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{{Short description|Russian state-sponsored Internet commentators}}
{{Cleanup-laundry|date=September 2008}}
{{Onesource|date=September 2008}} {{use dmy dates|date=August 2023}}
{{POV|date=September 2008}}
The '''web brigades''' ({{lang-ru|Веб-бригады}} )<ref name="Polyanskaya"/> are in view of some Russian liberal intellectuals online teams of commentators linked to ] that participate in ]s and ] to promote ] and prevent free discussions of
undesirable subjects. Assertions of the existence of web brigades were made in a 2003 article "The Virtual Eye of the ]"<ref name="Polyanskaya"/> (detailed below). <!--to a 2001 article "Commissars of the Internet" (Комиссары Интернета)<ref>, November 18, 2001</ref> anonymously published by Anastasya.-->


'''Russian web brigades''',{{Efn|group=lower-alpha|{{Langx|ru|Русские веб-бригады}}}} also called '''Russian trolls''', '''Russian bots''', '''Kremlinbots''', or '''Kremlin trolls''' are ] anonymous Internet political commentators and ] linked to the ].<ref name="Botter 2022">{{cite journal |author1-last=Stukal |author1-first=Denis |author2-last=Sanovich |author2-first=Sergey |author3-last=Bonneau |author3-first=Richard |author4-last=Tucker |author4-first=Joshua A. |date=February 2022 |title=Why Botter: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D8A8A74976408CF7EC329827AFFFD3FC/S0003055421001507a.pdf/div-class-title-why-botter-how-pro-government-bots-fight-opposition-in-russia-div.pdf |journal=] |location=] and ] |publisher=] on behalf of the ] |volume=116 |issue=1 |pages=843–857 |doi=10.1017/S0003055421001507 |doi-access=free |issn=1537-5943 |lccn=08009025 |oclc=805068983 |s2cid=247038589 |access-date=10 March 2022 |archive-date=1 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220401073322/https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D8A8A74976408CF7EC329827AFFFD3FC/S0003055421001507a.pdf/div-class-title-why-botter-how-pro-government-bots-fight-opposition-in-russia-div.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="ACI 2019">{{cite journal |author-last=Sultan |author-first=Oz |date=Spring 2019 |title=Tackling Disinformation, Online Terrorism, and Cyber Risks into the 2020s |journal=The Cyber Defense Review |location=] |publisher=] |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=43–60 |issn=2474-2120 |jstor=26623066 |jstor-access=free}}</ref> Participants report that they are organized into teams and groups of commentators that participate in Russian and international ]s and ] using ], ]s, and large-scale orchestrated trolling and ] to promote pro-] and pro-].<ref name="Botter 2022"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house|title=Salutin' Putin: inside a Russian troll house|author=Shaun Walker|work=the Guardian|date=2 April 2015|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=2 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402114320/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/revealed-putins-army-of-pro-kremlin-bloggers-10138893.html|title=Revealed: Putin's army of pro-Kremlin bloggers|author=Paul Gallagher|date=27 March 2015|work=The Independent|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=26 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151126110950/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/revealed-putins-army-of-pro-kremlin-bloggers-10138893.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932/|title=The Kremlin's Troll Army|author=Daisy Sindelar|work=The Atlantic|date=12 August 2014|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=12 August 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140812224136/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/russias-online-comment-propaganda-army/280432/|title=Russia's Online-Comment Propaganda Army|author=Olga Khazan|work=The Atlantic|date=9 October 2013|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=9 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131009161712/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/russias-online-comment-propaganda-army/280432/|url-status=live}}</ref>
An article "Conspiracy theory" published in in 2003 criticized theory of web brigades as attempts of creating myths by Russian liberal thinkers in a response for massive sobering up of Russian people. A point was made that observed behaviour of forum participants may be explained without a theory of FSB-affiliated brigades.<ref name="Usup"/>


Kremlin trolls are closely tied to the ], a Saint Petersburg-based company run by ], who was a close ally to Putin and head of the mercenary ] before his death in 2023.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-08-27 |title=Wagner boss Prigozhin confirmed dead in plane crash - Moscow |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66632924 |access-date=2024-01-13 |language=en-GB |archive-date=27 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230827105707/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66632924 |url-status=live }}</ref> Articles on the ] concerning the ] and the ] were targeted by Russian internet propaganda outlets.<ref name="Botter 2022"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://gizmodo.com/a-tweetbot-caught-the-russian-govt-editing-flight-mh17-1607483459|title=A Tweetbot Caught the Russian Gov't Editing Flight MH17 Misplaced Pages Info|first=Robert|last=Sorokanich|date=18 July 2014|access-date=3 December 2016|archive-date=15 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161115045613/http://gizmodo.com/a-tweetbot-caught-the-russian-govt-editing-flight-mh17-1607483459|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Dewey|first=Caitlin|url=https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/07/21/flight_mh17s_wikipedia_page_edited_from_ip_address_associated_with_putins_office.html|title=Flight MH17's Misplaced Pages page edited by Russian government; An IP address associated with Vladimir Putin's office has made multiple edits to the Misplaced Pages page for the MH17 flight page|work=]|agency=The Washington Post|date=July 21, 2014|access-date=August 10, 2016|archive-date=12 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141246/https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/07/21/flight_mh17s_wikipedia_page_edited_from_ip_address_associated_with_putins_office.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Zeveleva|first=Olga|url=https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/2967/wikipedia-russian-government-edits|title=Knowledge is power: why is the Russian government editing Misplaced Pages?|work=The Calvert Journal|date=6 August 2014|access-date=3 December 2016}}</ref> In June 2019, a group of 12 editors introducing coordinated pro-government and anti-opposition bias was blocked on the Russian-language Misplaced Pages.<ref name="meduza" /> During the ] in 2022, Kremlin trolls were still active on many social platforms and were spreading ].<ref name=":0" />
As mentioned in 2007 sociological research of big groups in Russian society by the , the idea of existence of web-brigades is a widespread point of view in RuNet. Authors say "it's difficult to say whether hypothesis of existence of web-brigades corresponds to reality", but acknowledge that users professing views and methods ascribed to members of web-brigades may be found at all opposition forums of RuNet. <ref>, by RIO-Center. (in Russian)</ref>


== Background ==
The expression "red web-brigades" (Красные веб-бригады) used by Anna Polyanskaya as a title to her article is a pun with "]".
{{Main|Russian disinformation|Propaganda in Russia|Media freedom in Russia}}


The earliest documented allegations of the existence of "web brigades" appear to be in the April 2003 Vestnik Online article "The Virtual Eye of ]" by ] journalist Anna Polyanskaya (a former assistant to assassinated ] politician ]<ref>{{in lang|ru}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817192722/http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0611/win/polyanskaya.htm |date=2018-08-17 }}, by Anna Polyansky</ref>) and two other authors, Andrey Krivov and Ivan Lomako. The authors claim that up to 1998, contributions to forums on Russian Internet sites (]) predominantly reflected ] and ] values, but after 2000, the vast majority of contributions reflected ] values. This sudden change was attributed to the appearance of teams of pro-Russian commenters who appeared to be organized by the ].<ref name="Polyanskaya">{{in lang|ru}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219182655/http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0430/win/polyanskaya_krivov_lomko.htm |date=2019-12-19 }} by Anna Polyanskaya, Andrei Krivov, and Ivan Lomko, Vestnik online, April 30, 2003</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.vestnik.com/eng/index.html |title=Russian-American Russian Language biweekly magazine "Vestnik": Main Page {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20130113130727/http://www.library.cjes.ru/online/?a=con&b_id=318|date=13 January 2013}} by ] and Vladimur Bagryansky, publication of the Russian Center for Extreme Journalism {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20130416192314/http://www.cjes.ru/index-e.php/|date=16 April 2013}}</ref> According to the authors, about 70% of Russian Internet posters were of generally liberal views prior to 1998–1999, while a surge of "antidemocratic" posts (about 60–80%) suddenly occurred at many Russian forums in 2000. This could also be a reflection to the fact that access to Internet among the general Russian population soared during this time, which was until then accessible only to some sections of the society.
==Polyanskaya's article==
This alleged phenomenon in ] was described in 2003 by ] Anna Polyanskaya (a former assistant to assassinated ] politician ]<ref>{{ru icon}} , by Anna Polyanskaya</ref>), ] Andrey Krivov and political activist Ivan Lomako. They described organized and professional "brigades", composed of ideologically and methodologically identical personalities, who were working in practically every popular ] and pro-] Internet forums and Internet newspapers of RuNet.


In January 2012, a ] group calling itself the Russian arm of ] published a massive collection of email allegedly belonging to former and present leaders of the pro-Putin youth organization ] (including a number of government officials).<ref name="guardian-hacked-emails">{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/putin-hacked-emails-russian-nashi|title=Polishing Putin: hacked emails suggest dirty tricks by Russian youth group|author=Miriam Elder|work=the Guardian|date=7 February 2012}}</ref> Journalists who investigated the leaked information found that the pro-Putin movement had engaged in a range of activities including paying commentators to post content and hijacking blog ratings in the fall of 2011.<ref name="kremlinBlogshop">{{in lang|ru}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303224027/http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1868022 |date=3 March 2016 }} by Anastasia Karimova. Kommersant Dengi, February 13, 2012</ref><ref name="freedom-net-2013"/> The e-mails indicated that members of the "brigades" were paid 85 rubles (about US$3) or more per comment, depending on whether the comment received replies. Some were paid as much as 600,000 rubles (about US$21,000) for leaving hundreds of comments on negative press articles on the internet, and were presented with iPads. A number of high-profile bloggers were also mentioned as being paid for promoting Nashi and government activities. The Federal Youth Agency, whose head (and the former leader of Nashi) ] was the highest-ranking individual targeted by the leaks, refused to comment on the authenticity of the e-mails.<ref name="guardian-hacked-emails"/><ref>{{in lang|ru}} . Izvestia, February 9, 2012.</ref>
The activity of Internet teams appeared in 1999 and were organized by the ], according to Polyanskaya. <ref name="Bagryansky"> {{ru icon}} by ] and Vladimur Bagryansky, publication of the Russian Center for Extreme Journalism </ref><ref name="Polyanskaya"> by Anna Polyanskaya, Andrei Krivov, and Ivan Lomko, Vestnik online, ], ]</ref> According to authors, about 70% of audience of Russian Internet were people of generally liberal views prior to 1998&ndash;1999, however sudden surge (about 60-80%) of "antidemocratic" posts suddenly occurred at many Russian forums in 2000.


In 2013, a ] report stated that 22 of 60 countries examined have been using paid pro-government commentators to manipulate online discussions, and that Russia has been at the forefront of this practice for several years, along with China and Bahrain.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf | title=A global assessment of internet and digital media | access-date=2024-06-21 | archive-date=29 November 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231129153934/https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="propaganda-army"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131009161712/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/russias-online-comment-propaganda-army/280432/ |date=9 October 2013 }}, ''The Atlantic'', by Olga Khazan, 9 October 2013</ref> In the same year, Russian reporters investigated the St. Petersburg ], which employs at least 400 people. They found that the agency covertly hired young people as "Internet operators" paid to write pro-Russian postings and comments, smearing opposition leader ] and U.S. politics and culture.<ref name="OperationPetersburg"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131006063659/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=38052 |date=6 October 2013 }}, ''The St. Petersburg Times'', by Sergey Chernov, 18, September,2013</ref><ref name="trollArmy"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240819070628/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31962644 |date=19 August 2024 }}, BBC</ref>
According to Polyanskaya and her colleagues, the behavior of people from the web brigades has distinct features, some of which are the following:<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
{{cquote|Each commenter was to write no less than 100 comments a day, while people in the other room were to write four postings a day, which then went to the other employees whose job was to post them on social networks as widely as possible.<ref name="OperationPetersburg"/>}}Some Russian opposition journalists state that such practices create a chilling effect on the ] remaining in the country.<ref name="propaganda-army"/>
*Any change in Moscow's agenda leads to immediate changes in the brigade's opinions.
*Boundless loyalty to ] and his circle.
*Respect and admiration for the ] and ].
*Nostalgia for the ] and propaganda of the ], and constant attempts to present in a positive light the entire history of Russia and the ], minimizing the number of people who died in repressions.<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*Anti-liberal, ], anti-Chechen, ] and anti-western opinions. ], ], approval of skinheads and ].<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*Accusation of ] against everyone who disagrees with them.
*Hatred of ] and ] organizations and activists, ]s and ]s, especially ], ], ], ], ], and ].
*Emigrants are accused of being traitors of the motherland. Some members will claim that they live in some Western country and tell stories about how much better life is in Putin's Russia.
*Before the ], the brigade's anti-U.S. operations reached unseen scale. The original publication describes: "it sometimes seemed that the U.S. was not liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein, but at a minimum had actually launched an attack on Russia and was marching on the Kremlin." However, it fell silent suddenly after Putin announced that Russia was not opposed to the victory of the coalition forces in Iraq.<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
Polyanskaya's article<ref name="Polyanskaya"/> describes the "tactics" of the alleged web brigades:
*'''Frequent changes of pseudonyms'''.<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*'''Round-the-clock presence''' on forums. At least one of the uniform members of the team can be found online at all times, always ready to repulse any “attack” by a ].<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*'''Intentional diversion of pointed discussions'''. For instance, the brigade may claim that ] never had any connection with Communism or that not a single person was killed in ] in 1968 by Soviet tanks.
*'''Individual work on opponents.''' "As soon as an opposition-minded liberal arrives on a forum, expressing a position that makes them a clear "ideological enemy”, he is immediately cornered and subjected to “]” by the unified web-brigade. Without provocation, the opponent is piled on with abuse or vicious “arguments” of the sort that the average person cannot adequately react to. As a result, the liberal either answers sharply, causing a scandal and getting himself labeled a “boor” by the rest of the brigade, or else he starts to make arguments against the obvious absurdities, to which his opponents pay no attention, but simply ridicule him and put forth other similar arguments."<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*'''Accusations that opponents are working for “enemies”'''. The opponents are accused of taking money from ], the ], the ], ], the ], or the ] rebels.
*'''Making personally offensive comments'''. Tendency to accuse their opponents of being ] during arguments.
*'''Remarkable ability to reveal personal information''' about their opponents and their quotes from old postings, sometimes more than a year old.
*'''Teamwork'''. "They unwaveringly support each other in discussions, ask each other leading questions, put fine points on each other’s answers, and even pretend not to know each other. If an opponent starts to be hounded, this hounding invariably becomes a team effort, involving all of the three to twenty nicknames that invariably are present on any political forum 24 hours a day."<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*'''Appealing to the Administration'''. The members of teams often "write mass collective complaints about their opponents to the editors, site administrators, or the electronic “complaints book”, demanding that one or another posting or whole discussion thread they don’t like be removed, or calling for the banning of individuals they find problematic."<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>
*'''Destruction of inconvenient forums'''. For example, on the site of the ], all critics of ] and the FSB "were suddenly and without any explanation banned from all discussions, despite their having broken none of the site’s rules of conduct. All the postings of this group of readers, going back a year and a half, were erased by the site administrator."<ref name="Polyanskaya"/>


Further investigations were performed by Russian opposition newspaper {{Lang|ru-latn|]}} and Institute of Modern Russia in 2014–15, inspired by the peak of activity of the pro-Russian brigades during the ] and ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.interpretermag.com/the-menace-of-unreality-how-the-kremlin-weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/ |title=The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money |work=The Interpreter Magazine |date=2014-11-22 |access-date=2015-03-13 |archive-date=11 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161211055823/http://www.interpretermag.com/the-menace-of-unreality-how-the-kremlin-weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america |title=Documents Show How Russia's Troll Army Hit America |publisher=BuzzFeed |date=2014-07-08 |access-date=2015-03-13 |archive-date=10 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010064433/https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-march-12-2015/#7432 |title=Novaya Gazeta Publishes List of Kremlin Trolls, Finds Further Information About 'Troll Farm' |work=The Interpreter Magazine |date=2015-03-06 |access-date=2015-03-13 |archive-date=4 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191104062409/http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-march-12-2015/#7432 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.rferl.org/content/how-to-guide-russian-trolling-trolls/26919999.html | title=One Professional Russian Troll Tells All | publisher=Radio Liberty | date=2015-03-26 | access-date=2015-03-26 | author=Dmitry Volchek, Daisy Sindelar | archive-date=23 September 2016 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160923040325/http://www.rferl.org/content/how-to-guide-russian-trolling-trolls/26919999.html | url-status=live }}</ref> The effort of using "troll armies" to promote Putin's policies is reported to be a multimillion-dollar operation.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Sindelar |first=Daisy |date=12 August 2014 |title=The Kremlin's Troll Army |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932/ |journal=The Atlantic |location=United States |publisher=Atlantic Media |access-date=6 June 2015 |archive-date=12 August 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140812224136/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-army/375932/ |url-status=live }}<br />{{cite web |url=https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america#.ghvY0zarp |title=Documents Show How Russia's Troll Army Hit America |last=Seddon |first=Max |date=2 June 2014 |website=BuzzFeed |access-date=5 June 2015 |archive-date=10 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010064433/https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america#.ghvY0zarp |url-status=live }}</ref> According to an investigation by the British '']'' newspaper, the flood of pro-Russian comments is part of a coordinated "]".<ref name="Guardian20150409">{{cite web | url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology | title=Inside the Kremlin's hall of mirrors | work=The Guardian | date=2015-04-09 | access-date=2015-04-11 | last=Pomerantsev | first=Peter | author-link=Peter Pomerantsev | archive-date=2 November 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191102122506/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology | url-status=live }}</ref> One ] bot network was documented to use more than 20,500 fake Twitter accounts to spam negative comments after the death of Boris Nemtsov and events related to the Ukrainian conflict.<ref name="AL20150403">{{cite web | url=http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/04/02/analyzing-kremlin-twitter-bots/ | title=Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin's Twitter Bot Campaign | publisher=Global Voices Online | date=April 2, 2015 | access-date=April 13, 2015 | author=Lawrence Alexander | archive-date=25 August 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150825085932/http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/04/02/analyzing-kremlin-twitter-bots/ | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title = #KremlinTrolls and Other Acquaintances of RU EMB Canada|url = http://kremlintrolls.com/t/20150907-canada_plus.html|website = kremlintrolls.com|access-date = September 12, 2015|archive-date = 17 September 2015|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150917220023/http://kremlintrolls.com/t/20150907-canada_plus.html|url-status = dead}}</ref>
==Criticism==


An article based on the original Polyanskaya article, authored by the Independent Customers' Association, was published in May 2008 at Expertiza.Ru. In this article the term ''web brigades'' is replaced by the term ''Team "G"''.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080529064939/http://www.expertiza.ru/expertiza.phtml?id=671 |date=29 May 2008 }}, May 25, 2008</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russia-theme/the-kremlins-virtual-squad|title=The Kremlin's virtual squad|work=openDemocracy|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=7 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180807220928/https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russia-theme/the-kremlins-virtual-squad|url-status=live}}</ref>
Alexander Yusupovskiy, head of the analytical department of the ] (Russian Parliament) published in 2003 an article "Conspiracy theory" in ] with criticism of theory of web brigades. <ref name="Usup"> , by Alexander Yusupovskiy, Russian Journal, ], ]</ref>


During ], Donald Trump retweeted a tweet by a fake account operated by Russians. In 2017, he was among almost 40 celebrities and politicians, along with over 3,000 global news outlets, identified to have inadvertently shared content from Russian troll-farm accounts.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/trump-other-politicians-celebs-shared-boosted-russian-troll-tweets-n817036|title = Russian Trolls Duped Global Media Thousands of Times|website = ]|date = 4 November 2017|access-date = 6 September 2024|archive-date = 4 June 2024|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20240604184313/https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/trump-other-politicians-celebs-shared-boosted-russian-troll-tweets-n817036|url-status = live}}</ref>
Yusupovskiy's points included:


== Methods ==
*According to Yusupovskiy, an active forum participant, it's not the first time he's faced an unfair method of polemics, when a person with "liberal democratic views" accused one's opponent of being an FSB agent as a final argument. Yusupovskiy himself didn't take Web brigades theory seriously, "naively" considering that officers of GRU or FSB have more topical problems than "comparing virtual penises" with liberals and emigrants. His own experience at forums also did not give him a reason proving the theory.
Web brigades commentators sometimes leave hundreds of postings a day that criticize the country's opposition and promote Kremlin-backed policymakers.<ref name="freedom-net-2013">{{cite web|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/russia|title=Russia - Country report - Freedom on the Net - 2013|access-date=3 December 2016|archive-date=5 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205101905/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/russia|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="propaganda-army"/><ref name="OperationPetersburg"/><ref name="trollArmy"/><ref name="freedom-net-2014">{{cite web|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/russia|title=Russia - Country report - Freedom on the Net - 2014|access-date=3 December 2016|archive-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424161917/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/russia|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="buzzfeed"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010064433/https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america |date=10 October 2017 }}, buzzfeed</ref> Commentators simultaneously react to discussions of "taboo" topics, including the historical role of Soviet leader ], political opposition, dissidents such as ], murdered journalists, and cases of international conflict or rivalry (with countries such as ], ], and ], but also with the foreign policies of the United States and the ]).<ref name="freedom-net-2013"/> Prominent journalist and Russia expert ] believes Russia's efforts are aimed at confusing the audience, rather than convincing it. He states that they cannot censor information but can "trash it with conspiracy theories and rumours".<ref name="trollArmy"/>
*Yusupovskiy considered Polyanskaya's article an interesting opportunity to draw a line of demarcation between analytics and its imitation. According to Yusupovskiy, authors of the article are obsessed with "a single but strong affection": to find a "Big Brother" beyond any phenomena not fitting their mindsets. Yusupovskiy called an article a classic illustration of reverted "]".
*Although Yusupovskiy himself has a list of claims against Russian security services and their presense in virtual world (as "according to statements of media every security service is busy in the Internet tracking terrorism, extremism, narcotic traffic, human trafficking and child pornography"), his claims are of different nature than those of Polyanskaya.
*Criticising Polyanskaya's point that Russian forums after 9/11 show "outstanding level of malice and hatred of the USA, gloat, slander and inhumanity" as "undifferentiated assessment bordering lie and slander", Yusupovskiy noted that there is a difference between "dislike of hegemonic policy of the United States" at Russian forums and "quite friendly attitude towards usual Americans". Aggression and xenophobia don't characterize one side but are a common place of discussion (as Yusupovskiy suggested, illusion of anonymity and absence of censorship allows such stuff to be taken from subconsciousness that won't let to be spoken aloud by an internal censor otherwise). According to Yusupovskiy,
{{Quotation|There's no lack of gloat of other kind — e.g. over Russian losses in Chechnya — or manifestations of brutal malice against "commies", "under men", Russians, Russia in posts of some our former compatriots from Israel, USA and other countries. And in a discussion of Palestineans or Arabs, "beasts", "not people", etc. are perhaps the most decent definitions given by many (not all) western participants of forums. It's specially touching to observe "briefings of hatred" (such things happen too), when Russian, Israeli and American patriots unanimously blame "Chechen-Palestinean-Islamic" terrorists...<ref name="Usup"/>}}
*Commenting on the change of attitude of virtual masses in 1998-1999 authors evade any mention of the 1998 ] which "crowned liberal decade", preferring to blame "mysterious bad guys or Big Brother" for that change.
{{Quotation|"''About 80% of authors at all web forums very aggressively and uniformly blame the USA''" as authors note, making a conclusion at the same time: "''at a moment amount of totalitarian opinions at Russian forums became 60%-80%''". Try to feel semantics of "extremal journalism" mindset and its logics of antithesises: either apology of Bush'es America while spitting on one's own country, either — totalitarian agentry. To illustrate "protective totalitarian" mindset, authors quote several malicious posts from masses of forum flapjaw: "''Security services existed in all times, all democratic states of the West had, have and will be having them.''" Or: "''FSB is the same security service like FBI in the USA or Mossad in Israel or Mi-6 in Great Britain''". And etc. I understand that I risk of being called "totalitarian", but quite honestly I'm having difficulties to recognize signs of totalitarianism in the above quotes. As authors continue, "''there are quite less real people with totalitarian views than one may consider after having a casual look on posts in any forum''". Here one can only sigh: would they look on ] or opinion polls results, how Stalin's popularity doesn't diminish and even rises, how meaning and emotional connotations of the word "democrat" changed (from positive to negative), and would they seriously consider these tendencies of development of social consciousness...<ref name="Usup"/>}}
*Authors exclude from their interpretation of events all other hypotheses, such as internet activity of a group of some "skinheads", ]s or simply unliberal students; or hackers able to get IP addresses of their opponents.
*According to Yusupovskiy, authors treat "independence of public opinion" in spirit of irreconcilable antagonism with "positive image of Russia".<ref name="Usup"/>


To avert suspicions, the users sandwich political remarks between neutral articles on travelling, cooking and pets.<ref name="trollArmy"/> They overwhelm comment sections of media to render meaningful dialogue impossible.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161127023507/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/04/pro-russia-trolls-ukraine-guardian-online |date=27 November 2016 }}, the Guardian, 4 May 2014</ref><ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150925171854/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-s-g20-snub/511377.html |date=25 September 2015 }}, The Moscow Times, Nov. 18 2014</ref>
Yusupovskiy finally commented on Polyanskaya's article:
{{cquote|The effect created by such Internet trolls is not very big, but they manage to make certain forums meaningless because people stop commenting on the articles when these trolls sit there and constantly create an aggressive, hostile atmosphere toward those whom they don’t like. The trolls react to certain news with torrents of mud and abuse. This makes it meaningless for a reasonable person to comment on anything there.<ref name="OperationPetersburg"/>}}
{{Quotation|"We would never make our country's military organizations and security services work under the rule of law and legal control, if won't learn to recognize rationally and objectively their necessity and usefulness for the country, state, society and citizens. Sweeping defamation and intentional discreditation with the help of "arguments", which are obviously false, only contribute to the extrusion of security services outside of rule of law and instigates them to chaos".<ref name="Usup"/>}}


A collection of leaked documents, published by Moy Rayon, suggests that work at the "troll den" is strictly regulated by a set of guidelines. Any blog post written by an agency employee, according to the leaked files, must contain "no fewer than 700 characters" during day shifts and "no fewer than 1,000 characters" on night shifts. Use of graphics and keywords in the post's body and headline is also mandatory. In addition to general guidelines, bloggers are also provided with "technical tasks" – keywords and talking points on specific issues, such as Ukraine, Russia's internal opposition and relations with the West.<ref name="trollArmy"/> On an average working day, the workers are to post on news articles 50 times. Each blogger is to maintain six Facebook accounts publishing at least three posts a day and discussing the news in groups at least twice a day. By the end of the first month, they are expected to have won 500 subscribers and get at least five posts on each item a day. On Twitter, the bloggers are expected to manage 10 accounts with up to 2,000 followers and tweet 50 times a day.<ref name="buzzfeed"/>
==Discussion on control over the Internet==
There are some suggestions that Russian troll networks may be operating on ], with certain boards being inundated with posts about how Ukraine is losing since Russia launched its full-scale invasion.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://cepa.org/article/pro-putin-disinformation-warriors-take-war-of-aggression-to-reddit/ | title=Pro-Putin Disinformation Warriors Take War of Aggression to Reddit | date=12 December 2023 }}</ref>
In 2006 radio talk show hosted by ] with a topic "Control over the Internet: How does that happen?", Russian journalist ] made the following points<!-- when asked by Albats about "web brigades" --><ref name=Albats_talk> , a talk show by ] at the ], January 22, 2006; interview with ] and others </ref>:
*There are countries with greater or less control over the Internet; but there is control over the Internet in Russia;
*During the ], a group of people calling themselves ] officers published allegedly internal GRU information on American losses in Iraq — this information was shown on the background of Anti-american hysteria and was well consumed. Later it turned out this information was not credible, but this effectively didn't change the result;
*After ] Russian ] issued a statement that ] "is a very bad resource", and after two days two teams calling themselves hackers appeared, to arrange hacker attacks against Kavkaz Center;
*Soldatov doesn't think web brigades are fiction. He had related issues with his own site, especially during such events like ];
*One of structures having related business with the Internet is ], which is currently a part of the ] and has been formerly a part of 16th ] department;
*There is a related agency in ] with competent people who can do such things. <ref name=Albats_talk/>


== Timeline ==
Other participant of the talk show, Russian political scientist ] made the following points:
{{Main article|Internet Research Agency}}
*There are countries with control over the Internet, there's none in Russia; there may be control understood as observation<!--surveillance-->, but there's no tool<!--mechanism--> to forbid any certain resource;
*Internet is good as the space where authorities and opposition are placed in absolutely equal conditions and they need to actually struggle and convince people. It's impossible to actually prohibit in the Internet, one needs to win ;
*Professional activity exists for long in the Internet — as many sites are professional media-structures with a team and owners perhaps — in a way a newspaper is. And coordinated work of these resources is possible. Commenting on a possibility that besides open structures there are closed ones imitating activity of youths, Gelman said he had an exact feeling it's fake;
*Answering Albats' question about possibilities of control over Internet as a means to exert influence on youths, Gelman asserted that authorities, opposition and America are all equal players in question of control and attempts of influence. Unlike e.g. television or newspapers all players in the Internet have equal possibilities, every player tries to do one's sort of work;
*Answering Albats' question "How control over Internet is technically organized?", Gelman noted that there are two major concepts: either the information is filtered before an user may access it ("premoderation"), either "postmoderation". While the first is the case in China, where access to certain types of resources is physically blocked, Gelman considers it a bad practice and it is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. Gelman thinks there must be control over the Internet in Russia, but only in the form of an agency searching for criminals in the Internet, tracking their IPs to get personal information, as well as there must be a mechanism to impose a penalty on such people. <ref name=Albats_talk/>


In 2015, Lawrence Alexander disclosed a network of propaganda websites sharing the same Google Analytics identifier and domain registration details, allegedly run by Nikita Podgorny from Internet Research Agency. The websites were mostly ] repositories focused on attacking Ukraine, ], Russian opposition and Western policies. Other websites from this cluster promoted president Putin and Russian nationalism, and spread alleged news from Syria presenting anti-Western and pro-] viewpoints.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kremlin-trolls-burned-across-the-internet-as-washington-debated-options/2017/12/23/e7b9dc92-e403-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html|title=Kremlin trolls burned across the Internet as Washington debated options|first1=Adam|last1=Entous|first2=Ellen|last2=Nakashima|first3=Greg|last3=Jaffe|date=25 December 2017|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=12 January 2018|archive-date=30 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171230155655/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kremlin-trolls-burned-across-the-internet-as-washington-debated-options/2017/12/23/e7b9dc92-e403-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title = Open-Source Information Reveals Pro-Kremlin Web Campaign|url = http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/07/13/open-source-information-reveals-pro-kremlin-web-campaign/|website = Global Voices|date = 13 July 2015|access-date = 2015-07-19|archive-date = 17 July 2015|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150717144400/http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/07/13/open-source-information-reveals-pro-kremlin-web-campaign/|url-status = live}}</ref>
=="LiveJournal fighters"==
A member of ] Roman Sadykhov claimed that he secretly infiltrated pro-Kremlin organizations of "] fighters", allegedly directed and paid from the Kremlin and instructions given to them by ], a close aide of ] <ref>{{ru icon}} , grani.ru, ], ]</ref> Surkov allegedly called Livejournal "a very important sector of work" <ref name="Surkov">, '']'', ], ]</ref> and said that people's brains must be "]" . He instructed "LiveJournal fighters" that


In August 2015, Russian researchers correlated Google search statistics of specific phrases with their geographic origin, observing increases in specific politically loaded phrases (such as "Poroshenko", "Maidan", "sanctions") starting from 2013 and originating from very small, peripheral locations in Russia, such as Olgino, which also happens to be the headquarters of the Internet Research Agency company.<ref>{{Cite web|title = Google выдал логово кремлевских троллей|date = 19 August 2015|url = http://www.stopfake.org/google-vydal-logovo-kremlevskih-trollej/|access-date = 2015-08-20|archive-date = 29 January 2019|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190129113959/https://www.stopfake.org/google-vydal-logovo-kremlevskih-trollej/|url-status = live}}</ref> The Internet Research Agency also appears to be the primary sponsor of an anti-Western exhibition ].<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.stopfake.org/en/emails-link-kremlin-troll-farm-to-bizarre-new-york-photography-exhibit/ | title=Emails Link Kremlin Troll Farm to Bizarre New York Photography Exhibit | publisher=StopFake.org | date=August 20, 2015 | access-date=September 13, 2015 | archive-date=17 April 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240417113838/https://www.stopfake.org/en/emails-link-kremlin-troll-farm-to-bizarre-new-york-photography-exhibit/ | url-status=live }}</ref>
{{Quotation|"We are losing in the Internet in that respect. It is always easier to break down things than to do something positive. What you are doing are jokes and minor infractions. Not only methods, but also goals must be radical. We must blow this romantics out of them . It is important not only to protect the authorities - this is understood, but we need to attract young people who can work creatively in the Internet. This is an important communication place of young people. Make them interested in conversations with you."<ref name="Surkov"/>}}


Since 2015, Finnish reporter ] has inquired into web brigades and Russian trolls.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/finnish-journalists-jessikka-aros-inquiry-into-russian-trolls-stirs-up-a-hornets-nest-20160311-gng8rk.html|title=Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro's inquiry into Russian trolls stirs up a hornet's nest|work=The Sydney Morning Herald|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=16 May 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240516235412/https://www.smh.com.au/world/finnish-journalists-jessikka-aros-inquiry-into-russian-trolls-stirs-up-a-hornets-nest-20160311-gng8rk.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition, Western journalists have referred to the phenomenon and have supported traditional media.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20171214/433629861346/el-presidente-de-la-ami-javier-moll-frente-a-las-fake-news-estamos-siempre-con-la-verdad-y-el-periodismo-riguroso.html|title=Article December 2017|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=23 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230523042338/https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20171214/433629861346/el-presidente-de-la-ami-javier-moll-frente-a-las-fake-news-estamos-siempre-con-la-verdad-y-el-periodismo-riguroso.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/15/inenglish/1521131265_135990.html|title=Press association supports EL PAÍS official targeted by Russian smear campaign|work=EL PAÍS|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=6 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191206133134/https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/15/inenglish/1521131265_135990.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
==See also==
*]
*]


In May 2019, it was reported that a study from the ] found that Russian Twitter bots had tried to inflame the United States' anti-vaccination debate by posting opinions on both sides in 2018.<ref>{{cite web |last1=O'Kane |first1=Caitlin |title=Russian trolls fueled anti-vaccination debate in U.S. by spreading misinformation on Twitter, study finds |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anti-vax-movement-russian-trolls-fueled-anti-vaccination-debate-in-us-by-spreading-misinformation-twitter-study/ |website=] |date=31 May 2019 |access-date=1 June 2019 |archive-date=23 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190723003409/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anti-vax-movement-russian-trolls-fueled-anti-vaccination-debate-in-us-by-spreading-misinformation-twitter-study/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
==References==

{{reflist}}
In June 2019 a group of 12 editors introducing coordinated pro-government and anti-opposition bias was blocked on the Russian-language Misplaced Pages.<ref name="meduza">{{Cite web |last=Kovalev |first=Alexey |author-link=Alexey Kovalev (journalist) |date=2019-07-05 |others=Translated by Hilah Kohen |title=Revenge of the editors |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/07/05/revenge-of-the-editors |access-date=2019-07-08 |website=] |archive-date=11 January 2020 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20200111185936/https://meduza.io/en/feature/2019/07/05/revenge-of-the-editors |url-status=live }}</ref> In July 2019 two operatives of the Internet Research Agency were detained in Libya and charged with attempting to influence local elections.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-05/libya-arrests-two-russians-accused-of-trying-to-influence-vote|title=Libya Uncovers Alleged Russian Plot to Meddle in African Votes|newspaper=Bloomberg.com|date=5 July 2019|access-date=6 September 2024|archive-date=19 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220219093018/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-05/libya-arrests-two-russians-accused-of-trying-to-influence-vote|url-status=live}}</ref> They were reportedly employees of Alexander Malkevich<!--Q4279423-->, manager of USA Really, a propaganda website.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-evolution-of-a-russian-troll-russia-libya-detained-tripoli/|title=The Evolution of a Russian Troll|last=Mackinnon|first=Amy|website=Foreign Policy|date=10 July 2019|language=en-US|access-date=2019-07-14|archive-date=11 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711051245/https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-evolution-of-a-russian-troll-russia-libya-detained-tripoli/|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2020, the research firm ] published a report detailing one particular Russian disinformation group codenamed "Secondary Infektion" (alluding to 80's ]) operating running since 2014. Over 6 years the group published over 2,500 items in seven languages and to over 300 platforms such as social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Reddit) and discussion forums. The group specialized in highly divisive topics regarding immigration, environment, politics, international relations and frequently used fake images presented as "leaked documents".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Executive Summary|url=https://secondaryinfektion.org/report/executive-summary/|access-date=2020-06-17|website=secondaryinfektion.org|language=en|archive-date=23 February 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240223192116/https://secondaryinfektion.org/report/executive-summary/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Starting in February 2022, a special attempt was made to back the Russian war in Ukraine. Particular effort was made to target Facebook and YouTube.{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}}

=== Russian invasion of Ukraine ===
{{Further|Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russian information war against Ukraine}}
In May 2022, during the ], the trolls allegedly hired by Internet Research Agency (IRA) had reportedly extended their foothold into TikTok, spreading misinformation on war events and attempting to question or sow doubt about the Ukraine war.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2022-05-01 |title=Russia's trolling on Ukraine gets 'incredible traction' on TikTok |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/01/russia-trolling-ukraine-traction-tiktok |access-date=2022-07-09 |website=the Guardian |language=en |archive-date=13 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220513161157/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/01/russia-trolling-ukraine-traction-tiktok |url-status=live }}</ref> Authentic-looking profiles had allegedly hundreds of thousands of followers.<ref name=":0" /> IRA was reported to be active across different platforms, including Instagram and Telegram.<ref name=":0" />

== See also ==
===Opinion-influencing operations in other countries===
Other countries and businesses have used paid Internet commenters to influence public opinion in other countries; some examples are below.
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* ] – China
* ] – Taiwan
* ] – Turkey
* ] – China
* ] – Israel
* ] – United Kingdom
* ] – China
* ] – United States
* ] – Vietnam
* ] – South Korea
* Bot Brigades – Serbia
{{div col end}}

===Related topics===
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{div col end}}

== Notes ==
{{Notes}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}


==External links== ==External links==
* , ], ].
* with ] at Moscow-based radio channel '']''. {{ru icon}}


== Literature ==
]
* Jolanta Darczewska: ''The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a Case Study''. Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2014, {{ISBN|978-83-62936-45-8}} ()
]
* ] & Michael Weiss: ''The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money''. The Institute of Modern Russia, New York 2014 ()
]
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{{Disinformation}}
{{Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections}}


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Latest revision as of 18:13, 15 December 2024

Russian state-sponsored Internet commentators

Russian web brigades, also called Russian trolls, Russian bots, Kremlinbots, or Kremlin trolls are state-sponsored anonymous Internet political commentators and trolls linked to the Russian government. Participants report that they are organized into teams and groups of commentators that participate in Russian and international political blogs and Internet forums using sockpuppets, social bots, and large-scale orchestrated trolling and disinformation campaigns to promote pro-Putin and pro-Russian propaganda.

Kremlin trolls are closely tied to the Internet Research Agency, a Saint Petersburg-based company run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was a close ally to Putin and head of the mercenary Wagner Group before his death in 2023. Articles on the Russian Misplaced Pages concerning the MH17 crash and the Russo-Ukrainian War were targeted by Russian internet propaganda outlets. In June 2019, a group of 12 editors introducing coordinated pro-government and anti-opposition bias was blocked on the Russian-language Misplaced Pages. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kremlin trolls were still active on many social platforms and were spreading disinformation related to the war events.

Background

Main articles: Russian disinformation, Propaganda in Russia, and Media freedom in Russia

The earliest documented allegations of the existence of "web brigades" appear to be in the April 2003 Vestnik Online article "The Virtual Eye of Big Brother" by French journalist Anna Polyanskaya (a former assistant to assassinated Russian politician Galina Starovoitova) and two other authors, Andrey Krivov and Ivan Lomako. The authors claim that up to 1998, contributions to forums on Russian Internet sites (Runet) predominantly reflected liberal and democratic values, but after 2000, the vast majority of contributions reflected totalitarian values. This sudden change was attributed to the appearance of teams of pro-Russian commenters who appeared to be organized by the Russian state security service. According to the authors, about 70% of Russian Internet posters were of generally liberal views prior to 1998–1999, while a surge of "antidemocratic" posts (about 60–80%) suddenly occurred at many Russian forums in 2000. This could also be a reflection to the fact that access to Internet among the general Russian population soared during this time, which was until then accessible only to some sections of the society.

In January 2012, a hacktivist group calling itself the Russian arm of Anonymous published a massive collection of email allegedly belonging to former and present leaders of the pro-Putin youth organization Nashi (including a number of government officials). Journalists who investigated the leaked information found that the pro-Putin movement had engaged in a range of activities including paying commentators to post content and hijacking blog ratings in the fall of 2011. The e-mails indicated that members of the "brigades" were paid 85 rubles (about US$3) or more per comment, depending on whether the comment received replies. Some were paid as much as 600,000 rubles (about US$21,000) for leaving hundreds of comments on negative press articles on the internet, and were presented with iPads. A number of high-profile bloggers were also mentioned as being paid for promoting Nashi and government activities. The Federal Youth Agency, whose head (and the former leader of Nashi) Vasily Yakemenko was the highest-ranking individual targeted by the leaks, refused to comment on the authenticity of the e-mails.

In 2013, a Freedom House report stated that 22 of 60 countries examined have been using paid pro-government commentators to manipulate online discussions, and that Russia has been at the forefront of this practice for several years, along with China and Bahrain. In the same year, Russian reporters investigated the St. Petersburg Internet Research Agency, which employs at least 400 people. They found that the agency covertly hired young people as "Internet operators" paid to write pro-Russian postings and comments, smearing opposition leader Alexei Navalny and U.S. politics and culture.

Each commenter was to write no less than 100 comments a day, while people in the other room were to write four postings a day, which then went to the other employees whose job was to post them on social networks as widely as possible.

Some Russian opposition journalists state that such practices create a chilling effect on the few independent media outlets remaining in the country.

Further investigations were performed by Russian opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta and Institute of Modern Russia in 2014–15, inspired by the peak of activity of the pro-Russian brigades during the Russo-Ukrainian War and assassination of Boris Nemtsov. The effort of using "troll armies" to promote Putin's policies is reported to be a multimillion-dollar operation. According to an investigation by the British Guardian newspaper, the flood of pro-Russian comments is part of a coordinated "informational-psychological war operation". One Twitter bot network was documented to use more than 20,500 fake Twitter accounts to spam negative comments after the death of Boris Nemtsov and events related to the Ukrainian conflict.

An article based on the original Polyanskaya article, authored by the Independent Customers' Association, was published in May 2008 at Expertiza.Ru. In this article the term web brigades is replaced by the term Team "G".

During his presidency, Donald Trump retweeted a tweet by a fake account operated by Russians. In 2017, he was among almost 40 celebrities and politicians, along with over 3,000 global news outlets, identified to have inadvertently shared content from Russian troll-farm accounts.

Methods

Web brigades commentators sometimes leave hundreds of postings a day that criticize the country's opposition and promote Kremlin-backed policymakers. Commentators simultaneously react to discussions of "taboo" topics, including the historical role of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, political opposition, dissidents such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, murdered journalists, and cases of international conflict or rivalry (with countries such as Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, but also with the foreign policies of the United States and the European Union). Prominent journalist and Russia expert Peter Pomerantsev believes Russia's efforts are aimed at confusing the audience, rather than convincing it. He states that they cannot censor information but can "trash it with conspiracy theories and rumours".

To avert suspicions, the users sandwich political remarks between neutral articles on travelling, cooking and pets. They overwhelm comment sections of media to render meaningful dialogue impossible.

The effect created by such Internet trolls is not very big, but they manage to make certain forums meaningless because people stop commenting on the articles when these trolls sit there and constantly create an aggressive, hostile atmosphere toward those whom they don’t like. The trolls react to certain news with torrents of mud and abuse. This makes it meaningless for a reasonable person to comment on anything there.

A collection of leaked documents, published by Moy Rayon, suggests that work at the "troll den" is strictly regulated by a set of guidelines. Any blog post written by an agency employee, according to the leaked files, must contain "no fewer than 700 characters" during day shifts and "no fewer than 1,000 characters" on night shifts. Use of graphics and keywords in the post's body and headline is also mandatory. In addition to general guidelines, bloggers are also provided with "technical tasks" – keywords and talking points on specific issues, such as Ukraine, Russia's internal opposition and relations with the West. On an average working day, the workers are to post on news articles 50 times. Each blogger is to maintain six Facebook accounts publishing at least three posts a day and discussing the news in groups at least twice a day. By the end of the first month, they are expected to have won 500 subscribers and get at least five posts on each item a day. On Twitter, the bloggers are expected to manage 10 accounts with up to 2,000 followers and tweet 50 times a day. There are some suggestions that Russian troll networks may be operating on Reddit, with certain boards being inundated with posts about how Ukraine is losing since Russia launched its full-scale invasion.

Timeline

Main article: Internet Research Agency

In 2015, Lawrence Alexander disclosed a network of propaganda websites sharing the same Google Analytics identifier and domain registration details, allegedly run by Nikita Podgorny from Internet Research Agency. The websites were mostly meme repositories focused on attacking Ukraine, Euromaidan, Russian opposition and Western policies. Other websites from this cluster promoted president Putin and Russian nationalism, and spread alleged news from Syria presenting anti-Western and pro-Assad viewpoints.

In August 2015, Russian researchers correlated Google search statistics of specific phrases with their geographic origin, observing increases in specific politically loaded phrases (such as "Poroshenko", "Maidan", "sanctions") starting from 2013 and originating from very small, peripheral locations in Russia, such as Olgino, which also happens to be the headquarters of the Internet Research Agency company. The Internet Research Agency also appears to be the primary sponsor of an anti-Western exhibition Material Evidence.

Since 2015, Finnish reporter Jessikka Aro has inquired into web brigades and Russian trolls. In addition, Western journalists have referred to the phenomenon and have supported traditional media.

In May 2019, it was reported that a study from the George Washington University found that Russian Twitter bots had tried to inflame the United States' anti-vaccination debate by posting opinions on both sides in 2018.

In June 2019 a group of 12 editors introducing coordinated pro-government and anti-opposition bias was blocked on the Russian-language Misplaced Pages. In July 2019 two operatives of the Internet Research Agency were detained in Libya and charged with attempting to influence local elections. They were reportedly employees of Alexander Malkevich, manager of USA Really, a propaganda website.

In 2020, the research firm Graphika published a report detailing one particular Russian disinformation group codenamed "Secondary Infektion" (alluding to 80's Operation Infektion) operating running since 2014. Over 6 years the group published over 2,500 items in seven languages and to over 300 platforms such as social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Reddit) and discussion forums. The group specialized in highly divisive topics regarding immigration, environment, politics, international relations and frequently used fake images presented as "leaked documents".

Starting in February 2022, a special attempt was made to back the Russian war in Ukraine. Particular effort was made to target Facebook and YouTube.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Further information: Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian information war against Ukraine

In May 2022, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the trolls allegedly hired by Internet Research Agency (IRA) had reportedly extended their foothold into TikTok, spreading misinformation on war events and attempting to question or sow doubt about the Ukraine war. Authentic-looking profiles had allegedly hundreds of thousands of followers. IRA was reported to be active across different platforms, including Instagram and Telegram.

See also

Opinion-influencing operations in other countries

Other countries and businesses have used paid Internet commenters to influence public opinion in other countries; some examples are below.

Related topics

Notes

  1. Russian: Русские веб-бригады

References

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External links

Literature

  • Jolanta Darczewska: The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a Case Study. Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2014, ISBN 978-83-62936-45-8 (PDF)
  • Peter Pomerantsev & Michael Weiss: The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money. The Institute of Modern Russia, New York 2014 (PDF)
Disinformation and misinformation
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