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| {{Falun Gong}} | |||
| ] has received a range of scholarly attention — including ethnographic studies, analysis on the teleology of practice and also some studies focusing on its relationship to ] and ]. Attention from the Academic community has increased following the onset of Chinese Communist Party's ] in 1999. | |||
| Prominent Falun Gong scholar David Ownby delineates three core themes in the teachings: first, "Li presents his vision both as a return to a lost, or neglected spiritual tradition, and as a major contribution to modern science";<ref name=Ownbyfuture>David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press</ref> second, "Falun Gong is profoundly ''moral''"; third, "Falun Dafa promises practitioners supernatural powers". Ownby also lists its "Chineseness" as a major part of the practice's appeal.<ref name=Ownbyfuture/> <!-- Marci A. Hamilton notes that the three values – truth, compassion, and tolerance – form the backbone of Falun Gong’s philosophy and opines based on his studies that "there could not be a gentler religion than the Falun Gong."<ref>God vs. the Gavel - Religion and the Rule of Law, Marci Hamilton, Cambridge university press </ref> lol, this needs context. i think it's terribly inappropriate for the final line of a lede--> | |||
| ==In relation to qigong and its roots in Chinese culture== | |||
| In 1992, Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong and along with teachings that touched upon a wide range of topics, from detailed exposition on qigong related phenomenon and cultivation practice to science and morality. In the next few years, Falun Gong quickly grew in popularity across China to become the most popular qigong practice in Chinese History.<ref name=Ownby /> Falun Gong was welcomed into the state-controlled Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped to organize many of his activities between 1992 and 1994, including 54 large-scale lectures. In 1992 and 1993 he won government awards at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos, including the ''"Qigong Master most acclaimed by the Masses"'' and ''"The Award for Advancing Boundary Science."''<ref name=Fellow> The Past, Present and Future of Falun Gong, A lecture by Harold White Fellow, Benjamin Penny, at the National Library of Australia, Canberra, 2001, , accessed 31/12/07</ref><ref>Clearwisdom.net, </ref>. | |||
| According to academics, Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, not religion. The debate between what can be called "]" and "]" schools of ''qigong'' theory has produced a considerable amount of literature. Xu Jian stated in The ] 58 (4 November 1999): "Situated both in scientific researches on ''qigong'' and in the prevailing nationalistic revival of traditional beliefs and values, this discursive struggle has articulated itself as an intellectual debate and enlisted on both sides a host of well-known writers and scientists — so much so that a veritable corpus of literature on ''qigong'' resulted. In it, two conflicting discourses became identifiable. Taking “discourse” in its contemporary sense as referring to forms of representation that generate specific cultural and historical fields of meaning, we can describe one such discourse as ] and ] and the other as ] and ]. Each strives to establish its own order of power and knowledge, its own “truth” about the “reality” of ''qigong'', although they differ drastically in their explanation of many of its phenomena. The controversy centers on the question of whether and how ''qigong'' can induce “supranormal abilities” (''teyi gongneng''). The psychosomatic discourse emphasizes the inexplicable power of ''qigong'' and relishes its super-normal mechanisms or which causative factors which go beyond wht canbe explained by presentday scietific models, whereas the rational discourse strives to demystify many of its phenomena and to situate it strictly in the knowledge present day modern science." The Chinese government has generally tried to encourage ''qigong'' as a science and discourage religious or supernatural elements. However, the category of science in China tends to include things that are generally not considered scientific in the West, including ''qigong'' and ]. | |||
| David Aikman has written in ] (March 2000): "Americans may believe that ''qigong'' belongs in a general category of socially neutral, New Age-style concepts that are merely subjective, not necessarily harmful, and incapable of scientific proof. But China's scientific community doesn't share this view. Experiments under controlled conditions established by the ] in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a ''qigong'' expert, actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration. Qi, according to much of China's scientific establishment, for all intents existed."<ref>American Spectator, March 2000, Vol. 33, Issue 2</ref> | |||
| Theories about the cultivation of ] (''dan''), "placement of the mysterious pass" (''xuanguan shewei''), among others, are also found in ancient Chinese texts such as The Book of Elixir (''Dan Jing''), Daoist Canon (''Tao Zang'') and Guide to Nature and Longevity (''Xingming Guizhi''). Falun Gong's teachings tap into a wide array of phenomena and cultural heritage that has been debated for ages. It is noteworthy that the definitions of many terms usually differ somewhat from ] and ] traditions. | |||
| Li Hongzhi states in : | |||
| <blockquote> | |||
| ''"Since the time Dafa was made public, I have unveiled some inexplicable phenomena in ''qigong'' as well as things that hadn’t been explained in the ''qigong'' community. But this isn’t the reason why so many people are studying Dafa. It’s because our Fa can truly enable people to Consummate, truly save people, and allow you to truly ascend to high levels in the process of cultivation. Whether it’s your realm of mind or the physical quality of your body, the Fa truly enables you to reach the standards of different levels. It absolutely can assume this role."'' | |||
| </blockquote> | |||
| Andrew P. Kipnis is quoted as stating: "...to the Western layperson, ''qigong'' of all sorts may seem to be religious because it deals with spiritual matters. Because Li Hongzhi makes use of many concepts from Buddhism and Taoism in his writings, this may make Falun Gong seem even more like a religion to the outsider; bur Falun Gong grew initially into a space termed scientific , but was mostly insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries"<ref>Porter 2003, pp. 38-39. Available online: </ref> | |||
| The term 'qigong' was coined in the early 1950s as an alternative label to past spiritual disciplines rooted Buddhism or Taoism, that promoted the belief in the supernatural, immortality and pursuit of spiritual transcendence. The new term was constructed to avoid danger of association with ancient spiritual practices which were labeled "superstitious" and persecuted during the Maoist era.<ref name=Ownby> Professor David Ownby, Department of History, University of Montreal, , accessed 31/12/07</ref> In Communist China, where spirituality and religion are looked-down upon, the concept was "tolerated" because it carried with it no overt religious or spiritual elements; and millions flocked to it during China's spiritual vacuum of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars argue that the immense popularity of qigong in China could, in part, lie in the fact that the public saw in it a way to improve and maintain health. According to Ownby, this rapidly became a social phenomenon of considerable importance.<ref name=Ownby /> | |||
| ==Falun Gong in relationship with Buddhism and Daoism== | |||
| The teachings of Falun Gong makes a distinction between ''fojia'', Buddha School, and ''fojiao'', the religion of Buddhism <ref name="Penny2005">p 39</ref> and also the Dao School (''daojia'') and the religion of Daoism (''daojiao''). Li states that there are two main systems of Xiu Lian or Cultivation practice the 'Buddha School' and the 'Dao School'. According to Li, Cultivation ways of the Buddha school focus on cultivation of ''Compassion'' while the Dao school lays emphasis on cultivation of ''Truthfulness''. In Falun Gong, ''Truthfulness'' and ''Compassion'' are apprently understood to be aspects of Cosmos's fundamental nature, Zhen-Shan-Ren, translated approximately as Truthfulness, Compassion and Endurance, each of which are said to further unfold into Zhen-Shan-Ren. Thus, cultivation practice whether in the in Buddha School or the Dao School is considered a process of assimilation to this cosmic characteristic.<ref name="Zhuan2000"> Hongzhi, Li retrieved June 14, 2006 </ref>. Li states that there are many cultivation ways in the Dao school and the Buddha School which are unrelated to secular religions and are often handed down from Master to disciple in secret or "has always been practiced quietly, either among the populace or deep in the mountains." Li states that "These kinds of practices have their uniqueness. They need to choose a good disciple—someone with tremendous virtue who is truly capable of cultivating to an advanced level." | |||
| In the book ''Falun Gong'', Li Hongzhi states: | |||
| <blockquote> | |||
| I hereby solemnly clarify that Falun Gong is qigong of the Buddha School. It is a righteous, great cultivation way and has nothing to do with | |||
| Buddhism. Buddha School qigong is Buddha School qigong, while Buddhism is Buddhism. They take different paths, even though they have the same goal in | |||
| cultivation. | |||
| </blockquote> | |||
| Li states that religion of Buddhism "is a system of cultivation practice that Sakyamuni enlightened to on his own in India more than two thousand years ago, and it is based on his original cultivation practice."<ref>, Li Hongzhi, 2001 Revised Edition</ref> | |||
| In Falun Gong, as in Buddhism or Daoism, practitioners are required to gradually let go of negative attachments. According to David Ownby, the requirement in Falun Gong to abandon human attachments is not for achieving selfish ends, but "quite the contrary. Practitioners are enjoined to treat others with compassion and benevolence in order to cultivate virtue and work off karma."<ref name=Ownbyfuture/><!-- pg. 112-116--> He says that such compassion and benevolence should not be reserved to those with whom one had a prior attachment, nor should the goal be to inspire gratitude or love. "Instead, one should be good because this conforms to the nature of the universe, not for any ulterior motive, be it as innocuous as 'feeling good about oneself and others.'" Li also insists that practitioners do not withdraw from the world, and that they maintain interactions with non-practitioners, including "even those who are hostile to practice."<ref name=Ownbyfuture/><!-- pg. 112-116--> The point here, according to Ownby, is that before the practitioner cultivates to such a point that they are dispassionate in their compassion, the stress experienced in the secular environment "constitutes a form of suffering which will enable them to reduce their karma."<ref name=Ownbyfuture/><!-- pg. 112-116--> | |||
| Stephen Chan, writing in the International Relations journal ''Global Society'', suggests that in providing a metaphysical system which relates the life of man with the greater cosmos, Falun Gong presents a philosophy which in a sense bypasses the communist-atheist ideology of Chinese state. He suggests that this may have lead to the decision of ban made by the Chinese authorities. Chan writes that Falun Gong poses no political threat to the Chinese government, and there is no deliberate political agenda within the Falun doctrine. He concludes that Falun Gong is banned not because of the doctrines, but simply because Falun Gong is outside of the communist apparatus.<ref name="Chan2003">p 195</ref> | |||
| Chan draws parallels between Falun Gong and Buddhism, in saying that the two share a central doctrine on goodness and unconditional compassion towards others. <ref name="Chan2003">Chan, Stephen, "A New Triptych for International Relations in the 21st Century: Beyond Waltz and Beyond Lacan's Antigone, with a Note on the Falun Gong of China," ''Global Society'', 2003, 17:2, 187 - 208</ref> Chan also provides a point of differentiation between Falun Gong and Buddhism <ref name="Chan2003">p 203</ref> Penny writes that another one of Li Hongzhi's critiques of Buddhism is that the original form of Buddhism, Sakyamuni's Buddhism, was somehow pure, it has declined over the centuries through the intervention of a degenerate priesthood, thus distorting the Buddhist Dharma.<ref name="Penny2005">p 42</ref> Falun Gong teaches the essential elevation of good as a governing norm, where good creates the society, although in a conservative way.<ref name="Chan2003">p 203</ref> | |||
| China scholar Benjamin Penny's 2005 publication ''The Falun Gong, Buddhism and "Buddhist qigong"'' point out that after the crackdown, the Chinese Buddhist Association, the official representative of Buddhism in Communist China, was eagar to denounce Falun Gong, and other Buddhist groups followed suit in fear of persecution <ref name="Penny2005">Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, ''Asian Studies Review'' (March 2005) Vol 29, pp.35-46.</ref> He also points out that the Buddhist community's response to Falun Gong could also have been due in part to Falun Gong's rapid growth in China.<ref name="Penny2005"/> According to Penny, Li tells that the features of the Buddha school includes the cultivation of Buddhahood and the belief in predestined relationships, which are included in the teachings of Falun Gong. <ref name="Penny2005"/> | |||
| ==Membership and finances== | |||
| <!--The following quote from Porter seems to be "apropos of nothing", i.e. not really related to the rest of the section. It might be useful but perhaps it belongs somewhere else, not here. | |||
| Porter writes that "Most who have written about Falun Gong have simply relied upon the writings of Li Hongzhi, the websites, and newspaper articles for their information about Falun Gong, and then applied the theoretical perspective of their discipline and their personal perspective in analyzing it."<ref name="Porter"> Noah Porter, (Masters Thesis for the University of South Florida) July 18, 2003, , retrieved June 14, 2006 </ref>Porter writes that he has hoped to "bridge" this communications gap with an anthropological study of Falun Gong, "to promote a broader understanding." He states in his thesis that "…practitioners do not isolate themselves from non-practitioners"<ref name="Porter"/> and are always exposed to different "identity streams," which he defines as "different forms of media, people, and ideas."--> | |||
| <!--This bit about Palmer's field notes and preliminary research report interrupts the flow. It's not directly relevant although it could be added as a note. | |||
| ] Susan Palmer's ] and a preliminary research report on Falun Dafa practitioners were released in the ] journal (nr. 4, 1 October 2000).--> | |||
| ] Susan Palmer writes that, "...Falun Gong does not behave like other new religions. For one thing, its organization - if one can even call it that - is quite nebulous. There are no church buildings, rented spaces, no priests or administrators. At first I assumed this was defensive now, I'm beginning to think that what you see is exactly what you get - Master Li's teachings on the Net on the one hand and a global network of practitioners on the other. Traveling through North America, all I dug up was a handful of volunteer contact persons. The local membership (they vehemently reject that word) is whoever happens to show up at the park on a particular Saturday morning to do qigong." | |||
| ===Finances=== | |||
| In his thesis, Noah Porter takes up the issue of Falun Gong and finance in Mainland China. He quotes and responds to some of the allegations of the Chinese Communist Party that Li benefited financially from teaching the practice. Porter writes that when teaching seminars, there was an admission of 40 yuan per new practitioner and 20 yuan for repeat practitioners--with the repeat practitioners making up for 50-75% of the admissions. He goes on to say with respect to the CCP's claims: "...but the Chinese government figures for the profits of the seminars counted all attendees as paying the 40-yuan fee charged to newcomers. Also, the Chinese Qigong Research Society received 40% of admission receipts from July 1993 to September 1994. Falun Gong's first four training seminars took in a total of 20,000 yuan, which is only 10% of the 200,000 figure cited by the Chinese government. Finally, from that 20,000 yuan, they had several operating expenses..."<ref>Porter 2003, p 197</ref> | |||
| Ian Johnson points out that during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg.<ref name=wildgrass>Johnson, Ian. ''Wild Grass: three stories of change in modern China''. Pantheon books. 2004. pp 23-229</ref> | |||
| James Tong writes about the competing claims by Falun Gong and the Chinese government in 'The China Quarterly' journal, 2003. He writes that the government has attempted to portray Falun Gong as being financially savvy with a centralized administration system and a variety of mechanisms for deriving profit from the practice. He also looks over Falun Gong's claims of having no hierarchy, administration, membership or financial accounts, and that seminar admission was charged at a minimal rate.<ref> James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing", The China Quarterly, 2002, 636-660: p 636</ref> Tong writes that it was in the government's interest, in the post-crackdown context, to portray Falun Gong as being highly organised: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was."<ref>Tong 2002, p 638 </ref> He writes that the government's charges that Falun Gong made excessive profits, charged exorbitant fees, and that Li Hongzhi led a lavish lifestyle "...lack both internal and external substantiating evidence" and points out that that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities "had disclosed no financial accounts that established the official charge and credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals."<ref>Tong 2002, p 657</ref> | |||
| Li Hongzhi stipulates in his books ''Falun Gong'' and ''Zhuan Falun'' that practitioners should only voluntarily help others learn the exercises and that this could never be done for fame and money, and also stipulates that practitioners must not accept any fee, donation or gift in return for their voluntarily teaching the practice. According to Falun Gong, Li's insistence that the practice be offered free of charge caused a rift with the China Qigong Research Society, the state administrative body under which Falun Dafa was initially introduced. Li subsequently withdrew from the organization. | |||
| Falun Gong website often state on their pages that "All Falun Gong Activities Are Free of Charge and Run by Volunteers"<ref>Learning the Practice, , accessed 21 July 2007</ref> | |||
| In an interview in Sydney on May 2, 1999, mentioning his financial status, Li said : "In mainland China I published so many books, but added together, they haven't exceeded twenty thousand Renminbi (equivalent to US $ 2,469). This is what the publishing company gave me. When publishing books in other countries of the world, you know there is a rule, which pays 5 or 6% royalties to the author, so each time I can only get a little bit, a few hundred, or a few thousand dollars." <ref>Li Hongzhi, Lecture in Sydney, 1999, , accessed 21 July 2007</ref> | |||
| ==Characterization as a 'cult'== | |||
| :''See also: ] | |||
| ===Use of the 'cult' label by the CCP=== | |||
| Falun Gong related sources say that the 'cult' label was first used against Falun Gong by the CCP three months after the onset of the ] campaign. They point out that "it was not arrived at by scholars of religion, nor sociologists, or psychologists. Nor was it the consensus of the government."<ref></ref>. A November 9, 1999, report by the Washington Post states, “It was Mr. Jiang who ordered that Falun Gong be branded a ‘cult,’ and then demanded that a law be passed banning cults.” Former Canadian Secretary of State ] and human rights lawyer ], authors of investigative reports on alleged organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China, profess that the 'cult' label "is a manufactured tool of repression, but not its cause." They state that the "cult" label was used as a tool incite hatred and dehumanize practitioners, and is merely a pretext for the government's persecution of the practice. "<ref name=bh /> According to China Scholar David Ownby, Falun Gong is "by no means a cult."<ref name=Ownbyfuture/> | |||
| ] of the ], and ] ] for his writing on the plight of Falun Gong practitioners, writes that declaring Falun Gong a cult was the most "brilliant" move: the Party quickly erected websites with "overnight experts" likening Li Hongzhi to ] or ], effectively putting Falun Gong on the defensive, cloaking the crackdown with the "legitimacy of the West's anti-cult movement," forcing practitioners to prove their innocence.<ref name=wildgrass/> The CCP controlled media portrayed Li as a "charlatan", while snapshots of manufactured accounting records were shown on television, "purporting to prove that made huge amounts of money off his books and videos."<ref name=wildgrass/> Ian Johnson points out that those, the CCP controlled media projected as purported "victims", were never allowed to be interviewed independently, making their claims "almost impossible to verify"; during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were ]; and fundamentally, "the group didn't meet many common definitions of a ],"<ref name=wildgrass/> since Falun Gong practitioners do not live isolated from society; they marry outside the group; they have non-practitioner friends; they hold normal jobs; they do not believe that "the world's end is imminent"; they do not give over large amounts of money for Falun Gong, and most importantly, they believe that "suicide is not accepted, nor is physical violence."<ref name=wildgrass/> | |||
| Julia Ching opines that calling Falun Gong an "cult" after the crackdown had already begun made previous illegal arrests and imprisonments constitutional. She states that "cult" was defined by an atheist government "on political premises, not by any religious authority" , and that the pronouncement was made without defining what a good cult, or a good religion would be.<ref name=XIX>p. 9</ref> | |||
| ===The American "anti-cult movement"=== | |||
| Following CCP's declaration of Falun Gong as a "cult", some members of the American "]" (ACM), including ] and ] , and criticised and attacked Falun Gong, suggesting that it is, or shares some characteristics of "a cult." | |||
| Bryan Edelman and James T. Richardson stated that "Over the years, the CCP has also become more sensitive to international criticisms concerning China's human rights record. In this context, the anti-cult movement and its ideology have served as useful tools, helping efforts by the party to try to maintain a delicate balance and create the illusion that the rule-of-law has been upheld, even as actions in violation of international customary law are being taken against the Falun Gong. The social construction of the cultic threat posed to Chinese society and the rest of the world, the subsequent government's response to that threat, and its lax definition of the term 'cult" has armed the CCP with the weapons necessary to attack any religious, qigong, or sectarian movement its sees as a potential threat to its authority. By applying the label and embracing theories that posit passive followers under the mental control of a dangerous leader, the government can aggressively destroy the group, all the while claiming to be protecting religious freedom. In this respect, the Western Anti-Cult Movement has served, unwittingly or not, as a lackey in the party's efforts to maintain its political dominance." <ref>Journal of Church and State, Spring 2005, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p265-267</ref> | |||
| Ian Johnson writes that the Communist Party's claim that Falun Gong was a "cult" gave the western anti-cult movement a new cause.<ref name=wildgrass>p. 227</ref> People external to the events in China would spend their time "debating obscure definitions of Master Li's works, trying to prove that the group was potentially dangerous." He says that one western academic published a paper which pleaded for an understanding of the Party's response to Falun Gong over concerns related to its teachings, and that there was a "legitimate right to fear the group."<ref name=wildgrass /> "This, even though the government had only interested itself in Falun Gong because of its demonstration in downtown Beijing, not because of its teachings." Most fundamentally, he contends, "what was often forgotten in the learned discourse was that the government, not Falun Gong, was killing people."<ref name=wildgrass /> | |||
| Edelman and Richardson, writing in the ''Journal of Church and State'', state that despite a lack of "empirical verification or general acceptance in the scientific community," the doctrines and theories behind the ACM have strongly influenced, and been largely adopted by the China Anti Cult Association (CACA), and employed specifically to assist in the persecution of Falun Gong in China.<ref name=edelman2>Brian Edelman and James T. Richardson, "Imposed limitations of Freedom of Religion in China: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults," ''Journal of Church and State'' (Vol. 47, Issue 2), pp. 243-268</ref> Edelman and Richardson see the "cult" label in this context as no more than a "convenient political tool" for the Chinese Communist Party to repress Falun Gong under false pretences. David Kilgour and David Matas have come to similar conclusions in their report, and see the "cult" label as a means of attempting to make the ] appear legitimate.<ref name=bh>, retrieved May 21, 2007</ref> | |||
| The Falun Dafa Information centre states that the cult label was, first, "meant to undercut public sympathy for the beleaguered Falun Gong, turning empathy instead into suspicion. Second, it would shift the spotlight away from the unlawful acts of the Party-state to instead the victim, calling into question his integrity. Thirdly, it would serve to dehumanize the Falun Gong, paving the way for more drastic violations of rights; indeed, torture and violence increased greatly in the years following"<ref></ref> | |||
| ===Refutations of the 'cult' characterization=== | |||
| Academics and institutions in the west have rejected these claims,{{fact|date=May 2009}} and as with the ACM as a whole, the theories which underlie these views have also been criticised as "pseudoscience."{{fact|date=May 2009}} | |||
| Several North American researchers such as Susan Palmer, David Ownby and Noah Porter have engaged in both ethnographic and textual studies of Falun Gong, and published findings which contradict those of the Anti-Cult Movement, stating that Falun Gong does not have the characteristics of a cult, has no formal organisation, no obligations of any kind, and that practitioners live normal lives and "participate in Falun Gong as much or as little as they like." | |||
| David Ownby, Director of the Centre of East Asian studies at the University of Montreal and a specialist in modern Chinese history, concludes as part of his key fieldwork-based findings, that Falun Gong is "by no means a cult," and that Falun Gong practitioners in North America are well-educated and tend to live in nuclear families. "Many work with computers or in finance; some are engineers." It is further contended that practitioners do not have "financial obligations to their faith community," and that they do not "live in isolation" and are "law-abiding."<ref>David Kilgour, notes for address At a conference of the International Society for Human Rights, Konigstein (near Frankfurt), Germany, 30 March 2007</ref> | |||
| ] suggests that Ownby's conclusion is similar to that of many independent observers, including that of himself and ], co-author of the . Kilgour says that in their experience, practitioners appear to be "…good citizens and exemplary members of their respective civil societies." Kilgour and Matas further opine that Falun Gong shares none of the characteristics of a cult, having no membership, offices or officials. They again draw on Ownby's research, and say that there is no penalty for leaving Falun Gong, "since there is nothing to leave." Practitioners are said to be free to engage in Falun Gong practice "as little or as much as they see fit. They can start and stop at any time. They can engage in their exercises in groups or singly." Li Hongzhi is referred to as the "author of the books which inspired Falun Gong practitioners," and is "not worshipped," nor receives money from practitioners. "He is a private person who meets rarely with practitioners," and transmits his "advice to practitioners" in the form of "conference lectures" and "published books"--which is "publicly available information." | |||
| Li Hongzhi emphasizes in his lectures the importance of maintaining normal relationships in society. In Zhuan Falun Li states "The majority of people in our school will practice cultivation in ordinary human society, so you should not distance yourself from ordinary human society and you must practice cultivation with a clear mind. The relationships among one another should remain normal."<ref name="Zealotry"> Hongzhi, Li retrieved June 14, 2006 </ref> | |||
| </blockquote> | |||
| ==Falun Gong as a 'cult of personality'== | |||
| Some scholars suggest that Li Hongzhi assumes the role of a supernatural entity within the teachings of Falun Gong: Maria Hsia Chang, for example, opines that "If Li Hongzhi’s disciples can become gods by engaging in Falun Gong, it stands to reason that the founder of this cultivation practice must himself be a deity."<ref name="Chang"> Chang, Maria Hsia (2004) ''Falun Gong: The End of Days'' (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press) ISBN 0-300-10227-5 </ref> However, Ian Johnson suggests that Li emphasises his teachings as simple revelations of "eternal truths", known since time immemorial but which have been corrupted over the course of time. Johnson opines that Li does not claim to be a messiah or god, but "only a wise teacher who has seen the light"<ref name="wildgrass">p 212</ref> Li said in 2004 that it "doesn't matter if believe in me or not. I haven't said that I am a god or a Buddha. Ordinary people can take me to be just an average, common man."<ref>Li Hongzhi, , from falundafa.org, accessed 20/5</ref> | |||
| Chang claims that Li's teaching on the "Dharma-ending period", and his remarks about providing salvation "in the final period of the Last Havoc," are apocalyptic.<ref name="Chang" /> Penny dissuades from considering Falun Gong as one of "these genuinely apocalyptic groups", or "that kind of organisation that believes that the world's going to end next Thursday." He says Falun Gong is "an entirely different thing", and that Li Hongzhi's teachings ought to be considered in the context of a "much more Buddhist notion of the cycle of the Dharma or the Buddhist law."<ref>Radio National, ''Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?'', produced by Chris Bullock, , accessed September 19, 2007.</ref> | |||
| Chinese public figure<ref>James Randi, accessed 20/5/08</ref> and freelance journalist Sima Nan asserts that Chinese history was full of charismatic masters like Li Hongzhi, and that Chairman Mao was also "quite similar to these masters."<ref>, Voice of America, 1 November 1999</ref> The late psychologist ] derided Falun Gong as a "cult".<ref>Don Lattin, , ], April 29, 2000 </ref><ref>, Chinese Embassy in the USA</ref> However, the proponents of such views have come under criticism within the academic community, their claims are disputed, and, according to Edelman and Richardson writing in the Journal of Church and State, "have been taken up by the PRC to create a sense of legitimacy around its campaign against the Falun Gong..."<ref name=edelman2>Brian Edelman and James T. Richardson, "Imposed limitations of Freedom of Religion in China: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults," ''Journal of Church and State'' (Vol. 47, Issue 2), pp. 243-268</ref> | |||
| ==References== | |||
| {{reflist}} | |||
| ] | |||
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