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{{Short description|Philosophical treatment of time, an object's persistence across it, and reality}} | |||
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{{other uses|Fourth dimension (disambiguation)}} | ||
{{Multiple issues| | |||
{{refimprove|date=March 2009}} | |||
{{original research|date=June 2011}} | |||
{{essay|date=June 2011}} | |||
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In ], '''four-dimensionalism''' (also known as the '''doctrine of ]''') is the ] position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space.<ref name="Sider1997">{{Cite journal |title=Four-Dimensionalism |first=Theodore |last=Sider |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=106 |issue=2 |pages=197–231 |date=April 1997 |url=http://tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf |jstor=2998357 |doi=10.2307/2998357 |access-date=2011-06-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304074848/http://tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf |archive-date=2016-03-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
'''Four dimensionalism''' is an ] view concerned with how objects persist in time. The proponents of four dimensionalism claim that both past and future objects lay equal claims to having the same level of reality as does the present moment. Therefore, if any object ‘x’ is a past reality, then the past object ‘y’ is equally as real as the present object. The same line of thinking applies for any future object. If any future object ‘y’ is a future reality, then the future object ‘y’ is equally as real as any present object. | |||
Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of '']''. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of ], according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the ] idea that only the present is real.<ref>{{Cite book|title=General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues |first=Theo A.F.|last=Kuipers|publisher=North Holland|year=2007|isbn=978-0-444-51548-3|page=326|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qUMuFaXjNjEC&pg=PA326}}</ref> As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Metaphysics : an introduction|first=Alyssa|last=Ney|author-link=Alyssa Ney|oclc=870919144}}</ref> | |||
Four dimensionalism is commonly expressed by means of a spatial analogue. For an object to have spatial extension, it must have different parts at different locations in space. ] are spread through time in the same way a spatial dimension is subdivided, such as football field into yards. Just as objects are extended in space, objects are conceptualized as being extended in time. | |||
'']''—or ''perdurance theory''—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and ],<ref name="sep-temporal-parts">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Hawley |first=Katherine |title=Temporal Parts |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/temporal-parts/|year=2010 |edition=Winter 2010}}</ref> according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view".<ref name=":0" /> While all perdurantists are plausibly considered four dimensionalists, at least one variety of four dimensionalism does not count as perdurantist in nature. This variety, known as '''exdurantism''' or the "stage view", is closely akin to the perdurantist position. They also countenance a view of persisting objects that have temporal parts that succeed one another through time. However, instead of identifying the persisting object as the entire set or sum of its temporal parts, the exdurantist argues that any object under discussion is a single stage (time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that the other stages or parts that comprise the persisting object are related to that part by a "temporal ]" relation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sider|first=Theodore|date=1996-09-01|title=All the world's a stage|journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy|volume=74|issue=3|pages=433–453|doi=10.1080/00048409612347421|issn=0004-8402}}</ref> | |||
One who believes in extended ] simples (from the Greek word μέρος; méros, "part"), maintains that objects do not consist of parts. The view which maintains that objects are wholly present at every moment of their existence is called ]. This is in contrast to ], which maintains that objects are not wholly present at every moment of their existence. Whether or not four dimensionalism applies to both objects and events is a hotly-debated topic among philosophers of time. | |||
Though they have often been conflated, eternalism is a theory of what time is like and what times exist, while perdurantism is a theory about persisting objects and their identity conditions over time. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism. Sider (1997)<ref name="Sider1997" /> uses the term ''four-dimensionalism'' to refer to perdurantism, but ] uses the term "four-dimensionalism" to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to "perdurantism", the view that ] is false and persisting objects have temporal parts.<ref>{{quotation|text={{omission}} This view is variously called "four-dimensionalism", "perdurantism", or "the doctrine of temporal parts". Some think that four-dimensionalism understood as the denial of presentism implies four-dimensionalism understood as perdurantism. But whether or not that is true, the important thing to recognize is that these are two very different views. To avoid confusion, I will in this paper reserve the term "four-dimensionalism" exclusively for the view that presentism is false, and I will use the term "perdurantism" to refer to the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.|author=Michael C. Rea|title=Four Dimensionalism|source=The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics}} </ref> | |||
The concept of four dimensionalism is in direct contrast to ], which asserts that only the present moment exists. The past and future are viewed as illusions of the mind. ], which also stands in contrast to ], asserts that both things in the past and things yet to exist are eternally real. Both of these concepts are exemplified by the ] in the work of ]. | |||
== Four-dimensionalism about material objects == | |||
==Temporal Parts== | |||
Four-dimensionalism is a name for different positions. One of these uses four-dimensionalism as a position of material objects with respect to dimensions. Four-dimensionalism is the view that in addition to spatial parts, objects have temporal parts.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Metaphysics: an Introduction|last=Ney|first=Alyssa|author-link=Alyssa Ney|date = 13 August 2014|isbn=978-1-317-67634-8|oclc=887509960}}</ref> | |||
According to this view, four-dimensionalism cannot be used as a synonym for perdurantism. Perdurantists have to hold a four-dimensional view of material objects: it is impossible that perdurantists, who believe that objects persist by having different temporal parts at different times, do not believe in temporal parts. However, the reverse is not true. Four-dimensionalism is compatible with either perdurantism or exdurantism. | |||
The idea of a whole object being composed of smaller parts is not a revolutionary idea. On the contrary, this notion is rather common. One instance of a whole object losing a part is the paradigm example of the ]. Another illustration is a familiar routine such as getting a haircut. Both of these instances provide an example of a whole object losing a part. For the four-dimensionalist, this does not represent the notion of parthood. | |||
==A-series and B-series== | |||
The notion of parthood for a four-dimensionalist allows one to speak of the parts of an object simpliciter. That is, without any criterion or condition, versus at any particular time such as t1or t2. Within the framework of four dimensionalism, one could say that his or her current temporal part is sitting at a computer, typing up a presentation on four dimensionalism, wearing sweatpants and having tea. Therefore, a four dimensionalist conceives of the parts of an object as an atemporal relation, or part of a larger ‘space-time’ worm. | |||
{{main article|A-series and B-series}} | |||
] in '']'' identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both ] and the ].<ref> by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7</ref> The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism. Much of the contemporary literature in the ] of time has been taken to spring forth from this distinction, and thus takes McTaggart's work as its starting point. | |||
Furthermore, the notion of parthood allows a four-dimensionalist to account for change, in a basic and ordinary sense of the word. Change is what allows ones to distinguish between different successive temporal parts. For example, one temporal part of a person may be typing at a computer, while another temporal part will be going to sleep. Still a third temporal part will be waking up to run errands and get prepared for work later in the evening. | |||
==Contrast with three-dimensionalism== | |||
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique ] that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: ], ] and ]. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct temporal parts.<ref name="Three-Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism">{{cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#ThreDimeFourDime | |||
==In Popular Culture== | |||
|title=Time: 8. The 3D/4D Controversy | |||
Four dimensionalism is a key concept in Kurt Vonnegut's book, ]. In the book, Tralfamadorians are an alien species that can see time. | |||
|date=2002-11-25 |access-date=2008-12-15 |publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |quote=As in the case of the disputes between A Theorists and B Theorists, on the one hand, and Presentists and Non-presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D controversy is part of a general disagreement among philosophers of time concerning the degree to which time is dissimilar from the dimensions of space. That general disagreement has been an important theme in the philosophy of time during the last one hundred years, and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081007063003/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time#3D4Con |archive-date=2008-10-07}}</ref> | |||
== Prominent arguments in favor of four-dimensionalism == | |||
⚫ | ==External links== | ||
Several lines of argumentation have been advanced in favor of four-dimensionalism: | |||
*Brown, C.L., 2006, " A philosophical, largely Wittgensteinian, approach towards a dissolution of the question: "What is space?" | |||
⚫ | *Rea, M. C., "" in ''The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics''. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes ] and four |
||
Firstly, four-dimensional accounts of time are argued to better explain paradoxes of change over time (often referred to as the paradox of the ]) than three-dimensional theories. A contemporary account of this paradox is introduced in Ney (2014),<ref name=":0" /> but the original problem has its roots in Greek antiquity. A typical Ship of Theseus paradox involves taking some changeable object with multiple material parts, for example a ship, then sequentially removing and replacing its parts until none of the original components are left. At each stage of the replacement, the ship is presumably identical with the original, since the replacement of a single part need not destroy the ship and create an entirely new one. But, it is also plausible that an object with none of the same material parts as another is not identical with the original object. So, how can an object survive the replacement of any of its parts, and in fact all of its parts? The four-dimensionalist can argue that the persisting object is a single space-time worm which has all the replacement stages as temporal parts, or in the case of the stage view that each succeeding stage bears a temporal counterpart relation to the original stage under discussion. | |||
Secondly, problems of temporary intrinsics are argued to be best explained by four-dimensional views of time that involve temporal parts. As presented by ],<ref>{{Cite book|title=On the plurality of worlds|last=Lewis|first=David K.|date=1986-01-01|publisher=B. Blackwell|oclc=12236763}}</ref> the problem of temporary intrinsics involves properties of an object that are both had by that object regardless of how anything else in the world is (and thus intrinsic), and subject to change over time (thus temporary). Shape is argued to be one such property. So, if an object is capable of having a particular shape, and also changing its shape at another time, there must be some way for the same object to be, say, both round and square. Lewis argues that separate temporal parts having the incompatible properties best explains an object being able to change its shape in this way, because other accounts of three-dimensional time eliminate intrinsic properties by indexing them to times and making them relational instead of intrinsic. | |||
==See also== | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ]<ref>{{aut|Lăzăroiu, A.}} 2007: Multiple occupancy, identity, and what matters. ''Philosophical explorations'', '''10'''(3): 211–225. {{doi|10.1080/13869790701535170}}</ref> | |||
* ] advocating this position | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
==References== | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
==Sources== | |||
* Armstrong, David M. (1980) "Identity Through Time", pages 67,8 in ] (editor), ''Time and Cause'', ]. | |||
* Hughes, C. (1986) "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?", ] 85: 213-33. | |||
* Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects", ] 46: 323-34. Reprinted in ''Rea'' 1997: 12.-330.'' | |||
* Heller, Mark (1990) ''The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter'', ]. | |||
* Heller, Mark (1992) "Things Change", ] 52: 695-304 | |||
* Heller, Mark (1993) "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism", ] 71: 47-59. | |||
* Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity", in ''Philosophical Papers, Volume 1'', 55-7. ]. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, editor (1976) ''The Identities of Persons'' ], pages 17-40. | |||
* Lewis, David (1986a). '']''. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. | |||
* Lewis, David (1986b). ''Philosophical Papers, Volume 2''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. | |||
* McTaggart John Ellis (1908) , originally published in ] 17: 456-473. | |||
* {{aut|Lewis, D.}} (1976) "Survival and identity", pages 17-40 in {{aut|Rorty, A.O.}} editor, ''The identities of persons''. Berkeley: University of California Press. | |||
* {{aut|Markosian, N.}} (2004) "A defense of presentism", pages 47-82 in {{aut|Zimmerman, D.W.}} editor, ''Oxford Studies in Metaphysics'', Volume 1, Oxford University Press. | |||
* {{aut|Muis, R.}} (2005) , '']'' 5 | |||
* {{aut|Robinson, D.}} (1985) "Can amoebae divide without multiplying?", ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'' 63(3): 299–319. {{doi|10.1080/00048408512341901}} | |||
⚫ | ==External links== | ||
⚫ | *Rea, M. C., "" in ''The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics''. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes ] and four-dimensionalism. | ||
*"" in the ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' | |||
{{Time Topics}} | {{Time Topics}} | ||
{{Time in philosophy}} | {{Time in philosophy}} | ||
{{DEFAULTSORT:Four-Dimensionalism}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:06, 7 November 2024
Philosophical treatment of time, an object's persistence across it, and reality For other uses, see Fourth dimension (disambiguation).This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these messages)
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In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the doctrine of temporal parts) is the ontological position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space. Thus, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies, just like an object that exists in a region of space has at least one part in every subregion of that space.
Four-dimensionalists typically argue for treating time as analogous to space, usually leading them to endorse the doctrine of eternalism. This is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real. As some eternalists argue by analogy, just as all spatially distant objects and events are as real as those close to us, temporally distant objects and events are as real as those currently present to us.
Perdurantism—or perdurance theory—is a closely related philosophical theory of persistence and identity, according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence, and the persisting object is the sum or set of all of its temporal parts. This sum or set is colloquially referred to as a "space-time worm", which has earned the perdurantist view the moniker of "the worm view". While all perdurantists are plausibly considered four dimensionalists, at least one variety of four dimensionalism does not count as perdurantist in nature. This variety, known as exdurantism or the "stage view", is closely akin to the perdurantist position. They also countenance a view of persisting objects that have temporal parts that succeed one another through time. However, instead of identifying the persisting object as the entire set or sum of its temporal parts, the exdurantist argues that any object under discussion is a single stage (time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that the other stages or parts that comprise the persisting object are related to that part by a "temporal counterpart" relation.
Though they have often been conflated, eternalism is a theory of what time is like and what times exist, while perdurantism is a theory about persisting objects and their identity conditions over time. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism. Sider (1997) uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism, but Michael Rea uses the term "four-dimensionalism" to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to "perdurantism", the view that endurantism is false and persisting objects have temporal parts.
Four-dimensionalism about material objects
Four-dimensionalism is a name for different positions. One of these uses four-dimensionalism as a position of material objects with respect to dimensions. Four-dimensionalism is the view that in addition to spatial parts, objects have temporal parts.
According to this view, four-dimensionalism cannot be used as a synonym for perdurantism. Perdurantists have to hold a four-dimensional view of material objects: it is impossible that perdurantists, who believe that objects persist by having different temporal parts at different times, do not believe in temporal parts. However, the reverse is not true. Four-dimensionalism is compatible with either perdurantism or exdurantism.
A-series and B-series
Main article: A-series and B-seriesJ.M.E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future, and thus assumes that the "present" has some objective reality, as in both presentism and the growing block universe. The B-series defines a given event as earlier or later than another event, but does not assume an objective present, as in four-dimensionalism. Much of the contemporary literature in the metaphysics of time has been taken to spring forth from this distinction, and thus takes McTaggart's work as its starting point.
Contrast with three-dimensionalism
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three dimensionalist considers time to be a unique dimension that is not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: length, width and height. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist agrees that the parts of an object can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, they do not believe an object can be differentiated into temporal parts across time. For example, in the three dimensionalist account, "Descartes in 1635" is the same object as "Descartes in 1620", and both are identical to Descartes, himself. However, the four dimensionalist considers these to be distinct temporal parts.
Prominent arguments in favor of four-dimensionalism
Several lines of argumentation have been advanced in favor of four-dimensionalism:
Firstly, four-dimensional accounts of time are argued to better explain paradoxes of change over time (often referred to as the paradox of the Ship of Theseus) than three-dimensional theories. A contemporary account of this paradox is introduced in Ney (2014), but the original problem has its roots in Greek antiquity. A typical Ship of Theseus paradox involves taking some changeable object with multiple material parts, for example a ship, then sequentially removing and replacing its parts until none of the original components are left. At each stage of the replacement, the ship is presumably identical with the original, since the replacement of a single part need not destroy the ship and create an entirely new one. But, it is also plausible that an object with none of the same material parts as another is not identical with the original object. So, how can an object survive the replacement of any of its parts, and in fact all of its parts? The four-dimensionalist can argue that the persisting object is a single space-time worm which has all the replacement stages as temporal parts, or in the case of the stage view that each succeeding stage bears a temporal counterpart relation to the original stage under discussion.
Secondly, problems of temporary intrinsics are argued to be best explained by four-dimensional views of time that involve temporal parts. As presented by David Lewis, the problem of temporary intrinsics involves properties of an object that are both had by that object regardless of how anything else in the world is (and thus intrinsic), and subject to change over time (thus temporary). Shape is argued to be one such property. So, if an object is capable of having a particular shape, and also changing its shape at another time, there must be some way for the same object to be, say, both round and square. Lewis argues that separate temporal parts having the incompatible properties best explains an object being able to change its shape in this way, because other accounts of three-dimensional time eliminate intrinsic properties by indexing them to times and making them relational instead of intrinsic.
See also
- Extended modal realism
- Four-dimensional space
- Multiple occupancy view
- Rietdijk–Putnam argument advocating this position
- Spacetime
- World line
- Light cone
References
- ^ Sider, Theodore (April 1997). "Four-Dimensionalism" (PDF). The Philosophical Review. 106 (2): 197–231. doi:10.2307/2998357. JSTOR 2998357. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2011-06-12.
- Kuipers, Theo A.F. (2007). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. North Holland. p. 326. ISBN 978-0-444-51548-3.
- ^ Ney, Alyssa. Metaphysics : an introduction. OCLC 870919144.
- Hawley, Katherine (2010). "Temporal Parts". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 ed.).
- Sider, Theodore (1996-09-01). "All the world's a stage". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74 (3): 433–453. doi:10.1080/00048409612347421. ISSN 0004-8402.
-
... This view is variously called "four-dimensionalism", "perdurantism", or "the doctrine of temporal parts". Some think that four-dimensionalism understood as the denial of presentism implies four-dimensionalism understood as perdurantism. But whether or not that is true, the important thing to recognize is that these are two very different views. To avoid confusion, I will in this paper reserve the term "four-dimensionalism" exclusively for the view that presentism is false, and I will use the term "perdurantism" to refer to the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.
— Michael C. Rea, Four Dimensionalism, The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics - Ney, Alyssa (13 August 2014). Metaphysics: an Introduction. ISBN 978-1-317-67634-8. OCLC 887509960.
- Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7
- "Time: 8. The 3D/4D Controversy". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002-11-25. Archived from the original on 2008-10-07. Retrieved 2008-12-15.
As in the case of the disputes between A Theorists and B Theorists, on the one hand, and Presentists and Non-presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D controversy is part of a general disagreement among philosophers of time concerning the degree to which time is dissimilar from the dimensions of space. That general disagreement has been an important theme in the philosophy of time during the last one hundred years, and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come.
- Lewis, David K. (1986-01-01). On the plurality of worlds. B. Blackwell. OCLC 12236763.
- Lăzăroiu, A. 2007: Multiple occupancy, identity, and what matters. Philosophical explorations, 10(3): 211–225. doi:10.1080/13869790701535170
Sources
- Armstrong, David M. (1980) "Identity Through Time", pages 67,8 in Peter van Inwagen (editor), Time and Cause, D. Reidel.
- Hughes, C. (1986) "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33.
- Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects", Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.
- Heller, Mark (1990) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge University Press.
- Heller, Mark (1992) "Things Change", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-304
- Heller, Mark (1993) "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59.
- Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity", in Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 55-7. Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, editor (1976) The Identities of Persons University of California Press, pages 17-40.
- Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McTaggart John Ellis (1908) The Unreality of time, originally published in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17: 456-473.
- Lewis, D. (1976) "Survival and identity", pages 17-40 in Rorty, A.O. editor, The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press. Google books
- Markosian, N. (2004) "A defense of presentism", pages 47-82 in Zimmerman, D.W. editor, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. Google books
- Muis, R. (2005) Review of Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time by Theodore Sider, Ars Disputandi 5
- Robinson, D. (1985) "Can amoebae divide without multiplying?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(3): 299–319. doi:10.1080/00048408512341901
External links
- Rea, M. C., "Four Dimensionalism" in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes presentism and four-dimensionalism.
- "Time" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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