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'''Comparative studies of the Roman and Han empires''' is a ] involving the roughly contemporaneous ] and the ] of ]. At their peaks, both states controlled up to a half of the world population<ref name="ACME">{{citation |last = Scheidel |first = Walter |url = http://www.stanford.edu/~scheidel/acme.htm |title = The Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project (ACME) |publisher=Stanford University |access-date = 2009-12-27 }}</ref> and produced political and cultural legacies that endure to the modern era; comparative studies largely focus on their similar scale at their pinnacles and on synchronism in their rise and decline.
'''Comparisons between the Roman and Han empires''' have been suggested since Edward Gibbon in the late 18th century. This is based on the similar scale of the empires, both in size and population, as well as parallels in their rise and decline. These two powers controlled a large portion of the world population, and produced distinct and lasting political and cultural impacts on Far Eastern and Western cultures. Several scholars have made comparative studies of the two empires. As Samuel Adshead puts it, "Other comparisons could be made None, however, offers so close a parallel with Han China as the Roman empire."<ref name = adshead/><br/>


The vast majority of studies focus on ] or ] but the comparison of the two has attracted interest in the 21st century. Studies examine the concepts of ethnicity, identity, and the views of foreigners. Scholars also explore the relevance of ancient structures and characteristics to China's loss of world leadership in what has been called the Early Modern "]."
However, only recent historiography has approached this period with a comparative interest in China, with a few major exceptions. This lack of research is an oversight scholars, like the major proponent of the approach, Walter Scheidel, find both a "persistent neglect" and a "major oversight" by western scholars.<ref name = ScheidelCompProj>{{cite web| title = THE STANFORD ANCIENT CHINESE AND MEDITERRANEAN EMPIRES COMPARATIVE HISTORY PROJECT | url = http://www.stanford.edu/~scheidel/acme.htm| first = Walter | last =Scheidel| publisher = Stanford University}}</ref> Scheidel defends the pursuit of such an approach, because he feels that the variables of understanding which became apparent in comparative studies often get overlooked by uni-cultural approaches. This comparative history compares not the only the two empires during their prime, but also the process they were formed from their predecessor states, the Warring States/Qin for the Han, and the Roman republic for the Roman Empire<ref name= "Great Divergence 3"/>.


== History ==
==Historiographical issues==
] in his ] '']'' (1922) stressed that the development of China during the ] "in innumerable parallels" corresponds to the contemporary Mediterranean world (301-50 BC), with the Chinese wars in 368-320 BC corresponding in political outcome to the ]. He regarded ] as the "Roman" state of China because Qin similarly founded a universal empire in its world. The First Emperor of the unified China, ] assumed the title "Shi," literally the equivalent to "Augustus." He began to build the Chinese ], the ]. Both fortifications protected against the barbarian.<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 38, 40-42, 416-417, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>
Roberts notes that "he idea that there might be a connection between the fall of the Roman and the early Chinese empires has been current since at least 1788"<ref>
{{cite book
|last= Roberts
|first= J. A. G.
|authorlink= JAG Roberts
|title= The complete history of China
|origyear= 1996
|year= 2003
|publisher= Sutton Publishing
|location= Stroud
|isbn= 0 7509 3192 2
|page= 63
|chapter= The Fall of the Roman and Chinese Empires Compared
|quote=
}}
p 63
</ref>
when ] broached the issue in his '']''.
Roberts also summarizes more recent views on the decay and collapse of Han China and Roman Europe.<ref>
{{cite book
|last= Roberts
|first= J. A. G.
|authorlink= JAG Roberts
|title= The complete history of China
|origyear= 1996
|year= 2003
|publisher= Sutton Publishing
|location= Stroud
|isbn= 0 7509 3192 2
|page= 64
|chapter= The Fall of the Roman and Chinese Empires Compared
|quote= More recently the collapse has been explained as the consequence of system weaknesses in the two empires
}}
</ref>


The historian ] in 1939 published ''Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events'', covering the period of the Han dynasty.<ref>Teggart, Frederick J., (1939). ''Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events'', (Berkeley: University of California Press).</ref> Teggart criticized the dominant narrative form of history aiming mainly to emphasize the greatness of one's own nation. His purpose of the Correlations was scientific understanding of affairs of nations and generalization of causes and effects. History must inquire "not only into what has happened, but into the way things actually work in the affairs of men." Besides the scientific comparative approach, his Correlations with China was revolutionary also in breaking the bond of ]: "The study of the past can become effective only when it is fully realized that all peoples have histories, that their history run concurrently and in the same world, and that the act of comparing is the beginning of all knowledge."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Robinson |first=Edgar Eugene |date=1940-09-01 |title=Review: Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events, by Frederick J. Teggart |url=https://online.ucpress.edu/phr/article/9/3/345/66941/Review-Rome-and-China-A-Study-of-Correlations-in |journal=Pacific Historical Review |language=en |volume=9 |issue=3 |pages=345 |doi=10.2307/3632912 |jstor=3632912 |issn=0030-8684}}</ref> The comparison, Teggart argued, revealed a correspondence in barbarian invasions throughout the continent of Eurasia, "and thus brought to light relations in the histories of widely separated areas which had not previously been suspected."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Theory and processes of history, by Frederick J. Teggart. |url=https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015017676720?urlappend=%3Bseq=1 |access-date=2023-09-04 |website=HathiTrust | hdl=2027/mdp.39015017676720?urlappend=%3Bseq=1 |language=en}}</ref>
Many historians find doing comparative studies between Rome and China difficult because of the imbalance of scholarship available. This can lead to various problems. Scheidel points out that comparative interests have much less importance to the study of the individual empires than they could have, so the approach receives much less interest.<ref name = Scheidel7> Scheidel 7 ''Rome and China''</ref> <br/>


] reviewed the previous scholarship when he explained the purpose of ]'s ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project and the framework of its study in the early 21st century. ] and ] both wrote works comparing ancient Mediterranean civilization and China; however, their studies have had little influence on later historians of the ancient world. Scheidel gives this as a contributing cause to the relative paucity of comparative studies between the two, though several scholars have made such studies. In the 1970s, principles of ] have been identified that can be applied to the study of Han China and Rome. They draw on analytical and illustrative comparisons.<ref>{{harvnb|Bonnell|1980}} in {{citation |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |url=http://www.stanford.edu/~scheidel/acme.htm |title=The Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project (ACME) |publisher=Stanford University |access-date=2009-12-27}}</ref>
Another limiting factor to the approach involves the breadth of scholarship which the historian needs to understand and digest. This, along with linguistic and culture divides in material available for scholars, provides problems which make it difficult to ensure a fully comprehensive approach.<ref name = Scheidel5> Scheidel 5 ''Rome and China''</ref>


The majority of the research in the subject area has concentrated on looking at the intellectual and philosophical history of each society. Scheidel also noted a change in the direction of research in the 2000s, with a refocusing on the "nature of moral, historical, and scientific thought" in Greece and China.<ref name="ACME"/> These researches have tended to focus on the philosophical and intellectual histories of China and the Greco-Roman world, and despite modern interest, gaps remain in the scholarship comparing Rome and the Han Empires. Scheidel notes that there are no comparative studies of ]; there is also a virtual absence of work on "political, social, economic or legal history" of the Greco-Roman world and ancient China, though historian Samuel Adshead addressed the issue.<ref name="ACME" />
==Formation==
]
]


In 1961, Adshead published an article comparing Rome and China. While outlining several parallels, especially the synchronism of their political patterns, he emphasized that contrasts overshadowed similarities and the two should not even be called by one word ("empire").<ref>Adshead, Samuel A. M. (1961). "Dragon and Eagle: A comparison of the Roman and Chinese Empires," ''Journal of Southeast Asian History'', vol 2 (3): p 11-22.</ref> In his ''China in World History'', Adshead compared the Han China and the Roman Empire before ]. He repeated that their "differences outweighed the similarities".<ref name="Adshead 4"/> However, his comparisons have received negative response from experts on Chinese history who cite his lack of use of Chinese sources, poor support of his arguments and eagerness to take poorly supported points as facts.<ref name="jenner">{{cite journal |first = William John Francis |last = Jenner |title = Review: China in World History |journal = The China Quarterly | number = 121 |date = March 1990 |volume = 121 |pages = 151 |doi = 10.1017/S0305741000013722 |jstor = 654084 |s2cid = 154989865 }}</ref><ref name = Farmer>{{cite journal |first = Edward |last = Farmer |journal = The Journal of Asian Studies |jstor = 2058649 |number = 3| volume = 48 |date = August 1989 |pages = 583–584 |title = Review: China in World History |doi = 10.2307/2058649 |s2cid = 166065264 |doi-access = free }}</ref> More recently, ] have been engaging in comparative work on political institutions between China and Rome<ref name="Edwards 2009" /> and between China and early modern Europe.<ref>{{harvnb|Hui|2005}}</ref>
Both of the empires had a similar formation process.<ref name= "Great Divergence 3"/> In the East, the ] (Chinese: 商) and ] (Chinese: 西周) periods created a shared culture for the kingdoms of the ] (Chinese: 戰國), a period in which numerous small polities consolidated into a series of large kingdoms which were finally united by the westernmost marcher state of Qin<ref name= "Great Divergence 3"> Scheidel, , 3</ref>. In the Mediterranean, ] arose first in central and southern Greece, especially on the shores of the ] sea, later expanding to include settlements such as ], Italy, and the Hellenistic kingdoms of the near east, with power eventually shifting to Rome, also the westernmost state; from which the Roman empire grew to dominate the region<ref name= "Great Divergence 3"/>


For their volume on the birth of the Chinese Empire, a team of Sinologists recruited a Roman Historian, ], to compare the First Emperors in the Roman and Chinese world. The choice, they explained, is not casual. "Few figures in world history can be compared to the ] as meaningfully as can ]." Both founded long lasting Empires.<ref>Pines, Yuri et al (2014). ''Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited'', (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 237. </ref> In his chapter, Yakobson outlines the parallels between the First Emperors of Rome and China. Both were legitimized as pacifiers of their worlds, Augustus ending civil wars and Qin Shi Huang inter-state wars. Their peace monuments, ] and ], symbolized ] and ] respectively. '']'' of Augustus parallels the imperial steles of Qin Shi Huang in the content of the message. Both glorify themselves as superhumans who have completed achievements of superhuman magnitude. Yakobson supposes that the existence of such parallels might point to certain fundamental patterns of empire that transcend the divide between civilizations.<ref>Yakobson, Alexander, (2014). "The First Emperors: Image and memory," ''Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited'', (ed. ] et al, Berkeley: University of California Press), p 280, 282-283, 287.</ref>
In his essay, "Imagining the Empire? Concepts of Primeval Unity in pre-imperial historiographical tradition", Yuri Pines compared the creation of the two empires. He states<ref name="Achim Mittag 2008">Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag (2008), 68</ref> that while the Roman empire resulted from a long process of expansion and that one can debate its date of origin, the Chinese empire was a new creation, in which the emperor "consciously distanced himself from his predecessors". While the unification of the western Mediterranean area under Rome had no precedent, the idea that "All-under-Heaven" should be unified under a single ruler was established in China from the beginning of ] rule, if not earlier. Pines finds<ref name="Achim Mittag 2008"/> it puzzling that the First Emperor presented himself as "a founder of a new entity rather than a restorer".<ref name="Achim Mittag 2008"/>


==Political pattern==
==Similarities==
One of the most appealing reasons for historians to begin comparing Han China and Roman Empire, is their synchronous ascent to political hegemony over the Mediterranean and East Asia respectively:<ref name="jenner"/><ref name=Farmer/>
*Both systems existed as warring states during the ];
*] conquered its world in 221 BC, while Rome established its hegemony over the Mediterranean in 189 BC;
*both empires endured for centuries until the Han Empire dissolved in 220 AD and Rome ] in 395;
*both began reconquista in the sixth century but at this point proceeded in opposite directions—China under the ] completed its reunification while ] failed.


The Sui-Justinian era marks the juncture when the two civilizations proceeded in reverse directions—China remained unified while the Mediterranean never repeated its ancient unity. Adshead called this a "major watershed" to "expansion in modern Europe" and to "implosion in pre-modern China."<ref>Adshead 2000, p 55.</ref> For Scheidel, "the most striking divergence concerns their afterlife: the effective absence of universal empire from the post-Roman Europe and its serial reconstitution in East Asia," and regrets that the causes for this divergence remain neglected in the research.<ref name="books.google.fr">{{Cite book |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dqoiBQAAQBAJ |title=State Power in Ancient China and Rome |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-020224-8 |language=en}}</ref>
Adshead argued the two empires had essential similarities. Specifically, both empires promoted a similar culture among the elite to foster unity; built roads to enhance communications; and constructed walls to defend against external threats. When they fell into crisis, elite outsiders later briefly revived each empire (the tetrarchy for Rome, Cao-Cao for China)<ref name= "Adshead 5">Adshead 5</ref>. Later, both empires also collapsed in a similar fashion, with one half being overrun by invaders and another half retaining a traditionalist regime<ref name =adshead>
{{cite book
|last= Adshead
|first= Samuel Adrian Miles
|title= China in world history
|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=E8mpbItQVc8C
|accessdate= 2009-12-22
|edition= 3
|year= 2000
|publisher= Palgrave Macmillan
|location=
|isbn= 9780312225650
|page= 4
|pages= 434
|quote= To understand China's relations with the other civilizations of antiquity one must first assess her place in the world at the time, that is, her relative standing and individual features, by comparing Han China with the classical Roman empire. Other comparisons could be made None, however, offers so close a parallel with Han China as the Roman empire. This section therefore examines first the similarities between Han China and the classical, pre-Constantinian Roman empire and second, the differences.
}}
</ref>.


Historian Max Ostrovsky partly filled this gap in the research. He used the comparative analysis to find out what caused the divergence: China never expanded beyond the ], ], or overseas. By contrast, the Mediterranean civilization was ever-expanding beyond the Roman ], northward and eastward during the ], and overseas afterwards. European kingdoms turned their exceeding energies outward and internal European ].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ostrovsky |first=Max |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9b0gn89Ep0gC&q=balanced |title=Y: The Hyperbola of the World Order |date=2007 |publisher=University Press of America |isbn=978-0-7618-3499-1 |language=en}}</ref>
==Geographic differences==


Adshead similarly supposed that due to "isolation of China behind desert, mountains and jungles … and with its back to a dead ocean," the Chinese elites strove to unity more than the European.<ref>Adshead 2000, p 48.</ref> Sinologist Victoria Tin-bor Hui drew a geopolitical explanation too. The ancient Chinese system, she wrote, was relatively enclosed, whereas the European system began to expand its reach to the rest of the world from the onset of system formation. In addition, overseas provided outlet for territorial competition, thereby allowing international competition on the European continent to trump the ongoing pressure toward convergence.<ref>], ''War and State Formation in China and Early Modern Europe'', Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 141.</ref>
The Han Empire followed tradition and geopolitics in having its heartland in the same river-valleys that nourished previous Chinese hegemons. The Roman Empire coalesced around a new site (]) but grew to include the littoral of the Mediterranean, somewhat in the tradition of the Athenian or Punic sea-borne empires.<ref>
Compare: {{cite book
|last= Scheidel
|first= Walter
|title= Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires
|url= http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Fz8I3INERwsC
|accessdate= 2009-12-21
|year= 2009
|series= Oxford studies in early empires
|publisher= Oxford University Press US
|isbn= 9780195336900
|page= 12
|pages= 240
|quote= the Roman Empire centered on a temperate sea core that was highly conducive to communication, the transfer of goods and people, and the projection of power, whereas China consists of river valleys that are separated by mountain ranges and posed far greater physical obstacles to integration. Moreover, whereas the Rhône, Danube and Nile converge on the inner sea core, Chinese rivers all flow eastward, thereby reinforcing regional separation.
}}
</ref>


In the field of comparative studies between empires, not just Rome and Han, ]'s ''The Political System of Empires'' (1963) has been described as influential as it pioneered the comparative approach.<ref>{{harvnb|Mutschler|Mittag|2008|p=xiii–xiv.}}</ref> In modern studies of ], however, ancient China has generally been overlooked. In Scheidel's words, " the comparative history of the largest agrarian empires of antiquity has attracted no attention at all. This deficit is only explicable with reference to academic specialization and language barriers".<ref name="ACME" />
According to Adshead, the Chinese and Roman Empires had similar sizes; the Han Empire was about 1.532 million square miles while the Roman Empire was about 1.763 million miles<ref name= "Adshead 5"/>


Scheidel omitted two notable studies, '']'' by Spengler and ''Civilization on Trial'' by ]. Spengler outlined three parallel phases which began in China c. 600 BC, the Mediterranean c. 450 BC and the modern world c. 1700. In all three cases, the size of armies and the scale of warfare increase. In the modern case the trend is demonstrated by Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the World War (the book was published before the Second World War) and is accelerated by modern military technology.<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 419-422, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Having correlated the Chinese wars of 368-320 BC with the ],<ref>Spengler 1922: vol II, p 417.</ref> Spengler added that the latter War corresponds to the settlement of the ] in that both avoided the "idea of the wiping out one of the leading great powers of the world" but we are in the same evolutionary chain of the three ]. The Third ended with ] proclamation ].<ref>Spengler 1922: vol II, p 422.</ref> The thesis had been published a couple of decades before a famous ] proclaimed a similar fate for Spengler's country. Comparing the three ages, the ancient Chinese, the Roman, and the Modern, Spengler states that "Caesarism" is an inevitable product of such an age and it "suddenly outlines itself on the horizon." In China the culmination occurred with the ], in the Mediterranean with ] and ] and in our world is expected in one century .<ref>Spengler 1922: vol II, p 419.</ref>
==Governance==


Whether influenced by Spengler or not, Toynbee drew a similar pattern for the same three civilizations. Ancient Mediterranean and Chinese worlds passed continual rounds of wars going on to a bitter end at which one surviving great power—Rome and Qin respectively—"knocked out" its last remaining competitor and by conquest imposed the overdue peace on the world, ] and ]. Having projected the unification of the modern world on the cases of Rome and Qin, Toynbee noted that, by contrast, the modern ultimate "blow" would be atomic. But Toynbee remains optimistic: No doubt, the modern world has far greater capacity to reconstruct than the Chinese and the Romans had.<ref>Toynbee, Arnold, (1948). ''Civilization on Trial'', (New York: Oxford University Press), p 127-128, 133-134, https://archive.org/details/civilizationontr00toyn/page/126/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>
The diverging course of Chinese and Roman state formation resulted in different state structures. The Han state had its origins in the highly competitive Warring States Era, which saw the numerous states of China war among themselves for domination. No less than 256 wars took place between 651 and 221 BCE<ref name= "Rome and China 29"> Scheidel, Walther, Rome and China: Comparative perspective on world Empires, 29</ref>. As the fate of a losing state was complete destruction and the absorption of its lands into the victors' domain, the rulers of the various states adopted reforms that resulted in a centralized state apparatus under a strong ruler, the King. Rome, on the other hand, never faced an enemy that posed an existential threat after 275 BCE (save for the Punic wars), and therefore the state apparatus lacked the Han degree of centralization<ref name= "Rome and China 29"/>. Only with the reign of Augustus did the centralized Imperial Roman bureaucracy begin to grow<ref>Scheidel, Walther, (Rome and China), 36</ref><ref>Scheidel, , 5</ref>. A quote from Scheidel about how outside military threats affected Chinese and Roman state centralization appears below:


Long time since the works of Spengler and Toynbee the comparative analysis between ancient Rome and China and its implications for the modern world did not receive further development but this changed with the emergence of the United States of America as effectively the only ] in the world after the ] in the late 20th century. The event led to a renewed interest in empires and their study. During the ], the number of publications related to empire has increased exponentially<ref>Vasunia, Phiroze (2011). "Review: The comparative study of empires," ''Journal of Roman Studies'', vol 101: p 235.</ref> accompanied by "stormy debates" on empires and Sinologist ] coined the term "comparative imperiology."<ref>Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011) ''The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared'', (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2-3, https://books.google.com/books?id=eyoNEAAAQBAJ</ref> The Roman Empire has occasionally been held up as a model for American dominance.<ref>{{harvnb|Mutschler|Mittag|2008|p=xiii.}}</ref> The United States' ] is unprecedented in the modern system and thus the only illuminating cases can be found in pre-modern systems: "One difficulty with analyzing unipolarity is that we have mainly the current case, although examining Roman Europe and Han China could be illuminating."<ref>], "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," ''World Politics'', 61/1, (2009): p 200.</ref>
<blockquote>The pattern of Roman warfare was quite different. Rome began as the dominant city-state in Latium, and its path to dominion in Italy was largely uninterrupted despite major military challenges and occasional setbacks. Beginning in the late fifth century, it overcame one rival after another in the Italian peninsula, and even when it faced war on more than one front, it was generally able to keep its opponents from combining against it. After c.275 BCE, its existence as a state was threatened just once, by Hannibal, and from a brief period from 218 to 207 BCE..... It did not face the sort of long-term challenges that threatened states in China, and this fact may to some extent account for the failure of the Republic's leaders to make the alterations in the institutional structure of the republic that Chinese rulers resorted to survive. <ref name= "Rome and China 29"/></blockquote>


In order to illuminate, Ostrovsky compared the evolution of the early hegemonies of Rome (189–168 BC) and Qin (364–221 BC). Since the condition of global closure (impossibility to expand) makes our ] more similar to China than Rome, the Chinese political pattern is supposed to be more relevant for us than the Roman. This implies hard anti-hegemonic balancing like ] rather than soft balancing like against Rome, total war and sweeping conquest like ] in 230–221 BC rather than Rome's gradual annexations, and, if civilization survives, a cosmopolitan revolution, like the Han revolution in 202 BC and the ] in AD 212, which similarly would turn the global ] into ]. Since the modern system will remain totally circumscribed until the end of history, this World State is likely to be permanent like the Chinese rather than temporary like the Roman.<ref>Ostrovsky 2007, p 320, 362–363.</ref>
Ronald Edwards notes common trends in Han and Roman institutional reform towards centralized control of regional officials.<ref>
{{cite journal
| last = Edwards
| first = Ronald A.
| year = 2009
| month = February
| title = Federalism and the Balance of Power: China's Han and Tang Dynasties and the Roman Empire
| journal = Pacific Economic Review
| volume = 14
| issue = 1
| pages = 1-21
| url = http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395142
| accessdate = 2009-12-20
}}
</ref>


==Economy== == Rationale ==
According to Adshead's book ''China in World History'', comparing Han China and Roman Europe gives context and assists understanding of China's interactions and relations with other civilisations of ]. "Other comparisons could be made&nbsp;... None, however, offers so close a parallel with Han dynasty as the Roman empire".<ref name="Adshead 4">{{harvnb|Adshead|2000|p=4.}}</ref> In the opinion of Scheidel:


{{quote|only comparisons with other civilizations make it possible to distinguish common features from culturally specific or unique characteristics and developments, help us identify variables that were critical to particular historical outcomes and allow us to assess the nature of any given ancient state or society within the wider context of premodern world history.<ref>{{harvnb|Scheidel|2009|p=5.}}</ref>}}
Adshead argued one of the most important differences between the two empires was their staple crop. The Han Empire's crop was millet, a superior crop that could be grown in more regions than Roman crops. As a result, the area under the cultivation of the Han Empire was twice as much as Rome, and the agricultural output much greater<ref> Adshead, 7</ref>. A further advantage that China's economy had over Rome was superior iron technology, which allowed it to produce superior iron farm tools<ref name= "Adshead 10"> Adshead, 10</ref>.


Comparative analysis, Scheidel added elsewhere, generates new causal insights which are impossible for analysis confined to single cases.<ref name="books.google.fr"/> Regarding why China and Rome, Scheidel explains that these two were among the largest (especially by population) and persistent of pre-modern empires, and in addition expanding and collapsing at roughly the same time.<ref>Scheidel
Many commodities were exchanged between China and Rome. Silk was exported to Rome in large quantities, so much that by the end of the fourth century virtually all classes at Rome were wearing it<ref> Adshead, 37</ref>. Other important imports from China were "seric iron", or cast iron, jade, and cupro-nickel<ref name= "Adshead 38"> Adshead, 38</ref>, along with Cinnamon and ginger<ref> Adshead, 39</ref>. The main Roman export was Egyptian linen, which was recorded in the Hou Han Shu (the official history of the Later Han)<ref name= "Adshead 38"/>.
2015, p 5.</ref> In the words of Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, "Comparing the Roman and Han empires contributes not only to understanding the trajectories along which the two civilizations developed, but also to heightening our awareness of possible analogies between the present and the past, be it with regard to America or China."<ref name="M&M xiv"/> Recent work by Ronald A. Edwards shows how such comparisons can be helpful in understanding ancient Han Chinese and Roman European political institutions.<ref name="Edwards 2009">{{harvnb|Edwards|2009}}</ref>


For Ostrovsky, the comparative analysis is vital for understanding the ] and the survival of China. The former case is one of the most extensive historical researches and counts multiple factors all of which can be true. Regarding the question why the fall of Rome was ''fatal'', however, the comparison with the Han China is the key rationale. It outlines the decisive factor (geopolitical circumscription) among multiple secondary. Moreover, he claims, it probably illuminates where we are heading.<ref>Ostrovsky 2007, p 50, 362–363.</ref>
===Monetary system===
] (] 218-222), ] (silver 249-251), ] (] 253-268 ] mint) <br>Row 2: ] (] 253-268), ] (silvered 270-275), ] (copper), ] (copper)]]
]


At last, comparison between the Roman and Han empires is aided by the rich amount of written evidence from both, as well as other artefactual sources.<ref name="M&M xiv">{{harvnb|Mutschler|Mittag|2008|p=xiv.}}</ref> Already Spengler emphasized the existence of the vast primary sources on the ] and stressed that the development corresponds not only to the contemporary Mediterranean world but also to "our own present time."<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 416-417, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>
Roman and Han monetary systems differed markedly. The Han monetary system was largely based on low-value bronze coins due to a lack of precious metals such as gold and silver, which were not cast into coin but floated as bullion.
Roman money, on the other hand, was mainly based on the precious silver denarri, although bronze coinage was used also. Rome's abundance of precious metals such as gold and silver allowed it to achieve a higher degree of monetization than the Han Empire<ref>Scheidel (Princeton), 52</ref>.


== See also ==
Each empire's monetary system became subject to state interference and debasement of the coinage. Early Han dynasty administrations permitted the private minting of coins, but the coinage came under government control by 110 BCE to fund military efforts against the Xiongnu. The state made frequent but unsuccessful attempts to issue overvalued, fiat coins; this failed in the face of widespread counterfeiting<ref> Scheidel (Princeton), 10</ref>. Not until the ''laissez-faire'' Later Han period (25-220 CE), were attempts to debase the coinage ended<ref> Scheidel (Princeton), 14</ref>. After the Han collapsed at the end of the second century CE, the monetary economy largely broke down with frequent debasements until the Tang dynasty re-introduced a stable monetary system<ref> Scheidel (Princeton), 15</ref>.
{{Portal|Ancient Rome|China|History}}

Roman currency became heavily debased in the later Empire, especially the silver coins used for daily life. The fineness of the silver coins fell from 50 percent to 1.7 percent from 238 to 269 <ref> Scheidel (Princeton), 52</ref>.This led to a two-tier monetary system in which the Roman elite had access to good-quality gold coins while commoners had to use debased silver coins (''de facto'' bronze due to the high degree of debasement)<ref name="Princeton 33"> Scheidel (Princeton), 33</ref>. Eventually the Roman monetary economy collapsed in the west, and a ''de facto'' gold-bronze monetary system remained in the eastern Mediterranean<ref name="Princeton 33"/>.

===State burden===

Adshead argues the structure of the state differed in the two empires. Specifically, he argues that Han China was a "more healthy" state than Rome, due to its superior technology and less oppressive administration than Rome, which suffered from military regimes and a burdensome state<ref name= "Adshead 10"/>. Rome also suffered from frequent miltiary mutinies<ref name= "Adshead 18"> Adshead, 18</ref>.In particular, Adshead noticed the greater military burden of Rome compared to China:
<blockquote>The huge burden of the Roman ] imposed a burden on the organism they were intended to shield that was far heavier than the Han protectorate garrisons in Central Asia. The Great wall was impressive, but with Han Wu-ti's forward policy it ceased to be a frontier and Han China was not a limes society with its attendant costs and dangers.<ref name= "Adshead 18"/></blockquote>

==Military==

The dominant form of soldier in both armies were the infantry, and both armies had to face nomadic cavalry opponents, the Xiongnu for the Han and the Iranians for Rome<ref> Adshead, 5</ref>.

Adshead stated that the Han foot soldier was better armed and equipped than his Roman counterpart to deal with cavalry, due to the Chinese crossbow which was deadly to horsemen. Consequently, Adshead noted that Han China, "never suffered from a Carrhae or an Adrianople"<ref name= "Adshead 10"/>.

The military became more powerful during the two empires' decline, and both suffered from military-backed pretenders and usurpers. Scheidel commented on the army's growing power in this quote:
<blockquote>It is true that in Rome, military power had long been more autonomous than in China; yet by the late second century CE China was rapidly catching up with and soon surpassing corrosive Roman habits, and likewise began to suffer at the hands of military pretenders and usurpers<ref name= "Great Divergence 8"/>. </blockquote>

==Plague==

A common problem that afflicted both empires and greatly weakened each at times, was disease. Both the Roman and Han Empires were connected by roads and sea routes, which allowed epidemics to spread diseases through them throughout the third, fourth, and fifth centuries C.E.. This resulted in a decrease in their ability to maintain their borders against invasions, as well as causing a decline in trade.<ref>National Geographic concise history of the world: an illustrated timeline By Neil Kagan page 106</ref> It also disrupted their ability to harvest and ship grain, which cities depended on for food. <ref>National Geographic concise history of the world: an illustrated timeline By Neil Kagan page 70</ref>

==Legacy==
The subsequent collapse of both empires also bear striking similarities;<ref name= "Great Divergence 4"/> each split into two halves, one that contained the original core but became more exposed to nomadic invasions (the west in the Roman case, the north in China), and a traditionalist half in the east (Rome) and south (China)<ref name= "Great Divergence 4">Scheidel, , 4</ref>.

However, very different results happened after the sixth century, which saw the restoration of an unified empire in China while Europe continued to disintegrate into the fragmented states of the Middle Ages.<ref name= "Great Divergence 8"> Scheidel, , 8 </ref>.

==See also==
* ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ]


==References== == References ==
=== Citations ===
{{reflist|1}}
{{Reflist}}


==Sources== === Sources ===
{{refbegin}} {{refbegin}}
* {{citation |last=Adshead |first=Samuel Adrian Miles |title = China in World History |isbn = 978-0-312-22565-0 |year=2000 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |orig-year=1988 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=E8mpbItQVc8C }}
* {{cite book
* {{citation |last=Bonnell |first=Victoria E. |title = The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical Sociology |journal= Comparative Studies in Society and History |publisher=Cambridge University Press |volume=22 |number=2 |date=April 1980 |pages=156–173 |doi = 10.1017/s0010417500009270 |doi-access=free }}
|last= Adshead
* {{citation |last=Edwards |first=Ronald A. |year=2009 |title = Federalism and the Balance of Power: China's Han and Tang Dynasties and the Roman Empire |journal = Pacific Economic Review |volume=14 |number=1 |pages=1–21 |ssrn=1395142 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00430.x |s2cid=154400404 }}
|first= Samuel Adrian Miles
*{{citation |last=Hui |first = Victoria Tin-bor |year=2005 |title = War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe |location = New York, NY |publisher = Cambridge University Press }}
|title= China in world history
* {{citation |editor1-last = Mutschler |editor1-first = Fritz-Heiner |editor2-last = Mittag |editor2-first = Achim |title = Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |isbn = 978-0-19-921464-8 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=QjS7W-BtXOkC&q=COnceiving+the+empire+rome+and+china }}
|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=E8mpbItQVc8C
* {{citation |last = Roberts |first = J.A.G. |author-link = J.A.G. Roberts |title = The complete history of China |chapter = The Fall of the Roman and Chinese Empires Compared |location = Stroud |publisher = Sutton Publishing |isbn = 0-7509-3192-2 |year = 2003 |orig-year = b1996 |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/completehistoryo0000robe }}
|accessdate= 2009-12-22
* {{citation |editor-last = Scheidel |editor-first = Walter |editor-link = Walter Scheidel |year = 2009 |title = Rome and China: comparative perspectives on ancient world empires |publisher = Oxford University Press |isbn = 978-0-19-533690-0 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=aTdN3PWIvs0C }}
|edition= 3
|year= 2000
|publisher= Palgrave Macmillan
|location=
|isbn= 9780312225650
}}
*Adshead, S. A. M. (1961). "Dragon and Eagle: a comparison of the Roman and Chinese empires". http://www.jstor.org/pss/20067345. Retrieved 2009-12-22.
* Edwards, Ronald A. (February 2009). "Federalism and the Balance of Power: China's Han and Tang Dynasties and the Roman Empire". Pacific Economic Review 14 (1): 1-21. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395142. Retrieved 2009-12-20.
* Mittag, Achim and Mutschler, Fritz-Heiner(eds.), ''Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared'', ], 2008. ISBN 0199214646
*Scheidel, Walter, Princeton University, Monetary systems of the Roman and Han Empires, <http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/020803.pdf> (Accessed December 27, 2008)
* Scheidel, Walter (ed.) 2008 Rome and China: comparative perspectives on ancient world empires (Oxford University Press) 9780195336900
*Scheidel, Walter, From the 'Great Convergence' to the 'First Great Divergence': Roman and Qin-Han State Formation and its Aftermath(10/2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096433
{{refend}} {{refend}}


== Further reading ==
==External links==
* {{citation |last=Adshead |first=S. A. M. |date=October 1961 |title=Dragon and Eagle: a comparison of the Roman and Chinese empires |journal=Journal of Southeast Asian History |volume=2 |number=3|pages=11–22 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |jstor=20067345 |doi = 10.1017/s021778110000034x }}
{{Wikiversity|Comparison between Roman and Han Empires}}
* ], and ], ''The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece'' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)
* {{cite web
* {{citation |last=Motomura |first=R. |title=An approach towards a comparative study of the Roman empire and the Ch'in and Han empires |journal=Kodai |volume=2 |year=1991 |pages=61–69 }}
| url = http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442585
* Lisa Ann Raphals, ''Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece'' (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992)
| title = Coin Quality, Coin Quantity, and Coin Value in Early China and the Roman World
| first = Walter
| last = Scheidel
| date = 2009-08-01
| quote = comparative study of two superficially quite different currency systems, in Warring States and Han China and in the Roman Empire.
}}
* (ACME)


== External links ==
* {{citation |ssrn = 1442585 |title = Coin Quality, Coin Quantity, and Coin Value in Early China and the Roman World |first = Walter |last = Scheidel |date= 2009-08-01 |quote = comparative study of two superficially quite different currency systems, in Warring States and Han China and in the Roman Empire|ref=none}}
*
* "," Interview with University of California, Berkeley, professors Michael Nylan and Carlos Noreña.


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{{DEFAULTSORT:Comparison Between Roman And Han Empires}}
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Latest revision as of 22:16, 26 August 2024

Political map of the Eastern Hemisphere in AD 200

Comparative studies of the Roman and Han empires is a historical comparative research involving the roughly contemporaneous Roman Empire and the Han dynasty of early imperial China. At their peaks, both states controlled up to a half of the world population and produced political and cultural legacies that endure to the modern era; comparative studies largely focus on their similar scale at their pinnacles and on synchronism in their rise and decline.

The vast majority of studies focus on one or the other but the comparison of the two has attracted interest in the 21st century. Studies examine the concepts of ethnicity, identity, and the views of foreigners. Scholars also explore the relevance of ancient structures and characteristics to China's loss of world leadership in what has been called the Early Modern "Great Divergence."

History

Oswald Spengler in his magnum opus The Decline of the West (1922) stressed that the development of China during the Warring States "in innumerable parallels" corresponds to the contemporary Mediterranean world (301-50 BC), with the Chinese wars in 368-320 BC corresponding in political outcome to the Second Punic War. He regarded Qin as the "Roman" state of China because Qin similarly founded a universal empire in its world. The First Emperor of the unified China, Hwang-ti assumed the title "Shi," literally the equivalent to "Augustus." He began to build the Chinese Limes, the Great Wall. Both fortifications protected against the barbarian.

The historian Frederick John Teggart in 1939 published Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events, covering the period of the Han dynasty. Teggart criticized the dominant narrative form of history aiming mainly to emphasize the greatness of one's own nation. His purpose of the Correlations was scientific understanding of affairs of nations and generalization of causes and effects. History must inquire "not only into what has happened, but into the way things actually work in the affairs of men." Besides the scientific comparative approach, his Correlations with China was revolutionary also in breaking the bond of Eurocentrism: "The study of the past can become effective only when it is fully realized that all peoples have histories, that their history run concurrently and in the same world, and that the act of comparing is the beginning of all knowledge." The comparison, Teggart argued, revealed a correspondence in barbarian invasions throughout the continent of Eurasia, "and thus brought to light relations in the histories of widely separated areas which had not previously been suspected."

Walter Scheidel reviewed the previous scholarship when he explained the purpose of Stanford University's ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project and the framework of its study in the early 21st century. Max Weber and Karl August Wittfogel both wrote works comparing ancient Mediterranean civilization and China; however, their studies have had little influence on later historians of the ancient world. Scheidel gives this as a contributing cause to the relative paucity of comparative studies between the two, though several scholars have made such studies. In the 1970s, principles of sociological examination have been identified that can be applied to the study of Han China and Rome. They draw on analytical and illustrative comparisons.

The majority of the research in the subject area has concentrated on looking at the intellectual and philosophical history of each society. Scheidel also noted a change in the direction of research in the 2000s, with a refocusing on the "nature of moral, historical, and scientific thought" in Greece and China. These researches have tended to focus on the philosophical and intellectual histories of China and the Greco-Roman world, and despite modern interest, gaps remain in the scholarship comparing Rome and the Han Empires. Scheidel notes that there are no comparative studies of high culture; there is also a virtual absence of work on "political, social, economic or legal history" of the Greco-Roman world and ancient China, though historian Samuel Adshead addressed the issue.

In 1961, Adshead published an article comparing Rome and China. While outlining several parallels, especially the synchronism of their political patterns, he emphasized that contrasts overshadowed similarities and the two should not even be called by one word ("empire"). In his China in World History, Adshead compared the Han China and the Roman Empire before Constantine. He repeated that their "differences outweighed the similarities". However, his comparisons have received negative response from experts on Chinese history who cite his lack of use of Chinese sources, poor support of his arguments and eagerness to take poorly supported points as facts. More recently, sinologists have been engaging in comparative work on political institutions between China and Rome and between China and early modern Europe.

For their volume on the birth of the Chinese Empire, a team of Sinologists recruited a Roman Historian, Alexander Yakobson, to compare the First Emperors in the Roman and Chinese world. The choice, they explained, is not casual. "Few figures in world history can be compared to the First Emperor as meaningfully as can Augustus." Both founded long lasting Empires. In his chapter, Yakobson outlines the parallels between the First Emperors of Rome and China. Both were legitimized as pacifiers of their worlds, Augustus ending civil wars and Qin Shi Huang inter-state wars. Their peace monuments, Ara Pacis Augustae and Twelve Metal Colossi, symbolized Pax Romana and Pax Sinica respectively. Res Gestae of Augustus parallels the imperial steles of Qin Shi Huang in the content of the message. Both glorify themselves as superhumans who have completed achievements of superhuman magnitude. Yakobson supposes that the existence of such parallels might point to certain fundamental patterns of empire that transcend the divide between civilizations.

Political pattern

One of the most appealing reasons for historians to begin comparing Han China and Roman Empire, is their synchronous ascent to political hegemony over the Mediterranean and East Asia respectively:

  • Both systems existed as warring states during the Axial Age;
  • Qin conquered its world in 221 BC, while Rome established its hegemony over the Mediterranean in 189 BC;
  • both empires endured for centuries until the Han Empire dissolved in 220 AD and Rome followed suit in 395;
  • both began reconquista in the sixth century but at this point proceeded in opposite directions—China under the Sui dynasty completed its reunification while Justinian failed.

The Sui-Justinian era marks the juncture when the two civilizations proceeded in reverse directions—China remained unified while the Mediterranean never repeated its ancient unity. Adshead called this a "major watershed" to "expansion in modern Europe" and to "implosion in pre-modern China." For Scheidel, "the most striking divergence concerns their afterlife: the effective absence of universal empire from the post-Roman Europe and its serial reconstitution in East Asia," and regrets that the causes for this divergence remain neglected in the research.

Historian Max Ostrovsky partly filled this gap in the research. He used the comparative analysis to find out what caused the divergence: China never expanded beyond the Great Wall, Tibet, or overseas. By contrast, the Mediterranean civilization was ever-expanding beyond the Roman limes, northward and eastward during the Middle Ages, and overseas afterwards. European kingdoms turned their exceeding energies outward and internal European power was balanced.

Adshead similarly supposed that due to "isolation of China behind desert, mountains and jungles … and with its back to a dead ocean," the Chinese elites strove to unity more than the European. Sinologist Victoria Tin-bor Hui drew a geopolitical explanation too. The ancient Chinese system, she wrote, was relatively enclosed, whereas the European system began to expand its reach to the rest of the world from the onset of system formation. In addition, overseas provided outlet for territorial competition, thereby allowing international competition on the European continent to trump the ongoing pressure toward convergence.

In the field of comparative studies between empires, not just Rome and Han, Shmuel Eisenstadt's The Political System of Empires (1963) has been described as influential as it pioneered the comparative approach. In modern studies of imperialism, however, ancient China has generally been overlooked. In Scheidel's words, " the comparative history of the largest agrarian empires of antiquity has attracted no attention at all. This deficit is only explicable with reference to academic specialization and language barriers".

Scheidel omitted two notable studies, The Decline of the West by Spengler and Civilization on Trial by Arnold J. Toynbee. Spengler outlined three parallel phases which began in China c. 600 BC, the Mediterranean c. 450 BC and the modern world c. 1700. In all three cases, the size of armies and the scale of warfare increase. In the modern case the trend is demonstrated by Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the World War (the book was published before the Second World War) and is accelerated by modern military technology. Having correlated the Chinese wars of 368-320 BC with the Second Punic War, Spengler added that the latter War corresponds to the settlement of the Versailles Treaty in that both avoided the "idea of the wiping out one of the leading great powers of the world" but we are in the same evolutionary chain of the three Punic Wars. The Third ended with Cato's proclamation Carthago delenda est. The thesis had been published a couple of decades before a famous Charter proclaimed a similar fate for Spengler's country. Comparing the three ages, the ancient Chinese, the Roman, and the Modern, Spengler states that "Caesarism" is an inevitable product of such an age and it "suddenly outlines itself on the horizon." In China the culmination occurred with the First Emperor, in the Mediterranean with Sulla and Pompey and in our world is expected in one century .

Whether influenced by Spengler or not, Toynbee drew a similar pattern for the same three civilizations. Ancient Mediterranean and Chinese worlds passed continual rounds of wars going on to a bitter end at which one surviving great power—Rome and Qin respectively—"knocked out" its last remaining competitor and by conquest imposed the overdue peace on the world, Pax Romana and Pax Sinica. Having projected the unification of the modern world on the cases of Rome and Qin, Toynbee noted that, by contrast, the modern ultimate "blow" would be atomic. But Toynbee remains optimistic: No doubt, the modern world has far greater capacity to reconstruct than the Chinese and the Romans had.

Long time since the works of Spengler and Toynbee the comparative analysis between ancient Rome and China and its implications for the modern world did not receive further development but this changed with the emergence of the United States of America as effectively the only superpower in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century. The event led to a renewed interest in empires and their study. During the War on Terror, the number of publications related to empire has increased exponentially accompanied by "stormy debates" on empires and Sinologist Yuri Pines coined the term "comparative imperiology." The Roman Empire has occasionally been held up as a model for American dominance. The United States' hegemony is unprecedented in the modern system and thus the only illuminating cases can be found in pre-modern systems: "One difficulty with analyzing unipolarity is that we have mainly the current case, although examining Roman Europe and Han China could be illuminating."

In order to illuminate, Ostrovsky compared the evolution of the early hegemonies of Rome (189–168 BC) and Qin (364–221 BC). Since the condition of global closure (impossibility to expand) makes our world system more similar to China than Rome, the Chinese political pattern is supposed to be more relevant for us than the Roman. This implies hard anti-hegemonic balancing like against Qin rather than soft balancing like against Rome, total war and sweeping conquest like Qin in 230–221 BC rather than Rome's gradual annexations, and, if civilization survives, a cosmopolitan revolution, like the Han revolution in 202 BC and the Edict of Caracalla in AD 212, which similarly would turn the global American Empire into World State. Since the modern system will remain totally circumscribed until the end of history, this World State is likely to be permanent like the Chinese rather than temporary like the Roman.

Rationale

According to Adshead's book China in World History, comparing Han China and Roman Europe gives context and assists understanding of China's interactions and relations with other civilisations of Antiquity. "Other comparisons could be made ... None, however, offers so close a parallel with Han dynasty as the Roman empire". In the opinion of Scheidel:

only comparisons with other civilizations make it possible to distinguish common features from culturally specific or unique characteristics and developments, help us identify variables that were critical to particular historical outcomes and allow us to assess the nature of any given ancient state or society within the wider context of premodern world history.

Comparative analysis, Scheidel added elsewhere, generates new causal insights which are impossible for analysis confined to single cases. Regarding why China and Rome, Scheidel explains that these two were among the largest (especially by population) and persistent of pre-modern empires, and in addition expanding and collapsing at roughly the same time. In the words of Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, "Comparing the Roman and Han empires contributes not only to understanding the trajectories along which the two civilizations developed, but also to heightening our awareness of possible analogies between the present and the past, be it with regard to America or China." Recent work by Ronald A. Edwards shows how such comparisons can be helpful in understanding ancient Han Chinese and Roman European political institutions.

For Ostrovsky, the comparative analysis is vital for understanding the fall of Rome and the survival of China. The former case is one of the most extensive historical researches and counts multiple factors all of which can be true. Regarding the question why the fall of Rome was fatal, however, the comparison with the Han China is the key rationale. It outlines the decisive factor (geopolitical circumscription) among multiple secondary. Moreover, he claims, it probably illuminates where we are heading.

At last, comparison between the Roman and Han empires is aided by the rich amount of written evidence from both, as well as other artefactual sources. Already Spengler emphasized the existence of the vast primary sources on the Warring States and stressed that the development corresponds not only to the contemporary Mediterranean world but also to "our own present time."

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^ Scheidel, Walter, The Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project (ACME), Stanford University, retrieved 2009-12-27
  2. Spengler, Oswald (1922). The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History, (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 38, 40-42, 416-417, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater
  3. Teggart, Frederick J., (1939). Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events, (Berkeley: University of California Press).
  4. Robinson, Edgar Eugene (1940-09-01). "Review: Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events, by Frederick J. Teggart". Pacific Historical Review. 9 (3): 345. doi:10.2307/3632912. ISSN 0030-8684. JSTOR 3632912.
  5. "Theory and processes of history, by Frederick J. Teggart". HathiTrust. hdl:2027/mdp.39015017676720. Retrieved 2023-09-04.
  6. Bonnell 1980 in Scheidel, Walter, The Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project (ACME), Stanford University, retrieved 2009-12-27
  7. Adshead, Samuel A. M. (1961). "Dragon and Eagle: A comparison of the Roman and Chinese Empires," Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol 2 (3): p 11-22.
  8. ^ Adshead 2000, p. 4.
  9. ^ Jenner, William John Francis (March 1990). "Review: China in World History". The China Quarterly. 121 (121): 151. doi:10.1017/S0305741000013722. JSTOR 654084. S2CID 154989865.
  10. ^ Farmer, Edward (August 1989). "Review: China in World History". The Journal of Asian Studies. 48 (3): 583–584. doi:10.2307/2058649. JSTOR 2058649. S2CID 166065264.
  11. ^ Edwards 2009
  12. Hui 2005
  13. Pines, Yuri et al (2014). Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 237.
  14. Yakobson, Alexander, (2014). "The First Emperors: Image and memory," Birth of an Empire: The State of Qin Revisited, (ed. Pines, Yuri et al, Berkeley: University of California Press), p 280, 282-283, 287.
  15. Adshead 2000, p 55.
  16. ^ Scheidel, Walter (2015). State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-020224-8.
  17. Ostrovsky, Max (2007). Y: The Hyperbola of the World Order. University Press of America. ISBN 978-0-7618-3499-1.
  18. Adshead 2000, p 48.
  19. Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in China and Early Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 141.
  20. Mutschler & Mittag 2008, p. xiii–xiv.
  21. Spengler, Oswald (1922). The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History, (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 419-422, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater
  22. Spengler 1922: vol II, p 417.
  23. Spengler 1922: vol II, p 422.
  24. Spengler 1922: vol II, p 419.
  25. Toynbee, Arnold, (1948). Civilization on Trial, (New York: Oxford University Press), p 127-128, 133-134, https://archive.org/details/civilizationontr00toyn/page/126/mode/2up?view=theater
  26. Vasunia, Phiroze (2011). "Review: The comparative study of empires," Journal of Roman Studies, vol 101: p 235.
  27. Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011) The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p 2-3, https://books.google.com/books?id=eyoNEAAAQBAJ
  28. Mutschler & Mittag 2008, p. xiii.
  29. Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," World Politics, 61/1, (2009): p 200.
  30. Ostrovsky 2007, p 320, 362–363.
  31. Scheidel 2009, p. 5.
  32. Scheidel 2015, p 5.
  33. ^ Mutschler & Mittag 2008, p. xiv.
  34. Ostrovsky 2007, p 50, 362–363.
  35. Spengler, Oswald (1922). The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History, (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 416-417, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater

Sources

Further reading

  • Adshead, S. A. M. (October 1961), "Dragon and Eagle: a comparison of the Roman and Chinese empires", Journal of Southeast Asian History, 2 (3), Cambridge University Press: 11–22, doi:10.1017/s021778110000034x, JSTOR 20067345
  • G. E. R. Lloyd, and Nathan Sivin, The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)
  • Motomura, R. (1991), "An approach towards a comparative study of the Roman empire and the Ch'in and Han empires", Kodai, 2: 61–69
  • Lisa Ann Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992)

External links

Categories: