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{{Short description|Interwar Polish military plan to defend against Soviet attack}}
⚫ '''Plan Wschód''' (''Plan East'') was a ] defensive ], created in case of war with the ]. Unlike ] (''Plan West''), it was being prepared during the whole ], as the government of the ] treated the Soviet Union as the main enemy, capable of starting a full-scale war. However, Plan East has not been preserved to this day; what is known are only some loose documents.
{{More citations needed|date=May 2012}}
⚫ '''Plan East''' ({{langx|pl|Plan Wschód}}) was a Polish defensive ] that was created in the 1920s and the 1930s in case of war against the ]. Unlike ] (''Plan Zachód''), it was being prepared during the whole ], as the government of the ] treated the Soviet Union as the greatest potential military threat that was capable of initiating a full-scale war. However, only a few loose historical documents remain of the original plan today.


==Introduction== ==Background==
Since its first days, the Second Polish Republic was involved in wars and conflicts with almost all its neighbors (see: ], ], ], ], ], ]). However, of all these countries, two were rightfully regarded as possible aggressors — ] and the Soviet Union. Since its establishment after ], the ] had been involved in wars and conflicts with almost all of its neighbours (see ], ], ], ], ] and ]). However, only two of the countries were considered to be major threats: ] and the ].<ref name="Seidner-1-2">Stanley S. Seidner, ''Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland'', New York, 1978, chs. 1-2.</ref>


In the 1920s and the 1930s, Polish leaders focused their efforts on countering the potential threat from the east. Fresh were memories of the Polish-Soviet War and the ], which saved Poland and the rest of Europe from the spread of the ] by force.<ref name="Seidner-1-2" /><ref name="Suny">
Rulers of the 1920s and 1930s Poland were obsessed with the threat from the East. Fresh were memories of the ] and the ], which saved both Poland and ] from ] spreading ] by force.<ref name="Suny">According to the British historian ], the Polish-Soviet War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more. Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution." It would be twenty years before the Bolsheviks would send their armies abroad to 'make revolution'.<br>], ''The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States'', Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-508105-6, </ref><ref name="Gella">According to American sociologist ] "the Polish victory had gained twenty years of independence not only for Poland, but at least for an entire central part of Europe.<br>], ''Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors'', SUNY Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-833-2, </ref> Both the ] and the government in ] were sure that another war with the Soviets was inevitable, thus preparations for it were far more advanced than preparation for armed conflict with Germany. Only after 1935, when ] anti-Polish propaganda increased, Army planners started to draw Plan West, as threats from Poland’s western neighbor became visible.


According to the British historian ], the Polish-Soviet War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more.... Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution". It would be twenty years before the Bolsheviks would send their armies abroad to "make revolution".<br>], ''The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States'', Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|0-19-508105-6}}, </ref><ref name="Gella">
==Polish-Soviet border in the interbellum==
According to the American sociologist ], "the Polish victory had gained twenty years of independence not only for Poland, but at least for an entire central part of Europe".<br />], ''Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors'', SUNY Press, 1988, {{ISBN|0-88706-833-2}}, </ref>
⚫ Poland’s borderline with the Soviet Union was 1,412 kilometers long (by comparison, the border with Germany and its province of ] was 1,912 km long). Like the border with Germany, it lacked any major geographical obstacles, so defence of this sprawling line was very difficult.


Since both the ] and the government in ] were certain that war against the Soviets was inevitable, preparations for it were far more advanced than those against Germany. It was only after 1935, when ] propaganda in Germany increased, that the German threat became visible enough for army planners to begin drawing up Plan West. Even in 1939, the number of completed fortifications in the east of Poland vastly outnumbered those in the west.<ref>Stanley S. Seidner, ''Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland'', New York, 1978, pp. 105–106.</ref>
⚫ In the north there was a flat, plain land, with huge forests (e.g. Puszcza Nalibocka — the Wilderness of Naliboki). Also, in the north there was a major rail route connecting ] to Western Europe. The major city in this area was ], located in the northeast corner of interbellum Poland.


==Interbellum Polish–Soviet border==
⚫ In the middle there was a huge, sparsely populated swamp known as ]. This land had no roads and few rail lines, however its strategic importance was huge, as its landscape made it possible to organize a long-lasting defence. In Polesie as well as in adjacent ], there were no major urban centers.
⚫ Poland's border with the Soviet Union was 1,412&nbsp;km long. By comparison, the border with Germany, including ], was more than 20% longer, at 1,912&nbsp;km. Neither border contained any major geographical obstacles, which made their defence very difficult.


⚫ In the north was flat land with huge forests such as ], the Wilderness of Naliboki. In addition, a major railway connecting ] to ] extended across the northern Poland. The area's major conurbation was ], in the northeast of interbellum Poland.
⚫ The south, which had formerly belonged to the ] as the eastern part of the province of ], was the best developed, with high rail density, growing industry (e.g., oil fields in ]), and the well-developed agriculture of ]. One of the major urban centers of interbellum Poland, ], was located there. Also, the borderline with the Soviet Union was marked by a natural obstacle—the ] river.


⚫ The centre of the country was primarily a huge sparsely-populated swamp, known as ]. Although it had no roads and few rail lines, it had a supreme strategic importance, as its landscape allowed a prolonged, organized defense. Neither Polesie nor the adjacent ] contained any major urban areas.
It should be mentioned that basically all Polish industrial and urban centers were located in the West. This made long-lasting defence possible, as Soviets’ reaching of ], ], ] or ] would possibly have taken weeks. Also, Polish planners counted on the cooperation of ], which was Poland’s main ally in the East.


⚫ The south, formerly a portion of the ] province of ], was the most highly-developed area, with ita high density of rail lines, growing amount of industry (such as oil fields in ]) and well-developed agriculture of ]. ], one of the major cities of interbellum Poland, was located in the area. In addition, the Soviet border was marked by a natural obstacle, the ] River.<ref name=sss108-109>Stanley S. Seidner, ''Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland'', New York, 1978, pp. 108–109.</ref>
⚫ ===Border conflicts in the East===
⚫ Soviet government from the very beginning undermined validity of the ], the same treaty that had been signed by Moscow in 1921. In the early 1920s the Soviets on several occasions organized guerilla attacks on Polish towns and villages located near the border. The most famous was the attack on ], which took place on the night of ]-] ]. This event resulted in creation of Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (]). Such attacks were numerous in the 1920s, however in the 1930s the situation improved.


Virtually all Polish industrial and urban centres were in the west and so a long-lasting defence was possible, as a Soviet force would have taken up to several weeks to reach ], ], ] or ].
==Plan East and its idea==
⚫ Unfortunately, no copy of the Plan has been preserved. All that is known are some basic ideas, but restoring the whole Plan is impossible. Work on the document was completed on ], ]. The Plan was based on the notions of ], who until his death in 1935 was sure that the war would start in the East. Thus most ] and field fortifications were held in the east, while Poland's western border was to a large extent neglected. Up to this day some of these fortifications can be seen in the ] area. Bunkers built by Polish Corps of Engineers in the 1930s were in late 1940s used by the ] in their guerilla skirmishes with ].


When they developed the plan, Polish planners assumed that co-operation and support would be forthcoming from ], which was Poland's ].<ref name="Seidner-1-2"/>
⚫ Polish planners were well aware of the fact that the ] was in all elements superior. Therefore, the main idea was to organize a so-called “resistance in motion’’, and to try to split Soviet forces south and north of the Polesie swamps. Frontline armies, located in the vicinity of the border, were going to try to stop advance of the aggressors and to bleed them, while reserves, located mostly in the area of ], were supposed to enter the conflict in later stages.


⚫ ===Border conflicts===
⚫ According to some sources, the Poles were expecting the Red Army to advance in three directions. First was along the rail line ] - Baranowicze - ] - Warsaw. Second direction was along the line Sarny - ] - ] and the third, in the south, along the line ] - Lwow.
⚫ The Soviet government undermined the validity of the ], which it had signed in 1921, from the outset. In the early 1920s, the Soviets repeatedly organized ] attacks on Polish settlements close to the border. The most famous one was the attack on ], which took place on the night of August 3–4, 1924, which prompted the creation of the ''Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza'' (]). Such attacks continued throughout the 1920s but reduced in scale during the 1930s, particularly after the signing of the 1932 ].<ref name="Seidner-1-2"/>


==Summary==
⚫ ==Structure of the Polish Army in the East==
⚫ No complete copy of the plan has been preserved. All that is known are the basic precepts, and restoring the whole plan is impossible. Work on the document was completed on February 4, 1939. The plan was based on the notions of ], who until his death in 1935 was sure that war would come from the east. Thus, most ] and field fortifications were held in the east, and Poland's western border was largely neglected. Some of the fortifications can still be seen in the area around ] (see ]). Bunkers built by Polish Corps of Engineers in the 1930s were used in late 1940s by the ] in its guerilla skirmishes against the Soviet ].
⚫ According to Polish historian Rajmund Szubanski, in case of war in the East, the bulk of the Polish Army was supposed to have been concentrated both in the north and south, with middle part of the borderline left to a large extent unguarded. Some military historians claim today that Polish planners placed too many units in the vicinity of the borderline, which would have resulted in their total destruction in the first days of the conflict. On the contrary - rear positions were inadequately protected.


⚫ Polish planners were well aware that the Red Army was, in many ways, superior to their own. Therefore, the main idea was to organize a so-called "resistance in motion" and to try to split Soviet forces south and north of the vast Polesie swamps. Frontline armies, in the vicinity of the border, were to try to delay the advance of the aggressors and to bleed them, and reserves, mostly in the areas of ] and ], were intended to enter the conflict in its later stages.
⚫ ===Front-line units===
⚫ * In the extreme north-east, around the rail nexus of ], there was Armia Wilno, with possibly consisted of three Infantry Divisions (1st “Legionnaire” I.D. from ], 19th I.D. from Wilno, 29th I.D. from ]), two Cavalry Brigades (3rd Wilenska BK from Wilno, 4th Suwalska BK from ]), and the 5th Lida Air Corps.


⚫ The Poles were expecting the Red Army to advance in three directions: along the ]–]–]–Warsaw rail line, along the Sarny–]–] line and along the ]–Lwów line.
* South to it there was Armia ], probably consisting of four Infantry Divisions (9th I.D. from ], 20th I.D. from Baranowicze, 18th I.D. from ], 28th I.D. from Warszawa), two Cavalry Brigades (9th Nowogrodzka BK from Baranowicze, 11th Podlaska BK from Bialystok) and the 4th Torun Air Corps.


⚫ ==Structure of Polish Army==
⚫ * In the middle there was Armia Polesie (also called Independent Operational Group Polesie). It possibly consisted of three Infantry Divisions (8th I.D. from ], 27th I.D. from ], 30th I.D. from ]), one Cavalry Brigade (1st Mazowiecka BK from Warszawa), ] and the 3rd Poznan Air Corps.
⚫ According to the Polish historian Rajmund Szubański, in case of war in the east, the bulk of the Polish Army would be concentrated in the north and the south, with the central section of the border left mostly unguarded. Some military historians claim that Polish planners placed too many units close to the border, which would have resulted in their total destruction in the opening days of the conflict. In contrast, the rear positions were inadequately protected.<!--Not sure about this sentence. Disputing the historians' views (both uncited), or meant to be "On the other hand"?--><ref name=sss108-109/>


⚫ ===Frontline units===
* To the south there was Armia Wolyn - three Infantry Divisions (2nd “Legionnaire” I.D. from ], 3rd “Legionnaire” I.D. from ], 13th I.D. from ]), one Cavalry Brigade (10th Wolynska BK from Rowne) and the 2nd Krakow Air Corps.
Seidner outlines the deployment:<ref name="Seidner-app">Stanley S. Seidner, ''Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland'', New York, 1978, appendices.</ref>
⚫ * In the extreme northeast, around the rail nexus of ], was '''Armia Wilno''', which possibly had three infantry divisions (] from ], ], also from Wilno, ] from ]), two Cavalry Brigades (] from Wilno, ] from ]), and the 5th Air Corps from ].
* South of Armia Wilno was '''Armia Baranowicze''', with probably four infantry divisions (] from ], ] from ], ] from ], and ] from ]), two cavalry brigades (] from Baranowicze, ] from Białystok) and the 4th Air Corps from ].
⚫ * In the centre was '''Armia Polesie''' (also called ''']'''), which was possibly composed of three infantry divisions (] from ], ] from ], ] from ]), one cavalry brigade (] from Warsaw), ] and the 3rd Air Corps from ].
* Further south was '''Armia Wołyń''', with three infantry divisions (] from ], ] from ], ] from ]), one cavalry brigade (] from Równe) and the 2nd Air Corps from ].
* In the extreme south was '''Armia Podole''', with five infantry divisions (] from ], ] from ], ] from ], ] from ], ] from ]), two cavalry brigades (] from Stanisławów, ] from ]) and the 6th Air Corps from ].


⚫ Apart from those units were all of the armies' Border Area Defence Corps units and garrisons of the main cities.
* In the extreme south there was Armia Podole - five Infantry Divisions (5th I.D. from Lwow, 11th I.D. from ], 12th I.D. from ], 22nd I.D. from ], 24th I.D. from ]), two Cavalry Brigades (6th Podolska BK from Stanislawow, 2nd Kresowa BK from ]) and the 6th Lwow Air Corps.

⚫ Apart from these units, in all armies there were Border-Area Defence Corps units and garrisons of the main cities.


===Reserve forces=== ===Reserve forces===
<ref name="Seidner-app" />
* Behind Armia Wilno and Armia Baranowicze there was Armia ], consisting of three Infantry Divisions. * Behind Armia Wilno and Armia Baranowicze was Armia ], with three infantry divisions.
⚫ * Behind Armia Podole and Armia Wołyń was Armia Lwów, with two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade (5th Krakowska BK from Kraków).
⚫ * Far behind the frontlines, around the city of Brzesc, was the main reserve, with probably six IDs, two cavalry brigades (7th Wielkopolska BK from Poznań, 8th Pomorska BK from ]), an armoured brigade and the 1st Warsaw Air Corps.


⚫ ==Red Army along Polish border==
⚫ * Behind Armia Podole and Armia Wolyn there was Armia Lwow, consisting of two Infantry Divisions and a Cavalry Brigade (5th Krakowska BK from Krakow).
⚫ In the mid-1930s, the Soviet government started an immense armament program, which resulted in a rapid increase in the number of units. The number of tanks and airplanes along the Polish border grew significantly, and the Soviets enjoyed superiority in all ways. Polish planners anticipated that the Soviets had three times as many soldiers as their ]. The Soviets' superiority in tanks and airplanes was not estimated, but the disproportion was immense. In August 1939, along the Polish border were likely as many as 173&nbsp;Red Army infantry divisions (see ]).
⚫ * Deep in the rear, around the city of Brzesc, there was the main reserve, probably consisting of six IDs, two Cavalry Brigades (7th Wielkopolska BK from Poznan, 8th Pomorska BK from ]), an Armored Brigade and the 1st Warsaw Air Corps.


==Invasion of Poland==
⚫ ==The Red Army and its units along the Polish border==
⚫ On September 1, 1939, Germany ]. Consequently, Plan East became void. On September 17, with a free hand because of the ], the Soviets broke their non-aggression pact by ]. The Red Army met little resistance, as the Polish Army was concentrated in the west in fighting the Germans. Thus, the Soviets quickly managed to occupy Polish ].
⚫ In the mid-1930s, the Soviet government started an immense armament program, which resulted in a fast increase of units. Number of tanks and airplanes grew significantly, and the Soviets enjoyed superiority in all elements. Polish planners anticipated that the Soviets had three times as many soldiers.Their superiority in tanks and airplanes was not estimated, but the disproportion was immense. Probably, in August 1939 along the Polish border there were as many as 173 Infantry Divisions of the Red Army (see: ]).


==September 1939== ==See also==
*]
⚫ On ], ], Nazi Germany attacked Poland (see: ]). Consequently, Plan East became void. On ], following the ], the Soviets, breaking the ], invaded Poland (see: ]). Red Army met little resistance, as Polish Army was concentrated in the West, finghting the Germans. Thus, the Soviets quickly managed to occupy Polish ].
*]


==References== ==References==
{{reflist}}
⚫ *], ''Plan operacyjny "Wschód"'', Warszawa 1994, ISBN 83-11-08313-4


==Further reading== ==Further reading==
⚫ * ], ''Plan operacyjny "Wschód"'', Warsaw 1994, {{ISBN|83-11-08313-4}}
* ], ''Polska sztuka wojenna 1918-39'', Warszawa 1972. * ], ''Polska sztuka wojenna 1918-39'', Warsaw 1972.


==External links== ==External links==
*{{pl icon}} * {{in lang|pl}}
*{{pl icon}} * {{in lang|pl}}
* {{in lang|uk}}


] ]
⚫ ]
]
] ]
⚫ ]

] ]
]
]

Latest revision as of 04:39, 21 October 2024

Interwar Polish military plan to defend against Soviet attack
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Plan East (Polish: Plan Wschód) was a Polish defensive military plan that was created in the 1920s and the 1930s in case of war against the Soviet Union. Unlike Plan West (Plan Zachód), it was being prepared during the whole interwar period, as the government of the Second Polish Republic treated the Soviet Union as the greatest potential military threat that was capable of initiating a full-scale war. However, only a few loose historical documents remain of the original plan today.

Background

Since its establishment after World War I, the Second Polish Republic had been involved in wars and conflicts with almost all of its neighbours (see Polish-Soviet War, Polish-Ukrainian War, Polish-Lithuanian War, Greater Poland Uprising, Silesian Uprisings and Border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia). However, only two of the countries were considered to be major threats: Germany and the Soviet Union.

In the 1920s and the 1930s, Polish leaders focused their efforts on countering the potential threat from the east. Fresh were memories of the Polish-Soviet War and the Battle of Warsaw, which saved Poland and the rest of Europe from the spread of the Bolshevik Revolution by force.

Since both the Polish Army and the government in Warsaw were certain that war against the Soviets was inevitable, preparations for it were far more advanced than those against Germany. It was only after 1935, when anti-Polish propaganda in Germany increased, that the German threat became visible enough for army planners to begin drawing up Plan West. Even in 1939, the number of completed fortifications in the east of Poland vastly outnumbered those in the west.

Interbellum Polish–Soviet border

Poland's border with the Soviet Union was 1,412 km long. By comparison, the border with Germany, including East Prussia, was more than 20% longer, at 1,912 km. Neither border contained any major geographical obstacles, which made their defence very difficult.

In the north was flat land with huge forests such as Puszcza Nalibocka, the Wilderness of Naliboki. In addition, a major railway connecting Moscow to Western Europe extended across the northern Poland. The area's major conurbation was Wilno, in the northeast of interbellum Poland.

The centre of the country was primarily a huge sparsely-populated swamp, known as Polesie. Although it had no roads and few rail lines, it had a supreme strategic importance, as its landscape allowed a prolonged, organized defense. Neither Polesie nor the adjacent Volhynia contained any major urban areas.

The south, formerly a portion of the Galicia province of Austria-Hungary, was the most highly-developed area, with ita high density of rail lines, growing amount of industry (such as oil fields in Boryslaw) and well-developed agriculture of Podolia. Lwów, one of the major cities of interbellum Poland, was located in the area. In addition, the Soviet border was marked by a natural obstacle, the Zbruch River.

Virtually all Polish industrial and urban centres were in the west and so a long-lasting defence was possible, as a Soviet force would have taken up to several weeks to reach Upper Silesia, Warsaw, Kraków or Poznań.

When they developed the plan, Polish planners assumed that co-operation and support would be forthcoming from Romania, which was Poland's main eastern ally.

Border conflicts

The Soviet government undermined the validity of the Riga Peace Treaty, which it had signed in 1921, from the outset. In the early 1920s, the Soviets repeatedly organized guerrilla attacks on Polish settlements close to the border. The most famous one was the attack on Stolpce, which took place on the night of August 3–4, 1924, which prompted the creation of the Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (Border Protection Corps). Such attacks continued throughout the 1920s but reduced in scale during the 1930s, particularly after the signing of the 1932 Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact.

Summary

No complete copy of the plan has been preserved. All that is known are the basic precepts, and restoring the whole plan is impossible. Work on the document was completed on February 4, 1939. The plan was based on the notions of Józef Piłsudski, who until his death in 1935 was sure that war would come from the east. Thus, most army maneuvers and field fortifications were held in the east, and Poland's western border was largely neglected. Some of the fortifications can still be seen in the area around Sarny (see Sarny Fortified Area). Bunkers built by Polish Corps of Engineers in the 1930s were used in late 1940s by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in its guerilla skirmishes against the Soviet Red Army.

Polish planners were well aware that the Red Army was, in many ways, superior to their own. Therefore, the main idea was to organize a so-called "resistance in motion" and to try to split Soviet forces south and north of the vast Polesie swamps. Frontline armies, in the vicinity of the border, were to try to delay the advance of the aggressors and to bleed them, and reserves, mostly in the areas of Brześć nad Bugiem and Lublin, were intended to enter the conflict in its later stages.

The Poles were expecting the Red Army to advance in three directions: along the Minsk–Baranowicze–Białystok–Warsaw rail line, along the Sarny–Kowel–Lublin line and along the Tarnopol–Lwów line.

Structure of Polish Army

According to the Polish historian Rajmund Szubański, in case of war in the east, the bulk of the Polish Army would be concentrated in the north and the south, with the central section of the border left mostly unguarded. Some military historians claim that Polish planners placed too many units close to the border, which would have resulted in their total destruction in the opening days of the conflict. In contrast, the rear positions were inadequately protected.

Frontline units

Seidner outlines the deployment:

Apart from those units were all of the armies' Border Area Defence Corps units and garrisons of the main cities.

Reserve forces

  • Behind Armia Wilno and Armia Baranowicze was Armia Lida, with three infantry divisions.
  • Behind Armia Podole and Armia Wołyń was Armia Lwów, with two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade (5th Krakowska BK from Kraków).
  • Far behind the frontlines, around the city of Brzesc, was the main reserve, with probably six IDs, two cavalry brigades (7th Wielkopolska BK from Poznań, 8th Pomorska BK from Bydgoszcz), an armoured brigade and the 1st Warsaw Air Corps.

Red Army along Polish border

In the mid-1930s, the Soviet government started an immense armament program, which resulted in a rapid increase in the number of units. The number of tanks and airplanes along the Polish border grew significantly, and the Soviets enjoyed superiority in all ways. Polish planners anticipated that the Soviets had three times as many soldiers as their Polish Army. The Soviets' superiority in tanks and airplanes was not estimated, but the disproportion was immense. In August 1939, along the Polish border were likely as many as 173 Red Army infantry divisions (see Soviet order of battle for invasion of Poland in 1939).

Invasion of Poland

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. Consequently, Plan East became void. On September 17, with a free hand because of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets broke their non-aggression pact by invading Poland. The Red Army met little resistance, as the Polish Army was concentrated in the west in fighting the Germans. Thus, the Soviets quickly managed to occupy Polish Kresy.

See also

References

  1. ^ Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978, chs. 1-2.
  2. According to the British historian A.J.P. Taylor, the Polish-Soviet War "largely determined the course of European history for the next twenty years or more.... Unavowedly and almost unconsciously, Soviet leaders abandoned the cause of international revolution". It would be twenty years before the Bolsheviks would send their armies abroad to "make revolution".
    Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-508105-6, Google Print, p.106
  3. According to the American sociologist Alexander Gella, "the Polish victory had gained twenty years of independence not only for Poland, but at least for an entire central part of Europe".
    Aleksander Gella, Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and Her Southern Neighbors, SUNY Press, 1988, ISBN 0-88706-833-2, Google Print, p. 23
  4. Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978, pp. 105–106.
  5. ^ Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978, pp. 108–109.
  6. ^ Stanley S. Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978, appendices.

Further reading

External links

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