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{{Short description|Unpopulated islet in southeastern Aegean}} | |||
{{Infobox Disputed Islands | |||
{{Redirect|Kardak|the village in Iran|Kardak, Iran}} | |||
| plural = yes | |||
{{pp-semi-indef}} | |||
| name = Kardak | |||
{{Infobox islands | |||
| image name = Imia with legends tr.svg | |||
| disputed = yes | |||
| image caption = Closeup map. | |||
| |
| name = Imia | ||
| plural = yes | |||
| locator map = {{location map|Greece|label=Imia/Kardak |position=left|width=250|lat=37.03|long=27.09|caption=Imia/Kardak in the Aegean Sea|float=right}} | |||
| other_names = '''Kardak''', '''Limnia''', '''İkizce''', '''Heipethes''' | |||
| map_custom = yes | |||
| |
| pushpin_map = Greece#Turkey | ||
| location = ] | |||
| native name link = | |||
| coordinates = {{coord|37|03|03|N|27|09|04|E|display=inline,title}} | |||
| other_names = '''İkizce''' | |||
| |
| total_islands = 2 | ||
| area_ha = 4 | |||
| coordinates = {{coord|37|03|03|N|27|09|04|E|display=inline,title}} | |||
| |
| country1 = Greece | ||
| |
| country2 = Turkey | ||
| |
| population = 0 | ||
| area = {{convert|40000|m2|ha acre|disp=or|abbr=on}} | |||
| length = | |||
| width = | |||
| coastline = | |||
| highest mount = | |||
| elevation = | |||
| country claim = Greece | |||
| country claim divisions title = | |||
| country claim divisions = | |||
| country 1 claim = | |||
| country 1 claim divisions title = | |||
| country 1 claim divisions = | |||
| country = Turkey | |||
| population = 0 | |||
| population as of = | |||
| density = | |||
| ethnic groups = | |||
| additional info = | |||
}} | }} | ||
''' |
'''Imia''' ({{langx|el|Ίμια}}) is a pair of small uninhabited ]s in the ], situated between the Greek island chain of the ] and the southwestern mainland coast of ]. They are known in Turkey as '''Kardak'''. | ||
Imia was the object of a military crisis and subsequent dispute over sovereignty between ] and ] in 1996. The Imia dispute is part of the larger ], which also comprises disputes over the ], the territorial waters, the ], the ]s (FIR) and the ] of the Aegean islands.<ref name="Maxwell">{{cite web | url = http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada420639 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130724010338/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada420639 | url-status = dead | archive-date = July 24, 2013 | title = Dispute in the Aegean Sea | access-date = 2013-07-24 | last = Arapoglou | first = Stergios, Major | work = Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama}}</ref> In the aftermath of the Imia crisis, the dispute was also widened, as Turkey began to lay parallel claims to a larger number of other islets in the Aegean. These islands, some of them inhabited, are regarded as indisputably Greek by Greece but as ] of undetermined sovereignty by Turkey. | |||
Their total surface area is {{convert|10|acres}}. The islands are also referred to as '''Limnia''' in Greek, or '''İkizce''' in Turkish, or as '''Heipethes''' in some early-20th century maps.<ref name="inanbas1997">Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): ''Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü''. Ankara. (ISBN 975-96281-0-4).</ref> Imia/Kardak was the object of a military crisis and subsequent dispute over sovereignty between ] and ] in 1996. | |||
==Geography== | |||
The Imia-Kardak dispute is part of the larger ], which also comprises disputes over the ], the territorial waters, the ], the ]s (FIR) and the ] of the Aegean islands. In the aftermath of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the dispute was also widened, as Turkey began to lay parallel claims to a larger number of other islets in the Aegean. These islands, some of them inhabited, are regarded as indisputably Greek by Greece but as ] of undetermined sovereignty by Turkey. | |||
The islets lie {{convert|5.5|nmi|lk=in}} east of the Greek island ], {{convert|1.9|nmi|abbr=on}} southeast of the Greek island of ], {{convert|3.8|nmi|abbr=on}} west of the Turkish peninsula of ], and {{convert|2.2|nmi|abbr=on}} from the Turkish islet of ]. The islets lie some {{Convert|300|m|abbr=on|sigfig=1}} apart from each other, the eastern one being slightly larger than the western one. Their total surface area is {{convert|10|acres}}. | |||
The islands are also referred to as '''Limnia''' (Λίμνια) in Greek, or '''İkizce''' in Turkish, or as '''Heipethes''' in some early-20th century maps.<ref name="inanbas1997">Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): ''Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü''. Ankara. ({{ISBN|975-96281-0-4}}).</ref> The toponym "Kardak" is believed to come from the Greek "Kar(y)dakia", i.e. "small walnuts", because of their shape.<ref> "The Kardakia were called so by the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Turks were calling them Kardak. Recently they renamed them to Ikince (meaning "double") obviously realizing that Kardak is of Greek origin" (quoting prof. I. Promponas)</ref> | |||
==The military crisis== | |||
While several other aspects of sovereignty rights in the Aegean had been a hotly disputed topic between the two countries for decades, conflicts over the possession of actual territory in the area were unknown until the end of 1995. The dispute over Imia arose on the occasion of a naval accident on 25 December 1995 when the Turkish cargo ship ''Figen Akat'' ran ashore on the islets and had to be ]d. | |||
==Background== | |||
It turned out that maps of the area were showing conflicting attributions of the islets to either Greece and Turkey. This at first resulted in a conflict between the Turkish captain and the Greek authorities over who was responsible for the salvage operation. On 27 December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry first notified the Greek authorities that it believed there was a sovereignty issue, and on 29 December it officially declared it considered the islets Turkish territory. | |||
] | |||
While several other aspects of ], such as the territorial waters and national airspace, had been disputed between the two countries for decades, conflicts over the possession of island territory were unknown until the end of 1995. Until 1985 Turkish hydrographic maps recognised the course of the Greek-Turkish border halfway between Imia and the Turkish coast.<ref>Example : Turkish Navy Hydrographic map N° 2342 "Ege Adalari - Türkiye-Yunanistan", Harta Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara 1956</ref> The dispute over Imia arose when, on 26 December 1995, the Turkish cargo ship ''Figen Akat'' accidentally ran aground on the east islet and had to be ].<ref name="eisa-net.org">{{Cite web|url=http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Schmidt_Institions%20in%20militarized%20crises.pdf|title=Are Institutions impotent in militarized Crisis? Limits of Institutional Contributions to Conflict Deescalation.-Carina Schmidt|access-date=2017-09-30|archive-date=2017-10-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171001031318/http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Schmidt_Institions%20in%20militarized%20crises.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> | |||
A Greek ] responded to the distress call. The Turkish captain initially refused the assistance offered, maintaining that he was within Turkish territorial waters. He ultimately accepted being towed to the Turkish port of ] by the Greek tugboat. The Greek captain filled in the necessary papers for the salvage fee but the Turkish captain objected, arguing that the freighter had been in Turkish waters.<ref name="Air_War_College">{{Cite web|url=http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2001_sensemaking_workshop/pdf/war_in_the_agean.pdf|title=Falling Towards War in the Aegean: A Case Study of the Imia/Kardak Affair}}</ref><ref name=Air_University/> | |||
The whole event was hardly reported by the media and it was not widely known to either the Greek or the Turkish public until a month later, on 20 January 1996 when the Greek magazine ''GRAMMA'' ran a story, one day after ] was appointed to form the new Greek government as ]. The article brought a severe reaction from the Greek press, which was followed by the mayor of Kalymnos and a priest hoisting a ] on the rocks on 26 January. | |||
On 27 December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry notified the Greek authorities that it believed there was a sovereignty issue, and on 29 December it declared the islets Turkish territory. On January 9, Athens rejected the claim, citing the ] (1923), the ] and the ] (1947). | |||
To oppose this, some Turkish TV ]s flew to the islet in a helicopter and raised a ], bringing down the Greek one, the whole event being broadcast live on Turkish television. Within 24 hours, the ] changed the flag (on 30 January), resulting in an exchange of fierce statements by the ] ] and the new Greek Prime Minister ]. Turkish and Greek naval forces were alerted and warships of both countries, both ] members, sailed to the islets. | |||
The whole event was barely reported in the media so it was not widely known to public until a month later, on 20 January 1996 when the Greek magazine ''GRAMMA'' ran a story, one day after ] was appointed to form a new Greek government as ]. The article brought a severe reaction from the Greek press, which was followed by four citizens of the neighboring island of ], including the mayor and the owner of a herd of sheep that remained on the islets, hoisting a Greek flag on the east islet on 25 January.<ref name="eisa-net.org"/> | |||
During the crisis, at the night of 28th of January, Greek special forces landed secretly on the east islet undetected. On 31 January at 1:40 am Turkish special forces also landed undetected on the west islet and once again changed the flag escalating the tensions, it wasn't until 4 hours later when the Greeks noticed this when a Greek helicopter took off at 5:30 am from the Greek ] "Navarino" for reconnaissance. During the mission it crashed over the islets (some speculating due to Turkish fire), but this was concealed by both states<ref></ref> to prevent further escalation. Three Greek officers on the helicopter died (Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos, and Ektoras Gialopsos). | |||
To oppose this, on 27 January some Turkish journalists from ] landed on the islet with a helicopter, lowered the Greek flag and hoisted a ], the whole event being broadcast live on Turkish television. | |||
The immediate military threat was defused primarily by American officials - in particular, US envoy ], working by telephone with officials of both sides during the final hours of the crisis. The Greeks and Turks did not speak directly to one another, but were responsive to Washington's assistance as an informal intermediary. Agreement was given by both sides to the United States to return to the "status quo ante" -- i.e., differing views on sovereignty and no military forces on the islets. Greek and Turkish officials provided assurances to the United States that their military forces on and arrayed around the islets would be removed, with the U.S. agreeing to monitor the withdrawal.<ref>, '']'', 31 January 1996.</ref> While US engagement was instrumental in defusing the crisis, the fundamental territorial issue has remained unresolved since that time. | |||
On 28 January, the ] patrol boat ''Antoniou'' lowered the Turkish flag and restored the Greek flag, in violation of the political order which was only to lower the Turkish flag, resulting in an exchange of fierce statements by the ] ] and the new Greek prime minister ]. Turkish and Greek naval forces were alerted and warships of both countries, both ] members, sailed to the islets.<ref name="Congress">{{cite web | url = http://congressionalresearch.com/96-140/document.php?study=Greece+and+Turkey+The+Rocky+Islet+Crisis | title = Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis | access-date = 2013-07-24 | last = Migdalovitz | first = Carol | work = Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress}}</ref> | |||
Nationalistic media seem to have played a role in inciting weak governments in Greece and Turkey to take action over the islets. | |||
==Legal status of the islets== | |||
The Greek government had recently completed two months of limbo induced by former Prime Minister ]'s prolonged illness, which resulted in his resignation. After only one week, the Costas Simitis government, which was still developing its identity, experienced the crisis. In contrast, Turkey's national election in late December was a stalemate, with competing leaders unable to reach an agreement on a new coalition administration. The opposition Islamist ] party won the most votes and dominated negotiations and other events. Tansu Ciller led an interim administration without a mandate until a new one was formed. The political uncertainty in Athens and Ankara made them exposed to predatory press, enabling the issue to quickly escalate. Greece and Turkey accused each other of using domestic uncertainty for hostile actions.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
The crucial point of reference for the assessment of the legal status of the islets, acknowledged as such by both sides, is the ] of 1923. With this peace treaty, Turkey confirmed large cessions of former Ottoman territory to Greece and Italy, most of which had factually been in effect since 1911 or 1913. The chain of the ] islands, which includes the islands neighbouring Imia/Kardak, were ceded to Italy. Later the rights to these islands were ceded by Italy to Greece with the 1947 ]. However, the Treaty of Lausanne does not mention every single small island by name, but treats them summarily. | |||
==Military crisis== | |||
Accordingly, at the heart of the legal issue of Imia/Kardak is the question whether these islands, by virtue of their geographic situation, fall under the scope of the renunciation of sovereignty and the cession to Italy as defined by certain articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. There are also issues relating to the interpretation of a later protocol signed between Italy and Turkey in 1932; regarding certain diplomatic exchanges made between the three parties at various times between 1932 and 1996; and regarding the relevance of actual practice (the factual exercise of sovereignty by either party) prior to 1996. | |||
{{Infobox military conflict | |||
| conflict = Imia Crisis | |||
| partof = ] | |||
| image = Kardak (Imia) Islets E-7218.jpg | |||
| image_size = 400px | |||
| caption = Location of the islands | |||
| place = Imia | |||
| coordinates = | |||
| date = 28–31 January 1996 | |||
| status = | |||
| goals = | |||
| concessions = | |||
| causes = | |||
| methods = | |||
| result = Ceasefire | |||
| combatant1 = {{flag|Greece}} | |||
* {{flagicon image|Naval_Jack_of_Greece.svg}} ] | |||
| combatant2 = {{flag|Turkey}} | |||
* {{flagicon image|Flag_of_Turkish_Naval_Forces_Command.PNG}} ] | |||
| commander1 = {{flagicon|Greece}} ''']'''<br><small>(])</small><br>{{flagicon|Greece}} ]<br><small>(])</small><br>{{flagicon|Greece}} Christos Lymperis <br><small>(Commander-in-chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces)</small> | |||
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Turkey}} ''']'''<br><small>(])</small><br>{{flagicon|Turkey}} ]<br><small>(])</small><br>{{flagicon|Turkey}} Güven Erkaya<br><small>(Commander-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces)</small> | |||
| casualties1 = 3 (helicopter crash)<ref name="auto">{{cite web|url=http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/Greek-Turkish-Media.PDF|title=The Role of the Media in Greek - Turkish Relations|last=Hadjidimos|first=Katharina|date=1999|access-date=26 August 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924023644/http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/Greek-Turkish-Media.PDF|archive-date=24 September 2015}}</ref> | |||
| casualties2 = None | |||
| howmany1 = | |||
| howmany2 = | |||
}} | |||
During the crisis, in the night of 28 January, Greek special forces landed secretly on the east islet undetected. | |||
On the 30th of January, Turkish and Greek officials gave statements, each insisting on their sovereign rights on Imia. Also, Turkish armored units moved to the ] on ], which caused the alert of the ].<ref name="eisa-net.org"/> | |||
On 31 January at 1:40 am Turkish special forces ] also landed on the west islet escalating the tensions. Around 3 hours later, a Hellenic Navy Bell 212, took off from the Greek ] ''Navarino'' for reconnaissance. The Greek SEALs confirmed the presence of Turkish forces and were ordered to return to the ship where during its return the helicopter crashed over the islets (some speculating due to Turkish fire), but this was concealed by both states<ref name="auto"/> to prevent further escalation, although three Greek officers on the helicopter were killed: Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos, and Ektoras Gialopsos. | |||
The immediate military threat was defused primarily by American officials—in particular, US envoy ], working by telephone with officials of both sides during the final hours of the crisis. The Greeks and Turks did not speak directly to one another but were responsive to Washington's assistance as an informal intermediary. Agreement was given by both sides to the United States to return to the "status quo ante"—i.e., differing views on sovereignty and no military forces on the islets. Greek and Turkish officials provided assurances to the United States that their military forces on and arrayed around the islets would be removed, with the ] agreeing to monitor the withdrawal.<ref>, '']'', 31 January 1996.</ref> While US engagement was instrumental in defusing the crisis, the fundamental territorial issue has remained unresolved since that time. | |||
Despite calls from the UN Secretary General and NATO Secretary General for a peaceful resolution, the agreement succeeded after President Clinton's phone calls to the leaders of both countries, along with intensive diplomacy from Holbrooke. Holbrooke stated that while President Clinton was on the phone with Athens and Ankara, Europeans were sleeping through the night. Adding that Europe's inability to take meaningful action in its own theater raises questions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.durham.ac.uk/media/durham-university/research-/research-centres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases/publications-database/boundary-amp-security-bulletins/bsb4-1_pratt.pdf|title=The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea|author=Martin Pratt and Clive Schofield}}</ref> | |||
==Aftermath== | |||
The crisis had a significant impact on Greece's domestic and foreign affairs. The Greek government weakened with the Greek opposition and media criticizing it, and the incident was viewed by the Greek population as a "national humiliation". The Greek Chief of Staff was sacked, primarily for making public comments on government talks during the crisis. Many Greeks considered the United States' neutral stance as equal to siding with Turkey. Furthermore, Greece was skeptical of the Europeans' seeming neutrality.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
The Turkish government claimed victory, although ] criticized it for succumbing to US pressure. Ciller's popularity increased, but she still couldn't form a government, and made a coalition with the ].<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
Holbrooke was planning to travel to Greece and Turkey to defuse tensions, but he had to cancel his trip because the Greek government wanted to mitigate its political setbacks and appease critics by disregarding Holbrooke.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
Later, a Turkish navy officer appeared to question Greece's control of the island of ] during a NATO planning meeting. Greece responded by demanding that Turkey disavow any claims to Gavdos.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport97-799">{{Cite web|url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-799.html|title=Congressional Research Service Report 97-799 Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments}}</ref> Even though the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Gavdos was a technical rather than a political matter, Turkish authorities began alluding to "grey areas"; that is, islets and rocks that are not specifically mentioned in treaties. They then asserted that there were 130 of these islands and rocks.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport97-799"/> | |||
Following the crisis, many efforts have been made to resolve Aegean disputes and improve bilateral relations.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport97-799"/> | |||
==Later tensions== | |||
In January 2016, Greek Defence Minister, ], flew over eastern ] in a military helicopter and threw a wreath into the sea around the islets where the three Greek Navy officers were killed in 1996.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mod.mil.gr/mod/en/content/show/36/A94008 |title=Wreath laying by Defence Minister Panos Kammenos into the sea around Imia islets |date=28 January 2016 | publisher=Greek Ministry of National Defence |access-date=4 April 2017}}</ref> | |||
In December 2016, Turkey's Foreign Minister, ], said that the islets were "Turkish soil", while the Greek government responded that "Greece's sovereignty over its islands in the Aegean, including Imia, is indisputable and established by international law."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ekathimerini.com/214212/article/ekathimerini/news/imia-are-turkish-soil-says-turkish-fm-prompting-greek-reaction |title=Imia are 'Turkish soil' says Turkish FM, prompting Greek reaction |date=1 December 2016 |access-date=1 December 2016}}</ref><ref name="ekathimerini.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.ekathimerini.com/214275/article/ekathimerini/news/after-turkish-provocations-ec-calls-on-ankara-to-respect-member-states |title=After Turkish provocations, EC calls on Ankara to respect member state |date=2 December 2016 |access-date=2 December 2016}}</ref> ] spokesperson said that the ] is urging Turkey to avoid any kind of “source of friction, threat or action directed against a member-state, which damages good-neighborly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”<ref name="ekathimerini.com"/> | |||
Tensions around the islets were renewed in January 2017, in light of deterioration of Greco–Turkish relations following Greek ] participants of the failed ] to Turkey. A Turkish navy missile boat accompanied with two special-forces speedboats entered the area around the islets on 29 January 2017. According to the statement issued by the Defence Ministry of Greece, they were blocked and warned by Greek coast guard vessels and withdrew from the area after about seven minutes. The Turkish armed forces denied that the ships were blocked but did not otherwise deny the incident; they stated that the mission was a part of an inspection of the ] by chief of General Staff ], who was on board at the time.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/30/greek-and-turkish-warships-in-standoff-in-aegean-sea |title=Greek and Turkish warships in standoff in Aegean sea |publisher=Guardian |date=30 January 2017 |access-date=30 January 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://en.protothema.gr/breaking-turkish-navy-ship-approaches-imia/ |title=Turkish navy ship approaches Greek island of Imia |date=29 January 2017 |access-date=30 January 2017}}</ref> | |||
In February 2018, Greek authorities said that a Turkish coast guard patrol vessel rammed a Greek coast guard boat near the islets. Nobody was injured, but the Greek vessel suffered damage to the stern where the Turkish boat rammed it with its bow. Greece complained to Turkey about the incident. Turkey's Foreign Ministry denied the Turkish vessel was at fault. It said the Greek statement misled Greece's own public and distorted the truth “as always”.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-turkey/greece-protests-to-turkey-over-boat-incident-ankara-denies-fault-idUSKCN1FX2AO |title=Greece protests to Turkey over boat incident, Ankara denies fault |website=] |date=13 February 2018 |access-date=13 February 2018}}</ref> The next day footage was revealed showing the Turkish patrol boat ramming the Greek boat.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=943833 |title=Video evidence shows Hellenic Coast Guard ship narrowly avoided being sunk |date=16 February 2018 |access-date=16 February 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://ahvalnews.com/greece-turkey/video-emerges-turkish-boat-ramming-greek-coast-guard |title=Video emerges of Turkish boat ramming Greek coast guard |date=17 February 2018 |access-date=17 February 2018}}</ref> Also, Turkey has started to build a watchtower, a facility to accommodate soldiers and a pier on the nearby islet of ]. ]s will be installed on the island to enable the Turkish Coast Guard to monitor naval activities around the islets.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-starts-building-watchtower-on-island-of-cavus-near-controversial-kardak-islets-127394 |title=Turkey starts building watchtower on island of Çavuş near controversial Kardak islets |date=15 February 2018 |access-date=15 February 2018}}</ref> | |||
==Legal status== | |||
The crucial point of reference for the assessment of the legal status of the islets, acknowledged as such by both sides, is the ] of 1923. With this peace treaty, Turkey confirmed large cessions of former Ottoman territory to Greece and Italy which had been ''de facto'' under their control since 1911 or 1913. The chain of the ] islands, which includes the islands neighbouring Imia, were ceded to Italy. Later the rights to these islands were ceded by Italy to Greece with the 1947 ]. However, the Treaty of Lausanne does not mention every single small island by name, but treats them summarily. | |||
Accordingly, at the heart of the legal issue of Imia is the question whether these islands, by virtue of their geographic situation, fall under the scope of the renunciation of sovereignty and the cession to Italy as defined by certain articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. There are also issues relating to the interpretation of a later protocol signed between Italy and Turkey in 1932; regarding certain diplomatic exchanges made between the three parties at various times between 1932 and 1996; and regarding the relevance of actual practice (the factual exercise of sovereignty by either party) prior to 1996. | |||
=== The Treaty of Lausanne === | |||
The provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne that are relevant to the Imia/Kardak and the related "grey-zones" issue, are the following:<ref></ref> | |||
===Treaty of Lausanne=== | |||
*Article 12 | |||
The provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne that are relevant to the Imia and the related "grey-zones" issue, are the following:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html |title=World War I Document Archive |publisher=Lib.byu.edu |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> | |||
* Article 6 | |||
:" In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets Iying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State." | |||
* Article 12 | |||
:" Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty." | :" Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty." | ||
*Article 15 | * Article 15 | ||
:"Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: , and the islets dependent thereon " | :"Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: , and the islets dependent thereon " | ||
*Article 16 | * Article 16 | ||
:"Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. " | :"Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. " | ||
The problem is because Imia |
The problem is because Imia is situated just outside the three-mile boundary of Article 6 and Article 12, but is also not in an obvious, strict sense geographically "dependent" (Article 15) on the larger Dodecanese islands (being still closer to the Turkish mainland than to the next larger island). Greece considers that the wording of Articles 12 and 16 together precludes any Turkish claim to territories outside the three-mile boundary once and for all, and that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a rather wide sense as covering everything in the whole general area of the Dodecanese outside the three-mile limit, in order to give the provisions of the treaty an inherently consistent meaning. Turkey, on the other hand, claims that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a narrow sense, and that formations such as Imia may therefore constitute "grey zones" that the treaty has left undecided; or indeed that Turkish sovereignty over them still holds. | ||
=== |
=== Treaty of Ankara and protocol of 1932 === | ||
{|class="infobox" style="width:260px;cell-padding:none;" | {|class="infobox" style="width:260px;cell-padding:none;" | ||
|- | |- | ||
|colspan="3" |
| colspan="3" style="text-align:center;"|'''Border Protocol of 1932'''<br />Demarcation line | ||
|- | |- | ||
|colspan="3"|] | |colspan="3"|] | ||
|- | |- | ||
|colspan="3" |
| colspan="3" style="text-align:center;"|Geographical points <br />'''Turkish side''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
!Point | !Point | ||
Line 83: | Line 130: | ||
!Modern name | !Modern name | ||
|- | |- | ||
|<small>A</small>||<small>Mordala I.|| | |<small>A</small>||<small>Mordala I.</small>|| | ||
|- | |- | ||
|<small>B</small>||<small>Kara Ada</small>||<small>Kara Ada</small> | |<small>B</small>||<small>Kara Ada</small>||<small>Kara Ada</small> | ||
Line 107: | Line 154: | ||
|<small>L</small>||<small>C. Monodendri</small>||<small>Tekeağaç</small> | |<small>L</small>||<small>C. Monodendri</small>||<small>Tekeağaç</small> | ||
|- | |- | ||
|colspan="3" |
| colspan="3" style="text-align:center;"|'''Italian (later Greek) side''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
!Point | !Point | ||
Line 125: | Line 172: | ||
|<small>F</small>||<small>Karapsili Pt.</small>||<small>Akr. Atsipas</small> | |<small>F</small>||<small>Karapsili Pt.</small>||<small>Akr. Atsipas</small> | ||
|- | |- | ||
|<small>G</small>||<small>Kardak (Rks)</small>||<small>Imia |
|<small>'''G'''</small>||<small>'''Kardak (Rks)'''</small>||<small>'''Imia'''</small> | ||
|- | |- | ||
|<small>H</small>||<small>Kalolimno</small>||<small>Kalolimnos</small> | |<small>H</small>||<small>Kalolimno</small>||<small>Kalolimnos</small> | ||
Line 136: | Line 183: | ||
|} | |} | ||
After the Treaty of Lausanne, a dispute arose between Turkey and Italy over some other small islands, not directly related to the area of Imia |
After the Treaty of Lausanne, a dispute arose between Turkey and Italy over some other small islands, not directly related to the area of Imia. This dispute was settled through a compromise, which was sealed in a bilateral ] at Ankara. As an appendix to that treaty, the two governments formally assured each other that they now considered the whole remaining Dodecanese border between them to be uncontroversial, and appointed a bilateral technical committee to trace its exact ] cartographically. | ||
The committee produced a technical protocol that was signed by envoys of the two foreign ministries in the same year.<ref> |
The committee produced a technical protocol that was signed by envoys of the two foreign ministries in the same year.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/italturc.htm |title=Hellenic MFA |publisher=Hri.org |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> This protocol mentions Imia explicitly, as being on the Italian (i.e. later Greek) side. The protocol itself, according to the present-day Turkish argument, does not bear the formal characteristics of an international treaty. The Greek side now holds that it nevertheless constitutes compelling evidence that the Turkish government of the time had made a binding commitment to accepting the delimitation as described in the protocol.<ref name="mfagr">{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_imia.html |title=The question of the Imia islands. Turkish allegations on "Grey zones" in the Aegean Sea |publisher=] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041028151152/http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_imia.html |archive-date=2004-10-28 |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> The Turkish side holds that the protocol is not binding as an international treaty and therefore has no value whatsoever for the resolution of the present dispute.<ref name="inanbas1997"/> | ||
===Treaty of Paris=== | |||
=== Later diplomatic relations === | |||
Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands to Greece with the ]. Article 14 enumerates the islands to be transferred to Greek sovereignty, and states that ''adjacent'' islets are to be transferred. The Turkish and Greek sides dispute the meaning of the term. Turkey claims that Imia does not fit into the definition stipulated by the Article 14 of the treaty.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa |title=Background Note on Aegean Disputes / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs |publisher=Mfa.gov.tr |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> | |||
After the 1996 crisis, the Turkish and Greek governments have made various claims that certain diplomatic exchanges between Turkey and Italy after 1932, and between Turkey and Greece after 1947, provided proof that the respective opponents at that time held legal opinions different from what they claim today, making their present stance inconsistent and untenable. Thus, Turkey has claimed that both the Italian government during the 1930s and the Greek government between 1947 and the 1950s had shown itself to be well aware that the 1932 protocol did not provide legal grounds for an exact delimitation of the boundary.<ref></ref> | |||
===Later diplomatic relations=== | |||
Conversely, Greece claims that Turkey, already during the 1930s, had explicitly confirmed to Italy that it considered the 1932 protocol valid and binding.<ref name="mfagr" /> However, most of this evidence is contained in diplomatic exchanges that have never been disclosed to the public by either of the two parties. | |||
After the 1996 crisis, the Turkish and Greek governments have made various claims that certain diplomatic exchanges between Turkey and Italy after 1932, and between Turkey and Greece after 1947, provided proof that the respective opponents at that time held legal opinions different from what they claim today, making their present stance inconsistent and untenable. Thus, Turkey has claimed that both the Italian government during the 1930s and the Greek government between 1947 and the 1950s had shown itself to be well aware that the 1932 protocol did not provide legal grounds for an exact delimitation of the boundary.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atmg.org/AegeanIssue.html|title=ATMG - Aegean Issue|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090516015652/http://www.atmg.org/AegeanIssue.html|archive-date=16 May 2009|access-date=26 August 2015}}</ref> | |||
Conversely, Greece claims that Turkey, already during the 1930s, had explicitly confirmed to Italy that it considered the 1932 protocol valid and binding.<ref name="mfagr"/> However, most of this evidence is contained in diplomatic exchanges that have never been disclosed to the public by either of the two parties. | |||
Greece also cites as evidence for a former Turkish acceptance of Greek sovereignty the diplomatic procedures around the original delimitation of ]s (FIR) within the framework of the ], in 1950. The relevant treaty states that, in the Aegean zone, the boundary between the Athens and Istanbul FIRs was to follow the boundaries of the territorial waters. This implies, according to the Greek view, that both parties at that time were taking for granted that a mutually agreed border did indeed exist, which would contradict the claims of persisting "grey zones" made today by Turkey.<ref name="mfagr" /> | |||
Greece also cites as evidence for a former Turkish acceptance of Greek sovereignty the diplomatic procedures around the original delimitation of ]s (FIR) within the framework of the ], in 1950. The relevant treaty states that, in the Aegean zone, the boundary between the Athens and Istanbul FIRs was to follow the boundaries of the territorial waters. This implies, according to the Greek view, that both parties at that time were taking for granted that a mutually agreed border did indeed exist, which would contradict the claims of persisting "grey zones" made today by Turkey.<ref name="mfagr"/> | |||
The maps of the air zones published after that agreement (e.g. an official map published by Turkey in 1953) do indeed show a line that runs where Greece today claims the territorial boundary should be, with Imia/Kardak on the Greek side.<ref></ref> Turkey holds that the agreement about the FIR boundaries was not concerned with determining sovereignty, and thus has no bearing on the issue. | |||
The maps of the air zones published after that agreement (e.g. an official map published by Turkey in 1953) do indeed show a line that runs where Greece today claims the territorial boundary should be, with Imia on the Greek side.<ref name="mfagrmaps">{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/imiamap.htm |title=Imia Rocks Maps |publisher=Hri.org |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref><ref name="asdf">{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/docs/imia-hri/ |title=Various Maps of the Imia islets |publisher=Hri.org |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> Turkey holds that the agreement about the FIR boundaries was not concerned with determining sovereignty, and thus has no bearing on the issue. | |||
=== Factual exercise of sovereignty === | |||
As is commonly the case in sovereignty disputes over marginal or outlying territories, some importance is attached to the question of which side had actually been exercising factual sovereignty over the territory ''before'' the dispute arose, and whether the other side ever voiced concerns over that display of sovereignty or else acquisced to it. | |||
===Cartographic evidence=== | |||
This question is even more difficult to answer in the case of Imia/Kardak than in many comparable cases, because the islets are geographically and socio-economically so insignificant that neither of the two parties ever had much occasion for displaying acts of sovereignty over them, or indeed for noticing any such acts in the case that the other side should have done so. The islets hold no man-made constructions and have only been used as feeding ground for a few goats that belong to Greek shepherds from Kalymnos. | |||
During and after the crisis of 1996, both sides put a lot of emphasis on previously published maps, which were cited as evidence purportedly showing that their respective views were shared by third parties, or had even been shared by the opposite side.<ref name="inanbas1997"/><ref name="mfagrmaps"/> For instance, a national road map sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Defense,<ref>Turkiye, 1:500 000. Map 2. Turkiye resmi Karayollari Haritasi - Official Road Map of Turkey. A joint production of the Turkish Ministry of Defence (M.S.B. Harita Genel Komutanlig-Turkey) in Ankara, and the Kartographischer Verlag . Published by Kartographischer Verlag R.Ryborsch, Frankfurt am Main.</ref> published just before the crisis, shows Imia (Limnia) as Greek territory. There are other Turkish maps of before 1996 that show Imia as Greek.<ref name="mfagrmaps"/> | |||
The question becomes of much higher relevance once the Turkish claim of "grey areas" is widened to include a larger number of islets, because in many of these cases the record is overwhelmingly in favour of Greece (with several of the islets in question being permanently inhabited, others carrying visible evidence of permanent exercise of sovereignty, such as lighthouses or other installations.) | |||
However, the cartographic evidence of before 1996 is so mixed that the only safe conclusion one can draw from it is that neither of the two governments ever bothered to enforce a consistent representation of whatever legal opinions they held with respect to these islands, in the work of their cartographic state agencies.<ref name="asdf"/> | |||
=== Cartographic evidence === | |||
During and after the crisis of 1996, both sides put a lot of emphasis on previously published maps, which were cited as evidence purportedly showing that their respective views were shared by third parties, or had even been shared by the opposite side.<ref name="inanbas1997" /><ref name="mfagrmaps"></ref><ref name="asdf"></ref> Indeed, the Turkish Ministry of Defence sponsored tourist map,<ref>Turkiye, 1:500 000. Map 2. Turkiye resmi Karayollari Haritasi - Official Road Map of Turkey. | |||
A joint production of the Turkish Ministry of Defence (M.S.B. Harita Genel Komutanlig-Turkey) in Ankara, and the Kartographischer Verlag . Published by Kartographischer Verlag R.Ryborsch, Frankfurt am Main.</ref> published just before the crisis, shows Imia (Limnia) as Greek sovereign territory. There are other Turkish maps of before 1996 that show Imia/Kardak as Greek.<ref name="mfagrmaps" /> | |||
There is also the case of a neighbouring islet, only a few miles from Imia, called ''Zouka'', ''Dzouka'' or ''Topan Adası'', which was consistently shown as Turkish in Greek naval maps,<ref name="mfagrmaps" /> but as Greek in Greek topographic maps.<ref name="asdf"/> When the attention of the Greek government was drawn to this fact in 2004, it was quick to admit that Zouka was in fact Turkish and that the attribution to Greece had been a mere technical mistake, since Zouka in fact lies on the Turkish side of the demarcation line of the 1932 protocol.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/cgi-bin/brief?/news/greek/apegr/2002/02-11-04.apegr.html |title=Athens News Agency: News in Greek, 02-11-04 |publisher=Hri.org |date=2002-11-04 |access-date=2015-08-25}}</ref> | |||
However, the cartographic evidence of before 1996 is so mixed that the only safe conclusion one can draw from it is that neither of the two governments ever bothered to enforce a consistent representation of whatever legal opinions they held with respect to these islands, in the work of their cartographic state agencies. It should also be noted that several of the maps cited as evidence by the two governments displayed confusion over what the geographic facts were in the first place (displaying some islets in the wrong places, confusing the names of some islands, or even displaying islands that do not exist).<ref name="asdf"/> | |||
Some of the existing cartographic problems can probably be traced back to a 1946–47 British cartographic survey conducted by the crew of ]. According to the account of its former navigation officer<ref name="childers">{{cite web|url=http://www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print_unique?e=C&f=13000&m=A19&aa=1&eidos=S|title=Letters to the editor - Throwing light on the Imia issue |publisher= Athens News SA|last=Cooper|first=W.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071215035336/http://www.athensnews.gr/athweb/nathens.print_unique?e=C&f=13000&m=A19&aa=1&eidos=S|archive-date=15 December 2007|date=2 July 2003|access-date=26 August 2015}}</ref> it is possible that the islets in question were wrongfully charted as belonging to Turkey by his predecessor. The reason was that during the ] boats of a British ] flotilla often evaded German patrols by making fast alongside Turkish fishing boats near the islet and convincing the Germans that they were Turkish fishermen in Turkish territory. | |||
There is also the case of a neighbouring islet, only a few miles from Imia/Kardak, called ''Zouka'', ''Dzouka'' or ''Topan Adası'', which was consistently shown as Turkish in Greek naval maps,<ref name="mfagrmaps" /> but as Greek in Greek topographic maps.<ref></ref> (When the attention of the Greek government was drawn to this fact in 2004, it was quick to admit that Zouka was in fact Turkish and that the attribution to Greece had been a mere technical mistake, since Zouka in fact lies on the Turkish side of the demarcation line of the 1932 protocol).<ref></ref> | |||
Out of this experience one officer of HMS Childers, who had served the special boat flotilla, probably charted the Turkish name of these islets, Kardak, and attributed them to Turkey. It is well possible that when the whole Dodecanese was ceded to Greece in 1947, these islets may not have been included in official maps because of the wartime experience of a British naval officer. | |||
Some of the existing cartographic problems can probably be traced back to a 1946-7 British cartographic survey conducted by the crew of ]. According to the account of its former navigation officer<ref name="childers">Cooper, W.: Throwing light on the Imia/Kardak issue. Letter to the Editor of the Athens News, 07/02/2003, p. A19, Article code C13000A191 </ref> it is possible that the islets in question were wrongfully charted as belonging to Turkey by his predecessor. The reason was that during the second World War boats of a British ] flotilla often evaded German patrols by making fast alongside Turkish fishing boats near the islet and convincing the Germans that they were Turkish fishermen in Turkish territory. | |||
Out of this experience one officer of HMS Childers, who had served the special boat flotilla, probably charted the Turkish name of these islets, Kardak, and attributed them to Turkey. It is well possible that when the whole Dodecanese was ceded to Greece in 1948, these islets may not have been included in official maps because of the wartime experience of a British naval officer. | |||
It appears, in short, that contradictory cartographic evidence in this field has been caused either by wartime mistakes, mere inattention or inadvertent proliferation of previous technical mistakes. It does not necessarily reflect consistent legal opinions or policies of either side. The conflicting cartographic evidence may nevertheless be one of the causes for the different sovereignty claims. | It appears, in short, that contradictory cartographic evidence in this field has been caused either by wartime mistakes, mere inattention or inadvertent proliferation of previous technical mistakes. It does not necessarily reflect consistent legal opinions or policies of either side. The conflicting cartographic evidence may nevertheless be one of the causes for the different sovereignty claims. | ||
=== |
===Reactions by international organizations and other countries=== | ||
After 1996, most foreign countries have carefully avoided taking an unequivocal stand on the Imia/Kardak issue in favour of either side. However, both Greek and Turkish public opinion has been eager to observe the stance of foreign governments on the issue, as evidenced through details such as the cartographic treatment of Imia/Kardak in maps published by state agencies. Particular close attention has been paid in this context to maps published by US government agencies. | |||
] said about the crisis: "I thought my aides were joking when they said Turkey and Greece would engage in war over rocks on which none but sheep live. I held phone calls with the leaders of both countries, and convinced them to not go to war over the rocks that inhabited mostly 20 sheep".{{citation needed|date=July 2023}} | |||
After 1996, most foreign countries have carefully avoided taking an unequivocal stand on the Imia issue in favour of either side. However, both Greek and Turkish public opinion has been eager to observe the stance of foreign governments on the issue, as evidenced through details such as the cartographic treatment of Imia in maps published by state agencies. Particular close attention has been paid in this context to maps published by US government agencies. Shortly after the 1996 crisis, the US National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) removed the Greek name ''Vrakhoi Imia'' from its maps, adding instead a note saying "Sovereignty undetermined",<ref name="inanbas1997"/> but in a new edition a few months later, in October 1996, it reverted that move and returned to the Greek name.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=256&article=1642|title=Gov't satisfied with Pentagon statement referring to Imia as Greek territory|publisher=]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120314035045/http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=256&article=1642|archive-date=14 March 2012|date=21 June 1997|access-date=26 August 2015}}</ref> In addition, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's claims be taken to a peaceful resolution according to the international law.<ref name="Air_University">{{cite web|url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420639.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170205013536/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420639.pdf|url-status=live|archive-date=February 5, 2017|title=DISPUTE IN THE AEGEAN SEA THE IMIA/KARDAK CRISIS|publisher= AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY |date=2002|pages=29, 42–43}}</ref> | |||
The government of ], the original contracting party of the 1932 border protocol, stated on 6 February 1996 that it considered the protocol valid, thus lending support to the Greek position.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring97/two_islets.html |title=A tale of two islets: The Imia incident between Greece and Turkey |publisher=hri.org |access-date=2017-02-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RTLA2arF4iMC&pg=PA145|title=Greece and the Law of the Sea, p145 |year=1997 |publisher=Martinus Nijhoff Publishers |isbn=9041103945 |access-date=2017-02-27}}</ref> | |||
The ] backed the Greek side on the Imia Islets dispute, and warned Turkey to refrain from any military operations against Greek sovereignty, and, along with the ], called Turkey to solve any disputes it has with Greece through the International Court of Justice. The resolution by the European Parliament entitled "Resolution on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union" also stated that Greece's borders were EU borders.<ref name="Turkey’s EU Bid">{{cite book|title=Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy|url=https://archive.org/details/turkeysaccession00arva|url-access=limited|editor-last=Arvanitopoulos|editor-first=Constantine|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|year=2008|author-last=Tsakonas|author-first=Panayotis J.|page=|chapter=How can the European Union transform the Greek-Turkish conflict?}}</ref><ref name="Rumelili">{{cite book|url=https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/065eb1b2-e7ea-4f23-9b10-20e263bb8c84.pdf|title=The microprocesses of hegemonic influence: The case of EU and Greece/Turkey|page=12|year=2004|last=Rumelili |first=Bahar|publisher=Bogazic University}}</ref><ref name="EP Resolution">{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/europ.htm |title= |publisher=European Parliament |date=15 February 1996 |access-date=2016-10-26|via=hri.org}}</ref><ref name="European_Resolution">publications.europa.eu http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e42184c-fc8b-450c-af50-a5f091145a3d/language-en</ref> | |||
In addition, it stated that the islets of Imia belongs to Dodecanese group of islands pursuant to the ], ] and ] treaties and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory.<ref name="Air_University"/><ref name="European_Resolution"/> | |||
After the incident Greece threatened to reopen debate on implementation of an EU customs union accord with Turkey and to block an EU aid package that is part of the accord. Greece mentioned that Turkey broke a commitment under the accord to have amicable ties with EU members. Many EU foreign ministers urged the parties to solve differences amicably. EU members were concerned that Greece's moves against Turkey would violate the customs union accord and interfere with developing ties and access to Turkey's market. The United States were also concerned since they were a proponent of Turkish-European links.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140">{{Cite web|url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/96-140.html|title=Congressional Research Service Report 96-140 Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis}}</ref> | |||
The French President ] “indicated that the fewer new problems Greece created for EU-Turkish cooperation, the more likely France would be to show solidarity with Greece.” Other European governments reportedly implied that if Greece sabotaged the customs union, then they would stall talks on ] EU membership.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
Greek Prime Minister said that Greece would cooperate with the EU once Turkey agreed to ] jurisdiction, but Turkey must initiate an appeal to the International Court of Justice since it is questioning Greek rights. The Greek opposition criticized the government, for its inability to get more support from Europe, while Turkey sent officials to Europe to explain their views and to counter Greece's attempt to impede Turkish-EU relations and recalled its ambassador from Athens.<ref name="CongressionalResearchServiceReport96-140"/> | |||
In October 2019, the US Secretary of State ], on his first official visit to Greece, when asked about a potential Imia scenario involving an escalation of Turkish aggression in the Aegean, stated that the US and Greece share the same values on sovereignty and vowed that the US would "protect these basic ideas of sovereignty".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ekathimerini.com/245229/article/ekathimerini/news/asked-about-imia-scenario-pompeo-expresses-support-for-sovereign-values|title= Asked about Imia scenario, Pompeo expresses support for sovereign values|publisher=Kathimerini |date=6 October 2019|access-date=6 October 2019}}</ref> | |||
Shortly after the 1996 crisis, the US National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) removed the Greek name ''Vrakhoi Imia'' from its maps, adding instead a note saying "Sovereignty undetermined",<ref name="inanbas1997" /> but in a new edition a few months later, in October 1996, it again reverted that move and returned to the Greek name.<ref></ref> | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
*] | * ] | ||
*] | * ] | ||
*] | * ] | ||
*], claimed by both ] and ]. | |||
*], currently under ]n military control but claimed also by ]. | |||
*], coral reefs in the ], claimed by Japan as an island and thus sovereign territory with territorial waters but regarded by the ] as being an insignificant and irrelevant rock. | |||
*], an uninhabited rocky islet in the ] with the status of the surrounding ocean floor disputed between ], ], ], and ]. | |||
*], five small islands currently under ]ese control, but claimed by the ] and the ] (Taiwan). | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
* Kurumahmut, Ali, (2000): “A New Greek – Turkish Dispute: Who Owns The Rocks?”, Proceedings of the International Symposium “The Aegean Sea 2000, 5–7 May 2000, Bodrum-Turkey, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111215224457/http://www.tudav.org/new/pdfs/aegean_sea_2000.pdf |date=2011-12-15 }} | |||
* Kemal Başlar (2001): Two facets of the Aegean Sea dispute: 'de lege lata' and 'de lege ferenda'. In: K. Başlar (ed.), ''Turkey and international law.'' Ankara. | |||
* Georgiades, Emily A., (2011): "The Imia Islets: A Beginning to the Maritime Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Dispute", Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, Vol. 17/1, 103–126. {{Dead link|date=September 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} | |||
* Lucas Cadena (1998): Greek-Turkish tensions. Conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other territorial issues threaten both the NATO alliance and regional peace. ''Princeton Journal of Foreign Affairs.'' | |||
* Lucas Cadena (1998): Greek-Turkish tensions. Conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other territorial issues threaten both the NATO alliance and regional peace. ''Princeton Journal of Foreign Affairs.'' | |||
* Sezgin, I.Can (2009): Why they did not fight? A Study on the Imia/ Kardak Crisis (1995-1996) between Greece and Turkey, http://uni-tuebingen.academia.edu/IbrahimCanSezgin/Papers/138642/Why_they_did_not_fight_Kardak-Imia_Crisis_1995-1996 | |||
* Sezgin, I.Can (2009): through web archive. | |||
* Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): ''Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü''. Ankara. (ISBN 975-96281-0-4). | |||
* |
* Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): ''Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü''. Ankara. ({{ISBN|975-96281-0-4}}). | ||
* Ali Kurumahmut ( |
* Ali Kurumahmut, Sertaç Başeren (2004): ''The twilight zones in the Aegean: (Un)forgotten Turkish islands. Ege'de gri bölgeler: Unutul(may)an Türk adaları.'' Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. ({{ISBN|975-16-1740-5}}). | ||
* Ali Kurumahmut (1998): "Ege'de temel sorun: Egemenliği tartışmalı adalar." Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. ({{ISBN|975-16-0954-2}}). | |||
* Dimitrios Lucas (2005): ''Greece's Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki 1999.'' MA thesis, Catholic University of Leuven. . | |||
* Dimitrios Lucas (2005): "Greece's Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki 1999." MA thesis, Catholic University of Leuven. . | |||
*{{cite book|last=Kallivretakis|first=Leonidas|year=1996|title=Report on the "Limnia-Imia" islets|publisher=]|location=Athens|url=http://helios-eie.ekt.gr/EIE/bitstream/10442/7743/1/LK_1996_01_TEXT.pdf}} | |||
{{Aegean Sea}} | {{Aegean Sea}} | ||
{{Dodecanese Islands}} | {{Dodecanese Islands}} | ||
{{Territorial disputes in Western Asia}} | |||
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Imia Kardak}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 12:48, 26 December 2024
Unpopulated islet in southeastern Aegean "Kardak" redirects here. For the village in Iran, see Kardak, Iran.
Disputed islands | |
---|---|
ImiaShow map of GreeceImiaShow map of Turkey | |
Other names | Kardak, Limnia, İkizce, Heipethes |
Geography | |
Location | Aegean Sea |
Coordinates | 37°03′03″N 27°09′04″E / 37.05083°N 27.15111°E / 37.05083; 27.15111 |
Total islands | 2 |
Area | 4 ha (9.9 acres) |
Claimed by | |
Greece | |
Turkey | |
Demographics | |
Population | 0 |
Imia (Greek: Ίμια) is a pair of small uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea, situated between the Greek island chain of the Dodecanese and the southwestern mainland coast of Turkey. They are known in Turkey as Kardak.
Imia was the object of a military crisis and subsequent dispute over sovereignty between Greece and Turkey in 1996. The Imia dispute is part of the larger Aegean dispute, which also comprises disputes over the continental shelf, the territorial waters, the air space, the Flight Information Regions (FIR) and the demilitarization of the Aegean islands. In the aftermath of the Imia crisis, the dispute was also widened, as Turkey began to lay parallel claims to a larger number of other islets in the Aegean. These islands, some of them inhabited, are regarded as indisputably Greek by Greece but as grey zones of undetermined sovereignty by Turkey.
Geography
The islets lie 5.5 nautical miles (10.2 km; 6.3 mi) east of the Greek island Kalymnos, 1.9 nmi (3.5 km; 2.2 mi) southeast of the Greek island of Kalolimnos, 3.8 nmi (7.0 km; 4.4 mi) west of the Turkish peninsula of Bodrum, and 2.2 nmi (4.1 km; 2.5 mi) from the Turkish islet of Çavuş Adası. The islets lie some 300 m (1,000 ft) apart from each other, the eastern one being slightly larger than the western one. Their total surface area is 10 acres (4.0 ha).
The islands are also referred to as Limnia (Λίμνια) in Greek, or İkizce in Turkish, or as Heipethes in some early-20th century maps. The toponym "Kardak" is believed to come from the Greek "Kar(y)dakia", i.e. "small walnuts", because of their shape.
Background
While several other aspects of sovereignty rights in the Aegean, such as the territorial waters and national airspace, had been disputed between the two countries for decades, conflicts over the possession of island territory were unknown until the end of 1995. Until 1985 Turkish hydrographic maps recognised the course of the Greek-Turkish border halfway between Imia and the Turkish coast. The dispute over Imia arose when, on 26 December 1995, the Turkish cargo ship Figen Akat accidentally ran aground on the east islet and had to be salvaged.
A Greek tugboat responded to the distress call. The Turkish captain initially refused the assistance offered, maintaining that he was within Turkish territorial waters. He ultimately accepted being towed to the Turkish port of Güllük by the Greek tugboat. The Greek captain filled in the necessary papers for the salvage fee but the Turkish captain objected, arguing that the freighter had been in Turkish waters.
On 27 December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry notified the Greek authorities that it believed there was a sovereignty issue, and on 29 December it declared the islets Turkish territory. On January 9, Athens rejected the claim, citing the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Convention between Italy and Turkey (1932) and the Treaty of Paris (1947).
The whole event was barely reported in the media so it was not widely known to public until a month later, on 20 January 1996 when the Greek magazine GRAMMA ran a story, one day after Kostas Simitis was appointed to form a new Greek government as prime minister. The article brought a severe reaction from the Greek press, which was followed by four citizens of the neighboring island of Kalymnos, including the mayor and the owner of a herd of sheep that remained on the islets, hoisting a Greek flag on the east islet on 25 January.
To oppose this, on 27 January some Turkish journalists from Hürriyet landed on the islet with a helicopter, lowered the Greek flag and hoisted a Turkish flag, the whole event being broadcast live on Turkish television. On 28 January, the Greek Navy patrol boat Antoniou lowered the Turkish flag and restored the Greek flag, in violation of the political order which was only to lower the Turkish flag, resulting in an exchange of fierce statements by the Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller and the new Greek prime minister Kostas Simitis. Turkish and Greek naval forces were alerted and warships of both countries, both NATO members, sailed to the islets.
Nationalistic media seem to have played a role in inciting weak governments in Greece and Turkey to take action over the islets. The Greek government had recently completed two months of limbo induced by former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's prolonged illness, which resulted in his resignation. After only one week, the Costas Simitis government, which was still developing its identity, experienced the crisis. In contrast, Turkey's national election in late December was a stalemate, with competing leaders unable to reach an agreement on a new coalition administration. The opposition Islamist Refah party won the most votes and dominated negotiations and other events. Tansu Ciller led an interim administration without a mandate until a new one was formed. The political uncertainty in Athens and Ankara made them exposed to predatory press, enabling the issue to quickly escalate. Greece and Turkey accused each other of using domestic uncertainty for hostile actions.
Military crisis
Imia Crisis | |||||||
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Part of Aegean dispute | |||||||
Location of the islands | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Kostis Stephanopoulos (President of Greece) Kostas Simitis (Prime Minister of Greece) Christos Lymperis (Commander-in-chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces) |
Süleyman Demirel (President of Turkey) Tansu Çiller (Prime Minister of Turkey) Güven Erkaya (Commander-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces) | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3 (helicopter crash) | None |
During the crisis, in the night of 28 January, Greek special forces landed secretly on the east islet undetected. On the 30th of January, Turkish and Greek officials gave statements, each insisting on their sovereign rights on Imia. Also, Turkish armored units moved to the Green Line on Cyprus, which caused the alert of the Cypriot National Guard. On 31 January at 1:40 am Turkish special forces SAT Commandos also landed on the west islet escalating the tensions. Around 3 hours later, a Hellenic Navy Bell 212, took off from the Greek frigate Navarino for reconnaissance. The Greek SEALs confirmed the presence of Turkish forces and were ordered to return to the ship where during its return the helicopter crashed over the islets (some speculating due to Turkish fire), but this was concealed by both states to prevent further escalation, although three Greek officers on the helicopter were killed: Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos, and Ektoras Gialopsos.
The immediate military threat was defused primarily by American officials—in particular, US envoy Richard Holbrooke, working by telephone with officials of both sides during the final hours of the crisis. The Greeks and Turks did not speak directly to one another but were responsive to Washington's assistance as an informal intermediary. Agreement was given by both sides to the United States to return to the "status quo ante"—i.e., differing views on sovereignty and no military forces on the islets. Greek and Turkish officials provided assurances to the United States that their military forces on and arrayed around the islets would be removed, with the U.S. agreeing to monitor the withdrawal. While US engagement was instrumental in defusing the crisis, the fundamental territorial issue has remained unresolved since that time.
Despite calls from the UN Secretary General and NATO Secretary General for a peaceful resolution, the agreement succeeded after President Clinton's phone calls to the leaders of both countries, along with intensive diplomacy from Holbrooke. Holbrooke stated that while President Clinton was on the phone with Athens and Ankara, Europeans were sleeping through the night. Adding that Europe's inability to take meaningful action in its own theater raises questions.
Aftermath
The crisis had a significant impact on Greece's domestic and foreign affairs. The Greek government weakened with the Greek opposition and media criticizing it, and the incident was viewed by the Greek population as a "national humiliation". The Greek Chief of Staff was sacked, primarily for making public comments on government talks during the crisis. Many Greeks considered the United States' neutral stance as equal to siding with Turkey. Furthermore, Greece was skeptical of the Europeans' seeming neutrality.
The Turkish government claimed victory, although Refah criticized it for succumbing to US pressure. Ciller's popularity increased, but she still couldn't form a government, and made a coalition with the Motherland Party.
Holbrooke was planning to travel to Greece and Turkey to defuse tensions, but he had to cancel his trip because the Greek government wanted to mitigate its political setbacks and appease critics by disregarding Holbrooke.
Later, a Turkish navy officer appeared to question Greece's control of the island of Gavdos during a NATO planning meeting. Greece responded by demanding that Turkey disavow any claims to Gavdos. Even though the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Gavdos was a technical rather than a political matter, Turkish authorities began alluding to "grey areas"; that is, islets and rocks that are not specifically mentioned in treaties. They then asserted that there were 130 of these islands and rocks.
Following the crisis, many efforts have been made to resolve Aegean disputes and improve bilateral relations.
Later tensions
In January 2016, Greek Defence Minister, Panos Kammenos, flew over eastern Aegean Sea in a military helicopter and threw a wreath into the sea around the islets where the three Greek Navy officers were killed in 1996.
In December 2016, Turkey's Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, said that the islets were "Turkish soil", while the Greek government responded that "Greece's sovereignty over its islands in the Aegean, including Imia, is indisputable and established by international law." European Commission spokesperson said that the EU is urging Turkey to avoid any kind of “source of friction, threat or action directed against a member-state, which damages good-neighborly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”
Tensions around the islets were renewed in January 2017, in light of deterioration of Greco–Turkish relations following Greek refusal to extradite participants of the failed 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt to Turkey. A Turkish navy missile boat accompanied with two special-forces speedboats entered the area around the islets on 29 January 2017. According to the statement issued by the Defence Ministry of Greece, they were blocked and warned by Greek coast guard vessels and withdrew from the area after about seven minutes. The Turkish armed forces denied that the ships were blocked but did not otherwise deny the incident; they stated that the mission was a part of an inspection of the Aksaz Naval Base by chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, who was on board at the time.
In February 2018, Greek authorities said that a Turkish coast guard patrol vessel rammed a Greek coast guard boat near the islets. Nobody was injured, but the Greek vessel suffered damage to the stern where the Turkish boat rammed it with its bow. Greece complained to Turkey about the incident. Turkey's Foreign Ministry denied the Turkish vessel was at fault. It said the Greek statement misled Greece's own public and distorted the truth “as always”. The next day footage was revealed showing the Turkish patrol boat ramming the Greek boat. Also, Turkey has started to build a watchtower, a facility to accommodate soldiers and a pier on the nearby islet of Çavuş Adası. Thermal cameras will be installed on the island to enable the Turkish Coast Guard to monitor naval activities around the islets.
Legal status
The crucial point of reference for the assessment of the legal status of the islets, acknowledged as such by both sides, is the Peace Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. With this peace treaty, Turkey confirmed large cessions of former Ottoman territory to Greece and Italy which had been de facto under their control since 1911 or 1913. The chain of the Dodecanese islands, which includes the islands neighbouring Imia, were ceded to Italy. Later the rights to these islands were ceded by Italy to Greece with the 1947 Treaty of Paris. However, the Treaty of Lausanne does not mention every single small island by name, but treats them summarily.
Accordingly, at the heart of the legal issue of Imia is the question whether these islands, by virtue of their geographic situation, fall under the scope of the renunciation of sovereignty and the cession to Italy as defined by certain articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. There are also issues relating to the interpretation of a later protocol signed between Italy and Turkey in 1932; regarding certain diplomatic exchanges made between the three parties at various times between 1932 and 1996; and regarding the relevance of actual practice (the factual exercise of sovereignty by either party) prior to 1996.
Treaty of Lausanne
The provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne that are relevant to the Imia and the related "grey-zones" issue, are the following:
- Article 6
- " In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets Iying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State."
- Article 12
- " Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty."
- Article 15
- "Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: , and the islets dependent thereon "
- Article 16
- "Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. "
The problem is because Imia is situated just outside the three-mile boundary of Article 6 and Article 12, but is also not in an obvious, strict sense geographically "dependent" (Article 15) on the larger Dodecanese islands (being still closer to the Turkish mainland than to the next larger island). Greece considers that the wording of Articles 12 and 16 together precludes any Turkish claim to territories outside the three-mile boundary once and for all, and that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a rather wide sense as covering everything in the whole general area of the Dodecanese outside the three-mile limit, in order to give the provisions of the treaty an inherently consistent meaning. Turkey, on the other hand, claims that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a narrow sense, and that formations such as Imia may therefore constitute "grey zones" that the treaty has left undecided; or indeed that Turkish sovereignty over them still holds.
Treaty of Ankara and protocol of 1932
Border Protocol of 1932 Demarcation line | ||
Geographical points Turkish side | ||
Point | Name in text | Modern name |
---|---|---|
A | Mordala I. | |
B | Kara Ada | Kara Ada |
C | Guirejik I. | Gürecik Adası |
D | Utchian I. | Kargı Adası |
E | Arkialla Pt. | |
F | Hussein Pt. | Hüseyin Burnu |
G | Lodo | Yassıada |
H | Atsaki | Topan Adası / Zouka |
I | Kato I. | Çavuş Adası |
J | Pondikusa | Büyükkiremit Adası |
K | Sandama Peninsula | İnce Burnu |
L | C. Monodendri | Tekeağaç |
Italian (later Greek) side | ||
Point | Name in text | Modern name |
A | C. Phuka | Ag. Fokas |
B | Luro Pt | Akr. Psalidi |
C | Kum Pt. | Akr. Ammoglossa |
D | C. Russa | Akr. Roussa |
E | Vasiliki Pt. | Vasiliki |
F | Karapsili Pt. | Akr. Atsipas |
G | Kardak (Rks) | Imia |
H | Kalolimno | Kalolimnos |
I | Agia Kiriaki | Ag. Kiriaki |
J | Pharmako | Farmakonisi |
Source: Text of the 1932 treaty and border protocol, and modern maps of the area. |
After the Treaty of Lausanne, a dispute arose between Turkey and Italy over some other small islands, not directly related to the area of Imia. This dispute was settled through a compromise, which was sealed in a bilateral treaty in 1932 at Ankara. As an appendix to that treaty, the two governments formally assured each other that they now considered the whole remaining Dodecanese border between them to be uncontroversial, and appointed a bilateral technical committee to trace its exact delimitation cartographically.
The committee produced a technical protocol that was signed by envoys of the two foreign ministries in the same year. This protocol mentions Imia explicitly, as being on the Italian (i.e. later Greek) side. The protocol itself, according to the present-day Turkish argument, does not bear the formal characteristics of an international treaty. The Greek side now holds that it nevertheless constitutes compelling evidence that the Turkish government of the time had made a binding commitment to accepting the delimitation as described in the protocol. The Turkish side holds that the protocol is not binding as an international treaty and therefore has no value whatsoever for the resolution of the present dispute.
Treaty of Paris
Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands to Greece with the 1947 Treaty of Paris. Article 14 enumerates the islands to be transferred to Greek sovereignty, and states that adjacent islets are to be transferred. The Turkish and Greek sides dispute the meaning of the term. Turkey claims that Imia does not fit into the definition stipulated by the Article 14 of the treaty.
Later diplomatic relations
After the 1996 crisis, the Turkish and Greek governments have made various claims that certain diplomatic exchanges between Turkey and Italy after 1932, and between Turkey and Greece after 1947, provided proof that the respective opponents at that time held legal opinions different from what they claim today, making their present stance inconsistent and untenable. Thus, Turkey has claimed that both the Italian government during the 1930s and the Greek government between 1947 and the 1950s had shown itself to be well aware that the 1932 protocol did not provide legal grounds for an exact delimitation of the boundary.
Conversely, Greece claims that Turkey, already during the 1930s, had explicitly confirmed to Italy that it considered the 1932 protocol valid and binding. However, most of this evidence is contained in diplomatic exchanges that have never been disclosed to the public by either of the two parties.
Greece also cites as evidence for a former Turkish acceptance of Greek sovereignty the diplomatic procedures around the original delimitation of Flight Information Regions (FIR) within the framework of the ICAO, in 1950. The relevant treaty states that, in the Aegean zone, the boundary between the Athens and Istanbul FIRs was to follow the boundaries of the territorial waters. This implies, according to the Greek view, that both parties at that time were taking for granted that a mutually agreed border did indeed exist, which would contradict the claims of persisting "grey zones" made today by Turkey.
The maps of the air zones published after that agreement (e.g. an official map published by Turkey in 1953) do indeed show a line that runs where Greece today claims the territorial boundary should be, with Imia on the Greek side. Turkey holds that the agreement about the FIR boundaries was not concerned with determining sovereignty, and thus has no bearing on the issue.
Cartographic evidence
During and after the crisis of 1996, both sides put a lot of emphasis on previously published maps, which were cited as evidence purportedly showing that their respective views were shared by third parties, or had even been shared by the opposite side. For instance, a national road map sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Defense, published just before the crisis, shows Imia (Limnia) as Greek territory. There are other Turkish maps of before 1996 that show Imia as Greek.
However, the cartographic evidence of before 1996 is so mixed that the only safe conclusion one can draw from it is that neither of the two governments ever bothered to enforce a consistent representation of whatever legal opinions they held with respect to these islands, in the work of their cartographic state agencies.
There is also the case of a neighbouring islet, only a few miles from Imia, called Zouka, Dzouka or Topan Adası, which was consistently shown as Turkish in Greek naval maps, but as Greek in Greek topographic maps. When the attention of the Greek government was drawn to this fact in 2004, it was quick to admit that Zouka was in fact Turkish and that the attribution to Greece had been a mere technical mistake, since Zouka in fact lies on the Turkish side of the demarcation line of the 1932 protocol.
Some of the existing cartographic problems can probably be traced back to a 1946–47 British cartographic survey conducted by the crew of HMS Childers. According to the account of its former navigation officer it is possible that the islets in question were wrongfully charted as belonging to Turkey by his predecessor. The reason was that during the Second World War boats of a British Special Boat Service flotilla often evaded German patrols by making fast alongside Turkish fishing boats near the islet and convincing the Germans that they were Turkish fishermen in Turkish territory.
Out of this experience one officer of HMS Childers, who had served the special boat flotilla, probably charted the Turkish name of these islets, Kardak, and attributed them to Turkey. It is well possible that when the whole Dodecanese was ceded to Greece in 1947, these islets may not have been included in official maps because of the wartime experience of a British naval officer.
It appears, in short, that contradictory cartographic evidence in this field has been caused either by wartime mistakes, mere inattention or inadvertent proliferation of previous technical mistakes. It does not necessarily reflect consistent legal opinions or policies of either side. The conflicting cartographic evidence may nevertheless be one of the causes for the different sovereignty claims.
Reactions by international organizations and other countries
Bill Clinton said about the crisis: "I thought my aides were joking when they said Turkey and Greece would engage in war over rocks on which none but sheep live. I held phone calls with the leaders of both countries, and convinced them to not go to war over the rocks that inhabited mostly 20 sheep".
After 1996, most foreign countries have carefully avoided taking an unequivocal stand on the Imia issue in favour of either side. However, both Greek and Turkish public opinion has been eager to observe the stance of foreign governments on the issue, as evidenced through details such as the cartographic treatment of Imia in maps published by state agencies. Particular close attention has been paid in this context to maps published by US government agencies. Shortly after the 1996 crisis, the US National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) removed the Greek name Vrakhoi Imia from its maps, adding instead a note saying "Sovereignty undetermined", but in a new edition a few months later, in October 1996, it reverted that move and returned to the Greek name. In addition, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's claims be taken to a peaceful resolution according to the international law.
The government of Italy, the original contracting party of the 1932 border protocol, stated on 6 February 1996 that it considered the protocol valid, thus lending support to the Greek position.
The European Union backed the Greek side on the Imia Islets dispute, and warned Turkey to refrain from any military operations against Greek sovereignty, and, along with the European Parliament, called Turkey to solve any disputes it has with Greece through the International Court of Justice. The resolution by the European Parliament entitled "Resolution on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union" also stated that Greece's borders were EU borders. In addition, it stated that the islets of Imia belongs to Dodecanese group of islands pursuant to the 1923, 1932 and 1947 treaties and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory.
After the incident Greece threatened to reopen debate on implementation of an EU customs union accord with Turkey and to block an EU aid package that is part of the accord. Greece mentioned that Turkey broke a commitment under the accord to have amicable ties with EU members. Many EU foreign ministers urged the parties to solve differences amicably. EU members were concerned that Greece's moves against Turkey would violate the customs union accord and interfere with developing ties and access to Turkey's market. The United States were also concerned since they were a proponent of Turkish-European links. The French President Jacques Chirac “indicated that the fewer new problems Greece created for EU-Turkish cooperation, the more likely France would be to show solidarity with Greece.” Other European governments reportedly implied that if Greece sabotaged the customs union, then they would stall talks on Cyprus EU membership.
Greek Prime Minister said that Greece would cooperate with the EU once Turkey agreed to International Court of Justice jurisdiction, but Turkey must initiate an appeal to the International Court of Justice since it is questioning Greek rights. The Greek opposition criticized the government, for its inability to get more support from Europe, while Turkey sent officials to Europe to explain their views and to counter Greece's attempt to impede Turkish-EU relations and recalled its ambassador from Athens.
In October 2019, the US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, on his first official visit to Greece, when asked about a potential Imia scenario involving an escalation of Turkish aggression in the Aegean, stated that the US and Greece share the same values on sovereignty and vowed that the US would "protect these basic ideas of sovereignty".
See also
References
- Arapoglou, Stergios, Major. "Dispute in the Aegean Sea". Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Archived from the original on July 24, 2013. Retrieved 2013-07-24.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü. Ankara. (ISBN 975-96281-0-4).
- "Professor I. Promponas stresses the greekness of the ... turkish name" (Ο καθηγητής Ι. Προμπονάς επισημαίνει την ελληνικότητα του ... τουρκικού ονόματος. Τί Ύμεια τί... Καρ(υ)δάκια". newspaper Ta Nea, July 1st, 1997 "The Kardakia were called so by the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Turks were calling them Kardak. Recently they renamed them to Ikince (meaning "double") obviously realizing that Kardak is of Greek origin" (quoting prof. I. Promponas)
- Example : Turkish Navy Hydrographic map N° 2342 "Ege Adalari - Türkiye-Yunanistan", Harta Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara 1956
- ^ "Are Institutions impotent in militarized Crisis? Limits of Institutional Contributions to Conflict Deescalation.-Carina Schmidt" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-10-01. Retrieved 2017-09-30.
- "Falling Towards War in the Aegean: A Case Study of the Imia/Kardak Affair" (PDF).
- ^ "DISPUTE IN THE AEGEAN SEA THE IMIA/KARDAK CRISIS" (PDF). AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY. 2002. pp. 29, 42–43. Archived (PDF) from the original on February 5, 2017.
- Migdalovitz, Carol. "Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis". Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress. Retrieved 2013-07-24.
- ^ "Congressional Research Service Report 96-140 Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis".
- ^ Hadjidimos, Katharina (1999). "The Role of the Media in Greek - Turkish Relations" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 26 August 2015.
- Greece, Turkey pull back warships, CNN.com, 31 January 1996.
- Martin Pratt and Clive Schofield. "The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea" (PDF).
- ^ "Congressional Research Service Report 97-799 Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments".
- "Wreath laying by Defence Minister Panos Kammenos into the sea around Imia islets". Greek Ministry of National Defence. 28 January 2016. Retrieved 4 April 2017.
- "Imia are 'Turkish soil' says Turkish FM, prompting Greek reaction". 1 December 2016. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
- ^ "After Turkish provocations, EC calls on Ankara to respect member state". 2 December 2016. Retrieved 2 December 2016.
- "Greek and Turkish warships in standoff in Aegean sea". Guardian. 30 January 2017. Retrieved 30 January 2017.
- "Turkish navy ship approaches Greek island of Imia". 29 January 2017. Retrieved 30 January 2017.
- "Greece protests to Turkey over boat incident, Ankara denies fault". Reuters. 13 February 2018. Retrieved 13 February 2018.
- "Video evidence shows Hellenic Coast Guard ship narrowly avoided being sunk". 16 February 2018. Retrieved 16 February 2018.
- "Video emerges of Turkish boat ramming Greek coast guard". 17 February 2018. Retrieved 17 February 2018.
- "Turkey starts building watchtower on island of Çavuş near controversial Kardak islets". 15 February 2018. Retrieved 15 February 2018.
- "World War I Document Archive". Lib.byu.edu. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- "Hellenic MFA". Hri.org. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- ^ "The question of the Imia islands. Turkish allegations on "Grey zones" in the Aegean Sea". Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 2004-10-28. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- "Background Note on Aegean Disputes / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Mfa.gov.tr. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- "ATMG - Aegean Issue". Archived from the original on 16 May 2009. Retrieved 26 August 2015.
- ^ "Imia Rocks Maps". Hri.org. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- ^ "Various Maps of the Imia islets". Hri.org. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- Turkiye, 1:500 000. Map 2. Turkiye resmi Karayollari Haritasi - Official Road Map of Turkey. A joint production of the Turkish Ministry of Defence (M.S.B. Harita Genel Komutanlig-Turkey) in Ankara, and the Kartographischer Verlag . Published by Kartographischer Verlag R.Ryborsch, Frankfurt am Main.
- "Athens News Agency: News in Greek, 02-11-04". Hri.org. 2002-11-04. Retrieved 2015-08-25.
- Cooper, W. (2 July 2003). "Letters to the editor - Throwing light on the Imia issue". Athens News SA. Archived from the original on 15 December 2007. Retrieved 26 August 2015.
- "Gov't satisfied with Pentagon statement referring to Imia as Greek territory". Embassy of Greece. 21 June 1997. Archived from the original on 14 March 2012. Retrieved 26 August 2015.
- "A tale of two islets: The Imia incident between Greece and Turkey". hri.org. Retrieved 2017-02-01.
- Greece and the Law of the Sea, p145. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1997. ISBN 9041103945. Retrieved 2017-02-27.
- Tsakonas, Panayotis J. (2008). "How can the European Union transform the Greek-Turkish conflict?". In Arvanitopoulos, Constantine (ed.). Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 111.
- Rumelili, Bahar (2004). The microprocesses of hegemonic influence: The case of EU and Greece/Turkey (PDF). Bogazic University. p. 12.
- "[Resolution, February 15, 1996]". European Parliament. 15 February 1996. Retrieved 2016-10-26 – via hri.org.
- ^ publications.europa.eu http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e42184c-fc8b-450c-af50-a5f091145a3d/language-en
- "Asked about Imia scenario, Pompeo expresses support for sovereign values". Kathimerini. 6 October 2019. Retrieved 6 October 2019.
Further reading
- Kurumahmut, Ali, (2000): “A New Greek – Turkish Dispute: Who Owns The Rocks?”, Proceedings of the International Symposium “The Aegean Sea 2000, 5–7 May 2000, Bodrum-Turkey, Archived 2011-12-15 at the Wayback Machine
- Georgiades, Emily A., (2011): "The Imia Islets: A Beginning to the Maritime Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Dispute", Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, Vol. 17/1, 103–126.
- Lucas Cadena (1998): Greek-Turkish tensions. Conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other territorial issues threaten both the NATO alliance and regional peace. Princeton Journal of Foreign Affairs. Princeton.edu
- Sezgin, I.Can (2009): Why they did not fight? A Study on the Imia/ Kardak Crisis (1995-1996) between Greece and Turkey through web archive.
- Yüksel İnan, Sertaç Başeren (1997): Status of Kardak Rocks. Kardak Kayalıklarının statüsü. Ankara. (ISBN 975-96281-0-4).
- Ali Kurumahmut, Sertaç Başeren (2004): The twilight zones in the Aegean: (Un)forgotten Turkish islands. Ege'de gri bölgeler: Unutul(may)an Türk adaları. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. (ISBN 975-16-1740-5).
- Ali Kurumahmut (1998): "Ege'de temel sorun: Egemenliği tartışmalı adalar." Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. (ISBN 975-16-0954-2).
- Dimitrios Lucas (2005): "Greece's Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki 1999." MA thesis, Catholic University of Leuven. Ethesis.net.
- Kallivretakis, Leonidas (1996). Report on the "Limnia-Imia" islets (PDF). Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation.
Dodecanese Islands | |
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The 12 major islands | |
Minor islands |
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Related articles | |
Greek islands: Aegean Islands, Saronic Islands, Crete, Cyclades, Dodecanese, Euboea, North Aegean Islands, Sporades, Ionian Islands, Echinades |
Territorial disputes in West Asia | |
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Parties involved shown in parentheses after each entry | |
Land | |
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