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{{short description|Position that appears to be skeptic but is actually dogmatic}}
] founded the ] journal, in which he popularised the term '''''pseudoskepticism''''' in the mid 1980s]]
{{Use American English|date=April 2021}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=April 2021}}


'''Pseudoskepticism''' (] '''pseudoscepticism''') is a philosophical or scientific position that appears to be that of ] or ] but in reality is a form of ]tism.
The term '''pseudoskepticism''' (or ''pseudo-skepticism'') denotes thinking that appears to be skeptical, but is not. The term is most commonly encountered in the form popularised by ], through his 'Journal of Scientific Exploration', where he defined psuedoskeptics as those
who take "the negative rather than an ] position but still call themselves 'skeptics'"<ref>"Marcello Truzzi, " ''Zetetic Scholar'' (1987) No. 12/13, 3-4.</ref>
<ref>{{citejournal|title=The Pathology of Organized Skepticism |author=LD Leiter |journal= Journal of Scientific Exploration|date= 2002 |publisher= scientificexploration.org|url= http://www.scientificexploration.org/jse/articles/pdf/16.1_leiter.pdf}}</ref>.


==Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries==
== Characteristics of pseudoskeptics ==
An early use of the word was in self-denigration: on 31 August 1869, ] philosopher ] wrote in his diary:
{{blockquote|My instinct is in harmony with the pessimism of Buddha and of ]. It is a doubt which never leaves me, even in my moments of religious fervor. Nature is indeed for me a ]; and I look at her, as it were, with the eyes of an artist. My intelligence remains skeptical. What, then, do I believe in? I do not know. And what is it I hope for? It would be difficult to say. Folly! I believe in goodness, and I hope that good will prevail. Deep within this ironical and disappointed being of mine there is a child hidden — a frank, sad, simple creature, who believes in the ideal, in love, in holiness, and all heavenly superstitions. A whole millennium of idyls sleeps in my heart; I am a pseudo-skeptic, a pseudo-scoffer.<ref>Charles Dudley Warner, Editor, ''Library Of The World's Best Literature Ancient And Modern, Vol. II'', 1896. Online at Project Gutenberg (e.g. )</ref>}}


It soon acquired its usual meaning where a claimed skeptic is accused of excessive sureness in turning initial doubts into certainties. In 1908 ] wrote on ]'s criticism of philosopher ] that:
While a Professor of Sociology at ] in 1987, Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics:
{{blockquote|Strauss had been a preacher but had renounced the cloth and set up shop as a critic of Christianity. He had labored with good intentions, no doubt, but the net result of all his smug agnosticism was that his disciples were as self-satisfied, bigoted, and prejudiced in the garb of agnostics as they had been before as Christians. Nietzsche's eye saw this and in the first of his little pamphlets "David Strauss, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" ("David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer"), he bore down on Strauss's bourgeoise pseudo-skepticism most savagely. This was 1873.<ref>H. L. (Henry Louis) Mencken, ''The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche'' (1908) publ. T.F. Unwin. Reprinted in ''Friedrich Nietzsche'', Originally published: Boston : Luce and Co., 1913. .</ref>|sign=|source=}}


Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Frederick L. Will used the term "pseudo-skepticism" in 1942. ] writes:
{{quote|In science, the burden of proof falls upon the claimant; and the more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is the burden of proof demanded. The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one that says the claim is ''not proved'' rather than ''disproved''. He asserts that the claimant has not borne the burden of proof and that science must continue to build its cognitive map of reality without incorporating the extraordinary claim as a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not assert a claim, ''he has no burden to prove anything''. He just goes on using the established theories of "conventional science" as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a ''negative hypothesis'' --saying, for instance, that a seeming psi result was actually due to an artifact--he is ''making a claim'' and therefore also has to bear a ''burden of proof''.<ref>"Marcello Truzzi, " ''Zetetic Scholar'' (1987) No. 12/13, 3-4.</ref>}}
{{blockquote| Will was no exception. He began as an analytical philosopher, distinguishing different uses of language with the aim of showing that certain traditional philosophical problems need no longer trouble us, once we have understood how to make the relevant linguistic distinctions. The enemies were two: the philosophical skeptic who poses these false problems and the philosopher who thinks that the skeptic needs to be answered. So in "Is there a Problem of Induction?" (''Journal of Philosophy'', 1942) it is two senses of "know" that are to be distinguished: "All the uneasiness, the pseudo-skepticism and the pseudo-problem of induction, would never appear if it were possible to keep clear that 'know' in the statement that we do not know statements about the future is employed in a very special sense, not at all its ordinary one.<ref>Alasdair MacIntyre "" to the book ''Pragmatism and Realism'' by Frederick L. Will (1997) quoting his earlier paper "" ''Journal of Philosophy'', Vol. 39, No. 19 (September 10, 1942), pp. 505-513</ref>}}


] Professor of English, John E. Sitter used the term in 1977 in a discussion of ]: "Pope's intent, I believe, is to chasten the reader's skepticism — the pseudo-skepticism of the overly confident 'you' ... "<ref>John E. Sitter, "" ''SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500–1900'', Vol. 17, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth Century (Summer, 1977), pp. 435-449</ref>
Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics:
<table><tr valign=top><td width=50%>
*The tendency to deny, rather than doubt <ref>"Marcello Truzzi, " ''Zetetic Scholar'' (1987) No. 12/13, 3-4. "Though many in this category who dismiss and ridicule anomaly claims call themselves 'skeptics,' they often are really 'pseudo-skeptics' because they deny rather than doubt anomaly claims"</ref>
*Double standards in the application of criticism <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', ".. they seem less inclined to take the same critical stance towards orthodox theories. For example, they may attack alternative methods in medicine (e.g., for a lack of double-blind studies) while ignoring that similar criticisms can be levelled against much conventional medicine"</ref>
*The making of judgments without full inquiry <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "those I term scoffers often make judgments without full inquiry"</ref>
*Tendency to discredit, rather than investigate <ref>Hyman, Ray, 1980. "Pathological Science: Towards a Proper Diagnosis and Remedy," ''Zetetic Scholar'', No. 6, 31-43. Truzzi wrote: ".. they may be more interested in discrediting an anomaly claim than in dispassionately investigating it"</ref>
*Use of ridicule or '']'' attacks in lieu of arguments<ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "scoffers sometimes manage to discredit anomaly claims (e.g., through ridicule or ad hominem attacks) "</ref>
*Pejorative labeling of proponents as 'promoters', 'pseudoscientists' or practitioners of 'pathological science.'<ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "A characteristic of many scoffers is their pejorative characterization of proponents as "promoters" and sometimes even the most protoscientific anomaly claimants are labeled as 'pseudoscientists' or practitioners of 'pathological science.' "</ref>
</td><td>
*Presenting insufficient evidence or proof <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "scoffers sometimes manage to discredit anomaly claims .. without presenting any solid disproof</ref>
*Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof <ref>Marcello Truzzi, "", ''Zetetic Scholar'', #12-13, 1987. "Critics who assert negative claims, but who mistakenly call themselves 'skeptics,' often act as though they have no burden of proof placed on them at all, though such a stance would be appropriate only for the agnostic or true skeptic"</ref>
*Making unsubstantiated counter-claims <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', ".. the true skeptic does not assert a claim, ''he has no burden to prove anything''. He just goes on using the established theories of 'conventional science' as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a ''negative hypothesis'' — saying, for instance, that a seeming psi result was actually due to an artifact — he is making a claim and therefore also has to bear a burden of proof."</ref>
*Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', ".. many critics seem to feel it is only necessary to present a case for their counter-claims based upon plausibility rather than empirical evidence"</ref>
*Suggesting that unconvincing evidence is grounds for dismissing it <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "Showing evidence is unconvincing is not grounds for completely dismissing it."</ref>
<!--- This needs rewording since it is mostly directed at believers. *Tendency to dismiss ''all'' evidence <ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "Some proponents of anomaly claims, like some critics, seen unwilling to consider evidence in probabilistic terms, clinging to any slim loose end as though the critic must disprove all evidence ever put forward for a particular claim."</ref> -->
</td></tr></table>


==Truzzi==
== Pseudo-skepticism and scientific method ==
In 1987, ] revived the term specifically for arguments which use scientific-sounding language to disparage or refute given beliefs, theories, or claims, but which in fact fail to follow the precepts of conventional ]. He argued that scientific skepticism is ] to new ideas, making no claims about them but waiting for them to satisfy a burden of proof before granting them validity. Pseudoskepticism, by contrast, involves "negative hypotheses"—theoretical assertions that some belief, theory, or claim is factually wrong—without satisfying the burden of proof that such negative theoretical assertions would require.<ref name="truzzi1">{{cite journal | last = Truzzi | first = Marcello | author-link= Marcello Truzzi | url = http://www.anomalist.com/commentaries/pseudo.html | title = On Pseudo-Skepticism | year = 1987 | journal = Zetetic Scholar | issue = 12/13 | pages = 3–4| access-date = 2008-10-10}}</ref><ref>{{dead link|date=July 2024|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}, '']'', February 15, 2003</ref><ref> '']'', October 10, 2007</ref><ref> '']'', January 1, 2003</ref>


In 1987, while working as a professor of ] at ], Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics in the journal ''Zetetic Scholar'' (which he founded):
It is normal scientific practice to posit alternate explanations (or theories) for observed phenomenon, to experiment, and to adopt the theory that best predicts the behaviour.
{{quotation|In science, the burden of proof falls upon the claimant; and the more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is the burden of proof demanded. The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one that says the claim is not proved rather than disproved. He asserts that the claimant has not borne the burden of proof and that science must continue to build its ] of reality without incorporating the extraordinary claim as a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not assert a claim, he has no burden to prove anything. He just goes on using the established theories of "conventional science" as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a negative hypothesis—saying, for instance, that a seeming ] ] was actually due to an artifact—he is making a claim and therefore also has to bear a burden of proof...
Scientific evidence is often indicative rather than overwhelming, and many theories are based not on any single piece of evidence, but on accumulated weight of evidence, or simply on accumulated lack of evidence to the contrary.


Both critics and proponents need to learn to think of ] in science as more like that found in the law courts, imperfect and with varying degrees of proof and evidence. Absolute truth, like absolute justice, is seldom obtainable. We can only do our best to approximate them.
For example, if a test is performed that shows apparent evidence for ESP, most scientists will suspect a flaw in the test. Scientific practice does not require every scientist to fully vet every experiment performed by every other scientist. Rather, scientific reports are reviewed by a number of peers, and where an experiment has produced interesting results, other scientists will try to reproduce it. If their results match, the evidence is accepted. If not, the original result is agreed to be an anomaly and it does not affect the acceptance of the dominant theory.
|Marcello Truzzi|"On Pseudo-Skepticism", ''Zetetic Scholar'', 12/13, pp3-4, 1987<ref name="truzzi1"/>}}


Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics:<ref name="truzzi1"/>
However, it is common for ]s to apply the label psuedoskeptic to anyone who is not prepared to either investigate the test or accept its conclusion. This is a misunderstanding of scientific method. To actually state that ESP does not exist and therefore there must be a flaw in the test is pseudoskepticism; taking a position on the validity on the test requires accepting a ]. Simply choosing to ignore the test is not pseudoskepticism, however frustrating it can be to those who welcome the apparent result of a test.
#Denying, when only doubt has been established
#Double standards in the application of criticism
#The tendency to discredit rather than investigate
#Presenting insufficient evidence or proof
#Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof
#Making unsubstantiated counter-claims
#Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence
#Suggesting that unconvincing evidence provides grounds for completely dismissing a claim


He characterized true skepticism as:<ref name="truzzi1"/>
== Academic studies ==
#Acceptance of doubt when neither assertion nor denial has been established
#No burden of proof to take an agnostic position
#Agreement that the corpus of established knowledge must be based on what is proved, but recognising its incompleteness
#Even-handedness in requirement for proofs, whatever their implication
#Accepting that a failure of a proof in itself proves nothing
#Continuing examination of the results of experiments even when flaws are found


== Subsequent usage ==
A Spring 2006 course at the University of Colorado, "Edges of Science" which "Examines the evidence for paranormal phenomena, reasons for skepticism", includes a section which shows "how a healthy skepticism can see through unsupported assertions, and how pathological skepticism can work against honest scientific inquiry."<ref>, Spring Semester Spring 2006</ref>
], who lost her initial belief in ] and in 1991 became a ] fellow, later described what she termed the "worst kind of pseudoskepticism":
{{blockquote|There are some members of the skeptics’ groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion.<ref>JE Kennedy, "", ''The Journal of Parapsychology'', Volume 67, pp. 53–74, 2003. See Note 1 page 64 quoting Blackmore, S. J. (1994). Women skeptics. In L. Coly & R. White (Eds.), ''Women and parapsychology'' (pp. 234–236). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.</ref>}}


] from the Department of Religious Studies at the ], labels the "extreme position that all significant evidence supporting paranormal phenomena is a result of deception or lies" as pseudoskepticism.<ref>Michael Stoeber, Hugo Anthony Meynell, ''Critical Reflections on the Paranormal'', SUNY Press, 1996, {{ISBN|0-7914-3063-4}}, {{ISBN|978-0-7914-3063-7}} </ref>
The Laboratory for Advances in Consciousness and Health at the ], run by Professor ], claims to provide "a responsible forum in which to conduct systematic research on pathological skepticism, illusory correlates, and self-deception in science, society, and human relationships."<ref>, University of Arizona</ref> The lab's research into "the role of conscious intention in energy medicine and healing, and the possibility of survival of consciousness after physical death" has been criticized in The ] because it did not consider non-paranormal explanations for the observations recorded.<ref>http://www.csicop.org/si/2003-01/medium.html "How Not to Test Mediums: Critiquing the Afterlife Experiments"</ref>.


While Truzzi's characterization was aimed at the holders of majority views whom he considered were excessively impatient of minority opinions, the term has been used to describe advocates of minority intellectual positions who engage in pseudoskeptical behavior when they characterize themselves as "skeptics" despite ] evidence that conforms to a preexisting belief. Thus according to Richard Cameron Wilson, some advocates of ] are indulging in "bogus scepticism" when they argue in this way.<ref name=Wilson_NS>, '']'', 18 September 2008</ref> Wilson argues that the characteristic feature of false skepticism is that it "centres not on an impartial search for the truth, but on the defence of a preconceived ideological position".<ref name=Wilson_fooled>Richard C. Wilson, , ''Icon'', 2008, {{ISBN|1-84831-014-5}}, 240 pages</ref> Examples include ] and ].
] Folklorist David J. Hufford<ref>"Reason, Rhetoric, and Religion: Academic Ideology versus Folk Belief", from ''New York Folklore'', Vol. 11, Nos. 1-4, 1985 40th Anniversary Issue" quoted in part in Clark, Jerome, ''Unexplained! 347 Strange Sightings, Incredible Occurrences, and Puzzling Physical Phenomena''; Detroit, Visible Ink Press; 1993, ISBN 0810394367; page 117</ref> uses the term "radical skepticism" to describe the unexamined prejudices and preconceptions which he argues are embraced by many — perhaps most — academic scientists. After reading and analysing the works of many skeptics and ]s, Hufford argues that one can readily find:

{{quote|], ] fallacies, ad hominem arguments and a whole host of other ]. Nonetheless, because this inductive dimension of scholarship is often less implicitly presented for scrutiny, and because so much of the work of framing questions and establishing boundaries of scholarly discourse about 'the ]' were largely set anywhere from several generations ago … to a number of centuries ago ... the systematic bias of this tradition operates almost invisibly today.}}

== History ==

Prior to Truzzi, the term "pseudo-skepticism" has occasionally been used in 19th and early 20th century ].

On 31 Aug 1869, Swiss philosopher ] wrote in his diary:

{{quote|My instinct is in harmony with the pessimism of Buddha and of ]. It is a doubt which never leaves me, even in my moments of religious fervor. Nature is indeed for me a Maïa; and I look at her, as it were, with the eyes of an artist. My intelligence remains skeptical. What, then, do I believe in? I do not know. And what is it I hope for? It would be difficult to say. Folly! I believe in goodness, and I hope that good will prevail. Deep within this ironical and disappointed being of mine there is a child hidden — a frank, sad, simple creature, who believes in the ideal, in love, in holiness, and all heavenly superstitions. A whole millennium of idyls sleeps in my heart; I am a pseudo-skeptic, a pseudo-scoffer.<ref>Charles Dudley Warner, Editor, ''Library Of The World's Best Literature Ancient And Modern, Vol. II'', 1896. Online at Project Gutenberg (eg. )</ref>}}

In 1908 ] wrote on ]'s criticism of philosopher ] that:

{{quote|Strauss had been a preacher but had renounced the cloth and set up shop as a critic of Christianity. He had labored with good intentions, no doubt, but the net result of all his smug agnosticism was that his disciplines were as self-satisfied, bigoted, and prejudiced in the garb of agnostics as they had been before Christians. Nietzsche's eye saw this and in the first of his little pamphlets "David Strauss, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" ("David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer"), he bore down on Strauss's bourgeoise pseudo-skepticism most savagely. This was 1873.<ref>H. L. (Henry Louis) Mencken, ''The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche'' (1908) publ. T.F. Unwin. Reprinted in ''Friedrich Nietzsche'', Originally published: Boston : Luce and Co., 1913. .</ref>}}

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Frederick L. Will used the term "pseudo-skepticism" in 1942. Alasdair MacIntyre writes:

{{quote| Will was no exception. He began as an analytical philosopher, distinguishing different uses of language with the aim of showing that certain traditional philosophical problems need no longer trouble us, once we have understood how to make the relevant linguistic distinctions. The enemies were two: the philosophical skeptic who poses these false problems and the philosopher who thinks that the skeptic needs to be answered. So in "Is there a Problem of Induction?" (''Journal of Philosophy'', 1942) it is two senses of "know" that are to be distinguished: "All the uneasiness, the pseudo-skepticism and the pseudo-problem of induction, would never appear if it were possible to keep clear that 'know' in the statement that we do not know statements about the future is employed in a very special sense, not at all its ordinary one.<ref>Alasdair MacIntyre "" to the book ''Pragmatism and Realism'' by Frederick L. Will (1997) quoting his earlier paper "" ''Journal of Philosophy'', Vol. 39, No. 19 (Sep. 10, 1942), pp. 505-513</ref>}}

] Professor of English, John E. Sitter used the term in 1977 in a discussion of ]: "Pope's intent, I believe, is to chasten the reader's skepticism — the pseudo-skepticism of the overly confident 'you' ... "<ref>John E. Sitter, "" ''Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900'', Vol. 17, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth Century (Summer, 1977), pp. 435-449</ref>

The term ''pseudoskepticism'' was popularised and characterised by Truzzi in 1987, in response to the ] who applied the label of "]s" to fields which Truzzi thought might be better described as ].<ref>Truzzi, ''ibid'', "A characteristic of many scoffers is their pejorative characterization of proponents as 'promoters' and sometimes even the most protoscientific anomaly claimants are labelled as "pseudoscientists" or practitioners of 'pathological science.' "</ref>

Science writer C. Eugene Emery, Jr. compared the degrees of skepticism of CD-ROM-based encyclopedias of articles on ] subjects. He called such articles "pseudoskeptical" if only suggested or stated that the subject was "controversial, but the author may not have a clue as to why".<ref>C. Eugene Emery, Jr., "", ''Skeptical Inquirer'', Nov-Dec, 1996</ref>

== Controversy surrounding the concept ==

Truzzi held that anything that has not been proved to be impossible must be treated as possible. On the strength of this argument, he personally accepted as plausible such things as the existence of UFOs and communicating with the dead. He was a founding member<ref name=SSE_Truzzi></ref> of the ] (SSE),<ref></ref> an organization that has been criticized by science journalist ] as "fringe" but also as showing a "surprising attitude of skepticism".<ref> '']''</ref>

One SSE member, L. David Leiter, thinks that organized skepticism might be called psuedo-skepticism or even pathological skepticism. According to Leiter, the label "Skeptic" "labels someone whose mental processes are continually and rigidly out of balance, in the direction of disbelief." He argues that the members of PhACT, "nstead of becoming scientifically minded, they become adherents of ], the belief system in which science and only science has all the answers to everything" and that even many pseudoskeptics are unwilling to spend the time to "read significantly into the literature on the subjects about which they are most skeptical"<ref>L. David Leiter, "" (PDF), in ''Journal of Scientific Exploration'', Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 125–128, 2002.</ref>

Groups sometimes accuse each other of pseudoskepticism. Commenting on the labels "dogmatic" and "pathological" that the "Association for Skeptical Investigation"<ref name=SI>'''' website</ref> puts on critics of paranormal investigations, ] of the ]<ref></ref> argues that that association "is a group of pseudo-skeptical paranormal investigators and supporters who do not appreciate criticism of paranormal studies by truly genuine skeptics and critical thinkers. The only skepticism this group promotes is skepticism of critics and criticisms of paranormal studies."<ref name=carroll>] "." '']''</ref>


== See also == == See also ==
* ]
{{wikiquote|Skepticism#Pathological_skepticism|Pathological skepticism}}
* ]
* ] The study of ]
* ]s * ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ], ]'s parody on CSICOP (=]) which is intended to ridicule CSICOP's perceived intense hostility to any claims which fall outside of their definition of 'normal'
* ]
* ] is the creation of false impressions or advocacy of false ideas and concepts using rhetoric, ], or insufficient or falsified evidence.
* ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ]
*]-Skeptic of ] causing ], ], and ] causing ]
* ]
*] was once criticized in an article by the ] for being too harshly critical of speculative ideas.(Specifically life extension, but also ] by some skeptics)
*'']'' is a controversial book by political scientist ], arguing claims over various environmental issues are exaggerations and unsupported by a proper analysis of the relevant data.
*] is a decades-old dispute about the effects of humans on the global climate.
*]
*]
*]


== Notes and references == == Notes and references ==
{{reflist}} {{reflist|2}}
* Truzzi, Marcello, "''''". Anomalist. (Commentary)
* Truzzi, Marcello, "''''". Oxymoron, 1998
* Drasin, Daniel, "''''". aol.com, 1997.
* Milton, Richard, "''''".
* Mooney, Chris, "''''". CSICOP, December, 2003.
* Haack, Susan, "''''". CSICOP, December 1997.
* Hall, Stephanie A. "''''" Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Folkore Society
* Sofka, Michael D., "''''". ISUNY, March, 2002.
* Beaty, William J., "''''". 1996.
* Hyman, Ray, "''''". (csicop.org)
* Martin, Brian, "''''". Society for Scientific Exploration. Journal of Scientific Exploration, Volume 12 No 4. 1998. (])
* ], "'' : Method for rating potentially revolutionary contributions to physics.''".
* Kruger, Justin, and David Dunning "''''". Department of Psychology, Cornell University.
* by Winston Wu
* Wilson, Robert Anton, in which he discusses CSICOP and pseudoskeptism, what he calls "irrational rationalists" and "fundamentalist materialism"
* Sarma, Amardeo,

== External links ==

* - Quotes and links to articles about skepticism and pseudoskepticism.



{{skepticism}} {{skepticism}}
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Latest revision as of 20:01, 11 December 2024

Position that appears to be skeptic but is actually dogmatic

Pseudoskepticism (also spelled as pseudoscepticism) is a philosophical or scientific position that appears to be that of skepticism or scientific skepticism but in reality is a form of dogmatism.

Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

An early use of the word was in self-denigration: on 31 August 1869, Swiss philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel wrote in his diary:

My instinct is in harmony with the pessimism of Buddha and of Schopenhauer. It is a doubt which never leaves me, even in my moments of religious fervor. Nature is indeed for me a Maïa; and I look at her, as it were, with the eyes of an artist. My intelligence remains skeptical. What, then, do I believe in? I do not know. And what is it I hope for? It would be difficult to say. Folly! I believe in goodness, and I hope that good will prevail. Deep within this ironical and disappointed being of mine there is a child hidden — a frank, sad, simple creature, who believes in the ideal, in love, in holiness, and all heavenly superstitions. A whole millennium of idyls sleeps in my heart; I am a pseudo-skeptic, a pseudo-scoffer.

It soon acquired its usual meaning where a claimed skeptic is accused of excessive sureness in turning initial doubts into certainties. In 1908 Henry Louis Mencken wrote on Friedrich Nietzsche's criticism of philosopher David Strauss that:

Strauss had been a preacher but had renounced the cloth and set up shop as a critic of Christianity. He had labored with good intentions, no doubt, but the net result of all his smug agnosticism was that his disciples were as self-satisfied, bigoted, and prejudiced in the garb of agnostics as they had been before as Christians. Nietzsche's eye saw this and in the first of his little pamphlets "David Strauss, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" ("David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer"), he bore down on Strauss's bourgeoise pseudo-skepticism most savagely. This was 1873.

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Frederick L. Will used the term "pseudo-skepticism" in 1942. Alasdair MacIntyre writes:

Will was no exception. He began as an analytical philosopher, distinguishing different uses of language with the aim of showing that certain traditional philosophical problems need no longer trouble us, once we have understood how to make the relevant linguistic distinctions. The enemies were two: the philosophical skeptic who poses these false problems and the philosopher who thinks that the skeptic needs to be answered. So in "Is there a Problem of Induction?" (Journal of Philosophy, 1942) it is two senses of "know" that are to be distinguished: "All the uneasiness, the pseudo-skepticism and the pseudo-problem of induction, would never appear if it were possible to keep clear that 'know' in the statement that we do not know statements about the future is employed in a very special sense, not at all its ordinary one.

Notre Dame Professor of English, John E. Sitter used the term in 1977 in a discussion of Alexander Pope: "Pope's intent, I believe, is to chasten the reader's skepticism — the pseudo-skepticism of the overly confident 'you' ... "

Truzzi

In 1987, Marcello Truzzi revived the term specifically for arguments which use scientific-sounding language to disparage or refute given beliefs, theories, or claims, but which in fact fail to follow the precepts of conventional scientific skepticism. He argued that scientific skepticism is agnostic to new ideas, making no claims about them but waiting for them to satisfy a burden of proof before granting them validity. Pseudoskepticism, by contrast, involves "negative hypotheses"—theoretical assertions that some belief, theory, or claim is factually wrong—without satisfying the burden of proof that such negative theoretical assertions would require.

In 1987, while working as a professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics in the journal Zetetic Scholar (which he founded):

In science, the burden of proof falls upon the claimant; and the more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is the burden of proof demanded. The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one that says the claim is not proved rather than disproved. He asserts that the claimant has not borne the burden of proof and that science must continue to build its cognitive map of reality without incorporating the extraordinary claim as a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not assert a claim, he has no burden to prove anything. He just goes on using the established theories of "conventional science" as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a negative hypothesis—saying, for instance, that a seeming psi result was actually due to an artifact—he is making a claim and therefore also has to bear a burden of proof...

Both critics and proponents need to learn to think of adjudication in science as more like that found in the law courts, imperfect and with varying degrees of proof and evidence. Absolute truth, like absolute justice, is seldom obtainable. We can only do our best to approximate them.

— Marcello Truzzi, "On Pseudo-Skepticism", Zetetic Scholar, 12/13, pp3-4, 1987

Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics:

  1. Denying, when only doubt has been established
  2. Double standards in the application of criticism
  3. The tendency to discredit rather than investigate
  4. Presenting insufficient evidence or proof
  5. Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof
  6. Making unsubstantiated counter-claims
  7. Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence
  8. Suggesting that unconvincing evidence provides grounds for completely dismissing a claim

He characterized true skepticism as:

  1. Acceptance of doubt when neither assertion nor denial has been established
  2. No burden of proof to take an agnostic position
  3. Agreement that the corpus of established knowledge must be based on what is proved, but recognising its incompleteness
  4. Even-handedness in requirement for proofs, whatever their implication
  5. Accepting that a failure of a proof in itself proves nothing
  6. Continuing examination of the results of experiments even when flaws are found

Subsequent usage

Susan Blackmore, who lost her initial belief in parapsychology and in 1991 became a CSICOP fellow, later described what she termed the "worst kind of pseudoskepticism":

There are some members of the skeptics’ groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion.

Hugo Anthony Meynell from the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Calgary, labels the "extreme position that all significant evidence supporting paranormal phenomena is a result of deception or lies" as pseudoskepticism.

While Truzzi's characterization was aimed at the holders of majority views whom he considered were excessively impatient of minority opinions, the term has been used to describe advocates of minority intellectual positions who engage in pseudoskeptical behavior when they characterize themselves as "skeptics" despite cherry picking evidence that conforms to a preexisting belief. Thus according to Richard Cameron Wilson, some advocates of AIDS denial are indulging in "bogus scepticism" when they argue in this way. Wilson argues that the characteristic feature of false skepticism is that it "centres not on an impartial search for the truth, but on the defence of a preconceived ideological position". Examples include climate change denial and Moon landing denial.

See also

Notes and references

  1. Charles Dudley Warner, Editor, Library Of The World's Best Literature Ancient And Modern, Vol. II, 1896. Online at Project Gutenberg (e.g. here)
  2. H. L. (Henry Louis) Mencken, The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1908) publ. T.F. Unwin. Reprinted in Friedrich Nietzsche, Originally published: Boston : Luce and Co., 1913. p.30.
  3. Alasdair MacIntyre "Foreword" to the book Pragmatism and Realism by Frederick L. Will (1997) quoting his earlier paper "Is There a Problem of Induction?" Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39, No. 19 (September 10, 1942), pp. 505-513
  4. John E. Sitter, "The Argument of Pope's Epistle to Cobham" SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500–1900, Vol. 17, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth Century (Summer, 1977), pp. 435-449
  5. ^ Truzzi, Marcello (1987). "On Pseudo-Skepticism". Zetetic Scholar (12/13): 3–4. Retrieved October 10, 2008.
  6. |+Helped+form+the+Committee+for+the+Scientific+Investigation+of+Claims+of+the+Paranormal;+67&pqatl=google "Marcello Truzzi: Helped form the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal", The San Diego Union Tribune, February 15, 2003
  7. "Marla vs. Pollock: Who’s the Fraudiest?" LA Weekly, October 10, 2007
  8. "The plain truth about legal truth" Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, January 1, 2003
  9. JE Kennedy, "The Capricious, Actively Evasive, Unsustainable Nature of Psi: A Summary and Hypotheses", The Journal of Parapsychology, Volume 67, pp. 53–74, 2003. See Note 1 page 64 quoting Blackmore, S. J. (1994). Women skeptics. In L. Coly & R. White (Eds.), Women and parapsychology (pp. 234–236). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
  10. Michael Stoeber, Hugo Anthony Meynell, Critical Reflections on the Paranormal, SUNY Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7914-3063-4, ISBN 978-0-7914-3063-7 page 16
  11. Richard Wilson, "Against the Evidence", New Statesman, 18 September 2008
  12. Richard C. Wilson, "Don't get fooled again: the sceptic's guide to life", Icon, 2008, ISBN 1-84831-014-5, 240 pages
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