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{{Short description|Study of evolution on morality or ethics}}
'''Evolutionary ethics''' could be either a form of ] or ].
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
{{Evolutionary biology}}
'''Evolutionary ethics''' is a field of inquiry that explores how ] might bear on our understanding of ] or ].<ref>{{Citation |last=FitzPatrick |first=William |title=Morality and Evolutionary Biology |date=2021 |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/morality-biology/ |access-date=2024-02-06 |edition=Spring 2021 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> The range of issues investigated by evolutionary ethics is quite broad. Supporters of evolutionary ethics have argued that it has important implications in the fields of ], ], and ].


Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to ] (]) based on the role of ] in shaping human ] and behavior. Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as ], ], or ] with a focus on understanding and explaining observed ethical preferences or choices and their origins. Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to morality based on the alleged role of ] in shaping human ] and behavior. Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as ], ], or ], and seek to explain certain human moral behaviors, capacities, and tendencies in evolutionary terms. For example, the nearly universal belief that incest is morally wrong might be explained as an evolutionary adaptation that furthered human survival.


Normative (or prescriptive) evolutionary ethics, by contrast, seeks not to explain moral behavior, but to justify or ] certain normative ethical theories or claims. For instance, some proponents of normative evolutionary ethics have argued that evolutionary theory undermines certain widely held views of humans' moral superiority over other animals.
On the other hand, normative evolutionary ethics may represent a more independent attempt to use ''evolution'', alone or partially, to justify an ethical system. This project has not, according to one view, been especially successful; for example, ] describes how we must rise above our ] to behave morally (that is, evolution has endowed us with various instincts, but we need some other moral system to decide which ones to empower or control). Dawkins has since expressed interest in what ] calls a ], which starts with the assumption that "morality" refers to "facts about the flourishing of conscious creatures".

Evolutionary metaethics asks how evolutionary theory bears on theories of ethical discourse, the question of whether objective moral values exist, and the possibility of objective moral knowledge. For example, some evolutionary ethicists have appealed to evolutionary theory to defend various forms of moral anti-realism (the claim, roughly, that objective moral facts do not exist) and moral skepticism.


==History== ==History==
In the chapter ''On the Development of the Intellectual and Moral Faculties During Primeval and Civilised Times'' of ] (1871) ] set out to explain the origin of human morality in order to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals. For Darwin, morality was a problem of natural history. He believed that a moral sense (]) would have little selective advantage for the individual, but it would be adaptive for the group. He did not construct a new system of Evolutionary Ethics<ref>Paul Lawrence Farber, 1994, ''The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics'', chapter 1</ref>. The first notable attempt to explore links between evolution and ethics was made by ] in '']'' (1871). In Chapters IV and V of that work Darwin set out to explain the origin of human morality in order to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals. Darwin sought to show how a refined moral sense, or ], could have developed through a natural evolutionary process that began with social instincts rooted in our nature as social animals.


Not long after the publication of Darwin's ''The Descent of Man'', evolutionary ethics took a very different—and far more dubious—turn in the form of ]. Leading Social Darwinists such as ] and ] sought to apply the lessons of biological evolution to social and political life. Just as in nature, they claimed, progress occurs through a ruthless process of competitive struggle and "survival of the fittest," so human progress will occur only if government allows unrestricted business competition and makes no effort to protect the "weak" or "unfit" by means of social welfare laws.<ref>Gregory Bassham, ''The Philosophy Book: From the Vedas to the New Atheists, 250 Milestones in the History of Philosophy''. New York: Sterling, 2015, p. 318.</ref> Critics such as ], ], ], ],<ref>{{Cite book |title=Anti-determinism, Tychism, and Evolutionism |chapter=Charles Sanders Peirce |year=2022 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#anti}}</ref> and ] roundly criticized such attempts to draw ethical and political lessons from Darwinism, and by the early decades of the twentieth century Social Darwinism was widely viewed as discredited.<ref>Richard Hofstadter, ''Social Darwinism in American Thought'', rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, p. 203.</ref>
] first described what is now known as the ]: making unjustified claims about what ''ought'' to be on the basis of statements about what ''is''. The problem is the justification of an ethical system. The problem is not ''what'' we ought to do, but ''why''. ] allows that ethical sentiments have evolved but denies that this provides a basis for morality (''Evolution and Ethics'',1893):
<blockquote>
The propounders of what are called the "ethics of evolution," when the "evolution of ethics" would usually better express the object of their speculations, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts and more or less sound arguments, in favour of the origin of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have little doubt, for my part, that they are on the right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other. The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before.<ref>Huxley, p. 66</ref>
</blockquote>
Huxley's criticism alluded to the ] developed earlier by ] and the related ] developed later by ]. The moral philosopher ] (1838–1900) claimed that evolution was irrelevant for ethics because it could not be used as a justification for ethics. British philosopher G. E. Moore (''Principia Ethica'') demonstrated that all systems of naturalistic ethics, including evolutionary ethics, are flawed. He first pointed out that even if evolution is progress, it cannot be concluded that the more advanced organisms are more advanced in every respect. So, it is impossible to infer particular moral judgements from that fact. Furthermore, the view that "we ought to move in the direction of evolution simply because it is the direction of evolution" was invalid because it was an example of the ''naturalistic fallacy'', that is the fallacy of defining 'the good' by reference to some other thing.


The modern revival of evolutionary ethics owes much to E. O. Wilson's 1975 book, ''Sociobiology: The New Synthesis''. In that work, Wilson argues that there is a genetic basis for a wide variety of human and nonhuman social behaviors.
American philosopher ] wrote about natural selection: "The entire modern deification of survival per se, survival returning into itself, survival naked and abstract, with the denial of any substantive excellence in what survives, except for more survival still, is surely the strangest intellectual stopping-place ever proposed by one man to another<ref>Quoted by Farber, 1994, p. 112</ref>. ] was also a critic of evolutionary ethics, although both philosophers accepted the fact of evolution. Dewey added that the discovery of the evolutionary origin of particular moral sentiments is not identical with the discovery of the foundation of an ethical system <ref>Farber, 1994, p.111-117</ref>.


More recently, a number of evolutionary biologists, including ], ], and ], have argued for a different relation between ethics and evolution. In Alexander's words: “Ethical questions, and the study of morality or concepts of justice and right and wrong, derive solely from the existence of ].” <ref name="Alex80">{{cite book |last=Alexander |first=Richard D. |date=1980 |editor-last1=Engelhardt |editor-first1=H. Tristam |editor-last2=Callahan |editor-first2=Daniel| title= Knowing and Valuing: The Search for Common Roots. Volume IV of The Foundations of Ethics and Its Relationship to Science |publisher=Hastings Center |pages=124–149 |chapter=Evolution, social behavior, and ethics |isbn=0916558045}}</ref> The latter, in turn, are inevitable consequences of genetic ]. Alexander argued that "Because morality involves conflicts of interest, it cannot easily be generalized into a universal despite virtually continual efforts by utilitarian philosophers to do that; morality does not derive its meaning from sets of universals or undeniable facts."<ref name="Alex87a">{{cite book |last=Alexander |first=Richard D. |date=1987 |editor-last1=Betzig |editor-first1=Laura |editor-last2=Bogerhoff Mulder |editor-first2=Monique |editor-last3=Turke |editor-first3=Paul| title= Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective |publisher= Cambridge University Press |pages=317–341 |chapter= Evolutionary approaches to human behavior: What does the future hold?|isbn=9780521327381}}</ref>
Evolutionary biologist and geneticist ] was highly critical of evolutionary ethics: "No theory of evolutionary ethics can be acceptable unless it gives a satisfactory explanation of just why the promotion of evolutionary development must be regarded as the ]" and "even if the direction of evolution were demonstrated to be "good", man is likely to prefer to be free rather than to be reasonable"<ref>Theodosius Dobzhansky, ''The Biological Basis of Human Freedom'', Columbia University Press, 1956, p. 128-129.</ref>.
Rather, he argued,

==Analytic philosophy==
Logical positivist philosopher ] stated in ''Language, Truth and Logic'' (1936) that moral judgements are pure expressions of feeling. They are unverifiable and cannot be true or false. In 1986, ] summarized the role of evolution as the source of ethical feelings:
<blockquote> <blockquote>
The two major contributions that evolutionary biology may be able to make to this problem are, first, to justify and promote the conscious realization that it is conflicts of interest concentrated at the individual level which lead to ethical questions, and, second, to help identify the nature and intensity of the conflicts of interest involved in specific cases.<ref name="Alex80"/>
Our moral sense, our altruistic nature, is an adaptation—a feature helping us in the struggle for existence and reproduction—no less than hands and eyes, teeth and feet. It is a cost-effective way of getting us to cooperate, which avoids both the pitfalls of blind action and the expense of a superbrain of pure rationality.<ref>Ruse, 1986, p. 230</ref>{{Failed verification|date=February 2009}}
</blockquote> </blockquote>
This view runs contrary to that of the majority of philosophers who work on evolutionary ethics, since it denies the existence of an innate “moral sense” in humans.<ref name="Muus04">{{Cite journal |last=Muus |first=Harriet | date=12 August 2024 | title=Evolutionary Ethics and Mate Selection | journal=] | publisher=]| doi = 10.31234/osf.io/c659q | url=https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/c659q}}</ref>


As an example of genetic conflict, parents are selected to direct their time and resources equally among their offspring, but any particular child is more strongly related to itself than to any of its siblings, and so will desire a greater amount of parental investment than either parent is selected to give.<ref name="Trivers74">{{cite journal |last=Trivers |first=Robert L. |date=1974 |title=Parent-offspring conflict |journal=American Zoologist |volume=14 |issue=1 |pages=249–264 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3881986}}</ref> A consequence of this ] is that natural selection is unable to instill a universal sense of what is "just" or "fair" with regard to treatment of siblings, since behavior that is most conducive to propagation of the parents' genes differs from what is most favorable for the child's genes.
In applying science to ], Ruse writes:

<blockquote>
Alexander noted that a focus on conflicts of interest is common among biologists and other non-philosophers, but that "many moral philosophers do not approach the problem of morality and ethics as if it arose as an effort to resolve conflicts of interests."<ref name="Alex87b">{{cite book |last=Alexander |first=Richard D. |date=1987| title= The Biology of Moral Systems |publisher=Aldine De Gruyter |isbn=9780202011738}}</ref>
In a sense … the evolutionist's case is that ethics is a collective illusion of the human race, fashioned and maintained by natural selection in order to promote individual reproduction. … ethics is illusory inasmuch as it persuades us that it has an objective reference. This is the crux of the biological position.<ref>Ruse, 1986, p. 235</ref>{{Failed verification|date=February 2009}}
He defined what he called "moral systems" as societal (''not'' evolved) responses to conflicts of interest.<ref name="AlexNote1">E.g. “restraints on individuals and subgroups serving their own interests occur solely because of the likelihood of prohibitive costs being imposed by some part of the rest of society; this is precisely the definition of moral systems I am developing here.”</ref> Among other examples, he cited societal rules or laws imposing monogamy. The behavioral conflicts that are addressed by such rules have their evolutionary origin in the (genetic) ] between men and women.<ref name="Muus04"/>
</blockquote>


==Descriptive evolutionary ethics== ==Descriptive evolutionary ethics==
{{See also|Evolution of morality}}
Descriptive evolutionary ethics is empirical research into moral attitudes and beliefs (humans) or moral behaviour (animals) in an evolutionary framework. Examples can be found in the field of ]. Evolutionary psychology attempts to ''explain'' major features of psychology in terms of species-wide evolved (via ]) predispositions. Ethical topics addressed include altruistic behaviors, deceptive or harmful behaviors, an innate sense of fairness or unfairness, feelings of kindness or love, self-sacrifice, feelings related to competitiveness and moral punishment or ], moral "cheating" or ], and inclinations for a wide variety of actions judged morally good or bad by (at least some within) a given society.
The most widely accepted form of evolutionary ethics is descriptive evolutionary ethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics seeks to explain various kinds of moral phenomena wholly or partly in genetic terms. Ethical topics addressed include altruistic behaviors, conservation ethics, an innate sense of fairness, a capacity for normative guidance, feelings of kindness or love, self-sacrifice, incest-avoidance, parental care, in-group loyalty, monogamy, feelings related to competitiveness and ], moral "cheating," and ].


A key issue of evolutionary psychology has been how altruistic feelings and behaviors could have evolved when the process of natural selection is based on the multiplication over time only of those genes that adapt better to changes in the environment of the species. Theories addressing this have included ] and ] (both direct and indirect, and on a society-wide scale). ] theories have also been advanced. A key issue in evolutionary psychology has been how altruistic feelings and behaviors could have evolved, in both humans and nonhumans, when the process of natural selection is based on the multiplication over time only of those genes that adapt better to changes in the environment of the species. Theories addressing this have included ], ], and ] (both direct and indirect, and on a society-wide scale). Descriptive evolutionary ethicists have also debated whether various types of moral phenomena should be seen as adaptations which have evolved because of their direct adaptive benefits, or spin-offs that evolved as side-effects of adaptive behaviors.


==Normative evolutionary ethics== ==Normative evolutionary ethics==
Normative evolutionary ethics aims at defining which acts are right or wrong, and which things are good or bad in an evolutionary context. It is not merely ''describing'', but it is ''prescribing'' goals, values and obligations. For example ] is a form of normative evolutionary ethics, because it defines what is "good" on the basis of genetics and the theory of evolution.{{cn}} ] is a more wide ranging topic. However, to the extent it promotes ethical values and policies based on the theory of evolution, it can also be classified as a normative evolutionary ethics. According to philosopher G. E. Moore (see above) all systems of naturalistic ethics, including normative evolutionary ethics, do commit the ''naturalistic fallacy''. The naturalistic fallacy does not apply to descriptive evolutionary ethics because no ethical statements are inferred from facts. Also, the naturalistic fallacy does not apply to weaker forms of normative evolutionary ethics, namely those which are ''consistent'' with evolution, but not ''derivable'' from evolution. Normative evolutionary ethics is the most controversial branch of evolutionary ethics. Normative evolutionary ethics aims at defining which acts are right or wrong, and which things are good or bad, in evolutionary terms. It is not merely ''describing'', but it is ''prescribing'' goals, values and obligations. ], discussed above, is the most historically influential version of normative evolutionary ethics. As philosopher ] famously argued, many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics seemed to commit a logical mistake that Moore dubbed the ''naturalistic fallacy''. This was the mistake of defining a normative property, such as goodness, in terms of some non-normative, naturalistic property, such as pleasure or survival.


More sophisticated forms of normative evolutionary ethics need not commit either the naturalistic fallacy or the ]. But all varieties of normative evolutionary ethics face the difficult challenge of explaining how evolutionary facts can have normative authority for rational agents. "Regardless of why one has a given trait, the question for a rational agent is always: is it right for me to exercise it, or should I instead renounce and resist it as far as I am able?"<ref>Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 3.2.</ref>
===Criticisms===
P. G. Woolcock argues<ref name="Woolcock">Peter G. Woolcock, 'The Case against Evolutionary Ethics Today' in: ''Biology and the Foundation of Ethics'', Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp 276-306</ref> that all normative evolutionary ethics are invalid. For example the argument
:1. The human species can survive only if we let severely physically and mentally handicapped infants and children die.
:2. Therefore: we ought to let severely physically and mentally handicapped infants die.
is a fallacy because the first statement is a purely descriptive premise containing no values, and a value pops up in the conclusion. It is the famous naturalistic fallacy (G. E. Moore). Additionally, the first premise is almost certainly false. We could make the argument valid by adding a second premise, namely:
:1b We ought to do whatever is necessary to ensure the survival of the human species
but then we would no longer be deducing a value conclusion from a purely factual premise, because 1b has a value component. This can also be explained in this way: if the definition of "good" is "whatever furthers human survival", then it should be nonsensical to ask "Is human survival itself good?", but is seems a perfectly meaningful question. This is Moore's ''open-question'' argument.


== Evolutionary metaethics ==
Another fallacy according to Woolcock is the confusion between an '''instrumental''' and a '''categorical''' justification. Consider the argument "We ought to be altruistic because evolution has selected altruism over millions of years as a reliable guide to what is good". Evolutionary theory, however, tell us only that altruism is good for the survival of our species, not that the survival of the human species is good. A categeorical justification would justify people's actions regardless of what their goals are.
Evolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally right or wrong, but it might be able to illuminate our use of moral language, or to cast doubt on the existence of objective moral facts or the possibility of moral knowledge. Evolutionary ethicists such as ], ], ], and ] have defended such claims.


Some philosophers who support evolutionary meta-ethics use it to undermine views of human well-being that rely upon Aristotelian ], or other goal-directed accounts of human flourishing. A number of thinkers have appealed to evolutionary theory in an attempt to debunk ] or support moral skepticism. Sharon Street is one prominent ethicist who argues that evolutionary psychology undercuts moral realism. According to Street, human moral decision-making is "thoroughly saturated" with evolutionary influences. Natural selection, she argues, would have rewarded moral dispositions that increased fitness, not ones that track moral truths, should they exist. It would be a remarkable and unlikely coincidence if "morally blind" ethical traits aimed solely at survival and reproduction aligned closely with independent moral truths. So we cannot be confident that our moral beliefs accurately track objective moral truth. Consequently, realism forces us to embrace moral skepticism. Such skepticism, Street claims, is implausible. So we should reject realism and instead embrace some antirealist view that allows for rationally justified moral beliefs.<ref>Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." ''Philosophical Studies'', 127: 109–66.</ref>
===The future===

Given the current state of knowledge, Huxley's statement with regards to "why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil" is still accurate with regards to individual human tastes and predispositions. Yet research in the fields of evolutionary psychology and primatology is beginning to reveal, in the general case, what is good and bad for our species in order for it to thrive and, in turn, more likely be happy. Evolutionary psychology's primary focus is to derive, especially through the deep analysis of hunter-gatherer culture and primate models, what is the most accurate description of general human predispositions (i.e. our innate "hard-wiring"). And as this understanding grows, it will become more and more feasible to redesign culture itself to be more "user friendly" to its human members. After all, in the ultimate sense, culture (like a computer) is a tool to serve its users. Noted primatologist ] asserts, "In the words of Edward Wilson, biology holds us "on a leash" and will let us stray only so far from who we are. We can design our life any way we want, but whether we will thrive depends on how well the life fits human predispositions" <ref>Frans de Waal, , ''New Scientist'', 8 October 2005</ref> Thus, the goals of evolutionary psychology overlap with the ].
Defenders of moral realism have offered two sorts of replies. One is to deny that evolved moral responses would likely diverge sharply from moral truth. According to David Copp, for example, evolution would favor moral responses that promote social peace, harmony, and cooperation. But such qualities are precisely those that lie at the core of any plausible theory of objective moral truth. So Street's alleged "dilemma"—deny evolution or embrace moral skepticism—is a false choice.<ref>David Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism." ''Philosophical Issues'', 18: 186–206.</ref>

A second response to Street is to deny that morality is as "saturated" with evolutionary influences as Street claims. William Fitzpatrick, for instance, argues that "ven if there is significant evolutionary influence on the content of many of our moral beliefs, it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are arrived at partly (or in some cases wholly) through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning, just as with our mathematical, scientific and philosophical beliefs."<ref>Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 4.1.</ref> The wide variability of moral codes, both across cultures and historical time periods, is difficult to explain if morality is as pervasively shaped by genetic factors as Street claims.

Another common argument evolutionary ethicists use to debunk moral realism is to claim that the success of evolutionary psychology in explaining human ethical responses makes the notion of moral truth "explanatorily superfluous." If we can fully explain, for example, why parents naturally love and care for their children in purely evolutionary terms, there is no need to invoke any "spooky" realist moral truths to do any explanatory work. Thus, for reasons of theoretical simplicity we should not posit the existence of such truths and, instead, should explain the widely held belief in objective moral truth as "an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us to cooperate with one another (so that our genes survive)."<ref>Michael Ruse and E. O. Wilson, "The Evolution of Ethics." ''New Scientist'', 102: 1478 (17 October 1985): 51–52.</ref>

Combining ] with ] does not lead to unacceptable results in ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Skarsaune |first=Knut Olav |date=2011-01-01 |title=Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9473-8 |journal=Philosophical Studies |language=en |volume=152 |issue=2 |pages=229–243 |doi=10.1007/s11098-009-9473-8 |issn=1573-0883}}</ref> No two worlds, that are non-normatively identical, can differ normatively. The instantiation of normative properties is metaphysically possible in a world like ours.<ref>Coons, Christian. “How to prove that some acts are wrong (without making substantive moral premises)//”Philosophical Studies”, (2011), 155, (1), 83-98. ISSN 0031-8116</ref> The phylogenetic adoption of moral sense does not deprive ethical norms of independent and objective ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lutz |first=Matthew |last2=Lenman |first2=James |date=2006-06-01 |title=Moral Naturalism | journal=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/}}</ref> A parallel with general theoretical principles exists, which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during an investigation. Ethical ] cognition is vindicated to the extent to which other ] knowledge is available.<ref>Shafer-Landau, R. Evolutionary debunking moral realism and moral knowledge//”J. Ethics and Social Philosophy”. (2012), 7, (1), 1-37</ref> Scrutinizing similar situations, the developing mind pondered idealized models subject to definite laws. In ], mutually acceptable behavior was mastered. A cooperative solution in rivalry among competitors is presented by ].<ref>Rosenberg, Alex. “Will genomics do more for metaphysics than Locke?”//Boniolo, Giovanni & De Anna, Gabriele, “Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology”, Cambridge University Press: , p.178-198. {{ISBN|978-0-521-12270-2}}</ref> This behavioral pattern is not conventional (metaphysically constructive) but represents an objective relation similar to that of force or momentum equilibrium in mechanics.<ref>Mazlovskis Arnis, “Evolutionary, timeless. and current ethos”//”Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti” (2020), XXVIII, p.55-73. ISSN 1407-1908</ref>


==See also== ==See also==
* {{annotated link|Animal faith}}
* ]
* {{annotated link|Appeal to nature}}
* ]
* {{annotated link|Bioethics}}
* ]
* {{annotated link|Eugenics}}
* ]
* {{annotated link|Evolution of morality}}
* ]
* ] * {{annotated link|Game theory}}
* {{slink|Pragmatic ethics#Moral ecology}}{{snd}}Theory that morality evolves like an ecosystem
* {{annotated link|Social Darwinism}}
* {{annotated link|Universal Darwinism}}


==Notes== ==Notes==
{{reflist}}
<references/>


==References== ==References==
*{{Cite book |last=Huxley |first=Thomas Henry |author-link=Thomas Henry Huxley |contribution=Evolution and Ethics |contribution-url=http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE9/E-E.html |year=1893 |editor-last=Nitecki |editor-first=Matthew H. |editor2-last=Nitecki |editor2-first=Doris V. |title=Evolutionary Ethics |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1993 |isbn=0-7914-1499-X |postscript=<!--None--> }} *{{Cite book |last=Huxley |first=Thomas Henry |author-link=Thomas Henry Huxley |contribution=Evolution and Ethics |contribution-url=http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE9/E-E.html |year=1893 |editor-last=Nitecki |editor-first=Matthew H. |editor2-last=Nitecki |editor2-first=Doris V. |title=Evolutionary Ethics |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1993 |isbn=0-7914-1499-X }}
*{{Cite book |last=Ruse |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Ruse |contribution=Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen |editor-last=Thompson |editor-first=Paul |title=Issues in Evolutionary Ethics |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1995 |isbn=0-7914-2027-2 |postscript=<!--None--> }} *{{Cite book |last=Ruse |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Ruse |contribution=Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen |editor-last=Thompson |editor-first=Paul |title=Issues in Evolutionary Ethics |year=1995 |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1995 |isbn=0-7914-2027-2 }}


==Further reading== ==Further reading==
* {{cite book |last=Alexander |first=Richard D. |author-link=Richard D. Alexander |title=Darwinism and Human Affairs |year=1979 |isbn=0-295-95641-0}}

* Curry, O. (2006). Who's afraid of the naturalistic fallacy? ''Evolutionary Psychology, 4,'' 234-247. * Curry, O. (2006). Who's afraid of the naturalistic fallacy? ''Evolutionary Psychology, 4,'' 234–247. {{usurped|1=}}
* {{cite book |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Dawkins |title=] |year=1976 |isbn=1-155-16265-X }}

* Duntley, J.D., & ] (2004). The evolution of evil. In A. Miller (Ed.), ''The social psychology of good and evil''. New York: Guilford. 102–123. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140520235357/http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/HomePage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/The%20evolution%20of%20evil.pdf |date=20 May 2014 }}
* {{cite book |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |authorlink=Richard Dawkins |title=] |year=1976 |isbn=115516265X }}
* {{cite book |last=Hauser |first=Marc |author-link=Marc Hauser |title=] |year=2006 |isbn=0-06-078070-3 }}

* Hare, D., Blossey, B., & Reeve, H.K. (2018) Value of species and the evolution of conservation ethics. ''Royal Society Open Science, 5'' (11). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181038.
* Duntley, J.D., & ] (2004). The evolution of evil. In A. Miller (Ed.), ''The social psychology of good and evil''. New York: Guilford. 102-123.
*Huxley, Julian. ''Evolutionary Ethics 1893-1943''. Pilot, London. In USA as ''Touchstone for ethics'' Harper, N.Y. (1947)

* Katz, L. (Ed.) Imprint Academic, 2000 {{ISBN|0-907845-07-X}}
* {{cite book |last=Hauser |first=Marc |authorlink=Marc Hauser |title=] |year=2006 |isbn=0060780703 }}
* Kitcher, Philip (1995) "Four Ways of "Biologicizing" Ethics" in Elliott Sober (ed.) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, The MIT Press

* Kitcher, Philip (2005) "Biology and Ethics" in David Copp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press
* Huxley, Julian. ''Evolutionary Ethics 1893-1943''. Pilot, London. In USA as ''Touchstone for ethics'' Harper, N.Y. (1947)
* Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: A critical evaluation of Kohlberg's model. ''], 112,'' 629–649.

* Krebs, D. L. (2005). An evolutionary reconceptualization of Kohlberg's model of moral development. In R. Burgess & K. MacDonald (Eds.) ''Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development'', (pp.&nbsp;243–274). CA: Sage Publications.
* Katz, L. (Ed.) Imprint Academic, 2000 ISBN 090784507X
* Mascaro, S., Korb, K.B., Nicholson, A.E., Woodberry, O. (2010). Evolving Ethics: The New Science of Good and Evil. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.

*Richerson, P.J. & Boyd, R. (2004). Darwinian Evolutionary Ethics: Between Patriotism and Sympathy. In Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss, (Eds.), ''Evolution and Ethics: Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective'', pp.&nbsp;50–77. {{ISBN|0-8028-2695-4}}
* Krebs, D. L. & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: A critical evaluation of Kohlberg’s model. ''], 112,'' 629-649.
* {{cite book |last=Ridley |first=Matt |author-link=Matt Ridley |title=] |year=1996|publisher=Viking |isbn=0-14-026445-0}}

*{{Cite book |last=Ruse |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Ruse |contribution=The New Evolutionary Ethics |editor-last=Nitecki |editor-first=Matthew H. |editor2-last=Nitecki |editor2-first=Doris V. |title=Evolutionary Ethics |date=January 1993 |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1993 |isbn=0-7914-1499-X }}
* Krebs, D. L. (2005). An evolutionary reconceptualization of Kohlberg’s model of moral development. In R. Burgess & K. MacDonald (Eds.) ''Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development'', (pp.&nbsp;243–274). CA: Sage Publications.
* {{cite book |last=Shermer |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Shermer |title=] |year=2004 |location=New York |publisher=] |isbn=0-8050-7520-8 }}

* Teehan, J. & diCarlo, C. (2004). On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A conceptual basis for evolutionary ethics. ''Evolutionary Psychology, 2,'' 32–46. {{usurped|1=}}
*Richerson, P.J. & Boyd, R. (2004). Darwinian Evolutionary Ethics: Between Patriotism and Sympathy. In Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss, (Eds.), ''Evolution and Ethics: Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective'', pp.&nbsp;50–77. ISBN 0802826954
* {{cite book |last=de Waal |first=Frans |author-link=Frans de Waal |title=] |year=1996 |location=London |publisher=] |isbn=0-674-35660-8 }}

* Walter, A. (2006). The anti-naturalistic fallacy: Evolutionary moral psychology and the insistence of brute facts. ''Evolutionary Psychology, 4,'' 33–48. {{usurped|1=}}
* {{cite book |last=Ridley |first=Matt |authorlink=Matt Ridley |title=] |year=1996|publisher=Viking |isbn=0140264450}}
*], E. Dietrich, et al. (2003). On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology. ''Biology and Philosophy 18:'' 669–682.

*Wilson, D. S. (2002). Evolution, morality and human potential. ''Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches''. S. J. Scher and F. Rauscher, Kluwer Press: 55-70
*{{Cite book |last=Ruse |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Ruse |contribution=The New Evolutionary Ethics |editor-last=Nitecki |editor-first=Matthew H. |editor2-last=Nitecki |editor2-first=Doris V. |title=Evolutionary Ethics |place=] | publisher=] |publication-date=1993 |isbn=0-7914-1499-X |postscript=<!--None--> }}
* {{cite book |last=Wilson |first=E. O. |author-link=E. O. Wilson |title=] |year=1979 |isbn=0-671-54130-7 }}

* {{cite book |last=Shermer |first=Michael |authorlink=Michael Shermer |title=] |year=2004 |location=New York |publisher=] |isbn=0-8050-7520-8 }} * {{cite book |last=Wright |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Wright (journalist)|title=] |year=1995 |isbn=0-679-40773-1 }}

* Teehan, J. & diCarlo, C. (2004). On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A conceptual basis for evolutionary ethics. ''Evolutionary Psychology, 2,'' 32-46.

* {{cite book |last=de Waal |first=Frans |authorlink=Frans de Waal |title=] |year=1996 |location=London |publisher=] |isbn=0-674-35660-8 }}

* Walter, A. (2006). The anti-naturalistic fallacy: Evolutionary moral psychology and the insistence of brute facts. ''Evolutionary Psychology, 4,'' 33-48.

*], E. Dietrich, et al. (2003). On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology. ''Biology and Philosophy 18:'' 669-682.

*Wilson, D. S. (2002). Evolution, morality and human potential. ''Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches''. S. J. Scher and F. Rauscher, Kluwer Press: 55-70

* {{cite book |last=Wilson |first=E. O. |authorlink=E. O. Wilson |title=] |year=1979 |isbn=0671541307 }}

* {{cite book |last=Wright |first=Robert |authorlink=Robert Wright (journalist)|title=] |year=1995 |isbn=0679407731 }}


==External links== ==External links==
* by S. E. Bromberg
* at the ] * at the ]
*{{sep entry|morality-biology|Morality and Evolutionary Biology|William FitzPatrick}} *{{cite SEP |url-id=morality-biology |title=Morality and Evolutionary Biology |last=FitzPatrick |first=William}}
*{{sep entry|altruism-biological|Biological Altruism|Samir Okasha}} *{{cite SEP |url-id=altruism-biological |title=Biological Altruism |last=Okasha |first=Samir}}

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Latest revision as of 14:04, 25 November 2024

Study of evolution on morality or ethics

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Evolutionary ethics is a field of inquiry that explores how evolutionary theory might bear on our understanding of ethics or morality. The range of issues investigated by evolutionary ethics is quite broad. Supporters of evolutionary ethics have argued that it has important implications in the fields of descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics.

Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to morality based on the alleged role of evolution in shaping human psychology and behavior. Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, or ethology, and seek to explain certain human moral behaviors, capacities, and tendencies in evolutionary terms. For example, the nearly universal belief that incest is morally wrong might be explained as an evolutionary adaptation that furthered human survival.

Normative (or prescriptive) evolutionary ethics, by contrast, seeks not to explain moral behavior, but to justify or debunk certain normative ethical theories or claims. For instance, some proponents of normative evolutionary ethics have argued that evolutionary theory undermines certain widely held views of humans' moral superiority over other animals.

Evolutionary metaethics asks how evolutionary theory bears on theories of ethical discourse, the question of whether objective moral values exist, and the possibility of objective moral knowledge. For example, some evolutionary ethicists have appealed to evolutionary theory to defend various forms of moral anti-realism (the claim, roughly, that objective moral facts do not exist) and moral skepticism.

History

The first notable attempt to explore links between evolution and ethics was made by Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871). In Chapters IV and V of that work Darwin set out to explain the origin of human morality in order to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals. Darwin sought to show how a refined moral sense, or conscience, could have developed through a natural evolutionary process that began with social instincts rooted in our nature as social animals.

Not long after the publication of Darwin's The Descent of Man, evolutionary ethics took a very different—and far more dubious—turn in the form of Social Darwinism. Leading Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner sought to apply the lessons of biological evolution to social and political life. Just as in nature, they claimed, progress occurs through a ruthless process of competitive struggle and "survival of the fittest," so human progress will occur only if government allows unrestricted business competition and makes no effort to protect the "weak" or "unfit" by means of social welfare laws. Critics such as Thomas Henry Huxley, G. E. Moore, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey roundly criticized such attempts to draw ethical and political lessons from Darwinism, and by the early decades of the twentieth century Social Darwinism was widely viewed as discredited.

The modern revival of evolutionary ethics owes much to E. O. Wilson's 1975 book, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. In that work, Wilson argues that there is a genetic basis for a wide variety of human and nonhuman social behaviors.

More recently, a number of evolutionary biologists, including Richard Alexander, Robert Trivers, and George Williams, have argued for a different relation between ethics and evolution. In Alexander's words: “Ethical questions, and the study of morality or concepts of justice and right and wrong, derive solely from the existence of conflicts of interest.” The latter, in turn, are inevitable consequences of genetic individuality. Alexander argued that "Because morality involves conflicts of interest, it cannot easily be generalized into a universal despite virtually continual efforts by utilitarian philosophers to do that; morality does not derive its meaning from sets of universals or undeniable facts." Rather, he argued,

The two major contributions that evolutionary biology may be able to make to this problem are, first, to justify and promote the conscious realization that it is conflicts of interest concentrated at the individual level which lead to ethical questions, and, second, to help identify the nature and intensity of the conflicts of interest involved in specific cases.

This view runs contrary to that of the majority of philosophers who work on evolutionary ethics, since it denies the existence of an innate “moral sense” in humans.

As an example of genetic conflict, parents are selected to direct their time and resources equally among their offspring, but any particular child is more strongly related to itself than to any of its siblings, and so will desire a greater amount of parental investment than either parent is selected to give. A consequence of this parent-offspring conflict is that natural selection is unable to instill a universal sense of what is "just" or "fair" with regard to treatment of siblings, since behavior that is most conducive to propagation of the parents' genes differs from what is most favorable for the child's genes.

Alexander noted that a focus on conflicts of interest is common among biologists and other non-philosophers, but that "many moral philosophers do not approach the problem of morality and ethics as if it arose as an effort to resolve conflicts of interests." He defined what he called "moral systems" as societal (not evolved) responses to conflicts of interest. Among other examples, he cited societal rules or laws imposing monogamy. The behavioral conflicts that are addressed by such rules have their evolutionary origin in the (genetic) sexual conflict between men and women.

Descriptive evolutionary ethics

See also: Evolution of morality

The most widely accepted form of evolutionary ethics is descriptive evolutionary ethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics seeks to explain various kinds of moral phenomena wholly or partly in genetic terms. Ethical topics addressed include altruistic behaviors, conservation ethics, an innate sense of fairness, a capacity for normative guidance, feelings of kindness or love, self-sacrifice, incest-avoidance, parental care, in-group loyalty, monogamy, feelings related to competitiveness and retribution, moral "cheating," and hypocrisy.

A key issue in evolutionary psychology has been how altruistic feelings and behaviors could have evolved, in both humans and nonhumans, when the process of natural selection is based on the multiplication over time only of those genes that adapt better to changes in the environment of the species. Theories addressing this have included kin selection, group selection, and reciprocal altruism (both direct and indirect, and on a society-wide scale). Descriptive evolutionary ethicists have also debated whether various types of moral phenomena should be seen as adaptations which have evolved because of their direct adaptive benefits, or spin-offs that evolved as side-effects of adaptive behaviors.

Normative evolutionary ethics

Normative evolutionary ethics is the most controversial branch of evolutionary ethics. Normative evolutionary ethics aims at defining which acts are right or wrong, and which things are good or bad, in evolutionary terms. It is not merely describing, but it is prescribing goals, values and obligations. Social Darwinism, discussed above, is the most historically influential version of normative evolutionary ethics. As philosopher G. E. Moore famously argued, many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics seemed to commit a logical mistake that Moore dubbed the naturalistic fallacy. This was the mistake of defining a normative property, such as goodness, in terms of some non-normative, naturalistic property, such as pleasure or survival.

More sophisticated forms of normative evolutionary ethics need not commit either the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy. But all varieties of normative evolutionary ethics face the difficult challenge of explaining how evolutionary facts can have normative authority for rational agents. "Regardless of why one has a given trait, the question for a rational agent is always: is it right for me to exercise it, or should I instead renounce and resist it as far as I am able?"

Evolutionary metaethics

Evolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally right or wrong, but it might be able to illuminate our use of moral language, or to cast doubt on the existence of objective moral facts or the possibility of moral knowledge. Evolutionary ethicists such as Michael Ruse, E. O. Wilson, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street have defended such claims.

Some philosophers who support evolutionary meta-ethics use it to undermine views of human well-being that rely upon Aristotelian teleology, or other goal-directed accounts of human flourishing. A number of thinkers have appealed to evolutionary theory in an attempt to debunk moral realism or support moral skepticism. Sharon Street is one prominent ethicist who argues that evolutionary psychology undercuts moral realism. According to Street, human moral decision-making is "thoroughly saturated" with evolutionary influences. Natural selection, she argues, would have rewarded moral dispositions that increased fitness, not ones that track moral truths, should they exist. It would be a remarkable and unlikely coincidence if "morally blind" ethical traits aimed solely at survival and reproduction aligned closely with independent moral truths. So we cannot be confident that our moral beliefs accurately track objective moral truth. Consequently, realism forces us to embrace moral skepticism. Such skepticism, Street claims, is implausible. So we should reject realism and instead embrace some antirealist view that allows for rationally justified moral beliefs.

Defenders of moral realism have offered two sorts of replies. One is to deny that evolved moral responses would likely diverge sharply from moral truth. According to David Copp, for example, evolution would favor moral responses that promote social peace, harmony, and cooperation. But such qualities are precisely those that lie at the core of any plausible theory of objective moral truth. So Street's alleged "dilemma"—deny evolution or embrace moral skepticism—is a false choice.

A second response to Street is to deny that morality is as "saturated" with evolutionary influences as Street claims. William Fitzpatrick, for instance, argues that "ven if there is significant evolutionary influence on the content of many of our moral beliefs, it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are arrived at partly (or in some cases wholly) through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning, just as with our mathematical, scientific and philosophical beliefs." The wide variability of moral codes, both across cultures and historical time periods, is difficult to explain if morality is as pervasively shaped by genetic factors as Street claims.

Another common argument evolutionary ethicists use to debunk moral realism is to claim that the success of evolutionary psychology in explaining human ethical responses makes the notion of moral truth "explanatorily superfluous." If we can fully explain, for example, why parents naturally love and care for their children in purely evolutionary terms, there is no need to invoke any "spooky" realist moral truths to do any explanatory work. Thus, for reasons of theoretical simplicity we should not posit the existence of such truths and, instead, should explain the widely held belief in objective moral truth as "an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us to cooperate with one another (so that our genes survive)."

Combining Darwinism with moral realism does not lead to unacceptable results in epistemology. No two worlds, that are non-normatively identical, can differ normatively. The instantiation of normative properties is metaphysically possible in a world like ours. The phylogenetic adoption of moral sense does not deprive ethical norms of independent and objective truth-values. A parallel with general theoretical principles exists, which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during an investigation. Ethical a priori cognition is vindicated to the extent to which other a priori knowledge is available. Scrutinizing similar situations, the developing mind pondered idealized models subject to definite laws. In social relation, mutually acceptable behavior was mastered. A cooperative solution in rivalry among competitors is presented by Nash equilibrium. This behavioral pattern is not conventional (metaphysically constructive) but represents an objective relation similar to that of force or momentum equilibrium in mechanics.

See also

Notes

  1. FitzPatrick, William (2021), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), "Morality and Evolutionary Biology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 6 February 2024
  2. Gregory Bassham, The Philosophy Book: From the Vedas to the New Atheists, 250 Milestones in the History of Philosophy. New York: Sterling, 2015, p. 318.
  3. "Charles Sanders Peirce". Anti-determinism, Tychism, and Evolutionism. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2022.
  4. Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, p. 203.
  5. ^ Alexander, Richard D. (1980). "Evolution, social behavior, and ethics". In Engelhardt, H. Tristam; Callahan, Daniel (eds.). Knowing and Valuing: The Search for Common Roots. Volume IV of The Foundations of Ethics and Its Relationship to Science. Hastings Center. pp. 124–149. ISBN 0916558045.
  6. Alexander, Richard D. (1987). "Evolutionary approaches to human behavior: What does the future hold?". In Betzig, Laura; Bogerhoff Mulder, Monique; Turke, Paul (eds.). Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective. Cambridge University Press. pp. 317–341. ISBN 9780521327381.
  7. ^ Muus, Harriet (12 August 2024). "Evolutionary Ethics and Mate Selection". PsyArXiv. Center for Open Science. doi:10.31234/osf.io/c659q.
  8. Trivers, Robert L. (1974). "Parent-offspring conflict". American Zoologist. 14 (1): 249–264.
  9. Alexander, Richard D. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine De Gruyter. ISBN 9780202011738.
  10. E.g. “restraints on individuals and subgroups serving their own interests occur solely because of the likelihood of prohibitive costs being imposed by some part of the rest of society; this is precisely the definition of moral systems I am developing here.”
  11. Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 3.2.
  12. Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–66.
  13. David Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism." Philosophical Issues, 18: 186–206.
  14. Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 4.1.
  15. Michael Ruse and E. O. Wilson, "The Evolution of Ethics." New Scientist, 102: 1478 (17 October 1985): 51–52.
  16. Skarsaune, Knut Olav (1 January 2011). "Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest". Philosophical Studies. 152 (2): 229–243. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9473-8. ISSN 1573-0883.
  17. Coons, Christian. “How to prove that some acts are wrong (without making substantive moral premises)//”Philosophical Studies”, (2011), 155, (1), 83-98. ISSN 0031-8116
  18. Lutz, Matthew; Lenman, James (1 June 2006). "Moral Naturalism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive.
  19. Shafer-Landau, R. Evolutionary debunking moral realism and moral knowledge//”J. Ethics and Social Philosophy”. (2012), 7, (1), 1-37
  20. Rosenberg, Alex. “Will genomics do more for metaphysics than Locke?”//Boniolo, Giovanni & De Anna, Gabriele, “Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology”, Cambridge University Press: , p.178-198. ISBN 978-0-521-12270-2
  21. Mazlovskis Arnis, “Evolutionary, timeless. and current ethos”//”Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti” (2020), XXVIII, p.55-73. ISSN 1407-1908

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