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{{Short description|Period of sociopolitical turmoil in China (1966–1976)}}
{{About|the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China|Iran's Islamic Cultural Revolution|Iranian Cultural Revolution}}
{{about|the movement in China|events elsewhere also called the "Cultural Revolution"|Cultural Revolution (disambiguation)|revolutions in culture generally|List of cultural, intellectual, philosophical and technological revolutions}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=March 2012}}
{{pp-move|small=yes}}
{{Chinese
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2021}}
|pic=Cultural Revolution poster.jpg
{{Infobox event
|piccap=Cultural Revolution propaganda poster. It depicts Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the ]. The caption says, "The People's Liberation Army of China is a great school for ]."
| duration = {{start and end dates|1966|5|16|1976|10|6|df=y}} ({{Age in years and days|16 May 1966|6 October 1976|sep=and}})
|picsize=250px
| location = ]
|title=Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
| deaths = Estimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions (see {{Section link|#Death toll}})
|s=无产阶级文化大革命
| organizers = ]
|t=無產階級文化大革命
| injuries =
|p=Wúchǎnjiējí Wénhuà Dàgémìng
| image = Cultural Revolution poster.jpg
|j=mou<sup>4</sup>caan<sup>2</sup>gaai<sup>1</sup>kap<sup>1</sup> man<sup>4</sup>faa<sup>3</sup> daai<sup>6</sup> gaak<sup>3</sup>ming<sup>6</sup>
| caption = Propaganda poster depicting ], above a group of soldiers from the ]. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of ]".
|wuu=vu<sup>平</sup>tshae<sup>上</sup>cia<sup>平</sup>cih<sup>入</sup> ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| title = Cultural Revolution
|poj=bô-sán-kai-kip bûn-huà tuā kik-miā
| image_size = 250px
|altname=Commonly abbreviated as
| cause =
|c2=
| result = Economic activity impaired, historical and cultural material destroyed.
1. 文化大革命<br>
| motive = Preservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
2. 文革
| property damage = ], ], ]
|p2=
| arrests = ], ], ], and ]
1. Wénhuà Dàgémìng
| reported injuries =
2. Wéngé
}}{{Infobox Chinese
|order=st
| picsize = 250px
| c = {{linktext|lang=zh|文化大革命}}
| l = "Great Cultural Revolution"
| p = Wénhuà dàgémìng
| bpmf = ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
| w = {{tone superscript|Wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4}}
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|wen|2|.|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|.|g|e|2|.|m|ing|4}}
| gr = Wenhuah dahgerminq
| wuu = Ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| j = man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
| y = Màhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
| poj = Bûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
| buc = Ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs = Vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| altname = Formal name
| s2 = {{nowrap|无产阶级文化大革命}}
| t2 = 無產階級文化大革命
| l2 = "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
| p2 = Wúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
| bpmf2 = ㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
| w2 = {{tone superscript|Wu2-ch}}{{wg-apos}}{{tone superscript|an2-chieh1-chi2 wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4}}
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|wu|2|.|ch|an|3|.|j|ie|1|.|j|i|2|-|wen|2|.|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|.|g|e|2|.|m|ing|4}}
| j2 = mou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
| wuu2 = Vu<sup>平</sup>tshae<sup>上</sup>cia<sup>平</sup>cih<sup>入</sup> ven<sup>平</sup>ho<sup>去</sup> du<sup>去</sup> keh<sup>入</sup>min<sup>去</sup>
| poj2 = Bû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
| buc2 = Ù-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs2 = Vû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| order = st
| t =
| s =
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|m|an|4|-|f|aa|3|-|d|aai|6|-|g|aak|3|-|m|ing|6}}
| tp = Wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
| tp2 = Wú-chǎn-jie-jí wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
| ci2 = {{IPAc-yue|m|ou|4|-|c|aan|2|-|g|aai|1|-|k|ap|1|-|m|an|4|-|f|aa|3|-|d|aai|6|-|g|aak|3|-|m|ing|6}}
}} }}
{{History of the People's Republic of China}}
{{Revolution sidebar}}
The '''Cultural Revolution''', formally known as the '''Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution''', was a ] in the ] (PRC). It was launched by ] in 1966 and lasted until 1976. Its publicly stated goal was to preserve ] by purging remnants of ] and traditional elements from ].


In May 1966, with the help of the ], Mao launched the Revolution and said that ] had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to ], and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". Mass upheaval began in ] with ] in 1966. Many young people, mainly students, responded by forming ] of ] throughout the country. '']'' became revered within ]. In 1967, emboldened radicals began ] from local governments and party branches, establishing new ] in their place while ]. These committees often split into rival factions, precipitating ]. After the ] in 1971, the ] became influential in 1972, and the Revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976, soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four.
The '''Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution''', commonly known as the '''Cultural Revolution''' ({{zh|c=文化大革命|p=Wénhuà Dàgémìng}}), was a social-political movement that took place in the ] from 1966 through 1976. Set into motion by ], then Chairman of the ], its stated goal was to enforce ] in the country by removing ], traditional and cultural elements from Chinese society, and to impose ] orthodoxy within the Party. The revolution marked the return of Mao Zedong to a position of power after the failed ]. The movement paralyzed China politically and significantly affected the country economically and socially.


The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, typically ranging from 1–2 million, including ] that included acts of ], as well as massacres in Beijing, ], ], ], ] and so on.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Wang-2001">{{Cite web |last1=Wang |first1=Youqin |author-link=Wang Youqin |date=2001 |title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966 |url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181223052419/http://ywang.uchicago.edu:80/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |archive-date=December 23, 2018 |website=]}}</ref> Red Guards sought to destroy the ] (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts, cultural and religious sites. Tens of millions were persecuted, including senior officials such as ], ] and ]; millions were persecuted for being members of the ], with intellectuals and scientists labelled as the ]. The country's schools and universities were closed, and the ] were cancelled. Over 10&nbsp;million ] were relocated under the ].
The Revolution was launched in May 1966. Mao alleged that ] elements were infiltrating the government and society at large, aiming to restore capitalism. He insisted that these "]s" be removed through violent ]. China's youth responded to Mao's appeal by forming ] groups around the country. The movement spread into the military, urban workers, and the Communist Party leadership itself. It resulted in widespread factional struggles in all walks of life. In the top leadership, it led to a mass purge of senior officials who were accused of taking a "capitalist road", most notably ] and ]. During the same period Mao's ] grew to immense proportions.


In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new ], replacing Mao's successor ]. Deng and his allies introduced the '']'' program and initiated ], which, together with the ], gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution, declaring it "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic." Given its broad scope and social impact, memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China. It is often referred to as the "ten years of chaos" ({{zhi|c=十年动乱|p=shí nián dòngluàn}}) or "ten years of havoc" ({{zhi|c=十年浩劫|p=shí nián hàojié}}).<ref>{{Cite web |title=Translation Glossary for the CR/10 Project |url=https://culturalrevolution.pitt.edu/media/cr10-glossary.pdf |access-date=November 28, 2023 |website=]}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Lu |first=Xing |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought |year=2004 |page=2 |quote=Known to the Chinese as the ten years of chaos }}</ref>
Millions of people were persecuted in the violent factional struggles that ensued across the country, and suffered a wide range of abuses including public humiliation, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, sustained harassment, and seizure of property. A large segment of the population was forcibly displaced, most notably the transfer of urban youth to rural regions during the ]. Historical relics and artifacts were destroyed. Cultural and religious sites were ransacked.


== Etymology ==
Mao officially declared the Cultural Revolution to have ended in 1969, but its active phase lasted until the death of the military leader ] in 1971. The political instability between 1971 and the arrest of the ] in 1976 is now also widely regarded as part of the Revolution. After Mao's death in 1976, reformers led by ] gained prominence. Most of the Maoist reforms associated with the Cultural Revolution were abandoned by 1978. The Cultural Revolution has been treated officially as a negative phenomenon ever since. {{By whom|date=November 2012}}
The terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. During this period, the term was used interchangeably with "cultural construction" and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters. This usage of "cultural revolution" continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s, and often involved drawing parallels to the ] or the ] of 1928–1931.<ref name="Thornton2019">{{Cite book |last=Thornton |first=Patricia M. |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |date=2019 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-76046-249-9 |editor-last=Sorace |editor-first=Christian |location=Acton, Australia |chapter=Cultural Revolution |editor-last2=Franceschini |editor-first2=Ivan |editor-last3=Loubere |editor-first3=Nicholas}}</ref>{{rp|56}}
{{History of the People's Republic of China}}

==Background==

===Creation of the People's Republic===
{{Main|Proclamation of the People's Republic of China}}

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's Republic of China, symbolically bringing the decades-long ] to a close. Remaining ] forces fled to ], and continued to resist the People's Republic in various ways. Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China, and Mao Zedong launched the ] to eliminate these soldiers left behind, as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao's new government.

===Great Leap Forward===
{{Main|Great Leap Forward|Great Chinese Famine}}
{{See also|Seven Thousand Cadres Conference}}

The Great Leap Forward, similar to the ], was Mao Zedong's proposal to make the newly created People's Republic of China an industrial superpower. Beginning in 1958, the Great Leap Forward did produce, at least on the surface, incredible industrialization, but also caused the ], while still falling short of projected goals. In early 1962, at CCP's ], Mao made ], after which he took a semi-retired role, leaving future responsibilities to ] and ].


{{Excerpt|Great Leap Forward|paragraphs=2}}
== Background ==
{{contains Chinese text}}


===Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism===
=== Great Leap Forward ===
{{main|Sino-Soviet split}}
{{Main|Great Leap Forward}}
In the early 1950s, the PRC and the ] (USSR) were the world's two largest communist states. Although initially they were mutually supportive, disagreements arose after ] took power in the USSR. In 1956, Khrushchev ], and began implementing ]. Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes, believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement.<ref name=Mac>{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |title=Mao's Last Revolution |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-674-02332-1}}</ref>{{rp|4–7}}
In 1958, after China's first ], Mao called for "grassroots socialism" in order to accelerate his plans for turning China into a modern industrialized state. In this spirit, Mao launched the ], established ]s in the countryside, and began the ] of the people into ]. Many communities were assigned production of a single commodity—steel. Mao vowed to increase agricultural production to twice 1957 levels.<ref name="Tang"/>


Mao believed that Khrushchev was a ], altering ] concepts, which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR. Relations soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the ] and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|4–7}}
The Great Leap was an economic failure. Uneducated farmers attempted to produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on ]s to achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was low quality and largely useless. The Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the production of most goods except substandard ] and steel. Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem for several years.<ref name="umd">{{cite web|last=Shinn|first=Rin Supp|title=History of China|url=http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc2.html|publisher=University of Maryland|accessdate=May 14, 2010}}</ref><ref name=jin1>{{cite book|last=Jin|first=Qiu|title=The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Stanford University Press|location=Stanford, California|pages=25–30}}</ref> In the meantime, chaos in the collectives, bad weather, and exports of food necessary to secure hard currency resulted in the ]. Food was in desperate shortage, and production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of millions of people, particularly in poorer inland regions.<ref name="White"></ref>


Mao denounced revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing at the USSR, Mao criticized its Balkan ally, the ]. In turn, the USSR criticized China's Balkan ally, the ]. In 1963, CCP began to denounce the USSR, publishing nine polemics.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|7}}
The Great Leap's failure reduced Mao's prestige within the Party. Forced to take major responsibility, in 1959, Mao resigned as the ], China's head of state, and was succeeded by ]. In July, ] at the scenic ] to discuss policy. At the conference, Marshal ], the Minister of Defence, criticized Great-Leap policies in a private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued by mismanagement and cautioning against elevating political dogma over the laws of economics.<ref name=umd/> Despite the moderate tone of Peng's letter, Mao took it as a personal attack against his leadership.<ref>Jin Qiu, ]</ref> Following the Conference, Mao had Peng removed from his posts, and accused him of being a "right-opportunist". Peng was replaced by ], another revolutionary army general who became a more staunch Mao supporter later in his career. While the ] served as a death knell for Peng, Mao's most vocal critic, it led to a shift of power to moderates led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who took effective control of the economy following 1959.<ref name=umd/>


Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential ]. As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course".<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|141}} Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and ], concerned that China's support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets.<ref name="Meyskens2020">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{rp|141}}
By the early 1960s, many of the Great Leap's economic policies were reversed by initiatives spearheaded by Liu, Deng, and ]. This moderate group of pragmatists were unenthusiastic about Mao's utopian visions. Owing to his loss of esteem within the party, Mao developed a decadent and eccentric lifestyle. {{Citation needed|date=November 2012}} <ref>Spence</ref> By 1962, while Zhou, Liu and Deng managed affairs of state and the economy, Mao had effectively withdrawn from economic decision-making, and focused much of his time on further contemplating his contributions to Marxist-Leninist social theory, including the idea of "continuous revolution".<ref>Jin Qiu, Ch. 2</ref> This theory's ultimate aim was to set the stage for Mao to restore his brand of Communism and his personal prestige within the Party.


=== Socialist Education Movement and ''Hai Rui Dismmised from Office'' ===
=== Sino-Soviet Split and anti-revisionism ===
{{See also|Socialist Education Movement|Hai Rui Dismissed from Office}}
{{Main|Sino-Soviet Split}}
In the early 1950s, the People's Republic of China and the ] were the two largest Communist states in the world. While they had initially been mutually supportive, issues arose following the ascendancy of ] to power in the Soviet Union after the death of ]. In 1956, Khrushchev ] and subsequently set about implementing post-Stalinist economic reforms. Mao and many members of the Chinese Communist Party were opposed to these changes, believing that it would have negative repercussions for the worldwide Marxist movement, among whom Stalin was still viewed as a hero.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. pp. 04-07">]. pp. 04–07.</ref> Mao believed that Khrushchev was not adhering to ], but was instead a ], altering his policies from basic Marxist concepts, something Mao feared would allow capitalists to eventually regain control of the country. Relations between the two governments ], with the Soviets refusing to support China's case for joining the United Nations and going back on their pledge to supply China with a ].<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. pp. 04-07"/>


] solidified the PLA's loyalty to Mao]]
Mao went on to publicly denounce revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing fingers at the Soviet Union, Mao criticized their ideological ally, the ], while the Soviets returned the favour by proxy via criticizing the ], a Chinese ally.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07">]. p. 07.</ref> In 1963, the Chinese Communist Party began to openly denounce the Soviet Union, publishing a series of nine polemics against its Marxist revisionism, with one of them being titled ''On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World'', in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was not only a revisionist but also increased the danger of capitalist restoration.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07"/> Khrushchev's downfall from an internal coup d'état in 1964 also contributed to Mao's fears of political vulnerability, particularly because of his dwindling prestige amongst his colleagues following the Great Leap Forward.<ref name="MacFarquhar and Schoenals 2006. p. 07"/>


In 1963, Mao launched the ].<ref name="Baum-1969">{{cite journal |last=Baum |first=Richard |year=1969 |title=Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective |journal=] |volume=38 |issue=38 |pages=92–119 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000049158 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=652308 |s2cid=154449798}}</ref> Mao set the scene by "]" powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty. His approach was executed via newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by his network of political allies.<ref name="Baum-1969" />
=== Precursor ===
] solidified the Army's loyalty towards Mao]]
Mao set the scene for the Cultural Revolution by "cleansing" powerful officials of questionable loyalty who were based in Beijing. His approach was less than transparent, achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internal meetings, and skillfully employing his network of political allies.


In late 1959, historian and Beijing Deputy Mayor ] published a historical drama entitled '']''. In the play, an honest civil servant, ], is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965 he secretly commissioned his wife ] and Shanghai propagandist ] to publish an article criticizing it.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 15-18.</ref> Yao boldly alleged that ''Hai Rui'' was really an allegory attacking Mao; that is, Mao was the corrupt emperor and ] was the honest civil servant.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 16.</ref> In late 1959, historian and deputy mayor of Beijing ] published a historical drama entitled '']''. In the play, an honest ], ], is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned ] and ] to publish an article criticizing it. Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao; flagging Mao as the emperor, and Peng Dehuai, who had previously questioned Mao during the ], as the honest civil servant.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|15–18}}


Yao's article put Beijing Mayor ]<ref>No relation to Peng Dehuai</ref> on the defensive. Peng, a powerful official and Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the "]", a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially only published in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally-distributed '']'' and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion", and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 14–19.</ref> Yao's article put Beijing mayor ] on the defensive. Peng, Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the ], a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially published only in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed '']'' and other major newspapers under his control, and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}} While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired ]—director of the ], an organ that controlled internal communications—making unsubstantiated charges. He installed loyalist ], head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}}


On 12 February 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the ''February Outline''. The ''Outline'' as sanctioned by the party center defined ''Hai Rui'' as a constructive ''academic'' discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any ''political'' implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations. Meanwhile, Mao sacked ] director ], a Peng ally.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}}
While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired ] &ndash; director of the Party's General Office, an organ that controlled internal communications &ndash; on a series of unsubstantiated charges, installing in his stead staunch loyalist ], head of Mao's security detail.<ref name="ReferenceA">]. Chapter 1.</ref> Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> In December, Defence Minister and Mao loyalist ] accused General ], the chief of staff of the ] (PLA), of being anti-Mao, alleging that Luo put too much emphasis on military training rather than Maoist "political discussion". Despite initial skepticism in the Politburo of Luo's guilt, Mao pushed for an 'investigation', after which Luo was denounced, dismissed, and forced to deliver a ]. Stress from the events led Luo to attempt suicide.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006. pp. 20–27.</ref> Luo's removal secured the military command's loyalty to Mao.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 24.</ref>


Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists ] and ]. They accused Peng of opposing Mao, labeled the ''February Outline'' "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique".<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}} On 16 May, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|27–35}}
====February Outline====
Having ousted Luo and Yang, Mao returned his attention to Peng Zhen. On February 12, 1966, the "]" issued a report known as the ''February Outline'' ({{lang|zh|二月提纲}}). The ''Outline'', sanctioned by the Party centre, defined ''Hai Rui'' as constructive ''academic'' discussion, and aimed to formally distance Peng Zhen from any ''political'' implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciation of Wu Han and Peng Zhen. Meanwhile, Mao also sacked Propaganda Department director ], a Peng Zhen ally. Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao would deliver his final blow to Peng Zhen at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists ] and ]. They accused Peng Zhen of opposing Mao, labeled the ''February Outline'' "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique".<ref>] Chapter 1.</ref> On May 16, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng Zhen and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist ] (CRG).<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. pp. 27–35.</ref>


== Early Stage: Mass Movement == == 1966: Outbreak ==
{{anchor|Beginning}} {{anchor|Beginning}}
The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods:


* spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place)
===The May 16 Notification===
* a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976<ref name="Russo-2020a">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham, NC |page=148}}</ref>


The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization. Virtually anyone could create a political organization, even without party approval. Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions. After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist, although their legacies were a topic of controversy later.<ref name="Russo-2020a" />
In early 1966, the ] issued six Central Documents regarding the dismissal of Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang in which they declared that the "Great Cultural Revolution" had been launched. One of these documents, released on May 16, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly accusing:<ref>]. pp. 39–40.</ref>


=== Notification ===
:Those representatives of the ] who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the ] into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like ] for example, who are still nestling beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.<ref>Quoted in ]. p. 47.</ref>
{{Main|16 May Notification}}
]
In May 1966, an expanded session of the ] was called in Beijing. The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on ] and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and ]. One of these documents, distributed on 16 May, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:{{r|Mac|pp=39–40}}


<blockquote>Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the ] into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.{{r|Mac|p=47}}</blockquote>
This text, known as the "May 16 Notification," summarized Mao's ideological justification for the Cultural Revolution.<ref>Li Xuefeng quoted in ]. p. 40.</ref> Effectively it implied that there are enemies of the Communist cause within the Party itself: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag."<ref name="ms46">]. p. 46.</ref> The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought."<ref name="ms46"/> The party leadership was relatively united in approving the general direction of Mao's agenda, but the charges against esteemed party leaders like Peng Zhen rang alarm bells in China's intellectual community and among the ].<ref name="ms41">]. p. 41.</ref>


Later known as the "16 May Notification", this document summarized Mao's ideological justification for CR.{{r|Mac|p=40}} Initially kept secret, distributed only among high-ranking party members, it was later declassified and published in '']'' on 17 May 1967.{{r|Mac|p=41}} Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag." The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of ]."{{r|Mac|p=46}} While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction.<ref name="Nianyi">{{cite book |last=Wang |first=Nianyi |script-title=zh:大动乱的年代:1949–1989 年的中国 |trans-title=Great age of turmoil, a history of China 1949–89 |language=zh |year=1989 |publisher=Henan People's Publishing House}}</ref>{{rp|13}} The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China's intellectual community and the ].{{r|Mac|p=41}}
===Early mass rallies===


=== Mass rallies (May–June) ===
After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee had effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On May 25, ], a philosophy lecturer at Peking University, authored a ] along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader ].<ref name=mac57>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 56 - 58</ref> Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng Zhen, were trying to contain revolutionary fervour in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.<ref name=mac57/> Mao, favouring chaos as a means to "cleanse" the leadership ranks, ordered Nie's message to be broadcast nationwide and called it "the first Marxist big-character poster in China." Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on June 13 to expand the class suspension nationwide.<ref name=mac59>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 59-61</ref> By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans against his perceived enemies.<ref name=mac59/>
]", an editorial published on the front page of '']'' on 1 June 1966, calling for the proletariat to "completely eradicate" the "] that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes".<ref name="Gao1987">{{cite book |last1=Gao |first1=Yuan |title=Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=OrN_UGo9S0UC |page=50}} |year=1987 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-6589-3}}</ref>{{rp|50}}]]
After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On 25 May, under the guidance of {{Interlanguage link|Cao Yi'ou|lt=|zh|曹轶欧|WD=}}—wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng—], a philosophy lecturer at ], authored a ] along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader Lu Ping. Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng, were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|56–58}}


Mao promptly endorsed Nie's poster as "the first Marxist big-character poster in China". Approved by Mao, the poster rippled across educational institutions. Students began to revolt against their school's party establishments. Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide. By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|59–61}}
When the dismissal of Peng Zhen and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, widespread confusion ensued. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng Zhen's ousting.<ref name=mac62>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 62-64</ref> Even the top Party leadership was unsure of the direction of the movement. Under the auspice of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, work teams - effectively 'ideological-guidance' squads of cadres - were sent to the city's schools and ''People's Daily'' to restore some semblance of order.<ref name=mac62/> However, the work teams were hastily dispatched and had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres. As a result the work teams came under increasing suspicion for being yet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary fervour.<ref name=mac71>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 71</ref>


When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, confusion was widespread. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng's ousting. Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond. After seeking Mao's guidance in ], ] and ] decided to send in 'work teams'—effectively 'ideological guidance' squads of cadres—to the city's schools and ''People's Daily'' to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|62–64}}
On July 28, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, stating that mass purges and all such related social and political phenomena were justified and correct. Mao responded with his full support with his own big-character poster entitled '']''. Mao wrote that despite having undergone a Communist revolution, China's political hierarchy was still dominated by "bourgeois" elitist elements, capitalists, and revisionists, and that these counter-revolutionary elements were indeed still present at the top ranks of the party leadership itself. This was, in effect, an open call-to-arms against Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and their allies.<ref name="Tang">Tang Tsou. (1986). The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-81514-5</ref>


The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|71}} Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|75}}
===1966===
]
On August 8, 1966, the party's Central Committee passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (a.k.a. "the 16 Points").<ref>, adopted on August 8, 1966, by the CC of the CCP (official English version)</ref> This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage":


===''Bombard the Headquarters'' (July)===
{{cquote|Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds, and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do just the opposite: It must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art, and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.}}
{{multiple image
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| footer = In 1966, Mao broke with ] (right), then serving as ], over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic '']'' was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois" party headquarters
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| alt1 = Mao Zedong, Chairman
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]
In July, Mao, in Wuhan, crossed the Yangtze River, showing his vigor. He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July. Several days later a rally was held at the ] to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders encouraged the masses to 'not be afraid' and take charge of the movement, free of Party interference.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|81–84}}


The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR's unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership. On 1 August, the Eleventh Plenum of the ] was convened to advance Mao's radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|94}}{{multiple image
The Decision took the existing student movement and elevated it to the level of a nationwide mass campaign, calling on not only students but also "the masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary cadres" to carry out the task of "transforming the superstructure" by writing big-character posters and holding "great debates."
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|footer = From left: (1) Students at ] making big-character posters denouncing ]; (2) Big-characters posted at ]; (3) Students at No. 23 Middle School in Beijing reading '']'' during the "Resume Classes" campaign}}


On 28 July, ] representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled '']'', rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Party.<ref name="Tang">{{Cite book |last=Tsou |first=Tang |author-link=Tsou Tang |title=The Cultural Revolution and post-Mao reforms: a historical perspective |year=1988 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-226-81514-5}}</ref>
The freedoms granted in the 16 Points were later written into the PRC constitution as "the four great rights" of "great democracy (大民主, Dàmínzhǔ)": the right to speak out freely, to air one's views fully, to write big-character posters, and to hold great debates (大鸣dàmíng、大放dàfàng、大字报dàzìbào、大辩论dàbiànlùn – the first two are basically synonyms). (In other contexts the second was sometimes replaced by 大串联dàchuànlián – the right to "link up," meaning for students to cut class and travel across the country to meet other young activists and propagate Mao Zedong Thought.){{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


This statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party hierarchy. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, but were sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two; Liu's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.<ref name="Tang"/>
Those who had anything other than a Communist background were challenged and often charged for corruption and sent to prison. These freedoms were supplemented by the right to strike, although this right was severely attenuated by the Army's entrance onto the stage of civilian mass politics in February 1967. All of these rights were removed from the constitution after Deng's government suppressed the ] movement in 1979.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


] targeting Liu Shaoqi's wife ]]]
On August 18, 1966, millions of Red Guards from all over the country gathered in Beijing for an audience with the Chairman. Atop ], Mao and Lin Biao made frequent appearances to greet approximately 11&nbsp;million Red Guards, receiving cheers each time. Mao praised their actions in the recent campaigns to develop socialism and democracy.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}
Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged. The extensive ], in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folded into the CRG.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|96}}


=== Red August and the Sixteen Points ===
Marxist-Leninist ideology was opposed to religion, and people were told to become atheists from the early days of Communist rule. During the ] campaign, religious affairs of all types were discouraged by Red Guards, and practitioners persecuted. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed down and sometimes converted to other uses, looted, and destroyed.<ref>{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the 'ruling class'.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007">Yu, Dan Smyer. "Delayed contention with the Chinese Marxist scapegoat complex: re-membering Tibetan Buddhism in the PRC." The Tibet Journal 32.1 (2007)</ref> Chinese Marxists declared 'the death of God', and considered religion a defilement of the Chinese communist vision. Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007"/>
{{Main|Red August}}
] surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966]]


'']'' led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China's future.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|107}} By December 1967, 350 million copies had been printed.<ref name="Lu">{{cite book |last=Lu |first=Xing |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication |publisher=] |year=2004 |isbn=978-1570035432 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv10tq3n6 |jstor=j.ctv10tq3n6}}</ref>{{rp|61–64}}
For two years, until July 1968 (and in some places for much longer), student activists such as the Red Guards expanded their areas of authority, and accelerated their efforts at socialist reconstruction. They began by passing out leaflets explaining their actions to develop and strengthen socialism, and posting the names of suspected "counter-revolutionaries" on bulletin boards. They assembled in large groups, held "great debates," and wrote educational plays. They held public meetings to criticize and solicit self-criticisms from suspected "counter-revolutionaries."
{{cquote|The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you ... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.}}
]]]
This was one of many quotations in the Little Red Book that the Red Guards would later follow as a guide, provided by Mao. It was the mechanism that led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as the future for China. These quotes directly from Mao led to other actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders.<ref>] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 107</ref> Although the 16 Points and other pronouncements of the central Maoist leaders forbade "physical struggle (武斗, wǔdòu)" in favor of "verbal struggle" (文斗, wéndòu), these ]s often led to physical violence. Initially verbal struggles among activist groups became even more violent, especially when activists began to seize weapons from the Army in 1967. The central Maoist leaders limited their intervention in activist violence to verbal criticism, sometimes even appearing to encourage "physical struggle," and only after the PLA began to intervene in 1969 did authorities begin to suppress the mass movement.


During the Red August of Beijing, on 8 August 1966, the ] passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points". This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country:"<ref>{{cite web |title=Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-33g.htm |website=] |publisher=] |access-date=5 March 2024}}</ref><ref name=Mac/>{{rp|92–93}}<blockquote>
During the Cultural Revolution, all politicians who had any history of being anything other than dogmatically Maoist were almost immediately purged. ], once the most powerful man in China after Mao, was sent to a detention camp, where he later died in 1969. Deng Xiaoping was himself sent away for a period of re-education three times, and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory until he was brought back years later by Zhou Enlai. Many of those accused were not lucky enough to survive their persecution, and were only rehabilitated posthumously, after Deng succeeded ] as the paramount leader of China.


Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie&nbsp;... to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.</blockquote>
On August 22, 1966, Mao issued a notice to stop "all police intervention in Red Guard tactics and actions." Those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled "counter-revolutionaries." Mao, drawing on his experiences from prior to 1949, suggested that "the sign of a true revolutionary was his desire to kill." Mao's praise for rebellion was effectively an endorsement for the actions of the Red Guards, which grew increasingly violent.<ref>MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; pp. 515</ref> Public security in China deteriorated rapidly as a result of central officials lifting restraints on violent behavior.<ref name="MacFarquhar126"/> ], the national police chief, said it was "no big deal" if Red Guards were beating "bad people" to death.<ref name="MacFarquhar125">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 125</ref>
The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the ] of society.


]
The police relayed Xie's remarks to the Red Guards and they acted accordingly.<ref name="MacFarquhar125"/> In the course of about two weeks, the violence left some one hundred teachers, school officials, and educated cadres dead in Beijing's western district alone. The number injured was "too large to be calculated."<ref name="MacFarquhar126">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 126</ref>
On 18 August in Beijing, over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around ] for an audience with the chairman.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106–107}} Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them, donning a Red Guard armband. Lin also took centre stage, denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution".<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} Subsequently, violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread.<ref name="Wang-2001" /><ref name="Jian-2006">{{Cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Guo |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=T5-4zOdHKOIC |page=237}} |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Song |first2=Yongyi |last3=Zhou |first3=Yuan |year=2006 |publisher=Scarecrow |isbn=978-0-8108-6491-7 |author-link2=Song Yongyi}}</ref>{{rp|xvi}} The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release.<ref name="Li2023">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Jie |title=Cinematic Guerillas: Propaganda, Projectionists, and Audiences in Socialist China |publisher=] |year=2023 |isbn=978-0-231-20627-3 |location=New York}}</ref>{{rp|53}}


On 22 August, a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior. ], the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes".<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124–126}}
The most gruesome aspects of the campaign included numerous incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were targets of 'struggle' could no longer bear the stress and committed suicide. In August and September 1966, there were 1,772 people murdered in Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were 704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.<ref>MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 124</ref>


On September 5, 1966, another notice was issued from the party leadership, encouraging all Red Guards to come to Beijing over a stretch of time. All costs, including accommodation and transportation, were to be paid by the government. On October 10, 1966, Mao's ally, General Lin Biao, publicly criticized Liu and Deng as "]s" and threats. Later, ] was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed. The campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During Red August, 1,772 people were murdered in Beijing; many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students.<ref name="Wang-2001" /> In September, Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths; in Wuhan, 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124}} Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.


=== Destruction of the Four Olds (August–November) ===
===1967===
{{main|Four Olds}}
] against cadres of the Chinese Communist Party Northeast Bureau, Yu Ping, organization department chief, and Gu Zhuoxin, secretary of the secretariat. Yu Ping was accused of being a "]" and Gu, a traitor to revolution. Both men survived the Cultural Revolution.]]
] at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |title=China's reluctant Emperor |newspaper=] |date=September 7, 2011 |access-date=February 15, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161006175341/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |archive-date=October 6, 2016 |url-status=live |last1=Melvin |first1=Shelia}}</ref>]]
On January 3, 1967, ] and ] employed local media and cadres to generate the so-called "January Storm", in which many prominent Shanghai municipal government leaders were heavily criticized and purged.<ref>Yan, Jiaqi. Gao, Gao. (1996). Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution. ISBN 0-8248-1695-1.</ref> This paved the way for ] to take charge of the city as leader of its Municipal Revolutionary Committee. The Municipal government was thus abolished. In Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were once again the targets of criticism, but others also pointed at the wrongdoings of the Vice Premier, ]. Separate political struggles ensued among central government officials and local party cadres, who seized the Cultural Revolution as an opportunity to accuse rivals of "counter-revolutionary activity."{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held, drawing in 12&nbsp;million people, most of whom were Red Guards.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106}} The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|110}}
On January 8, Mao praised these actions through the party-run ''People's Daily'', urging all local government leaders to rise in self-criticism, or the criticism and purging of others suspected of "counterrevolutionary activity". This led to massive power struggles which took the form of purge after purge among local governments, many of which stopped functioning altogether. Involvement in some sort of "revolutionary" activity was the only way to avoid being purged, but it was no guarantee.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


At the rallies, Lin called for the destruction of the Four Olds; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}}<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=146}} Some changes associated with the Four Olds campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary" names.<ref>{{cite web |last=Shi |first=Gang |year=2004 |script-title=zh:红卫兵 "破四旧" 的文化与政治 |url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=5436 |access-date=June 10, 2020 |website=Chinese University of Hong Kong |language=zh}}</ref>
In February, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, with support from Mao, insisted that the "class struggles" be extended to the military. Many prominent generals of the ] who were instrumental in the founding of the PRC voiced their concern and opposition to the Cultural Revolution, calling it a "mistake". Former Foreign Minister Chen Yi, angered at a Politburo meeting, said factionalism was going to completely destroy the military, and in turn the party.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


Other aspects were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards laid siege to the ] in ],<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|119}} and other historically significant tombs and artifacts.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10" />
Other generals, including ] and ] also expressed their discontent. They were subsequently denounced on national media, controlled by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, as the "February Counter-current forces" ({{zh|c=二月逆流}}, Èryuè Nìliú). They were all eventually purged. At the same time, many large and prominent Red Guard organizations rose in protest against other Red Guard organizations who ran dissimilar revolutionary messages, further complicating the situation and exacerbating the chaos.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses, or looted and destroyed.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051225041328/http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm |url-status=dead |title=murdoch edu |archive-date=December 25, 2005}}</ref> Marxist propaganda depicted ] as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007">{{Cite book |last=Smyer |first=Dan |title=The Spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China |year=2013 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780203803431 |isbn=978-1-136-63375-1}}</ref> Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many ] were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007" />
This led to a notice to stop all unhealthy activity within the Red Guards from Jiang Qing. On April 6, 1967, Liu Shaoqi was openly and widely denounced by a Zhongnanhai faction whose members included Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, and ultimately, Mao himself. This was followed by a protest and mass demonstrations, most notably in Wuhan on July 20, where Jiang openly denounced any "counter-revolutionary activity"; she later personally flew to Wuhan to criticize ], the general in charge of the Wuhan area.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


<gallery>
On July 22, Jiang Qing directed the Red Guards to replace the People's Liberation Army if necessary, and thereby to render the existing forces powerless. After the initial praise by Jiang Qing, the Red Guards began to steal and loot from barracks and other army buildings. This activity, which could not be stopped by army generals, continued until the autumn of 1968.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}
File:Kong Yanjin - looking north - P1060200.JPG|The ] was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10">{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ}} |title=Asiaweek, Volume 10 |year=1984}}</ref><ref name="Jeni Hung">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060321075615/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 21, 2006 |title=Children of Confucius |author=Jeni Hung |magazine=The Spectator |access-date=March 4, 2007 |date=April 5, 2003}}</ref>
File:Statue of Emperor - Ming Tombs.jpg|This statue of the ] was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place.
File:Huineng.jpg|The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk ] were attacked during the Cultural Revolution.
File:SuzhouGardenFrieze.jpg|A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou.
</gallery>


=== Central Work Conference (October) ===
===1968===
In October 1966, Mao convened a Central Work Conference, mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology. Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self-criticism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|137}} After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit, was placed under house arrest, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in ]. Rebellion by ] accelerated after the conference.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2016 |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |page=119 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref>
In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign began, aimed at promoting the already-adored Mao Zedong to god-like status. On July 27, 1968, the Red Guards' power over the army was officially ended and the central government sent in units to protect many areas that remained targets for the Red Guards. Mao had supported and promoted the idea by allowing one of his "Highest Directions" to be heard by the masses. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao feared that the chaos they caused—and could still cause—might harm the very foundation of the ]. In any case, their purpose had been largely fulfilled, and Mao had largely consolidated his political power. <!-- Commented out because image was deleted: ] -->{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


=== End of the year ===
In early October, Mao began a campaign to purge officials disloyal to him. They were sent to the countryside to work in labor camps. In the same month, at the 12th Plenum of the 8th Party Congress, Liu Shaoqi was "forever expelled from the Party", and Lin Biao was made the Party's Vice-Chairman, Mao's "comrade-in-arms" and "designated successor", his status and fame in the country was second only to Mao.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}
On 5 October, the ] and the PLA's Department of General Political Tasks directed military academies to dismiss their classes to allow cadets to become more involved in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=The Cold War in East Asia |date=2018 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-138-65179-1 |location=Abingdon, Oxon}}</ref>{{Rp|page=147}} In doing so, they were acting on Lin Biao's 23 August 1966 for "three month turmoil" in the PLA.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=147}}


In ], rioting broke out during the ].<ref name="Simpson2023">{{Cite book |last=Simpson |first=Tim |title=Betting on Macau: Casino Capitalism and China's Consumer Revolution |year=2023 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-5179-0031-1 |series=Globalization and Community series |location=Minneapolis}}</ref>{{rp|84}} The event was prompted by the colonial government's delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in ].<ref name="Simpson2023" />{{rp|84}} The school board illegally began construction, but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers. Several people were injured in the resulting ]. On December 3, 1966, two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed, leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mendes |first=Carmen Amado |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=kebmyB-5-IYC |page=34}} |title=Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999 |year=2013 |publisher=] |isbn=978-988-8139-00-2 |page=34}}</ref> The event set in motion Portugal's de facto abdication of control over Macau, putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China.<ref name="Simpson2023" />{{rp|84–85}}
In December 1968, Mao began the "]". During this movement, which lasted for the next decade, young intellectuals living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside. The term "intellectuals" was actually used in the broadest sense to refer to recently graduated middle school students. In the late 1970s, these "young intellectuals" were finally allowed to return to their home cities. This movement was in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


By the beginning of 1967, a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed. Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups, these included poor peasant associations, workers' pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, among others. Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to "join up", and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross-group congresses and assemblies.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|60}}
== Lin Biao phase ==

===Transition of power===
==1967: Seizure of power==
The ] was held in April 1969, and served as a means to 'revitalize' the party with fresh thinking and new cadres after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of preceding years.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 285.</ref> The institutional framework of the Party established two decades earlier had broken down almost entirely: delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees rather than through election by party members.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 288.</ref> Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress (28% of the delegates were PLA members), and the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee reflected this increase.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 292.</ref> Many military officers elevated to senior positions were loyal to Lin Biao, opening a new factional divide between the military and civilian leadership.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. Chapter 17.</ref>
{{See also|Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|Violent struggle|Rebel Faction (Cultural Revolution)|Conservative Faction (Cultural Revolution)|Smashing gong-jian-fa}}

Mass organizations coalesced into two factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in January 1967.<ref name="Tanigawa-2018">{{Cite journal |last=Tanigawa |first=Shinichi |year=2018 |title=The Policy of the Military 'Supporting the Left' and the Spread of Factional Warfare in China's Countryside: Shaanxi, 1967–1968 |journal=Modern China |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=35–67 |doi=10.1177/0097700417714159 |s2cid=148920995 |issn=0097-7004 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Mao's policy was to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the PLA to support "the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" />

In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative, in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare.<ref name="Xu2022">{{Cite book |last1=Xu |first1=Youwei |title=Everyday Lives in China's Cold War Military Industrial Complex: Voices from the Shanghai Small Third Front, 1964–1988 |last2=Wang |first2=Y. Yvon |publisher=] |year=2022 |isbn=978-3030996871}}</ref>{{rp|345}} The three "Supports" were to "support the left", "support the interior", "support industry". The "two Militaries" referred to "military management" and "military training".<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|345}} The policy of supporting the left failed to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary".<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" /> PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, leading many military units to repress radicals.<ref name="war">{{cite journal |last1=Song |first1=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |year=2011 |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976 |url-status=live |journal=Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence |issn=1961-9898 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425062821/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976 |archive-date=April 25, 2019 |access-date=April 25, 2019}}</ref>

Spurred by the events in Beijing, ] formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named ] organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that displaced existing Red Guard groups. On 3 January 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under ] in what became known as the ], and formed in its place the ].<ref name=Jiaqi>{{cite book |last1=Jiaqi |first1=Yan |last2=Gao |first2=Gao |title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution |publisher=University of Hawai'i Press |year=1996 |isbn=978-0824816957}}</ref>{{rp|}}<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Mao then expressed his approval.<ref name="Walder-2016" />

] of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967]]
Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2016 |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |page=103 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref> Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016" /> ] were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bridgham |first=Philip |year=1968 |title=Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=34 |issue=34 |pages=6–37 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000014417 |jstor=651368 |s2cid=145582720 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day. In Heilongjiang, local party secretary ] seized power from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|170–72}}

In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice-Premier ]. The power-seizure movement was appearing in the military as well. In February, prominent generals ] and ], as well as Vice-Premier ], vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, endorsing the radicals' activities. This resistance was branded the "]"<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|195–196}}—effectively silencing critics within the party.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|207–209}}

], 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."]]
Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments began collapsing all across China.<ref name="Walder-2019-1">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, MA |page=172 |publisher=Harvard University Press |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{rp|21}} Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to ] between factions.

Tension grew between mass organizations and the military. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition.<ref name="Nianyi" />{{rp|219–221}}

In Wuhan, as in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment. ], the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On 20 July 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary ], in what became known as the ]. Subsequently, Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|214}}

The Gang of Four's ] admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the PLA. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the takeovers were unsuccessful.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|175}} Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Wang-2001" />

In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang began establishing a "workers' armed self-defense force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he saw as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps". Meanwhile, a massive movement to "]", or to smash the Police, the Procuratorate and the Court, was carried out in mainland China.<ref>{{Citation |title=Judicial Interpretation as a de facto Primary Statute for Adjudication |date=2022 |work=Law as an Instrument: Sources of Chinese Law for Authoritarian Legality |pages=60–81 |editor-last=Wang |editor-first=Shucheng |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/law-as-an-instrument/judicial-interpretation-as-a-de-facto-primary-statute-for-adjudication/87D28075ECB7646286E2DEF81067AAFE |access-date=2024-12-29 |place=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-009-15256-3}}</ref> The few remaining going-jian-fa organizations were later placed under military control.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Len |first=Shao-chuan |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Criminal_Justice_in_Post_Mao_China/Q-CcaaqKYL8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=smashing+gong-jian-fa&pg=PA18&printsec=frontcover |title=Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents |last2=Chiu |first2=Hungdah |date=1985-06-30 |publisher=State University of New York Press |isbn=978-1-4384-1050-0 |language=en}}</ref>

{{Location map+ |China |width=250 |float=right |caption=Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967. |places=
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In ], an arms manufacturing center, during August 1967, battles involved close to 10,000 combatants, killed or wounded close to 1,000, and created 180,000 refugees in ] alone. ] was destroyed in a battle involving tanks, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In ], on 28 August 1967, ] gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing ] factions, killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133. In ] and ], factory clashes killed 37, wounded 290, and led to 300 "prisoners of war", two of whom were ]. At ], a battle in which ] led the victorious faction, killed 18 and wounded 983. In ], fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68. In ], on 13 August 1967, two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire, killing seven people. At ], on 10 August 1967, a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early, stranding 54 Japanese passengers. Military control was imposed over the ] in March 1967 and over the ] in August.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|214–217}}

], including ], were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the ] residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored ], ] samples, radioactive substances, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. In ], rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever ], testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|218–220}}

Nationwide, a total of 18.77&nbsp;million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of violent struggles, which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In ], ], and ], tanks, armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.<ref name="war" />

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China.<ref name=":0222">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Shuanglin |title=China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options |publisher=] |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-009-09902-8 |edition= |location=New York, NY |pages= |doi=10.1017/9781009099028}}</ref>{{Rp|page=270}} The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) developed in the late 1960s.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} In this system, each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by ].<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}} ] brought healthcare to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic ], ], and ] and treated common ].<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last1=Gong |first1=Y. L. |last2=Chao |first2=L. M. |date=September 1982 |title=The role of barefoot doctors |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=72 |issue=9 Suppl |pages=59–61 |doi=10.2105/ajph.72.9_suppl.59 |issn=0090-0036 |pmc=1650037 |pmid=7102877}}</ref> Immunizations were provided free of charge.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=9}} Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=9}} For treatment of major diseases, rural people traveled to state-owned hospitals.<ref name=":0222" />{{Rp|page=270}}

== 1968: Purges ==
{{See also|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
]]]

In May 1968, Mao launched a massive political purge. Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the CR's earlier, more populist, phase.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|239}} On 27 July, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the ] in September, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated |url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/lrs-liu.htm |access-date=June 10, 2020 |website=www.marxists.org}}</ref>

=== Mao meets with Red Guard leaders (July) ===
As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year, violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses. Violence was particularly pronounced at ], where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight. At Mao's initiative, on 27 July 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence. Red Guards attacked the workers, who remained peaceful. Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.<ref name="Russo2020">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham, NC}}</ref>{{rp|205–206}}

On 28 July, Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion.<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|205–206}} It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look."<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|210}}

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war."<ref name="Russo2020" />{{rp|217}}
{{Blockquote|text=You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?}}

===Mao's cult of personality and "mango fever" (August) ===
{{Main|Mango cult}}{{See also|Mao Zedong's cult of personality}}
]

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao's reputation began. On 4 August, Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister ],<!-- Name not mentioned in sources but dates appear to be correct --> in an apparent diplomatic gesture.<ref name="Murck2013">{{cite book |first=Alfreda |last=Murck |title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=mymWMQEACAAJ}} |year=2013 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-3-85881-732-7}}</ref> Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at ] on 5 August, who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.<ref name="Walder2015">{{cite book |first=Andrew G. |last=Walder |title=China Under Mao |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ |page=280}} |year=2015 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-05815-6 |pages=280–281}}</ref><ref name="Murck2013"/>

Several months of "mango fever" followed as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in ]. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.<ref name="Walder2015" />

The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organized in support of the "precious gift", as the mangoes were known.<ref name="Leese2011">{{citation |author=Daniel Leese |title=Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=iqjviY6aFloC |page=221}} |year=2011 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-49811-1 |pages=221–222}}</ref> A dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato. He was put on trial for "malicious slander", found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then shot in the head.<ref name="Moore2013">{{cite news |last1=Moore |first1=Malcolm |date=March 7, 2013 |title=How China came to worship the mango during the Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120055831/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html |archive-date=November 20, 2015 |access-date=January 28, 2016 |work=] |location=Beijing}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/ |title=The Mao Mango Cult of 1968 and the Rise of China's Working Class |last1=Marks |first1=Ben |website=Collectors Weekly |access-date=February 28, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105161815/https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/ |archive-date=November 5, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref>

It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support."<ref name="Schrift2001">{{cite book |last1=Schrift |first1=Melissa |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=MQFBcWSPRdYC |page=98}} |title=Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult |publisher=Rutgers University Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-8135-2937-0 |pages=96–98 |access-date=September 29, 2019}}</ref> Through early 1969, participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass-produced mango facsimiles, gaining media attention in the provinces.<ref name="Leese2011" />

=== Down to the Countryside Movement (December) ===
{{Main|Down to the Countryside Movement}}
In December 1968, Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement. During this movement, which lasted for the following decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recent college graduates. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Donald N. |last1=Sull |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=-2PVYI4kAtQC |page=18}} |title=Made In China: What Western Managers Can Learn from Trailblazing Chinese Entrepreneurs |last2=Yong |first2=Wang |publisher=Harvard Business School Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1591397151 |pages=17–18}}</ref>

== 1969–1971: Lin Biao ==
The ] was held in April 1969. It served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking—as well as new cadres, after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|285}} The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely: rather than through an election by party members, delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|288}} Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress, reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee—over 28%. Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|292}}
{{Quote box {{Quote box
|quote = "We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor." |quote = We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.
|source = &ndash; Premier Zhou Enlai at the Ninth Party Congress<ref>As quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291.</ref> |source = Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress<ref>{{Cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Ch0bH0uX8U0C |page=291}} |title=Mao's Last Revolution |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |year=2009 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-04041-0}}</ref>
|width = 30% |width = 30%
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}} }}
Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists ] and ] under Mao's guidance.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 289.</ref> The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries", and drew extensively from quotations in the ]. The Congress solidified the role of Maoism within the party psyche, re-introducing ] as an official guiding ideology of the party in the ], and officially designating Lin as Mao's successor.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 291.; At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions; This practice was unique to China.</ref> Lastly, the Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng as the members of the new ]. Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 290.</ref> Mao also restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the party's Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966-8 because the Central Cultural Revolution Group held ''de facto'' control of the country.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 296.</ref>


Reflecting this, Lin was officially elevated to become the Party's preeminent figure outside of Mao, with his name written into the ] as his "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor".<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|291}} At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions. Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|289}}
===PLA gains pre-eminent role===
Mao's efforts at re-instituting party and state institutions generated mixed results. Many far-flung provinces remained volatile as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many of which were violent, continued at the local level despite the declaration that the Ninth Congress marked a temporary "victory" for the Cultural Revolution.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 316.</ref> Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin Biao's PLA camp and the Jiang Qing-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang Qing drew many civilian leaders, including prominent theoretician ], closer to Lin Biao.<ref>Qiu, p. 115</ref>
]
Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the Soviet Union and the United States. The friction with the Soviet Union intensified after ] on the ] in March 1969 as the Chinese leadership prepared for all-out war.<ref name=m317>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 317.</ref> In October, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing.<ref name=m317/> Amidst the tension, Lin Biao issued what appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven Military Regions on October 18 without passing through Mao. This drew the ire of the Chairman, who saw it as evidence that his authority was prematurely usurped by his declared successor.<ref name=m317/> The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing the stature of Lin Biao at the expense of Mao.<ref name=m321>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 321.</ref> There is some evidence to suggest that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the United States as a means to avoid PLA dominance in domestic affairs that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.<ref name=m321/> During his ] with U.S. President ] in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed seeking better relations with the U.S.<ref name=m322>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 322.</ref>


The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the ''Little Red Book''. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party, re-introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution. The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao, Lin, Chen, Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}}
After being confirmed as Mao's successor, Lin's supporters focused on the restoration of the position of ],<ref>This position, effectively China's ], has been called "President" since 1982</ref> which had been abolished by Mao after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or Vice-Chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the Politburo was that Mao should assume the office with Lin becoming Vice-Chairman; but for unknown reasons, Mao had voiced his explicit opposition to the recreation of the position and his assuming it.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 327.</ref>


Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}} Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|296}}
Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in ] held in late August 1970. ], now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of State Chairman, despite Mao's wishes to the contrary.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 331.</ref> Moreover, Chen launched an assault on ], a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 328.</ref> The attacks on Zhang found favour with many attendees at the Plenum, and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the Cultural Revolution itself. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist",<ref name=m332>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 332.</ref> and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write ]s on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission, and placed his loyalists in leadership roles of the ].<ref name=m332/>
]


In early 1970, the nationwide "]" was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central, aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions.<ref name="Song-2011a" /> A large number of "minor criminals" were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yan |first=Fei |date=2024-02-05 |title='Turning One's Back on the Party and the People': Suicides during the Chinese Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Journal |volume=91 |pages=67–88 |doi=10.1086/729112 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=December 14, 2016 |title=China: the Cultural Revolution |url=https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240225111424/https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/#_edn13 |archive-date=2024-02-25 |access-date=2024-03-16 |website=]}}</ref> According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution, during the campaign 1.87 million people were persecuted as traitors, spies, and counterrevolutionaries, and over 284,800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone.<ref name="Song-2011a" />
===Flight of Lin Biao===
{{Main|Lin Biao incident}}
By 1971, diverging interests between the civilian and military wings of the leadership were apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen Boda marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 353.</ref> According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup. Lin's son, ], and other high-ranking military conspirators formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai, and dubbed the plan to oust Mao by force ], which sounds similar to "Military Uprising" in Mandarin. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin planned and executed the alleged coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as a passive character manipulated by members of his family and his supporters.<ref name=jin>{{cite book|last=Qiu|first=Jin|title=The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Standard University Press|location=Stanford, California}}</ref> Qiu contests that Lin Biao was never personally involved in drafting the ''Outline'' and evidence suggests that Lin Liguo drafted the coup.<ref name=jin/>


===PLA encroachment===
The ''Outline'' allegedly consisted mainly of plans for aerial bombardments through use of the Air Force. It initially targeted Zhang Chunqiao and ], but would later involve Mao himself. Were the plan to succeed, Lin would arrest his political rivals and assume power. Assassination attempts were alleged to have been made against Mao in Shanghai, from September 8 to September 10, 1971. Perceived risks to Mao's safety were allegedly relayed to the Chairman. One internal report alleged that Lin had planned to bomb a bridge that Mao was to cross to reach Beijing; Mao reportedly avoided this bridge after receiving intelligence reports.
] parade|center]]


Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile, even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many violent, continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|316}} Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin's PLA camp and the Jiang-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders, including Chen, closer to Lin.<ref name="Jin">{{cite book |last=Jin |first=Qiu |title=The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=1999 |isbn=978-0804735292}}</ref>{{rp|115}}
In the official narrative, on September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, his wife ], Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the ] ostensibly to seek asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in ], killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel en route to the Soviet Union. A Soviet team investigating the incident was not able to determine the cause of the crash, but hypothesized that the plane was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.


Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US. The friction with the USSR intensified after ] on the ] in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all-out war.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|317}} In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate ] Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in 'schismatic activity' which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|150–151}}
The official account has been put to question by foreign scholars, who have raised doubts over Lin's choice of the Soviet Union as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.<ref name="jin"/><ref>Hannam and Lawrence 3–4</ref>


In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions.<ref name="Meyskens2020" />{{rp|151}} That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Amid the tension, Lin issued the "]", which appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven ] on October 18 without going through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|317}}
On September 13, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin Biao. Only on September 30 was Lin's death confirmed in Beijing, which led to the cancellation of the ] celebration events the following day. The Central Committee kept information under wraps, and news of Lin's death was not released to the public until two months following the incident.<ref name="jin"/> Many of Lin's supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong; those who remained on the mainland were purged. The event caught the party leadership off guard: that Lin – already enshrined into the Party Constitution as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and "successor" – could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption.<ref name="jin"/>


The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing Lin's stature at Mao's expense.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} During his later meeting with ] in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U.S.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|322}}
==“Gang of Four” and their downfall==

==== Restoration of State Chairman position ====
]
After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman,{{Notetag|This position, effectively China's de jure ], was renamed "President" in 1982.}} which had been abolished by Mao after Liu's purge. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the ] was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao voiced his explicit opposition.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|327}}

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes. Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|328–331}}

The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist",<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}} and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the ].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}}

===Project 571===
{{Main|Project 571}}

By 1971, the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|353}} According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.<ref name=Jin/>

Lin's son ], along with other high-ranking military conspirators, formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao ''Outline for Project 571''{{snd}}in the original Mandarin, the phrase sounds similar to the term for 'military uprising'. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive, cajoled by elements among his family and supporters. Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the ''Outline'', with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft.<ref name=Jin/>
==== Lin's flight and plane crash ====
{{Main|Lin Biao incident}}
]'', with his name (lower right) later scratched out]]
According to the official narrative, on 13 September Lin Biao, his wife ], Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel. A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.

The account was questioned by those who raised doubts over Lin's choice of the USSR as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.<ref name=Jin/><ref>Hannam and Lawrence 3–4</ref>

On 13 September, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin. His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September, which led to the cancellation of the ] celebration events the following day. The Central Committee did not release news of Lin's death to the public until two months later. Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.<ref name=Jin/>

The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.<ref name=Jin/>

== 1972–1976: The Gang of Four ==
{{Main|Gang of Four}} {{Main|Gang of Four}}
{{multiple image|perrow = 2/3|total_width=280
|align =right
| image3 = 1967-07 1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立 江青.jpg|width3=2466|height3=2952
| image2 = 1967-07_1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立_张春桥-上海革委会主任.jpg|width2=653|height2=829
| image4 = Yaowenyuan.jpg |width4=2072|height4=2745
| image1 = Wanghongwen.jpg|width1=3005|height1=3000
| footer = The "]", clockwise from top-left: ], ], ], ]}}
Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Party vice-chairman. Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|357}} was seemingly getting groomed for succession.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|364}}

Jiang's position strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, Jiang's political ambitions began to emerge. She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the ].<ref name="Yao Wenyuan">{{Cite news |url=http://www.economist.com/node/5381892 |title=Yao Wenyuan |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |access-date=2016-05-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160623212046/http://www.economist.com/node/5381892 |archive-date=2016-06-23 |url-status=live}}</ref>


] (left) receiving Red Guards in Beijing with ] (center) and ], with each holding a copy of the ''Little Red Book''|alt=]]
===Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng===
By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff to carry out basic functions.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|340}} China's economy had fallen into disarray, which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals, whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained mostly Zhou's domain, one of the few remaining moderates. Zhou attempted to restore the economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political succession threat.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Forster |first=Keith |year=1992 |title=China's Coup of October 1976 |journal=Modern China |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=263–303 |doi=10.1177/009770049201800302 |jstor=189334 |s2cid=143387271 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref>
In the political aftermath of Lin Biao's flight, another void opened with the question of succession. In the absence of fitting candidates, in September 1972, a thirty-eight year-old cadre from Shanghai, ], was transferred to Beijing.<ref name=mac357>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 357.</ref> Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,<ref name=mac357/> became the Communist Party's Vice-Chairman the following year, seemingly being groomed for succession.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 364.</ref> Jiang Qing's position also strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, it was clear that Jiang Qing had political ambitions of her own. She allied herself with Wang Hongwen and propaganda specialists ] and ], forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the "]".


In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the ] campaign began under Jiang's leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|366}} Its stated goals were to purge China of ] thinking and denounce Lin's actions as traitorous and regressive.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|372}}
By 1973, factional struggles were continuing in factories, railways, and local government. The country's economy had fallen into disarray. Moreover, the party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and leftist radicals, whose focus remained upholding ideological purity. The economy remained largely the domain of Zhou Enlai, one of the few moderates 'left standing'. The Gang of Four resented the influence held by Zhou, and identified him as their main political threat in post-Mao era succession.


=== Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (1975) ===
With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping resumed his political career as Vice-Premier in April 1973, in the first of a series of promotions approved by Mao. He began chairing party meetings, and directing "day-to-day government affairs" while Zhou Enlai was in hospital receiving treatment. Meanwhile Mao issued a series of rebukes against the Gang of Four, criticizing their ability to manage the economy. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.
Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, assuming the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of Mao-approved promotions. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, then adding the additional titles of ], ], and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}


Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.{{citation needed|date=December 2018}}
In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the "]" campaign began under Jiang Qing's leadership.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 366.</ref> Its stated goals were to purge China of ] thinking and denounce Lin Biao's actions as traitorous and regressive. Reminiscent of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, the political battle was carried out through historical ], and although Zhou Enlai's name was never mentioned during this campaign, the Premier's historical namesake, the ], was a frequent target. The public had become weary of protracted political campaigns that seemed to have no practical value, and did not participate enthusiastically. The campaign failed to achieve its goals.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


At the time, Jiang Qing and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's propaganda network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's heavy hand in political and media control however, did not prevent Deng from reinstating his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity as the first step to restoring economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the railway system, steel production, and other key areas of the economy. By late 1975 however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, and launched a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Chapter 22</ref> At the time, Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's ], while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the ], ], etc. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the CR's legacy and launched the ], a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}


===Death of Zhou Enlai=== ===Death of Zhou Enlai===
On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died of ]. On January 15 Deng Xiaoping delivered Zhou's official eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao himself, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 217–218</ref><ref>Spence 610</ref> Curiously, after Zhou's death, Mao selected neither a member of the Gang of Four nor Deng Xiaoping to become Premier, instead choosing the relatively unknown ]. On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On 15 January, Deng delivered Zhou's eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.<ref name=Teiwes>{{cite journal |first1=Frederick |last1=Teiwes |first2=Warren |last2=Sun |title=The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era |journal=] |year=2004 |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=211–235 |jstor=40022499}}</ref>{{rp|217–218}}<ref name=Spence>{{cite book |last=Spence |first=Jonathan |author-link=Jonathan Spence |title=The Search for Modern China |publisher=W. W. Norton |year=1999 |isbn=0-393-97351-4}}</ref>{{rp|610}} After Zhou's death, Mao selected the relatively unknown ] instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier.<ref>{{Cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=tprrCQAAQBAJ |page=490}} |page=490 |title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes – Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400–2100 |last1=Slatyer |first1=Will |year=2015 |publisher=Partridge |isbn=978-1482829617}}</ref>


The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose a set of restrictions known as the "five nos": no wearing black armbands, no mourning wreaths, no mourning halls, no memorial activities, and no handing out photos of Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaoping (who was seen as Zhou's ally), and the prohibition against publicly mourning Zhou became associated with each other shortly after Zhou's death, leading to popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four.<ref name="TS1">Tiewes and Sun, 213</ref> The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the CR, the public persecution of Deng—seen as Zhou's ally—and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four. Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On 25 March 1976, Shanghai's '']'' published an article calling Zhou "the ] inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|213–214}}


===Tiananmen incident===
Official attempts to enforce the "five nos" included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On March 25, 1976, Shanghai's '']'' published an article calling Zhou "the capitalist roader inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power". Such propaganda efforts to attack Zhou's image only strengthened the public's attachment to Zhou's memory.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 214</ref>
{{Main|1976 Tiananmen incident}}


On 4 April 1976, on the eve of China's annual ], a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the ] in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. They honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}} The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218}}
===Tiananmen Incident===
{{Main|Tiananmen Incident}}
On April 4, 1976, on the eve of China's annual ], a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the ] in ] to commemorate Zhou Enlai. The people of Beijing honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.<ref name="Tiananmen1" /> The most obvious purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the ] were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao himself, and his Cultural Revolution.<ref name="TS2">Teiwes and Sun 218</ref>


Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on April 4.<ref name="TS2"/> All levels of society, from the poorest peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership but rather seemed to be a reflection of public sentiment.<ref>Teiwes and Sun 119–220</ref> Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April. All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou's treatment, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218–220}}


The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary', and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a violent riot. Police cars were set on fire and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square.<ref name="Tiananmen1">Spence, 612</ref> Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison work camps. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang Qing and her allies pinned Deng Xiaoping as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions "inside and outside the Party" on April 7. This marked Deng's second purge in ten years.<ref name="Tiananmen1" /> The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square. Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April. This marked Deng's second purge.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}}


===Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four=== ===Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four's downfall===
{{See also|Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong}}
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of the revolutionary foundation of Communist China. When his death was announced on the afternoon of September 9, in a press release entitled “A Notice from the Central Committee, the NPC, State Council, and the CMC to the whole Party, the whole Army and to the people of all nationalities throughout the country”,<ref>] chaired the Funeral Committee.
On 9 September 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of China's revolutionary foundation. His death was announced on 9 September.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |script-title=zh:1976.9.10 毛主席逝世–中共中央等告全国人民书(附图) |publisher=] |work=] |date=November 12, 2000 |access-date=March 21, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041214123917/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |archive-date=December 14, 2004 |url-status=live}}</ref> The nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Memorial speech by Hua Kuo-Feng |url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hua-guofeng/1976/09/18.htm |website=www.marxists.org |access-date=May 7, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |script-title=zh:毛泽东葬礼上的江青:头戴黑纱 面无表情 |trans-title=Jiang Qing at Mao's funeral: black veil on her head, expressionless face |url-status=dead |url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml?_from_ralated |website=] |access-date=May 7, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111206233053/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml |archive-date=December 6, 2011 |language=zh}}</ref>


Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message “With you in charge, I'm at ease”, to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and a large segment of party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal ], on October 10, the ] had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup. Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "]," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, Director of Central Office ], Vice Premier ] and party elder ], on October 6, the ]'s Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor=189334 |title=China's Coup of October 1976 |journal=Modern China |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=263–303 |last1=Forster |first1=Keith |year=1992 |doi=10.1177/009770049201800302 |s2cid=143387271}}</ref>

After Mao's death, people characterized as 'beating-smashing-looting elements', who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR, were purged or punished. "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|359}}


==Aftermath== ==Aftermath==
Although Hua Guofeng publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the ],<ref name = "Harding"/> namely, “Whatever policy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support,” and “Whatever directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow.” Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the damage of the Cultural Revolution; but unlike Deng, who wanted to propose new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning of the early 1950s.


=== Transitional period ===
It became increasingly clear to Hua that, without Deng Xiaoping, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping personally wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively catapulting Deng to China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the Party's ] was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, ], Deng Xiaoping, ], and ] as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref>
Although Hua denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the ].<ref name = "Harding"/> Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the CR's damage; but unlike Deng, who wanted new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rozman |first=Gilbert |author-link=Gilbert Rozman |year=1987 |title=The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 |publisher=] |doi=10.1515/9781400858590 |pages=63–68 |isbn=978-1400858590}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |editor1-first=Martin M. |editor1-last=McCauley |date=2016-07-08 |journal=Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China |doi=10.4324/9781315494890 |last=Ferdinand |first=Pete |orig-year=1986 |title=China |pages=194–204 |editor2-first=Stephen |editor2-last=Carter |location=New York |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781315494890}}</ref>


It became increasingly clear to Hua, that without Deng, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On 10 October, Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively elevating Deng to be China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the ] was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, ] and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm |title=Basic Knowledge about the Communist Party of China: The Eleventh Congress |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070624082411/http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm |archive-date=June 24, 2007}}</ref>
In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé Hu Yaobang to power. Hu published an article in the '']'', making clever use of Mao's quotations while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On July 1, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. With an expanding power base, in September 1978, Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's “Two Whatevers”.<ref name="Harding">Harding, Harry. (1987). China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3462-X</ref>


===Repudiation and reform under Deng===
On December 18, 1978, the pivotal ] was held. At the congress Deng remarked that “a liberation of thoughts” was necessary and the leadership must “]”. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the ]. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his “Two Whatevers” a mistake. ], a trusted ally of Mao, was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the ]. Disgraced former leader Liu Shaoqi was allowed a belated state funeral.<ref>Andrew, Christopher. Mitrokhin, Vasili. (2005). The World was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books Publishing. ISBN 0-465-00311-7</ref>
{{See also|Boluan Fanzheng|1978 Truth Criterion Controversy|Reforms and Opening Up}}
] became the ] in 1978. He started the process of ]|alt=]]


Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called ''Boluan Fanzheng'' in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Wellman |first2=William J. |date=2008-08-20 |title=Hua Guofeng, Transitional Leader of China After Mao, Is Dead at 87 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/asia/21hua.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |work=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Barmé |first=Geremie R. |title=History for the Masses |url=http://www.morningsun.org/stages/history_for_the_masses.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |website=Morning Sun}}</ref> In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé ] to power. Hu published an article in the '']'', making clever use of Mao's quotations, while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On 1 July, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As his power base expanded, in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers".<ref name="Harding">{{Cite book |last=Harding |first=Harry |title=China's second revolution: reform after Mao |year=1987 |publisher=The Brookings Institution |isbn=978-0-8157-3462-8 |location=Washington, D.C.}}</ref> The "]", launched by Deng and Hu and their allies, also triggered a decade-long ] movement in mainland China, promoting democracy, ] and universal values, while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Xu |first=Jilin |author-link=Xu Jilin |date=December 2000 |title=The fate of an enlightenment: twenty years in the Chinese intellectual sphere (1978–98) |url=https://www.eastasianhistory.org/sites/default/files/article-content/20/EAH20_06.pdf |journal=East Asian History |publisher=] |issue=20 |pages=169–186}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Huaiyin |url=https://academic.oup.com/hawaii-scholarship-online/book/15223/chapter-abstract/169722777?redirectedFrom=fulltext |title=Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing |year=2012 |publisher=] |isbn=9780824836085 |chapter=Challenging the Revolutionary Orthodoxy: 'New Enlightenment' Historiography in the 1980s}}</ref>
At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, ], ] and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were politically rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the party as its General-Secretary. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned, and ], another Deng ally, was named Premier. Deng remained the Chairman of the ], but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies almost in their entirety.


On 18 December 1978, ] was held. Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "]" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the ]. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Legvold |first1=Robert |last2=Andrew |first2=Christopher |last3=Mitrokhin |first3=Vasili |year=2006 |title=The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=85 |issue=1 |pages=158 |jstor=20031879 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> Peng Dehuai, who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978.
==Policy and effect==
The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched essentially all of China's population. During the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity was halted, with “revolution”, regardless of interpretation, being the primary objective of the country. The start of the Cultural Revolution brought huge numbers of Red Guards to Beijing, with all expenses paid by the government, and the railway system was in turmoil. Countless ancient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and paintings were destroyed by Red Guards. By December 1967, 350&nbsp;million copies of Mao's '']'' had been printed.<ref>Lu, Xing. (2004). Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication. UNC Press. ISBN 1-57003-543-1</ref>


At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, ] and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the ] as its ]. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned, and ], another Deng ally, was named ]. Hua remained on the Central Military Commission, but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent. Within a few years, Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3&nbsp;million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 1, 1989 |script-title=zh:胡耀邦同志领导平反"六十一人案"追记 |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |access-date=February 17, 2020 |website=www.hybsl.cn |publisher=] |language=zh |archive-date=January 3, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210103094052/http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html |url-status=dead}}</ref> In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.<ref>Sterba, James P. ''The New York Times'', January 25, 1981</ref>
The ten years of the Cultural Revolution brought China's education system to a virtual halt. The university entrance exams were cancelled after 1966, and were not restored until 1977 under Deng Xiaoping. Many ]s were sent to rural labour camps, and many of those who survived left China shortly after the revolution ended.{{Citation needed|date=July 2010}} Many survivors and observers{{Who|date=July 2010}} suggest that almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of political “struggle” in some way. According to most Western observers as well as followers of Deng Xiaoping, this led to almost an entire generation of inadequately educated individuals. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on popular education varied among regions, and formal measurements of literacy did not resume until the 1980s.<ref name="Peterson">Peterson, Glen. (1997). The Power of Words: literacy and revolution in South China, 1949–95. UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-0612-5</ref> Some counties in ] had illiteracy rates as high as 41% some 20 years after the revolution. The leaders of China at the time denied any illiteracy problems from the start. This effect was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many of the districts were forced to rely upon chosen students to re-educate the next generation.<ref name="Peterson" />


In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name="PRC-2020">{{Cite web |script-title=zh:关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 |url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |access-date=April 23, 2020 |website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Wilson Center-1981">{{Cite web |date=June 27, 1981 |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344.pdf?v=d461ad5001da989b8f96cc1dfb3c8ce7 |website=Wilson Center}}</ref><ref name="CCCCP-11">{{Cite book |url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/index.htm |title=Resolution on CPC History |chapter=6th Plenary Session of the ] "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." |access-date=2023-11-19 |via=www.marxists.org}}</ref>
As the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Health was marginalized, a large number of health personnel were deployed to the countryside. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in the health and the life expectancy of the general population.<ref name="Huang Foreign Affairs 2011">{{cite journal|last=Huang|first=Yanzhong|journal=Foreign Affairs|title=The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis|volume=90|number=6|year=2011|pages=119–136}}</ref>


== Atrocities ==
] became the central operative guide to all things in China. The authority of the Red Guards surpassed that of the army, local police authorities, and the law in general. Chinese traditional arts and ideas were ignored and publicly attacked, with praise for Mao being practiced in their place. People were encouraged to criticize cultural institutions and to question their parents and teachers, which had been strictly forbidden in traditional Chinese culture. The persecution of traditional Chinese cultural institutions was emphasized even more during the ''Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign''. Slogans such as “Parents may love me, but not as much as Chairman Mao” were common.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}
===Death toll===
] in September 1967 targeting ], the father of ], who had been labeled an "anti-party element"<ref>{{Cite web |title=Beijing Revises 'Correct' Version of Party History Ahead of Centenary |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/history-04152021091451.html |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=Radio Free Asia}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Cole |first=J. Michael |date=April 22, 2021 |title=The Chinese Communist Party is playing dangerous games with history |url=https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/ |url-status=live |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=iPolitics |archive-date=2021-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422235008/https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=With whiffs of Cultural Revolution, Xi calls for struggle 50 times |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/With-whiffs-of-Cultural-Revolution-Xi-calls-for-struggle-50-times |access-date=May 20, 2021 |website=Nikkei}}</ref>]]


Fatality estimates vary across different sources, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, or even tens of millions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chirot |first=Daniel |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=e-kVgozyE8gC |page=198}} |title=Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age |year=1996 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-02777-7 |pages=198 |quote=At least one million died, though some estimates of deaths go as high as 20 million |author-link=Daniel Chirot}}</ref><ref name="Song-2011c">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=2011-10-11 |script-title=zh:文革中到底"非正常死亡"了多少人?– 读苏扬的《文革中中国农村的集体屠杀》 |trans-title=How many really died in the Cultural Revolution? – After reading Su Yang's ''Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution'' |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220624112011/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-24 |website=China News Digest |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Ling-2011">{{Cite web |last1=Ling |first1=Zhijun |last2=Ma |first2=Licheng |date=2011-01-30 |script-title=zh:"四人帮"被粉碎后的怪事:"文革"之风仍在继续吹 |trans-title=The strange thing after the collapse of the Gang of Four: the wind of Cultural Revolution continued to blow |url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622104204/http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |archive-date=2020-06-22 |website=] |language=zh |script-quote=zh:粉碎"四人帮"之后,叶剑英在一次讲话中沉痛地说:"文化大革命"死了2000万人,整了1亿人,浪费了8000亿人民币。}}</ref><ref name="Pye-1986">{{cite journal |last1=Pye |first1=Lucian W. |year=1986 |title=Reassessing the Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=108 |pages=597–612 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000037085 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=653530 |s2cid=153730706 |quote=See, for example, Huo-cheng, Li, "Chinese Communists reveal for the first time the number 20 million deaths for the Cultural Revolution," ] (Daily News), 26 10 1981, p. 3}}</ref><ref name="WangS-2012">{{cite web |date=August 18, 2012 |title=Remembering the dark days of China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180609084717/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |archive-date=June 9, 2018 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |website=] |quote=According to a working conference of the Communist Party's Central Committee in 1978, 20 million Chinese died in the revolution, 100 million were persecuted and 800 billion yuan was wasted.}}</ref><ref name="Strauss-1994">{{cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |date=July 17, 1994 |title=How Many Died? New Evidence Suggests Far Higher Numbers For the Victims of Mao Zedong's Era |newspaper=] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |url-status=live |access-date=May 9, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509114452/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |archive-date=May 9, 2019 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution, both top-down as perpetuated by authorities, as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since, the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself: it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wang |first=Youqin |date=2007-12-15 |title=Finding a Place for the Victims: The Problem in Writing the History of the Cultural Revolution |url=https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2593 |journal=China Perspectives |language=fr |volume=2007 |issue=4 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.2593 |issn=2070-3449 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
The Cultural Revolution also brought to the forefront numerous internal power struggles within the Communist party, many of which had little to do with the larger battles between Party leaders, but resulted instead from local factionalism and petty rivalries that were usually unrelated to the “revolution” itself. Because of the chaotic political environment, local governments lacked organization and stability, if they existed at all. Members of different factions often fought on the streets, and political assassinations, particularly in predominantly rural provinces, were common. The masses spontaneously involved themselves in factions, and took part in open warfare against other factions. The ideology that drove these factions was vague and sometimes nonexistent, with the struggle for local authority being the only motivation for mass involvement.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended,<ref name="Walder2019a">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |pages=23}}</ref> when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities.<ref name="Walder-20192">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of disorder: inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |page=143 |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{rp|172}} As Walder summarizes, "The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease."<ref name="Walder2019a" /> Serious man-made disasters such as the ], also caused many deaths.
===Population restructuring===
] in ], 1968.]]
During the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party instituted a policy known as the ], in which educated youths living in the urban areas were sent to live and work in agrarian areas, in order that they might better understand the role of manual agrarian labour in Chinese society. In the initial stages of this policy, most of the youth who took part in it volunteered, although later on the government resorted to forcing many of them to move.<ref>]: “During the Cultural Revolution in China, upon graduation from High School, he was forced to work in an impoverished village as a farmer. He studied at night after long days of physical labor.”</ref>


]s of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following:<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016">{{cite journal |last=Yan |first=Fei |date=June 2016 |script-title=zh:政治運動中的集體暴力:「非正常死亡」再回顧(1966–1976) |trans-title=Collective violence in political movements: a review of the "unnatural deaths" (1966–1976) |url=https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c155-201603016.pdf |journal=] |volume=155 |pages=64–65, 74 |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="open2012">{{cite journal |last=Jin |first=Zhong |date=2012-10-07 |script-title=zh:最新版文革死亡人數 |trans-title=The latest version of the Cultural Revolution death toll |url=http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008 |url-status=live |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629225002/http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008%23.YrzXDnbMJw8 |archive-date=2022-06-29 |language=zh}}</ref>
In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights. Historian Mobo Gao went as far as to criticise such attitudes, suggesting that “from the perspectives of the rural residents, the educated youth had a good life. They did not have to work as hard as the local farmers and they had state and family subsidies. They would frequently go back home to visit their parents in the cities, and they had money to spend and wore fashionable clothes.”<ref>]. p. 36.</ref> Gao also claimed that during the Revolution, Mao sent his daughter, ], to work on a farm in ].<ref>]. p. 109.</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+
!Time
!Source
!Deaths (in millions)
!Remarks
|-
|2014
|]
|1.1–1.6<ref name="Walder-2014">{{cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |year=2014 |title=Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971 |journal=Social Science History |volume=38 |issue=3–4 |pages=513–39 |doi=10.1017/ssh.2015.23 |s2cid=143087356}}</ref>
|Examines the period between 1966 and 1971.<ref name="Walder-2014" /> Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 annals from every ] and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively covered up deaths.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Song-2017">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=2017-04-03 |script-title=zh:广西文革绝密档案中的大屠杀和性暴力 |trans-title=Massacres and sexual violence recorded in the classified documents of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220622192624/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-22 |website=China News Digest}}</ref> Annal editors were supervised by the ].<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Song-2017" /> In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.<ref name="Yan2016" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Walder |first1=Andrew G. |last2=Su |first2=Yang |year=2003 |title=The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=173 |issue=173 |pages=74–99 |doi=10.1017/S0009443903000068 |jstor=20058959 |s2cid=43671719 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>
|-
|1999
|Ding Shu
|2<ref name="Open Magazine-1999">{{ubl|{{cite news |date=August 1999 |script-title=zh:兩百萬人含恨而終─文革死亡人數統計 |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong |language=zh}}|A different version appears in:{{Cite news |last=Ding |first=Shu |date=2004-03-15 |script-title=zh:文革死亡人数的一家之言 |language=zh |trans-title=Home report on the Cultural Revolution's death toll |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/CR/ZK04/cr209.hz8.html}}}}</ref>
|Ding's figures include 100,000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966, with 200,000 forced to commit suicide, plus 300,000–500,000 killed in violent struggles, 500,000 during ], 200,000 during ] and the ].<ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1996
|CCP History Research Center
|1.728<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016">{{Cite web |year=2016 |script-title=zh:文革五十周年:必须再来一次反文革 |trans-title=Fiftieth anniversary of the Cultural Revolution: It must be opposed once again |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625142850/http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |archive-date=2020-06-25 |website=胡耀邦史料信息网 |publisher=]}}</ref>
|The 1.728 million were counted as "]s", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from {{zhi|c=建国以来历次政治运动事实|l=Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC}}, a book by the party's History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984&nbsp;... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of unnatural deaths; 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; during ''violent struggles'' 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled".<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref>{{cite news |date=October 1996 |title=Title unknown |journal=Zhengming Magazine |location=Hong Kong |script-quote=zh:中共一九七八年和一九八四年的内部调查&nbsp;...「两千一百四十四万余人受到审查、冲击;一亿两千五百余万人受到牵连、影响」...「四百二十余万人曾被关押、隔离审查;一百三十余万人曾被公安机关拘留、逮捕;一百七十二万八千余人非正常死亡&nbsp;...「十三万五千余人被以现行反革命罪判为死刑;在武斗中有二十三万七千余人死亡,七十三万余人伤残」}}</ref> While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable.<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Chen 1998">{{cite book |last=Chen |first=Yung-fa |script-title=zh:中國共產革命七十年 (下) |publisher=Linking |year=1998 |location=] |page=817 |language=zh |script-quote=zh:文化大革命的非正常死亡人數只有大躍進的十分之一不到, 從農民觀點來看, 其錯誤之嚴重, 遠遠不如大躍進&nbsp;... 二千六百萬人慘死 |author-link=Chen Yung-fa}}</ref>
|-
|1991
|]
|7.731<ref name="Rummel-1991">{{Cite book |last1=Rummel |first1=R. J. |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=iIEPoEL4lG0C |page=263}} |title=China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 |year=1991 |publisher=Transaction |isbn=978-1412814003 |page=263}}</ref>
|Rummel included his estimate of '']'' camp deaths in this figure.<ref name="Yan2016" /> He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million.<ref name="Rummel-1991" />
|-
|1982
|]
|3.42–20<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Pye-1986" />
|Several sources have quoted a statement made by ] ], of "683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, plus 123,700 deaths due to ] and 115,500 deaths due to ]s and imprisonment, in addition to 557,000 people missing."<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref name="Dai-2016" /> In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong's ''Open Magazine'', an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting, while he was the party's ].<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Dai-2016">{{cite news |last=Dai |first=Kaiyuan |date=2016-04-18 |script-title=zh:文革的本质:– 场大清洗 |language=zh |trans-title=The nature of the Cultural Revolution: a great purge |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408122445/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |archive-date=2022-04-08 |quote=Note 12}}</ref> Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978.<ref name="Ling-2011" /><ref name="Pye-1986" /><ref name="WangS-2012" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1979
|{{lang|fr|]}}
|0.4<ref name="AGP-1979">Agence France Presse, Beijing, February 3, 1979; compiled into ]-Chi 79.25 (February 5, 1979), p. E2.{{Title missing}}</ref>
|This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source.<ref name="AGP-1979" /> In 1986, ] referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less."<ref>{{cite book |last=Meisner |first=Maurice |url=https://archive.org/details/maoschinaaftera00meis/page/371/ |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic |publisher=Free Press |year=1986 |edition=2nd |pages=371–372, 394 |quote=Li's estimate for Guangdong is roughly consistent with a widely accepted nationwide figure of 400,000 Cultural Revolution deaths, a number first reported in 1979 by the Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking based on estimates of unofficial but "usually reliable" Chinese sources. The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less.}}</ref> Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Leightner |first=Jonathan |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=RzUlDwAAQBAJ |page=27}} |title=Ethics, Efficiency and Macroeconomics in China: From Mao to Xi |year=2017 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-351-80583-4 |page=27 |quote=There is no agreement on how many people died during the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps one of the best estimates is 400,000, made by a Beijing correspondent for Agence France-Presse (Meisner 1999: 354).}}</ref>
|}


===Slogans and rhetoric=== === Massacres ===
], one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre]]
].]]
According to Shaorong Huang, the fact that the Cultural Revolution had such massive effects on Chinese society is the result of extensive use of political slogans.<ref name=huang>Huang, Shaorong. “The power of Words: Political Slogans as Leverage in Conflict and Conflict Management during China's Cultural Revolution Movement,” in Chinese Conflict Management and Resolution, by Guo-Ming Chen and Ringo Ma (2001), Greenwood Publishing Group</ref> In Huang's view, rhetoric played a central role in rallying both the Party leadership and people at large during the Cultural Revolution. For example, the slogan “to rebel is justified” (造反有理, zàofǎn yǒulǐ) became a unitary theme.<ref name=huang/>


Massacres took place across China, including in ], ], ], ], ], ], and ], as well as ] in Beijing.<ref name="Song-2011a">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=August 25, 2011 |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240114034126/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |archive-date=2024-01-14 |access-date=December 27, 2019 |website=] }}</ref><ref name="Wang-2001" />
Huang asserts that political slogans were ubiquitous in every aspect of people's lives, being printed onto ordinary items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.<ref>]. p. 14.</ref> Workers were supposed to “grasp revolution and promote productions”, while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because “more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain.” Even a casual remark by Mao, “Sweet potato tastes good; I like it” became a slogan everywhere in the countryside.<ref name=huang/>


These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, militia, and the military.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Song-2002">{{Cite book |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |title= |publisher=Open Magazine |year=2002 |isbn=978-9627934097 |location=Hong Kong |script-title=zh:文革大屠杀 |trans-title=Massacres during the Cultural Revolution}}</ref><ref name="Yang-2006" /> Most victims were members of the ] as well as their children, or members of "rebel groups". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres.<ref name="Song-2002" /><ref name="Yang-2017">{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Jisheng |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=4d4qDwAAQBAJ |page=524}} |script-title=zh:天地翻覆—中国文化大革命史 |year=2017 |publisher=Cosmos Books |location=Hong Kong |language=zh |author-link=Yang Jisheng (journalist)}}</ref> Collective killings in ] and ] were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.<ref name="Yang-2006">{{Cite journal |last1=Yang |first1=Su |year=2006 |title= |script-title=zh:'文革' 中的集体屠杀:三省研究 |trans-title=Collective killings in the Cultural Revolution: a study of three provinces |url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/93-mcs-2006-issue-3/974-2012-01-05-15-35-10.html |journal=] |language=zh |volume=3}}</ref>
Political slogans of the time had three sources: Mao, official Party media such as '']'', and the Red Guards.<ref name=huang/> Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that led to the factionalization of the ].<ref>Chan</ref> These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in being most loyal to ]. Red Guard slogans were the most violent in nature, such as “Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot”, “Long live the red terror!” and “Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces”.<ref name=huang/>


Official sources in 1980 revealed that, during the Red August, at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards, including teachers and principals of many schools, meanwhile 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to flee.<ref name="Wang-2001" /><ref name="Jian-2015">{{Cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Guo |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=k9NQCgAAQBAJ |page=86}} |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Song |first2=Yongyi |author-link2=Song Yongyi |last3=Zhou |first3=Yuan |date=2015 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-4422-5172-4}}</ref><ref name="NPR-2014">{{Cite news |last1=Kuhn |first1=Anthony |date=2014-02-04 |title=Chinese Red Guards Apologize, Reopening A Dark Chapter |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/01/23/265228870/chinese-red-guards-apologize-reopening-a-dark-chapter |access-date=February 14, 2020 |website=NPR}}</ref> The ] in rural Beijing caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966; those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38-day old baby, with 22 families being completely wiped out.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Jian-2015" /><ref name="Yu-2020">{{Cite web |last1=Yu |first1=Luowen |title=文革时期北京大兴县大屠杀调查 |trans-title=An investigation of the Daxing Massacre in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution |url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=2464 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160804162846/http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=2464 |archive-date=2016-08-04 |access-date= |website=] |language=zh}}</ref>
Sinologists Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi point out that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the “cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style.”<ref name=dittmerchen>Dittmer, Lowel and Chen Ruoxi. (1981) “Ethics and rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” Studies in Chinese Terminology, 19, p. 108</ref> This changed during the Cultural Revolution. Since Mao wanted an army of bellicose people in his crusade, rhetoric at the time was reduced to militant and violent vocabulary.<ref name=huang/> These slogans were a powerful and effective method of “thought reform”, mobilizing millions of people in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, “while at the same time reforming their objective world.”<ref name=huang/><ref name="Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12">Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12.</ref>


In ], Hunan, a total of 7,696 people were killed ], in addition to 1,397 forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 becoming permanently disabled.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Tan |first1=Hecheng |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=0QCDDQAAQBAJ |page=20}} |title=The Killing Wind: A Chinese County's Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution |date=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-062252-7 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |author=Jiang |first=Fangzhou |author-link=Jiang Fangzhou |date=November 9, 2012 |title= |script-title=zh:发生在湖南道县的那场大屠杀 |url=https://cn.nytimes.com/culture/20121108/cc08jiangfangzhou/ |access-date=December 5, 2019 |newspaper=] |language=zh}}</ref>
Dittmer and Chen argue that the emphasis on politics made language a very effective form of propaganda, but “also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring.”<ref name="Dittmer and Chen 1981, p. 12"/> To distance itself from the era, Deng Xiaoping's government cut back heavily on the use of political slogans. The practice of sloganeering saw a mild resurgence in the late 1990s under ].


In the ], ] shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000 as well as ] primarily between 1967 and 1968 in Guangxi,<ref name="RFA-2016">{{Cite web |title=Interview: 'People Were Eaten by The Revolutionary Masses' |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-cultrev-04292016134149.html |access-date=November 30, 2019 |website=Radio Free Asia}}</ref><ref name="Yan">{{Cite web |last1=Yan |first1=Lebin |script-title=zh:我参与处理广西文革遗留问题 |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124094818/http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html |archive-date=November 24, 2020 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> where one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution took place, before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.<ref name="Chang">{{cite book |last1=Chang |first1=Jung |title=Mao: The Unknown Story |last2=Halliday |first2=Jon |publisher=Knopf |year=2005 |isbn=0679422714}}</ref>{{rp|545}}
===Arts===
During the Cultural Revolution, there was an overhaul of many of the arts, with the intention of producing new and innovative art that reflected the benefits of a socialist society. As a part of this, many artists whose work was deemed to be bourgeoise or anti-socialist were persecuted and prevented from working.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 22">]. p. 22.</ref>


In 1975, the PLA led ] in ] around the town of Shadian, targeting ], resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and the destruction of 4,400 homes.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Zhou-1999">{{Cite book |last1=Zhou |first1=Yongming |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=8Rv-MsA4UGIC |page=162}} |title=Anti-drug Crusades in Twentieth-century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=1999 |isbn=978-0-8476-9598-0}}</ref><ref name="Liang-2018">{{Cite web |date=November 26, 2018 |title=China's Puzzling Islam Policy |url=https://stanfordpolitics.org/2018/11/26/chinas-puzzling-islam-policy/ |access-date=December 27, 2019 |website=Stanford Politics}}</ref>
At the same time, other art forms flourished in the People's Republic during the Revolution. One of the most notable examples of this was the ], which saw “some amazing achievements in those years” under the leadership of such figures as Yu Huiyong.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 22"/> One of China's most important playwrights and directors of the late twentieth century, Zhang Guangtian, has argued that during the Cultural Revolution, the innovations that were encouraged in the Peking Opera—which primarily involved “the formalism and style of simplification and concision”—led it into one of its greatest periods.<ref>Zhang Guangtian, quoted in ]. p. 22.</ref>


=== Violent struggles, struggle sessions, and purges ===
Another form of the arts which was influenced, much in the same style as was the traditional theatre, was popular song. Many revolution-themed songs, such as "]", "]", "]" and "]" were either written or became extremely popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it ''de facto'' supplanted "]" as the national anthem of China, though the latter was restored to its previous place after the Cultural Revolution ended.
{{main|Violent Struggle|Struggle session|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
], where 400–500 people killed in factional clashes are buried, out of a total of at least 1,700 deaths.<ref name="Buckley">{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-chongqing.html |title=Chaos of Cultural Revolution Echoes at a Lonely Cemetery, 50 Years Later |date=April 4, 2016 |work=] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>]]


''Violent struggles'' were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "rebel groups") that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967. They brought the country to a state of civil war.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Phillips |first1=Tom |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion |title=The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion |date=May 11, 2016 |work=] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Weapons used included some 18.77&nbsp;million guns{{notetag|Some claim 1.877 million.{{why|date=October 2023}}}}, 2.72&nbsp;million grenades, 14,828 cannons, millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks.<ref name="Song-2011a" /> Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in ], and in ].<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Buckley" /><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Ramzy |first1=Austin |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained |date=May 14, 2016 |work=The New York Times |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300,000 to 500,000.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011a" />
===Historical relics===
]
China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage as they were thought to be at the root of “old ways of thinking”. Many artifacts were seized from private homes and museums and often destroyed on the spot. There are no records of exactly how much was destroyed. Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed or, later, smuggled abroad for sale, during the short ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese historians compare the cultural suppression during the Cultural Revolution to ] ]. ] intensified during this period, because religion was seen as being opposed to Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thinking.<ref>Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, ''Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution'', Honolulu Univ. of Hawai'i Press 1996, p.73</ref>


The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> During 1967, casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer, most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low.<ref name="Walder-20192"/> The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.<ref name="Walder-20192"/>{{rp|150}}
Although being undertaken by some of the Revolution's enthusiastic followers, the destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Communist Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. Indeed, on May 14, 1967, the CCP central committee issued a document entitled ''Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution''.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 21">]. p. 21.</ref> ] excavation and preservation also continued successfully in this period, and several major discoveries, such as that of the ] and the ] tombs occurred during the Revolution, and were duly protected from any potential damage.<ref name="Gao 2008. p. 21"/> The most prominent symbol of academic research in archaeology, the journal ], did not publish during the Cultural Revolution.<ref>''Journal of Asian history'', Volume 21, 1987, p. 87</ref>


The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower. Walder stated that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry" another important factor was that "he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing."<ref name="Walder-20192"/>{{rp|154–155}}
The status of traditional Chinese culture within China was also severely damaged as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Many traditional customs, such as fortune telling, paper art, ] consultations,<ref>{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> wearing traditional Chinese dresses for weddings, the use of the traditional Chinese calendar, scholarship in classical Chinese literature and the practice of referring to the ] as the “New Year” rather than the “Spring Festival” have been weakened in mainland China.


In addition to violent struggles, millions of Chinese were violently persecuted, especially via struggle sessions. Those identified as spies, "]s", "revisionists", or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity.<ref name="Harding" /> Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide. Researchers claimed that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicide during the early CR.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" />
===Struggle sessions and purges===
{{Main|Struggle session}}
]
Millions of people in China were violently persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Those identified as spies, “running dogs”, “revisionists”, or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. At least hundreds of thousands of people were murdered, starved, or worked to death. Millions more were forcibly displaced. Young people from the cities were forcibly moved to the countryside, where they were forced to abandon all forms of standard education in place of the propaganda teachings of the Communist Party of China.<ref name="Harding" />


At the same time, many "unjust, false, and mistaken" cases appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to ] or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Ding |first1=Shu |year=2004 |script-title=zh:文革中的"清理阶级队伍"运动 – 三千万人被斗,五十万人死亡 |url=http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816021356/http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html |archive-date=August 16, 2017 |access-date=January 13, 2020 |website=China News Digest |language=zh}}</ref> Purges of similar nature such as the ] and the campaign towards the ] were launched in the 1970s.<ref name="Song-2011b">{{Cite web |last1=Song |first1=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |date=September 2011 |script-title=zh:文革中"非正常死亡"了多少人? |url=http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120513113444/http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |archive-date=2012-05-13 |website=China in Perspective |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /> For example, a political purge in Yunnan province, the ], resulted in 17,000 deaths and wrongfully persecuted a total of 1.38 million people.<ref name="Song-2011a" />
Estimates of the death toll, including both civilians and Red Guards, from various sources<ref name="White"/> are about 500,000 between 1966 and 1969. Some people were not able to stand the torture and, losing hope for the future, committed suicide. One of the most famous cases of attempted suicide due to political persecution involved Deng Xiaoping's son, ], who jumped (or was thrown) from a four-story building after being “interrogated” by Red Guards. Instead of dying, he became a ]. In the trial of the so-called Gang of Four, a Chinese court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted, of which 34,800 were said to have died.<ref>James P. Sterba, ''New York Times'', January 25, 1981</ref>


=== Repression of ethnic minorities ===
According to '']'', an estimated 100,000 people died in one of the worst factional struggles in ] in January–April 1968, before Premier Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.<ref name="Cannibalism in Stalin's Russia and Mao's China"/><ref name="Yue"/> In 1993, ] author<ref name="Chen">{{Cite book|title=Acting the Right Part: Political Theatre and Popular Drama in Contemporary China|first=Xiaomei|last=Chen|publisher=University of Hawaii Press|year=2002|pages=30–31}}</ref> Zheng Yi wrote the controversial book '']'', alleging “systematic killing and ] of individuals in the name of political revolution and ']'” among the ] in ], Guangxi, during that period.<ref name="Cannibalism in Stalin's Russia and Mao's China">Steven Bela Vardy and Agnes Huszar Vardy. . ], ''East European Quarterly'', XLI, No.2, 2007</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=The Chinese National Character: From Nationhood to Individuality|first=Lung-Kee|last=Sun|publisher=M.E. Sharpe|year=2002|page=142}}</ref> The book was roundly criticized in China for its reliance on unpublished interviews and for its negative portrayal of a Chinese ethnic minority,<ref name="Chen"/> although senior party historians have corroborated some allegations of cannibalism.<ref name="r1">] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 259</ref> Sinologist Gang Yue has questioned how “systematic” the cannibalism could have been, given the inherent factionalism of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Yue">{{Cite book|title=The Mouth That Begs: Hunger, Cannibalism, and the Politics of Eating in Modern China|first=Gang|last=Yue|publisher=Duke University Press|year=1999|pages=228–230}}</ref> MacFarquhar and Schoenhals also dispute that it was communism that compelled the Zhuang in this area towards cannibalism, noting that similar incidents occurred under pressure from the ] in the ].<ref name="r1"/>
{{See also|Inner Mongolia incident|Shadian incident}}
] during a struggle session]]
] and his wife]]


The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities. Languages and customs of ] were labeled as part of the Four Olds, texts in ethnic languages were burned, and bilingual education was suppressed.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Qingxia |first1=Dai |last2=Yan |first2=Dong |date=March 2001 |title=The Historical Evolution of Bilingual Education for China's Ethnic Minorities |journal=Chinese Education & Society |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=7–53 |doi=10.2753/CED1061-193234027 |issn=1061-1932 |quote=Ethnic languages were repudiated as one of the "four olds" and large numbers of books and documents pertaining to ethnic languages were burned.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wu |first=Jiaping |date=May 2014 |title=The Rise of Ethnicity under China's Market Reforms |journal=] |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=967–984 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2427.2012.01179.x |issn=0309-1317 |quote=Campaigns of 'class eradication' became more radical during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and had a disastrous effect on ethnic culture. Ethnic traditions were seen as part of the 'four olds' (old ideas, customs, culture and habits; in Chinese, sijiu) that had to be destroyed.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chunli |first=Xia |date=2007 |title=From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law: A Constructivist Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China |journal=International Journal on Minority and Group Rights |volume=14 |issue=4 |pages=399–424 |doi=10.1163/138548707X247392 |issn=1385-4879 |jstor=24675396 |quote=Traditional minority designs and colourful lace were marked as "four olds" (sijiu) and burnt.}}</ref> In ], some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed,<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|258}} during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In ], copies of the ] and other books of the ] were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162">{{Cite journal |date=January 2001 |last=Fung |first=Edmund S. K. |title=Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building. Zhou Yongming |journal=The China Journal |volume=45 |issn=1324-9347 |page=162 |jstor=3182405}}</ref> In the ] areas of northeast China, clashes took place.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lovell |first=Julia |title=Maoism: A Global History |year=2019 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-525-65605-0 |pages=114–115 |quote=Events took a horrific turn in the frontier town of Yanbian, where freight trains trundled from China into the DPRK, draped with the corpses of Koreans killed in the pitched battles of the Cultural Revolution, and daubed with threatening graffiti: 'This will be your fate also, you tiny revisionists!' |author-link=Julia Lovell}}</ref>
The true figure of those who were persecuted or died during the Cultural Revolution may never be known, since many deaths went unreported or were actively covered up by the police or local authorities. The state of Chinese demographics at the time was very poor, and the PRC has been hesitant to allow formal research into the period.<ref> by Andreas Lorenz in Beijing, ] Online. May 15, 2007</ref> In ''Mao's Last Revolution'' (2006), ] and Michael Schoenhals assert that in rural China alone some 36&nbsp;million people were persecuted, of whom between 750,000 and 1.5&nbsp;million were killed, with roughly the same number permanently injured.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals. p. 262</ref> In '']'', ] and ] claim that as many as 3&nbsp;million people died in the violence of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon. ''].'' ], London, 2005. p.569</ref> Sociologist Daniel Chirot claims that around 100 million people suffered and at least one million people, and perhaps as many as 20 million, died in the Cultural Revolution.<ref>Daniel Chirot. ''.'' ], 1996. ISBN 0-691-02777-3 p. 198</ref>


In ] Province, the palace of the ]'s king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim ] at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the ], reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162" /> After the Cultural Revolution, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Khalid |first1=Zainab |date=January 4, 2011 |title=Rise of the Veil: Islamic Modernity and the Hui Woman |url=http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140809045544/http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection |archive-date=August 9, 2014 |access-date=July 25, 2014 |website=SIT Digital Collections |series=Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection |publisher=SIT Graduate Institute |pages=8, 11 |format=PDF |id=Paper 1074}}</ref>
===Ethnic minorities===
The Cultural Revolution wreaked much havoc on minority cultures in China. In ], over 6,000 ] were destroyed, often with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards. In ], some 790,000 people were persecuted. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death and 120,000 were maimed,<ref>] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. p. 258</ref> during a ruthless ] to find members of the alleged ] New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In ], copies of the ] and other books of the ] were apparently burned. Muslim ] were reportedly paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies. In the ethnic ] areas of northeast China, language schools were destroyed. In ] Province, the palace of the ]'s king was torched, and an infamous massacre of ] Muslim people at the hands of the ] in Yunnan, known as the “]”, reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.<ref>Yongming Zhou, ''Anti-drug crusades in twentieth-century China : nationalism, history, and state building'', Lanham Rowman & Littlefield 1999, p.162</ref>


Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". ]s, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout ] in 1966,<ref>{{cite book |first1=John |last1=Powers |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=wksCKIivSNUC|page-PR35}} |title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet |first2=David |last2=Templeman |publisher=Grove |year=2007 |isbn=978-0810868052 |page=35}}</ref> removing Tibet's exemption from China's land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the ].<ref>{{cite book |author=Adam Jones |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=TkPqxCBbF7UC |page=97}} |title=Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction |publisher=Routledge |year=2006 |isbn=978-0415353854 |pages=96–97}}</ref><ref name="cycle">{{cite book |author=Ronald D. Schwartz |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=s_7WkbZAaWEC |page=12}} |title=Circle Of Protest |year=1996 |isbn=978-8120813700 |pages=12–13 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass }}</ref> The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards.<ref name="Ardley">{{cite book |last=Ardley |first=Jane |title=Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0700715725 |doi=10.4324/9780203221150}}</ref>{{rp|9}} Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s.<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Laird |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=As_4aQjGaUEC |page=345}} |title=The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama |year=2007 |isbn=978-1555846725 |page=345 |publisher=Open Road }}</ref>
Concessions given to minorities were abolished as part of the Red Guards' attack on the “]”: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. ] were established in the ] (Tibet had previously been exempt from China's period of land reform) and reimposed in other minority areas. Despite official persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}


Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|9}} An estimated 600,000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950, but by 1979, most were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|22}} The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization,<ref name="cycle" /><ref>{{cite book |first1=Kimberley Ens |last1=Manning |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC |page=23}} |title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine |first2=Felix |last2=Wemheuer |publisher=University of British Columbia Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0774859554 |page=23}}</ref> however, the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed.<ref>{{cite book |first=Warren W. |last=Smith |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=WYiVlfLzlRUC |page=6}} |title=Tibet's Last Stand?: The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2009 |isbn=978-0742566859 |page=6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=John Powers |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=D96ifo76RZEC |page=142}} |title=History As Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0198038849 |page=142}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |first1=Barry |last1=Sautman |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC |page=240}} |title=Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region |first2=June Teufel |last2=Dreyer |publisher=M. E. Sharp |year=2006 |isbn=978-0765631497 |pages=238–247}}</ref> Despite persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schwartz |first1=Ronald |title=Religious Persecution in Tibet |url=http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130923042104/http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2013 |access-date=December 5, 2018 |website=www.tibet.ca |publisher=Memorial University of Newfoundland}}</ref>
The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was largely due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defences. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live along China's borders. In the late 1960s China experienced a period of strained relations with a number of its neighbours, notably with the ] and ]. Many of the Cultural Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply too unreasonable to be implemented. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst of the effects of the Cultural Revolution to ethnic minorities in China, coincides closely with Lin Biao's removal from power.<ref name="Dreyer">{{cite book |title=China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 3rd Edition |last=Dreyer |first=June Teufel |authorlink=http://www.fpri.org/about/people/dreyer.html |year=2000 |publisher=Macmillan |location=London, Great Britain |isbn=0-333-91287-X |pages=289–291 |page=347 |url= |accessdate=October 3, 2010}}</ref>


It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defenses. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors, notably with the Soviet Union and India.<ref name="Dreyer">{{cite book |last1=Dreyer |first1=June Teufel |title=China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition |publisher=Macmillan |year=2000 |isbn=0-333-91287-X |edition=3rd |location=London |pages=289–291}}</ref>
==Legacy==
]


===China=== === Rape and sexual abuse ===
{{Further|Sent-down youth#Sexual violence}}
====Communist Party opinions====
], Emily Honig, and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent-down women were common during the Cultural Revolution's height.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Larson |first=Wendy |date=October 1999 |title=Never This Wild: Sexing the Cultural Revolution |journal=] |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=423–450 |doi=10.1177/009770049902500402 |s2cid=144491731 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Honig |first=Emily |year=2003 |title=Socialist Sex: The Cultural Revolution Revisited |journal=] |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=143–175 |doi=10.1177/0097700402250735 |issn=0097-7004 |jstor=3181306 |s2cid=143436282 |quote=A 1973 report on sent-down youth estimated that since 1969, there had been some 16,000 cases of rape.}}</ref> Tania Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Branigan |first=Tania |date=2023-01-19 |title=A tragedy pushed to the shadows: the truth about China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/19/tragedy-pushed-to-the-shadows-truth-about-china-cultural-revolution |access-date=2024-10-18 |work=] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Branigan |first=Tania |title=Red Memory: The Afterlives of China's Cultural Revolution |date=2023 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-1-324-05195-4 |page=166 |quote=But the city girls, naive and far from their families, were easy prey for peasants and especially cadres. Though fright and shame deterred many from reporting abuses, thousands of cases were recorded in a single year. The problem was pronounced enough that the centre kept threatening punishment for rapes. Often the victims took the blame, since they had worse class backgrounds than officials.}}</ref>
To make sense of the mass chaos caused by Mao's leadership in the Cultural Revolution while preserving the Party's authority and legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to lend the event a "proper" historical judgment. On June 27, 1981, the Central Committee adopted the "]" (The Resolution), an official assessment of major historical events since 1949.<ref name="People.com">: 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 (Guānyú Jiànguó yǐlái Dǎng De Ruògān Lìshǐ Wèntí De Juéyì) (Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China) full text.</ref> The Resolution boldly noted Mao's leadership role in the movement, stating that "chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong". But it diluted blame on Mao himself by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups of ] and ]", who caused its worst excesses. The Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people."<ref name="People.com"/>


== Cultural impact and influence ==
The official view aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the ] and the ]. It also separates Mao's personal mistakes from the correctness of the theory that he created, which remains an official guiding ideology in the Party. Deng Xiaoping famously summed this up with the phrase "Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."<ref name=ms>{{cite web|last=Schiavenza|first=Matt|title=Does a New Biography Tell the Whole Story on Deng Xiaoping?|url=http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping|publisher=Asia Society|accessdate=October 30, 2011}}</ref> In rhetoric, Deng affirmed that Maoist ideology was responsible for the revolutionary success of the Communist Party, but abandoned it in practice to favour "]", a very different model of state-directed ].


=== Red Guards riot ===
In Mainland China, the official Party view now serves as the dominant framework for ] of the time period; alternative views (see below) are discouraged. Following the Cultural Revolution, a new genre of literature known as "]" (''shangen wenxue'') emerged, being encouraged by the post-Mao government. Largely written by educated youths such as ], ], and ], scar literature depicted the Revolution from a negative viewpoint, using their own perspectives and experiences as a basis.<ref>]. p. 32.</ref>
]


The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News, which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|61–64}}
After the suppression of the ], both liberals and conservatives within the Party accused each other of excesses that they claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. ], who promoted the use of military force, cited that the student movement had taken inspiration from the grassroots populism of the Cultural Revolution, and that if it is left unchecked, would eventually lead to a similar degree of mass chaos.<ref>''AsiaNews.it''</ref> ], who was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including "reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slander and lies... innundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal freedoms."<ref>Zhao 43–44</ref>


The revolution aimed to eliminate ] - the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students, especially the Red Guards, denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|59–61}} Many died from ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the ] so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="King">{{cite book |first= |url=https://archive.org/details/artinturmoilchin0000unse |title=Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–76 |publisher=] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0774815437 |editor-last=King |editor-first=Richard |doi=10.59962/9780774815444}}</ref>{{rp|176}}
====Alternative opinions====
Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural Revolution, there are many Chinese people who hold more positive views of it, particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its policies.<ref name="Gao 2008">].</ref> Since Deng's ascendancy to power, the government has arrested and imprisoned figures who have taken a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For instance, in 1985, a young worker at a shoe factory put up a poster on the wall of a factory in ], Shaanxi, which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the ], the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness." The factory worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died soon after "without any apparent cause."<ref>]. p. 46-47.</ref>


=== Academics and intellectuals ===
One of the student leaders of the ], ], author of ''Almost a Revolution'', has a positive view of some aspects of the Cultural Revolution. According to Shen, the trigger for the famous Tiananmen hunger-strikes of 1989 was a big-character poster ('']''), a form of public political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen remarked that the congregation of students from across the country to Beijing on trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the experiences of Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Tang"/>
], one of China's foremost ] scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused ] to order special protection for key technical experts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |chapter=The People's Liberation Army and China's Space and Missile Development |editor1=Laurie Burkitt |editor2=Andrew Scobell |editor3=Larry Wortzel |editor3-link=Larry Wortzel |title=The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75 |publisher=] |url=https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |page=198 |year=2003 |isbn=978-1-58487-126-2 |access-date=January 11, 2022 |archive-date=February 5, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref>]]


Academics and ]s were regarded as the "]" and were widely persecuted. Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the ]. The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Academics, scientists, and educators who died included ], ], Wu Han, ], ], ] and ].<ref name="documents">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132 |title=Chinese Politics: Fall of Hua Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982) |publisher=] |year=1995 |isbn=978-1570030635 |editor-last=Myers |editor-first=James T. |editor-last2=Domes |editor-first2=Jürgen |editor-last3=von Groeling |editor-first3=Erik}}</ref> As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of ] in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among the members of the academy, 229 died.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Cao |first1=Pu |title=文革中的中科院:131位科学家被打倒,229人遭迫害致死 |trans-title=Chinese Academy of Sciences during the Cultural Revolution: 131 scientists were "downed" while 229 were persecuted to death |url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=3847 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230127210636/https://www.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/collections/spc/usc-collections/?cid=4&tid=3847/ |archive-date=2023-01-27 |access-date= |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in ] had been persecuted, while more than 310 were disabled, over 40 committed suicide, and 5 were ].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Jingheng |script-title=zh:青海核武基地的劫难 |url=http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200714221024/http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html |archive-date=July 14, 2020 |access-date=July 14, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=May 2, 2012 |script-title=zh:文革对中国核基地的损害:4000人被审查 40人自尽 |url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200608171436/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml |archive-date=June 8, 2020 |access-date=February 23, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref>
Since the advent of the internet, various people in both China and abroad have begun to argue online that the Cultural Revolution had many beneficial qualities for China that have been denied by both the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party and the Western media. Some hold that the Revolution 'cleansed' China from superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. These sentiments increased following the ] in 1999, when a segment of the population began to associate anti-Maoist viewpoints with the United States.<ref>]. p. 117.</ref>


Despite the hardships, some significant achievements came in science and technology: scientists tested the first missile, created China's first ] and launched China's first satellite in the "]" program.<ref>{{Cite web |date=November 21, 2013 |title= |script-title=zh:中国"文革"科研仅两弹一星核潜艇 |url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/tfzg/detail_2013_11/21/31452743_0.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191101091030/https://phtv.ifeng.com/program/tfzg/detail_2013_11/21/31452743_0.shtml |archive-date=2019-11-01 |access-date=February 23, 2020 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ching |first=Pao-yu |author-link=Pao-yu Ching |year=2019 |title=From Victory to Defeat – China's Socialist Road and Capitalist Reversal |url=https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810043322/https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/ |archive-date=August 10, 2020 |website=] |page=45}}</ref>
Maoist apologists, otherwise known as the "]", have also become more organized in the internet era. One Maoist website has collected thousands of signatures demanding punishment for those who publicly criticize Mao. Along with the call for legal action, this movement demands the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era "neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local public security bureaus. The recent movement in defense of Mao was sparked by an online column written by ] (no relation), an economist, who provocatively wrote that Mao Zedong "was not a god". The move to have Mao's image publicly protected is correlated with the recent political career of ], whose term as ] in Chongqing has been characterized by the use of Maoist propaganda not popular in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>Ewing</ref>


Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as ]. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy.<ref name="Huang Foreign Affairs 2011">{{cite journal |last1=Huang |first1=Yanzhong |year=2011 |title=The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia |url-status=live |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=90 |pages=119–36 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141113012140/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia |archive-date=November 13, 2014 |access-date=November 12, 2014 |number=6}}</ref>
====Contemporary China====
Public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited in China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details of the Cultural Revolution, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks on the subject continue to abide by the "official view" (see above) of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s on remain classified, and are not open to formal inspection by private academics.<ref name="Fong">Fong</ref> At the ] in Beijing, the Cultural Revolution is barely mentioned in its historical exhibits.<ref name=johnson>{{cite news|last=Johnson|first=Ian|title=At China’s New Museum, History Toes Party Line|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=all|accessdate=October 31, 2011|newspaper=New York Times|date=April 3, 2011}}</ref> Despite inroads made by numerous prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research of the Cultural Revolution is discouraged by the Chinese government.<ref name="Fong" /> There is concern that as witnesses age and die, the opportunity to research the event thoroughly within China may be lost.<ref> article by Didi Kirsten Tatlow in '']'' July 22, 2010, accessed July 22, 2010</ref>


=== Education system ===
That the government still displays such heightened sensitivities around the Cultural Revolution is an indicator that it still considers itself, at least in part, an inheritor of its legacy. The government is apprehensive that academic probing and popular discussions will lead to ideological conflict and increase social instability. It may threaten the foundations of Communist rule. The focus of the Chinese government on maintaining political and social stability has been a top priority since the ] on reformers on June 4, 1989, and the current government has no interest in re-evaluating any issue that might lead to a split in the Chinese leadership, or which might polarize the Party on ideological grounds.<ref name="Fong" />
In the early months of Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were closed. Secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the "Old Three Cohort (老三届)".<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}} Colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972.<ref name="Joel">{{cite book |last=Joel |first=Andreas |title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0804760782}}</ref>{{rp|164}} ] were cancelled after 1966 (until the beginning of '']'' period in 1977), replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units. Traditional values were abandoned.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|195}} On the other hand, industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers, inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks advocating ].<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}} Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers, and by 1976, there were 15,000 such 21 July Universities.<ref name=":Minami">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |publisher=] |year=2024 |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{rp|92}}


Meanwhile, in the initial stage of the ], most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government forced them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17&nbsp;million urban youth left for the countryside. Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education.<ref name="King" />{{rp|10}} This generation is sometimes referred to as the "lost generation".<ref>{{cite news |author=Tracy You |date=October 25, 2012 |title=China's 'lost generation' recall hardships of Cultural Revolution |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129030828/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |archive-date=November 29, 2014 |access-date=November 15, 2014 |work=CNN}}</ref> In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights.<ref name="Gao">{{cite book |last=Gao |first=Mobo |author-link=Gao Mobo |url=http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |title=The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=Pluto Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-7453-2780-8 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |archive-date=November 3, 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref>{{rp|36}} Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s.<ref name="Peterson">{{Cite book |last=Peterson |first=Glen |title=The Power of Words |publisher=University of British Columbia Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-7748-5453-5 |doi=10.59962/9780774854535}}</ref> Some counties in ] had literacy rates as low as 59% 20 years after the revolution. This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on students to teach.<ref name="Peterson" />
===Outside mainland China===
In Hong Kong a ] inspired by the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these activists for more than a generation in the eyes of Hong Kong residents.<ref>Wiltshire, Trea. (republished & reduced 2003). Old Hong Kong – Volume Three. Central, Hong Kong: Text Form Asia books Ltd. ISBN 962-7283-61-4</ref> In Taiwan, ] initiated the ] to counter what he regarded as destruction of traditional Chinese values by the Communists on the mainland. In ], Communist leader and Chinese ally ] began a "Cultural and Social Revolution" organized along the same lines as the Cultural Revolution. In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of the anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the ] of Peru, the U.S.-based ],<ref>''Up Against the Wall,'' Curtis Austin, University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, 2006, p.170</ref> and the 1960s ] movement in general. In 2007 ] Donald Tsang remarked that the Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution , when people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the place".<ref name=hk>{{cite news|last=BBC|title=HK's Tsang apologises for gaffe|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm|date=October 13, 2007|work=BBC News}}</ref> The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later retracted with an accompanying apology.<ref name=hk/>


Primary and middle schools gradually reopened during the Cultural Revolution. Schooling years were reduced and education standard fell, but the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all, and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-thirds. Educational opportunities for rural children expanded, while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti-elitist policies.<ref name="Joel" />{{rp|166–167}} Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time.<ref name="Joel" />{{rp|163}} Rural infrastructure developed during this period, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals.<ref name="Han2008">{{Cite book |last=Han |first=Dongping |url= |title=The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village |date=2008 |publisher=Monthly Review Press |isbn=978-1-58367-180-1 |location=New York}}</ref>{{rp|177}}
===Academic debate===
Various schools of thought have emerged surrounding the nature of the Cultural Revolution. The movement's complexities contain many contradictions: led by an all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven to fruition by a series of grassroots-led popular uprisings against the Communist establishment. While Mao's leadership was pivotal at the start of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that as events progressed it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision.<ref name=jinqiu>{{cite book|last=Jin|first=Qiu|title=The Culture of Power the Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Standard University Press|location=Palo Alto, California|isbn=0-8047-3529-8|pages=2–3}}</ref> In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a much more decentralized and varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning itself into a large number of 'local revolutions' which differed in their nature and goals.<ref name=jinqiu/>


===Slogans and rhetoric===
Academic interest has also focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's personality. Mao had always envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader, which made him wary of the bureaucratic details of peacetime governance. With the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form," once again taking on the role of a guerrilla leader fighting against an institutionalized Party bureaucracy. ] and Schoenhals, writing in ''Mao's Last Revolution'', paint the movement as neither a ''bona fide'' war over ideological purity ''nor'' a mere power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.<ref name=rmms>{{cite book|last=MacFaquhar|first=Roderick|title=Mao's Last Revolution|year=2006|publisher=Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=0-674-02332-3|coauthors=Michael Schoenhals}}</ref> They reason that the Cultural Revolution happened due to a series of complex factors: China's relationship with the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the ], and the failures of the Great Leap Forward.<ref name=rmms/> The movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive ''and'' preserve the invulnerability of his ideas after his death.<ref>MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, ''Mao's Last Revolution'', Introduction</ref>
]'', with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967]]
Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans.<ref name="huang">{{Cite book |title=The power of words: political slogans as leverage in conflict and conflict management during China's cultural revolution movement |editor-first1=G. |editor-last1=Chen |editor-first2=R. |editor-last2=Ma |publisher=Greenwood}}</ref> He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" ({{zhi|c=造反有理|p=zàofǎn yǒulǐ}}) affected many views.<ref name=huang/>

]]]
Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people's lives, printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|14}} Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan.<ref name=huang/>{{Page needed|date=November 2024}}

Political slogans had three sources: Mao, Party media such as ''People's Daily'', and the Red Guards.<ref name=huang/> Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards.{{sfn|Chang|Halliday|2005}} These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in claiming loyalty to Mao. Red Guard slogans were violent, advancing themes such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."<ref name=huang/>{{Page number|date=November 2024}}

Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the ] had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the cultivation of a "refined and elegant literary style".<ref name=Dittmer>{{Cite book |last1=Dittmer |first1=Lowell |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=7NkhMkuCs7QC}} |title=Ethics and Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Chen |first2=Ruoxi |year=1981 |publisher=Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California |isbn=978-0-912966-47-2}}</ref> This changed during the CR. These slogans were an effective method of "thought reform", mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."<ref name=huang/>{{Page number|date=November 2024}}<ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}}

Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring".<ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}} To distance itself from the era, Deng's government cut back on political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, ] called the Cultural Revolution a "grave mistake".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paulson |first1=Henry M. |title=Dealing with China: an insider unmasks the new economic superpower |year=2015 |location=New York |publisher=Grand Central Publishing |isbn=978-1455504213 |page=4}}</ref>

===Arts and literature===
In 1966, ] advanced the ''Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line''. Those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao (black line) should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts.<ref name="Jiaqi" />{{rp|352–353}} Disseminators of the "old culture" would be eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and were persecuted, and subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they could be humiliated and ravaged, and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour.<ref name="Hong">{{cite book |last=Hong |first=Zicheng |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=S7C9xtFKGWEC |page=213}} |title=A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature |publisher=Brill |year=2009 |isbn=978-9004173668 |translator-last=Day |translator-first=Michael M.}}</ref>{{rp|213–214}} For instance, ] and her husband were sent to a tea farm in ]. She did not resume writing until the 1980s.<ref name="sina">{{cite web |last1=Zhang |first1=Xiaofeng |author-mask=Zhang Xiaofeng (张晓风) |date=March 12, 2008 |title= |script-title=zh:张晓风:我的父亲母亲 |trans-title=Zhang Xiaofeng: My father and mother |url=http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019152135/http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |archive-date=October 19, 2017 |access-date=May 3, 2017 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref>

In 1970, the CCP came to view the ] as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the ] in an effort to rein in cultural politics.<ref name=":Minami" />{{rp|160}} The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "]" became dogmatized.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Cai |first1=Xiang |title=Revolution and its narratives : China's socialist literary and cultural imaginaries (1949–1966) |last2=蔡翔 |publisher=] |others=Rebecca E. Karl, Xueping Zhong, 钟雪萍 |year=2016 |isbn=978-0-8223-7461-9 |location=Durham, NC |pages=xix}}</ref> The literary situation eased after 1972, as more were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.<ref name="Hong" />{{rp|219–20}} Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the Ministry of Culture.<ref name="documents" /> Many died: the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979. These include writers such as ], ], ], ], ], ] and ].<ref name="Hong" />{{rp|213–14}}
==== Opera and music ====
]'', one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution]]Jiang took control of the stage and introduced ] under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which modified ] in both content and form, was promoted.<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|115}} Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years, most notably the opera '']''. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.<ref name="King" />{{rp|176}} ]s became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people.<ref name="Xu2022" />{{rp|362}} The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions.<ref name="Jiaqi" />{{rp|352–53}}<ref name="Lu" />{{rp|115}} Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism.<ref name="Karl-2010">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: a concise history |publisher=] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham, NC |pages=148}}</ref> Their narratives begin with them oppressed by ], class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP.<ref name="Karl-2010" />

During the Cultural Revolution, composers of '']'', which had already banned following the communist revolution, were persecuted, including ] who was killed in 1967.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781578066094 |url-access=registration |title=Jazz Planet |editor=E. Taylor Atkins |page= |publisher=University Press of Mississippi |year=2004 |isbn=978-1578066094 |access-date=June 27, 2015}}</ref> Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "]", "]", "]" and "]" were either written or became popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it ''de facto'' supplanted "]" (lyrics author ] persecuted to death) as the national anthem of China, though the latter was later restored to its previous place.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=几度沧桑 国歌的诞生及背后鲜为人知的故事 |trans-title=The birth and behind-the-scene stories of the national anthem |url=https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2017-06/07/content_5200590.htm |access-date=2024-12-31 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> Moreover, "quotation songs", in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Coderre2021">{{Cite book |last=Coderre |first=Laurence |title=Newborn Socialist Things: Materiality in Maoist China |date=2021 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-2161-2 |location=Durham, NC |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1r4xd0g |jstor=j.ctv1r4xd0g}}</ref>{{rp|34}} Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers, their primary distribution,<ref name="Coderre2021" />{{rp|35}} as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976.<ref name="Coderre2021" />{{rp|32–33}} "]" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968.<ref name="Coderre2021" />{{rp|42}}

====Visual arts====
]

Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as ], ], and ] were persecuted.<ref name="King" />{{rp|97}} Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour.<ref name="Andrews" />{{rp|351–52}} In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "]".<ref name="Andrews" />{{rp|368–376}}

Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people's leading source of information. They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=I3S6mlTj1K4C |page=4}} |title=Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution |editor-first=Harriet |editor-last=Evans |editor-first2=Stephanie |editor-last2=Donald |pages=1–5 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=1999 |isbn=978-0847695119}}</ref> The two main posters genres were the big-character poster or '']'' and commercial propaganda poster.<ref name="Cushing">{{cite book |last1=Cushing |first1=Lincoln |last2=Tompkins |first2=Ann |title=Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution |publisher=Chronicle Books |year=2007 |isbn=978-0811859462}}</ref>{{rp|7–12}}

* The ''dazibao'' presented slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. Mao wrote his own ''dazibao'' at Beijing University on 5 August 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters".<ref name="Cushing" />{{rp|5}}
* '']hua,'' or propaganda paintings, were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a ] visual style with specific conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".<ref name="Cushing" />{{rp|7–12}}<ref name="Andrews">{{cite book |last=Andrews |first=Julia Frances |title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref>{{rp|360}}

Some scholar also argued that, before this period, relatively few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers, and during the revolution, the struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves.<ref name="Ching-2021">{{Cite book |last=Ching |first=Pao-Yu |title=Revolution and counterrevolution: China's continuing class struggle since liberation |publisher=Foreign Languages Press |year=2021 |isbn=978-2-491182-89-2 |edition=2nd |location=Paris |page=137}}</ref> The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "]" celebrated in a socialist society.<ref name="Ching-2021" />

==== Film ====
The ''Four Hundred Films to be Criticized'' booklet was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned.<ref name="Jiaqi" />{{rp|401–02}} These included many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friends. Those who died in the period included ], ], ], ], and ].<ref>{{cite book |author=Paul G. Pickowicz <!-- |pages=371–72 --> |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=3XNyF4a7xHsC |page=128}} |title=China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2013 |isbn=978-1442211797 |pages=128–29}}</ref> No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=V0R-3zFSJbkC |page=207}} |title=Handbook of Chinese Popular Culture |publisher=Greenwood |year=1994 |isbn=978-0313278082 |editor=Dingbo Wu |page=207 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |editor2=Patrick D. Murphy |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429072451/https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207 |archive-date=April 29, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref> A notable example is '']''.<ref>{{cite book |author=Yingjin Zhang |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=6WzJq0hForAC |page=219}} |title=Chinese National Cinema |publisher=Routledge |year=2004 |isbn=978-0415172905 |pages=219–20}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1=Tan Ye |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC |page=41}} |title=Historical Dictionary of Chinese Cinema |author2=Yun Zhu |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-0810867796 |page=41}}</ref> China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|213}} ] and ] developed mass audiences in China.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|213}} In 1972, Chinese officials invited ] to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Antonioni made the documentary '']''. When it was released in 1974, CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as ] and anti-Chinese. Viewing art through the principles of the ], particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art-for-art's-sake, party leadership construed Antonioni's aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sorace |first=Christian |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |year=2019 |publisher=] |isbn=9781760462499 |location=Acton |chapter=Aesthetics}}</ref>{{rp|13–14}}

Mobile film units brought ] to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period, particularly including revolutionary model operas.<ref name="Coderre2021" />{{rp|30}} During the Cultural Revolution's early years, mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades, which became known as "red treasure films".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Jie |title=Material Contradictions in Mao's China |publisher=] |year=2022 |isbn=978-0-295-75085-9 |editor-last=Altehenger |editor-first=Jennifer |location=Seattle |chapter=Mobile Projectionists and the Things They Carried |editor-last2=Ho |editor-first2=Denise Y.}}</ref>{{rp|110}} The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re-organization and expansion of China's film exhibition network.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|73}} From 1965 to 1976, the number of film projection units in China quadrupled, total film audiences nearly tripled, and the national film attendance rate doubled.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|133}} The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which, in its view, would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism.<ref name="Li2023" />{{rp|133}}

===Historical sites===
]

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking". Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or ] ideas was destroyed. Few records relate how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale. Chinese historians compare the suppression to ]'s ]. ] intensified during this period, as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|73}}

The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On 14 May 1967, the Central Committee issued ''Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution''.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Despite this, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites, including the ] and ], showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed.<ref>{{cite book |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=zDhquEq5kTYC |page=446}} |title=Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing |author=Jun Wang |pages=446–47 |publisher=World Scientific |year=2011 |isbn=978-9814295727}}</ref> Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were burnt.<ref name=Barnouin>{{cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |last2=Yu |first2=Changgen |title=Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution |publisher=Routledge |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-7103-0458-2}}</ref>{{rp|98}}

Later ] excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the ] and the ], occurred after the peak of the Revolution.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Nevertheless, the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology, the journal '']'', did not publish.<ref>{{cite web |title=《Archaeology》 Publishing report |url=http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/oldNavi/n_YearStats.aspx?NaviID=48&Flg=local&BaseID=KAGU&NaviLink=Search%3a%E8%80%83%E5%8F%A4-%2fkns55%2foldNavi%2fn_list.aspx%3fNaviID%3d48%26Field%3dcykm%24%25%2522%7b0%7d%2522%26selectIndex%3d0%26Value%3d%25e8%2580%2583%25e5%258f%25a4%7cArchaeology-%2fkns55%2foldNavi%2fn_item.aspx%3fNaviID%3d48%26Flg%3dlocal%26BaseID%3dKAGU |publisher=China Academic Journals Full-text Database |access-date=31 January 2017}}</ref> After the most violent phase, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the ''Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign'' as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements.

=== Media ===
{{Further|Media history of China}}
During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, ] was at its peak.<ref name="Russo2020a">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and Revolutionary Culture |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |page=148 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv15kxg2d |jstor=j.ctv15kxg2d}}</ref> While the number of newspapers declined in this period, the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew.<ref name="Volland2021">{{Cite journal |last=Volland |first=Nicolai |year=2021 |title="Liberating the Small Devils": Red Guard Newspapers and Radical Publics, 1966–1968 |journal=] |volume=246 |page=367 |doi=10.1017/S0305741021000424 |issn=0305-7410 |s2cid=235452119 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to ], the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965, to 49 in 1966, and then to a 20th-century low of 43 in 1967.<ref name="Volland2021" /> At the same time, the number of publications by mass organizations such as ] grew to an estimated number as high as 10,000.<ref name="Volland2021" />

Independent political groups could publish ] and handbills, as well as leaders' speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified.<ref name="Walder2019b">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution |year=2019 |publisher=] |doi=10.2307/j.ctvnjbhrb |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |jstor=j.ctvnjbhrb |s2cid=241177426}}</ref>{{rp|24}} From 1966 to 1969, at least 5,000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published.<ref name="Thornton2019" />{{rp|60}} Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers, articles, speeches, and ].<ref name="Russo2020a" /> For example, the largest student organization in Shanghai, the Red Revolutionaries, established a newspaper that had a print run of 800,000 copies by the end of 1966.<ref name="Walder2019b" />{{rp|58–59}}

== Foreign relations ==
] after being burned]]
The functions of China's embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the ], Mao stated that in ], China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little".<ref name=":Li" />{{rp|287}} Later that year, China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning.<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Hongshan |title=Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War |year=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=9780231207058 |location=New York |doi=10.7312/li--20704 |jstor=10.7312/li--20704 }}</ref>{{rp|287}}

However, the ] culminated in 1969, and according to declassified documents from both China and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch ] after the ] in 1969.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=May 12, 2010 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |website=]}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Ni |title=1969年, 中苏核危机始末 |trans-title=The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303213408/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |archive-date=2022-03-03 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> The planned targets include Beijing, ], ] and China's missile-launch centers of ], ] and ].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /> This crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the ].<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=] |language=en}}</ref> Eventually, the Soviet called off the attack due to the intervention from the United States.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" />

China ] as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in ], supporting parties in ], ], ], ], ] and in particular, the ] (responsible for the ]).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/2188861/maoism-global-history-how-china-exported-revolution |title=When Pol Pot lounged by Mao's pool: how China exported Maoism |date=March 8, 2019 |website=South China Morning Post |access-date=April 1, 2020}}</ref> It is estimated that at least 90% of the Khmer Rouge's foreign aid came from China. In 1975 alone at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20&nbsp;million came from China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Laura |first1=Southgate |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=54iUDwAAQBAJ |page=84}} |title=ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State |date=2019 |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-0221-2}}</ref> China's economic malaise impacted China's ability to assist ] in its ] against ] by the 1970s, which cooled relations between the once allied nations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Path |first1=Kosal |date=18 April 2011 |title=The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972–75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources |journal=] |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=519–555 |doi=10.1080/01446193.2010.512497 |s2cid=155036059}}</ref>

== Evaluations ==
{{main|Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution}}

On 27 June 1981, the ] adopted the '']'', an official assessment of major historical events since 1949.<ref name="marxists.org3">{{cite web |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Communism Subject Archive) |url=http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121213182749/http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm |archive-date=December 13, 2012 |access-date=December 27, 2012}}</ref> The Resolution declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name="marxists.org3" />

After the Cultural Revolution, a massive social and cultural movement known as the "]" took place in ] since the late 1970s.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Huaiyin |url=https://academic.oup.com/hawaii-scholarship-online/book/15223/chapter-abstract/169722777?redirectedFrom=fulltext |title=Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing |date=October 2012 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8248-3608-5 |chapter=6 Challenging the Revolutionary Orthodoxy: “New Enlightenment” Historiography in the 1980s}}</ref> The movement lasted throughout the 1980s, and opposed the ideology of Cultural Revolution and ].<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal |last=Xu |first=Jilin |author-link=Xu Jilin |date=December 2000 |title=The fate of an enlightenment: twenty years in the Chinese intellectual sphere (1978-98) |url=https://www.eastasianhistory.org/sites/default/files/article-content/20/EAH20_06.pdf |journal=East Asian History |language=en |publisher=] |issue=20 |pages=169–186}}</ref> The New Enlightenment movement ended due to the ] in June 1989.<ref name=":522">{{Cite web |last=Pei |first=Minxin |author-link=Minxin Pei |date=June 3, 2019 |title=Tiananmen and the end of Chinese enlightenment |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Tiananmen-and-the-end-of-Chinese-enlightenment |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190603192225/https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Tiananmen-and-the-end-of-Chinese-enlightenment |archive-date=2019-06-03 |access-date= |website=Nikkei Asia |language=en}}</ref> After ] in early 1992, however, intellectuals in mainland China became divided and formed two major ], the ] and the ], which held different views on the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":02" /><ref name=":4022">{{Cite journal |last=Lei |first=Letian |date=2024-07-11 |title=The mirage of the alleged Chinese new left |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2024.2370972 |journal=] |language=en |pages=1–22 |doi=10.1080/13569317.2024.2370972 |issn=1356-9317 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Meanwhile ] scholars hold another view.{{cn|date=January 2025}}


To this day, public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited within mainland China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks abide by the "official view" of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified.<ref name="Fong2">Fong</ref> Despite inroads by prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research is discouraged.<ref name="Fong2" />
The mass hysteria surrounding the Cultural Revolution was also unprecedented. Historian Phillip Short contends that the Cultural Revolution contained elements that was akin to a form of religious worship.<ref name=ps>{{cite web|last=Short|first=Phillip|title=Mao's Bloody Revolution: Revealed|url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wd0aW-4mV68|accessdate=November 1, 2011}}</ref> Mao's godlike status during the period yielded him ultimate definitional power over Communist doctrine, yet the esoteric nature of his writings led to endless wars over its interpretation, with both conservatives and liberals drawing on Mao's teachings to achieve their divergent goals. Many factional struggles were not unlike religious wars, with all sides claiming allegiance to the most "authentic" form of Maoism.


Mao Zedong's legacy remains in some dispute. During the anniversary of his birth, many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as "the people's great savior". Contemporary discussions in the CCP-owned tabloid '']'' continue to glorify Mao. Rather than focus on consequences, state media newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective".<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 23, 2013 |title=China media: Mao Zedong's legacy |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-25490140 |access-date=May 18, 2021 |work=]}}</ref> Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy". Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power, costing millions of lives then and during his rule.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schram |first=Stuart R. |year=1994 |title=Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler |journal=] |volume=137 |issue=137 |pages=125–143 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000034068 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=655689 |s2cid=154770001}}</ref>
Virtually all English-language books paint a highly negative picture of the movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of life..."<ref>]. p. 605-606.</ref> Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization, hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war...", calling Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century."<ref>Barnouin and Yu 217</ref> In '']'', ] and Halliday attributed all the destruction of the Cultural Revolution to Mao personally, with more sympathetic portrayals of his allies and opponents.<ref>Chang and Halliday, ''Mao: The Unknown Story''.</ref> A small number of scholars continue to hold positive views about the Cultural Revolution. Mobo Gao, writing in ''The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'',<ref name=about>Pluto Press, </ref> asserts that the movement benefited millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial workers,<ref>]. p. 01.</ref> and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued Maoist nostalgia in China today as remnants of its positive legacy.<ref>]. p. 03.</ref>


==See also== ==See also==
* ]
{{Portal|People's Republic of China}}
* ]
*] (Chinese:八九點鐘的太陽 — 文革紀錄片, Bā-Jiǔ Diǎnzhōng De Tàiyáng – Wéngé Jìlùpiàn), a documentary exploring the events and effects of the Cultural Revolution
* ]
*'']'', a memoir of experiences during the Cultural Revolution
* ]
*'']: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution'', an autobiography that includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
* ]
*'']'', book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village during the Cultural Revolution
* ]
*] in Albania, inspired by the Cultural Revolution


== Notes == == Notes ==
{{Reflist|2}} {{NoteFoot}}


==References== == References ==
=== Citations ===
* . ''AsiaNews.it''. 2003. Retrieved August 21, 2011.
{{Reflist}}
* Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. . Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved on March 12, 2011.

* Chan, A; ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''; University of Washington Press (1985)
=== Sources ===
* {{cite book |title= Inside the Cultural Revolution |last= {{aut|]}} |year= 1975 |publisher= Scribner |isbn= 0-02-524630-5 |nopp=|ref=Cha75}}
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |title= The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History |last= {{aut|Clark, Paul}} |year= 2008 |publisher= Cambridge University Press |location= Cambridge and New York |isbn= 978-0-521-87515-8 |nopp=|ref=Cla08}}
* {{Cite news |date=2003 |title=Li Peng, the 'butcher of Tiananmen,' was 'ready to die' to stop the student turmoil |url=https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Li-Peng,-the-%25E2%2580%259Cbutcher-of-Tiananmen,%25E2%2580%259D-was-%25E2%2580%259Cready-to-die%25E2%2580%259D-to-stop-the-student-turmoil-18592.html |access-date=August 21, 2011 |work=]}}
* Ewing, Kent. (2011, June 4). "Mao's Army on the Attack". ''Asia Times Online''. Asia Times Online (Holdings). Retrieved at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html> on June 16, 2011.
* {{Cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |url={{google books|plainurl=y|id=NztlWQeXf2IC}} |title=Zhou Enlai: a political life |last2=Yu |first2=Changgeng |publisher=] |year=2006 |isbn=978-962-996-280-7 |location=Hong Kong}}
* Fong Tak-ho. (2006, May 19). "Cultural Revolution? What Revolution?" ''Asia Times Online''. Asia Times Online (Holdings). Retrieved at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html> on June 15, 2011.
* {{Cite news |last=Ewing |first=Kent |date=2011-06-05 |title=Mao's Army on the Attack |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605024417/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html |archive-date=5 June 2011 |access-date=2023-11-19 |publisher=]}}
* {{cite book |title= The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution |last= {{aut|Gao, Mobo}} |year= 2008 |publisher= Pluto Press |location= London |isbn= 978-0-7453-2780-8|nopp=|ref=Gao08}} Retrieved at <http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf> on September 2, 2012
* {{Cite news |last=Tak-ho |first=Fong |date=May 19, 2006 |title=Cultural Revolution? What Revolution? |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060616144533/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html |archive-date=June 16, 2006 |access-date=June 15, 2011 |work=]}}
* {{cite book |title= The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution|last= {{aut|Lee, Hong Yong}} |year= 1978 |publisher= University of California Press |location= Berkeley |isbn=0-520-03297-7 |nopp=|ref=Lee78}}
* {{Cite book |last=Gao |first=Mobo |url=http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |title=The battle for China's past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution |publisher=] |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-7453-2780-8 |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf |archive-date=3 November 2012}}
* {{cite book |title= Mao's Last Revolution |last= {{aut|] and Schoenhals, Michael}} |year= 2006 |publisher= Harvard University Press |isbn= 978-0-674-02332-1 |nopp=|ref=Har08}}
* {{cite book |title= Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture |last= {{aut|Solomon, Richard H.}} |year= 1971 |publisher= University of California Press |location= Berkeley and Los Angeles |isbn= |nopp=|ref=Sol71}} * {{Cite book |title=Art in Turmoil: the chinese cultural revolution, 1966-76 |publisher=] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-7748-1543-7 |editor-last=King |editor-first=Richard |series=Contemporary chinese studies series |location=Vancouver}}
* {{Cite book |last=Lieberthal |first=Kenneth G. |title=Governing China: from revolution through reform |date=2003 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-393-92492-3 |edition=2nd |location=New York, NY}}
* Spence, Jonathan D. (1999). ''The Search for Modern China'', New York: W.W. Norton and Company. ISBN 0-393-97351-4.
* {{Cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |author-link=Roderick MacFarquhar |title=Mao's last revolution |last2=Schoenhals |first2=Michael |author-link2=Michael Schoenhals |date=2006 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-674-02332-1 |location=Cambridge, Mass |oclc=ocm64427572}}
* {{cite book |title= Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of Intellectuals in China's Great Cultural Revolution|last= {{aut|Thurston, Anne F.}} |year= 1988 |publisher= Harvard University Press |location= Cambridge |isbn= |nopp=|ref=Thu88}}
* {{Cite book |last=Spence |first=Jonathan D. |author-link=Jonathan Spence |title=The search for modern China |date=1999 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-393-97351-8 |edition=2nd |location=New York}}
* Teiwes, Frederick C. & Sun, Warren. (2004). "The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era". ''Pacific Affairs''. Vol. 77, No. 2, Summer. 211–235. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40022499> on March 11, 2011.
* {{Cite journal |last1=Teiwes |first1=Frederick C. |author-link=Frederick Teiwes |last2=Sun |first2=Warren |date=Summer 2004 |title=The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era |journal=] |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=211–235 |jstor=40022499}}
* Zhao Ziyang. '']''. Trans & Ed. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2009. ISBN 1-4391-4938-0
* {{Cite book |last=Thurston |first=Anne F. |title=Enemies of the people: The ordeal of the intellectuals in China's great Cultural Revolution |publisher=] |year=1988 |isbn=978-0-674-25375-9 |edition=Repr |location=Cambridge, Mass.}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Zhao |first1=Ziyang |title=Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang |title-link=Prisoner of the State |last2=Bao |first2=Pu |last3=Chiang |first3=Renee |last4=Ignatius |first4=Adi |author-link4=Adi Ignatius |last5=MacFarquhar |first5=Roderick |publisher=] |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4391-4938-6 |location=New York |oclc=301887109}}
{{refend}}

==Further reading==


== Further reading ==
===General=== ===General===
{{Library resources box}}
* Michael Schoenhals, ed., ''China's Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969: Not a Dinner Party'' (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. An East Gate Reader). xix, 400p. ISBN 1-56324-736-4.
* Jack Chen, '']'' (New York: Macmillan, 1973). Book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village during the Cultural Revolution
* ] and Schoenhals, Michael. ''Mao's Last Revolution''. ], 2006. ISBN 0-674-02332-3
* Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, '']'' (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). An autobiography that includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
* Morning Sun, "Bibliography," Books and articles of General Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution.
* ], '']'' (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
* Richard Curt Kraus, ''The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). {{ISBN|978-0199740550}}
* Morning Sun, "Bibliography," Books and articles of General Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution
* {{Cite web |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=May 14, 2016 |title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160514190548/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html |archive-date=May 14, 2016 |access-date=November 28, 2023 |website=]}}


===Specific topics=== ===Specific topics===
* ]. ''China: Alive in the Bitter Sea'' (New York: Crown, 1990). {{ISBN|0812918657}} An oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution
* Chan, Anita. 1985. ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
* Chan, Che Po. 1991. ''From Idealism to Pragmatism: The Change of Political Thinking among the Red Guard Generation in China''. PhD diss., ]. * Anit Chan, ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985).
* Lingchei Letty Chen, ''The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years'' (New York: Cambria Press, 2020). Scholarly studies on memory writings and documentaries of the Mao years, victimhood narratives, perpetrator studies, ethics of bearing witness to atrocities
* Zheng Yi. ]. ], 1998. ISBN 0-8133-2616-8
* Jie Li and Enhua Zhang, eds., ''Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution'' (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016). Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc.
* Yang, Guobin. 2000. ''China's Red Guard Generation: The Ritual Process of Identity Transformation, 1966–1999''. PhD diss., ].
* ], ''The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong'' (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). {{ISBN|0804729220}}
* ], ''China: Alive in the Bitter Sea'', (1982, revised 2000), ISBN 0-553-34219-3, an oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution.
* ], ''The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices'', translated by ]. (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002). {{ISBN|0701173459}}
* ] and ]. ''].'' Jonathan Cape, London, 2005. ISBN 0-224-07126-2
* ''The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong'' written by Ross Terrill, Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-2922-0


===Commentaries=== ===Commentaries===
* Guokai Liu, ''A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution'' edited by Anita Chan. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).
* ] (penname of ]) ''Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (1979). ISBN 0-8052-8069-3
* ], ''The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). {{ISBN|0850312086}}
* ]. ''Chinese Shadows'' (1978). ISBN 0-670-21918-5; ISBN 0-14-004787-5.
* —— '']'' (New York: Viking Press, 1977). {{ISBN|0670219185}}
* ]. ''The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (1986). ISBN 0-03-005063-4; ISBN 0-586-08630-7; ISBN 0-8050-0350-9; ISBN 0-8050-0242-1.
* —— ''Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). {{ISBN|0805280693}}
* ]. ''The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'' (1977; revised 1981). ISBN 0-85031-208-6; ISBN 0-8052-8080-4; ISBN 0-312-12791-X; ISBN 0-85031-209-4; ISBN 0-85031-435-6 (revised ed.).
* —— ''The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics'' (New York: Holt, 1985). {{ISBN|0030050634}}
*Liu, Guokai. 1987. ''A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution''. edited by Anita Chan. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.


===Fictional treatments=== ===Fictional treatments===
* ], ''Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party'' (New York: Holt, 2007). {{ISBN|0805082077}}. Young adult novel
* Sijie Dai, translated by Ina Rilke, ''Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress'' (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 2001). 197p. ISBN 0-375-41309-X
* ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: Knopf / Random House, 2001). {{ISBN|037541309X}}
* Xingjian Gao, translated by Mabel Lee, ''One Man's Bible: A Novel'' (New York: HarperCollins, 2002). 450p.
* ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).
* Hua Gu, ''A Small Town Called Hibiscus'' (Beijing, China: Chinese Literature: distributed by China Publications Centre, 1st, 1983. Panda Books). Translated by Gladys Yang. 260p. Reprinted: San Francisco: China Books.
* ], ''A Small Town Called Hibiscus'', translated by ] (Beijing: Chinese Literature / China Publications Centre, 1983).
* Hua Yu, ''To Live: A Novel'' (New York: Anchor Books, 2003). Translated by Michael Berry. 250p.
* ], '']'', translated by ] (New York: Tor Books, 2014). {{ISBN|0765377063}}
* ], '']'', translated by Michael Berry (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).


===Memoirs by Chinese participants=== ===Memoirs by Chinese participants===
* Guanlong Cao, ''The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
* Liu Ping, '']'' (San Francisco, June 2012). 556 pages ISBN 9780835100403
* ], '']'' (Grove, May 1987). 547 pages ISBN 0-394-55548-1 * ], '']'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
* ], ''Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 524 p.&nbsp;ISBN 91020696 * ], '']'' (New York: Grove, 1987). {{ISBN|0394555481}}
* Heng Liang Judith Shapiro, ''Son of the Revolution'' (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1983). * ] and ], ''Son of the Revolution'' (New York: Knopf, 1983).
* Wenguang Huang, ''The Little Red Guard: A Family Memoir'' (New York: Riverhead Books, 2012).
* Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, ''Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution'' (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).
* Jiang Yang Chu translated and annotated by Djang Chu, ''Six Chapters of Life in a Cadre School: Memoirs from China's Cultural Revolution'' (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). * ], ''The Cowshed: Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'', translated by Chenxin Jiang (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).
* Kang Zhengguo, ''Confessions: An Innocent Life in Communist China'', translated by Susan Wilf (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).
* ], ''Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'' (New York: Viking, 1995). Translated by Howard Goldblatt.
* Ken Ling, '']: Journal of a Young Chinese'', English text prepared by Miriam London and Ta-Ling Lee. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972).
* Guanlong Cao, ''The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
* Liu Ping, ''My Chinese Dream: From Red Guard to CEO'' (San Francisco: China Books, 2012). {{ISBN|978-0835100403}}
* ], ''Red Scarf Girl: A Memoir of the Cultural Revolution'' (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
* ], ''Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'', translated by Howard Goldblatt. (New York: Viking, 1995).
* ], '']'' (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). ISBN 1-4000-9698-7.
* ], '']'' (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). {{ISBN|1400096987}}
* Rae Yang, ''Spider Eaters : A Memoir'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
* Nanchu, ''Red Sorrow'' (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012).
* Weili Ye, Xiaodong Ma, ''Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution'' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
* ], ''Feather in the Storm'' (New York: Pantheon, 2006). {{ISBN|978-0375424281}}
* Lijia Zhang, "Socialism Is Great": A Worker's Memoir of the New China (New York: Atlas & Co, Distributed by Norton, 2007).
* ], ''Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder"'', translated by Howard Goldblatt. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
* ], ''Feather in the Storm'' (Pantheon, 2006). ISBN 978-0-375-42428-1.
* Rae Yang, ''Spider Eaters'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
* Xinran Xue, ''The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices '' (Chatto & Windus, 2002). Translated by Esther Tyldesley. ISBN 0-7011-7345-9
* ], ] (England, Bantam Books, 2000) * ], '']'' (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1997).
* Weili Ye and Xiaodong Ma, ''Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution'' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
* Zhang Xianliang, Grass Soup, ISBN 0-7493-9774-8
* Lijia Zhang, ''Socialism Is Great!: A Worker's Memoir of the New China'' (New York: Atlas & Co, 2007).


== External links == ==External links==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Sister project links}}
{{Sister project links|n=no|v=Modern China: China since 1945 and the Modern World|q=no|s=no|b=VCE History Revolutions/Chinese Revolution}}
*
* *
*
*
*
*
*
* and the of the subject available from the film's site.
* and the of the subject available from the film's site.
*
* by Dave Pugh *
* by Youqin Wang * by Dave Pugh
* by Youqin Wang
* by ]. '']'', January 6, 1993.


{{Cultural Revolution}} {{Cultural Revolution}}{{Mao Zedong}}{{Maoism}}
{{Religious persecution}}
{{Cold War}}


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Latest revision as of 03:23, 12 January 2025

Period of sociopolitical turmoil in China (1966–1976) This article is about the movement in China. For events elsewhere also called the "Cultural Revolution", see Cultural Revolution (disambiguation). For revolutions in culture generally, see List of cultural, intellectual, philosophical and technological revolutions.

Cultural Revolution
Propaganda poster depicting Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought".
Duration16 May 1966 – 6 October 1976 (1966-05-16 – 1976-10-06) (10 years and 143 days)
LocationChina
MotivePreservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
Organized byChinese Communist Party Politburo
OutcomeEconomic activity impaired, historical and cultural material destroyed.
DeathsEstimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions (see § Death toll)
Property damageCemetery of Confucius, Temple of Heaven, Ming tombs
ArrestsJiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen
Cultural Revolution
Chinese文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhWenhuah dahgerminq
Wade–GilesWen-hua ta-ko-ming
Tongyong PinyinWún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA
Wu
RomanizationVenho du kehmin
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationMàhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
Jyutpingman4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
Formal name
Simplified Chinese无产阶级文化大革命
Traditional Chinese無產階級文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Wade–GilesWu-chʻan-chieh-chi wen-hua ta-ko-ming
Tongyong PinyinWú-chǎn-jie-jí wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA
Wu
RomanizationVutshaeciacih venho du kehmin
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingmou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙ-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
History of the People's Republic of China
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1949–1976: Mao era
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1989–2002: Jiang era
2002–2012: Hu era
2012–present: Xi era
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The Cultural Revolution, formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a sociopolitical movement in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 and lasted until 1976. Its publicly stated goal was to preserve Chinese socialism by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society.

In May 1966, with the help of the Cultural Revolution Group, Mao launched the Revolution and said that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to bombard the headquarters, and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". Mass upheaval began in Beijing with Red August in 1966. Many young people, mainly students, responded by forming cadres of Red Guards throughout the country. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung became revered within his cult of personality. In 1967, emboldened radicals began seizing power from local governments and party branches, establishing new revolutionary committees in their place while smashing public security, procuratorate and judicial systems. These committees often split into rival factions, precipitating armed clashes among the radicals. After the fall of Lin Biao in 1971, the Gang of Four became influential in 1972, and the Revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976, soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four.

The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, typically ranging from 1–2 million, including a massacre in Guangxi that included acts of cannibalism, as well as massacres in Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan and so on. Red Guards sought to destroy the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts, cultural and religious sites. Tens of millions were persecuted, including senior officials such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Dehuai; millions were persecuted for being members of the Five Black Categories, with intellectuals and scientists labelled as the Stinking Old Ninth. The country's schools and universities were closed, and the National College Entrance Examination were cancelled. Over 10 million youth from urban areas were relocated under the Down to the Countryside Movement.

In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China, replacing Mao's successor Hua Guofeng. Deng and his allies introduced the Boluan Fanzheng program and initiated reforms and opening of China, which, together with the New Enlightenment movement, gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution, declaring it "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic." Given its broad scope and social impact, memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China. It is often referred to as the "ten years of chaos" (十年动乱; shí nián dòngluàn) or "ten years of havoc" (十年浩劫; shí nián hàojié).

Etymology

The terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. During this period, the term was used interchangeably with "cultural construction" and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters. This usage of "cultural revolution" continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s, and often involved drawing parallels to the May Fourth Movement or the Soviet cultural revolution of 1928–1931.

Background

Creation of the People's Republic

Main article: Proclamation of the People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's Republic of China, symbolically bringing the decades-long Chinese Civil War to a close. Remaining Republican forces fled to Taiwan, and continued to resist the People's Republic in various ways. Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China, and Mao Zedong launched the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries to eliminate these soldiers left behind, as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao's new government.

Great Leap Forward

Main articles: Great Leap Forward and Great Chinese Famine See also: Seven Thousand Cadres Conference

The Great Leap Forward, similar to the Five-year plans of the Soviet Union, was Mao Zedong's proposal to make the newly created People's Republic of China an industrial superpower. Beginning in 1958, the Great Leap Forward did produce, at least on the surface, incredible industrialization, but also caused the Great Chinese Famine, while still falling short of projected goals. In early 1962, at CCP's Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, Mao made self-criticism, after which he took a semi-retired role, leaving future responsibilities to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

This section is an excerpt from Great Leap Forward.
Rural workers smelting iron during the nighttime in 1958
This article is part of
a series aboutMao Zedong

Personal
Leadership
Works
Legacy
Mao Zedong's signature
The Great Leap Forward stemmed from multiple factors, including "the purge of intellectuals, the surge of less-educated radicals, the need to find new ways to generate domestic capital, rising enthusiasm about the potential results mass mobilization might produce, and reaction against the sociopolitical results of the Soviet's development strategy." Mao ambitiously sought an increase in rural grain production and an increase in industrial activity. Mao was dismissive of technical experts and basic economic principles, which meant that industrialization of the countryside would solely be dependent on the peasants. Grain quotas were introduced with the idea of having peasants provide grains for themselves and support urban areas. Output from the industrial activities such as steel was also supposed to be used for urban growth. Local officials were fearful of the so-called "Anti-Right Deviation Struggle" and they competed to fulfill or over-fulfill quotas which were based on Mao's exaggerated claims, collecting non-existent "surpluses" and leaving farmers to starve to death. Higher officials did not dare to report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies, and national officials, blaming bad weather for the decline in food output, took little or no action.

Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism

Main article: Sino-Soviet split

In the early 1950s, the PRC and the Soviet Union (USSR) were the world's two largest communist states. Although initially they were mutually supportive, disagreements arose after Nikita Khrushchev took power in the USSR. In 1956, Khrushchev denounced his predecessor Josef Stalin and his policies, and began implementing economic reforms. Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes, believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement.

Mao believed that Khrushchev was a revisionist, altering Marxist–Leninist concepts, which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR. Relations soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the United Nations and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon.

Mao denounced revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing at the USSR, Mao criticized its Balkan ally, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In turn, the USSR criticized China's Balkan ally, the Party of Labour of Albania. In 1963, CCP began to denounce the USSR, publishing nine polemics.

Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential fifth columnists. As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course". Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and North Vietnam, concerned that China's support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets.

Socialist Education Movement and Hai Rui Dismmised from Office

See also: Socialist Education Movement and Hai Rui Dismissed from Office
The purge of General Luo Ruiqing solidified the PLA's loyalty to Mao

In 1963, Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement. Mao set the scene by "cleansing" powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty. His approach was executed via newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by his network of political allies.

In late 1959, historian and deputy mayor of Beijing Wu Han published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. In the play, an honest civil servant, Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it. Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao; flagging Mao as the emperor, and Peng Dehuai, who had previously questioned Mao during the Lushan Conference, as the honest civil servant.

Yao's article put Beijing mayor Peng Zhen on the defensive. Peng, Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the Five Man Group, a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially published only in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed People's Daily and other major newspapers under his control, and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics. While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired Yang Shangkun—director of the party's General Office, an organ that controlled internal communications—making unsubstantiated charges. He installed loyalist Wang Dongxing, head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.

On 12 February 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the February Outline. The Outline as sanctioned by the party center defined Hai Rui as a constructive academic discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any political implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations. Meanwhile, Mao sacked Propaganda Department director Lu Dingyi, a Peng ally.

Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. They accused Peng of opposing Mao, labeled the February Outline "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique". On 16 May, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).

1966: Outbreak

The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods:

  • spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place)
  • a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976

The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization. Virtually anyone could create a political organization, even without party approval. Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions. After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist, although their legacies were a topic of controversy later.

Notification

Main article: 16 May Notification
The 16 May Notification

In May 1966, an expanded session of the Politburo was called in Beijing. The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents, distributed on 16 May, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.

Later known as the "16 May Notification", this document summarized Mao's ideological justification for CR. Initially kept secret, distributed only among high-ranking party members, it was later declassified and published in People's Daily on 17 May 1967. Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag." The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought." While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction. The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China's intellectual community and the eight non-Communist parties.

Mass rallies (May–June)

"Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits", an editorial published on the front page of People's Daily on 1 June 1966, calling for the proletariat to "completely eradicate" the "Four Olds that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes".

After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On 25 May, under the guidance of Cao Yi'ou [zh]—wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng—Nie Yuanzi, a philosophy lecturer at Peking University, authored a big-character poster along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader Lu Ping. Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng, were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.

Mao promptly endorsed Nie's poster as "the first Marxist big-character poster in China". Approved by Mao, the poster rippled across educational institutions. Students began to revolt against their school's party establishments. Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide. By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans.

When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, confusion was widespread. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng's ousting. Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond. After seeking Mao's guidance in Hangzhou, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in 'work teams'—effectively 'ideological guidance' squads of cadres—to the city's schools and People's Daily to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.

The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor. Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.

Bombard the Headquarters (July)

Mao–Liu conflictMao Zedong, ChairmanLiu Shaoqi, PresidentIn 1966, Mao broke with Liu Shaoqi (right), then serving as President, over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic Bombard the Headquarters was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois" party headquarters
Mao waves to the crowd on the banks of the Yangtze before his swim across, July 1966

In July, Mao, in Wuhan, crossed the Yangtze River, showing his vigor. He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July. Several days later a rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders encouraged the masses to 'not be afraid' and take charge of the movement, free of Party interference.

The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR's unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership. On 1 August, the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened to advance Mao's radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech.

Red Guards in BeijingFrom left: (1) Students at Beijing Normal University making big-character posters denouncing Liu Shaoqi; (2) Big-characters posted at Peking University; (3) Students at No. 23 Middle School in Beijing reading People's Daily during the "Resume Classes" campaign

On 28 July, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled Bombard the Headquarters, rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Party.

This statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party hierarchy. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, but were sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two; Liu's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.

A struggle session targeting Liu Shaoqi's wife Wang Guangmei

Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged. The extensive Organization Department, in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folded into the CRG.

Red August and the Sixteen Points

Main article: Red August
Mao and Lin Biao surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966

Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China's future. By December 1967, 350 million copies had been printed.

During the Red August of Beijing, on 8 August 1966, the party's General Committee passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points". This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country:"

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie ... to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.

The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the superstructure of society.

Tiananmen Square on 15 September 1966, the occasion of Chairman Mao's third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966.

On 18 August in Beijing, over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around Tiananmen Square for an audience with the chairman. Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them, donning a Red Guard armband. Lin also took centre stage, denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution". Subsequently, violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread. The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release.

On 22 August, a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior. Xie Fuzhi, the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes".

The campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During Red August, 1,772 people were murdered in Beijing; many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students. In September, Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths; in Wuhan, 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period. Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.

Destruction of the Four Olds (August–November)

Main article: Four Olds
The remains of Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned

Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held, drawing in 12 million people, most of whom were Red Guards. The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards.

At the rallies, Lin called for the destruction of the Four Olds; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas. Some changes associated with the Four Olds campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary" names.

Other aspects were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards laid siege to the Temple of Confucius in Qufu, and other historically significant tombs and artifacts.

Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses, or looted and destroyed. Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class. Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.

  • The cemetery of Confucius was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966. The cemetery of Confucius was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.
  • This statue of the Yongle Emperor was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place. This statue of the Yongle Emperor was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place.
  • The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk Huineng were attacked during the Cultural Revolution. The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk Huineng were attacked during the Cultural Revolution.
  • A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou. A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou.

Central Work Conference (October)

In October 1966, Mao convened a Central Work Conference, mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology. Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self-criticism. After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit, was placed under house arrest, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in Jiangxi. Rebellion by party cadres accelerated after the conference.

End of the year

On 5 October, the Central Military Commission and the PLA's Department of General Political Tasks directed military academies to dismiss their classes to allow cadets to become more involved in the Cultural Revolution. In doing so, they were acting on Lin Biao's 23 August 1966 for "three month turmoil" in the PLA.

In Macau, rioting broke out during the 12-3 incident. The event was prompted by the colonial government's delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in Taipa. The school board illegally began construction, but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers. Several people were injured in the resulting melee. On December 3, 1966, two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed, leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government. The event set in motion Portugal's de facto abdication of control over Macau, putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China.

By the beginning of 1967, a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed. Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups, these included poor peasant associations, workers' pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, among others. Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to "join up", and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross-group congresses and assemblies.

1967: Seizure of power

See also: Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution), Violent struggle, Rebel Faction (Cultural Revolution), Conservative Faction (Cultural Revolution), and Smashing gong-jian-fa

Mass organizations coalesced into two factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in January 1967. Mao's policy was to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the PLA to support "the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."

In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative, in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare. The three "Supports" were to "support the left", "support the interior", "support industry". The "two Militaries" referred to "military management" and "military training". The policy of supporting the left failed to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary". PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, leading many military units to repress radicals.

Spurred by the events in Beijing, power seizure groups formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named Wang Hongwen organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that displaced existing Red Guard groups. On 3 January 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under Chen Pixian in what became known as the January Storm, and formed in its place the Shanghai People's Commune. Mao then expressed his approval.

Rebel factions of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967

Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown. Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown. "Revolutionary committees" were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party. For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day. In Heilongjiang, local party secretary Pan Fusheng seized power from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.

In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice-Premier Tao Zhu. The power-seizure movement was appearing in the military as well. In February, prominent generals Ye Jianying and Chen Yi, as well as Vice-Premier Tan Zhenlin, vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, endorsing the radicals' activities. This resistance was branded the "February Countercurrent"—effectively silencing critics within the party.

Red Guards marching in Guizhou, 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."

Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments began collapsing all across China. Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to violent struggles between factions.

Tension grew between mass organizations and the military. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition.

In Wuhan, as in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment. Chen Zaidao, the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On 20 July 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary Wang Li, in what became known as the Wuhan Incident. Subsequently, Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA.

The Gang of Four's Zhang Chunqiao admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the PLA. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the takeovers were unsuccessful. Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities.

In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang began establishing a "workers' armed self-defense force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he saw as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps". Meanwhile, a massive movement to "smash gong-jian-fa", or to smash the Police, the Procuratorate and the Court, was carried out in mainland China. The few remaining going-jian-fa organizations were later placed under military control.

Cultural Revolution is located in ChinaWuzhongWuzhongZhengzhouZhengzhouKaifengKaifengShanghaiShanghaiLianyuanLianyuanChongqingChongqingGuangzhouGuangzhouclass=notpageimage| Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967.

In Chongqing, an arms manufacturing center, during August 1967, battles involved close to 10,000 combatants, killed or wounded close to 1,000, and created 180,000 refugees in Chengdu alone. Chaotianmen harbor district was destroyed in a battle involving tanks, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In Wuzhong, Ningxia, on 28 August 1967, Kang Sheng gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing Hui Muslim factions, killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133. In Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, factory clashes killed 37, wounded 290, and led to 300 "prisoners of war", two of whom were buried alive. At Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant, a battle in which Wang Hongwen led the victorious faction, killed 18 and wounded 983. In Lianyuan, fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68. In Wenzhou, on 13 August 1967, two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire, killing seven people. At Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, on 10 August 1967, a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early, stranding 54 Japanese passengers. Military control was imposed over the Daqing Oil Field in March 1967 and over the Anshan Iron and Steel Plant in August.

Unconventional weapons, including weapon of mass destruction, were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored pathogenic bacteria, poisonous plant samples, radioactive substances, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. In Changchun, rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever dirty bomb, testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August.

Nationwide, a total of 18.77 million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of violent struggles, which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In Chongqing, Xiamen, and Changchun, tanks, armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China. The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) developed in the late 1960s. In this system, each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by barefoot doctors. The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care. Barefoot doctors brought healthcare to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic hygiene, preventive healthcare, and family planning and treated common illnesses. Immunizations were provided free of charge. Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China. For treatment of major diseases, rural people traveled to state-owned hospitals.

1968: Purges

See also: Cleansing the Class Ranks
A rally in opposition to Liu Shaoqi

In May 1968, Mao launched a massive political purge. Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the CR's earlier, more populist, phase. On 27 July, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power.

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in September, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".

Mao meets with Red Guard leaders (July)

As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year, violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses. Violence was particularly pronounced at Qinghua University, where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight. At Mao's initiative, on 27 July 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence. Red Guards attacked the workers, who remained peaceful. Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.

On 28 July, Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion. It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look."

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war."

You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?

Mao's cult of personality and "mango fever" (August)

Main article: Mango cultSee also: Mao Zedong's cult of personality
A propaganda oil painting of Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1967)

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao's reputation began. On 4 August, Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, in an apparent diplomatic gesture. Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at Tsinghua University on 5 August, who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.

Several months of "mango fever" followed as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in Chengdu. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.

The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organized in support of the "precious gift", as the mangoes were known. A dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato. He was put on trial for "malicious slander", found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then shot in the head.

It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support." Through early 1969, participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass-produced mango facsimiles, gaining media attention in the provinces.

Down to the Countryside Movement (December)

Main article: Down to the Countryside Movement

In December 1968, Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement. During this movement, which lasted for the following decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recent college graduates. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically.

1969–1971: Lin Biao

The 9th National Congress was held in April 1969. It served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking—as well as new cadres, after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years. The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely: rather than through an election by party members, delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees. Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress, reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee—over 28%. Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership.

We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.

— Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress

Reflecting this, Lin was officially elevated to become the Party's preeminent figure outside of Mao, with his name written into the party constitution as his "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor". At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions. Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.

The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the Little Red Book. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party, re-introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution. The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao, Lin, Chen, Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.

Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress. Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control.

In early 1970, the nationwide "One Strike-Three Anti Campaign" was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central, aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions. A large number of "minor criminals" were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972. According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution, during the campaign 1.87 million people were persecuted as traitors, spies, and counterrevolutionaries, and over 284,800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone.

PLA encroachment

Mao (left) and Lin (right) in 1967, riding in the back of a vehicle during an International Workers' Day parade

Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile, even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many violent, continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR. Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin's PLA camp and the Jiang-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders, including Chen, closer to Lin.

Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US. The friction with the USSR intensified after border clashes on the Ussuri River in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all-out war. In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate Third Front Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in 'schismatic activity' which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.

In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions. That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Amid the tension, Lin issued the "Order Number One", which appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven military regions on October 18 without going through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority.

The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing Lin's stature at Mao's expense. Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. During his later meeting with Richard Nixon in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U.S.

Restoration of State Chairman position

Liu Shaoqi on his deathbed in 1969

After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman, which had been abolished by Mao after Liu's purge. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the Politburo was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao voiced his explicit opposition.

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes. Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.

The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist", and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the Beijing Military Region.

Project 571

Main article: Project 571

By 1971, the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement. According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.

Lin's son Lin Liguo, along with other high-ranking military conspirators, formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao Outline for Project 571 – in the original Mandarin, the phrase sounds similar to the term for 'military uprising'. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive, cajoled by elements among his family and supporters. Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the Outline, with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft.

Lin's flight and plane crash

Main article: Lin Biao incident
Graffiti of Lin Biao's foreword to the Little Red Book, with his name (lower right) later scratched out

According to the official narrative, on 13 September Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel. A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.

The account was questioned by those who raised doubts over Lin's choice of the USSR as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.

On 13 September, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin. His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September, which led to the cancellation of the National Day celebration events the following day. The Central Committee did not release news of Lin's death to the public until two months later. Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.

The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.

1972–1976: The Gang of Four

Main article: Gang of Four The "Gang of Four", clockwise from top-left: Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Jiang Qing

Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Party vice-chairman. Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background, was seemingly getting groomed for succession.

Jiang's position strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, Jiang's political ambitions began to emerge. She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the Gang of Four.

Jiang Qing (left) receiving Red Guards in Beijing with Zhou Enlai (center) and Kang Sheng, with each holding a copy of the Little Red Book

By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff to carry out basic functions. China's economy had fallen into disarray, which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals, whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained mostly Zhou's domain, one of the few remaining moderates. Zhou attempted to restore the economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political succession threat.

In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began under Jiang's leadership. Its stated goals were to purge China of New Confucianist thinking and denounce Lin's actions as traitorous and regressive.

Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (1975)

Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, assuming the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of Mao-approved promotions. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, then adding the additional titles of PLA General Chief of Staff, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.

At the time, Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's propaganda network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the railway system, steel production, etc. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the CR's legacy and launched the Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend, a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.

Death of Zhou Enlai

On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On 15 January, Deng delivered Zhou's eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou. After Zhou's death, Mao selected the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier.

The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the CR, the public persecution of Deng—seen as Zhou's ally—and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four. Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On 25 March 1976, Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao published an article calling Zhou "the capitalist roader inside the Party wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.

Tiananmen incident

Main article: 1976 Tiananmen incident

On 4 April 1976, on the eve of China's annual Qingming Festival, a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. They honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument. The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution.

Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April. All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou's treatment, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership.

The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square. Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April. This marked Deng's second purge.

Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four's downfall

See also: Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong

On 9 September 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of China's revolutionary foundation. His death was announced on 9 September. The nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge, I'm at ease," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, Director of Central Office Wang Dongxing, Vice Premier Li Xiannian and party elder Chen Yun, on October 6, the Central Security Bureau's Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.

After Mao's death, people characterized as 'beating-smashing-looting elements', who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR, were purged or punished. "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.

Aftermath

Transitional period

Although Hua denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the Two Whatevers. Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the CR's damage; but unlike Deng, who wanted new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning.

It became increasingly clear to Hua, that without Deng, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On 10 October, Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively elevating Deng to be China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the 11th National Congress was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Repudiation and reform under Deng

See also: Boluan Fanzheng, 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy, and Reforms and Opening Up
Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China in 1978. He started the process of reform and opening up

Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called Boluan Fanzheng in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé Hu Yaobang to power. Hu published an article in the Guangming Daily, making clever use of Mao's quotations, while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On 1 July, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As his power base expanded, in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers". The "1978 Truth Criterion Discussion", launched by Deng and Hu and their allies, also triggered a decade-long New Enlightenment movement in mainland China, promoting democracy, humanism and universal values, while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution.

On 18 December 1978, Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held. Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "seek truth from facts" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the economic reform era. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral. Peng Dehuai, who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978.

At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, He Long and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the party secretariat as its secretary-general. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned, and Zhao Ziyang, another Deng ally, was named premier. Hua remained on the Central Military Commission, but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent. Within a few years, Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3 million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases. In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.

In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."

Atrocities

Death toll

A struggle session in September 1967 targeting Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, who had been labeled an "anti-party element"

Fatality estimates vary across different sources, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, or even tens of millions. In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution, both top-down as perpetuated by authorities, as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since, the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself: it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it.

Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended, when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities. As Walder summarizes, "The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease." Serious man-made disasters such as the 1975 Banqiao Dam failure, also caused many deaths.

Literature reviews of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following:

Time Source Deaths (in millions) Remarks
2014 Andrew G. Walder 1.1–1.6 Examines the period between 1966 and 1971. Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 annals from every county and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively covered up deaths. Annal editors were supervised by the CCP Propaganda Department. In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.
1999 Ding Shu 2 Ding's figures include 100,000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966, with 200,000 forced to commit suicide, plus 300,000–500,000 killed in violent struggles, 500,000 during Cleansing the Class Ranks, 200,000 during One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the Anti-May Sixteenth Elements Campaign.
1996 CCP History Research Center 1.728 The 1.728 million were counted as "unnatural deaths", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from 建国以来历次政治运动事实; 'Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC', a book by the party's History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984 ... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of unnatural deaths; 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; during violent struggles 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled". While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable.
1991 Rudolph J. Rummel 7.731 Rummel included his estimate of Laogai camp deaths in this figure. He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million.
1982 Ye Jianying 3.42–20 Several sources have quoted a statement made by Marshal Ye Jianying, of "683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, plus 123,700 deaths due to violent struggles and 115,500 deaths due to struggle sessions and imprisonment, in addition to 557,000 people missing." In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong's Open Magazine, an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting, while he was the party's Vice Chairman. Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978.
1979 Agence France Presse 0.4 This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source. In 1986, Maurice Meisner referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less." Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".

Massacres

Quotations of Mao Zedong on a street wall of Wuxuan County, one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre

Massacres took place across China, including in Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, Ruijin, and Qinghai, as well as Red August in Beijing.

These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, militia, and the military. Most victims were members of the Five Black Categories as well as their children, or members of "rebel groups". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres. Collective killings in Guangxi and Guangdong were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.

Official sources in 1980 revealed that, during the Red August, at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards, including teachers and principals of many schools, meanwhile 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to flee. The Daxing Massacre in rural Beijing caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966; those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38-day old baby, with 22 families being completely wiped out.

In Dao County, Hunan, a total of 7,696 people were killed from 13 August to 17 October 1967, in addition to 1,397 forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 becoming permanently disabled.

In the Guangxi Massacre, the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000 as well as cannibalism primarily between 1967 and 1968 in Guangxi, where one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution took place, before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.

In 1975, the PLA led a massacre in Yunnan around the town of Shadian, targeting Hui people, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and the destruction of 4,400 homes.

Violent struggles, struggle sessions, and purges

Main articles: Violent Struggle, Struggle session, and Cleansing the Class Ranks
The Cultural Revolution Cemetery in Chongqing, where 400–500 people killed in factional clashes are buried, out of a total of at least 1,700 deaths.

Violent struggles were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "rebel groups") that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967. They brought the country to a state of civil war. Weapons used included some 18.77 million guns, 2.72 million grenades, 14,828 cannons, millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks. Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in Sichuan, and in Xuzhou. Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300,000 to 500,000.

The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly. During 1967, casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July. Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer, most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low. The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.

The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower. Walder stated that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry" another important factor was that "he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing."

In addition to violent struggles, millions of Chinese were violently persecuted, especially via struggle sessions. Those identified as spies, "running dogs", "revisionists", or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide. Researchers claimed that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicide during the early CR.

At the same time, many "unjust, false, and mistaken" cases appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to lynching or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people. Purges of similar nature such as the One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the campaign towards the May Sixteenth elements were launched in the 1970s. For example, a political purge in Yunnan province, the Zhao Jianmin spy case, resulted in 17,000 deaths and wrongfully persecuted a total of 1.38 million people.

Repression of ethnic minorities

See also: Inner Mongolia incident and Shadian incident
The Panchen Lama during a struggle session
Struggle session of Sampho Tsewang Rigzin and his wife

The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities. Languages and customs of ethnic minorities in China were labeled as part of the Four Olds, texts in ethnic languages were burned, and bilingual education was suppressed. In Inner Mongolia, some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed, during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In Xinjiang, copies of the Qur'an and other books of the Uyghur people were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies. In the ethnic Korean areas of northeast China, clashes took place.

In Yunnan Province, the palace of the Dai people's king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim Hui people at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the Shadian incident, reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975. After the Cultural Revolution, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.

Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". People's communes, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1966, removing Tibet's exemption from China's land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the 1959 Tibetan uprising. The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards. Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s.

Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture. An estimated 600,000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950, but by 1979, most were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared. The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization, however, the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed. Despite persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.

It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defenses. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors, notably with the Soviet Union and India.

Rape and sexual abuse

Further information: Sent-down youth § Sexual violence

Pan Suiming, Emily Honig, and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent-down women were common during the Cultural Revolution's height. Tania Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.

Cultural impact and influence

Red Guards riot

A 1968 map of Beijing showing streets and landmarks renamed during the Cultural Revolution. Andingmen Inner Street became "Great Leap Forward Road", Taijichang Street became the "Road for Eternal Revolution", Dongjiaominxiang was renamed "Anti-Imperialist Road", Beihai Park was renamed "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Park" and Jingshan Park became "Red Guard Park". Most of the Cultural Revolution-era name changes were later reversed.

The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News, which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.

The revolution aimed to eliminate cow demons and snake spirits - the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students, especially the Red Guards, denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents. Many died from ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the Down to the Countryside Movement so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Academics and intellectuals

Yao Tongbin, one of China's foremost missile scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused Zhou Enlai to order special protection for key technical experts.

Academics and intellectuals were regarded as the "Stinking Old Ninth" and were widely persecuted. Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the May Seventh Cadre School. The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Academics, scientists, and educators who died included Xiong Qinglai, Jian Bozan, Wu Han, Rao Yutai, Wu Dingliang, Yao Tongbin and Zhao Jiuzhang. As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among the members of the academy, 229 died. As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in Qinghai had been persecuted, while more than 310 were disabled, over 40 committed suicide, and 5 were executed.

Despite the hardships, some significant achievements came in science and technology: scientists tested the first missile, created China's first hydrogen bomb and launched China's first satellite in the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" program.

Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as barefoot doctors. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy.

Education system

In the early months of Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were closed. Secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the "Old Three Cohort (老三届)". Colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972. University entrance exams were cancelled after 1966 (until the beginning of Boluan Fanzheng period in 1977), replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units. Traditional values were abandoned. On the other hand, industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers, inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks advocating vocational education. Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers, and by 1976, there were 15,000 such 21 July Universities.

Meanwhile, in the initial stage of the Down to the Countryside Movement, most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government forced them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17 million urban youth left for the countryside. Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education. This generation is sometimes referred to as the "lost generation". In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights. Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s. Some counties in Zhanjiang had literacy rates as low as 59% 20 years after the revolution. This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on students to teach.

Primary and middle schools gradually reopened during the Cultural Revolution. Schooling years were reduced and education standard fell, but the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all, and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-thirds. Educational opportunities for rural children expanded, while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti-elitist policies. Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time. Rural infrastructure developed during this period, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals.

Slogans and rhetoric

A Red Guard holding up the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967

Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans. He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" (造反有理; zàofǎn yǒulǐ) affected many views.

The remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Revolution in Anhui

Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people's lives, printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables. Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan.

Political slogans had three sources: Mao, Party media such as People's Daily, and the Red Guards. Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards. These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in claiming loyalty to Mao. Red Guard slogans were violent, advancing themes such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."

Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the cultivation of a "refined and elegant literary style". This changed during the CR. These slogans were an effective method of "thought reform", mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."

Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring". To distance itself from the era, Deng's government cut back on political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, Jiang Zemin called the Cultural Revolution a "grave mistake".

Arts and literature

In 1966, Jiang Qing advanced the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line. Those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao (black line) should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts. Disseminators of the "old culture" would be eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and were persecuted, and subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they could be humiliated and ravaged, and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour. For instance, Mei Zhi and her husband were sent to a tea farm in Lushan County, Sichuan. She did not resume writing until the 1980s.

In 1970, the CCP came to view the Ministry of Culture as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the State Council in an effort to rein in cultural politics. The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature" became dogmatized. The literary situation eased after 1972, as more were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work. Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the Ministry of Culture. Many died: the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979. These include writers such as Lao She, Fu Lei, Deng Tuo, Baren, Li Guangtian, Yang Shuo and Zhao Shuli.

Opera and music

The ballet The Red Detachment of Women, one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution

Jiang took control of the stage and introduced revolutionary operas under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which modified Peking opera in both content and form, was promoted. Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years, most notably the opera The Legend of the Red Lantern. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire. Loyalty dances became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people. The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions. Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism. Their narratives begin with them oppressed by misogyny, class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP.

During the Cultural Revolution, composers of Yellow Music, which had already banned following the communist revolution, were persecuted, including Li Jinhui who was killed in 1967. Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "Ode to the Motherland", "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", "The East Is Red" and "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China" were either written or became popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it de facto supplanted "March of the Volunteers" (lyrics author Tian Han persecuted to death) as the national anthem of China, though the latter was later restored to its previous place. Moreover, "quotation songs", in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers, their primary distribution, as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976. "Rusticated youths" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968.

Visual arts

Posters from the Cultural Revolution period

Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as Feng Zikai, Shi Lu, and Pan Tianshou were persecuted. Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour. In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "Black Paintings".

Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people's leading source of information. They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party. The two main posters genres were the big-character poster or dazibao and commercial propaganda poster.

  • The dazibao presented slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. Mao wrote his own dazibao at Beijing University on 5 August 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters".
  • Xuanchuanhua, or propaganda paintings, were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a Socialist Realist visual style with specific conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".

Some scholar also argued that, before this period, relatively few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers, and during the revolution, the struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves. The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "newborn things" celebrated in a socialist society.

Film

The Four Hundred Films to be Criticized booklet was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned. These included many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friends. Those who died in the period included Cai Chusheng, Zheng Junli, Shangguan Yunzhu, Wang Ying, and Xu Lai. No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films. A notable example is Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films. Albanian films and North Korean films developed mass audiences in China. In 1972, Chinese officials invited Michelangelo Antonioni to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Antonioni made the documentary Chung Kuo, Cina. When it was released in 1974, CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as reactionary and anti-Chinese. Viewing art through the principles of the Yan'an Talks, particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art-for-art's-sake, party leadership construed Antonioni's aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film.

Mobile film units brought Chinese cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period, particularly including revolutionary model operas. During the Cultural Revolution's early years, mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades, which became known as "red treasure films". The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re-organization and expansion of China's film exhibition network. From 1965 to 1976, the number of film projection units in China quadrupled, total film audiences nearly tripled, and the national film attendance rate doubled. The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which, in its view, would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism.

Historical sites

Buddhist statues defaced during the Cultural Revolution

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking". Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or feudal ideas was destroyed. Few records relate how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale. Chinese historians compare the suppression to Qin Shi Huang's great Confucian purge. Religious persecution intensified during this period, as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.

The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On 14 May 1967, the Central Committee issued Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution. Despite this, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites, including the Temple of Heaven and Ming Tombs, showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed. Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were burnt.

Later archaeological excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the Terracotta Army and the Mawangdui, occurred after the peak of the Revolution. Nevertheless, the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology, the journal Kaogu, did not publish. After the most violent phase, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements.

Media

Further information: Media history of China

During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, freedom of the press in China was at its peak. While the number of newspapers declined in this period, the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew. According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965, to 49 in 1966, and then to a 20th-century low of 43 in 1967. At the same time, the number of publications by mass organizations such as Red Guards grew to an estimated number as high as 10,000.

Independent political groups could publish broadsheets and handbills, as well as leaders' speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified. From 1966 to 1969, at least 5,000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published. Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers, articles, speeches, and big-character posters. For example, the largest student organization in Shanghai, the Red Revolutionaries, established a newspaper that had a print run of 800,000 copies by the end of 1966.

Foreign relations

The Embassy of China, Jakarta after being burned

The functions of China's embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Mao stated that in foreign relations, China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little". Later that year, China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning.

However, the Sino-Soviet conflict culminated in 1969, and according to declassified documents from both China and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch a large-scale nuclear strike on China after the Zhenbao Island incident in 1969. The planned targets include Beijing, Changchun, Anshan and China's missile-launch centers of Jiuquan, Xichang and Lop Nur. This crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the Cuban missile crisis. Eventually, the Soviet called off the attack due to the intervention from the United States.

China exported communist revolutions as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in Southeast Asia, supporting parties in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and in particular, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (responsible for the Cambodian genocide). It is estimated that at least 90% of the Khmer Rouge's foreign aid came from China. In 1975 alone at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20 million came from China. China's economic malaise impacted China's ability to assist North Vietnam in its war against South Vietnam by the 1970s, which cooled relations between the once allied nations.

Evaluations

Main article: Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution

On 27 June 1981, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, an official assessment of major historical events since 1949. The Resolution declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic."

After the Cultural Revolution, a massive social and cultural movement known as the "New Enlightenment" took place in mainland China since the late 1970s. The movement lasted throughout the 1980s, and opposed the ideology of Cultural Revolution and feudalism. The New Enlightenment movement ended due to the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in June 1989. After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in early 1992, however, intellectuals in mainland China became divided and formed two major schools of thought, the Liberalism and the New Left, which held different views on the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile Maoist scholars hold another view.

To this day, public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited within mainland China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks abide by the "official view" of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified. Despite inroads by prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research is discouraged.

Mao Zedong's legacy remains in some dispute. During the anniversary of his birth, many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as "the people's great savior". Contemporary discussions in the CCP-owned tabloid Global Times continue to glorify Mao. Rather than focus on consequences, state media newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective". Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy". Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power, costing millions of lives then and during his rule.

See also

Notes

  1. This position, effectively China's de jure head of state, was renamed "President" in 1982.
  2. Some claim 1.877 million.

References

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Sources

Further reading

General

Library resources about
Cultural Revolution

Specific topics

  • Fox Butterfield. China: Alive in the Bitter Sea (New York: Crown, 1990). ISBN 0812918657 An oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution
  • Anit Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985).
  • Lingchei Letty Chen, The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years (New York: Cambria Press, 2020). Scholarly studies on memory writings and documentaries of the Mao years, victimhood narratives, perpetrator studies, ethics of bearing witness to atrocities
  • Jie Li and Enhua Zhang, eds., Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016). Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc.
  • Ross Terrill, The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). ISBN 0804729220
  • Xinran, The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices, translated by Esther Tyldesley. (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002). ISBN 0701173459

Commentaries

  • Guokai Liu, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution edited by Anita Chan. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).
  • Pierre Ryckmans, The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). ISBN 0850312086
  • —— Chinese Shadows (New York: Viking Press, 1977). ISBN 0670219185
  • —— Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). ISBN 0805280693
  • —— The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics (New York: Holt, 1985). ISBN 0030050634

Fictional treatments

Memoirs by Chinese participants

  • Guanlong Cao, The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
  • Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
  • Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove, 1987). ISBN 0394555481
  • Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1983).
  • Wenguang Huang, The Little Red Guard: A Family Memoir (New York: Riverhead Books, 2012).
  • Ji Xianlin, The Cowshed: Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, translated by Chenxin Jiang (New York: New York Review Books, 2016).
  • Kang Zhengguo, Confessions: An Innocent Life in Communist China, translated by Susan Wilf (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).
  • Ken Ling, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese, English text prepared by Miriam London and Ta-Ling Lee. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972).
  • Liu Ping, My Chinese Dream: From Red Guard to CEO (San Francisco: China Books, 2012). ISBN 978-0835100403
  • Ma Bo, Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, translated by Howard Goldblatt. (New York: Viking, 1995).
  • Anchee Min, Red Azalea (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). ISBN 1400096987
  • Nanchu, Red Sorrow (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012).
  • Emily Wu, Feather in the Storm (New York: Pantheon, 2006). ISBN 978-0375424281
  • Yang Jiang, Six Chapters from My Life "Downunder", translated by Howard Goldblatt. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
  • Rae Yang, Spider Eaters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
  • Ting-Xing Ye, A Leaf in the Bitter Wind (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1997).
  • Weili Ye and Xiaodong Ma, Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
  • Lijia Zhang, Socialism Is Great!: A Worker's Memoir of the New China (New York: Atlas & Co, 2007).

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