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{{Short description|Stalinist era of Soviet history}} | |||
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{{redirect|Stalinist era}} | |||
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{{Infobox historical era | |||
| name = Stalinist era | |||
| location = ] | |||
| start = 1927 | |||
| end = 1953 | |||
| image = | |||
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| caption = | |||
| before = ] | |||
| including = ]<br><br>] | |||
| after = ] | |||
| monarch = | |||
| leaders = ] | |||
| presidents = | |||
| primeministers = | |||
| key_events = ]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>]<br>] | |||
}} | |||
{{history of Russia}} | |||
{{history of the Soviet Union}} | |||
<noinclude>{{Joseph Stalin series|expanded=Leader of the Soviet Union}}</noinclude> | |||
The '''history of the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1953''', commonly referred to as the '''Stalin Era''' or '''Stalinist Era''', covers the period in ] from the ] through victory in the ] and down to the ] of ] in 1953. Stalin sought to destroy his enemies while transforming ] with ], in particular through the ] and rapid ]. ] within the party and the state and fostered an extensive ]. ] and the ] of the ] served as Stalin's major tools in molding Soviet society. ] in achieving his goals, which included ], ]s, ], and ], led to ]: in ] ]s<ref>] (2003) ''].'' {{ISBN|0-7679-0056-1}} pp 582–583</ref> and during ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Holodomor|title=Holodomor | Facts, Definition, & Death Toll|date=8 August 2023 }}</ref><ref>]</ref> | |||
World War II, known as "the ]" by Soviet historians, devastated much of the ], with about ]. In the course of World War II, the Soviet Union's armies occupied ], where they established or supported ]. By 1949, the ] had started between the ] and the ], with the ] (created 1955) pitched against ] (created 1949) in Europe. After 1945, Stalin did not directly engage in any wars, continuing his ] rule until his death in 1953.<ref>Olga V. Natolochnaya, "Socio-economic situation in the USSR during 1945-1953 years." ''Journal of International Network Center for Fundamental and Applied Research'' 1 (2015): 15-21. </ref> | |||
==Stalinist development== | |||
==Soviet state's development== | |||
===Planning=== | |||
===Industrialization in practice=== | |||
At the Fifteenth ] of the ] in ] ], ] attacked the left by expelling ] and his supporters from the party and then moving against the right by abandoning ]'s ] which had been championed by ] and ]. Warning delegates of an impending capitalist encirclement, he stressed that survival and development could only occur by pursuing the rapid development of ]. Stalin remarked that the ] was "fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries" (the ], ], ], the ], etc.), and thus must narrow "this distance in ten years". In a perhaps eerie foreboding of ], Stalin declared, "Either we do it or we shall be crushed". | |||
{{main|Industrialization in the Soviet Union}} | |||
The mobilization of resources by state planning expanded the country's industrial base. From 1928 to 1932, ] output, necessary for further development of the industrial infrastructure rose from 3.3 million to 6.2 million tons per year. ], a basic fuel of modern economies and Stalinist ], rose from 35.4 million to 64 million tons, and the output of ] rose from 5.7 million to 19 million tons. A number of industrial complexes such as ] and ], the Moscow and ] automobile plants, the ] and Kramatorsk heavy ] plants, and Kharkiv, ] and ] tractor plants had been built or were under construction.<ref>Martin Mccauley, ''The Soviet Union 1917–1991'' (Routledge, 2014). p. 81.</ref> | |||
In real terms, the workers' standards of living tended to drop, rather than rise during industrialization. Stalin's laws to "tighten work discipline" made the situation worse: e.g., a 1932 change to the ] labor law code enabled firing workers who had been absent without a reason from the workplace for just one day. Being fired accordingly meant losing "the right to use ration and commodity cards" as well as the "loss of the right to use an apartment″ and even blacklisted for new employment which altogether meant a threat of starving.<ref>{{Cite web|url= http://www.cyberussr.com/rus/trud-uvol32-e.html | title= On Firing for Unexcused Absenteeism | publisher=Cyber USSR | access-date= 2010-08-01}}</ref> Those measures, however, were not fully enforced, as managers were hard-pressed to replace these workers. In contrast, the 1938 legislation, which introduced labor books, followed by major revisions of the labor law, was enforced. For example, being absent or even 20 minutes late were grounds for becoming fired; managers who failed to enforce these laws faced criminal prosecution. Later, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 26 June 1940 "On the Transfer to the Eight-Hour Working Day, the Seven-day Work Week, and on the Prohibition of Unauthorized Departure by Laborers and Office Workers from Factories and Offices"<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cyberussr.com/rus/uk-trud-e.html | title=On the Prohibition of Unauthorized Departure by Laborers and Office Workers from Factories and Offices | publisher = Cyber USSR | access-date= 2010-08-01}}</ref> replaced the 1938 revisions with obligatory criminal penalties for quitting a job (2–4 months imprisonment), for being late 20 minutes (6 months of probation and pay confiscation of 25 per cent), etc. | |||
To oversee the radical transformation of the Soviet Union, the party, under Stalin's direction, established ''Gosplan'' (the State General Planning Commission), a state organ responsible for guiding the socialist economy toward accelerated industrialization. In April ] Gosplan released two joint drafts that began the process that would industrialize the primarily agrarian nation. This 1700 page report became the basis the first ] for National Economic Construction, or '']'', calling for the doubling of Soviet capital stock between ] and ]. | |||
Based on these figures, the Soviet government declared that the ] had been fulfilled by 93.7% in only four years, while parts devoted to the ] parts were fulfilled by 108%. Stalin in December 1932 declared the plan success to the ] since increases in the output of coal and iron would fuel future development.<ref>, Martin Mccauley, ''Stalin and Stalinism'' (3rd ed. 2013) p. 39.</ref> | |||
Shifting from Lenin's NEP, the first Five-Year Plan established central planning as the basis of economic decision-making and the stress on rapid heavy industrialization (''see'' ]). It began the rapid process of transforming a largely agrarian nation consisting of peasants into an industrial superpower. In effect, the initial goals were laying the foundations for future, ]. | |||
During the ] (1933–1937), on the basis of the huge investment during the first plan, the industry expanded extremely rapidly and nearly reached the plan's targets. By 1937, coal output was 127 million tons, pig iron 14.5 million tons, and there had been very rapid development of the armaments industry.<ref>E. A. Rees, ''Decision-making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932–37'' (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997) 212–213.</ref> | |||
The new economic system put forward by the first Five-Year plan entailed a complicated series of planning arrangements (''see'' ]). The first Five-Year plan focused on the mobilization of natural resources to build up the country's heavy industrial base by increasing output of ], ], and other vital resources. At a high human cost, this process was largely successful, forging a capital base for industrial development more rapidly than any country in history. However, as the economy grew more complex in the post-Stalin years, the prudence of planned economic decision-making would prove less apt at attaining growth through technological innovation and improvements in productivity, thus resulting in the stagnation associated with the later years prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. | |||
While making a massive leap in industrial capacity, the First Five Year Plan was extremely harsh on industrial workers; quotas were difficult to fulfill, requiring that miners put in 16- to 18-hour workdays.<ref>, Andrew B. Somers, ''History of Russia'' (Monarch Press, 1965) p. 77.</ref> Failure to fulfill quotas could result in treason charges.<ref>''Problems of Communism'' (1989) – Volume 38 p. 137</ref> Working conditions were poor, even hazardous. Due to the allocation of resources for the industry along with decreasing productivity since collectivization, a famine occurred. In the construction of the industrial complexes, inmates of ] camps were used as expendable resources. But conditions improved rapidly during the second plan. Throughout the 1930s, industrialization was combined with a rapid expansion of technical and engineering education as well as increasing emphasis on munitions.<ref>Mark Harrison and Robert W. Davies. "The Soviet military‐economic effort during the second five‐year plan (1933–1937)." ''Europe‐Asia Studies'' 49.3 (1997): 369–406.</ref> | |||
===Industrialization in practice=== | |||
From 1921 until 1954, the ] operated at high intensity, seeking out anyone accused of sabotaging the system. The estimated numbers vary greatly. Perhaps, 3.7 million people were sentenced for alleged counter-revolutionary crimes, including 600,000 sentenced to death, 2.4 million sentenced to labor camps, and 700,000 sentenced to ]. Stalinist repression reached its peak during the Great Purge of 1937–1938, which removed many skilled managers and experts and considerably slowed industrial production in 1937.<ref>Vadim Birstein ''Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon'' (Biteback Publishing, 2013) pp. 80–81.</ref> | |||
The mobilization of resources by state planning augmented the country's industrial base. Pig ] output, necessary for development of nonexistent industrial infrastructure rose from 3.3 million to 10 million tons per year. ], the integral product fueling modern economies and Stalinist industrialization, successfully rose from 35.4 million to 75 million tons, and output of ] rose from 5.7 million to 19 million tons. A number of industrial complexes such as ] and ], the ] and ] automobile plants, the ] and Kramatorsk heavy ] plants, and Kharkov, ] and Cheliabinsk ] plants have been built or under construction. | |||
==Economy== | |||
Based largely on these figures the Five Year Industrial Production Plan had been fulfilled by 93.7 percent in only four years, while parts devoted to heavy-industry part were fulfilled by 108%. Stalin in December ] declared the plan a success to the Central Committee, since increases in the output of ] and ] would fuel future development. | |||
{{Main|Economy of the Soviet Union}} | |||
===Collectivization of agriculture=== | |||
While undoubtedly marking a tremendous leap in industrial capacity, the Five Year Plan was extremely harsh on industrial workers; quotas were extremely difficult to fulfill, requiring that miners put in 16 to 18-hour workdays. Failure to fulfill the quotas could result in treason charges. | |||
{{Main|Collectivisation in the Soviet Union|Dekulakization|Agriculture in the Soviet Union|Holodomor}} | |||
Working conditions were poor, even hazardous. By some estimates, 127,000 workers died during the four years (from 1928 to 1932). Due to the allocation of resources for industry along with decreasing productivity since collectivization, a famine occurred. The use of forced labor must also not be overlooked. In the construction of the industrial complexes, inmates of ]s were used as expendable resources. | |||
], 1931]] | |||
Under the NEP (New Economic Policy), Lenin had to tolerate the continued existence of privately owned agriculture. He decided to wait at least 20 years before attempting to place it under state control and in the meantime concentrate on industrial development. However, after ], the timetable for collectivization was shortened to just five years. Demand for food intensified, especially in the USSR's primary grain producing regions, ]. Upon joining ]es (collective farms), peasants had to give up their private plots of land and property. Every harvest, Kolkhoz production was sold to the state for a low price set by the state itself. However, the natural progress of collectivization was slow, and the November 1929 Plenum of the ] decided to accelerate collectivization through force. In any case, Russian peasant culture formed a bulwark of traditionalism that stood in the way of the Soviet state's goals. | |||
Given the goals of the first Five Year Plan, the state sought increased political control of agriculture in order to feed the rapidly growing urban population and to obtain a source of ] through increased cereal exports. Given its late start, the USSR needed to import a substantial number of the expensive technologies necessary for heavy industrialization. | |||
From ] until ], during the period of state-guided, forced industrialization, it is claimed 3.7 million people were sentenced for alleged counter-revolutionary crimes, including 0.6 million sentenced to death, 2.4 million sentenced to ]s, and 0.7 million sentenced to expatriation. Some other estimates put these figures much higher. Much like with the famines, the evidence supporting these high numbers<sup>4</sup> is disputed by some historians, although this is a minority view. | |||
By 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture had been collectivized. In many cases, peasants bitterly opposed this process and often slaughtered their animals rather than give them to collective farms, even though the government only wanted the grain. ]s, prosperous peasants, were forcibly resettled to ], ] and the ] (a large portion of the kulaks served at forced labor camps). However, just about anyone opposing collectivization was deemed a "kulak". The policy of liquidation of kulaks as a class—formulated by Stalin at the end of 1929—meant some executions, and even more deportation to special settlements and, sometimes, to forced labor camps.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hudson|first=Hugh D.|chapter=Liquidation of Kulak Influence, War Panic, and the Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class, 1927–1929|date=2012|work=Peasants, Political Police, and the Early Soviet State: Surveillance and Accommodation under the New Economic Policy|pages=89–111|editor-last=Hudson|editor-first=Hugh D.|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US|language=en|doi=10.1057/9781137010544_6|isbn=978-1-137-01054-4|title=Peasants, Political Police, and the Early Soviet State}}</ref> | |||
===Collectivization=== | |||
''Main article: ].'' | |||
Despite the expectations, collectivization led to a catastrophic drop in farm productivity, which did not return to the levels achieved under the NEP until 1940. The upheaval associated with collectivization was particularly severe in Ukraine and the heavily Ukrainian ]. Peasants slaughtered their livestock en masse rather than give them up. In 1930 alone, 25% of the nation's cattle, sheep, and goats, and one-third of all pigs were killed. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviet livestock numbers would return to their 1928 level. Government bureaucrats, who had been given a rudimentary education on farming techniques, were dispatched to the countryside to "teach" peasants the new ways of socialist agriculture, relying largely on theoretical ideas that had little basis in reality.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/famine-and-oppression/|title=Famine and Oppression {{!}} History of Western Civilization II|website=courses.lumenlearning.com|access-date=2019-03-28}}</ref> Even after the state inevitably won and succeeded in imposing collectivization, the peasants did everything they could in the way of sabotage. They cultivated far smaller portions of their land and worked much less. The scale of the ] has led many Ukrainian scholars to argue that there was a deliberate policy of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Other scholars argue that the massive death totals were an inevitable result of a very poorly planned operation against all peasants, who had given little support to Lenin or Stalin. | |||
In ] ] the ] decided to implement forced collectivization. This marked the end of the ], which had allowed peasants to sell their surpluses on the open market. Grain requisitioning intensified and peasants were forced to give up their private plots of land and property, to work for ]s, and to sell their produce to the state for a low price set by the state itself. | |||
{{Blockquote|text=Almost 99% of all cultivated land had been pulled into collective farms by the end of 1937. The ghastly price paid by the peasantry has yet to be established with precision, but probably up to 5 million people died of persecution or starvation in these years. Ukrainians and Kazakhs suffered worse than most nations.|sign=]|source=Comrades! A History of World Communism (2007) p. 145}}] | |||
In Ukraine alone, the number of people who died in the famines is now estimated to be 3.5 million.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Himka | first1 = John-Paul | year = 2013 | title = Encumbered Memory: The Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33 | journal = Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History | volume = 14 | issue = 2| pages = 411–436 | doi=10.1353/kri.2013.0025| s2cid = 159967790 }}</ref><ref>R. W. Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, ''The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia Volume 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931–1933'' (2nd ed. 2010) p xiv </ref> | |||
Given the goals of the First Five Year Plan, the state sought increased political control of agriculture, hoping to feed the rapidly growing urban areas and to export grain, a source of foreign currency needed to import technologies necessary for heavy-industrialization. | |||
The USSR took over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, which were lost to Germany in 1941, and then recovered in 1944. The collectivization of their farms began in 1948. Using terror, mass killings and deportations, most of the peasantry was collectivized by 1952. Agricultural production fell dramatically in all the other Soviet Republics.<ref>{{Citation | url = http://www.xxiamzius.lt/archyvas/xxiamzius/20030124/istdab_01.html | first = Kazys | last = Blaževičius | title = Antanas Sniečkus. Kas jis? | journal = XXI Amžius | number = 7 | page = 1111 | place = ] | language = lt | date = Jan 24, 2003}}.</ref> | |||
By ] about 90% of Soviet agriculture was collectivized. In many cases peasants bitterly opposed this process and often slaughtered their animals rather than give them to collective farms. ]s, prosperous peasants, were forcibly resettled to ] (a large portion of the kulaks served at forced ]s). However, just about anyone opposing collectivization was deemed a "]." The policy of liquidation of kulaks as a class, formulated by Stalin at the end of ], meant executions, and deportation to ] camps. | |||
===Rapid industrialization=== | |||
Despite the expectations, collectivization led to a catastrophic drop in farming productivity, which did not regain the NEP level until ]. The upheaval associated with collectivization worsened famine conditions during a time of drought, particularly in the ] and ] region. The number of people who died in these famines is estimated at between two and five million. The actual number of casualties is bitterly disputed to this day. In 1975, ] and ] estimated that 265,800 ] families were sent to the ] in 1930. In 1979, ] used Abramov's and Kocharli's estimate to calculate that 2.5 million peasants were exiled between 1930 and 1931, but he suspected that he underestimated the total number. | |||
{{Main|Industrialization in the Soviet Union}} | |||
In the period of rapid industrialization and mass collectivization preceding World War II, Soviet employment figures experienced exponential growth. 3.9 million jobs per annum were expected by 1923, but the number actually climbed to an astounding 6.4 million. By 1937, the number rose yet again, to about 7.9 million. Finally, in 1940 it reached 8.3 million. Between 1926 and 1930, the urban population increased by 30 million. Unemployment had been a problem in late Imperial Russia and even under the NEP, but it ceased being a major factor after the implementation of Stalin's massive industrialization program. The sharp mobilization of resources used in order to industrialize the heretofore agrarian society created a massive need for labor; unemployment virtually dropped to zero. Wage setting by Soviet planners also contributed to the sharp decrease in unemployment, which dropped in real terms by 50% from 1928 to 1940. With wages artificially depressed, the state could afford to employ far more workers than would be financially viable in a market economy. Several ambitious extraction projects were begun that endeavored to supply raw materials for both military hardware and consumer goods. | |||
The Moscow and ] automobile plants produced automobiles for the public—despite few Soviet citizens being able to afford a car—and the expansion of steel production and other industrial materials made the manufacture of a greater number of cars possible. Car and truck production, for example, reached 200,000 in 1931.{{Sfn | Tucker | 1990 | p = 96}} | |||
===Changes in Soviet Society=== | |||
A minimum wage of 110–115 rubles was established in 1937; private gardens were allowed for one million workers to farm in their private plots. Even so, most Soviet workers lived in crowded communal housings and dormitories and suffered from extreme poverty.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817939423_23.pdf|title=Forced Labor in Soviet Industry: The End of the 1930s to the Mid-1950s. An Overview|website=hoover.org|author=Andrei Sokolov|access-date=2023-03-07}}</ref> | |||
<div style="float:right;width:181px;margin:1ex 0 1ex 1em;">]</div> | |||
==Society== | |||
Stalin's industrial policies largely improved living standards for the majority of the population, although the debated mortality levels resulting from Stalinist policies taints the Soviet record. | |||
===Propaganda=== | |||
{{further|Propaganda in the Soviet Union}} | |||
] | |||
Most of the top communist leaders in the 1920s and 1930s had been propagandists or editors before 1917, and were keenly aware of the importance of propaganda. As soon as they gained power in 1917 they seized the monopoly of all communication media, and greatly expanded their propaganda apparatus in terms of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets. Radio became a powerful tool in the 1930s.<ref>David Brandenberger, ''Propaganda state in crisis: Soviet ideology, indoctrination, and terror under Stalin, 1927–1941'' (2012).</ref> Stalin, for example, has been an editor of ''Pravda''. Besides the national newspapers '']'' and ''],'' there were numerous regional publications as well as newspapers and magazines and all the important languages. Ironclad uniformity of opinion was the norm during the Soviet era. Typewriters and printing presses were closely controlled until the late 1980s to prevent unauthorized publications. ] illegal circulation of subversive fiction and nonfiction was brutally suppressed. The rare exceptions to 100% uniformity in the official media were indicators of high-level battles. The Soviet draft constitution of 1936 was an instance. ''Pravda'' and '']'' (the paper for manual workers) praised the draft constitution. However ''Izvestiia'' was controlled by ] and it published negative letters and reports. Bukharin won out and the party line changed and started to attack "Trotskyite" oppositionists and traitors. Bukharin's success was short-lived; he was arrested in 1937, given a show trial and executed.<ref>Ellen Wimberg, "Socialism, democratism and criticism: The Soviet press and the national discussion of the 1936 draft constitution." ''Europe‐Asia Studies'' 44#2 (1992): 313–332.</ref> | |||
===Education=== | |||
Employment, for instance, rose greatly; 3.9 million per year was expected by ], but the number was actually an astounding 6.4 million. By ], the number rose yet again, to about 7.9 million, and in ] it was 8.3 million. Between 1926 and 1930, the urban population increased by 30 million. ] had been a problem during the time of the Tsar and even under the NEP, but it was not a major factor after the implementation of Stalin's industrialization program. The mobilization of resources to industrialize the agrarian society industrial created a need for labor, meaning that the ] went virtually to zero. Several ambitious projects were begun, and they supplied raw materials not only for military weapons but also for consumer goods. | |||
{{Main|Education in the Soviet Union}} | |||
Industrial workers needed to be educated in order to be competitive and so embarked on a program contemporaneous with industrialization to greatly increase the number of schools and the general quality of education. In 1927, 7.9 million students attended 118,558 schools. By 1933, the number rose to 9.7 million students in 166,275 schools. In addition, 900 specialist departments and 566 institutions were built and fully operational by 1933. Literacy rates increased substantially as a result, especially in the ].{{Sfn | Tucker | 1990 | p = 228}}<ref>Boris N. Mironov, “The Development of Literacy in Russia and the USSR from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries.” ''History of Education Quarterly'' 31#2 (1991), pp. 229–252. </ref> | |||
===Women=== | |||
The ] and ] automobile plants produced automobiles that the public could utilize, although not necessarily afford, and the expansion of heavy plant and ] production made production of a greater number of cars possible. ] and ] production, for example, reached 200,000 in ]. Because the industrial workers needed to be educated, the number of ] increased. In ], 7.9 million students attended 118,558 schools. This number rose to 9.7 million students and 166,275 schools by 1933. In addition, 900 specialist departments and 566 institutions were built and functioning by 1933. | |||
{{Main|Women_in_Russia#Soviet_era:_feminist_reforms|l1 = Women in the Soviet Union}} | |||
The Soviet people also benefited from a type of social liberalization. Women were to be given the same education as men and, at least legally speaking, obtained the same rights as men in the workplace.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} Although in practice these goals were not reached, the efforts to achieve them and the statement of theoretical equality led to a general improvement in the socio-economic status of women.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} | |||
Women were notably recruited as clerks for the expanding ]s, resulting in a "feminization" of department stores as the number of female sales staff rose from 45 percent of the total sales staff in 1935 to 62 percent of the total sales staff in 1938.{{sfn|Hessler|2020|p=211}} This was in part due to a propaganda campaign launched in 1931 which linked femininity with "culture" and asserted that the New Soviet Woman was also a working woman.{{sfn|Hessler|2020|p=211}} Furthermore, department store staff had a low status in the Soviet Union and many men did not want to work as sales staff, leading to the jobs as sales staff going to poorly educated working-class women and from women newly arrived in the cities from the countryside.{{sfn|Hessler|2020|p=211}} | |||
The Soviet people also benefited from a degree of social liberalization. Females were given an adequate, equal education and women had equal rights in employment, precipitating improving lives for women and families. Stalinist development also contributed to advances in health care, which vastly increased the lifespan for the typical Soviet citizen and the quality of life. Stalin's policies granted the Soviet people universal access to health care and education, allowing this generation to be the first not to fear ], ], and ]. The occurrences of these diseases dropped to record-low numbers, increasing life spans by decades. | |||
However, many rights were rolled back by the authorities during this era, such as abortion, which was legalized before Stalin came to power, was banned in 1936<ref>{{Cite web |title=When Soviet Women Won the Right to Abortion (For the Second Time) |url=https://jacobin.com/2020/03/soviet-women-abortion-ussr-history-health-care/ |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=jacobin.com |language=en-US}}</ref> after controversial debate among citizens.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-08-31 |title=Letters to the Editor on the Draft Abortion Law |url=https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1936-2/abolition-of-legal-abortion/abolition-of-legal-abortion-texts/abolition-of-legal-abortion/ |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=Seventeen Moments in Soviet History |language=en-US}}</ref> Women's issues were also largely ignored by the government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mamonova |first=Tatyana |title=Women and Russia: Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union |location=Oxford |publisher=Basil Blackwell Publisher |year=1984 |isbn=0-631-13889-7}}</ref> | |||
Soviet women under Stalin were also the first generation of women able to give birth in the safety of a hospital, with access to prenatal care. Education was also an example of an increase in standard of living after economic development. The generation born during Stalin's rule was the first near-universally literate generation. Engineers were sent abroad to learn industrial technology, and hundreds of foreign engineers were brought to Russia on contract. ] was also improved, as many new ] were built. Workers who exceeded their quotas, '']s'', received many incentives for their work. They could thus afford to buy the goods that were mass-produced by the rapidly expanding Soviet economy. | |||
===Health=== | |||
==The Great Purges== | |||
{{Main|Healthcare_in_Russia#Semashko_system|l1 = Healthcare in the Soviet Union}} | |||
''Main article: ]''. | |||
Stalinist development also contributed to advances in health care, which marked a massive improvement over the Imperial era. Stalin's policies granted the Soviet people access to ] and ]. Widespread immunization programs created the first generation free from the fear of ] and ]. The occurrences of these diseases dropped to record-low numbers and infant mortality rates were substantially reduced, resulting in the ] for both men and women to increase by over 20 years by the mid-to-late 1950s.<ref name="rand">{{Citation | editor1-first = Julie | editor1-last = Da Vanzo | editor2-first = Gwen | editor2-last = Farnsworth | url = https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF124/ | title = Russia's Demographic "Crisis" | pages =115–121 | year = 1996 | publisher = ] | isbn = 978-0-8330-2446-6}}.</ref> | |||
===Youth=== | |||
As this process unfolded, Stalin consolidated near-absolute power using the 1934 assassination of ] (which many suspect Stalin of having planned) as a pretext to launch the ] against his suspected political and ideological opponents, most notably the old cadres and the rank and file of the ]. Trotsky had already been expelled from the party in 1927, exiled to ] in 1928 and then expelled from the USSR entirely in 1929. Stalin used the purges to politically and physically destroy his other formal rivals (and former allies) accusing ] and ] of being behind Kirov's assassination and planning to overthrow Stalin. Ultimately, those supposedly involved in this and other conspiracies numbered in the tens of thousands with various ] and senior party members blamed with conspiracy and sabotage which were used to explain industrial accidents, production shortfalls and other failures of Stalin's regime. Measures used against opposition and suspected opposition ranged from imprisonment in work camps (]s) to execution to assassination (of Trotsky's son ] and likely of ] - Trotsky himself was to die at the hands of one of Stalin's assassins in 1940). The period between 1936-1937 is often called the ''Great Terror'', with thousands of people (even merely suspected of opposing Stalin's regime) being killed or imprisoned. Stalin is reputed to have personally signed 40,000 death warrants of suspected political opponents. | |||
]" by ] (1937), depicting ]]] | |||
The ] or Youth Communist League, was an entirely new youth organization designed by Lenin became an enthusiastic strike force that organized communism across the Soviet Union often called on to attack traditional enemies.<ref>Karel Hulicka, "The Komsomol." ''Southwestern Social Science Quarterly'' (1962): 363–373. </ref> The Komsomol played an important role as a mechanism for teaching Party values to the younger generation. The Komsomol also served as a mobile pool of labor and political activism, with the ability to relocate to areas of high-priority at short notice. In the 1920s the Kremlin assigned Komsomol major responsibilities for promoting industrialization at the factory level. In 1929 7,000 Komsomol cadets were building the tractor factory in Stalingrad, 56,000 others built factories in the Urals, and 36,000 were assigned work underground in the coal mines. The goal was to provide an energetic hard-core of Bolshevik activists to influence their coworkers the factories and mines that were at the center of communist ideology.<ref>Hannah Dalton, ''Tsarist and Communist Russia, 1855–1964 '' (2015) p 132.</ref><ref>Hilary Pilkington, ''Russia's Youth and its Culture: A Nation's Constructors and Constructed'' (1995) pp 57–60.</ref> | |||
Komsomol adopted meritocratic, supposedly class-blind membership policies in 1935, but the result was a decline in working class youth members, and a dominance by the better educated youth. A new social hierarchy emerged as young professionals and students joined the Soviet elite, displacing proletarians. Komsomol's membership policies in the 1930s reflected the broader nature of Stalinism, combining Leninist rhetoric about class-free progress with Stalinist pragmatism focused on getting the most enthusiastic and skilled membership.<ref>Seth Bernstein, "Class Dismissed? New Elites and Old Enemies among the “Best” Socialist Youth in the Komsomol, 1934–41." ''Russian Review'' 74.1 (2015): 97–116.</ref> Under Stalin, the ] was also extended to adolescents as young as 12 years old in 1935.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mccauley |first1=Martin |title=Stalin and Stalinism: Revised 3rd Edition |date=13 September 2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-86369-4 |page=49 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oQ7dAAAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+death+penalty+12+years+old&pg=PA49 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Wright |first1=Patrick |title=Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War |date=28 October 2009 |publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-162284-7 |page=342 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ps5wZUFnE7IC&dq=stalin+death+penalty+12+years+old&pg=PA342 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Boobbyer |first1=Philip |title=The Stalin Era |date=2000 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-415-18298-0 |page=160 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lYMsIE5KjmMC&dq=stalin+death+penalty+12+years+old+boys&pg=PA160 |language=en}}</ref> | |||
During this period, the practice of mass arrest, torture, and imprisonment or execution without trial, of anyone suspected by the secret police of opposing Stalin's regime became commonplace. By the ]'s own estimates, 681,692 people were shot during 1937-38 alone (although many historians think that this was an undercount), and millions of people were transported to ] work camps. | |||
===Modernity=== | |||
Several ]s were held in ], to serve as examples for the trials that local courts were expected to carry out elsewere in the country. There were four key trials from 1936 to 1938, The Trial of the Sixteen was the first (December 1936); then the Trial of the Seventeen (January 1937); then the trial of ] generals, including Marshal Tukhachevsky (June 1937); and finally the ] (including ]) in March 1938. ''See also: ]'' | |||
Urban women under Stalin, paralleling the modernization of western countries, were also the first generation of women able to give birth in a hospital with access to prenatal care. Education was another area in which there was improvement after economic development, also paralleling other western countries. The generation born during Stalin's rule was the first near-universally literate generation. Some engineers were sent abroad to learn industrial technology, and hundreds of foreign engineers were brought to Russia on contract. Transport links were also improved, as many new railways were built, although with forced labour, costing thousands of lives. Workers who exceeded their quotas, '']s'', received many incentives for their work, although many such workers were in fact "arranged" to succeed by receiving extreme help in their work, and then their achievements were used for propaganda.<ref>{{cite book|author=Sheila Fitzpatrick|title=Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times : Soviet Russia in the 1930s|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=A3M8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA10|year=2000|publisher=Oxford UP|pages=8–10|isbn=978-0-19-505001-1}}</ref> | |||
===Religion=== | |||
In spite of the Stalin's seemingly progressive ], enacted in 1936, the party's power was in reality subordinated by the secret police, the mechanism whereby Stalin secured his ] through state terror. | |||
{{Further|Religion in the Soviet Union|USSR anti-religious campaign (1928–1941)}} | |||
] in 1929, magazine of the Society of the Godless. The first five-year plan of the Soviet Union is shown crushing the gods of the ].]] | |||
The systematic attacks on the ] began as soon as the Bolsheviks took power in 1917. In the 1930s, Stalin intensified his war on organized religion.<ref>N. S. Timasheff, ''Religion In Soviet Russia 1917–1942'' (1942) </ref> Nearly all churches and monasteries were closed and tens of thousands of clergymen were imprisoned or executed. Historian Dimitry Pospielovski has estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 Orthodox clergy died by execution or in prison 1918–1929, plus an additional 45,000 in 1930–1939. Monks, nuns, and related personnel added an additional 40,000 dead.<ref>{{cite book|author=Daniel H. Shubin|title=A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV: Tsar Nicholas II to Gorbachev's Edict on the Freedom of Conscience|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WK4tAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144|year=2006|publisher=Algora|page=144|isbn=978-0-87586-443-3}}</ref> | |||
The state propaganda machine vigorously promoted atheism and denounced religion as being an artifact of capitalist society. In 1937, ] decried the attacks on religion in the Soviet Union. By 1940, only a small number of churches remained open. The ] were mostly directed at the Russian Orthodox Church, as it was a symbol of the czarist government. In the 1930s however, all faiths were targeted: minority Christian denominations, ], ], and ]. During ] state authorities eased pressures on ] and stopped prosecuting the church. The Orthodox Church was, therefore, able to help the Soviet Army to defend Russia.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.rbth.com/history/333593-how-russian-orthodox-church-helped/amp | title=How the Russian Orthodox Church helped the Red Army defeat the Nazis }}</ref> Religions in former USSR republics revived and once again flourished after the ] in the 1990s. As Paul Froese explains: | |||
==The Great Patriotic War== | |||
:Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called “scientific atheism,” complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and a promise of worldly salvation. But in the end, a majority of older Soviet citizens retained their religious beliefs and a crop of citizens too young to have experienced pre-Soviet times acquired religious beliefs.<ref>Paul Froese, Paul. "Forced secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an atheistic monopoly failed." ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'' 43.1 (2004): 35–50. </ref> | |||
According to 2012 official statistics, nearly 15% of ethnic Russians identify as atheist, and nearly 27% identify as unaffiliated.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://c2.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOTO/OGONIOK/2012/034/ogcyhjk2.jpg |title=Archived copy |website=c2.kommersant.ru |access-date=11 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170421154615/http://c2.kommersant.ru/ISSUES.PHOTO/OGONIOK/2012/034/ogcyhjk2.jpg |archive-date=21 April 2017 |url-status=dead}}</ref> | |||
===War and Stalinist development=== | |||
===Ethnic policies=== | |||
Heavy-industrialization contributed to the Soviet Union's wartime victory over ] in the ] (known throughout the former USSR as the Great Patriotic War). The Red Army overturned the Nazi eastern expansion single-handedly, with the turning point on the Eastern Front being the ]. Although the Soviet Union was getting aid and weapons from the United States, its production of war materials was greater than that of Nazi Germany because of rapid growth of Soviet industrial production during the interwar years. The Second Five Year Plan raised the steel production to 18 million tons and the coal to 128 million tons. Before it was interrupted, the Third Five Year Plan produced 18 millions of ] and 150 million tons of ]. During the war, the allies were able to outstrip Nazi Germany in the production of war materials, in some cases ten-fold. The tank production, for example, was equal to 40,000 per year for the allies, to only 4,000 for Nazi Germany. | |||
] | |||
The Soviet Union authorities systematically promoted the national consciousness of indigenous peoples and established institutional forms | |||
characteristic of a modern nation for them.<ref></ref> In Central Asia the liberation of women was approached in the same revolutionary way as the assault on the religion. In 1927 the campaign against ] (veil) started, called "]" (assault). However, it produced a massive backlash and paranja did not disappear until the 1950s.<ref></ref><ref></ref> | |||
In 1937, as a part of the ], repressive “national operations” were conducted. Representatives of “Western” minorities were targeted | |||
While naïve to de-emphasize U.S. assistance in ], the Soviet Union's industrial output helped stop Nazi Germany's initial advance, and stripped them of their advantage. According to ], "One can hardly doubt that if there had been a slower buildup of industry, the attack would have been successful and world history would have evolved quite differently." For the laborers involved in industry, however, life was difficult. Workers were encouraged to fulfill and overachieve quotas through propaganda, such as the Stakhanovite movement. Between 1933 and 1945, some argue that seven million civilians died because of the demanding labor. Between 1930 and 1940, 6 million were put through the forced labor system. | |||
because of their possible connections to countries hostile to the USSR and fear of disloyalty in case of an invasion.<ref></ref> | |||
==Great Purge== | |||
Some historians, however, interpret the lack of preparedness of the Soviet Union to defend itself as a flaw in Stalin's economic planning. ] argues that there was "a command-administrative economy" but it was not "a planned one". He argues that the Soviet Union suffered from a chaotic state of the Politburo in its policies due to the ], and was completely unprepared for the ] invasion. When the Soviet Union was invaded in 1941, Stalin was indeed surprised. Economist ], in addition, argues in his ''Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan'', that an array "of alternative paths were available, evolving out of the situation existing at the end of the 1920s... that could have been as good as those achieved by, say, 1936 yet with far less turbulence, waste, destruction and sacrifice." | |||
{{Main|Great Purge}} | |||
] Soldiers watching a parade on May 1, 1936, at the Beginning of the Great Purge]] | |||
As this process unfolded, Stalin consolidated near-absolute power by destroying the potential opposition. In 1936–1938, about three quarters of a million Soviets were executed, and more than a million others were sentenced to lengthy terms in harsh labour camps. Stalin's Great Terror ravaged the ranks of factory directors and engineers, and removed most of the senior officers in the Army.<ref>James Harris, ''The Great Fear: Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s'' (2017), p. 1 </ref> The pretext was the 1934 assassination of ] (which many suspect Stalin of having planned, although there is no evidence for this).<ref>Matt Lenoe, "Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?." ''Journal of Modern History'' 74.2 (2002): 352–380. </ref> Nearly all the old pre-1918 Bolsheviks were purged. Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927, exiled to Kazakhstan in 1928, expelled from the USSR in 1929, and assassinated in 1940. Stalin used the purges to politically and physically destroy his other formal rivals (and former allies) accusing ] and ] of being behind Kirov's assassination and planning to overthrow Stalin. Ultimately, the people arrested were tortured and forced to confess to being spies and saboteurs, and quickly convicted and executed.<ref>James Harris, ''The Anatomy of Terror: Political Violence under Stalin'' (2013)</ref> | |||
Several ] were held in Moscow, to serve as examples for the trials that local courts were expected to carry out elsewhere in the country. There were four key trials from 1936 to 1938, The Trial of the Sixteen was the first (December 1936); then the Trial of the Seventeen (January 1937); then the trial of ] generals, including ] (June 1937); and finally the ] (including ]) in March 1938. During these, the defendants typically confessed to sabotage, spying, counter-revolution, and conspiring with Germany and Japan to invade and partition the Soviet Union. The initial trials in 1935–1936 were carried out by the ] under ]. In turn the prosecutors were tried and executed. The secret police were renamed the ] and control given to ], known as the "Bloody Dwarf".<ref>Arkadiĭ Vaksberg and Jan Butler, ''The Prosecutor and the Prey: Vyshinsky and the 1930s' Moscow Show Trials'' (1990).</ref> | |||
While by no means an "orderly" economy or an efficient one, the Five Year Plans did plan an offensive, but since the Soviet Union was under attack, the situation required a defensive response. The result, as Shearer points out, was that the command economy had to be relaxed so that the mobilization needed was achieved. Sapir supports this view, arguing that Stalin's policies developed a mobilized economy (which was inefficient), with tension between central and local decision-making. Market forces became more significant than central administrative constraints. This view, however, is refuted by ], who argues that Soviet Union's "heavy industrialization translated into ultimate survival." | |||
The "Great Purge" swept the Soviet Union in 1937. It was widely known as the "Yezhovschina", the "Reign of Yezhov". The rate of arrests was staggering. In the armed forces alone, 34,000 officers were purged, including many at the higher ranks.<ref>{{cite book|author=Geoffrey Roberts|title=Stalin's General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OOxRrfalHJcC&pg=PT58|year=2012|publisher=Icon Books|pages=58–59|isbn=978-1-84831-443-6}}</ref> The entire Politburo and most of the Central Committee were purged, along with foreign communists who were living in the Soviet Union, and numerous intellectuals, bureaucrats, and factory managers. The total of people imprisoned or executed during the Yezhovschina numbered about two million.<ref>{{cite book|author=Paul R. Gregory|title=Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-DH57dXl_agC&pg=PA18|year=2009|publisher=Yale University Press|pages=16–20|isbn=978-0-300-15278-4}}</ref> By 1938, the mass purges were starting to disrupt the country's infrastructure, and Stalin began winding them down. Yezhov was gradually relieved of power. Yezhov was relieved of all powers in 1939, then tried and executed in 1940. His successor as head of the NKVD (from 1938 to 1945) was ], a Georgian friend of Stalin's. Arrests and executions continued into 1952, although nothing on the scale of the Yezhovschina ever happened again. | |||
===Wartime developments=== | |||
During this period, the practice of mass arrest, torture, and imprisonment or execution without trial, of anyone suspected by the secret police of opposing Stalin's regime became commonplace. By the NKVD's own count, 681,692 people were shot during 1937–1938 alone, and hundreds of thousands of political prisoners were transported to Gulag work camps.<ref>{{cite book|author= Gregory|title=Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-DH57dXl_agC&pg=PA16|year=2009|page=16|publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-15278-4}}</ref> | |||
] | |||
The mass terror and purges were little known to the outside world, and some western intellectuals and fellow travellers continued to believe that the Soviets had created a successful alternative to a capitalist world. In 1936, the country adopted its ], which only on paper granted freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Scholars estimate the total death toll for the Great Purge (1936–1938), including fatalities attributed to prison conditions, to be roughly 700,000-1.2 million.<ref>{{Citation |title=Introduction: the Great Purges as history |date=1985 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511572616.002 |work=Origins of the Great Purges |pages=1–9 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511572616.002 |isbn=978-0521259217 |access-date=2021-12-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Homkes|first=Brett|date=2004|title=Certainty, Probability, and Stalin's Great Purge|url=https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=mcnair|journal=McNair Scholars Journal}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ellman |first1=Michael |title=Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments |journal=Europe-Asia Studies |date=2002 |volume=54 |issue=7 |pages=1151–1172 |doi=10.1080/0966813022000017177 |jstor=826310 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/826310 |issn=0966-8136}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Shearer |first1=David R. |title=Stalin and War, 1918-1953: Patterns of Repression, Mobilization, and External Threat |date=11 September 2023 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-000-95544-6 |page=vii |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CCHMEAAAQBAJ&dq=great+purge+1.2+million&pg=PR7 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Nelson |first1=Todd H. |title=Bringing Stalin Back In: Memory Politics and the Creation of a Useable Past in Putin's Russia |date=16 October 2019 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-4985-9153-9 |page=7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oJGyDwAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+great+purge+1.2+million&pg=PA7 |language=en}}</ref> | |||
In March 1939, the ] was held in Moscow. Most of the delegates present at the ] in 1934 were gone, and Stalin was heavily praised by Litvinov and the western democracies criticized for failing to adopt the principles of "collective security" against Nazi Germany. | |||
The Nazi invasion caught the Soviet military unprepared. A widely-held belief is that this was caused by a large number (an estimated 40,000) of the senior officers being sent to prison in the "Great Purges" of ]-]. To secure Soviet influence over ] and buy some time, Stalin arranged the ], a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on ], ]. A secret appendix to the pact gave Eastern ], ], ] and ] to the USSR, and Western Poland and ] to Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany invaded Poland on ]st, USSR followed on ]th. On ]th, the USSR’s invaded Finland during the ]. Although outnumbering Finnish troops by over 50:1, the Soviets were unable to capture more than a small fraction of the nation. | |||
===Interpreting the purges=== | |||
On ] ], however, ] broke the pact and invaded the Soviet Union (see ]). | |||
Two major lines of interpretation have emerged among historians. One argues that the purges reflected Stalin's ambitions, his paranoia, and his inner drive to increase his power and eliminate potential rivals. Revisionist historians explain the purges by theorizing that rival factions exploited Stalin's paranoia and used terror to enhance their own position. Peter Whitewood examines the first purge, directed at the Army, and comes up with a third interpretation that: Stalin and other top leaders, assuming that they were always surrounded by enemies, always worried about the vulnerability and loyalty of the Red Army. It was not a ploy – Stalin truly believed it. “Stalin attacked the Red Army because he seriously misperceived a serious security threat”; thus “Stalin seems to have genuinely believed that foreign‐backed enemies had infiltrated the ranks and managed to organize a conspiracy at the very heart of the Red Army.” The purge hit deeply from June 1937 and November 1938, removing 35,000; many were executed. Experience in carrying out the purge facilitated purging other key elements in the wider Soviet polity.<ref>Peter Whitewood, ''The Red Army and the Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet Military'' (2015) Quoting pp 12, 276.</ref><ref>Ronald Grigor Suny, review, ''Historian'' (2018) 80#1:177-179.</ref> Historians often cite the disruption as factors in its disastrous military performance during the German invasion.<ref>Roger R. Reese, "Stalin Attacks the Red Army." ''Military History Quarterly'' 27.1 (2014): 38–45.</ref> | |||
==Foreign relations, 1927–1939== | |||
Using his contacts within the German ] party, ] spy ] was able to discover the exact date and time of the planned German invasion of the Soviet Union. This information was passed along to Stalin, but went ignored, despite warning from not only Sorge, but ] as well. | |||
{{Main|Foreign relations of the Soviet Union|International relations (1919–1939)}} | |||
The Soviet government had forfeited foreign-owned private companies during the creation of the RSFSR and the USSR. Foreign investors did not receive any monetary or material compensation. The USSR also refused to pay tsarist-era debts to foreign debtors. The young Soviet polity was a pariah because of its openly stated goal of supporting the overthrow of capitalistic governments. It sponsored workers' revolts to overthrow numerous capitalistic European states, but they all failed. Lenin reversed radical experiments and restored a sort of capitalism with the NEC. The Comintern was ordered to stop organizing revolts. Starting in 1921 Lenin sought trade, loans and recognition. One by one, foreign states reopened trade lines and recognized the Soviet government. The United States was the last major polity to recognise the USSR in 1933. In 1934, the French government proposed an alliance and led 30 governments to invite the USSR to join the League of Nations. The USSR had achieved legitimacy but was expelled in December 1939 for aggression against Finland.<ref>George F. Kennan, ''Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin'' (1961). pp 172–259.</ref><ref>Barbara Jelavich, ''St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814–1974'' (1974). pp 336–354.</ref> | |||
In 1928, Stalin pushed a leftist policy based on his belief in an imminent great crisis for capitalism. Various European communist parties were ordered not to form coalitions and instead to denounce moderate socialists as ]. Activists were sent into labour unions to take control away from socialists–a move the ] never forgave. By 1930, the Stalinists started suggesting the value of alliance with other parties, and by 1934 the idea to form a ] had emerged. Comintern agent ] was especially effective in organizing intellectuals, antiwar and pacifist elements to join the anti-Nazi coalition.<ref>Sean McMeekin, ''The Red Millionaire: A Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Moscow’s Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West'' (2003) pp 115–116, 194.</ref> Communists would form coalitions with any party to fight fascism. For Stalinists, the Popular Front was simply an expedient, but to rightists, it represented the desirable form of transition to socialism.<ref>Jeff Frieden, "The internal politics of European Communism in the Stalin Era: 1934–1949". ''Studies in Comparative Communism'' 14.1 (1981): 45–69 {{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> | |||
It is said that Stalin at first refused to believe ] had broken the treaty. However, new evidence shows Stalin held meetings with a variety of senior Soviet government and military figures, including ] (People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs), ] (People's Commissar for Defense), ] (Chief of Staff of the Red Army), ] (Commander of both North Caucasus and Baltic Military Districts), and ] (Deputy People's Commissar for Defense). All in all, on the very first day of the attack, Stalin held meetings with over 15 individual members of the Soviet government and military apparatus.<sup>5</sup> | |||
Franco-Soviet relations were initially hostile because the USSR officially opposed the World War I peace settlement of 1919 that France emphatically championed. While the Soviet Union was interested in conquering territories in Eastern Europe, France was determined to protect the fledgling states there. However, ]'s foreign policy centered on a massive seizure of Central European, Eastern European, and Russian lands for Germany's own ends, and when Hitler pulled out of the ] in Geneva in 1933, the threat hit home. Soviet Foreign Minister ] reversed Soviet policy regarding the Paris Peace Settlement, leading to a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. In May 1935, the USSR concluded pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. Stalin-ordered the ] to form a ] with leftist and centrist parties against the forces of ]. The pact was undermined, however, by strong ideological hostility to the Soviet Union and the Comintern's new front in France, Poland's refusal to permit the ] on its soil, France's defensive military strategy, and a continuing Soviet interest in patching up relations with Nazi Germany. | |||
Nazi German troops reached the outskirts of ] in December 1941, but were diverted to shore up southern flanks. At the ] in 1942-43, after losing an estimated 1 million men in the bloodiest fighting in history, the Red Army was able to regain the initiative of the war. Due to the unwillingness of the Japanese to open a second front in ], the Soviets were able to call dozens of Red Army division back from eastern Russia. These units were instrumental in turning the tide, because most of their officer corps had escaped Stalin’s purges. The Soviet forces were soon able to regain their lost territory and push their over-stretched enemy back to Nazi Germany itself. | |||
The Soviet Union supplied military aid to the ] of the ] during the ], including munitions and soldiers, and helped far-left activists come to Spain as volunteers. The Spanish government let the USSR have the government treasury. Soviet units systematically liquidated anarchist supporters of the Spanish government. Moscow's support of the government gave the Republicans a Communist taint in the eyes of anti-Bolsheviks in Britain and France, weakening the calls for Anglo-French intervention in the war.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McCannon | |||
From the end of 1944 to 1949 large sections of eastern Germany came under the Soviet Union's occupation and on May 2nd 1945, the capital city ] was taken, while over fifteen million Germans were removed from eastern Germany and pushed into central Germany (later called GDR ]) and western Germany (later called FRG ]). Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Czech etc. were then moved onto German land. | |||
|first=John|date=1995|title=Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39: A Reexamination|journal=Russian History|volume=22|issue=2|pages=154–180|issn=0094-288X|jstor=24657802|doi=10.1163/187633195X00070}}</ref> | |||
Nazi Germany promulgated an ] with Imperialist Japan and Fascist Italy, along with various Central and Eastern European states (such as ]), ostensibly to suppress Communist activity but more realistically to forge an alliance against the USSR.<ref>Lorna L. Waddington, "The Anti-Komintern and Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the 1930s". ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 42.4 (2007): 573–594.</ref> | |||
The Soviets bore the brunt of World War II because the West could not open up a second ground front in Europe until the invasion of ] and ]. Approximately 21 million Soviets, among them 7 million civilians, were killed in "Operation Barbarossa," the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. Civilians were rounded up and burned or shot in many cities conquered by the Nazis. Many feel that since the Slavs were considered "sub-human," this was ethnically targeted mass murder. However, the retreating Soviet army was ordered to pursue a ']' policy whereby retreating Soviet troops were ordered to destroy Russian and occupied Polish civilian infrastructure and food supplies so that the Nazi German troops could not use them. | |||
== World War II == | |||
] resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The ] was especially scathed due to the mass destruction of the industrial base that it had built up in the 1930s. The only major industrial power in the world to emerge intact, and even greatly strengthened from an economic perspective, was the ]. | |||
{{Main|Soviet Union in World War II}} | |||
] at the end of the ]. At the center Major General ] and Brigadier ]]] | |||
Stalin arranged the ], a non-aggression pact with ] on 23 August along with the ] to open economic relations. A secret appendix to the pact gave Eastern Poland, Latvia, Estonia, ] and Finland to the USSR, and Western Poland and ] to Nazi Germany. This reflected the Soviet desire of territorial gains. | |||
Following the pact with Hitler, Stalin in 1939–1940 annexed half of Poland, the three Baltic States, and Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in Romania. They no longer were buffers separating the USSR from German areas, argues Louis Fischer. Rather they facilitated Hitler's rapid advance to the gates of Moscow.<ref>Louis Fischer, ''Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1941'' (1969).</ref> | |||
Propaganda was also considered an important foreign relations tool. International exhibitions, the distribution of media such as films, e.g.: '']'', as well as inviting prominent foreign individuals to tour the Soviet Union, were used as a method of gaining international influence and encouraging fellow travelers and pacifists to build popular fronts.<ref>Frederick C. Barghoorn, ''Soviet foreign propaganda'' (1964) pp 25–27, 115, 255.</ref> | |||
===Start of World War II=== | |||
{{Main|Events preceding World War II in Europe|Soviet invasion of Poland|Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940)|Winter War}} | |||
Germany ] on 1 September; the ] on 17 September. The Soviets quelled opposition by executing and arresting thousands. They relocated suspect ethnic groups to Siberia in four waves, 1939–1941. Estimates varying from the figure over 1.5 million.<ref>Pavel Polian, ''Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR'' (2004) p 119 </ref> | |||
After Poland was divided up with Germany, Stalin made territorial demands to Finland, claiming security needs regarding the protection of Leningrad. After the Finns refused the demands, the Soviets invaded Finland on 30 November 1939, launching the ], with the goal of annexing Finland into the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Manninen|first1=Ohto|author-link1=Ohto Manninen|title=Miten Suomi valloitetaan: Puna-armeijan operaatiosuunnitelmat 1939–1944|year=2008|publisher=Edita|isbn=978-951-37-5278-1|ref=Manninen2008|language=fi|trans-title=How to Conquer Finland: Operational Plans of the Red Army 1939–1944}}</ref> Despite outnumbering Finnish troops by over 2.5:1, the war proved embarrassingly difficult for the Red Army, which was ill-equipped for the winter weather and lacking competent commanders since the ]. The Finns resisted fiercely, and received some support and considerable sympathy from the Allies. On 29 January 1940, the Soviets put an end to their puppet ] that they had intended on inserting into Helsinki, and informed the Finnish government that the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate peace.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Trotter|first1=William R.|author-link1=William R. Trotter|title=The Winter War: The Russo–Finnish War of 1939–40|edition=5th|year=2002|orig-year=1991|publisher=Aurum Press|isbn=1-85410-881-6}}</ref> The ] was signed on 12 March 1940, with the war ending the following day. By the terms of the treaty, Finland relinquished the ] and some smaller territories.<ref>Derek W. Spring, "The Soviet decision for war against Finland, 30 November 1939." ''Soviet Studies'' 38.2 (1986): 207–226. </ref> London, Washington—and especially Berlin—calculated that the poor showing of the Soviet army indicated it was incompetent to defend the USSR against a German invasion.<ref>Roger R. Reese, "Lessons of the Winter War: a study in the military effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939–1940." ''Journal of Military History'' 72.3 (2008): 825–852.</ref><ref>Martin Kahn, "'Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated': Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War Potential before Operation Barbarossa,” ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 25#2 (2012), 220–240,</ref> | |||
In 1940, the USSR ] and illegally annexed Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. On 14 June 1941, the USSR performed first mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. | |||
On 26 June 1940 the Soviet government issued an ] to the Romanian minister in Moscow, demanding the ] immediately cede ] and ]. Italy and Germany, which needed a stable Romania and access to its oil fields urged ] to do so. Under duress, with no prospect of aid from France or Britain, Carol complied. On 28 June, Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and ] ], ], and the ].<ref>{{Citation | first = Charles | last = King | title = The Moldovans | publisher = Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-0-8179-9792-2 | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/moldovansromania00king_0 }}.</ref> | |||
===Great Patriotic War=== | |||
{{Main|Great Patriotic War (term)|Eastern Front (World War II)|Operation Barbarossa|Diplomatic history of World War II}} | |||
] | |||
On 22 June 1941, ] abruptly broke the non-aggression pact and ]. Stalin had made no preparations. Soviet intelligence was fooled by German disinformation and the invasion caught the Soviet military unprepared. In the larger sense, Stalin expected invasion but not so soon.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Murphy, David E (2005), What Stalin Knew: the enigma of Barbarossa.}}</ref> The Army had been decimated by the Purges; time was needed for a recovery of competence. As such, mobilization did not occur and the Soviet Army was tactically unprepared as of the invasion. The initial weeks of the war were a disaster, with hundreds of thousands of men being killed, wounded, or captured. Whole divisions disintegrated against the German onslaught. Soviet POWs in German prison camps were treated poorly, leading to only 1/10 of Red Army POWs surviving German camps. In contrast, 1/3 of German POWs survived the Soviet prison camps.<ref>*Citino, R. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. University Press of Kansas, 2007. | |||
* Glantz, D. with House, J. When Titan's Clashed. University Press of Kansas, 2015. | |||
* Glantz, D. with House, J. Armageddon in Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2. University Press of Kansas, 2009. | |||
* Glantz, D. with House, J. To the Gates of Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. University Press of Kansas, 2009. | |||
* Kavalerchik, B. The Price of Victory: The Red Army’s Casualties in the Great Patriotic War. Pen & Sword Military, 2017. | |||
* Liedtke, G. Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941–1943. Helion & Company LTD, 2016.</ref> | |||
German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow in December 1941, but failed to capture it, due to staunch Soviet defence and counterattacks. At the ] in 1942–1943, the Red Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the German army. Due to the unwillingness of the Japanese to open a second front in ], the Soviets were able to call dozens of Red Army divisions back from eastern Russia. These units were instrumental in turning the tide, because most of their officer corps had escaped Stalin's purges. The Soviet forces soon launched massive counterattacks along the entire German line. By 1944, the Germans had been pushed out of the Soviet Union onto the banks of the ] river, just east of Prussia. With Soviet Marshal ] attacking from Prussia, and Marshal ] slicing Germany in half from the south, the fate of ] was sealed. On 2 May 1945 the last German troops surrendered to the Soviet troops in Berlin. | |||
===Wartime developments=== | |||
{{further|Home front during World War II#Soviet Union}} | |||
From the end of 1944 to 1949, large sections of eastern Germany came under the Soviet Union's occupation and on 2 May 1945, ], while over fifteen million Germans were removed from eastern Germany (renamed the ] of the ]) and pushed into ] (later called the ]) and ] (later called the ]). | |||
An atmosphere of ] took over the Soviet Union during the war, and persecution of the Orthodox Church was halted. The Church was now permitted to operate with a fair degree of freedom, so long as it did not get involved in politics. In 1944, a ] was written, replacing ], which had been used as the national anthem since 1918. These changes were made because it was thought that the people would respond better to a fight for their country than for a political ideology. | |||
As mentioned, the Soviets bore the heaviest casualties of ]. These war casualties can explain much of Russia's behavior after the war. The Soviet Union continued to occupy and dominate Eastern Europe as a "buffer zone" to protect Russia from another invasion from the West. Russia had been invaded three times past 150 years before the ] during the Napoleonic Wars, ], and ], suffering tens of millions of casualties. | |||
The Soviets bore the brunt of World War II because the West did not open up a second ground front in Europe until the ] and the ]. Approximately 26.6 million Soviets, among them 18 million civilians, were killed in the war. Civilians were rounded up and burned or shot in many cities conquered by the Nazis.{{Citation needed|date=April 2011}} The retreating Soviet army was ordered to pursue a ']' policy whereby retreating Soviet troops were ordered to destroy civilian infrastructure and food supplies so that the Nazi German troops could not use them. | |||
The Soviets were determined to punish those peoples it saw as collaborating with Germany during the war. Millions of Poles, Latvians, Georgians, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities were deported to Gulags in Siberia. It was also during the Soviet retaking of Poland during which thousands of Polish Army officers, including reservists, were executed in what came to be known as the ]. | |||
Stalin's original declaration in March 1946 that there were 7 million war dead was revised in 1956 by ] with a round number of 20 million. In the late 1980s, demographers in the State Statistics Committee (]) took another look using demographic methods and came up with an estimate of 26–27 million. A variety of other estimates have been made.<ref>{{Citation | first1 = Michael | last1 = Ellman | first2 = S | last2 = Maksudov | title = Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note | journal = ] | volume = 46 | number = 4 | year = 1994 | pages = 671–680 | doi=10.1080/09668139408412190 | pmid=12288331}}.</ref> In most detailed estimates roughly two-thirds of the estimated deaths were civilian losses. However, the breakdown of war losses by nationality is less well known. One study, relying on indirect evidence from the 1959 population census, found that while in terms of the aggregate human losses the major Slavic groups suffered most, the largest losses relative to population size were incurred by minority nationalities mainly from European Russia, among groups from which men were mustered to the front in "nationality battalions" and appear to have suffered disproportionately.<ref>{{Citation | first1 = Barbara A | last1 = Anderson | first2 = Brian D | last2 = Silver | contribution = Demographic Consequences of World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR | editor-first = Susan J | editor-last = Linz | title = The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union | place = Totowa, ] | publisher = Rowman & Allanheld | year = 1985}}.</ref> | |||
Stalin also had all Russian soldiers taken captive by Germany sent to isolated work camps in Siberia. This was done to minimize any perceived counter-revolutionary ideas they had been exposed to while not under direct Soviet control. | |||
After the war, the Soviet Union ], in line with ]. | |||
==The Cold War== | |||
Stalin was determined to punish those peoples he saw as ] during the war and to deal with the problem of ], which would tend to pull the Soviet Union apart. Millions of Poles, Latvians, Georgians, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities were deported to Gulags in Siberia. (Previously, following ], thousands of Polish Army officers, including reservists, had been executed in the spring of 1940, in what came to be known as the ].) In addition, in 1941, 1943 and 1944 several whole nationalities had been deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, including, among others, the ], ], ], ], ], and ]. Though these groups were later politically "rehabilitated", some were never given back their former autonomous regions.<ref>{{Citation | first = Robert | last = Conquest | title = The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities | place = London | publisher = MacMillan | year = 1970 | isbn = 978-0-333-10575-7}}.</ref><ref name = "Wimbush">{{Citation | first1 = S Enders | last1 = Wimbush | first2 = Ronald | last2 = Wixman | title = The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Central Asia | journal = Canadian Slavonic Papers | volume = 27 | number = 2–3 |date= 1975 | pages = 320–340| doi = 10.1080/00085006.1975.11091412 }}.</ref><ref name = "Nekich">{{Citation | author = Alexander Nekrich | author-link = Alexander Nekrich | title = The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War | place = New York | publisher = WW Norton | year = 1978 | isbn = 978-0-393-00068-9}}.</ref><ref name = "transfer">], Misplaced Pages.</ref> | |||
===The tenor of Soviet-US relations=== | |||
] | |||
At the same time, in a famous ] toast in May 1945, Stalin extolled the role of the ] in the defeat of the fascists: "I would like to raise a toast to the health of our ] and, before all, the Russian people. I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the nationalities of our country... And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet Government was the decisive strength, which secured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity – over fascism..."<ref>{{Citation | type = complete text of the toast | title = Russification| title-link = Russification}}.</ref> | |||
World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout ], from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The Soviet Union was especially devastated due to the mass destruction of the industrial base that it had built up in the 1930s. The USSR also experienced a major ] in 1946–1948 due to war devastation that cost an estimated 1 to 1.5 million lives as well as secondary population losses due to reduced fertility.{{Efn | Although the 1946 drought was severe, government mismanagement of its grain reserves largely accounted for the population losses.<ref>{{Citation | first = Michael | last = Ellman | title = The 1947 Soviet Famine and the Entitlement Approach to Famines | journal = Cambridge Journal of Economics | volume = 24 | issue = 5 | year = 2000 | pages = 603–630 | doi=10.1093/cje/24.5.603}}.</ref>}} However, the Soviet Union recovered its production capabilities and overcame pre-war capabilities, becoming the country with the most powerful land army in history by the end of the war, and having the most powerful military production capabilities. | |||
The wartime alliance between the ] and the Soviet Union was an aberration from the normal tenor of Russian-US relations. Strategic rivalry between the huge, sprawling nations goes back to the ] when, after a century of friendship, Americans and Russians became rivals over the development of ]. Tsarist Russia, unable to compete industrially, sought to close off and colonize parts of East Asia, while Americans demanded open competition for markets. | |||
====War and Stalinist industrial-military development==== | |||
In ] the rivalry turned intensely ideological. Americans never forgot that the Soviet government negotiated a separate peace with ] in the ] in ], leaving the Western Allies to fight the ] alone. Lasting Russian mistrust stemmed from the landing of U.S. troops in Soviet Russia in ], which became becoming involved, directly and indirectly, in assisting the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the civil war. | |||
{{Further|Soviet industry in World War II|Soviet combat vehicle production during World War II}} | |||
Although the Soviet Union received aid and weapons from the United States under the ] program, the Soviet production of war materials was greater than that of Nazi Germany because of rapid growth of Soviet industrial production during the interwar years (additional supplies from lend-lease accounted for about 10–12% of the Soviet Union's own industrial output). The Second Five Year Plan raised ] production to 18 million tons and ] to 128 million tons. Before it was interrupted, the ] produced no less than 19 million tons of steel and 150 million tons of coal.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://uwaterloo.ca/library/special-collections-archives/first-five-year-plan|title=The First Five Year Plan, 1928–1932|date=2015-10-07|website=Special Collections & Archives|language=en|access-date=2019-03-28}}</ref> | |||
The Soviet Union's industrial output provided an armaments industry which supported their army, helping it resist the Nazi military offensive. According to Robert L. Hutchings, "One can hardly doubt that if there had been a slower buildup of industry, the attack would have been successful and world history would have evolved quite differently."<ref>Russia and the USSR, 1855–1991: Autocracy and Dictatorship p.147</ref> For the laborers involved in industry, however, life was difficult. Workers were encouraged to fulfill and overachieve quotas through ], such as the ]. | |||
In addition, the Soviets never forgot their requests that the ] and ] open a second front on the European continent; but the Allied invasion did not occur until ] ], more than two years after the Soviets had demanded it. In the meantime, the Russians suffered horrendous casualties, as high as twenty million dead, and the Soviets were forced to withstand the brunt of German strength. | |||
Some historians, however, interpret the lack of preparedness of the Soviet Union to defend itself as a flaw in Stalin's economic planning. David Shearer, for example, argues that there was "a command-administrative economy" but it was not "a planned one". He argues that the Soviet Union was still suffering from the Great Purge, and was completely unprepared for the German invasion. Economist Holland Hunter, in addition, argues in his ''Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan'', that an array "of alternative paths were available, evolving out of the situation existing at the end of the 1920s... that could have been as good as those achieved by, say, 1936 yet with far less turbulence, waste, destruction and sacrifice." | |||
<div style="float:right;width:299px;margin:1ex 0 1ex 1em;text-align:center;font-size:x-small;font-style:italic;"> | |||
]<br> | |||
'''The Big Three: The Allied Leaders at Yalta'''<br> | |||
Prime Minister ] (UK),<br> | |||
President ] (US),<br> | |||
and First Secretary ] (USSR) | |||
</div> | |||
==Cold War== | |||
===The breakdown of postwar peace=== | |||
{{Main|Cold War}} | |||
===Soviet control over Eastern Europe=== | |||
When the war ended in Europe on ], ], Soviet and Western (US, British, and French) troops were located in particular places, essentially, along a line in the center of Europe that came to be called the ]. Aside from a few minor adjustments, this would be the "iron curtain" of the ]. In hindsight, ] signified the agreement of both sides that they could stay there and that neither side would use force to push the other out. This tacit accord applied to Asia as well, as evinced by U.S. occupation of ] and the ]. Politically, therefore, Yalta was an agreement on the postwar status quo in which Soviet Union hegemony reigned over about one third and the United States over two thirds. | |||
{{main|Soviet sphere of influence}} | |||
]-]an borders and creation of the ] after World War II]] | |||
In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union extended its political and military influence over ], in a move that was seen by some as a continuation of the older policies of the ]. Some territories that had been lost by Soviet Russia in the ] (1918) were annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II: the ] and eastern portions of interwar Poland. The ] also gained the northern half of East Prussia (]) from Germany. The ] gained ] (as ]) from ], and Ukrainian populated Northern ] (as ]) from ]. Finally, by the late 1940s, pro-Soviet Communist Parties won the elections in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe (specifically ], ], ], ] and ]) and subsequently became ]. These elections are generally regarded as ], and the Western powers recognized them as ]. For the duration of the Cold War, the countries of Eastern Europe became Soviet ]s — they were "independent" nations, which were ] ]s whose ] had to be approved by the ], and so their governments usually kept their policy in line with the wishes of the Soviet Union, although nationalistic forces and pressures within the satellite states played a part in causing some deviation from strict Soviet rule. | |||
===Tenor of Soviet–U.S. relations=== | |||
The Soviets were able to use a well organized ring of spies in the United States, to gain critical advantages during meetings with Great Britain and the United States. Several of FDR’s advisors and cabinet members regularly reported their activities to ] handlers. | |||
{{Main|Soviet Union–United States relations}} | |||
], ], and ] during his 70th Birthday Celebration]] | |||
The USSR urgently needed munitions, food and fuel that was provided by the U.S. and also Britain, primarily through ]. The three powers kept in regular contact, with Stalin trying to maintain a veil of secrecy over internal affairs. Churchill and other top Soviets visited Moscow, as did Roosevelt's top aide ]. Stalin repeatedly requested that the United States and Britain open a second front on ]; but the ] did not occur until June 1944, more than two years later. In the meantime, the Russians suffered high casualties, and the Soviets faced the brunt of German strength. The Allies pointed out that their intensive air bombardment was a major factor that Stalin ignored.<ref>Herbert Feis, ''Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought'' (Princeton, NJ, 1957).</ref><ref>William H. McNeill, ''America, Britain, & Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941–1946'' (1953)</ref><ref>Jonathan Fenby, ''Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill Won One War and Began Another'' (2007)</ref> | |||
=== Korean War === | |||
There were fundamental contrasts between the visions of the ] and the ], between ] and ]. And those contrasts had been simplified and refined in national ideologies to represent two ways of life, each vindicated in ] by previous disasters. Conflicting models of autarky versus exports, of state planning against free enterprise, were to vie for the allegiance of the developing and developed world in the postwar years. | |||
{{Main|Korean War}} | |||
In 1950, the Soviet Union protested against the fact that the Chinese seat at the ] was held by the ], and boycotted the meetings.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Soviets boycott United Nations Security Council |url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-boycott-united-nations-security-council}}</ref> While the Soviet Union was absent, the UN passed | |||
] condemning ]n actions and eventually offered military support to ].<ref>{{Cite web |year=1965 |title=Resolution 82 (1950) / |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112025}}</ref> After this incident the Soviet Union was never absent at the meetings of the Security Council. | |||
==Domestic events== | |||
Even so, however, the Cold War was not obviously inevitable in ]. Despite the wherewithal of the United States to advance a different vision of postwar Europe, ] viewed the reemergence of ] and ] as Russia's chief threats, not the United States. At the time, the prospects of an Anglo-American front against the USSR seemed slim from Stalin's standpoint. Economic advisers such as ] reinforced this view, predicting a postwar crisis of overproduction in capitalist countries which would culminate by ]-] in another great depression. For one, Stalin assumed that the capitalist camp would soon resume its internal rivalry over colonies and trade and not pose a threat to Russia. | |||
{{Main article|Economy of the Soviet Union}} | |||
===Censorship=== | |||
Varga's analysis was partly based on trends in U.S. federal expenditures. Due to the war effort mostly, in the first peacetime year of ], federal spending still amounted to $62 billion, or 30% of ], up from 3% of GDP in ], before the ], ], and ]. Thus, Stalin assumed that the Americans would ''need'' to Russia, needing to maintain the same level of state expenditures. | |||
{{Main|Censorship in the Soviet Union}} | |||
Art and science were subjected to rigorous censorship under Stalin's direct oversight. Where previously The All- Russian Union of Writers ] had attempted to publish apolitical writing, The ] (RAPP) insisted on the importance of politics in literary work, and published content which primarily embodied the ]. In 1925, The RAPP launched a campaign against the AUW chairman ]. It resulted in the defeat of the AUW, and they were replaced by the All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers, which strictly adopted the literary style of socialist realism. Soviet biology studies were heavily influenced by the now-discredited biologist ], who rejected the concept of ] in favor of a form of ]. In physics, the ] was dismissed as "bourgeois idealism". Much of this censorship was the work of ], known as Stalin's "ideological hatchet man", until his death from a heart attack in 1948.<ref>Kirill O. Rossianov, "Stalin as Lysenko's editor: reshaping political discourse in Soviet science." ''Russian History'' 21.1-4 (1994): 49-63.</ref> | |||
] reached its height in the postwar period, with his picture displayed in every school, factory, and government office, yet he rarely appeared in public. Postwar reconstruction proceeded rapidly, but as the emphasis was all on heavy industry and energy, living standards remained low, especially outside of the major cities.<ref>Carol Strong, and Matt Killingsworth, "Stalin the charismatic leader?: Explaining the ‘cult of personality’ as a legitimation technique." ''Politics, Religion & Ideology'' 12.4 (2011): 391-411. </ref> | |||
However, there would be no postwar crisis of overproduction. And, as Varga anticipated, the U.S. maintained a roughly comparable level of government spending in the postwar era. It was just maintained in a vastly different way. In the end, the postwar U.S. government would look a lot like the wartime government, with the military establishment, along with military-security, accounting for a significant share of federal expenditures. | |||
=== |
=== Post-war period === | ||
The mild political liberalization that took place in the Soviet Union during the war quickly came to an end in 1945. The Orthodox Church was generally left unmolested after the war and was even allowed to print small amounts of religious literature, but persecution of minority religions was resumed.<ref>Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine, 1953-1971." ''Canadian Slavonic Papers'' 14.2 (1972): 191-212.</ref> | |||
Stalin and the Communist Party were given full credit for the victory over Germany, and generals such as Zhukov were demoted to regional commands (Ukraine in his case). With the onset of the Cold War, anti-Western propaganda was stepped up, with the capitalist world depicted as a decadent place where crime, unemployment, and poverty were rampant.<ref>Walter D. | |||
The United States, however, led by President ] since ] ], was determined to shape the postwar world according to open up the world's markets to capitalist trade according to the principles laid down by the ]: self-determination, equal economic access, and a rebuilt capitalist democratic Europe that could again serve as a hub in world affairs. ] had never forgotten the excitement with which he had greeted the principles of Wilsonian idealism during ], and he saw his mission in the 1940s as bringing lasting peace and genuine democracy to the world. | |||
Connor, "Deviant behavior in capitalist society. The Soviet image." ''Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science'' 61.4 (1970): 554-564. </ref> | |||
The late Stalinist period saw the emergence of a tacit "big deal" between the state and the Soviet ''nomenklatura'' and the experts whose status corresponded to that of the Western middle class under which the state would accept "bourgeois" habits such as a degree of consumerism, romance, and domesticity in exchange for the unflinching loyalty of the ''nomenklatura'' to the state.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=21}} The informal "big deal" was a result of World War Two as many of the Soviet middle classes expected a higher standard of living after the war in exchange for accepting wartime sacrifices, and as the Soviet system could not function with the necessary technical experts and the ''nomenklatura'', the state needed the services of such people, leading to the informal "big deal".{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=29}} Furthermore, during the war, the state had to a certain extent relaxed its control and allowed informal practices to exist that usually contravened the rules.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=28}} After 1945, this loosening of social control was never completely undone as instead the state sought to co-opt the certain elements of the population, allowing certain rules to be contravened provided that the populace remained overall loyal.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=28–29}} One result of the "big deal" was a rise in materialism, corruption and nepotism that continued to color daily life in the Soviet Union for the rest of its existence.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=29}} Another example of the "big deal" was the publication starting in the late 1940s of a series of romance novels aimed at a female audience; a choice of subject matter that would have been unthinkable before the war.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=21}} | |||
But this vision was equally a vision of national self-interest. ] resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The only major industrial power in the world to emerge intact—and even greatly strengthened from an economic perspective—was the United States, which moved swiftly to consolidate its position. As the world's greatest industrial power, and as one of the few nations unravaged by the war, the United States stood to gain more than any other country from opening the entire world to opening up a global market for its exports and access to vital raw materials. | |||
In particular, the late 1940s saw the rise of the ''vory v zakone'' ("]") as ] is known who form a very distinctive subculture complete with their own dialect of Russian. Despite their name, the ''vory v zakone'' are not just thieves, but engage in the entire gamut of criminal activities. The ''vory v zakone'' did well as blackmarketers in a post-war society that suffered from a shortage of basic goods. The crime wave that gripped the Soviet Union in the late 1940s was the source of much public disquiet at the time.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=197}} A particular source of worry was the rise of juvenile crime with one police study from 1947 showing that 69% of all crimes were committed by teenagers under the age of 16.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=172}} Most of the juvenile criminals were orphans from the war living on the streets who turned to crime as the only way to survive.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=172}} Most of the complaints about juvenile crime concerned street children working as prostitutes, thieves or hiring their services out to the ''vory v zakone''.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=173}} Various economic reforms like ] were undertaken in order to stabilize post-war economy and suppress illegal trade. | |||
===The beginning of the Cold War=== | |||
The Great Patriotic War despite the immense sufferings and losses, thanks to propaganda, came to be looked backed nostalgically as a time of excitement, adventure, danger, and national solidarity while life in the post-war era was seen as dull, stagnant, mundane and as a time when people put their own individual interests ahead of the greater good.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=28}} There was a widespread feeling that though the war had been won, the peace had been lost as the wartime expectations and hopes for a better world after the war were dashed.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=28}} The post-war era saw the emergences of various subcultures that usually in some way deviated from what was officially ascribed (for an example listening to smuggled records of Western pop music), and depending upon the nature of the subcultures were either tolerated by the authorities or cracked down upon.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=28}} Another post-war social trend was the emergence of greater individualism and a search for privacy as the demand grew for private apartments while those in urban areas sought to spend more time in the countryside, where the state had less control over daily life.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=27}} For members of the ''nomenklatura'', the ultimate status symbol came to be the dacha in the countryside where the ''nomenklatura'' and their families could enjoy themselves far from prying eyes.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=27}} Others sought their own personal space by devoting themselves to apolitical pursuits such as the hard sciences or by moving to a remote region such as Siberia where the state had less control.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=27}} Informal networks of friends and relatives known as ''svoi'' ("one's own") emerged that functioned as self-help societies, and often became crucial to determining one's social success as the membership of the right ''svoi'' could improve the odds of one's children attending a prestigious university or allow one to obtain basic goods in short supply such as toilet paper.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=27}} Another example of the social trend towards a greater personal spaces for ordinary people was the rise in popularity of underground poetry and of the ''samizdat'' literature that criticized the Soviet system.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=27–28}} | |||
Truman could advance these principles with an economic powerhouse that produced 50 percent of the world's industrial goods and military power that rested on a monopoly of the new atom bomb. Such a Europe required a healthy Germany at its center; these aims were at the center of what the Soviet Union strove to avoid as the breakdown of the wartime alliance went forward. | |||
Despite the best efforts of the authorities, many young people in the late 1940s liked to listen to the Russian language broadcasts of the ] and the ], leading to a major campaign launched in 1948 intended to discredit both radio stations as "capitalist propaganda".{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=68}} Likewise, the journals '']'' (''America'') and '']'' (''British Ally'') published by the American and British governments were very popular with young people in the late 1940s, selling out within minutes of appearing on kiosks in Moscow and Leningrad (modern St. Petersburg).{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=68}} The German historian Juliane Fürst has cautioned the interest of young people in the ] culture was not necessarily a rejection of the Soviet system, but instead reflected mere curiosity about the world beyond the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=68–69}} Fürst wrote that many young people in the late 1940s-early 1950s displayed ambivalent attitudes, being on one hand convinced that their nation was the world's greatest and most progressive nation while at the same time displaying a certain nagging self-doubt and a belief that just might be something better out there.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=69–70}} The way that ] had merged with Communism during the Great Patriotic War to create a new Soviet identity based equally upon pride in being Russian and being Communist allowed the authorities to cast criticism of the Soviet system as "unpatriotic", which for the time seemed to rebuff the elements of self-doubt that were residing with certain segments of the people.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=69–70}} | |||
The wherewithal of the United States to advance a different vision of the postwar world conflicted with Soviet interests. National security had been the real cornerstone of Soviet policy since the 1920s, when the Communist Party adopted Stalin's "]" and rejected ]'s ideas of "world revolution." Before the war, Stalin was uninterested in pushing Soviet boundaries beyond their full Tsar extent. | |||
Another sign of a growing search for a personal space of one's own after 1945 were the popularity of apolitical films such as musicals, comedies and romances over the more political films that glorified Communism.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=206}} The late 1940s were a time of what the Hungarian historian Peter Kenz called the "film hunger" as the Soviet film industry could not release enough films owing to the problems posed by post war reconstruction, and so as a result Soviet cinemas showed American and German films captured by the Red Army in the eastern parts of Germany and in Eastern Europe, known in the Soviet Union as "trophy films".{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=206}} Much to the worry of the authorities, American films such as ''Stagecoach'', ''The Roaring Twenties'', ''The Count of Monte Cristo'', and ''Sun Valley'' proved to be extremely popular with Soviet audiences.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=206}} The most popular of all the foreign films were the 1941 German-Hungarian romantic musical film ''The Girl of My Dreams'', which was released in the Soviet Union in 1947, and the 1941 American film ''Tarzan's New York Adventures'', which was released in the Soviet Union in 1951.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=206}} The musician ] recalled: "It was the one and only thing in Tbilisi for which everyone went out of their minds, the trophy film, ''The Girl of My Dreams'', with the extraordinary and indescribable Marika Rökk in the main role. Normal life stopped in the city. Everyone talked about the film, they ran to see it whenever they had a chance, in the streets people whistled melodies from it, from half-open windows you hear people playing tunes from it on the piano".{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=206}} | |||
In this sense, the aims of Soviet Union were not aggressive expansionison but rather consolidation, i.e. attempting to secure the war-torn country's western borders. Stalin, assuming that ] and ] could menace the Soviet Union once again by the 1960s, thus quickly imposed Moscow-dominated governments in the springboards of the Nazi onslaught: ], ], and ]. | |||
As early as the late 1940s, the Austrian scholar ] contended that the Soviet government was not a monolithic totalitarian machine, but instead divided into vast ''chefstvo'' (patronage) networks extending down from the elite to the lowest ranks of power with Stalin more as the ultimate arbiter of the various factions instead of being the leader of a ''1984'' type state.{{sfn|Laqueur|1987|p=180}} Borkenau's techniques were a minute analysis of official Soviet statements and the relative placement of various officials at the Kremlin on festive occasions to determine which Soviet official enjoyed Stalin's favour and which official did not.{{sfn|Laqueur|1987|p=180}} Signs such as newspaper editorials, guest lists at formal occasions, obituaries in Soviet newspapers, and accounts of formal speeches were important to identifying the various ''chefstvo'' networks.{{sfn|Laqueur|1987|p=180}} Borkenau argued that even small changes in the formalistic language of the Soviet state could sometimes indicate important changes: "Political issues must be interpreted in the light of formulas, political and otherwise, and their history; and such interpretation cannot be safely concluded until the whole history of the given formula has been established from its first enunciation on".{{sfn|Laqueur|1987|p=180}} | |||
Disagreements over postwar plans first centered on Eastern and Central Europe. Having lost 20 million dead in the war, suffered German and Nazi German invasion through Poland, and suffered tens of millions of casualties due to onslaughts from the West three times in the preceding 150 years, first with ], the Soviet Union was determined to destroy Germany's capacity for another war. U.S. aims were ostensibly opposed since they would require a healthy Germany at the center of Europe. | |||
Terror by the secret police continued in the postwar period. Although nothing comparable to 1937 ever happened again, there were many smaller purges, including a mass purge of the ] apparatus in 1951–52. Starting in 1949, the principle enemy of the state came to be portrayed as the "rootless cosmopolitans", a term that was never precisely defined.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=79}} The term "rootless cosmopolitan" in practice was used to attack intellectuals, Jews and frequently both.{{sfn|Fürst|2010|p=79}} Stalin's health also deteriorated precipitously after WWII. He suffered a stroke in the fall of 1945 and was ill for months. This was followed by another stroke in 1947. Stalin became less active in the day-to-day running of the state and instead of party meetings, preferred to invite the Politburo members to all-night dinners where he would watch movies and force them to get drunk and embarrass themselves or say something incriminating.<ref>Yoram Gorlizki, and Oleg Khlevniuk, ''Cold peace: Stalin and the Soviet ruling circle, 1945-1953'' (Oxford University Press, 2004).</ref> | |||
], long a visceral anti-Communist, condemned Stalin for cordoning off a new Russian empire with an "iron curtain." Afterwards, Truman finally refused to give the war-torn Soviet Union reparations from West Germany's industrial plants, Stalin retaliated by sealing off East Germany as a Communist state. | |||
In October 1952, the ] convened in Moscow. Stalin did not feel up to delivering the main report and for most of the proceedings sat in silence while ] and ] delivered the main speeches. He did suggest however that the party be renamed from "The All-Union Party of Bolsheviks" to "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union" on the grounds that "There was once a time when it was necessary to distinguish ourselves from the Mensheviks, but there are no Mensheviks anymore. We are the entire party now." Stalin also mentioned his advancing age (two months away from 73) and suggested that it might be time to retire. Predictably, no one at the congress would dare agree with it and the delegates instead pleaded for him to stay. | |||
Russia's historic lack of maritime access, a perennial concern of Russian foreign policy well before the ], was also a focus for Russia where interests diverged between East and West. Stalin pressed the Turks for improved access out of the ] through ]'s ], which would allow Soviet passage from the Black Sea to the ]. Churchill had earlier recognized Stalin's claims, but now the British and Americans forced the Soviet Union to pull back. | |||
=== Post Stalin's death === | |||
But when Soviet security was not at stake, Stalin demonstrated no overtly aggressive designs: the Soviet Union eventually withdrew from Northern ], at Anglo-American behest; Stalin did observe his ] agreement with Churchill and did not aid the communists in the struggle against the corrupt, British-led monarchial autocracy in Greece; in Finland he accepted a friendly, noncommunist government; and Russian troops were withdrawn from ] by the end of ]. | |||
On 1 March 1953, Stalin's staff found him semi-conscious on the bedroom floor of his ].{{sfnm|1a1=Conquest|1y=1991|1p=311|2a1=Volkogonov|2y=1991|2pp=571–572|3a1=Service|3y=2004|3pp=582–584|4a1=Khlevniuk|4y=2015|4pp=142, 191}} He had suffered a ].{{sfn|Conquest|1991|p=312}} Stalin died on 5 March 1953.{{sfnm|1a1=Conquest|1y=1991|1p=313|2a1=Volkogonov|2y=1991|2p=574|3a1=Service|3y=2004|3p=586|4a1=Khlevniuk|4y=2015|4p=313}} An autopsy revealed that he had died of a cerebral hemorrhage and that he also suffered from severe damage to his cerebral arteries due to ].{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=189}} It is possible that Stalin was murdered.{{sfn|Service|2004|p=587}} ] has been suspected of murder, although no firm evidence has ever appeared.{{sfn|Conquest|1991|p=312}} | |||
Stalin left no anointed successor nor a framework within which a transfer of power could take place.{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=310}} The Central Committee met on the day of his death, with Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev emerging as the party's key figures.{{sfn|Service|2004|pp=586–587}} The system of ] was restored, and measures introduced to prevent any one member attaining autocratic domination again.{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=312}} The collective leadership included the following eight senior members of the ] listed according to the order of precedence presented formally on 5 March 1953: ], ], ], ], ], ], ] and ].{{sfn|Ra'anan|2006|p=20}} Reforms to the Soviet system were immediately implemented.{{sfn|Service|2004|p=591}} Economic reform scaled back the mass construction projects, placed a new emphasis on house building, and eased the levels of taxation on the peasantry to stimulate production.{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=315}} The new leaders sought rapprochement with the ] and a less hostile relationship with the ],{{sfn|Service|2004|p=593}} pursuing a negotiated end to the ] in July 1953.{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=316}} The doctors who had been imprisoned were released and the anti-Semitic purges ceased.{{sfnm|1a1=Etinger|1y=1995|1pp=120–121|2a1=Conquest|2y=1991|2p=314|3a1=Khlevniuk|3y=2015|3p=314}} A mass ] for certain categories of imprisoned was issued, halving the country's inmate population, while the state security and Gulag systems were reformed, with torture being banned in April 1953.{{sfn|Khlevniuk|2015|p=315}} | |||
==="Containment" and the Marshall Plan=== | |||
==Notes== | |||
While the Soviet Union acquiesced to Anglo-American designs to impede Soviet access to the Mediterranean (a perennial focus of British foreign policy since the ] in the 1850s), the Americans heated up their rhetoric; Anglo-American aims to prop up the Greek autocracy became a struggle to protect "free" peoples against "totalitarian" regimes. This would be articulated in the ] Speech of ] ], which argued that the United States would have to $400 million to efforts to "contain" communism. | |||
{{Notelist}} | |||
==References== | |||
By successfully aiding ], Truman also set a precedent for the U.S. aid to authoritarian anticommunist regimes. U.S. foreign policy moved from State Department officer ]'s argument that the Soviets had to be "contained" using "unalterable counterforce at every point," until the breakdown of Soviet power occurred. U.S. foreign policy moved from State Department officer ]'s argument that the Soviets had to be "contained" using "unalterable counterforce at every point," until the breakdown of Soviet power occurred. | |||
===Citations=== | |||
The United launched massive economic reconstruction efforts, first in Western Europe and then in ] (as well as in ] and ]). The ] began to pump $12 billion into Western Europe. The rationale was economically stable nations were less likely to fall prey to Soviet influence. | |||
{{Reflist|30em}} | |||
===Sources=== | |||
Stalin, fearing a revived ] due to the ], responded by blocking access to ], which was deep within the Soviet zone although subject to four power control. The Soviets cut off all rail and road routes to West Berlin. Convinced that he could starve and freeze ] into submission, no trucks or trains were allowed entry into the city. However, this decision backfired when Truman embarked on a highly visible move that would humiliate the Soviets internationally: flying supplies in over the blockade during 1948-1949. Military confrontation loomed while Truman flew supplies through East Germany into West Berlin during the ]-] blockade. This costly aerial supplying of West Berlin became known as the ]. | |||
{{refbegin}} | |||
* {{cite encyclopedia |last=Etinger |first=Iakov |contribution=The Doctors' Plot: Stalin's Solution to the Jewish Question |pages=103–124 |title=Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union |editor-first=Yaacov |editor-last=Ro'i |series=The Cummings Center Series |location=Ilford |publisher=Frank Cass |year=1995 |isbn=0-7146-4619-9}} | |||
* {{cite book |last=Conquest |first=Robert |title=] |year=1991 |publisher=Penguin |location=New York and London |isbn=978-0-14-016953-9}} | |||
* {{cite book |last=Khlevniuk |first=Oleg V. |year=2015 |title=Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator |translator1=Nora Seligman Favorov |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven and London |isbn=978-0-300-16388-9}} | |||
* {{cite book|editor-last=Ra'anan|editor-first=Uri|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NoIajCLpLigC&q=order+of+precedence++1953+++Mikoyan++Vorosilov++Kaganovich&pg=PA20|title=Flawed Succession: Russia's Power Transfer Crises|location=Oxford|publisher=Lexington Books|year=2006|isbn=978-0-7391-1403-2}} | |||
* {{cite book |last=Service |first=Robert |year=2004 |title=Stalin: A Biography |location=London |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-333-72627-3}} | |||
* {{cite book |last=Volkogonov |first=Dimitri |title=Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy |year=1991 |translator=Harold Shukman |location=London |publisher=Weidenfeld and Nicolson |isbn=978-0-297-81080-3}} | |||
] | |||
{{refend}} | |||
== Further reading == | |||
Truman joined eleven other nations in ] to form the ] (NATO), the United States' first "entangling" European alliance in 170 years. Stalin retaliated these moves by integrating the economies of Eastern Europe in his version of the ], exploding the first Soviet atomic device in ], signing an alliance with ] in ] ], and forming the ], Eastern Europe's counterpart to ]. | |||
{{Further|Soviet Union#Further reading}} | |||
{{See also|Bibliography of Stalinism and the Soviet Union}} | |||
* Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ''The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century'' (1989). | |||
*{{cite book |last1=Fürst |first1=Juliane |title=Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism |date=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-161450-7}} | |||
* Hosking, Geoffrey. ''The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within'' (2nd ed. Harvard UP 1992) 570 pp. | |||
*{{cite book |last1=Laqueur |first1=Walter |title=The Fate of the Revolution |date=1987 |publisher=Scribner |location=New York |isbn=0-684-18903-8}} | |||
* Kort, Michael. ''The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath'' (7th ed. 2010) 502 pp. | |||
* McCauley, Martin. ''The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union '' (2007), 522 pp. | |||
* Moss, Walter G. ''A History of Russia. Vol. 2: Since 1855'' (2nd ed. 2005). | |||
* Nove, Alec. ''An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991'' (3rd ed. 1993). | |||
===Stalin and Stalinism=== | |||
U.S. officials quickly moved to escalate and expand "containment." In a secret ] document, ], they proposed to strengthen their alliance systems, quadruple defense spending, and embark on an elaborate propaganda campaign to convince Americans to fight this costly cold war. Truman ordered the development of a ]; in early ] the U.S. embarked on its first attempt to prop up colonialism in ] in the face of mounting popular, communist-led resistance; and the United States embarked on what the Soviets considered a blatant violation of wartime treaties yet: plans to form a West German army. | |||
* Daniels, R. V., ed. ''The Stalin Revolution'' (1964) | |||
* Davies, Sarah, and James Harris, eds. ''Stalin: A New History,'' (2006), 310 pp, 14 specialized essays by scholars . | |||
* De Jonge, Alex. ''Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union'' (1986). | |||
* Fitzpatrick, Sheila, ed. ''Stalinism: New Directions,'' (1999), 396 pp, excerpts from many scholars on the impact of Stalinism on the people{{ISBN?}} | |||
* Hoffmann, David L. ed. ''Stalinism: The Essential Readings,'' (2002) essays by 12 scholars. | |||
* Laqueur, Walter. ''Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations'' (1990). | |||
* Kershaw, Ian, and Moshe Lewin. ''Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison'' (2004) . | |||
* Lee, Stephen J. ''Stalin and the Soviet Union'' (1999){{ISBN?}} | |||
* Lewis, Jonathan. ''Stalin: A Time for Judgement'' (1990). | |||
* McNeal, Robert H. ''Stalin: Man and Ruler'' (1988) | |||
* Martens, Ludo. ''Another view of Stalin'' (1994), a highly favorable view from a Maoist historian | |||
* Service, Robert. ''Stalin: A Biography'' (2004), along with Tucker the standard biography | |||
* Tucker, Robert C. ''Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929'' (1973) | |||
* {{Citation | first = Robert C | last = Tucker | title = Stalin in Power | place = New York | publisher = WW Norton | year = 1990 | url = http://www.historyebook.org | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20000707012840/http://www.historyebook.org | archive-date = 2000-07-07 }} | |||
===1927–1939=== | |||
The immediate post-] period may have been the historical high point for the popularity of communist ideology. Communist parties won large shares of the vote free elections in countries such as ], ], ], ], and ] and won significant popular support in Asia—in ], ], and ]—and throughout Latin America. In addition they won large support in ], ], and ], where free elections remained absent or constrained but where Communist parties enjoyed widespread appeal. | |||
* Bendavid-Val, Leah, James H. Billington and Philip Brookman. ''Propaganda and Dreams: Photographing the 1930s in the USSR and the US'' (1999) | |||
* Clark, Katerina. ''Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941'' (2011) | |||
* Fitzpatrick, Sheila. ''Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization'' (1996) | |||
* {{Citation | last = Fitzpatrick | first = Sheila | title = Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s | year = 2000 | publisher = Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-505001-1 | author-mask = 3}}. | |||
*{{cite book |last1=Hessler |first1=Julie |title=A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953 |date=2020 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton |isbn=978-1-4008-4356-5}} | |||
===Foreign policy, 1927–1941=== | |||
In response, the United States sustained a massive anticommunist ideological offensive. The United States aimed to "contain" communism and promote ] through both aggressive diplomacy and interventionist policies. In retrospect, this initiative appears largely successful: Washington brandished its role as the leader of the "]" at least as effectively as the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" camp. | |||
* Carr, Edward Hallett. ''German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939'' (Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). | |||
* Ericson, Edward E. Jr. ''Feeding the German eagle: Soviet economic aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941'' (1999).{{ISBN?}} | |||
* Fischer, Louis. ''Russia’s Road From Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations 1917–1941.'' (1969). | |||
* Haslam, Jonathan. ''The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe 1933–1939'' (1984). | |||
* Kennan, George F. ''Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin'' (1961). | |||
* Laqueur, Walter. ''Russia and Germany; a century of conflict'' (1965) | |||
* Nekrich, Aleksandr M. ''Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941'' (Columbia UP, 1997). | |||
* Siegel, Katherine. ''Loans and Legitimacy: The Evolution of Soviet-American Relations, 1919–1933'' (1996). | |||
* Ulam, Adam B. ''Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973'' (2nd ed. 1974) pp 126–213 | |||
* Wegner, Bernd. ''From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941'' (1997){{ISBN?}} | |||
=== |
===World War II=== | ||
* Bellamy, Chris. ''Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War'' (2008), 880pp | |||
''Main article: ]'' | |||
* Berkhoff, Karel C. ''Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II'' (2012) | |||
* Broekmeyer, Marius. ''Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, 1941–1945.'' 2004. 315 pp. | |||
* Feis, Herbert. ''Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War they waged and the Peace they sought'' (1953). | |||
* Fenby, Jonathan. ''Alliance: the inside story of how Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill won one war and began another'' (2015). | |||
* Hill, Alexander. ''The Red Army and the Second World War'' (2017), 738 pp. | |||
* McNeill, William H. ''America, Britain, & Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941–1946'' (1953) | |||
* Overy, Richard. ''Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941–1945'' (1998) | |||
* Reynolds, David, and Vladimir Pechatnov, eds. '' The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt'' (2019) | |||
* Roberts, Geoffrey. ''Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953'' (2006). | |||
* Seaton, Albert. ''Stalin as Military Commander,'' (1998){{ISBN?}} | |||
* Weeks, Albert L. ''Assured Victory: How 'Stalin the Great' Won the War But Lost the Peace'' (ABC-CLIO, 2011). | |||
* Weeks, Albert L. ''Russia's Life-saver: Lend-lease Aid to the USSR in World War II'' (2004). | |||
===Cold War=== | |||
The ], which lasted from 25 June ] to 27 July ], was the first major conflict after ]. It heightened the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union considerably, in fact it is generally considered a major stepping stone in the Cold War (even when the term Cold War seems contradictory, meaning war without battles). The Soviet Union firmly favoured the North Korean cause and showed this by sending it huge amounts of modern war material. | |||
* Goncharov, Sergei, John Lewis and Litai Xue, ''Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War'' (1993) | |||
* Gorlizki, Yoram, and Oleg Khlevniuk. ''Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953'' (2004){{ISBN?}} | |||
* Harrison, Mark. "The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression," ''Past & Present'' (2011) Vol. 210 Issue suppl_6, pp 103–120. | |||
* Holloway, David. ''Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956'' (1996) | |||
* Kahn, Martin. ''The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II: Economy, Society and Military Power'' (Routledge, 2017). | |||
* ]. ''Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945'' (1979) | |||
* {{Citation | last = Mastny | first = Vojtech | title = The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years | year = 1998 | isbn = | author-mask = 3}}{{ISBN?}} | |||
* ]. '']'' (2004), Pulitzer Prize; | |||
* Ulam, Adam B. ''Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973'', 2nd ed. (1974) | |||
* Zubok, Vladislav M. ''A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev'' (2007) | |||
=== Primary sources === | |||
In 1950 the Soviet Union protested against the fact that the Chinese seat at the ] was held by the (Nationalist controlled) Republic of China, and boycotted the meetings. It came to regret this decision when the Korean War started. The UN passed a resolution condemning North Korean actions and offering military support to South Korea. Had the Soviet Union been present at the meetings it would certainly have vetoed the outcome. After this incident the Soviet Union was never absent at the meetings of the Security Council. | |||
* Degras, Jane T. ''The Communist International, 1919–1943'' (3 Vols. 1956); documents; ; (PDF). | |||
* Degras, Jane Tabrisky. ed. ''Soviet documents on foreign policy'' (1978). | |||
* Goldwin, Robert A., Gerald Stourzh, Marvin Zetterbaum, eds. ''Readings in Russian Foreign Policy'' (1959) 800pp; {{ISBN?}} | |||
* Gruber, Helmut. ''International Communism in the Era of Lenin: A Documentary History'' (Cornell University Press, 1967) | |||
* Khrushchev, Nikita. ''Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 1: Commissar, 1918–1945'' | |||
* Khrushchev, Nikita. ''Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 2: Reformer, 1945–1964'' | |||
* ] ''The Maisky Diaries: The Wartime Revelations of Stalin's Ambassador in London'' edited by ], (Yale UP, 2016); highly revealing commentary 1934–1943; ; abridged from 3 volume Yale edition; | |||
* Molotov, V.M. '']'' ed. by Felix Chuev and ] (2007) | |||
* Reynolds, David, and Vladimir Pechatnov, eds. ''The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt'' (2019) | |||
== |
==External links== | ||
* {{Citation | url = http://deweytextsonline.area501.net/ImpressionsOfSovietRussia.htm | contribution = Impressions of Soviet Russia | first = John | last = Dewey | publisher = Area 501 | title = Dewey texts online | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080121085401/http://deweytextsonline.area501.net/ImpressionsOfSovietRussia.htm | archive-date = 2008-01-21 }}. | |||
<sup>1</sup>'']: ], 1994''<br> | |||
* {{Citation | url = http://www.globalpost.com/video/commerce/100722/stalin-russia-soviet-union | title = Moscow: Stalin 2.0 | format = video | type = report | newspaper = The ]}}, | |||
<sup>2</sup>''Elias H. Tuma: Twenty-six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965''<br> | |||
* (in Russian & English) | |||
<sup>3</sup> by Jeff Coplon, Originally published in the Village Voice (New York City), January 12, 1988.<br> | |||
* {{Citation | url = http://library2.usask.ca/USSRConst/ | title = USSR in Construction | type = digital presentation | publisher = The University of Saskatchewan}} – several full issues of the propaganda journal by the USSR government 1930–1941. | |||
<sup>4</sup>'']: The Great Terror, 1968''<br> | |||
<sup>5</sup>''(Steven J. Main: ibid.; 1). 837, citing '1zvestiya 'TsK KPSS', Volume 6, 1990; p. 216-22).'' | |||
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The history of the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1953, commonly referred to as the Stalin Era or Stalinist Era, covers the period in Soviet history from the establishment of Stalinism through victory in the Second World War and down to the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Stalin sought to destroy his enemies while transforming Soviet society with central planning, in particular through the forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid development of heavy industry. Stalin consolidated his power within the party and the state and fostered an extensive cult of personality. Soviet secret-police and the mass-mobilization of the Communist Party served as Stalin's major tools in molding Soviet society. Stalin's methods in achieving his goals, which included party purges, ethnic cleansings, political repression of the general population, and forced collectivization, led to millions of deaths: in Gulag labor camps and during famine.
World War II, known as "the Great Patriotic War" by Soviet historians, devastated much of the USSR, with about one out of every three World War II deaths representing a citizen of the Soviet Union. In the course of World War II, the Soviet Union's armies occupied Eastern Europe, where they established or supported Communist puppet governments. By 1949, the Cold War had started between the Western Bloc and the Eastern (Soviet) Bloc, with the Warsaw Pact (created 1955) pitched against NATO (created 1949) in Europe. After 1945, Stalin did not directly engage in any wars, continuing his totalitarian rule until his death in 1953.
Soviet state's development
Industrialization in practice
Main article: Industrialization in the Soviet UnionThe mobilization of resources by state planning expanded the country's industrial base. From 1928 to 1932, pig iron output, necessary for further development of the industrial infrastructure rose from 3.3 million to 6.2 million tons per year. Coal production, a basic fuel of modern economies and Stalinist industrialization, rose from 35.4 million to 64 million tons, and the output of iron ore rose from 5.7 million to 19 million tons. A number of industrial complexes such as Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the Moscow and Gorky automobile plants, the Ural Mountains and Kramatorsk heavy machinery plants, and Kharkiv, Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk tractor plants had been built or were under construction.
In real terms, the workers' standards of living tended to drop, rather than rise during industrialization. Stalin's laws to "tighten work discipline" made the situation worse: e.g., a 1932 change to the RSFSR labor law code enabled firing workers who had been absent without a reason from the workplace for just one day. Being fired accordingly meant losing "the right to use ration and commodity cards" as well as the "loss of the right to use an apartment″ and even blacklisted for new employment which altogether meant a threat of starving. Those measures, however, were not fully enforced, as managers were hard-pressed to replace these workers. In contrast, the 1938 legislation, which introduced labor books, followed by major revisions of the labor law, was enforced. For example, being absent or even 20 minutes late were grounds for becoming fired; managers who failed to enforce these laws faced criminal prosecution. Later, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 26 June 1940 "On the Transfer to the Eight-Hour Working Day, the Seven-day Work Week, and on the Prohibition of Unauthorized Departure by Laborers and Office Workers from Factories and Offices" replaced the 1938 revisions with obligatory criminal penalties for quitting a job (2–4 months imprisonment), for being late 20 minutes (6 months of probation and pay confiscation of 25 per cent), etc.
Based on these figures, the Soviet government declared that the Five Year Industrial Production Plan had been fulfilled by 93.7% in only four years, while parts devoted to the heavy industry parts were fulfilled by 108%. Stalin in December 1932 declared the plan success to the Central Committee since increases in the output of coal and iron would fuel future development.
During the Second Five-Year Plan (1933–1937), on the basis of the huge investment during the first plan, the industry expanded extremely rapidly and nearly reached the plan's targets. By 1937, coal output was 127 million tons, pig iron 14.5 million tons, and there had been very rapid development of the armaments industry.
While making a massive leap in industrial capacity, the First Five Year Plan was extremely harsh on industrial workers; quotas were difficult to fulfill, requiring that miners put in 16- to 18-hour workdays. Failure to fulfill quotas could result in treason charges. Working conditions were poor, even hazardous. Due to the allocation of resources for the industry along with decreasing productivity since collectivization, a famine occurred. In the construction of the industrial complexes, inmates of Gulag camps were used as expendable resources. But conditions improved rapidly during the second plan. Throughout the 1930s, industrialization was combined with a rapid expansion of technical and engineering education as well as increasing emphasis on munitions.
From 1921 until 1954, the police state operated at high intensity, seeking out anyone accused of sabotaging the system. The estimated numbers vary greatly. Perhaps, 3.7 million people were sentenced for alleged counter-revolutionary crimes, including 600,000 sentenced to death, 2.4 million sentenced to labor camps, and 700,000 sentenced to expatriation. Stalinist repression reached its peak during the Great Purge of 1937–1938, which removed many skilled managers and experts and considerably slowed industrial production in 1937.
Economy
Main article: Economy of the Soviet UnionCollectivization of agriculture
Main articles: Collectivisation in the Soviet Union, Dekulakization, Agriculture in the Soviet Union, and HolodomorUnder the NEP (New Economic Policy), Lenin had to tolerate the continued existence of privately owned agriculture. He decided to wait at least 20 years before attempting to place it under state control and in the meantime concentrate on industrial development. However, after Stalin's rise to power, the timetable for collectivization was shortened to just five years. Demand for food intensified, especially in the USSR's primary grain producing regions, with new, forced approaches implemented. Upon joining kolkhozes (collective farms), peasants had to give up their private plots of land and property. Every harvest, Kolkhoz production was sold to the state for a low price set by the state itself. However, the natural progress of collectivization was slow, and the November 1929 Plenum of the Central Committee decided to accelerate collectivization through force. In any case, Russian peasant culture formed a bulwark of traditionalism that stood in the way of the Soviet state's goals.
Given the goals of the first Five Year Plan, the state sought increased political control of agriculture in order to feed the rapidly growing urban population and to obtain a source of foreign currency through increased cereal exports. Given its late start, the USSR needed to import a substantial number of the expensive technologies necessary for heavy industrialization.
By 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture had been collectivized. In many cases, peasants bitterly opposed this process and often slaughtered their animals rather than give them to collective farms, even though the government only wanted the grain. Kulaks, prosperous peasants, were forcibly resettled to Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Russian Far North (a large portion of the kulaks served at forced labor camps). However, just about anyone opposing collectivization was deemed a "kulak". The policy of liquidation of kulaks as a class—formulated by Stalin at the end of 1929—meant some executions, and even more deportation to special settlements and, sometimes, to forced labor camps.
Despite the expectations, collectivization led to a catastrophic drop in farm productivity, which did not return to the levels achieved under the NEP until 1940. The upheaval associated with collectivization was particularly severe in Ukraine and the heavily Ukrainian Volga region. Peasants slaughtered their livestock en masse rather than give them up. In 1930 alone, 25% of the nation's cattle, sheep, and goats, and one-third of all pigs were killed. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviet livestock numbers would return to their 1928 level. Government bureaucrats, who had been given a rudimentary education on farming techniques, were dispatched to the countryside to "teach" peasants the new ways of socialist agriculture, relying largely on theoretical ideas that had little basis in reality. Even after the state inevitably won and succeeded in imposing collectivization, the peasants did everything they could in the way of sabotage. They cultivated far smaller portions of their land and worked much less. The scale of the Ukrainian famine has led many Ukrainian scholars to argue that there was a deliberate policy of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Other scholars argue that the massive death totals were an inevitable result of a very poorly planned operation against all peasants, who had given little support to Lenin or Stalin.
Almost 99% of all cultivated land had been pulled into collective farms by the end of 1937. The ghastly price paid by the peasantry has yet to be established with precision, but probably up to 5 million people died of persecution or starvation in these years. Ukrainians and Kazakhs suffered worse than most nations.
— Robert Service, Comrades! A History of World Communism (2007) p. 145
In Ukraine alone, the number of people who died in the famines is now estimated to be 3.5 million.
The USSR took over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, which were lost to Germany in 1941, and then recovered in 1944. The collectivization of their farms began in 1948. Using terror, mass killings and deportations, most of the peasantry was collectivized by 1952. Agricultural production fell dramatically in all the other Soviet Republics.
Rapid industrialization
Main article: Industrialization in the Soviet UnionIn the period of rapid industrialization and mass collectivization preceding World War II, Soviet employment figures experienced exponential growth. 3.9 million jobs per annum were expected by 1923, but the number actually climbed to an astounding 6.4 million. By 1937, the number rose yet again, to about 7.9 million. Finally, in 1940 it reached 8.3 million. Between 1926 and 1930, the urban population increased by 30 million. Unemployment had been a problem in late Imperial Russia and even under the NEP, but it ceased being a major factor after the implementation of Stalin's massive industrialization program. The sharp mobilization of resources used in order to industrialize the heretofore agrarian society created a massive need for labor; unemployment virtually dropped to zero. Wage setting by Soviet planners also contributed to the sharp decrease in unemployment, which dropped in real terms by 50% from 1928 to 1940. With wages artificially depressed, the state could afford to employ far more workers than would be financially viable in a market economy. Several ambitious extraction projects were begun that endeavored to supply raw materials for both military hardware and consumer goods.
The Moscow and Gorky automobile plants produced automobiles for the public—despite few Soviet citizens being able to afford a car—and the expansion of steel production and other industrial materials made the manufacture of a greater number of cars possible. Car and truck production, for example, reached 200,000 in 1931.
A minimum wage of 110–115 rubles was established in 1937; private gardens were allowed for one million workers to farm in their private plots. Even so, most Soviet workers lived in crowded communal housings and dormitories and suffered from extreme poverty.
Society
Propaganda
Further information: Propaganda in the Soviet UnionMost of the top communist leaders in the 1920s and 1930s had been propagandists or editors before 1917, and were keenly aware of the importance of propaganda. As soon as they gained power in 1917 they seized the monopoly of all communication media, and greatly expanded their propaganda apparatus in terms of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets. Radio became a powerful tool in the 1930s. Stalin, for example, has been an editor of Pravda. Besides the national newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, there were numerous regional publications as well as newspapers and magazines and all the important languages. Ironclad uniformity of opinion was the norm during the Soviet era. Typewriters and printing presses were closely controlled until the late 1980s to prevent unauthorized publications. Samizdat illegal circulation of subversive fiction and nonfiction was brutally suppressed. The rare exceptions to 100% uniformity in the official media were indicators of high-level battles. The Soviet draft constitution of 1936 was an instance. Pravda and Trud (the paper for manual workers) praised the draft constitution. However Izvestiia was controlled by Nikolai Bukharin and it published negative letters and reports. Bukharin won out and the party line changed and started to attack "Trotskyite" oppositionists and traitors. Bukharin's success was short-lived; he was arrested in 1937, given a show trial and executed.
Education
Main article: Education in the Soviet UnionIndustrial workers needed to be educated in order to be competitive and so embarked on a program contemporaneous with industrialization to greatly increase the number of schools and the general quality of education. In 1927, 7.9 million students attended 118,558 schools. By 1933, the number rose to 9.7 million students in 166,275 schools. In addition, 900 specialist departments and 566 institutions were built and fully operational by 1933. Literacy rates increased substantially as a result, especially in the Central Asian republics.
Women
Main article: Women in the Soviet UnionThe Soviet people also benefited from a type of social liberalization. Women were to be given the same education as men and, at least legally speaking, obtained the same rights as men in the workplace. Although in practice these goals were not reached, the efforts to achieve them and the statement of theoretical equality led to a general improvement in the socio-economic status of women.
Women were notably recruited as clerks for the expanding department stores, resulting in a "feminization" of department stores as the number of female sales staff rose from 45 percent of the total sales staff in 1935 to 62 percent of the total sales staff in 1938. This was in part due to a propaganda campaign launched in 1931 which linked femininity with "culture" and asserted that the New Soviet Woman was also a working woman. Furthermore, department store staff had a low status in the Soviet Union and many men did not want to work as sales staff, leading to the jobs as sales staff going to poorly educated working-class women and from women newly arrived in the cities from the countryside.
However, many rights were rolled back by the authorities during this era, such as abortion, which was legalized before Stalin came to power, was banned in 1936 after controversial debate among citizens. Women's issues were also largely ignored by the government.
Health
Main article: Healthcare in the Soviet UnionStalinist development also contributed to advances in health care, which marked a massive improvement over the Imperial era. Stalin's policies granted the Soviet people access to free health care and education. Widespread immunization programs created the first generation free from the fear of typhus and cholera. The occurrences of these diseases dropped to record-low numbers and infant mortality rates were substantially reduced, resulting in the life expectancy for both men and women to increase by over 20 years by the mid-to-late 1950s.
Youth
The Komsomol or Youth Communist League, was an entirely new youth organization designed by Lenin became an enthusiastic strike force that organized communism across the Soviet Union often called on to attack traditional enemies. The Komsomol played an important role as a mechanism for teaching Party values to the younger generation. The Komsomol also served as a mobile pool of labor and political activism, with the ability to relocate to areas of high-priority at short notice. In the 1920s the Kremlin assigned Komsomol major responsibilities for promoting industrialization at the factory level. In 1929 7,000 Komsomol cadets were building the tractor factory in Stalingrad, 56,000 others built factories in the Urals, and 36,000 were assigned work underground in the coal mines. The goal was to provide an energetic hard-core of Bolshevik activists to influence their coworkers the factories and mines that were at the center of communist ideology.
Komsomol adopted meritocratic, supposedly class-blind membership policies in 1935, but the result was a decline in working class youth members, and a dominance by the better educated youth. A new social hierarchy emerged as young professionals and students joined the Soviet elite, displacing proletarians. Komsomol's membership policies in the 1930s reflected the broader nature of Stalinism, combining Leninist rhetoric about class-free progress with Stalinist pragmatism focused on getting the most enthusiastic and skilled membership. Under Stalin, the death penalty was also extended to adolescents as young as 12 years old in 1935.
Modernity
Urban women under Stalin, paralleling the modernization of western countries, were also the first generation of women able to give birth in a hospital with access to prenatal care. Education was another area in which there was improvement after economic development, also paralleling other western countries. The generation born during Stalin's rule was the first near-universally literate generation. Some engineers were sent abroad to learn industrial technology, and hundreds of foreign engineers were brought to Russia on contract. Transport links were also improved, as many new railways were built, although with forced labour, costing thousands of lives. Workers who exceeded their quotas, Stakhanovites, received many incentives for their work, although many such workers were in fact "arranged" to succeed by receiving extreme help in their work, and then their achievements were used for propaganda.
Religion
Further information: Religion in the Soviet Union and USSR anti-religious campaign (1928–1941)The systematic attacks on the Russian Orthodox Church began as soon as the Bolsheviks took power in 1917. In the 1930s, Stalin intensified his war on organized religion. Nearly all churches and monasteries were closed and tens of thousands of clergymen were imprisoned or executed. Historian Dimitry Pospielovski has estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 Orthodox clergy died by execution or in prison 1918–1929, plus an additional 45,000 in 1930–1939. Monks, nuns, and related personnel added an additional 40,000 dead.
The state propaganda machine vigorously promoted atheism and denounced religion as being an artifact of capitalist society. In 1937, Pope Pius XI decried the attacks on religion in the Soviet Union. By 1940, only a small number of churches remained open. The early anti-religious campaigns under Lenin were mostly directed at the Russian Orthodox Church, as it was a symbol of the czarist government. In the 1930s however, all faiths were targeted: minority Christian denominations, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. During World War II state authorities eased pressures on Religion in Russia and stopped prosecuting the church. The Orthodox Church was, therefore, able to help the Soviet Army to defend Russia. Religions in former USSR republics revived and once again flourished after the fall of communism in the 1990s. As Paul Froese explains:
- Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called “scientific atheism,” complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and a promise of worldly salvation. But in the end, a majority of older Soviet citizens retained their religious beliefs and a crop of citizens too young to have experienced pre-Soviet times acquired religious beliefs.
According to 2012 official statistics, nearly 15% of ethnic Russians identify as atheist, and nearly 27% identify as unaffiliated.
Ethnic policies
The Soviet Union authorities systematically promoted the national consciousness of indigenous peoples and established institutional forms characteristic of a modern nation for them. In Central Asia the liberation of women was approached in the same revolutionary way as the assault on the religion. In 1927 the campaign against paranja (veil) started, called "hujum" (assault). However, it produced a massive backlash and paranja did not disappear until the 1950s.
In 1937, as a part of the Great Purge, repressive “national operations” were conducted. Representatives of “Western” minorities were targeted because of their possible connections to countries hostile to the USSR and fear of disloyalty in case of an invasion.
Great Purge
Main article: Great PurgeAs this process unfolded, Stalin consolidated near-absolute power by destroying the potential opposition. In 1936–1938, about three quarters of a million Soviets were executed, and more than a million others were sentenced to lengthy terms in harsh labour camps. Stalin's Great Terror ravaged the ranks of factory directors and engineers, and removed most of the senior officers in the Army. The pretext was the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov (which many suspect Stalin of having planned, although there is no evidence for this). Nearly all the old pre-1918 Bolsheviks were purged. Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927, exiled to Kazakhstan in 1928, expelled from the USSR in 1929, and assassinated in 1940. Stalin used the purges to politically and physically destroy his other formal rivals (and former allies) accusing Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev of being behind Kirov's assassination and planning to overthrow Stalin. Ultimately, the people arrested were tortured and forced to confess to being spies and saboteurs, and quickly convicted and executed.
Several show trials were held in Moscow, to serve as examples for the trials that local courts were expected to carry out elsewhere in the country. There were four key trials from 1936 to 1938, The Trial of the Sixteen was the first (December 1936); then the Trial of the Seventeen (January 1937); then the trial of Red Army generals, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (June 1937); and finally the Trial of the Twenty One (including Bukharin) in March 1938. During these, the defendants typically confessed to sabotage, spying, counter-revolution, and conspiring with Germany and Japan to invade and partition the Soviet Union. The initial trials in 1935–1936 were carried out by the OGPU under Genrikh Yagoda. In turn the prosecutors were tried and executed. The secret police were renamed the NKVD and control given to Nikolai Yezhov, known as the "Bloody Dwarf".
The "Great Purge" swept the Soviet Union in 1937. It was widely known as the "Yezhovschina", the "Reign of Yezhov". The rate of arrests was staggering. In the armed forces alone, 34,000 officers were purged, including many at the higher ranks. The entire Politburo and most of the Central Committee were purged, along with foreign communists who were living in the Soviet Union, and numerous intellectuals, bureaucrats, and factory managers. The total of people imprisoned or executed during the Yezhovschina numbered about two million. By 1938, the mass purges were starting to disrupt the country's infrastructure, and Stalin began winding them down. Yezhov was gradually relieved of power. Yezhov was relieved of all powers in 1939, then tried and executed in 1940. His successor as head of the NKVD (from 1938 to 1945) was Lavrentiy Beria, a Georgian friend of Stalin's. Arrests and executions continued into 1952, although nothing on the scale of the Yezhovschina ever happened again.
During this period, the practice of mass arrest, torture, and imprisonment or execution without trial, of anyone suspected by the secret police of opposing Stalin's regime became commonplace. By the NKVD's own count, 681,692 people were shot during 1937–1938 alone, and hundreds of thousands of political prisoners were transported to Gulag work camps. The mass terror and purges were little known to the outside world, and some western intellectuals and fellow travellers continued to believe that the Soviets had created a successful alternative to a capitalist world. In 1936, the country adopted its first formal constitution, which only on paper granted freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Scholars estimate the total death toll for the Great Purge (1936–1938), including fatalities attributed to prison conditions, to be roughly 700,000-1.2 million.
In March 1939, the 18th congress of the Communist Party was held in Moscow. Most of the delegates present at the 17th congress in 1934 were gone, and Stalin was heavily praised by Litvinov and the western democracies criticized for failing to adopt the principles of "collective security" against Nazi Germany.
Interpreting the purges
Two major lines of interpretation have emerged among historians. One argues that the purges reflected Stalin's ambitions, his paranoia, and his inner drive to increase his power and eliminate potential rivals. Revisionist historians explain the purges by theorizing that rival factions exploited Stalin's paranoia and used terror to enhance their own position. Peter Whitewood examines the first purge, directed at the Army, and comes up with a third interpretation that: Stalin and other top leaders, assuming that they were always surrounded by enemies, always worried about the vulnerability and loyalty of the Red Army. It was not a ploy – Stalin truly believed it. “Stalin attacked the Red Army because he seriously misperceived a serious security threat”; thus “Stalin seems to have genuinely believed that foreign‐backed enemies had infiltrated the ranks and managed to organize a conspiracy at the very heart of the Red Army.” The purge hit deeply from June 1937 and November 1938, removing 35,000; many were executed. Experience in carrying out the purge facilitated purging other key elements in the wider Soviet polity. Historians often cite the disruption as factors in its disastrous military performance during the German invasion.
Foreign relations, 1927–1939
Main articles: Foreign relations of the Soviet Union and International relations (1919–1939)The Soviet government had forfeited foreign-owned private companies during the creation of the RSFSR and the USSR. Foreign investors did not receive any monetary or material compensation. The USSR also refused to pay tsarist-era debts to foreign debtors. The young Soviet polity was a pariah because of its openly stated goal of supporting the overthrow of capitalistic governments. It sponsored workers' revolts to overthrow numerous capitalistic European states, but they all failed. Lenin reversed radical experiments and restored a sort of capitalism with the NEC. The Comintern was ordered to stop organizing revolts. Starting in 1921 Lenin sought trade, loans and recognition. One by one, foreign states reopened trade lines and recognized the Soviet government. The United States was the last major polity to recognise the USSR in 1933. In 1934, the French government proposed an alliance and led 30 governments to invite the USSR to join the League of Nations. The USSR had achieved legitimacy but was expelled in December 1939 for aggression against Finland.
In 1928, Stalin pushed a leftist policy based on his belief in an imminent great crisis for capitalism. Various European communist parties were ordered not to form coalitions and instead to denounce moderate socialists as social fascists. Activists were sent into labour unions to take control away from socialists–a move the British unions never forgave. By 1930, the Stalinists started suggesting the value of alliance with other parties, and by 1934 the idea to form a Popular Front had emerged. Comintern agent Willi Münzenberg was especially effective in organizing intellectuals, antiwar and pacifist elements to join the anti-Nazi coalition. Communists would form coalitions with any party to fight fascism. For Stalinists, the Popular Front was simply an expedient, but to rightists, it represented the desirable form of transition to socialism.
Franco-Soviet relations were initially hostile because the USSR officially opposed the World War I peace settlement of 1919 that France emphatically championed. While the Soviet Union was interested in conquering territories in Eastern Europe, France was determined to protect the fledgling states there. However, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy centered on a massive seizure of Central European, Eastern European, and Russian lands for Germany's own ends, and when Hitler pulled out of the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1933, the threat hit home. Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov reversed Soviet policy regarding the Paris Peace Settlement, leading to a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. In May 1935, the USSR concluded pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. Stalin-ordered the Comintern to form a popular front with leftist and centrist parties against the forces of Fascism. The pact was undermined, however, by strong ideological hostility to the Soviet Union and the Comintern's new front in France, Poland's refusal to permit the Red Army on its soil, France's defensive military strategy, and a continuing Soviet interest in patching up relations with Nazi Germany.
The Soviet Union supplied military aid to the Republican faction of the Second Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War, including munitions and soldiers, and helped far-left activists come to Spain as volunteers. The Spanish government let the USSR have the government treasury. Soviet units systematically liquidated anarchist supporters of the Spanish government. Moscow's support of the government gave the Republicans a Communist taint in the eyes of anti-Bolsheviks in Britain and France, weakening the calls for Anglo-French intervention in the war.
Nazi Germany promulgated an Anti-Comintern Pact with Imperialist Japan and Fascist Italy, along with various Central and Eastern European states (such as Hungary), ostensibly to suppress Communist activity but more realistically to forge an alliance against the USSR.
World War II
Main article: Soviet Union in World War IIStalin arranged the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on 23 August along with the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement to open economic relations. A secret appendix to the pact gave Eastern Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Finland to the USSR, and Western Poland and Lithuania to Nazi Germany. This reflected the Soviet desire of territorial gains.
Following the pact with Hitler, Stalin in 1939–1940 annexed half of Poland, the three Baltic States, and Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in Romania. They no longer were buffers separating the USSR from German areas, argues Louis Fischer. Rather they facilitated Hitler's rapid advance to the gates of Moscow.
Propaganda was also considered an important foreign relations tool. International exhibitions, the distribution of media such as films, e.g.: Alexander Nevski, as well as inviting prominent foreign individuals to tour the Soviet Union, were used as a method of gaining international influence and encouraging fellow travelers and pacifists to build popular fronts.
Start of World War II
Main articles: Events preceding World War II in Europe, Soviet invasion of Poland, Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940), and Winter WarGermany invaded Poland on 1 September; the USSR followed on 17 September. The Soviets quelled opposition by executing and arresting thousands. They relocated suspect ethnic groups to Siberia in four waves, 1939–1941. Estimates varying from the figure over 1.5 million.
After Poland was divided up with Germany, Stalin made territorial demands to Finland, claiming security needs regarding the protection of Leningrad. After the Finns refused the demands, the Soviets invaded Finland on 30 November 1939, launching the Winter War, with the goal of annexing Finland into the Soviet Union. Despite outnumbering Finnish troops by over 2.5:1, the war proved embarrassingly difficult for the Red Army, which was ill-equipped for the winter weather and lacking competent commanders since the purge of the Soviet high command. The Finns resisted fiercely, and received some support and considerable sympathy from the Allies. On 29 January 1940, the Soviets put an end to their puppet Terijoki Government that they had intended on inserting into Helsinki, and informed the Finnish government that the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate peace. The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940, with the war ending the following day. By the terms of the treaty, Finland relinquished the Karelian Isthmus and some smaller territories. London, Washington—and especially Berlin—calculated that the poor showing of the Soviet army indicated it was incompetent to defend the USSR against a German invasion.
In 1940, the USSR occupied and illegally annexed Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. On 14 June 1941, the USSR performed first mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
On 26 June 1940 the Soviet government issued an ultimatum to the Romanian minister in Moscow, demanding the Kingdom of Romania immediately cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Italy and Germany, which needed a stable Romania and access to its oil fields urged King Carol II to do so. Under duress, with no prospect of aid from France or Britain, Carol complied. On 28 June, Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and occupied Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Hertsa region.
Great Patriotic War
Main articles: Great Patriotic War (term), Eastern Front (World War II), Operation Barbarossa, and Diplomatic history of World War IIOn 22 June 1941, Adolf Hitler abruptly broke the non-aggression pact and invaded the Soviet Union. Stalin had made no preparations. Soviet intelligence was fooled by German disinformation and the invasion caught the Soviet military unprepared. In the larger sense, Stalin expected invasion but not so soon. The Army had been decimated by the Purges; time was needed for a recovery of competence. As such, mobilization did not occur and the Soviet Army was tactically unprepared as of the invasion. The initial weeks of the war were a disaster, with hundreds of thousands of men being killed, wounded, or captured. Whole divisions disintegrated against the German onslaught. Soviet POWs in German prison camps were treated poorly, leading to only 1/10 of Red Army POWs surviving German camps. In contrast, 1/3 of German POWs survived the Soviet prison camps. German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow in December 1941, but failed to capture it, due to staunch Soviet defence and counterattacks. At the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943, the Red Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the German army. Due to the unwillingness of the Japanese to open a second front in Manchuria, the Soviets were able to call dozens of Red Army divisions back from eastern Russia. These units were instrumental in turning the tide, because most of their officer corps had escaped Stalin's purges. The Soviet forces soon launched massive counterattacks along the entire German line. By 1944, the Germans had been pushed out of the Soviet Union onto the banks of the Vistula river, just east of Prussia. With Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov attacking from Prussia, and Marshal Ivan Konev slicing Germany in half from the south, the fate of Nazi Germany was sealed. On 2 May 1945 the last German troops surrendered to the Soviet troops in Berlin.
Wartime developments
Further information: Home front during World War II § Soviet UnionFrom the end of 1944 to 1949, large sections of eastern Germany came under the Soviet Union's occupation and on 2 May 1945, the capital city Berlin was taken, while over fifteen million Germans were removed from eastern Germany (renamed the Recovered Territories of the Polish People's Republic) and pushed into central Germany (later called the German Democratic Republic) and western Germany (later called the Federal Republic of Germany).
An atmosphere of patriotic emergency took over the Soviet Union during the war, and persecution of the Orthodox Church was halted. The Church was now permitted to operate with a fair degree of freedom, so long as it did not get involved in politics. In 1944, a new Soviet national anthem was written, replacing the Internationale, which had been used as the national anthem since 1918. These changes were made because it was thought that the people would respond better to a fight for their country than for a political ideology.
The Soviets bore the brunt of World War II because the West did not open up a second ground front in Europe until the invasion of Italy and the Battle of Normandy. Approximately 26.6 million Soviets, among them 18 million civilians, were killed in the war. Civilians were rounded up and burned or shot in many cities conquered by the Nazis. The retreating Soviet army was ordered to pursue a 'scorched earth' policy whereby retreating Soviet troops were ordered to destroy civilian infrastructure and food supplies so that the Nazi German troops could not use them.
Stalin's original declaration in March 1946 that there were 7 million war dead was revised in 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev with a round number of 20 million. In the late 1980s, demographers in the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) took another look using demographic methods and came up with an estimate of 26–27 million. A variety of other estimates have been made. In most detailed estimates roughly two-thirds of the estimated deaths were civilian losses. However, the breakdown of war losses by nationality is less well known. One study, relying on indirect evidence from the 1959 population census, found that while in terms of the aggregate human losses the major Slavic groups suffered most, the largest losses relative to population size were incurred by minority nationalities mainly from European Russia, among groups from which men were mustered to the front in "nationality battalions" and appear to have suffered disproportionately.
After the war, the Soviet Union occupied and dominated Eastern Europe, in line with Soviet ideology.
Stalin was determined to punish those peoples he saw as collaborating with Germany during the war and to deal with the problem of nationalism, which would tend to pull the Soviet Union apart. Millions of Poles, Latvians, Georgians, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities were deported to Gulags in Siberia. (Previously, following the 1939 annexation of eastern Poland, thousands of Polish Army officers, including reservists, had been executed in the spring of 1940, in what came to be known as the Katyn massacre.) In addition, in 1941, 1943 and 1944 several whole nationalities had been deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, including, among others, the Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks. Though these groups were later politically "rehabilitated", some were never given back their former autonomous regions.
At the same time, in a famous Victory Day toast in May 1945, Stalin extolled the role of the Russian people in the defeat of the fascists: "I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, before all, the Russian people. I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the nationalities of our country... And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet Government was the decisive strength, which secured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity – over fascism..."
World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The Soviet Union was especially devastated due to the mass destruction of the industrial base that it had built up in the 1930s. The USSR also experienced a major famine in 1946–1948 due to war devastation that cost an estimated 1 to 1.5 million lives as well as secondary population losses due to reduced fertility. However, the Soviet Union recovered its production capabilities and overcame pre-war capabilities, becoming the country with the most powerful land army in history by the end of the war, and having the most powerful military production capabilities.
War and Stalinist industrial-military development
Further information: Soviet industry in World War II and Soviet combat vehicle production during World War IIAlthough the Soviet Union received aid and weapons from the United States under the Lend-Lease program, the Soviet production of war materials was greater than that of Nazi Germany because of rapid growth of Soviet industrial production during the interwar years (additional supplies from lend-lease accounted for about 10–12% of the Soviet Union's own industrial output). The Second Five Year Plan raised steel production to 18 million tons and coal to 128 million tons. Before it was interrupted, the Third Five Year Plan produced no less than 19 million tons of steel and 150 million tons of coal.
The Soviet Union's industrial output provided an armaments industry which supported their army, helping it resist the Nazi military offensive. According to Robert L. Hutchings, "One can hardly doubt that if there had been a slower buildup of industry, the attack would have been successful and world history would have evolved quite differently." For the laborers involved in industry, however, life was difficult. Workers were encouraged to fulfill and overachieve quotas through propaganda, such as the Stakhanovite movement.
Some historians, however, interpret the lack of preparedness of the Soviet Union to defend itself as a flaw in Stalin's economic planning. David Shearer, for example, argues that there was "a command-administrative economy" but it was not "a planned one". He argues that the Soviet Union was still suffering from the Great Purge, and was completely unprepared for the German invasion. Economist Holland Hunter, in addition, argues in his Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan, that an array "of alternative paths were available, evolving out of the situation existing at the end of the 1920s... that could have been as good as those achieved by, say, 1936 yet with far less turbulence, waste, destruction and sacrifice."
Cold War
Main article: Cold WarSoviet control over Eastern Europe
Main article: Soviet sphere of influenceIn the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union extended its political and military influence over Eastern Europe, in a move that was seen by some as a continuation of the older policies of the Russian Empire. Some territories that had been lost by Soviet Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) were annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II: the Baltic states and eastern portions of interwar Poland. The Russian SFSR also gained the northern half of East Prussia (Kaliningrad Oblast) from Germany. The Ukrainian SSR gained Transcarpathia (as Zakarpattia Oblast) from Czechoslovakia, and Ukrainian populated Northern Bukovina (as Chernivtsi Oblast) from Romania. Finally, by the late 1940s, pro-Soviet Communist Parties won the elections in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe (specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) and subsequently became People's Democracies. These elections are generally regarded as rigged, and the Western powers recognized them as show elections. For the duration of the Cold War, the countries of Eastern Europe became Soviet satellite states — they were "independent" nations, which were one-party communist states whose General Secretary had to be approved by the Kremlin, and so their governments usually kept their policy in line with the wishes of the Soviet Union, although nationalistic forces and pressures within the satellite states played a part in causing some deviation from strict Soviet rule.
Tenor of Soviet–U.S. relations
Main article: Soviet Union–United States relationsThe USSR urgently needed munitions, food and fuel that was provided by the U.S. and also Britain, primarily through Lend Lease. The three powers kept in regular contact, with Stalin trying to maintain a veil of secrecy over internal affairs. Churchill and other top Soviets visited Moscow, as did Roosevelt's top aide Harry Hopkins. Stalin repeatedly requested that the United States and Britain open a second front on Continental Europe; but the Allied invasion did not occur until June 1944, more than two years later. In the meantime, the Russians suffered high casualties, and the Soviets faced the brunt of German strength. The Allies pointed out that their intensive air bombardment was a major factor that Stalin ignored.
Korean War
Main article: Korean WarIn 1950, the Soviet Union protested against the fact that the Chinese seat at the United Nations Security Council was held by the Nationalist government of China, and boycotted the meetings. While the Soviet Union was absent, the UN passed a resolution condemning North Korean actions and eventually offered military support to South Korea. After this incident the Soviet Union was never absent at the meetings of the Security Council.
Domestic events
Main article: Economy of the Soviet UnionCensorship
Main article: Censorship in the Soviet UnionArt and science were subjected to rigorous censorship under Stalin's direct oversight. Where previously The All- Russian Union of Writers (AUW) had attempted to publish apolitical writing, The Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) insisted on the importance of politics in literary work, and published content which primarily embodied the hegemony of the working-class values in fiction. In 1925, The RAPP launched a campaign against the AUW chairman Yevgeny Zamyatin. It resulted in the defeat of the AUW, and they were replaced by the All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers, which strictly adopted the literary style of socialist realism. Soviet biology studies were heavily influenced by the now-discredited biologist Trofim Lysenko, who rejected the concept of Mendelian inheritance in favor of a form of Lamarckism. In physics, the theory of relativity was dismissed as "bourgeois idealism". Much of this censorship was the work of Andrei Zhdanov, known as Stalin's "ideological hatchet man", until his death from a heart attack in 1948.
Stalin's cult of personality reached its height in the postwar period, with his picture displayed in every school, factory, and government office, yet he rarely appeared in public. Postwar reconstruction proceeded rapidly, but as the emphasis was all on heavy industry and energy, living standards remained low, especially outside of the major cities.
Post-war period
The mild political liberalization that took place in the Soviet Union during the war quickly came to an end in 1945. The Orthodox Church was generally left unmolested after the war and was even allowed to print small amounts of religious literature, but persecution of minority religions was resumed.
Stalin and the Communist Party were given full credit for the victory over Germany, and generals such as Zhukov were demoted to regional commands (Ukraine in his case). With the onset of the Cold War, anti-Western propaganda was stepped up, with the capitalist world depicted as a decadent place where crime, unemployment, and poverty were rampant.
The late Stalinist period saw the emergence of a tacit "big deal" between the state and the Soviet nomenklatura and the experts whose status corresponded to that of the Western middle class under which the state would accept "bourgeois" habits such as a degree of consumerism, romance, and domesticity in exchange for the unflinching loyalty of the nomenklatura to the state. The informal "big deal" was a result of World War Two as many of the Soviet middle classes expected a higher standard of living after the war in exchange for accepting wartime sacrifices, and as the Soviet system could not function with the necessary technical experts and the nomenklatura, the state needed the services of such people, leading to the informal "big deal". Furthermore, during the war, the state had to a certain extent relaxed its control and allowed informal practices to exist that usually contravened the rules. After 1945, this loosening of social control was never completely undone as instead the state sought to co-opt the certain elements of the population, allowing certain rules to be contravened provided that the populace remained overall loyal. One result of the "big deal" was a rise in materialism, corruption and nepotism that continued to color daily life in the Soviet Union for the rest of its existence. Another example of the "big deal" was the publication starting in the late 1940s of a series of romance novels aimed at a female audience; a choice of subject matter that would have been unthinkable before the war.
In particular, the late 1940s saw the rise of the vory v zakone ("thieves in law") as Russian organised crime is known who form a very distinctive subculture complete with their own dialect of Russian. Despite their name, the vory v zakone are not just thieves, but engage in the entire gamut of criminal activities. The vory v zakone did well as blackmarketers in a post-war society that suffered from a shortage of basic goods. The crime wave that gripped the Soviet Union in the late 1940s was the source of much public disquiet at the time. A particular source of worry was the rise of juvenile crime with one police study from 1947 showing that 69% of all crimes were committed by teenagers under the age of 16. Most of the juvenile criminals were orphans from the war living on the streets who turned to crime as the only way to survive. Most of the complaints about juvenile crime concerned street children working as prostitutes, thieves or hiring their services out to the vory v zakone. Various economic reforms like Monetary reform of 1947 were undertaken in order to stabilize post-war economy and suppress illegal trade.
The Great Patriotic War despite the immense sufferings and losses, thanks to propaganda, came to be looked backed nostalgically as a time of excitement, adventure, danger, and national solidarity while life in the post-war era was seen as dull, stagnant, mundane and as a time when people put their own individual interests ahead of the greater good. There was a widespread feeling that though the war had been won, the peace had been lost as the wartime expectations and hopes for a better world after the war were dashed. The post-war era saw the emergences of various subcultures that usually in some way deviated from what was officially ascribed (for an example listening to smuggled records of Western pop music), and depending upon the nature of the subcultures were either tolerated by the authorities or cracked down upon. Another post-war social trend was the emergence of greater individualism and a search for privacy as the demand grew for private apartments while those in urban areas sought to spend more time in the countryside, where the state had less control over daily life. For members of the nomenklatura, the ultimate status symbol came to be the dacha in the countryside where the nomenklatura and their families could enjoy themselves far from prying eyes. Others sought their own personal space by devoting themselves to apolitical pursuits such as the hard sciences or by moving to a remote region such as Siberia where the state had less control. Informal networks of friends and relatives known as svoi ("one's own") emerged that functioned as self-help societies, and often became crucial to determining one's social success as the membership of the right svoi could improve the odds of one's children attending a prestigious university or allow one to obtain basic goods in short supply such as toilet paper. Another example of the social trend towards a greater personal spaces for ordinary people was the rise in popularity of underground poetry and of the samizdat literature that criticized the Soviet system.
Despite the best efforts of the authorities, many young people in the late 1940s liked to listen to the Russian language broadcasts of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), leading to a major campaign launched in 1948 intended to discredit both radio stations as "capitalist propaganda". Likewise, the journals Amerika (America) and Britanskii Soiuznik (British Ally) published by the American and British governments were very popular with young people in the late 1940s, selling out within minutes of appearing on kiosks in Moscow and Leningrad (modern St. Petersburg). The German historian Juliane Fürst has cautioned the interest of young people in the Anglo-American culture was not necessarily a rejection of the Soviet system, but instead reflected mere curiosity about the world beyond the Soviet Union. Fürst wrote that many young people in the late 1940s-early 1950s displayed ambivalent attitudes, being on one hand convinced that their nation was the world's greatest and most progressive nation while at the same time displaying a certain nagging self-doubt and a belief that just might be something better out there. The way that Russian nationalism had merged with Communism during the Great Patriotic War to create a new Soviet identity based equally upon pride in being Russian and being Communist allowed the authorities to cast criticism of the Soviet system as "unpatriotic", which for the time seemed to rebuff the elements of self-doubt that were residing with certain segments of the people.
Another sign of a growing search for a personal space of one's own after 1945 were the popularity of apolitical films such as musicals, comedies and romances over the more political films that glorified Communism. The late 1940s were a time of what the Hungarian historian Peter Kenz called the "film hunger" as the Soviet film industry could not release enough films owing to the problems posed by post war reconstruction, and so as a result Soviet cinemas showed American and German films captured by the Red Army in the eastern parts of Germany and in Eastern Europe, known in the Soviet Union as "trophy films". Much to the worry of the authorities, American films such as Stagecoach, The Roaring Twenties, The Count of Monte Cristo, and Sun Valley proved to be extremely popular with Soviet audiences. The most popular of all the foreign films were the 1941 German-Hungarian romantic musical film The Girl of My Dreams, which was released in the Soviet Union in 1947, and the 1941 American film Tarzan's New York Adventures, which was released in the Soviet Union in 1951. The musician Bulat Okudzhava recalled: "It was the one and only thing in Tbilisi for which everyone went out of their minds, the trophy film, The Girl of My Dreams, with the extraordinary and indescribable Marika Rökk in the main role. Normal life stopped in the city. Everyone talked about the film, they ran to see it whenever they had a chance, in the streets people whistled melodies from it, from half-open windows you hear people playing tunes from it on the piano".
As early as the late 1940s, the Austrian scholar Franz Borkenau contended that the Soviet government was not a monolithic totalitarian machine, but instead divided into vast chefstvo (patronage) networks extending down from the elite to the lowest ranks of power with Stalin more as the ultimate arbiter of the various factions instead of being the leader of a 1984 type state. Borkenau's techniques were a minute analysis of official Soviet statements and the relative placement of various officials at the Kremlin on festive occasions to determine which Soviet official enjoyed Stalin's favour and which official did not. Signs such as newspaper editorials, guest lists at formal occasions, obituaries in Soviet newspapers, and accounts of formal speeches were important to identifying the various chefstvo networks. Borkenau argued that even small changes in the formalistic language of the Soviet state could sometimes indicate important changes: "Political issues must be interpreted in the light of formulas, political and otherwise, and their history; and such interpretation cannot be safely concluded until the whole history of the given formula has been established from its first enunciation on".
Terror by the secret police continued in the postwar period. Although nothing comparable to 1937 ever happened again, there were many smaller purges, including a mass purge of the Georgian Communist Party apparatus in 1951–52. Starting in 1949, the principle enemy of the state came to be portrayed as the "rootless cosmopolitans", a term that was never precisely defined. The term "rootless cosmopolitan" in practice was used to attack intellectuals, Jews and frequently both. Stalin's health also deteriorated precipitously after WWII. He suffered a stroke in the fall of 1945 and was ill for months. This was followed by another stroke in 1947. Stalin became less active in the day-to-day running of the state and instead of party meetings, preferred to invite the Politburo members to all-night dinners where he would watch movies and force them to get drunk and embarrass themselves or say something incriminating.
In October 1952, the first postwar party congress convened in Moscow. Stalin did not feel up to delivering the main report and for most of the proceedings sat in silence while Nikita Khrushchev and Georgy Malenkov delivered the main speeches. He did suggest however that the party be renamed from "The All-Union Party of Bolsheviks" to "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union" on the grounds that "There was once a time when it was necessary to distinguish ourselves from the Mensheviks, but there are no Mensheviks anymore. We are the entire party now." Stalin also mentioned his advancing age (two months away from 73) and suggested that it might be time to retire. Predictably, no one at the congress would dare agree with it and the delegates instead pleaded for him to stay.
Post Stalin's death
On 1 March 1953, Stalin's staff found him semi-conscious on the bedroom floor of his Volynskoe dacha. He had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. Stalin died on 5 March 1953. An autopsy revealed that he had died of a cerebral hemorrhage and that he also suffered from severe damage to his cerebral arteries due to atherosclerosis. It is possible that Stalin was murdered. Beria has been suspected of murder, although no firm evidence has ever appeared.
Stalin left no anointed successor nor a framework within which a transfer of power could take place. The Central Committee met on the day of his death, with Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev emerging as the party's key figures. The system of collective leadership was restored, and measures introduced to prevent any one member attaining autocratic domination again. The collective leadership included the following eight senior members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union listed according to the order of precedence presented formally on 5 March 1953: Georgy Malenkov, Lavrentiy Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich and Anastas Mikoyan. Reforms to the Soviet system were immediately implemented. Economic reform scaled back the mass construction projects, placed a new emphasis on house building, and eased the levels of taxation on the peasantry to stimulate production. The new leaders sought rapprochement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a less hostile relationship with the United States, pursuing a negotiated end to the Korean War in July 1953. The doctors who had been imprisoned were released and the anti-Semitic purges ceased. A mass amnesty of 1953 for certain categories of imprisoned was issued, halving the country's inmate population, while the state security and Gulag systems were reformed, with torture being banned in April 1953.
Notes
- Although the 1946 drought was severe, government mismanagement of its grain reserves largely accounted for the population losses.
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- Louis Fischer, Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1941 (1969).
- Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet foreign propaganda (1964) pp 25–27, 115, 255.
- Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (2004) p 119 online
- Manninen, Ohto (2008). Miten Suomi valloitetaan: Puna-armeijan operaatiosuunnitelmat 1939–1944 [How to Conquer Finland: Operational Plans of the Red Army 1939–1944] (in Finnish). Edita. ISBN 978-951-37-5278-1.
- Trotter, William R. (2002) . The Winter War: The Russo–Finnish War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). Aurum Press. ISBN 1-85410-881-6.
- Derek W. Spring, "The Soviet decision for war against Finland, 30 November 1939." Soviet Studies 38.2 (1986): 207–226. online
- Roger R. Reese, "Lessons of the Winter War: a study in the military effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939–1940." Journal of Military History 72.3 (2008): 825–852.
- Martin Kahn, "'Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated': Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War Potential before Operation Barbarossa,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25#2 (2012), 220–240,
- King, Charles (2000), The Moldovans, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, ISBN 978-0-8179-9792-2.
- Murphy, David E (2005), What Stalin Knew: the enigma of Barbarossa.
- *Citino, R. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. University Press of Kansas, 2007.
- Glantz, D. with House, J. When Titan's Clashed. University Press of Kansas, 2015.
- Glantz, D. with House, J. Armageddon in Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2. University Press of Kansas, 2009.
- Glantz, D. with House, J. To the Gates of Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. University Press of Kansas, 2009.
- Kavalerchik, B. The Price of Victory: The Red Army’s Casualties in the Great Patriotic War. Pen & Sword Military, 2017.
- Liedtke, G. Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941–1943. Helion & Company LTD, 2016.
- Ellman, Michael; Maksudov, S (1994), "Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note", Europe-Asia Studies, 46 (4): 671–680, doi:10.1080/09668139408412190, PMID 12288331.
- Anderson, Barbara A; Silver, Brian D (1985), "Demographic Consequences of World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR", in Linz, Susan J (ed.), The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Conquest, Robert (1970), The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, London: MacMillan, ISBN 978-0-333-10575-7.
- Wimbush, S Enders; Wixman, Ronald (1975), "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Central Asia", Canadian Slavonic Papers, 27 (2–3): 320–340, doi:10.1080/00085006.1975.11091412.
- Alexander Nekrich (1978), The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, New York: WW Norton, ISBN 978-0-393-00068-9.
- Population transfer in the Soviet Union, Misplaced Pages.
- Russification (complete text of the toast).
- Ellman, Michael (2000), "The 1947 Soviet Famine and the Entitlement Approach to Famines", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 24 (5): 603–630, doi:10.1093/cje/24.5.603.
- "The First Five Year Plan, 1928–1932". Special Collections & Archives. 2015-10-07. Retrieved 2019-03-28.
- Russia and the USSR, 1855–1991: Autocracy and Dictatorship p.147
- Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, NJ, 1957).
- William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941–1946 (1953)
- Jonathan Fenby, Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill Won One War and Began Another (2007)
- "Soviets boycott United Nations Security Council".
- "Resolution 82 (1950) /". 1965.
- Kirill O. Rossianov, "Stalin as Lysenko's editor: reshaping political discourse in Soviet science." Russian History 21.1-4 (1994): 49-63.
- Carol Strong, and Matt Killingsworth, "Stalin the charismatic leader?: Explaining the ‘cult of personality’ as a legitimation technique." Politics, Religion & Ideology 12.4 (2011): 391-411. online
- Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine, 1953-1971." Canadian Slavonic Papers 14.2 (1972): 191-212.
- Walter D. Connor, "Deviant behavior in capitalist society. The Soviet image." Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 61.4 (1970): 554-564. online
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 21.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 29.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 28.
- Fürst 2010, p. 28–29.
- Fürst 2010, p. 197.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 172.
- Fürst 2010, p. 173.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 27.
- Fürst 2010, p. 27–28.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 68.
- Fürst 2010, p. 68–69.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 69–70.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 206.
- ^ Laqueur 1987, p. 180.
- ^ Fürst 2010, p. 79.
- Yoram Gorlizki, and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold peace: Stalin and the Soviet ruling circle, 1945-1953 (Oxford University Press, 2004).
- Conquest 1991, p. 311; Volkogonov 1991, pp. 571–572; Service 2004, pp. 582–584; Khlevniuk 2015, pp. 142, 191.
- ^ Conquest 1991, p. 312.
- Conquest 1991, p. 313; Volkogonov 1991, p. 574; Service 2004, p. 586; Khlevniuk 2015, p. 313.
- Khlevniuk 2015, p. 189.
- Service 2004, p. 587.
- Khlevniuk 2015, p. 310.
- Service 2004, pp. 586–587.
- Khlevniuk 2015, p. 312.
- Ra'anan 2006, p. 20.
- Service 2004, p. 591.
- ^ Khlevniuk 2015, p. 315.
- Service 2004, p. 593.
- Khlevniuk 2015, p. 316.
- Etinger 1995, pp. 120–121; Conquest 1991, p. 314; Khlevniuk 2015, p. 314.
Sources
- Etinger, Iakov (1995). "The Doctors' Plot: Stalin's Solution to the Jewish Question". In Ro'i, Yaacov (ed.). Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union. The Cummings Center Series. Ilford: Frank Cass. pp. 103–124. ISBN 0-7146-4619-9.
- Conquest, Robert (1991). Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York and London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-016953-9.
- Khlevniuk, Oleg V. (2015). Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator. Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-16388-9.
- Ra'anan, Uri, ed. (2006). Flawed Succession: Russia's Power Transfer Crises. Oxford: Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-1403-2.
- Service, Robert (2004). Stalin: A Biography. London: Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-72627-3.
- Volkogonov, Dimitri (1991). Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. Translated by Harold Shukman. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-81080-3.
Further reading
Further information: Soviet Union § Further reading See also: Bibliography of Stalinism and the Soviet Union- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989).
- Fürst, Juliane (2010). Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-161450-7.
- Hosking, Geoffrey. The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within (2nd ed. Harvard UP 1992) 570 pp.
- Laqueur, Walter (1987). The Fate of the Revolution. New York: Scribner. ISBN 0-684-18903-8.
- Kort, Michael. The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (7th ed. 2010) 502 pp.
- McCauley, Martin. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union (2007), 522 pp.
- Moss, Walter G. A History of Russia. Vol. 2: Since 1855 (2nd ed. 2005).
- Nove, Alec. An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991 (3rd ed. 1993).
Stalin and Stalinism
- Daniels, R. V., ed. The Stalin Revolution (1964)
- Davies, Sarah, and James Harris, eds. Stalin: A New History, (2006), 310 pp, 14 specialized essays by scholars excerpt and text search.
- De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union (1986).
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila, ed. Stalinism: New Directions, (1999), 396 pp, excerpts from many scholars on the impact of Stalinism on the people
- Hoffmann, David L. ed. Stalinism: The Essential Readings, (2002) essays by 12 scholars.
- Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations (1990).
- Kershaw, Ian, and Moshe Lewin. Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (2004) excerpt and text search.
- Lee, Stephen J. Stalin and the Soviet Union (1999)
- Lewis, Jonathan. Stalin: A Time for Judgement (1990).
- McNeal, Robert H. Stalin: Man and Ruler (1988)
- Martens, Ludo. Another view of Stalin (1994), a highly favorable view from a Maoist historian
- Service, Robert. Stalin: A Biography (2004), along with Tucker the standard biography
- Tucker, Robert C. Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929 (1973)
- Tucker, Robert C (1990), Stalin in Power, New York: WW Norton, archived from the original on 2000-07-07
1927–1939
- Bendavid-Val, Leah, James H. Billington and Philip Brookman. Propaganda and Dreams: Photographing the 1930s in the USSR and the US (1999)
- Clark, Katerina. Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941 (2011) excerpt and text search
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (1996) excerpt and text search
- ——— (2000), Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-505001-1.
- Hessler, Julie (2020). A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-4356-5.
Foreign policy, 1927–1941
- Carr, Edward Hallett. German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1951).
- Ericson, Edward E. Jr. Feeding the German eagle: Soviet economic aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941 (1999).
- Fischer, Louis. Russia’s Road From Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations 1917–1941. (1969). Online free to borrow
- Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe 1933–1939 (1984).
- Kennan, George F. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (1961). Online free to borrow
- Laqueur, Walter. Russia and Germany; a century of conflict (1965) Online free To borrow
- Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941 (Columbia UP, 1997).
- Siegel, Katherine. Loans and Legitimacy: The Evolution of Soviet-American Relations, 1919–1933 (1996).
- Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973 (2nd ed. 1974) pp 126–213
- Wegner, Bernd. From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941 (1997)
World War II
- Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (2008), 880pp excerpt and text search
- Berkhoff, Karel C. Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II (2012) excerpt and text search
- Broekmeyer, Marius. Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, 1941–1945. 2004. 315 pp.
- Feis, Herbert. Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War they waged and the Peace they sought (1953). online free o borrow
- Fenby, Jonathan. Alliance: the inside story of how Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill won one war and began another (2015).
- Hill, Alexander. The Red Army and the Second World War (2017), 738 pp.
- McNeill, William H. America, Britain, & Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941–1946 (1953)
- Overy, Richard. Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941–1945 (1998) excerpt and text search
- Reynolds, David, and Vladimir Pechatnov, eds. The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt (2019)
- Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (2006).
- Seaton, Albert. Stalin as Military Commander, (1998)
- Weeks, Albert L. Assured Victory: How 'Stalin the Great' Won the War But Lost the Peace (ABC-CLIO, 2011).
- Weeks, Albert L. Russia's Life-saver: Lend-lease Aid to the USSR in World War II (2004).
Cold War
- Goncharov, Sergei, John Lewis and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (1993) excerpt and text search
- Gorlizki, Yoram, and Oleg Khlevniuk. Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (2004)
- Harrison, Mark. "The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression," Past & Present (2011) Vol. 210 Issue suppl_6, pp 103–120.
- Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (1996) excerpt and text search
- Kahn, Martin. The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II: Economy, Society and Military Power (Routledge, 2017).
- Mastny, Vojtech. Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945 (1979)
- ——— (1998), The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years
- Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (2004), Pulitzer Prize; excerpt and text search
- Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973, 2nd ed. (1974)
- Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007)
Primary sources
- Degras, Jane T. The Communist International, 1919–1943 (3 Vols. 1956); documents; online vol 1 1919–1922; vol 2 1923–1928 (PDF).
- Degras, Jane Tabrisky. ed. Soviet documents on foreign policy (1978).
- Goldwin, Robert A., Gerald Stourzh, Marvin Zetterbaum, eds. Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (1959) 800pp;
- Gruber, Helmut. International Communism in the Era of Lenin: A Documentary History (Cornell University Press, 1967)
- Khrushchev, Nikita. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 1: Commissar, 1918–1945 contents
- Khrushchev, Nikita. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 2: Reformer, 1945–1964 contents
- Maisky, Ivan. The Maisky Diaries: The Wartime Revelations of Stalin's Ambassador in London edited by Gabriel Gorodetsky, (Yale UP, 2016); highly revealing commentary 1934–1943; excerpts; abridged from 3 volume Yale edition; online review
- Molotov, V.M. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics ed. by Felix Chuev and Albert Resis (2007)
- Reynolds, David, and Vladimir Pechatnov, eds. The Kremlin Letters: Stalin's Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt (2019)
External links
- Dewey, John, "Impressions of Soviet Russia", Dewey texts online, Area 501, archived from the original on 2008-01-21.
- "Moscow: Stalin 2.0" (video), The Global Post (report),
- "Russia's Necropolis of Terror and the Gulag" (1918-2023) a geographical introduction to repression and commemoration (in Russian & English)
- USSR in Construction (digital presentation), The University of Saskatchewan – several full issues of the propaganda journal by the USSR government 1930–1941.
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