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{{short description|Logical connective}} | |||
{{redirect|Logical conditional|other related meanings|Conditional statement}} | |||
{{Redirect|Logical conditional|other related meanings|Conditional statement (disambiguation){{!}}Conditional statement}} | |||
:''For the rule of inference which is similar conceptually and in name see: ]'' | |||
{{distinguish|Material inference|Material implication (rule of inference)}} | |||
{{Infobox logical connective | |||
'''material implication''' (also known as '''material conditional''' or '''material consequence''') is a ] often symbolized by a forward arrow "→", and often simply called "implication." A single ] formed from the connection of two, for instance "''p''→''q''" (called a ]) is typically ] as "If ''p'', then ''q''" or "''q'' if ''p''". The material implication between two sentences ''p'', ''q'' is typically symbolized as | |||
| title = Material conditional | |||
| other titles = IMPLY | |||
| Venn diagram = Venn1011.svg | |||
| wikifunction = Z10329 | |||
| definition = <math>x \rightarrow y</math> | |||
| truth table = <math>(1011)</math> | |||
| logic gate = IMPLY_ANSI.svg | |||
| DNF = <math>\overline{x} + y</math> | |||
| CNF = <math>\overline{x} + y</math> | |||
| Zhegalkin = <math>1 \oplus x \oplus xy</math> | |||
| 0-preserving = no | |||
| 1-preserving = yes | |||
| monotone = no | |||
| affine = no | |||
| self-dual = no | |||
}} | |||
{{Logical connectives sidebar}} | |||
The '''material conditional''' (also known as '''material implication''') is an ] commonly used in ]. When the conditional symbol <math>\rightarrow</math> is ] as material implication, a formula <math> P \rightarrow Q</math> is true unless <math>P</math> is true and <math>Q</math> is false. Material implication can also be characterized inferentially by '']'', '']'', ], and ].{{citation needed|reason=This is copied from below, but is it really the minimal + sufficient characterization?|date=February 2021}} | |||
# <math>p \rightarrow q</math>; | |||
# <math>p \supset q</math>; | |||
# <math>p \Rightarrow q</math> (Although this symbol is often used for ] (i.e. logical implication) rather than for material implication.) | |||
Material implication is used in all the basic systems of ] as well as some ]s. It is assumed as a model of correct conditional reasoning within mathematics and serves as the basis for commands in many ]s. However, many logics replace material implication with other operators such as the ] and the ]. Due to the ] and related problems, material implication is not generally considered a viable analysis of ]s in ]. | |||
As placed within the material conditionals above, ''p'' is known as the '']'', and ''q'' as the '']'', of the conditional. One can also use compounds as components, for example ''pq'' → (''r''→''s''). There, the compound ''pq'' (short for "''p'' and ''q''") is the antecedent, and the compound ''r''→''s'' is the consequent, of the larger conditional of which those compounds are components. | |||
== Notation == | |||
Implication is a form of ]. For instance, in an argument such as "Fred is Mike's brother's son. Therefore Fred is Mike's nephew" the statement "Fred is Mike's nephew." is a material consequence of "Fred is Mike's brother's son," not a formal consequence. The ] of the argument depends on the the meanings of the words "Fred," "Mike," "brother," "son," and "nephew," not the ] of the argument. <ref>''Logical consequence'', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> | |||
In logic and related fields, the material conditional is customarily notated with an infix operator <math>\to</math>.<ref name="hilbert1918">{{cite book |last1=Hilbert |first1=D. |title=Prinzipien der Mathematik (Lecture Notes edited by Bernays, P.) |date=1918}}</ref> The material conditional is also notated using the infixes <math>\supset</math> and <math>\Rightarrow</math>.<ref>{{Cite book | last =Mendelson | first =Elliott | author-link =Elliott Mendelson |title=Introduction to Mathematical Logic | year=2015 | edition=6th | location=Boca Raton | publisher=CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group (A Chapman & Hall Book) | isbn=978-1-4822-3778-8 | page=2 }}</ref> In the prefixed ], conditionals are notated as <math>Cpq</math>. In a conditional formula <math>p\to q</math>, the subformula <math>p</math> is referred to as the '']'' and <math>q</math> is termed the '']'' of the conditional. Conditional statements may be nested such that the antecedent or the consequent may themselves be conditional statements, as in the formula <math>(p\to q)\to(r\to s)</math>. | |||
=== History === | |||
In ], the compound ''p''→''q'' is equivalent to the negative compound: not (both ''p'' and not ''q''). In everyday English, saying "It is false that if ''p'' then ''q''" is not often taken as flatly equivalent to saying "''p'' is true and ''q'' is false" but, when used within classical logic, those phrasings are taken as logically equivalent. (Other senses of English "if...then..." require other logical forms.) | |||
In '']'' (1889), ] expressed the proposition "If <math>A</math>, then <math>B</math>" as <math>A</math> Ɔ <math>B</math> with the symbol Ɔ, which is the opposite of C.<ref>{{Cite book |editor=Jean van Heijenoort |title=From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931 |year=1967 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=0-674-32449-8 |pages=84–87}}</ref> He also expressed the proposition <math>A\supset B</math> as <math>A</math> Ɔ <math>B</math>.{{efn|Note that the horseshoe symbol Ɔ has been flipped to become a subset symbol ⊂.}}<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://github.com/mdnahas/Peano_Book/blob/46e27bdb5aed51c078ad99e5a78d134fd2a0c3ca/Peano.pdf |title=English Translation of 'Arithmetices Principia, Nova Methodo Exposita' |access-date=2022-08-10 |author=Michael Nahas |date=25 Apr 2022 |publisher=GitHub |page=VI}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://math.stackexchange.com/a/1146502/186330 |title=elementary set theory – Is there any connection between the symbol ⊃ when it means implication and its meaning as superset? |access-date=2022-08-10 |author=Mauro ALLEGRANZA |date=2015-02-13 |website=Mathematics Stack Exchange |publisher=Stack Exchange Inc |language=en |at=Answer}}</ref> ] expressed the proposition "If ''A'', then ''B''" as <math>A\to B</math> in 1918.<ref name="hilbert1918"/> ] followed Peano in his '']'' (1910–1913), in which he expressed the proposition "If ''A'', then ''B''" as <math>A\supset B</math>. Following Russell, ] expressed the proposition "If ''A'', then ''B''" as <math>A\supset B</math>. ] expressed the proposition "If ''A'', then ''B''" as <math>A\supset B</math> at first but later came to express it as <math>A\to B</math> with a right-pointing arrow.<!-- check https://jeff560.tripod.com/set.html later --> ] expressed the proposition "If ''A'', then ''B''" as <math>A\Rightarrow B</math> in 1954.<ref name="bourbaki1954a">{{cite book |last1=Bourbaki |first1=N. |title=Théorie des ensembles |date=1954 |publisher=Hermann & Cie, Éditeurs |location=Paris |page=14}}</ref> | |||
==Definitions |
==Definitions== | ||
Logicians have many different views on the nature of material implication and approaches to explain its sense.<ref name="Clarke">{{cite web | url=http://www.cs.cornell.edu/Info/People/gries/symposium/clarke.htm | title=A Comparison of Techniques for Introducing Material Implication | publisher=Cornell University | date=March 1996 | accessdate=March 4, 2012 | author=Clarke, Matthew C.}}</ref> | |||
=== |
===Semantics=== | ||
From a ] ], material implication is the ] ]al operator which returns "true" unless its first argument is true and its second argument is false. This semantics can be shown graphically in a ] such as the one below. One can also consider the equivalence <math>A \to B \equiv \neg (A \land \neg B) \equiv \neg A \lor B</math>. | |||
In ], the compound ''p''→''q'' is logically equivalent to the negative compound: not both ''p'' and not ''q''. Thus the compound ''p''→''q'' is ''false'' ] both ''p'' is true and ''q'' is false. By the same stroke, ''p''→''q'' is ''true'' if and only if either ''p'' is false or ''q'' is true (or both). Thus → is a function from pairs of ]s of the components ''p'', ''q'' to truth values of the compound ''p''→''q'', whose truth value is entirely a function of the truth values of the components. Hence, the compound ''p''→''q'' is called '']''. The compound ''p''→''q'' is logically equivalent also to ¬''p''∨''q'' (either not ''p'', or ''q'' (or both)), and to ¬''q'' → ¬''p'' (if not ''q'' then not ''p''). But it is not equivalent to ¬''p'' → ¬''q'', which is equivalent to ''q''→''p''. | |||
===Truth table=== | |||
The ] of <math>A \rightarrow B</math>: | |||
The truth table associated with the material conditional '''not p or q''' (symbolized as '''p → q''') and the logical implication '''p implies q''' (symbolized as '''p → q''', or '''Cpq''') is as follows: | |||
{{2-ary truth table|1|1|0|1|<math>A \rightarrow B</math>}} | |||
{| border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" style="text-align:center;" | |||
|+ | |||
! style="width:35px; background:#aaa;"| p | |||
! style="width:35px; background:#aaa;"| q | |||
! style="width:35px" | '''p → q''' | |||
|- | |||
| T || T || T | |||
|- | |||
| T || F || F | |||
|- | |||
| F || T || T | |||
|- | |||
| F || F || T | |||
|} | |||
The logical cases where the antecedent {{mvar|A}} is false and {{math|''A'' → ''B''}} is true, are called "]s". | |||
===As a formal connective=== | |||
Examples are ... | |||
The material conditional can be considered as a symbol of a ], taken as a set of sentences, satisfying all the classical inferences involving →, in particular the following characteristic rules: | |||
* ... with {{math|''B''}} false: ''"If ] is a sister of ], then Galileo Galilei is a brother of Marie Curie"'', | |||
* ... with {{math|''B''}} true: ''"If Marie Curie is a sister of Galileo Galilei, then Marie Curie has a sibling."''. | |||
===Deductive definition=== | |||
# ]; | |||
Material implication can also be characterized ] in terms of the following ].{{citation needed|reason=As in the lead, is this really the minimal + sufficient characterization?|date=February 2021}} | |||
# ]; | |||
# ]; | |||
# ]. | |||
* '']'' | |||
Unlike truth-functional one, this approach to logical connectives permits the examination of structurally identical propositional forms in various ]s, where somewhat different properties may be demonstrated. For example, in ] which rejects proofs by contraposition as valid rules of inference, {{math|(''p'' → ''q'') ⇒ ¬''p'' ∨ ''q''}} is not a propositional theorem, but ]. | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
Unlike the semantic definition, this approach to logical connectives permits the examination of structurally identical propositional forms in various ]s, where somewhat different properties may be demonstrated. For example, in ], which rejects proofs by contraposition as valid rules of inference, <math>(A \to B) \Rightarrow \neg A \lor B </math> is not a propositional theorem, but ].{{clarify|date=February 2021 |reason= Why is proof theory necessary for this?}} | |||
==Formal properties== | ==Formal properties== | ||
{{Expand section|date=February 2021}} | |||
When studying logic formally, the material conditional is distinguished from the ] relation <math>A \models B</math>, if every interpretation that makes A true also makes B true. However, there is a close relationship between the two in most logics, including ]. For example, the following principles hold: | |||
When ], ] and ] are classical, material implication validates the following equivalences: | |||
* If <math>\Gamma\models\psi</math> then <math>\varnothing\models\varphi_1\land\dots\land\varphi_n\rightarrow\psi</math> for some <math>\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_n\in\Gamma</math>. (This is a particular form of the ].) | |||
* Contraposition: <math>P \to Q \equiv \neg Q \to \neg P</math> | |||
* ]: <math>P \to (Q \to R) \equiv (P \land Q) \to R</math> | |||
* Negated conditionals: <math>\neg(P \to Q) \equiv P \land \neg Q</math> | |||
* Or-and-if: <math>P \to Q \equiv \neg P \lor Q</math> | |||
* Commutativity of antecedents: <math>\big(P \to (Q \to R)\big) \equiv \big(Q \to (P \to R)\big)</math> | |||
* ]: <math>\big(R \to (P \to Q)\big) \equiv \big((R \to P) \to (R \to Q)\big)</math> | |||
Similarly, on classical interpretations of the other connectives, material implication validates the following ]s: | |||
* The converse of the above | |||
* Antecedent strengthening: <math>P \to Q \models (P \land R) \to Q</math> | |||
* ]: <math>\neg P \models P \to Q </math> | |||
* ]: <math>(P \to Q) \land (Q \to R) \models P \to R</math> | |||
* ]: <math>(P \lor Q) \to R \models (P \to R) \land (Q \to R)</math> | |||
] involving material implication include: | |||
* Both <math>\rightarrow</math> and <math>\models</math> are ]; i.e., if <math>\Gamma\models\psi</math> then <math>\Delta\cup\Gamma\models\psi</math>, and if <math>\varphi\rightarrow\psi</math> then <math>(\varphi\land\alpha)\rightarrow\psi</math> for any α, Δ. (In terms of structural rules, this is often referred to as ] or ''thinning''.) | |||
* ]: <math>\models P \to P</math> | |||
* ]: <math>\models (P \to Q) \lor (Q \to P)</math> | |||
* ]: <math>\models (P \to Q) \lor (P \to \neg Q)</math> | |||
== Discrepancies with natural language == | |||
These principles do not hold in all logics, however. Obviously they do not hold in ]s, nor do they hold in ]s. | |||
Material implication does not closely match the usage of ]s in ]. For example, even though material conditionals with false antecedents are ], the natural language statement "If 8 is odd, then 3 is prime" is typically judged false. Similarly, any material conditional with a true consequent is itself true, but speakers typically reject sentences such as "If I have a penny in my pocket, then Paris is in France". These classic problems have been called the ].<ref name="sep-conditionals">{{cite encyclopedia |first=Dorothy |last=Edgington |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2008 |title=Conditionals |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Winter 2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/conditionals/}}</ref> In addition to the paradoxes, a variety of other arguments have been given against a material implication analysis. For instance, ]s would all be vacuously true on such an account.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Starr |first1=Will |editor-last1=Zalta |editor-first1=Edward N. |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |title=Counterfactuals |year=2019 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/counterfactuals}}</ref> | |||
Other properties of implication (following expressions are always true, for any logical values of variables): | |||
In the mid-20th century, a number of researchers including ] and ] proposed that ] principles could explain the discrepancies between natural language conditionals and the material conditional. On their accounts, conditionals ] material implication but end up conveying additional information when they interact with conversational norms such as ].<ref name="sep-conditionals"/><ref name="gillies" >{{cite encyclopedia |last=Gillies |first=Thony |editor-last1=Hale |editor-first1=B. | editor-last2=Wright |editor-first2=C. | editor-last3=Miller |editor-first3=A. |encyclopedia=A Companion to the Philosophy of Language |title=Conditionals |url=http://www.thonygillies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/gillies-conditionals-handbook.pdf |year=2017 |pages=401–436 |publisher=Wiley Blackwell |doi=10.1002/9781118972090.ch17|isbn=9781118972090 }}</ref> Recent work in ] and ] has generally eschewed material implication as an analysis for natural-language conditionals.<ref name="gillies" /> In particular, such work has often rejected the assumption that natural-language conditionals are ]al in the sense that the truth value of "If ''P'', then ''Q''" is determined solely by the truth values of ''P'' and ''Q''.<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> Thus semantic analyses of conditionals typically propose alternative interpretations built on foundations such as ], ], ], and ].<ref name="gillies" /><ref name="sep-conditionals"/><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last=von Fintel |first=Kai |editor-last1=von Heusinger |editor-first1= Klaus | editor-last2= Maienborn |editor-first2= Claudia | editor-first3=Paul |editor-last3=Portner |encyclopedia=Semantics: An international handbook of meaning |title=Conditionals |url=http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-2011-hsk-conditionals.pdf |year=2011 |pages=1515–1538 |publisher= de Gruyter Mouton |doi=10.1515/9783110255072.1515|hdl=1721.1/95781 |isbn=978-3-11-018523-2 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> | |||
*]: <math>(s \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow ((s \rightarrow p) \rightarrow (s \rightarrow q))</math> | |||
Similar discrepancies have been observed by psychologists studying conditional reasoning, for instance, by the notorious ] study, where less than 10% of participants reasoned according to the material conditional. Some researchers have interpreted this result as a failure of the participants to conform to normative laws of reasoning, while others interpret the participants as reasoning normatively according to nonclassical laws.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Oaksford |first1=M. |last2=Chater |first2=N. |year=1994 |title=A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection |journal=] |volume=101 |issue=4 |pages=608–631 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.608 |citeseerx=10.1.1.174.4085 |s2cid=2912209 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stenning |first1=K. |last2=van Lambalgen |first2=M. |year=2004 |title=A little logic goes a long way: basing experiment on semantic theory in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning |journal=Cognitive Science |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=481–530 |doi=10.1016/j.cogsci.2004.02.002 |citeseerx=10.1.1.13.1854 }}</ref><ref name="vonSydow2006">{{cite thesis |last=von Sydow |first=M. |title=Towards a Flexible Bayesian and Deontic Logic of Testing Descriptive and Prescriptive Rules |year=2006 |location=Göttingen |publisher=Göttingen University Press |doi=10.53846/goediss-161 |s2cid=246924881 |url=https://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/handle/11858/00-1735-0000-0006-AC29-9|type=doctoralThesis |doi-access=free }}</ref> | |||
*]: <math>(a \rightarrow b) \rightarrow ((b \rightarrow c) \rightarrow (a \rightarrow c))</math> | |||
*]: <math>a \rightarrow a</math> | |||
*truth preserving: The interpretation under which all variables are assigned a truth value of 'true' produces a truth value of 'true' as a result of material implication. | |||
*commutativity of antecedents: <math>(a \rightarrow (b \rightarrow c)) \equiv (b \rightarrow (a \rightarrow c))</math> | |||
Note that <math>a \rightarrow (b \rightarrow c)</math> is ] to <math>(a \and b) \rightarrow c</math>; this property is sometimes called ]. Because of these properties, it is convenient to adopt a ] notation for → where <math>a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c</math> denotes <math>a \rightarrow (b \rightarrow c)</math>. | |||
Note also that comparison of truth table shows that <math>a \rightarrow b</math> is equivalent to <math>\neg a \or b</math>, and it is sometimes convenient to replace one by the other in proofs. Such a replacement can be viewed as a ]. | |||
== Philosophical problems with material conditional == | |||
Outside of mathematics, it is a matter of some controversy as to whether the ] for ] provides an adequate treatment of ‘conditional statements in English’ (a ] in the ] with a ] attached, i.e., an ], or false-to-fact sentences in the ], i.e., a ]).<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> That is to say, critics argue that in some non-mathematical cases, the truth value of a compound statement, "if ''p'' then ''q''", is not adequately determined by the truth values of ''p'' and ''q''.<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> Examples of non-truth-functional statements include: "''p'' because ''q''", "''p'' before ''q''" and "it is possible that ''p''".<ref name="sep-conditionals"/> “ the sixteen possible truth-functions of ''A'' and ''B'', is the only serious candidate. First, it is uncontroversial that when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false, "If ''A'', ''B''" is false. A basic rule of inference is ]: from "If ''A'', ''B''" and ''A'', we can infer ''B''. If it were possible to have ''A'' true, ''B'' false and "If ''A'', ''B''" true, this inference would be invalid. Second, it is uncontroversial that "If ''A'', ''B''" is sometimes true when ''A'' and ''B'' are respectively (true, true), or (false, true), or (false, false)… Non-truth-functional accounts agree that "If ''A'', ''B''" is false when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false; and they agree that the conditional is sometimes true for the other three combinations of truth-values for the components; but they deny that the conditional is always true in each of these three cases. Some agree with the truth-functionalist that when ''A'' and ''B'' are both true, "If ''A'', ''B''" must be true. Some do not, demanding a further relation between the facts that ''A'' and that ''B''.”<ref name="sep-conditionals">{{cite web |first=Dorothy |last=Edgington |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2008 |title=Conditionals |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Winter 2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/conditionals/}}</ref> | |||
{{quotation|The truth-functional theory of the conditional was integral to ]'s new logic (1879). It was taken up enthusiastically by ] (who called it "material implication"), ] in the '']'', and the ]s, and it is now found in every logic text. It is the first theory of conditionals which students encounter. Typically, it does not strike students as ''obviously'' correct. It is logic's first surprise. Yet, as the textbooks testify, it does a creditable job in many circumstances. And it has many defenders. It is a strikingly simple theory: "If ''A'', ''B''" is false when ''A'' is true and ''B'' is false. In all other cases, "If ''A'', ''B''" is true. It is thus equivalent to "~(''A''&~''B'')" and to "~''A'' or ''B''". "''A'' ⊃ ''B''" has, by stipulation, these truth conditions.|]|The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|“Conditionals”<ref name="sep-conditionals"/>}} | |||
The meaning of the material conditional can sometimes be used in the ] English "if ''condition'' then ''consequence''" construction (a kind of ]), where ''condition'' and ''consequence'' are to be filled with English sentences. However, this construction also implies a "reasonable" connection between the condition (]) and consequence (]) (see ]).{{citation needed|date=February 2012}} | |||
There are various kinds of conditionals in English; e.g., there is the ] and the subjunctive or ]. The latter do not have the same truth conditions as the material conditional. For an overview of some the various analyses, formal and informal, of conditionals, see the "References" section below. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
{{col |
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}} | ||
{{col-break}} | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
{{col-break}} | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * '']'' | ||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
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* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
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===Conditionals=== | ===Conditionals=== | ||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
== Notes == | |||
{{Notelist}} | |||
== References == | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
== Further reading == | == Further reading == | ||
* Brown, Frank Markham (2003), ''Boolean Reasoning: The Logic of Boolean Equations'', 1st edition, ] Academic Publishers, ], MA. 2nd edition, ], ], NY, 2003. | * Brown, Frank Markham (2003), ''Boolean Reasoning: The Logic of Boolean Equations'', 1st edition, ] Academic Publishers, ], MA. 2nd edition, ], ], NY, 2003. | ||
* ] (2001), "Conditionals", in Lou Goble (ed.), ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic'', ]. | * ] (2001), "Conditionals", in Lou Goble (ed.), ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic'', ]. | ||
* ] (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, ], ], MA. | * ] (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, ], ], MA. | ||
* ], "Indicative Conditionals", '']'', '''5''' (1975): 269–286. | * ], "Indicative Conditionals", '']'', '''5''' (1975): 269–286. | ||
== |
==External links== | ||
*{{Commons category-inline}} | |||
* {{SEP|conditionals|Conditionals|Edgington, Dorothy}} | |||
*{{cite SEP |url-id=conditionals |title=Conditionals |last=Edgington |first=Dorothy}} | |||
==References== | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
{{Logical connectives}} | {{Logical connectives}} | ||
{{Common logical symbols}} | |||
{{Mathematical logic}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 07:06, 22 December 2024
Logical connective "Logical conditional" redirects here. For other related meanings, see Conditional statement. Not to be confused with Material inference or Material implication (rule of inference).IMPLY | |
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Definition | |
Truth table | |
Logic gate | |
Normal forms | |
Disjunctive | |
Conjunctive | |
Zhegalkin polynomial | |
Post's lattices | |
0-preserving | no |
1-preserving | yes |
Monotone | no |
Affine | no |
Self-dual | no |
Logical connectives | ||||||||||||||||||||||
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The material conditional (also known as material implication) is an operation commonly used in logic. When the conditional symbol is interpreted as material implication, a formula is true unless is true and is false. Material implication can also be characterized inferentially by modus ponens, modus tollens, conditional proof, and classical reductio ad absurdum.
Material implication is used in all the basic systems of classical logic as well as some nonclassical logics. It is assumed as a model of correct conditional reasoning within mathematics and serves as the basis for commands in many programming languages. However, many logics replace material implication with other operators such as the strict conditional and the variably strict conditional. Due to the paradoxes of material implication and related problems, material implication is not generally considered a viable analysis of conditional sentences in natural language.
Notation
In logic and related fields, the material conditional is customarily notated with an infix operator . The material conditional is also notated using the infixes and . In the prefixed Polish notation, conditionals are notated as . In a conditional formula , the subformula is referred to as the antecedent and is termed the consequent of the conditional. Conditional statements may be nested such that the antecedent or the consequent may themselves be conditional statements, as in the formula .
History
In Arithmetices Principia: Nova Methodo Exposita (1889), Peano expressed the proposition "If , then " as Ɔ with the symbol Ɔ, which is the opposite of C. He also expressed the proposition as Ɔ . Hilbert expressed the proposition "If A, then B" as in 1918. Russell followed Peano in his Principia Mathematica (1910–1913), in which he expressed the proposition "If A, then B" as . Following Russell, Gentzen expressed the proposition "If A, then B" as . Heyting expressed the proposition "If A, then B" as at first but later came to express it as with a right-pointing arrow. Bourbaki expressed the proposition "If A, then B" as in 1954.
Definitions
Semantics
From a classical semantic perspective, material implication is the binary truth functional operator which returns "true" unless its first argument is true and its second argument is false. This semantics can be shown graphically in a truth table such as the one below. One can also consider the equivalence .
Truth table
The truth table of :
F | F | T |
F | T | T |
T | F | F |
T | T | T |
The logical cases where the antecedent A is false and A → B is true, are called "vacuous truths". Examples are ...
- ... with B false: "If Marie Curie is a sister of Galileo Galilei, then Galileo Galilei is a brother of Marie Curie",
- ... with B true: "If Marie Curie is a sister of Galileo Galilei, then Marie Curie has a sibling.".
Deductive definition
Material implication can also be characterized deductively in terms of the following rules of inference.
Unlike the semantic definition, this approach to logical connectives permits the examination of structurally identical propositional forms in various logical systems, where somewhat different properties may be demonstrated. For example, in intuitionistic logic, which rejects proofs by contraposition as valid rules of inference, is not a propositional theorem, but the material conditional is used to define negation.
Formal properties
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When disjunction, conjunction and negation are classical, material implication validates the following equivalences:
- Contraposition:
- Import-export:
- Negated conditionals:
- Or-and-if:
- Commutativity of antecedents:
- Left distributivity:
Similarly, on classical interpretations of the other connectives, material implication validates the following entailments:
- Antecedent strengthening:
- Vacuous conditional:
- Transitivity:
- Simplification of disjunctive antecedents:
Tautologies involving material implication include:
Discrepancies with natural language
Material implication does not closely match the usage of conditional sentences in natural language. For example, even though material conditionals with false antecedents are vacuously true, the natural language statement "If 8 is odd, then 3 is prime" is typically judged false. Similarly, any material conditional with a true consequent is itself true, but speakers typically reject sentences such as "If I have a penny in my pocket, then Paris is in France". These classic problems have been called the paradoxes of material implication. In addition to the paradoxes, a variety of other arguments have been given against a material implication analysis. For instance, counterfactual conditionals would all be vacuously true on such an account.
In the mid-20th century, a number of researchers including H. P. Grice and Frank Jackson proposed that pragmatic principles could explain the discrepancies between natural language conditionals and the material conditional. On their accounts, conditionals denote material implication but end up conveying additional information when they interact with conversational norms such as Grice's maxims. Recent work in formal semantics and philosophy of language has generally eschewed material implication as an analysis for natural-language conditionals. In particular, such work has often rejected the assumption that natural-language conditionals are truth functional in the sense that the truth value of "If P, then Q" is determined solely by the truth values of P and Q. Thus semantic analyses of conditionals typically propose alternative interpretations built on foundations such as modal logic, relevance logic, probability theory, and causal models.
Similar discrepancies have been observed by psychologists studying conditional reasoning, for instance, by the notorious Wason selection task study, where less than 10% of participants reasoned according to the material conditional. Some researchers have interpreted this result as a failure of the participants to conform to normative laws of reasoning, while others interpret the participants as reasoning normatively according to nonclassical laws.
See also
- Boolean domain
- Boolean function
- Boolean logic
- Conditional quantifier
- Implicational propositional calculus
- Laws of Form
- Logical graph
- Logical equivalence
- Material implication (rule of inference)
- Peirce's law
- Propositional calculus
- Sole sufficient operator
Conditionals
Notes
- Note that the horseshoe symbol Ɔ has been flipped to become a subset symbol ⊂.
References
- ^ Hilbert, D. (1918). Prinzipien der Mathematik (Lecture Notes edited by Bernays, P.).
- Mendelson, Elliott (2015). Introduction to Mathematical Logic (6th ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group (A Chapman & Hall Book). p. 2. ISBN 978-1-4822-3778-8.
- Jean van Heijenoort, ed. (1967). From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931. Harvard University Press. pp. 84–87. ISBN 0-674-32449-8.
- Michael Nahas (25 Apr 2022). "English Translation of 'Arithmetices Principia, Nova Methodo Exposita'" (PDF). GitHub. p. VI. Retrieved 2022-08-10.
- Mauro ALLEGRANZA (2015-02-13). "elementary set theory – Is there any connection between the symbol ⊃ when it means implication and its meaning as superset?". Mathematics Stack Exchange. Stack Exchange Inc. Answer. Retrieved 2022-08-10.
- Bourbaki, N. (1954). Théorie des ensembles. Paris: Hermann & Cie, Éditeurs. p. 14.
- ^ Edgington, Dorothy (2008). "Conditionals". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 ed.).
- Starr, Will (2019). "Counterfactuals". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Gillies, Thony (2017). "Conditionals" (PDF). In Hale, B.; Wright, C.; Miller, A. (eds.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 401–436. doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch17. ISBN 9781118972090.
- von Fintel, Kai (2011). "Conditionals" (PDF). In von Heusinger, Klaus; Maienborn, Claudia; Portner, Paul (eds.). Semantics: An international handbook of meaning. de Gruyter Mouton. pp. 1515–1538. doi:10.1515/9783110255072.1515. hdl:1721.1/95781. ISBN 978-3-11-018523-2.
- Oaksford, M.; Chater, N. (1994). "A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection". Psychological Review. 101 (4): 608–631. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.174.4085. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.608. S2CID 2912209.
- Stenning, K.; van Lambalgen, M. (2004). "A little logic goes a long way: basing experiment on semantic theory in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning". Cognitive Science. 28 (4): 481–530. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.13.1854. doi:10.1016/j.cogsci.2004.02.002.
- von Sydow, M. (2006). Towards a Flexible Bayesian and Deontic Logic of Testing Descriptive and Prescriptive Rules (doctoralThesis). Göttingen: Göttingen University Press. doi:10.53846/goediss-161. S2CID 246924881.
Further reading
- Brown, Frank Markham (2003), Boolean Reasoning: The Logic of Boolean Equations, 1st edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA. 2nd edition, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2003.
- Edgington, Dorothy (2001), "Conditionals", in Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell.
- Quine, W.V. (1982), Methods of Logic, (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Stalnaker, Robert, "Indicative Conditionals", Philosophia, 5 (1975): 269–286.
External links
- Media related to Material conditional at Wikimedia Commons
- Edgington, Dorothy. "Conditionals". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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