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{{Short description|Argument for the existence of God}}
The '''argument from morality''' is one of several ]. This argument comes in different forms, all aiming to prove ]’s existence from the evidence of ] in the world.
{{about|the theological argument|the argument against modal realism|Argument from morality (modal realism)}}
{{good article}}
{{Philosophy of religion sidebar|God}}


The '''argument from morality''' is an argument for the ]. Arguments from morality tend to be based on ] or moral order. Arguments from moral normativity observe some aspect of morality and argue that ] is the best or only explanation for this, concluding that God must exist. Arguments from moral order are based on the asserted need for moral order to exist in the universe. They claim that, for this moral order to exist, God must exist to support it. The argument from morality is noteworthy in that one cannot evaluate the soundness of the argument without attending to almost every important philosophical issue in ].
==The argument==


German philosopher ] devised an argument from morality based on ]. Kant argued that the goal of humanity is to achieve perfect happiness and virtue (the '']'') and believed that an ] must be assumed to exist in order for this to be possible, and that God must be assumed to exist to provide this. Rather than aiming to prove the existence of God, however, Kant was simply attempting to demonstrate that all moral thought requires the assumption that God exists, and therefore that we are entitled to make such an assumption only as a regulative principle rather than a constitutive principle (meaning that such a principle can guide our actions, but it does not provide knowledge). In his book '']'', ] argued that "conscience reveals to us a moral law whose source cannot be found in the natural world, thus pointing to a supernatural Lawgiver."<ref name="Marty2010">{{cite book|last=Marty|first=Elsa J.|title=A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=78962vlrCDcC&pg=PA154|access-date=2 December 2012|date=2010-08-19|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|isbn=9781441111975|page=154|quote=C.S. Lewis offered a popularized version of such an argument in a series of talks for the BBC during World War II, later published in his ''Mere Christianity'' Lewis argued that conscience reveals to us a moral law whose source cannot be found in the natural world, thus pointing to a supernatural Lawgiver.}}</ref><ref name="Allison2011">{{cite book|last=Allison|first=Gregg|title=Historical Theology: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oO2eY2BC6xIC&pg=PA207|access-date=2 December 2012|date=2011-03-29|publisher=Zondervan|isbn=9780310230137|page=207|quote=In his highly influential book Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis revived the moral argument for the existence of God. By moving from the fact of human quarrels and the moral law that these presuppose, to the reality of God as the moral Lawgiver whose law people break, Lewis set forth a foundation not only for the existence of God, but for the message that "the Christians are talking about.... The tell you how the demands of this law, which you and I cannot meet, have been met on our behalf, how God himself becomes a man to save a man from the disapproval of God."
All forms of the moral argument begin with the observation of ''moral normativity''. That is, human beings are typically aware of actions as being right and wrong. This awareness seems to bind us toward certain obligations, regardless of our personal goals and ends. In this sense, moral qualities have the appearance of universality and objectivity.
}}</ref> Lewis argued that accepting the validity of human reason as a given must include accepting the validity of practical reason, which could not be valid without reference to a higher cosmic moral order which could not exist without a God to create and/or establish it. A related argument is from conscience; ] argued that the ] supports the claim that objective moral truths exist because it drives people to act morally even when it is not in their own interest. Newman argued that, because the conscience suggests the existence of objective moral truths, God must exist to give authority to these truths.


Contemporary defenders of the argument from morality are ], ] and ].
In its most general form, the moral argument takes the following form:


==General form==
# Moral normativity exists.
All variations of the argument from morality begin with an observation about moral thought or experiences and conclude with the existence of God. Some of these arguments propose moral facts which they claim evident through human experience, arguing that God is the best explanation for these. Other versions describe some end which humans should strive to attain that is only possible if God exists.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/ | title=Moral Arguments for the Existence of God | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=May 25, 2004 | access-date=March 24, 2012 | author=Byrne, Peter}}</ref>
# The best explanation of moral normativity is God.
# Therefore God exists. (from 1 and 2)


Many arguments from morality are based on moral normativity, which suggests that objective moral truths exist and require God's existence to give them authority. Often, they consider that morality seems to be binding – obligations are seen to convey more than just a preference, but imply that the obligation will stand, regardless of other factors or interests. For morality to be binding, God must exist.<ref name=SEPNormative>{{Cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/#ArgNorMor | title=Moral Arguments for the Existence of God | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=May 25, 2004 | access-date=March 24, 2012 | author=Byrne, Peter}}</ref> In its most general form, the argument from moral normativity is:
What follows are some of the more common variations of the moral argument. The list is by no means exclusive.


#A human experience of morality is observed.
==Variation 1: Moral sanctions==
#God is the best or only explanation for this moral experience.
#Therefore, God exists.<ref name=SEPNormative/>{{Failed verification|date=April 2020}}


Some arguments from moral order suggest that morality is based on rationality and that this can only be the case if there is a moral order in the universe. The arguments propose that only the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived could support the existence of moral order in the universe, so God must exist. Alternative arguments from moral order have proposed that we have an obligation to attain the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue. They attest that whatever we are obliged to do must be possible, and achieving the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue is only possible if a natural moral order exists. A natural moral order requires the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived, so God must exist.<ref name=SEPOrder>{{Cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/#ArgMorOrd | title=Moral Arguments for the Existence of God | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=May 25, 2004 | access-date=March 24, 2012 | author=Byrne, Peter}}</ref>
<ol>
<li value=4>Moral norms exist and have authority.
<li value=5>If they have authority, there must be a reliable motive for human beings to be moral.
<li value=6>No such motive could exist, unless there was an omniscient, omnipresent, wholly just agent to attach sanctions to behavior under moral norms.
<li value=7>Therefore God exists.
</ol>


==Variations==
One may ask why the required recognition and upholding of moral norms must be carried out by divine intelligence, as opposed to human intelligence. A. E. Taylor explains that the moral law holds everywhen and everywhere, whereas the human mind is limited in its comprehension and scope. Only a sovereign God could properly detect infringements of the moral law and apply sanctions. In his ''Letter concerning Toleration'', ] contends that one of the few religious stances that the commonwealth cannot tolerate is ], for atheists have no motive to act upon their promises and oaths.


===Criticism=== ===Practical reason===
]
In his '']'', German philosopher ] stated that no successful argument for God's existence arises from ] alone. In his ''Critique of Practical Reason'' he went on to argue that, despite the failure of these arguments, morality requires that God's existence is assumed, owing to practical reason.<ref name=OppyKant>Oppy 2006, pp. 372–373</ref> Rather than proving the existence of God, Kant was attempting to demonstrate that all moral thought requires the assumption that God exists.<ref>Guyer 2006, p. 234</ref> Kant argued that humans are obliged to bring about the '']'': the two central aims of moral virtue and happiness, where happiness arises out of virtue. As ], Kant argued, it must be possible for the ''summum bonum'' to be achieved.<ref name=SEPOrder/> He accepted that it is not within the power of humans to bring the ''summum bonum'' about, because we cannot ensure that virtue always leads to happiness, so there must be a higher power who has the power to create an ] where virtue can be rewarded by happiness.<ref name=OppyKant/>


Philosopher G. H. R. Parkinson notes a common objection to Kant's argument: that what ought to be done does not necessarily entail that it is possible. He also argues that alternative conceptions of morality exist which do not rely on the assumptions that Kant makes – he cites ] as an example which does not require the ''summum bonum''.<ref name="Parkinson">Parkinson 1988, p. 344</ref> ] argues that much moral guidance is unattainable, such as the Biblical command to be Christ-like. He proposes that Kant's first two premises only ] that we must try to achieve the perfect good, not that it is actually attainable.<ref>Everitt 2003, p. 137</ref>
Critics assert that laws can carry normative force without being derived from an act of legislation. Here are some examples:


===Argument from objective moral truths===
<ul>
Both theists and non-theists have accepted that the existence of objective moral truths might entail the existence of God. ] philosopher ] accepted that, if objective moral truths existed, they would warrant a supernatural explanation. Scottish philosopher ] presented the following argument:
<li>If someone affirms both "''p''" and "''p'' implies ''q''", he or she cannot deny "''q''".
#If morality is objective and absolute, God must exist.
<li>It is wrong to believe both "''p''" and "not-''p''" at the same time.
#Morality is objective and absolute.
</ul>
#Therefore, God must exist.<ref name=Martin>Martin 1992, pp. 213–214</ref>


Many critics have challenged the second premise of this argument, by offering a biological and sociological account of the development of human morality which suggests that it is neither objective nor absolute. This account, supported by biologist ] and philosopher ], proposes that the human experience of morality is a by-product of natural selection, a theory philosopher Mark D. Linville calls evolutionary naturalism. According to the theory, the human experience of moral obligations was the result of ], which attached a sense of morality to human psychology because it was useful for moral development; this entails that moral values do not exist independently of the human mind. Morality might be better understood as an evolutionary imperative in order to propagate genes and ultimately reproduce. No human society today advocates immorality, such as theft or murder, because it would undoubtedly lead to the end of that particular society and any chance for future survival of offspring. Scottish empiricist ] made a similar argument, that belief in objective moral truths is unwarranted and to discuss them is meaningless.<ref>Craig & Moreland 2011, p. 393</ref>
These laws carry clear normative force over our speech and thought. Yet, one does not feel compelled to posit the existence of a Great Logician in the sky to sanction infringements of these laws. In this light, the argument is seen to rest on the following questionable assumption: "All authoritative norms are based on the acts of a legislator." However, some theistic philosophers maintain that even such "norms of reason" derive their authority from God in some fashion.


Because evolutionary naturalism proposes an ] account of morality, it does not require morality to exist objectively; Linville considers the view that this will lead to ] or ].<ref>Craig & Moreland 2011, pp. 393–394</ref><ref>Boniolo & De Anna 2006, pp. 24–25</ref> ] argued that, if evolutionary naturalism is accepted, human morality cannot be described as absolute and objective because moral statements cannot be right or wrong. Despite this, Lewis argued, those who accept evolutionary naturalism still act as if objective moral truths exist, leading Lewis to reject naturalism as incoherent.<ref>McSwain & Ward 2010, pp. 110–111</ref> As an alternative ethical theory, Lewis offered a form of ] which equated God with goodness and treated goodness as an essential part of reality, thus asserting God's existence.<ref>McSwain & Ward 2010, p. 112</ref>
Furthermore, critics assert that this argument denies one of the main features of moral normativity. The two norms of reason given above can be thought of as being intrinsically normative. A rule such as, "If you want to stay healthy, exercise daily", on the other hand, is extrinsicially normative, since its normative force derives from a secondary desire (the desire to stay healthy). The given argument, and its thought that God must exist to attach a fail-safe system of rewards and punishments to moral rules, concedes that moral facts are not intrinsically normative. Bindingness attaches to them only in so far as they engage with a secondary desire (the desire to avoid punishment).


J. C. A. Gaskin challenges the first premise of the argument from moral objectivity, arguing that it must be shown why absolute and objective morality entails that morality is ], rather than simply a human invention. It could be the consent of humanity that gives it moral force, for example.<ref name="Parkinson" /> American philosopher ] argues that it is not ] that objective moral truths must entail the existence of God, suggesting that there could be alternative explanations: he argues that naturalism may be an acceptable explanation and, even if a supernatural explanation is necessary, it does not have to be God (] is a viable alternative). Martin also argues that a non-objective account of ethics might be acceptable and challenges the view that a subjective account of morality would lead to moral anarchy.<ref name=Martin/>
==Variation 2: Transcendentality of morality ==


] has argued for this form of the moral argument.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OxiAikEk2vU | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211115/OxiAikEk2vU| archive-date=2021-11-15 | url-status=live|title=The Moral Argument |publisher=DrCraigVideos |date=January 21, 2015 |website=] |access-date=March 21, 2021}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
<ol>
<li value=8> Moral facts exist.
<li value=9> Moral facts are ] in nature.
<li value=10> The best explanation of there being transcendental moral facts is provided by theism.
<li value=11> Therefore the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking theism is true.
</ol>


===Argument for conscience===
Here, a ''transcendental'' fact is one that cannot be stated entirely in the language of the natural sciences, and that is true irrespective of human opinion. Theism provides the most intelligible explanation for such moral facts via the notion that rightness is one and the same property as the property of being commanded by God (wrongness consists in being forbidden by God).
]
Related to the argument from morality is the argument from conscience, associated with eighteenth-century bishop ] and nineteenth-century cardinal ].<ref name="Parkinson" /> Newman proposed that the ], as well as giving moral guidance, provides evidence of objective moral truths which must be supported by the divine. He argued that emotivism is an inadequate explanation of the human experience of morality because people avoid acting immorally, even when it might be in their interests. Newman proposed that, to explain the conscience, God must exist.<ref name=Martin214>Martin 1992, p. 214</ref>


British philosopher ] argued that moral rules cannot be established from conscience because the differences in people's consciences would lead to contradictions. Locke also noted that the conscience is influenced by "education, company, and customs of the country", a criticism mounted by J. L. Mackie, who argued that the conscience should be seen as an "introjection" of other people into an agent's mind.<ref>Parkinson 1988, pp. 344–345</ref> Michael Martin challenges the argument from conscience with a naturalistic account of conscience, arguing that naturalism provides an adequate explanation for the conscience without the need for God's existence. He uses the example of the internalization by humans of social pressures, which leads to the fear of going against these norms. Even if a supernatural cause is required, he argues, it could be something other than God; this would mean that the phenomenon of the conscience is no more supportive of ] than polytheism.<ref name=Martin214/>


] argues for the existence of God in a similar way in his book '']'', but he does not directly refer to it as the argument from morality.
In order for this argument to work, it should be shown that a non-theistic worldview cannot adequately account for transcendental normative facts. Historically, the burden of proof has been placed on the non-theist to demonstrate a naturalistic metaphysics for morals, as both proponents and opponents of the moral argument tend to agree that morality may be a phenomenon which shows that there is more to the real world than meets the ]'s eye.


==Notes and references==
===Criticism===
{{reflist}}


==Bibliography==
Critics point out this argument's appeal to a ] of ethics. Objections to divine command theories of ethics are numerous, most stemming from forms of the ]. Is an action good because God commanded it, or did God command it because it is good? The first horn would imply that what is good is arbitrary; God decides what is right and wrong in the same way that a government decides which side of the street cars should drive on. This seems unreasonable. The second horn would imply that God made his commands in accordance with transcendental facts that exist apart from God - exactly the types of facts that the theist is asking the non-theist to provide an account for. The argument is thus turned over on its head: the theist must account for the existence of these transcendental facts without invoking God. The non-theist can thus recognize the transcendentality of moral facts and yet still reject premise (10) on the basis that a theistic hypothesis still leaves transcendental moral facts unexplained.
*{{cite book | title=The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=1987 | author=Adams, Robert | isbn=9780195041460}}
*{{cite book | title=Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2006 | last1=Boniolo | first1=Giovanni | last2=De Anna | first2=Gabriele | isbn=9780521856294}}
*{{cite book | title=Essays on Moral Realism | publisher=Cornell University Press | year=1988 | at=Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief | author=Boyd, Richard | editor=Sayre-McCord, Geoffery | isbn=9780801495410 | url-access=registration | url=https://archive.org/details/essaysonmoralrea00unse }}
*{{cite book | title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology | publisher=John Wiley & Sons | year=2011 | last1=Craig | first1=William Lane | last2=Moreland | first2=J.P. | isbn=9781444350852}}
*{{cite book | title=Non-Existence of God | publisher=Routledge | year=2003 | isbn=9780415301060| author=Everitt, Nicholas }}
*{{cite book | title=Kant | publisher=Taylor & Francis | year=2006 | author=Guyer, Paul | isbn=9780415283359}}
*{{cite book | title=The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=1996 | author=Hare, John}}
*{{cite book | title=Critique of Practical Reason | at=Part I, Bk. II, Chap. V | author=Kant, Immanuel}}
*{{cite book | author=Mackie, J.L. | title=The Miracle of Theism | at=Chap. VI | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=1982}}
*{{cite book | title=Atheism: A Philosophical Justification | publisher=Temple University Press | year=1992 | author=Martin, Michael | isbn=9780877229438}}
*{{cite book | title=The Cambridge Companion to C.S. Lewis | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2010 | last=McSwain | first1=Robert | last2=Ward | first2=Michael | isbn=9780521884136}}
*{{cite book | title=Arguing About Gods | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2006 | author=Oppy, Graham | isbn=9780521863865}}
*{{cite book | title=An Encyclopedia of Philosophy | publisher=Taylor & Francis | year=1988 | author=Parkinson, G. H. R. | isbn=9780415003230}}
*{{cite book | title=The Existence of God | url=https://archive.org/details/existenceofgod0000swin | url-access=registration | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=1979 | author=Swinburne, Richard}}


==External links==
Proponents of the argument maintain that the Euthyphro dilemma can be adequately resolved. ], for example, explains that God indeed commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that ''good is an essential part of God's nature''. Some criticize such a response as exhibiting ].
*{{cite SEP |url-id=moral-arguments-god |title=Moral Arguments for the Existence of God |last=Evans |first=C. Stephen}}
*, ''Harvard Theological Review'' 85:1 (January 1992), pp.&nbsp;85–108; revised and reprinted as Chapter IV in Stephen Palmquist, (Ashgate, 2000).


{{philosophy of religion}}
==Variation 3: Moral order (Kant) ==
{{Theology}}

<ol>
<li value=12> The '']'' is where moral virtue and happiness coincide.
<li value=13> We are rationally obliged to attain the ''summum bonum''.
<li value=14> What we are obliged to attain, it must be possible for us to attain.
<li value=15> If there is no God or afterlife, it is not possible to attain the ''summum bonum''.
<li value=16> God (and the afterlife) must exist.
</ol>

Premises (12) and (13) reflect ]'s belief that behaving morally should lead to happiness. Premise (14) tells us that “ought implies can”. It cannot be true that we ought to seek an end if there is no chance of our attaining it. Premise (15) points to the fact that the world as it appears to us is governed by morally blind causes. These causes give no hope whatsoever that pursuit of moral virtue will lead to happiness. They do not even give hope that we can become morally virtuous. Human agency is beset by weaknesses that make the attainment of virtue — in the absence of external aid — seem impossible. The being postulated in (16) has omniscience and omnipotence combined with perfect goodness. Thus it will ensure that the pursuit of a virtuous state is possible through external aid (as in grace) and will promise an immortality where the moral journey can be completed. It will also ensure that in the long run happiness will result from virtue. Its existence would mean that there is a perfect moral causality at work in the world.

===Criticism===

Kant himself asserts that if the ''summum bonum'' cannot be attained, then the moral law which bids us to seek it “must be fantastic and directed to imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false”. Critics point out a certain type of circularity: Kant's argument presupposes that both the pursuit of moral virtue and the pursuit of happiness must be rational enterprises; however, this is precisely the sort of thing that may not be true in a non-theistic universe. Kant's conception of God arises as an attempt to harmonize these two conflicting goals, but critics assert that practical reason is not committed to the pursuit of two ends that apparently conflict.

==General criticisms==

All these variations depend on some way on premise (1): that moral normativity is a real objective phenomenon. Some critics reject this very first premise, rendering all subsequent argumentation moot. Morality, they argue, may have the strong appearance of objectivity but is actually ].

For example, it is possible to view moral values as social constructs, created by certain individuals or groups to abridge the behavior of another group to benefit themselves or others like themselves. To illustrate, a mother who has been abandoned by her partner may teach her sons not to cheat on their wives to spare other women from her pain, eventually leading to the concepts of monogamy and chastity. In this way, morality originates as a principle of self-preservation. But as it is propagated, it is ingrained into the younger generation and colors their conception of morality. ] provides elaborate explanations of this sort of how initially amoral social practices became artificially colored with moral significance. In modern science, similar explanations of the phenomenon of morality have been given and analyzed through fields like ] and ].

==External links==
*
*
*


{{DEFAULTSORT:Argument From Morality}}
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]
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Latest revision as of 00:24, 21 October 2023

Argument for the existence of God This article is about the theological argument. For the argument against modal realism, see Argument from morality (modal realism).

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The argument from morality is an argument for the existence of God. Arguments from morality tend to be based on moral normativity or moral order. Arguments from moral normativity observe some aspect of morality and argue that God is the best or only explanation for this, concluding that God must exist. Arguments from moral order are based on the asserted need for moral order to exist in the universe. They claim that, for this moral order to exist, God must exist to support it. The argument from morality is noteworthy in that one cannot evaluate the soundness of the argument without attending to almost every important philosophical issue in meta-ethics.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant devised an argument from morality based on practical reason. Kant argued that the goal of humanity is to achieve perfect happiness and virtue (the summum bonum) and believed that an afterlife must be assumed to exist in order for this to be possible, and that God must be assumed to exist to provide this. Rather than aiming to prove the existence of God, however, Kant was simply attempting to demonstrate that all moral thought requires the assumption that God exists, and therefore that we are entitled to make such an assumption only as a regulative principle rather than a constitutive principle (meaning that such a principle can guide our actions, but it does not provide knowledge). In his book Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis argued that "conscience reveals to us a moral law whose source cannot be found in the natural world, thus pointing to a supernatural Lawgiver." Lewis argued that accepting the validity of human reason as a given must include accepting the validity of practical reason, which could not be valid without reference to a higher cosmic moral order which could not exist without a God to create and/or establish it. A related argument is from conscience; John Henry Newman argued that the conscience supports the claim that objective moral truths exist because it drives people to act morally even when it is not in their own interest. Newman argued that, because the conscience suggests the existence of objective moral truths, God must exist to give authority to these truths.

Contemporary defenders of the argument from morality are Graham Ward, Alister McGrath and William Lane Craig.

General form

All variations of the argument from morality begin with an observation about moral thought or experiences and conclude with the existence of God. Some of these arguments propose moral facts which they claim evident through human experience, arguing that God is the best explanation for these. Other versions describe some end which humans should strive to attain that is only possible if God exists.

Many arguments from morality are based on moral normativity, which suggests that objective moral truths exist and require God's existence to give them authority. Often, they consider that morality seems to be binding – obligations are seen to convey more than just a preference, but imply that the obligation will stand, regardless of other factors or interests. For morality to be binding, God must exist. In its most general form, the argument from moral normativity is:

  1. A human experience of morality is observed.
  2. God is the best or only explanation for this moral experience.
  3. Therefore, God exists.

Some arguments from moral order suggest that morality is based on rationality and that this can only be the case if there is a moral order in the universe. The arguments propose that only the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived could support the existence of moral order in the universe, so God must exist. Alternative arguments from moral order have proposed that we have an obligation to attain the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue. They attest that whatever we are obliged to do must be possible, and achieving the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue is only possible if a natural moral order exists. A natural moral order requires the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived, so God must exist.

Variations

Practical reason

Portrait of Immanuel Kant, who proposed an argument for the existence of God from morality

In his Critique of Pure Reason, German philosopher Immanuel Kant stated that no successful argument for God's existence arises from reason alone. In his Critique of Practical Reason he went on to argue that, despite the failure of these arguments, morality requires that God's existence is assumed, owing to practical reason. Rather than proving the existence of God, Kant was attempting to demonstrate that all moral thought requires the assumption that God exists. Kant argued that humans are obliged to bring about the summum bonum: the two central aims of moral virtue and happiness, where happiness arises out of virtue. As ought implies can, Kant argued, it must be possible for the summum bonum to be achieved. He accepted that it is not within the power of humans to bring the summum bonum about, because we cannot ensure that virtue always leads to happiness, so there must be a higher power who has the power to create an afterlife where virtue can be rewarded by happiness.

Philosopher G. H. R. Parkinson notes a common objection to Kant's argument: that what ought to be done does not necessarily entail that it is possible. He also argues that alternative conceptions of morality exist which do not rely on the assumptions that Kant makes – he cites utilitarianism as an example which does not require the summum bonum. Nicholas Everitt argues that much moral guidance is unattainable, such as the Biblical command to be Christ-like. He proposes that Kant's first two premises only entail that we must try to achieve the perfect good, not that it is actually attainable.

Argument from objective moral truths

Both theists and non-theists have accepted that the existence of objective moral truths might entail the existence of God. Atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie accepted that, if objective moral truths existed, they would warrant a supernatural explanation. Scottish philosopher W. R. Sorley presented the following argument:

  1. If morality is objective and absolute, God must exist.
  2. Morality is objective and absolute.
  3. Therefore, God must exist.

Many critics have challenged the second premise of this argument, by offering a biological and sociological account of the development of human morality which suggests that it is neither objective nor absolute. This account, supported by biologist E. O. Wilson and philosopher Michael Ruse, proposes that the human experience of morality is a by-product of natural selection, a theory philosopher Mark D. Linville calls evolutionary naturalism. According to the theory, the human experience of moral obligations was the result of evolutionary pressures, which attached a sense of morality to human psychology because it was useful for moral development; this entails that moral values do not exist independently of the human mind. Morality might be better understood as an evolutionary imperative in order to propagate genes and ultimately reproduce. No human society today advocates immorality, such as theft or murder, because it would undoubtedly lead to the end of that particular society and any chance for future survival of offspring. Scottish empiricist David Hume made a similar argument, that belief in objective moral truths is unwarranted and to discuss them is meaningless.

Because evolutionary naturalism proposes an empirical account of morality, it does not require morality to exist objectively; Linville considers the view that this will lead to moral scepticism or antirealism. C. S. Lewis argued that, if evolutionary naturalism is accepted, human morality cannot be described as absolute and objective because moral statements cannot be right or wrong. Despite this, Lewis argued, those who accept evolutionary naturalism still act as if objective moral truths exist, leading Lewis to reject naturalism as incoherent. As an alternative ethical theory, Lewis offered a form of divine command theory which equated God with goodness and treated goodness as an essential part of reality, thus asserting God's existence.

J. C. A. Gaskin challenges the first premise of the argument from moral objectivity, arguing that it must be shown why absolute and objective morality entails that morality is commanded by God, rather than simply a human invention. It could be the consent of humanity that gives it moral force, for example. American philosopher Michael Martin argues that it is not necessarily true that objective moral truths must entail the existence of God, suggesting that there could be alternative explanations: he argues that naturalism may be an acceptable explanation and, even if a supernatural explanation is necessary, it does not have to be God (polytheism is a viable alternative). Martin also argues that a non-objective account of ethics might be acceptable and challenges the view that a subjective account of morality would lead to moral anarchy.

William Lane Craig has argued for this form of the moral argument.

Argument for conscience

Portrait of John Henry Newman, who used the conscience as evidence of the existence of God

Related to the argument from morality is the argument from conscience, associated with eighteenth-century bishop Joseph Butler and nineteenth-century cardinal John Henry Newman. Newman proposed that the conscience, as well as giving moral guidance, provides evidence of objective moral truths which must be supported by the divine. He argued that emotivism is an inadequate explanation of the human experience of morality because people avoid acting immorally, even when it might be in their interests. Newman proposed that, to explain the conscience, God must exist.

British philosopher John Locke argued that moral rules cannot be established from conscience because the differences in people's consciences would lead to contradictions. Locke also noted that the conscience is influenced by "education, company, and customs of the country", a criticism mounted by J. L. Mackie, who argued that the conscience should be seen as an "introjection" of other people into an agent's mind. Michael Martin challenges the argument from conscience with a naturalistic account of conscience, arguing that naturalism provides an adequate explanation for the conscience without the need for God's existence. He uses the example of the internalization by humans of social pressures, which leads to the fear of going against these norms. Even if a supernatural cause is required, he argues, it could be something other than God; this would mean that the phenomenon of the conscience is no more supportive of monotheism than polytheism.

C. S. Lewis argues for the existence of God in a similar way in his book Mere Christianity, but he does not directly refer to it as the argument from morality.

Notes and references

  1. Marty, Elsa J. (2010-08-19). A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 154. ISBN 9781441111975. Retrieved 2 December 2012. C.S. Lewis offered a popularized version of such an argument in a series of talks for the BBC during World War II, later published in his Mere Christianity Lewis argued that conscience reveals to us a moral law whose source cannot be found in the natural world, thus pointing to a supernatural Lawgiver.
  2. Allison, Gregg (2011-03-29). Historical Theology: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine. Zondervan. p. 207. ISBN 9780310230137. Retrieved 2 December 2012. In his highly influential book Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis revived the moral argument for the existence of God. By moving from the fact of human quarrels and the moral law that these presuppose, to the reality of God as the moral Lawgiver whose law people break, Lewis set forth a foundation not only for the existence of God, but for the message that "the Christians are talking about.... The tell you how the demands of this law, which you and I cannot meet, have been met on our behalf, how God himself becomes a man to save a man from the disapproval of God."
  3. Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
  4. ^ Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
  5. ^ Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
  6. ^ Oppy 2006, pp. 372–373
  7. Guyer 2006, p. 234
  8. ^ Parkinson 1988, p. 344
  9. Everitt 2003, p. 137
  10. ^ Martin 1992, pp. 213–214
  11. Craig & Moreland 2011, p. 393
  12. Craig & Moreland 2011, pp. 393–394
  13. Boniolo & De Anna 2006, pp. 24–25
  14. McSwain & Ward 2010, pp. 110–111
  15. McSwain & Ward 2010, p. 112
  16. "The Moral Argument". Youtube.com. DrCraigVideos. January 21, 2015. Archived from the original on 2021-11-15. Retrieved March 21, 2021.
  17. ^ Martin 1992, p. 214
  18. Parkinson 1988, pp. 344–345

Bibliography

  • Adams, Robert (1987). The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195041460.
  • Boniolo, Giovanni; De Anna, Gabriele (2006). Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521856294.
  • Boyd, Richard (1988). Sayre-McCord, Geoffery (ed.). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief. ISBN 9780801495410.
  • Craig, William Lane; Moreland, J.P. (2011). The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 9781444350852.
  • Everitt, Nicholas (2003). Non-Existence of God. Routledge. ISBN 9780415301060.
  • Guyer, Paul (2006). Kant. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415283359.
  • Hare, John (1996). The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance. Oxford University Press.
  • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Part I, Bk. II, Chap. V.
  • Mackie, J.L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford University Press. Chap. VI.
  • Martin, Michael (1992). Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press. ISBN 9780877229438.
  • McSwain, Robert; Ward, Michael (2010). The Cambridge Companion to C.S. Lewis. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521884136.
  • Oppy, Graham (2006). Arguing About Gods. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521863865.
  • Parkinson, G. H. R. (1988). An Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415003230.
  • Swinburne, Richard (1979). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.

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