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| {{Short description|Overview of the political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency}} | |||
| {{Politics of Russia}} | |||
| {{update|date=January 2015}} | |||
| {{use dmy dates|date=July 2024|cs1-dates=y}} | |||
| {{Putin sidebar}} | |||
| A diverse variety of informal political groups emerged since the presidency of ] starting in 1999. They include remnants of the ] family, ] lawyers and economists, and security-intelligence elements called the ].<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| == Background == | |||
| At the start of his presidency, ] announced that he would consolidate political powers in ] into the so-called '''power vertical'''. However, despite being considered successful by many, this controversial endeavour partially backfired and led to the increasing factionalism within the president's inner circle. Although other institutions now became largely irrelevant, disputes and clashes between Kremlin factions, rather than the president's will, are increasingly important in determining major Russian sate policy outcomes.<ref>* by ] and Samuel Charap, ] 30.1 (2006-2007).</ref>. The political groups include security-intelligence leaders called the ], "] lawyers", one of them current Russian president ] and others.<ref name="willerton">{{cite book|last=Willerton|first=John|title=Developments in Russian Politics|editor=White, Gitelman, Sakwa|publisher=Duke University Press|date=2005|volume=6|chapter=Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency|isbn=0822335220}}</ref> | |||
| {{further|Russia under Vladimir Putin}} | |||
| When Putin came to power in 1999, he had few protégés or long-term associates, and had to balance various competitive elements as he crafted his team. In contrast to the Yeltsin years, Putin's regime was marked by personnel stability, a gradual elevation of trusted associates and coalition-building across competing interests both within the presidential administration and with other political actors.<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| == |
== Overview == | ||
| As ] Vladimir Putin, a former employee of the ] and ] ] Directorate and former Chief of the Committee for External Relations of ], had come to the presidency in 2000, many political observers noticed quick career promotion of bureaucrats and businesspeople from ] to the federal power bodies (especially the ], a very influential institution that has always been totally controlled by the presidential authority) and large state-controlled companies (such as ] and ]) and their struggle against old Moscow elites loyal to ]'s family, known as ''Family group'', as well as against influential media tycoon ] and his allies, who helped Putin on his way to power in 1999–2000.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Происхождение путинской олигархии |language=ru |trans-title=Origins of Putin's oligarchy |author-first=Vladimir |author-last=Pribylovsky |author-link=Vladimir Pribylovsky |date=2005 |url=http://www.anticompromat.org/oligarhi/ppo.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100819202453/http://www.anticompromat.org/oligarhi/ppo.html |archive-date=2010-08-19}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d776a916-ff2f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html |title=Back in business - how Putin's allies are turning Russia into a corporate state |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070510014238/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d776a916-ff2f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html |archive-date=2007-05-10 |author-first1=Neil |author-last1=Buckley |author-first2=Arkady |author-last2=Ostrovsky |newspaper=] |date=2006-06-19}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/russia/article/0,2763,1522191,00.html |title=Meet the chief exec of Kremlin inc ... |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302025318/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/06/russia.nickpatonwalsh |archive-date=2022-03-02 |author-first=Nick Paton |author-last=Walsh |newspaper=] |date=2005-07-06}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2004/07/28/sechin.shtml |title=St. Petersburg Team Building Their Own 'Family' |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061113092309/http://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2004/07/28/sechin.shtml |archive-date=2006-11-13 |author-first=Dmitry |author-last=Koptev |newspaper=] |url-status=usurped |date=2004-07-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18629-2005Apr27.html |title=As Russian's Trial Ends, So Does Era Of First Oligarchs |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170320221022/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18629-2005Apr27.html |archive-date=2017-03-20 |author-first=Peter |author-last=Finn |newspaper=] |date=2005-04-27}}</ref> | |||
| When Putin came to power, he had few protégés or long-term associates, and had to balance various competitive elements as he crafted his team. In contrast to the Yeltsin years, Putin's regime was marked by personnel stability, a gradual elevation of trusted associates and coalition-building across competing interests both within the presidential adminstration and with other political actors.<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton, it is difficult to make general judgements about the various informal groups, their backgrounds and political preferences.<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| ==Overview== | |||
| As ] Vladimir Putin, former employee of the ] and ] ] Directorate and former Chief of the Committee for External Relations of ], had come to the presidency in 2000, many political observers noticed quick career promotion of bureaucracy and businesspeople from ] to the federal power bodies (especially the ], a very influential institution that has always been totally controlled by the presidential authority) and large state-controlled companies (such as ] and ]) and their struggle against old Moscow elites loyal to ]'s family, known as ''Family group'', as well as against influential media tycoon ] and his allies, who helped Putin on his way to power in 1999 - 2000.<ref> (Origins of Putin's oligarchy) by ] (2005).</ref><ref> by Neil Buckley and Arkady Ostrovsky, ], June 19, 2006.</ref><ref> by Nick Paton Walsh, ], July 6, 2005.</ref><ref> by ], ], July 28, 2004,</ref><ref> by Peter Finn, ], April 27, 2005.</ref> | |||
| == Major groups == | |||
| According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton, it is difficult to make general judgements about the various informal groups, their backgrounds and political preferences.<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| {{Update section|date=November 2019}} | |||
| ] | |||
| === St. Petersburg economists and lawyers === | |||
| ==Major Groups== | |||
| According to Associate Professor of Political Science ] of the ] in the ], reformist St. Petersburg economists and lawyers constitute a prominent group in the Putin team. Many of them have career and personal ties to Putin dating back to the early 1990s.<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| ] | |||
| Many of the members of the economic reform team, both in the presidential administration and the government, are drawn from the St Petersburg group. They are academically qualified, have significant administrative experience, and are often focused on the technical complexities of the country's system transformation. They are - in general - committed to market development, privatization and the continued diminution of the state's role in the country's socioeconomic life. The liberal economists contend that the consolidation of democracy comes with improving the population's standard of living and developing the private sector. Prominent St Petersburg economists include ], ] and Putin's economic adviser ].<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| ===St. Petersburg economists and lawyers=== | |||
| According to Associate Professor of Political Science ] of the ] in the ], reformist St Petersburg economists and lawyers constitute a prominent group in the Putin team. Many of them have career and personal ties to Putin dating back to the early 1990s.<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| ], ], ], ], ], ], and ] at the funeral of ], 29 June 2015]] | |||
| Many of the members of the economic reform team, both in the presidential adminstration and the government, are drawn from the St Petersburg group. They are academically qualified and have significant adminstrative experience, are often focused on the technical complexities of the country's system transformation. They are - in general - committed to market development, privatization and the continued diminution of the state's role in the country's socioeconomic life. The liberal economists contend that the consolidation of democracy comes with improving the population's standard of living and developing the private sector. Prominent St Petersburg economists include ], ] and Putin's economic adviser ].<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| The St Petersburg lawyers focus on constitutional-legal-administrative arrangements to bolster an efficient democratic system, favouring reforms that strengthen simultaneously the market economy and political stability. Prominent members included the former presidential administration head ] and ].<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| === Siloviki === | |||
| The St Petersburg lawyers focus on constitutional-legal-adminstrative arrangements to bolster and efficient democratic system, favouring reforms that strengthen simultaniously the market economy and political stability. Prominent members included the former presidential adminstration head ] and ].<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| Much foreign attention has been given to the security-intelligence elements, what Russians refer to as the ]i. They began coming to power under Yeltsin, but this accelerated during Putin's premiership and presidency. A common view in Russia is that these siloviki are generally non-ideological, are corrupt, have a pragmatic law and order focus and have Russian national interests at heart. They do not form a cohesive group.<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> Putin himself is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the ]. | |||
| === Remnants of the Yeltsin family === | |||
| ===Siloviki=== | |||
| Another identifiable group are the remnants of the so-called "Family" - a term which originally referred to relatives and associates of the former president Yeltsin. Most senior members of the group have left the highest corridors of power, but some have been able to survive and secure influential positions.<ref name="Willerton_2005"/> | |||
| Much foreign attention has been given to the security-intelligence elements, what Russians refer to as the ]. They began coming to power under Yeltsin, but this accelerated during Putin's premiership and presidency. A common view in Russia is that these siloviki are generally non-ideological, are not corrupt, have a pragmatic law and order focus and have Russian national interests at heart. They do not form a cohesive group.<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| === |
=== Ozero === | ||
| ] is the name of a co-operative society headed, '']'', by Putin. The co-operative administers Putin's substantial personal wealth generated over the course of his presidency. The immense financial power of members of the co-operative fundamentally creates a wealthy clique of new oligarchs capable of replacing the financial power of Yeltsin era oligarchs. | |||
| Another identifiable group are the remnants of the so-called "Family" - a term which originally referred to relatives and associated of the former president Yeltsin. Most senior members of the group have left the highest corridors of power, but some have been able to survive and secure influential positions.<ref name="willerton"/> | |||
| ==Outside opinion== | == Outside opinion == | ||
| According to a ] article by ] and Samuel Charap, at the start of his presidency, ] announced that he would consolidate political powers in ] into the so-called |
According to a '']'' article written by ] and Samuel Charap in 2006–2007, at the start of his presidency, ] announced that he would consolidate political powers in ] into the so-called ''power vertical''. However, despite being considered successful by many, this controversial endeavour partially backfired and led to the increasing factionalism within the president's inner circle. Although other institutions became largely irrelevant, disputes and clashes between Kremlin factions, rather than the president's will, became more and more important in determining major policy outcomes, Bremmer and Charap write.<ref>{{cite news |author-first1=Ian |author-last1=Bremmer |author-link1=Ian Bremmer |author-first2=Samuel |author-last2=Charap |newspaper=] |id=30:1 |date=Winter 2006–2007 |url=http://www.fbird.com/assets/The%20Siloviki%20in%20Putins%20Russia%20Who%20They%20Are%20and%20What%20They%20Want__1272006135841.pdf |title=The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929111633/http://www.fbird.com/assets/The%20Siloviki%20in%20Putins%20Russia%20Who%20They%20Are%20and%20What%20They%20Want__1272006135841.pdf |archive-date=2007-09-29}}</ref> | ||
| ==History== | == History == | ||
| During the final years of ]'s presidency, ], ] of the ], was considered to be the most influential figure within the Family group. Despite his obvious connections to Russian commerce, he was dominating Russia's politics of that time.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Putin & Voloshin |author= Rafael Behr|date=17 May 2003|work= Johnson's Russia List|publisher= Financial Times (UK) |url=http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7184-19.cfm |access-date=23 February 2007 |url-status=deviated |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120309144953/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7184-19.cfm |archive-date=9 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Oligarchs, Putin |author= Vladimir Pribylovsky|date= 1–15 May 2003|work= Johnson's Russia List|publisher= WPS Monitoring Agency|translator-last1=Frolov|translator-first1=Kirill|url=http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-13.cfm |access-date=23 February 2007 |url-status=deviated |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030527225513/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-13.cfm |archive-date=27 May 2003}}</ref> | |||
| In 1999, the Family group, Vladimir Putin, Boris Berezovsky and their allies united their efforts in order to prevent coming to power of the ] political alliance of former ] ] and ] ] that was supported by media tycoon ] and to some extent by the public opinion. The efforts were successful, but as soon as Putin had won the ], an acute conflict with Boris Berezovsky developed, and in 2002 Berezovsky fled to London. As a result, Russian authorities consolidated their power over Russian television companies ] and ] previously controlled by Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, respectively.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Владимир Прибыловский, Юрий Фельштинский. Операция "Наследник". Главы из книги |language=ru |trans-title= |author= |date= |website=lib.ru |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://www.lib.ru/HISTORY/FELSHTINSKY/naslednik.txt |access-date=2007-02-23 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170824084233/http://lib.ru/HISTORY/FELSHTINSKY/naslednik.txt |archive-date=2017-08-24}}</ref> | |||
| During the final years of ]'s presidency, ], chief of the ], was considered to be the most influential figure within the Family group, somewhat shady though, dominating Russia's politics of that time | |||
| . | |||
| The Family group has also almost entirely lost its influence by 2004 after the dismissals of Alexander Voloshin (October 2003), Prime Minister ] (February 2004) and some key figures of ], but some of the group's members secured their political survival. ], initially being an aide to Voloshin, gained much influence, as well as ] ], who had leaned towards new Saint Petersburg elites and whose son had become ]'s ]. Tycoon ], who had leaned towards the Family group in the 1990s, also remained influential, as well as former Mass Media Minister ]. Each of them, however, had already distanced away from the Family group by that time. | |||
| In 1999 the Family group, Vladimir Putin, Boris Berezovsky and their allies united their efforts in order to prevent coming to power of the ] political alliance of former Prime Minster ] and ] Mayor ] that was supported by media tycoon ] and to some extent by the public opinion. The efforts were successful, but as soon as Putin had won the ], an acute conflict with Boris Berezovsky developed, and in 2002 Berezovsky fled to London. As a result, Russian authorities consolidated their power over Russian TV companies ] and ] previously controlled by Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, respectively. | |||
| As the Family group had lost its influence, especially during Vladimir Putin's second four-year presidential term (since 7 May 2004), some conflicts between parts of the new elites of Saint Petersburg origin became evident, as witnessed e.g. by the disputes over the fate of ], failed project of merging ] and ], struggle for ] and upcoming 2008 ], some appointments and dismissals in ] and consequences of the ], but the exact configuration of these new groups still remains unclear. However, it is widely acknowledged that ] and ] are key figures heading their own factions and opposed to each other but both very close to Putin. Former Prime Minister ] is considered a close ally of Sechin.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Агония в виде кадровых перестановок у силовиков |language=ru |trans-title= |author= |date= |work=stringer-news.ru |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://www.stringer-news.ru/publication.mhtml?Part=50&PubID=6733 |access-date=2007-02-23 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927120128/http://www.stringer-news.ru/publication.mhtml?Part=50&PubID=6733 |archive-date=2007-09-27}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:ВОЙНА ДВУХ БАШЕН |language=ru |trans-title= |author= |date= |work=novayagazeta.ru |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/94n/n94n-s01.shtml |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-01-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070128092203/http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/94n/n94n-s01.shtml |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Газета Русский Курьер: Толчея среди кандидатов в "преемники" |language=ru |trans-title= |author= |date= |work=ruscourier.ru |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://www.ruscourier.ru/archive/1286 |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927212821/http://www.ruscourier.ru/archive/1286 |archive-date=2007-09-27 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title= Антикомпромат.Ру. Путин|url=http://www.anticompromat.ru/putin/5bashen.html |access-date=2007-02-23 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070109160627/http://www.anticompromat.ru/putin/5bashen.html |archive-date=2007-01-09}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Белковский: Фрадков и Сечин усилились |language=ru |trans-title= |author= |date= |work=apn.ru |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://www.apn.ru/news/article11530.htm |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-09-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927232036/http://www.apn.ru/news/article11530.htm |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Эхо Москвы Власть: Георгий Сатаров |author-last=Сатаров |author-first=Георгий |date= |work=Эхо Москвы |publisher= |publication-place= |url=http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/politic/48964/ |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-12-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071229020537/http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/politic/48964/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Радиостанция «Эхо Москвы»: Власть, Пятница, 16 Февраль 2007 |url=http://echo.msk.ru/programs/politic/49642/index.phtml |access-date=2007-02-23 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080121182955/http://echo.msk.ru/programs/politic/49642/index.phtml |archive-date=2008-01-21}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Putin reshuffle gives clues to choice of heir |author-first=Nick Paton |author-last=Walsh |work=] |date=2005-11-15 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/russia/article/0,2763,1642664,00.html |access-date=2016-12-16 |archive-date=2022-03-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302025328/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/15/russia.nickpatonwalsh |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=588623 |title=The Appetite Increases during the Struggle - Kommersant Moscow |work=kommersant.com |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-09-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927191654/http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=588623 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=735542 |title=Things to Come - Kommersant Moscow |work=kommersant.com |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-09-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930190853/http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=735542 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kommersant.com/p511585/r_1/Damage_Control/ |title=Damage Control - Kommersant Moscow |work=kommersant.com |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-09-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070920130946/http://www.kommersant.com/p511585/r_1/Damage_Control/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=583190 |title=The Service Oil Pipeline - Kommersant Moscow |work=kommersant.com |access-date=2007-02-23 |archive-date=2007-09-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930192154/http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=583190 |url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
| The Family group has also almost entirely lost its influence by 2004 after the dismissals of Alexander Voloshin (October 2003), Prime Minister ] (February 2004) and some key figures of ], but some of the group's members secured their political survival. ], initially being an aide to Voloshin, gained much influence, as well as Prosecutor General ], who had leaned towards new Saint Petersburg elites and whose son had become ]'s ]. Tycoon ], who had leaned towards the Family group in the 1990s, also remained influential, as well as former Mass Media Minister ]. Each of them, however, had already distanced away from the Family group by that time. | |||
| == See also == | |||
| As the Family group had lost its influence, especially during Vladimir Putin's second four-year presidential term (since ]]), some conflicts between parts of the new elites of Saint Petersburg origin became evident, as witnessed e.g. by the disputes over the fate of ], failed project of merging ] and ], struggle for ] and upcoming 2008 ], some appointments and dismissals in ] and consequences of the ], but the exact configuration of these new groups still remains unclear. However, it is widely acknowledged that ] and ] are key figures heading their own factions and opposed to each other but both very close to Putin. Former Prime Minister ] is considered close ally of Sechin. ( | |||
| * ] | |||
| * ] | |||
| ) | |||
| == |
== References == | ||
| {{reflist|refs= | |||
| This is a list of people who had ties with Vladimir Putin or his closest allies in Saint Petersburg and have been quickly promoted to important positions under him as FSB Director, Prime Minister and President. The list is arranged by the probable origin of their ties. | |||
| <ref name="Willerton_2005">{{cite book |title=Developments in Russian Politics |chapter=Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency |author-last=Willerton |author-first=John |editor-last1=White |editor-last2=Gitelman |editor-last3=Sakwa |publisher=] |date=2005 |volume=6 |isbn=0-8223-3522-0}}</ref> | |||
| }} | |||
| == Further reading == | |||
| ===Colleagues of Putin at the Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast KGB Directorate=== | |||
| * {{cite web |url=http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/BP-Russian-billionaires-and-the-Kremlin.pdf |title=BP, Russian billionaires, and the Kremlin: a Power Triangle that never was |author-first=Shamil |author-last=Yenikeyeff |work=Oxford Energy Comment |publisher=] |date=2011-11-23}} | |||
| :] (considered an ally of Igor Sechin) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (also worked in Saint Petersburg Mayor's Office) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (classmate of Boris Gryzlov and Sergei Smirnov) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (classmate of Nikolai Patrushev and Boris Gryzlov, fellow student of Boris Gryzlov at the institute) | |||
| ====…and participants of the ]==== | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (business partner of Boris Gryzlov) | |||
| {{Vladimir Putin}} | |||
| ===People that have got acquainted with Putin during his work in Dresden=== | |||
| {{Auth}} | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| ===Employees of the Saint Petersburg Mayor's Office Committee for External Relations led by Putin in 1991-1996=== | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (father-in-law of Vladimir Ustinov's son and a close associate of ] and Gennady Timchenko) | |||
| :] (father-in-law of Anatoly Serdyukov and unsuccessful contender in the 1999 Leningrad Oblast Governor election assisted by Boris Gryzlov as his campaign manager) | |||
| ===Colleagues of Putin from other committees of Saint Petersburg Mayor's Office=== | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (started his promotion before Putin) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| ===Fellow students of Dmitry Medvedev at the Law Department of ] graduated in 1987=== | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| ===Colleagues of Nikolay Patrushev from the Karelian KGB Directorate of the early 1990s=== | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| ===Other close associates of Vladimir Putin=== | |||
| :] (classmate of Nikolay Patrushev and Sergei Smirnov, business partner of Viktor Ivanov, ally of Viktor Zubkov) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (son-in-law of Viktor Zubkov, ally of Viktor Ivanov) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (ally of ] CEO ]) | |||
| :] (former ally of ] and ]) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (previously loyal to ]'s family, now a close ally of Igor Sechin) | |||
| :] | |||
| :] (bodyguard of Putin in the 1990s) | |||
| ==Notes== | |||
| {{reflist}} | |||
| ==See also== | |||
| *] | |||
| ==External links== | |||
| * by ] and Samuel Charap, ] 30.1 (2006-2007). | |||
| * (Origins of Putin's oligarchy) by ] (2005). | |||
| ] | ] | ||
| ] | |||
| ] | ] | ||
| ] | |||
Latest revision as of 02:26, 15 December 2024
Overview of the political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency | This article needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (January 2015) |
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A diverse variety of informal political groups emerged since the presidency of Vladimir Putin starting in 1999. They include remnants of the Yeltsin family, Saint Petersburg lawyers and economists, and security-intelligence elements called the siloviki.
Background
Further information: Russia under Vladimir PutinWhen Putin came to power in 1999, he had few protégés or long-term associates, and had to balance various competitive elements as he crafted his team. In contrast to the Yeltsin years, Putin's regime was marked by personnel stability, a gradual elevation of trusted associates and coalition-building across competing interests both within the presidential administration and with other political actors.
Overview
As President Vladimir Putin, a former employee of the Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast KGB Directorate and former Chief of the Committee for External Relations of Saint Petersburg Mayor's Office, had come to the presidency in 2000, many political observers noticed quick career promotion of bureaucrats and businesspeople from Saint Petersburg to the federal power bodies (especially the Presidential Executive Office, a very influential institution that has always been totally controlled by the presidential authority) and large state-controlled companies (such as Gazprom and Rosneft) and their struggle against old Moscow elites loyal to Boris Yeltsin's family, known as Family group, as well as against influential media tycoon Boris Berezovsky and his allies, who helped Putin on his way to power in 1999–2000.
According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton, it is difficult to make general judgements about the various informal groups, their backgrounds and political preferences.
Major groups
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St. Petersburg economists and lawyers
According to Associate Professor of Political Science John P. Willerton of the University of Arizona in the United States, reformist St. Petersburg economists and lawyers constitute a prominent group in the Putin team. Many of them have career and personal ties to Putin dating back to the early 1990s.
Many of the members of the economic reform team, both in the presidential administration and the government, are drawn from the St Petersburg group. They are academically qualified, have significant administrative experience, and are often focused on the technical complexities of the country's system transformation. They are - in general - committed to market development, privatization and the continued diminution of the state's role in the country's socioeconomic life. The liberal economists contend that the consolidation of democracy comes with improving the population's standard of living and developing the private sector. Prominent St Petersburg economists include Alexei Kudrin, Herman Gref and Putin's economic adviser Andrey Illarionov.
The St Petersburg lawyers focus on constitutional-legal-administrative arrangements to bolster an efficient democratic system, favouring reforms that strengthen simultaneously the market economy and political stability. Prominent members included the former presidential administration head Dmitry Medvedev and Dmitry Kozak.
Siloviki
Much foreign attention has been given to the security-intelligence elements, what Russians refer to as the siloviki. They began coming to power under Yeltsin, but this accelerated during Putin's premiership and presidency. A common view in Russia is that these siloviki are generally non-ideological, are corrupt, have a pragmatic law and order focus and have Russian national interests at heart. They do not form a cohesive group. Putin himself is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the KGB.
Remnants of the Yeltsin family
Another identifiable group are the remnants of the so-called "Family" - a term which originally referred to relatives and associates of the former president Yeltsin. Most senior members of the group have left the highest corridors of power, but some have been able to survive and secure influential positions.
Ozero
Ozero is the name of a co-operative society headed, inter alia, by Putin. The co-operative administers Putin's substantial personal wealth generated over the course of his presidency. The immense financial power of members of the co-operative fundamentally creates a wealthy clique of new oligarchs capable of replacing the financial power of Yeltsin era oligarchs.
Outside opinion
According to a The Washington Quarterly article written by Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap in 2006–2007, at the start of his presidency, Vladimir Putin announced that he would consolidate political powers in Russia into the so-called power vertical. However, despite being considered successful by many, this controversial endeavour partially backfired and led to the increasing factionalism within the president's inner circle. Although other institutions became largely irrelevant, disputes and clashes between Kremlin factions, rather than the president's will, became more and more important in determining major policy outcomes, Bremmer and Charap write.
History
During the final years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, Alexander Voloshin, chief of the Presidential Executive Office, was considered to be the most influential figure within the Family group. Despite his obvious connections to Russian commerce, he was dominating Russia's politics of that time.
In 1999, the Family group, Vladimir Putin, Boris Berezovsky and their allies united their efforts in order to prevent coming to power of the Fatherland-All Russia political alliance of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov that was supported by media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky and to some extent by the public opinion. The efforts were successful, but as soon as Putin had won the 2000 presidential election, an acute conflict with Boris Berezovsky developed, and in 2002 Berezovsky fled to London. As a result, Russian authorities consolidated their power over Russian television companies NTV and ORT previously controlled by Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, respectively.
The Family group has also almost entirely lost its influence by 2004 after the dismissals of Alexander Voloshin (October 2003), Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (February 2004) and some key figures of his Cabinet, but some of the group's members secured their political survival. Vladislav Surkov, initially being an aide to Voloshin, gained much influence, as well as Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, who had leaned towards new Saint Petersburg elites and whose son had become Igor Sechin's son-in-law. Tycoon Roman Abramovich, who had leaned towards the Family group in the 1990s, also remained influential, as well as former Mass Media Minister Mikhail Lesin. Each of them, however, had already distanced away from the Family group by that time.
As the Family group had lost its influence, especially during Vladimir Putin's second four-year presidential term (since 7 May 2004), some conflicts between parts of the new elites of Saint Petersburg origin became evident, as witnessed e.g. by the disputes over the fate of YUKOS, failed project of merging Rosneft and Gazprom, struggle for Sibneft and upcoming 2008 presidential election, some appointments and dismissals in Mikhail Fradkov's Second Cabinet and consequences of the Three Whales Corruption Scandal, but the exact configuration of these new groups still remains unclear. However, it is widely acknowledged that Igor Sechin and Dmitry Medvedev are key figures heading their own factions and opposed to each other but both very close to Putin. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov is considered a close ally of Sechin.
See also
References
- ^ Willerton, John (2005). "Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency". In White; Gitelman; Sakwa (eds.). Developments in Russian Politics. Vol. 6. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-3522-0.
- Pribylovsky, Vladimir (2005). Происхождение путинской олигархии [Origins of Putin's oligarchy] (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2010-08-19.
- Buckley, Neil; Ostrovsky, Arkady (2006-06-19). "Back in business - how Putin's allies are turning Russia into a corporate state". The Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2007-05-10.
- Walsh, Nick Paton (2005-07-06). "Meet the chief exec of Kremlin inc ..." The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2022-03-02.
- Koptev, Dmitry (2004-07-28). "St. Petersburg Team Building Their Own 'Family'". The Moscow News. Archived from the original on 2006-11-13.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link) - Finn, Peter (2005-04-27). "As Russian's Trial Ends, So Does Era Of First Oligarchs". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2017-03-20.
- Bremmer, Ian; Charap, Samuel (Winter 2006–2007). "The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want" (PDF). The Washington Quarterly. 30:1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-29.
- Rafael Behr (2003-05-17). "Putin & Voloshin". Johnson's Russia List. Financial Times (UK). Archived from the original on 2012-03-09. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- Vladimir Pribylovsky (1–15 May 2003). "Oligarchs, Putin". Johnson's Russia List. Translated by Frolov, Kirill. WPS Monitoring Agency. Archived from the original on 2003-05-27. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
- Владимир Прибыловский, Юрий Фельштинский. Операция "Наследник". Главы из книги. lib.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2017-08-24. Retrieved 2007-02-23.
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Further reading
- Yenikeyeff, Shamil (2011-11-23). "BP, Russian billionaires, and the Kremlin: a Power Triangle that never was" (PDF). Oxford Energy Comment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
