Gallina, who became a major proponent of the concept. Keller coordinated with the Commanding Officer of ], Maj. Joe Crockett. Their initial step was to attach a ] Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a ] Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. The experiment did not go well, and the concept was tabled until that summer, when Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Gallina became Commanding Officer (CO) of 2nd ] General Gray discussed the idea with Gallina, who became a major proponent of the concept.


In December 1984, Captain E.L. Gillespie arrived at Radio Battalion to develop a concept of operations to integrate Radio Battalion Marines with Force Reconnaissance Teams for independent advance force operations. In December 1984, ] E.L. Gillespie, a J2 SIGINT Operations Officer in ], arrived at ] to develop a concept of operations to integrate ] Marines with ] teams for independent advance force operations.


Captain Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" contending that integration with a 4-man Force Recon Team was not viable due to conflicting missions. He suggested that a separate 6-man Radio Bn team be trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, ground reconnaissance and survival skills. Captain Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" contending that integration with a four-man ] team was not viable due to conflicting missions. He suggested that a separate six-man ] team be trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, terrestrial reconnaissance, and survival skills.


The original mission statement for the team was, "To conduct limited communications intelligence and specified electronic warfare operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions.'' The original mission statement for the team was, "To conduct limited ] and specified ] operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions.''


The initial list of titles for this proposed group was: The initial list of titles for this proposed group was:
Line 101: Line 98:
* Radio Research Team (RRT) * Radio Research Team (RRT)
* Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) * Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)
General Gray got the list and personally circled the Radio Reconnaissance Team as the official name for the teams. He then directed the CO of Radio Battalion to screen, select, and train the required personnel to deploy two six-man RRT's for a ] operational deployment during the advance force operational phase of Exercise Solid Shield-85. General Gray got the list and personally circled the Radio Reconnaissance Team as the official name for the teams. He then directed the CO of ] to screen, select, and train the required personnel to deploy two six-man RRT's for a ] operational deployment during the advance force operational phase of Exercise Solid Shield-85.


He also ensured that the CO of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company would assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping, and that II MEF's Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes would adequately reflect the integration of the RRT. He also ensured that the CO of ] would assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping, and that ] Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes would adequately reflect the integration of the RRT.


Captain Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2nd Radio Battalion personnel. However, most Radio Battalion Marines did not share the officers' enthusiasm for the project. There was also resistance by Company Commanders, who did not want to allow their best Marines to be assigned to the task. By and large, (with the exception of the SNCO's and Sergeants) the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were a group of "malcontents" that were just marking time and waiting for their discharge papers. Captain Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2nd ] personnel. However, most ] Marines did not share the officers' enthusiasm for the project. There was also resistance by Company Commanders, who did not want to allow their best Marines to be assigned to the task. With the exception of the ] and ], the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were "malcontents" waiting to be ].


At this time, Major Carrick insisted that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company Indocrination Process (Indoc). Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the Radio Battalion Marines would either quit or fail the Indoc and the project would be put to rest once and for all. At this time, Major Carrick insisted that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2nd ] Company ]. Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the ] Marines would either quit or fail the ] and the project would be put to rest once and for all.


However, all of the RRT candidates and one other Marine from 6th Marines passed the Indoc. Captain Gillespie later talked to the indoc instructors who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit, but they wouldn't. However, all of the RRT candidates passed the ]. Captain Gillespie later talked to the ] instructors, who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit, but they wouldn't.


After the Indoc, one RRT was sent to ] training at ], Georgia, while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85. The exercise went well, and by all accounts, the Radio Reconnaissance ] was an unqualified success. After the ], one RRT was sent to ] at ], ], while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85. The exercise went well, and by all accounts, the ] ] was an unqualified success.


In 1987, 1st Radio Battalion officially stood up a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon, prior to 1987 1st Radio Battalion shied away from designating the unit as "Radio Reconnaissance" and referred to the unit and its members as the MEU(SOC) Detachment. The initial cadre/plank owners were CWO2 Denny Taylor, MSgt Aubrey Henson, SSgt Scott Laasanen and Sgt's Daniel Stinson and Mike Portillo. 1st RRP Marines trained with A Co. 1st Recon Bn in the initial stages as well as attending varied multiservice schools to perfect their skills. The RRIP for the first two years of 1st RRP consisted of between 4-6 months of training, formal schools and exercises prior to a Marine being certified and assigned to a team. In 1987, ] at ] officially created a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. Prior to 1987, the ] had shied away from designating the unit as "Radio Reconnaissance" for fear of dividing vital resources and creating a separatist culture within the ranks of MEU(SOC) deploying ] detachments. 1st RRP Marines trained with Alpha Company, ] in the initial stages and attended various multi-service schools to perfect their skills. During its first two years, 1st ] RRIP consisted of 4–6 months of training, formal schools, and exercises prior to a Marine achieving certification and being assigned to a team.


Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the ] (Special Operations Capable) Radio Battalion Detachment assigned to each of the rotating 11th, 13th, 15th, 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEU(SOC) deployments. Captain Gillespie was assigned as the officer in charge of the 2d RadBn Detachment, 24th ] in 1986, which was the first RadBn detachment to conduct real world operations during ] (a Kuwaiti Oil Tanker escort operation). Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the ] (]) ] Detachment assigned to each of the rotating ], ], ], ], ], and ] deployments.


The 24th ] RRT reinforced by members of 1st RRP with specific linguist skills, was involved in significant ] operations in the ] and provided intelligence support for several combat actions against Iranian forces, including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel, ] and the incident at Middle Shoals Light. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in Panama leading to and during ], the invasion of Panama. Captain Gillespie was assigned as the officer in charge of the 2nd ] Detachment, 24th MEU(SOC) in 1986, which was the first ] detachment to conduct real-world operations during ] (a ]i ] escort operation). The 24th MEU(SOC) RRT reinforced by members of 1st RRP with specific linguist skills, was involved in significant cryptologic operations in the ] and provided intelligence support for several ] ], including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel, ] and the ]. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in ] leading to and during ], the invasion of ].


In the ] Theater, the first certified RRT to participate in real-world operations deployed in 1988–89 as part of the 13th MEU(SOC) ] Detachment commanded by ] Kirk Kicklighter. ] Scott Laasanen and Sergeant Daniel Stinson served as team leaders during collection missions in support of ] intervening in ] in ], as well as intelligence operations against rebel forces seeking to ] the newly installed government of ] ] in the Republic of the ].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.radioreconnaissanceproject.com/history | title=History }}</ref>
In many cases, ] Commanders would state that the RRT's were the most valuable intelligence and communications asset in the force, and that if only six Marines could be inserted during advance force, pre-assault, or special operations mission, the RRT would be the ones to go.


==See also== ==See also==

{{portal|United States Marine Corps|USMC_logo.svg}}
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ] * ]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
*{{cite book|
author=Wise, Harold Lee|
title=Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88|
url=http://www.insidethedangerzone.com|
location=Annapolis | publisher=Naval Institute Press|
year=2007|
isbn=978-1-59114-970-5}}


==External links== ==External links==
*


{{US Marine Corps navbox}}
]

]
{{authority control}}
]

]
]
]

Latest revision as of 02:02, 24 December 2024

This article is about a military unit. For the data structure and algorithm, see Rapidly exploring random tree.

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "Radio Reconnaissance Platoon" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (April 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
The RRT of the 22nd MEU(SOC), Tunisia, 1997

The Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is a specially trained Marine Corps Intelligence element of a United States Marine Corps Radio Battalion. A Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) was assigned as the tactical signals intelligence collection element for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Detachment One. Regular RRTs also participate in SOC operations during Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or MEU(SOC), deployments.

Mission

The mission of the Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is to conduct tactical signals intelligence and electronic warfare operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander during advance force, pre-assault, and deep post-assault operations, as well as maritime special purpose operations.

The RRT is used when the use of conventionally-trained radio battalion elements is inappropriate or not feasible.

While deployed with a MEU (SOC), the Radio Reconnaissance Team is also a part of the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) as a unit of the Reconnaissance & Surveillance Element (MSPF). The MSPF is a sub-element of the MEU(SOC), as a whole, and is responsible for performing specialized maritime missions. These missions include, but are not limited to:

Capabilities

Insertion/Extraction Techniques

A Radio Reconnaissance Marine fast roping from a CH-46 Sea Knight

SIGINT

Training

RRP begins with completion of Army Airborne School, which is followed by the Basic Reconnaissance Course, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE), and the Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program.

A Sergeant (center) encourages an RRP candidate (right) during the last few yards of the Ruck Run event of the Indoc.

Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program

The Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program (RRIP) is the in-house technical training tool used by the RRP to ensure that its Marines are not only tactically proficient in basic reconnaissance skills but technically adept in their respective areas of expertise. The RRIP has a duration of several days that can be dynamically determined to suit the needs of the platoon and its deployment tempo. During the RRIP, an RRP candidate can expect very long and strenuous days. The RRIP culminates in a series of field training exercises (FTX's) from 24 to 72 hours in length.

Advanced training

Advanced training may include:

Organization

There are currently three Radio Battalions, two with their own RRPs. 1st Radio Battalion, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), is located at Camp Pendleton, California. 2nd Radio Battalion, II MEF, is located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Owing to a restructuring of the entire Radio Battalion organization, the former 1st Radio Battalion, with its RRP, moved from Marine Corps Base Hawaii in Kāneʻohe Bay to Camp Pendleton in October 2004. The RRP has since been reestablished in 3rd Radio Battalion, Kaneohe HI. The RRTs of 1st and 3rd Radio Battalions still deploy in support of III MEF's 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Alpha and Bravo cycles based in Okinawa. 1st Radio Battalion also deploys RRT's in support of I MEF's rotating 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units.

A six-man Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is typically composed of a Team Leader (Staff Sergeant or Sergeant), Assistant Team Leader (Sergeant or Corporal), Point Man, Navigator, Radio-Telegraph Operator (RTO), and Assistant RTO.

History

Lt. General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) and future Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2nd Radio Battalion, FMFLant, met at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2nd Radio Battalion Detachment from Beirut, Lebanon. The Marines of 2ndRadio Battalion had conducted tactical cryptologic operations in support of the entire deployment of the US peacekeeping force in Beirut since the initial landings at Beirut International Airport.

During the wait, Gray and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the Radio Battalion detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical cryptologic database available from national and theater assets prior to the Marines' landing in Beirut. Equally significant were the unconventional aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in Beirut. Those that posed the greatest threat to the Marines did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or call signs.

Because the detachment had received no intelligence from the National Security Agency prior to deployment, they were forced to start from scratch upon arrival in Beirut. General Gray wanted to integrate a Force Reconnaissance team with attached Radio Battalion cryptologists, selected and trained for terrestrial reconnaissance and special operations. He directed Lt. Col. Keller to coordinate with 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company to test this idea.

Keller coordinated with the Commanding Officer of 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company, Maj. Joe Crockett. Their initial step was to attach a Radio Battalion Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a Force Recon Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. The experiment did not go well, and the concept was tabled until that summer, when Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Gallina became Commanding Officer (CO) of 2nd Radio Bn. General Gray discussed the idea with Gallina, who became a major proponent of the concept.

In December 1984, Captain E.L. Gillespie, a J2 SIGINT Operations Officer in Joint Special Operations Command, arrived at Radio Battalion to develop a concept of operations to integrate Radio Battalion Marines with Force Recon teams for independent advance force operations.

Captain Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" contending that integration with a four-man Force Recon team was not viable due to conflicting missions. He suggested that a separate six-man Radio Bn team be trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, terrestrial reconnaissance, and survival skills.

The original mission statement for the team was, "To conduct limited communications intelligence and specified electronic warfare operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions.

The initial list of titles for this proposed group was:

  • Force Reconnaissance Support Team (FRST)
  • Radio Search Team (RST)
  • Signal Search Team (SST)
  • Special Search Team (SST)
  • Radio Research Team (RRT)
  • Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)

General Gray got the list and personally circled the Radio Reconnaissance Team as the official name for the teams. He then directed the CO of Radio Battalion to screen, select, and train the required personnel to deploy two six-man RRT's for a proof of concept operational deployment during the advance force operational phase of Exercise Solid Shield-85.

He also ensured that the CO of 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company would assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping, and that II MEF's Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes would adequately reflect the integration of the RRT.

Captain Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2nd Radio Battalion personnel. However, most Radio Battalion Marines did not share the officers' enthusiasm for the project. There was also resistance by Company Commanders, who did not want to allow their best Marines to be assigned to the task. With the exception of the Senior non-commissioned officers and Sergeants, the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were "malcontents" waiting to be discharged.

At this time, Major Carrick insisted that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company Indoctrination Process (Indoc). Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the Radio Battalion Marines would either quit or fail the Indoc and the project would be put to rest once and for all.

However, all of the RRT candidates passed the Indoc. Captain Gillespie later talked to the Indoc instructors, who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit, but they wouldn't.

After the Indoc, one RRT was sent to Army Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia, while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85. The exercise went well, and by all accounts, the Radio Reconnaissance proof of concept was an unqualified success.

In 1987, 1st Radio Battalion at MCB Hawaii officially created a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. Prior to 1987, the battalion had shied away from designating the unit as "Radio Reconnaissance" for fear of dividing vital resources and creating a separatist culture within the ranks of MEU(SOC) deploying Radio Battalion detachments. 1st RRP Marines trained with Alpha Company, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion in the initial stages and attended various multi-service schools to perfect their skills. During its first two years, 1st Radio Battalion's RRIP consisted of 4–6 months of training, formal schools, and exercises prior to a Marine achieving certification and being assigned to a team.

Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Radio Battalion Detachment assigned to each of the rotating 11th, 13th, 15th, 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEU(SOC) deployments.

Captain Gillespie was assigned as the officer in charge of the 2nd Radio Battalion Detachment, 24th MEU(SOC) in 1986, which was the first Radio Battalion detachment to conduct real-world operations during Operation Earnest Will (a Kuwaiti oil tanker escort operation). The 24th MEU(SOC) RRT reinforced by members of 1st RRP with specific linguist skills, was involved in significant cryptologic operations in the Persian Gulf and provided intelligence support for several combat actions against Iranian forces, including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel, Iran Ajr and the incident at Middle Shoals Light. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in Panama leading to and during Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama.

In the Pacific Theater, the first certified RRT to participate in real-world operations deployed in 1988–89 as part of the 13th MEU(SOC) Radio Battalion Detachment commanded by First Lieutenant Kirk Kicklighter. Staff Sergeant Scott Laasanen and Sergeant Daniel Stinson served as team leaders during collection missions in support of Australian forces intervening in civil war in Papua New Guinea, as well as intelligence operations against rebel forces seeking to overthrow the newly installed government of President Corazon Aquino in the Republic of the Philippines.

See also

References

  1. Kreisher, Otto (March 2003). "The USMC-SOCOM Connection". Navy League of the United States. Copley News Service. Archived from the original on 5 March 2010.
  2. 1st Radio Battalion, Marine Forces Pacific. "Radio Reconnaissance Company" (PPT). United States Marine Corps. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  3. https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/Docs/MCISRE_Final_Sept2014.pdf
  4. "History".

Further reading

External links

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