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{{Short description|Military strategy based on overwhelming power}} | |||
].]] | |||
{{Other uses|Shock and Awe (disambiguation)}} | |||
'''Shock and Awe''' is a method of ] that attempts to destroy an adversary's will to fight through spectacular displays of power. Its authors label it a subset of ], a doctrine that advocates defeating an adversary by swift action against all aspects of their ability to resist, rather than by strictly military forces. | |||
{{war}} | |||
It is a product of the ] of the ], and has been notably applied in the ]. | |||
'''Shock and awe''' (technically known as '''rapid dominance''') is a military strategy based on the use of ] and spectacular ] to paralyze the enemy's perception of the battlefield and destroy their will to fight.<ref name="oxfordref">{{cite web |url=http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100502693 |title=Shock and awe – Overview|access-date=May 18, 2015|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref><ref name="oxford">{{cite book |last=Knowles |first=Elizabeth |year=2006 |title=The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable |isbn=978-0-19-860981-0 |location=Oxford, United Kingdom |publisher=]}}</ref> Though the concept has a variety of historical precedents, the doctrine was explained by ] and ] in 1996 and was developed specifically for application by the US military by the ] of the United States.<ref name="oxford" /><ref name="oxfordref" /> | |||
==Doctrine of |
==Doctrine of rapid dominance== | ||
Rapid dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting | |||
Rapid Dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting "to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe."{{ref|RDdef}} Further, Rapid Dominance will "impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on . . . seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels."{{ref|RDdef2}} | |||
{{Quote|to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.<ref name="rddef">Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, <cite></cite> (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV.</ref>}} | |||
Introduced in a report to the ]' National Defense University in ], Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-] military doctrine for the United States. Rapid Dominance and Shock and Awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the United States military is reduced in size and ] is increasingly integrated into warfare.{{ref|RDprologue}} Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that Rapid Dominance exploits "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" which they attribute to the United States.{{ref|RD3factors}} | |||
Further, rapid dominance will, according to Ullman and Wade, | |||
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of Rapid Dominance: "near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment."{{ref|RD4char}} | |||
{{Quote|impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on ... seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels.<ref name="rddef2">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XXV.</ref>}} | |||
''Shock and Awe'' is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect which Rapid Dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of ], overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action. The development of ]s is one enabling technology for the doctrine of Rapid Dominance. | |||
Introducing the doctrine in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-] military doctrine for the United States. Rapid dominance and shock and awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the ] is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare.<ref name="rdprologue">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, Prologue.</ref> Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that rapid dominance exploits the "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.<ref name="rd3factors">David J. Gibson, <cite> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516045556/http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_main.pl?database=ft_u2&searchid=111016521012191&keyfieldvalue=ADA389508&filename=%2Ffulcrum%2Fdata%2FTR_fulltext%2Fdoc%2FADA389508.pdf |date=2011-05-16 }}</cite> (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2001), 17.</ref> | |||
Ullman and Wade identified a number of previous events or lines of military thought which they claim relied upon inflicting shock and awe. Most cited by Ullman during the Iraq War is the ]. Ullman and Wade hold it as a case in which "nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction" caused complete shock and capitulation.{{ref|ExHN}} Rapid Dominance should seek to impose a similar though non-nuclear effect upon an adversary's psychology, they write. Concepts which they term "Overwhelming Force" and "Massive Bombardment" are noted as apparently similar to Rapid Dominance; however, they argue such approaches are not time-sensitive or suitable to small forces. Ullman and Wade write that ] employed their concepts of brilliance, rapidity, and dominance. | |||
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of rapid dominance:<ref name="rd4char">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XII.</ref> | |||
==Differences from "AirLand Battle"== | |||
# near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment; | |||
Rapid Dominance differs substantially from the previous United States doctrine of ]. Principally used in the ] ], AirLand Battle was introduced as the overarching doctrine of the ] in ]. It is a force-on-force ] method of ] which advocates the destruction of its adversary's military forces. To this end, U.S. forces would concentrate all ground and air fires against an enemy's military command, logistics, and main force units throughout their depth to achieve favorable attrition.{{ref|FM100-5}} In contrast to AirLand Battle, Rapid Dominance targets the will of the adversary's entire society; whereas AirLand Battle identified an adversary's core as its military concentrations, Rapid Dominance sees it as the adversary's psychological will to fight. | |||
# rapidity and timeliness in application; | |||
# operational brilliance in execution; and | |||
# (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment. | |||
The term "shock and awe" is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect that rapid dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of ], overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action. | |||
In the United States Army's Field Manual 1 of 2001, the concepts of Shock and Awe are visible. "The goal of future Army operations will be to simultaneously attack critical targets throughout the area of operations by rapid maneuver and precision fires to break the adversary's will and compel him to surrender," it reads.{{ref|FM1}} | |||
The doctrine of rapid dominance has evolved from the concept of "decisive force". Ulman and Wade contrast the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique. | |||
This lightning-fast, highly efficient type of war, where hundreds of targets are destroyed in the first minutes, is based on a new doctrine: | |||
]. Using technological advancements brought by the ], revolutionary capabilities are possible, which the commanders in the 1991 Iraq War could only dream of. | |||
===Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure=== | |||
==Shock and Awe vs. Terrorism== | |||
Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "inimize ], loss of life, and ]" is a "political sensitivity to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure",<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' .</ref> and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction."<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' .</ref> | |||
At face value, the doctrine of shock and awe shares much in common with the tenets of terrorism, with both intending to affect political outcomes through non-traditional uses of military power. American supporters of Shock and Awe claim that unlike terrorism, Shock and Awe does not deliberately target civilians, although civilians could be killed. Critics however, point to the difficulty in reducing civilian casualties while bombing locations with high civilian population density. | |||
Using as an example a theoretical invasion of Iraq 20 years after ], the authors claimed, "Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping ] on ] and ] had on the Japanese."<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' .</ref> | |||
Furthermore, many have argued that the label of terrorism does not hinge on civilian casualities, as terror can be elicited through many other means as well. One historical example is the terrorist group, the ] of the United States, which conducted an extensive domestic bombing campaign for many years against government and corporate property without killing a single person, through the use of extensive prior warnings and strategically flamboyant targets. Such attacks are clearly intended to elicit terror, in that case among the state and corporate apparatus itself, as well as to build a domestic insurgency, as stated in the claims of responsibility issued by the ], and so clearly fall under the realm of terrorism. | |||
Reiterating the example in an interview with ] several months before ], Ullman stated, "You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted."<ref name="cbs">CBS Evening News (Jan. 24, 2003) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml |date=2008-09-26 }} accessed August 4, 2006.</ref> | |||
Excluding any arbitrary framework of moral supremacy, it is difficult to determine if Shock and Awe is empirically different from terrorism, as both tactics' primary goal is to elicit terror, shock and awe. The words "shock" and "awe" are in fact both synonyms of "terror." | |||
==Historical applications== | |||
==Criticism== | |||
] and ] (Nagasaki is pictured) as an example of shock and awe.]] | |||
Shock and Awe met significant criticism from both military and civilian sectors. United States theorists had criticized its assumptions of total information awareness, unmatched technology, and assumptions of symmetric warfare. | |||
Ullman and Wade argue that there have been military applications that fall within some of the concepts of shock and awe. They enumerate nine examples: | |||
* ''']''': The "application of massive or overwhelming force" to "disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties to ourselves and to ] as possible." | |||
* ''']''': The establishment of shock and awe through "instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems." | |||
* '''Massive bombardment''': Described as "precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time." | |||
* ''']''': The "intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale." | |||
* ''']''': The "selective, instant beheading of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe." | |||
* '''Haitian example''': This example (occasionally referred to as the ] example) refers to a martial parade staged in Haiti on behalf of the (then) colonial power France in the early 1800s in which the native Haitians marched a small number of battalions in a cyclical manner. This led the colonial power into the belief that the size of the native forces was large enough so as to make any military action infeasible. | |||
* '''The ]s''': "Achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility." | |||
* '''Decay and default''': "The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the application of massive destruction." | |||
=== First Chechen War === | |||
In coverage by ] before the ], "Shock and Awe" was often used to mean an indiscriminate "]" or ].{{ref|Doomsday}} Critics of the war compared the plans of the United States to the ] during the ],{{ref|Guernica}} and termed such plans as ].{{ref|Savagery}} The ] had said that targets, munitions and attack times were chosen to minimize civilian casualties.{{ref|USciv}} | |||
Russia's military strategy in the ], and particularly the ], was described as "shock and awe."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=H2MIFNEcPKcC&pg=PA125|title=Warfare in Woods and Forests|last=Clayton|first=Anthony|date=2011-12-07|publisher=Indiana University Press |isbn=978-0253005533|pages=125|language=en}}</ref> | |||
=== Iraq War === | |||
Shock and Awe–style warfare also seems to be less effective against an extended insurgency than against an enemy's military. | |||
{{main|2003 invasion of Iraq}} | |||
== |
==== Buildup ==== | ||
Before the ], United States armed forces officials described their plan as employing shock and awe.<ref name="appterm">{{cite web |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-faces-massive-us-missile-barrage/ |title=Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage |website=] |date=24 January 2003 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml |archive-date=2008-09-26 }}" (], January 24, 2003.</ref> But, ], commanding general of the invading forces, "had never cared for the use of the term 'shock and awe' " and "had not seen that effect as the point of the air offensive."<ref>{{Cite book |title=The Iraq war |last=Keegan |first=John |date=2004 |publisher=A.A. Knopf |isbn=9781400043446 |edition=1st American |location=New York |oclc=647323673}}</ref> | |||
Before the ] in ], officials in the ] described their plan as employing Shock and Awe.{{ref|AppTerm}} During the war, Harlan K. Ullman, principal author of <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, said the United States' did not execute a Shock and Awe campaign.{{ref|UllmanNF}} | |||
==== Conflicting pre-war assessments ==== | |||
Limited bombing began on ] 2003 as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill ]. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until ], when at 1700 ] the main bombing campaign of the Coalition began. Its forces launched approximately 1700 air ]s (504 using ]s).{{ref|Sorties}} Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards ] on the previous day, attempting to strike quickly. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on ], and the United States declared victory on ]. | |||
Before its implementation, there was dissent within the Bush administration as to whether the shock and awe plan would work. According to a CBS News report, "One senior official called it a bunch of bull, but confirmed it is the concept on which the war plan is based." CBS Correspondent David Martin noted that during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in the prior year, the U.S. forces were "badly surprised by the willingness of al Qaeda to fight to the death. If the Iraqis fight, the U.S. would have to throw in reinforcements and win the old fashioned way by crushing the Republican Guards, and that would mean more casualties on both sides."<ref>{{cite news | |||
|title=Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage | |||
|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-faces-massive-us-missile-barrage/ | |||
|author=David Martin | |||
|publisher=CBS News | |||
|date=January 24, 2003 | |||
|access-date=March 8, 2005 | |||
|archive-date=September 26, 2008 | |||
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml | |||
|url-status=live | |||
}}</ref> | |||
==== Campaign ==== | |||
Whether or to what extent the United States fought a campaign of Shock and Awe is unclear by contradictory post-war assessments. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on ], the '']'' published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command.{{ref|WPInterview}} According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralising effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's ] and ] units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad, and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide." | |||
Continuous bombing began on March 19, 2003, as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill ] with ]s. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until March 21, 2003, when, at 1700 ], the main bombing campaign of the US and their allies began. Its forces launched approximately 1,700 air sorties (504 using ]s).<ref name="sorties">"", ], April 30, 2003, 15.</ref> Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards ] on the previous day. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on April 5, and the United States declared victory on April 15. The term "shock and awe" is typically used to describe only the very beginning of the invasion of Iraq, not the larger war, nor ]. | |||
==== Conflicting post-war assessments ==== | |||
In contrast, in an ] presentation to the ] Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to Rapid Dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude."{{ref|USAWC}} The speed of the Coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities. | |||
To what extent the United States fought a campaign of shock and awe is unclear as post-war assessments are contradictory. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on April 27, '']'' published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command.<ref name="wpinterview">William Branigin, "", ], October 27, 2003.</ref> According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralizing effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's ] and ] units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide." | |||
In contrast, in an October 2003 presentation to the ] Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to rapid dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude". The speed of the coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities.<ref name="usawc">"", presentation by the United States Army War College to United States House Committee on Armed Services, October 21, 2003.</ref> | |||
Later, another theory was proposed that Saddam Hussein may have set up conditions for a long guerrilla insurgency. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/041220/20baghdad.htm | |||
According to ''National Geographic'' researcher Bijal Trivedi, "Even after several days of bombing the Iraqis showed remarkable resilience. Many continued with their daily lives, working and shopping, as bombs continued to fall around them. According to some analysts, the military's attack was perhaps too precise. It did not trigger shock and awe in the Iraqis and, in the end, the city was only captured after close combat on the outskirts of Baghdad."<ref name="NatlGeo">{{cite web | |||
==Popular culture== | |||
|title=Inside Shock and Awe | |||
Following the ] in ], the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The ] received at least 29 applications using "Shock and Awe."{{ref|29Patents}} The first came from a fireworks company on the day the United States started bombing ]. The ] manufacturers ] and ] have attempted to use "shock and awe" in titles, but met criticism. Miscellaneous uses of the term include ] equipment, an ], a ] and a set of Bowling balls called Shock & Awe and Total Shock & Awe by the company MoRich | |||
|url=http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/channel/blog/2005/03/explorer_shockawe.html | |||
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050407005312/http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/channel/blog/2005/03/explorer_shockawe.html | |||
|url-status=dead | |||
|archive-date=April 7, 2005 | |||
|author=Bijal Trivedi | |||
|publisher=National Geographic Channel | |||
|date=February 14, 2005}}</ref> | |||
==== Criticism of execution ==== | |||
A ] comedy album was released in 2003 under the title ''Shock and Awe.'' That same year, country musician ] released an album entitled '']''. | |||
According to '']'' correspondent ] in 2003, "To some in the Arab and Muslim countries, Shock and Awe is terrorism by another name; to others, a crime that compares unfavourably with September 11."<ref name="Guardian">Whitaker, B. (March 24, 2003) "Flags in the dust" ''Guardian Unlimited'' accessed July 30, 2006.</ref> Anti-war protesters in 2003 also claimed that "the shock and awe pummeling of Baghdad a kind of terrorism."<ref>{{cite news | |||
|title=Antiwar Protesters Spar With Police | |||
|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11085-2003Mar22?language=printer | |||
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180810155953/https://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11085-2003Mar22/?language=printer | |||
|url-status=dead | |||
|archive-date=August 10, 2018 | |||
|newspaper=The Washington Post | |||
|date=March 22, 2003}}</ref> | |||
==== Casualties ==== | |||
The pronunciation of the phrase "shock and awe" bears some resemblance to the pronunciation of the Hebrew word "]" which means, "the glory or radiance of God". This likeness is coincidental. | |||
A dossier released by ], a project of the U.K. non-governmental non-violent and disarmament organization ], attributed approximately 6,616 civilian deaths to the actions of U.S.-led forces during the "invasion phase", including the shock-and-awe bombing campaign on Baghdad.<ref>{{cite web | |||
|url=http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr12.php | |||
|title=A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005 | |||
|publisher=Iraq Body Count | |||
|date=July 18, 2005}}</ref> | |||
These findings were disputed by both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boylan, the spokesman for the U.S. military in Baghdad, stated, "I don't know how they are doing their methodology and can't talk to how they calculate their numbers," as well as "we do everything we can to avoid civilian casualties in all of our operations."<ref>{{cite news | |||
==See also== | |||
|title=Iraq war takes heavy toll on civilians | |||
*] | |||
|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8628614 | |||
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050721003842/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8628614/ | |||
|url-status=live | |||
|archive-date=July 21, 2005 | |||
|publisher=Reuters/MSNBC.com | |||
|date=July 19, 2005}}</ref> National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi stated, "Civilian casualties did occur, but the strikes, for the most part, were surgical."<ref name="NatlGeo"/> | |||
==In popular culture== | |||
*] | |||
Following the ] by the US, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The ] received at least 29 trademark applications in 2003 for exclusive use of the term.<ref name="29patents">Robert Longley, " {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140713143740/http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/shockandawe.htm |date=2014-07-13 }}", ], October 27, 2003.</ref> The first came from a fireworks company on the day the US started bombing ]. ] registered the trademark the day after the beginning of the operation for use in a video game title but later withdrew the application and described it as "an exercise of regrettable bad judgment."<ref>{{cite news | |||
|title=Tech Briefs: Sony says it's sorry for 'shock and awe' idea | |||
|url=http://www.seattlepi.com/business/118102_tbrf18.html | |||
|publisher=Seattle Post-Intelligencer | |||
|date=April 18, 2003}}</ref> | |||
In an interview, ] stated that he believed that using the term to try to sell products was "probably a mistake", and that "the marketing value will be somewhere between slim and none".<ref>{{cite news | |||
==References== | |||
|title=US companies battle over 'shock and awe' copyright | |||
#{{note|RDdef}}Harlan K. Ullmann and James P. Wade, <cite><cite> (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV. | |||
|url=http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s856964.htm | |||
#{{note|RDdef2}}Ullmann and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XXV. | |||
|publisher=The World Today | |||
#{{note|RDprologue}}Ullmann and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, Prologue. | |||
|author=Agnes Cusack | |||
#{{note|RD3factors}}David J. Gibson, <cite></cite> (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2001), 17. | |||
|date=May 16, 2003}}</ref> | |||
#{{note|RD4char}}Ullmann and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XII. | |||
#{{note|ExHN}}Ullmann and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, 23. | |||
Shock and awe is the job of Jane Doe, most commonly known as The Soldier from ]'s 2007 multi-player FPS game ''].'' | |||
#{{note|FM100-5}}<cite>Field Manual 100-5 'Operations'</cite> (United States Army, 1982). | |||
#{{note|FM1}}<cite>Field Manual 1 'The Army'</cite> (United States Army, 2001), The Characteristics of Future Operations. | |||
In the 2009 theatrical movie '']'', the genocide attack on the Na'vi is described as a "Shock and Awe" campaign by doctor Max Patel. | |||
#{{note|Doomsday}}Oliver Burkeman, "", ], ] ]. | |||
#{{note|Guernica}}Gar Smith, "", ], ] ]. | |||
In the 2011 theatrical film '']'', the invasion by the alien force is described as using "rapid dominance" along the world's coastlines, including indiscriminate use of heavy ordnance. | |||
#{{note|Savagery}}Henry Michaels, "", World Socialist Web Site, ] ]. | |||
#{{note|USciv}}"", ], ] ]. | |||
A mission entitled "Shock and Awe" in the video game '']'' concludes with the detonation of a nuclear warhead. | |||
#{{note|AppTerm}}"" (], ] ]. | |||
#{{note|UllmanNF}}Paul Sperry, "", ], ] ]. | |||
In the 2008 video game '']'', one of the songs in the soundtrack of the game is titled "Shock and Awe". | |||
#{{note|Sorties}}"", ], ] ], 15. | |||
#{{note|WPInterview}}William Branigin, "", ], ] ]. | |||
In the 2016 video game ], one doctrine the player can select is named “Shock and Awe”, focussing on overwhelming Artillery- and Air support. However, the game is set before Ullman and Wade’s explanation of the terminology. | |||
#{{note|USAWC}}"", presentation by the United States Army War College to United States House Committee on Armed Services, ] ]. | |||
#{{note|29Patents}}Robert Longley, "", ], ] ]. | |||
==See also== | |||
#{{note|sA}}Jason Athenety, "" | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
==Notes== | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
<!-- Dead note "USciv": "", ], March 22, 2003. --> | |||
==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
*Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". United States Army Command and General Staff College, |
* Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". ''United States Army Command and General Staff College'', June 17, 2004. | ||
*Branigin, William. "". ], |
* Branigin, William. "". '']'', October 27, 2003. | ||
*Peterson, Scott. "". ], |
* Peterson, Scott. "". '']'', January 30, 2003. | ||
*Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. <cite> |
* Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. <cite>Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons</cite>. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998. | ||
*Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. <cite>Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons</cite>. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998. | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:13, 29 August 2024
Military strategy based on overwhelming power For other uses, see Shock and Awe (disambiguation).Shock and awe (technically known as rapid dominance) is a military strategy based on the use of overwhelming power and spectacular displays of force to paralyze the enemy's perception of the battlefield and destroy their will to fight. Though the concept has a variety of historical precedents, the doctrine was explained by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in 1996 and was developed specifically for application by the US military by the National Defense University of the United States.
Doctrine of rapid dominance
Rapid dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting
to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.
Further, rapid dominance will, according to Ullman and Wade,
impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on ... seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels.
Introducing the doctrine in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-Cold War military doctrine for the United States. Rapid dominance and shock and awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the United States military is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare. Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that rapid dominance exploits the "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of rapid dominance:
- near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment;
- rapidity and timeliness in application;
- operational brilliance in execution; and
- (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment.
The term "shock and awe" is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect that rapid dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action.
The doctrine of rapid dominance has evolved from the concept of "decisive force". Ulman and Wade contrast the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique.
Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure
Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "inimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage" is a "political sensitivity to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure", and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction."
Using as an example a theoretical invasion of Iraq 20 years after Operation Desert Storm, the authors claimed, "Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese."
Reiterating the example in an interview with CBS News several months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Ullman stated, "You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted."
Historical applications
Ullman and Wade argue that there have been military applications that fall within some of the concepts of shock and awe. They enumerate nine examples:
- Overwhelming force: The "application of massive or overwhelming force" to "disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties to ourselves and to noncombatants as possible."
- Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The establishment of shock and awe through "instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems."
- Massive bombardment: Described as "precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time."
- Blitzkrieg: The "intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale."
- Sun Tzu: The "selective, instant beheading of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe."
- Haitian example: This example (occasionally referred to as the Potemkin village example) refers to a martial parade staged in Haiti on behalf of the (then) colonial power France in the early 1800s in which the native Haitians marched a small number of battalions in a cyclical manner. This led the colonial power into the belief that the size of the native forces was large enough so as to make any military action infeasible.
- The Roman legions: "Achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility."
- Decay and default: "The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the application of massive destruction."
First Chechen War
Russia's military strategy in the First Chechen War, and particularly the Battle of Grozny, was described as "shock and awe."
Iraq War
Main article: 2003 invasion of IraqBuildup
Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, United States armed forces officials described their plan as employing shock and awe. But, Tommy Franks, commanding general of the invading forces, "had never cared for the use of the term 'shock and awe' " and "had not seen that effect as the point of the air offensive."
Conflicting pre-war assessments
Before its implementation, there was dissent within the Bush administration as to whether the shock and awe plan would work. According to a CBS News report, "One senior official called it a bunch of bull, but confirmed it is the concept on which the war plan is based." CBS Correspondent David Martin noted that during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in the prior year, the U.S. forces were "badly surprised by the willingness of al Qaeda to fight to the death. If the Iraqis fight, the U.S. would have to throw in reinforcements and win the old fashioned way by crushing the Republican Guards, and that would mean more casualties on both sides."
Campaign
Continuous bombing began on March 19, 2003, as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill Saddam Hussein with decapitation strikes. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until March 21, 2003, when, at 1700 UTC, the main bombing campaign of the US and their allies began. Its forces launched approximately 1,700 air sorties (504 using cruise missiles). Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards Baghdad on the previous day. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on April 5, and the United States declared victory on April 15. The term "shock and awe" is typically used to describe only the very beginning of the invasion of Iraq, not the larger war, nor the ensuing insurgency.
Conflicting post-war assessments
To what extent the United States fought a campaign of shock and awe is unclear as post-war assessments are contradictory. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on April 27, The Washington Post published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command. According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralizing effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide."
In contrast, in an October 2003 presentation to the United States House Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to rapid dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude". The speed of the coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities.
According to National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi, "Even after several days of bombing the Iraqis showed remarkable resilience. Many continued with their daily lives, working and shopping, as bombs continued to fall around them. According to some analysts, the military's attack was perhaps too precise. It did not trigger shock and awe in the Iraqis and, in the end, the city was only captured after close combat on the outskirts of Baghdad."
Criticism of execution
According to The Guardian correspondent Brian Whitaker in 2003, "To some in the Arab and Muslim countries, Shock and Awe is terrorism by another name; to others, a crime that compares unfavourably with September 11." Anti-war protesters in 2003 also claimed that "the shock and awe pummeling of Baghdad a kind of terrorism."
Casualties
A dossier released by Iraq Body Count, a project of the U.K. non-governmental non-violent and disarmament organization Oxford Research Group, attributed approximately 6,616 civilian deaths to the actions of U.S.-led forces during the "invasion phase", including the shock-and-awe bombing campaign on Baghdad.
These findings were disputed by both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boylan, the spokesman for the U.S. military in Baghdad, stated, "I don't know how they are doing their methodology and can't talk to how they calculate their numbers," as well as "we do everything we can to avoid civilian casualties in all of our operations." National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi stated, "Civilian casualties did occur, but the strikes, for the most part, were surgical."
In popular culture
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The United States Patent and Trademark Office received at least 29 trademark applications in 2003 for exclusive use of the term. The first came from a fireworks company on the day the US started bombing Baghdad. Sony registered the trademark the day after the beginning of the operation for use in a video game title but later withdrew the application and described it as "an exercise of regrettable bad judgment."
In an interview, Harlan Ullman stated that he believed that using the term to try to sell products was "probably a mistake", and that "the marketing value will be somewhere between slim and none".
Shock and awe is the job of Jane Doe, most commonly known as The Soldier from Valve's 2007 multi-player FPS game Team Fortress 2.
In the 2009 theatrical movie Avatar, the genocide attack on the Na'vi is described as a "Shock and Awe" campaign by doctor Max Patel.
In the 2011 theatrical film Battle: Los Angeles, the invasion by the alien force is described as using "rapid dominance" along the world's coastlines, including indiscriminate use of heavy ordnance.
A mission entitled "Shock and Awe" in the video game Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare concludes with the detonation of a nuclear warhead.
In the 2008 video game Command & Conquer: Red Alert 3, one of the songs in the soundtrack of the game is titled "Shock and Awe".
In the 2016 video game Hearts of Iron IV, one doctrine the player can select is named “Shock and Awe”, focussing on overwhelming Artillery- and Air support. However, the game is set before Ullman and Wade’s explanation of the terminology.
See also
- Demoralization (military)
- Hearts and minds (Iraq)
- Powell Doctrine
- Psychological warfare
- Rumsfeld Doctrine
- Terror (politics)
- London Blitz
- Blitzkrieg
Notes
- ^ "Shock and awe – Overview". Oxford University Press. Retrieved May 18, 2015.
- ^ Knowles, Elizabeth (2006). The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-860981-0.
- Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, XXV.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, Prologue.
- David J. Gibson, Shock and Awe: A Sufficient Condition for Victory? Archived 2011-05-16 at the Wayback Machine (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2001), 17.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, XII.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, Introduction.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, Chapter 5.
- Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe, Chapter 1.
- CBS Evening News (Jan. 24, 2003) Interview with Harlan Ullman Archived 2008-09-26 at the Wayback Machine accessed August 4, 2006.
- Clayton, Anthony (2011-12-07). Warfare in Woods and Forests. Indiana University Press. p. 125. ISBN 978-0253005533.
- "Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage". CBS News. 24 January 2003. Archived from the original on 2008-09-26." (CBS News, January 24, 2003.
- Keegan, John (2004). The Iraq war (1st American ed.). New York: A.A. Knopf. ISBN 9781400043446. OCLC 647323673.
- David Martin (January 24, 2003). "Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage". CBS News. Archived from the original on September 26, 2008. Retrieved March 8, 2005.
- "Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers", USCENTAF, April 30, 2003, 15.
- William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers", Washington Post, October 27, 2003.
- "Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy", presentation by the United States Army War College to United States House Committee on Armed Services, October 21, 2003.
- ^ Bijal Trivedi (February 14, 2005). "Inside Shock and Awe". National Geographic Channel. Archived from the original on April 7, 2005.
- Whitaker, B. (March 24, 2003) "Flags in the dust" Guardian Unlimited Iraq special report at guardian.co.uk accessed July 30, 2006.
- "Antiwar Protesters Spar With Police". The Washington Post. March 22, 2003. Archived from the original on August 10, 2018.
- "A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005". Iraq Body Count. July 18, 2005.
- "Iraq war takes heavy toll on civilians". Reuters/MSNBC.com. July 19, 2005. Archived from the original on July 21, 2005.
- Robert Longley, "Patent Office Suffers 'Shock and Awe' Attack Archived 2014-07-13 at the Wayback Machine", About.com, October 27, 2003.
- "Tech Briefs: Sony says it's sorry for 'shock and awe' idea". Seattle Post-Intelligencer. April 18, 2003.
- Agnes Cusack (May 16, 2003). "US companies battle over 'shock and awe' copyright". The World Today.
Further reading
- Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". United States Army Command and General Staff College, June 17, 2004.
- Branigin, William. "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers". Washington Post, October 27, 2003.
- Peterson, Scott. "US mulls air strategies in Iraq". Christian Science Monitor, January 30, 2003.
- Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998.
External links
- Shock and awe Archived 2007-03-12 at the Wayback Machine, from SourceWatch
- Command and Control Research Program